R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-1

Section 11-23-1 defines murder to include both degrees, so an indictment charging “murder” gives notice of first-degree murder.

State v. Jefferds · filed 1959-06-19

Consequently the term “murder” used in the indictment could only refer to the definition contained in §11-23-1. The defendant contends that the word “murder” standing alone refers only to what is now second degree murder. However, in our opinion the definition of the term “murder” used in the indictment embraces everything which is contained in the statutory section. The offense thus described includes each of the degrees prescribed by the statute.

Section 11-23-1 allows a murder indictment to encompass every statutory degree and theory without specifying them on its face.

State v. Lanigan · filed 1987-06-26

The definition of the term “murder” as used in Lani-gan’s indictment encompasses everything contained in § 11-23-1, and the state need not specify on the face of the indictment the degree or theory of murder.

Section 11-23-1 does not require an indictment to specify the degree of murder, and an indictment charging murder generally can support a first-degree murder conviction.

State v. Simpson · filed 1995-05-26

Pursuant to this provision, the degree of murder need not be specified in the indictment. Although this provision relates to the form of the indictment, we believe the inclusion of this language in the statute supports our finding that the prosecutor’s instruction was sufficient to inform the members of the grand jury of the elements of murder so as to enable them to make a determination concerning the existence of probable cause.

Section 11-23-1 permits a murder charge without specifying the degree of murder in the indictment.

Jackson v. State, 99-1037 (r.I.super. 6-25-2006) · filed 2007-06-25

The State is not required to particularize a murder charge; the murder statute states "the degree of murder may be charged in the indictment or information." R.I. Gen. Laws 1956 § 11-23-1 (emphasis added).

Section 11-23-1 treats a killing during an attempted robbery as first degree murder.

State v. Jefferson · filed 1976-03-10

The jury, however, found that Jefferson had killed DeFusco during the course of an attempted robbery which under G. L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §11-23-1 constitutes first degree murder. ... Viewing the reasonable inferences from both these facts and the scientific findings by the municipal and federal authorities in a light most favorable to the prosecution, there was ample evidence to enable the jury to find that Jefferson had murdered his landlord while attempting to rob him.

Section 11-23-1 allows a first-degree murder conviction based on a killing during robbery, but the underlying robbery merges with a felony murder conviction and cannot be separately punished.

State v. Innis · filed 1978-08-09

We therefore hold that defendant may not be convicted of both murder in the first degree under a felony murder theory and the underlying felony of robbery. Upon retrial, if defendant is convicted on the murder count under a felony murder theory, he may not be separately convicted and punished for the underlying robbery.

Section 11-23-1 permits separate convictions for premeditated first-degree murder and burglary when the murder conviction does not rest on a felony-murder theory and each offense requires proof of an element the other does not.

State v. Baton · filed 1985-02-26

In the case at bar, the jury had the right to separately consider the underlying charge because the state did not proceed under a felony-murder theory but proved premeditated deliberation. We find that the murder was not the result of the burglary, rather that the burglary was perpetrated in advancement of the premeditated murder. When there are separate elements in the crimes of burglary and first-degree murder that are not included in the other offense, the offenses do not merge and the trial justice, in the exercise of his discretion, is justified in imposing consecutive life sentences.

Section 11-23-1 makes a homicide committed during an enumerated felony first-degree murder without proof of premeditation or deliberation.

State v. Villani · filed 1985-04-11

In this jurisdiction the felony-murder theory, simply stated, is that any homicide committed while perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate any of the enumerated felonies is first-degree murder. Such a homicide acquires first-degree-murder status without the necessity of proving such elements as premeditation and deliberation.

Section 11-23-1 makes a homicide committed during an enumerated felony first-degree murder without requiring actual malice; rape qualifies even when the death is unintentional.

State v. Washington · filed 1990-11-02

We do not find that these circumstances warrant our construing § 11-23-1 contrary to clear legislative intent. ... First, the statute, in defining murder, does not require that the "malice aforethought" be actual. Therefore, defendant must concede that inferred or imputed malice may also fall within the definition. ... The underlying felony of rape clearly fits within the statute.

Section 11-23-1 classifies murder committed during arson as first-degree murder.

State v. Garcia · filed 2000-01-26

Finally, we hold that the trial justice did not err in imposing sentences of life without parole upon defendant for having participated in the murder of two of the youngest children among his six victims. Pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 11-23-1, "[e]very murder * * * committed in the perpetration of * * * any arson * * * is murder in the first degree."

Section 11-23-1 requires no proof of specific intent to kill or rape for felony murder based on rape, so diminished capacity cannot defeat that charge.

Washington v. State, 98-1623 (r.I.super. 2005) · filed 2005-07-18

Murder that is not based on a death resulting from a felony depends on proof of a specific intent to kill that can be negated by evidence of diminished capacity, whereas felony murder (in this case based on the underlying felony of rape) requires no proof of specific intent to kill or rape that could be so negated.

Section 11-23-1 makes felony murder a general-intent crime that does not require a specific intent to kill, so diminished capacity cannot defeat the charge by negating that intent.

Washington v. State · filed 2010-02-25

The applicant was charged under G.L.1956 § 11-23-1 with the general-intent crime of felony murder. ... The crime of felony murder does not require "proof of the specific intent to kill or to cause great bodily harm." State v. Amazeen, 526 A.2d 1268, 1271 (R.I.1987). ... Accordingly, the defense is available only for crimes of specific intent.

Section 11-23-1 allows attempted robbery to serve as the underlying felony for first-degree felony murder.

Jefferson v. State · filed 1984-03-02

It is clear from a reading ... of the statute that the attempt to commit any of the enumerated felonies may serve as a distinct underlying felony for invoking the felony-murder rule.

Section 11-23-1 does not make possession of drugs with intent to deliver a predicate offense for first-degree felony murder.

State v. Oliveira · filed 2005-08-05

This Court is bound by the Legislature’s choice not to include “possession with intent to deliver” as one of the enumerated predicate offenses for first-degree felony murder.

Section 11-23-1 allows a drug-distribution crime to serve as the predicate felony for felony murder.

Torres v. State · filed 2011-05-19

However, it is without legitimate debate that, in Rhode Island, drug-distribution crimes can form the predicate felony for a felony murder charge.

Section 11-23-1 defines murder to require an unlawful killing, so once a defendant introduces some evidence of self-defense, the prosecution must disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

In Re Doe · filed 1978-08-17

The defense of self-defense, then, necessarily refutes and element of the crime of murder, as defined by §11-23-1. In this situation both Mullaney and Patterson indicate that the prosecution must negate the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we hold that once the defendant introduces some evidence of self-defense, the burden of persuasion is on the prosecution to negate that defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 11-23-1 requires an unlawful killing for murder, and evidence of self-defense contests that element.

State v. Pule · filed 1982-12-21

Further, the assertion of self-defense refutes the element of “unlawfulness” necessary for murder in this state.

Section 11-23-1’s premeditation element can coexist with legal insanity under the M’Naghten test.

State v. Arpin · filed 1980-02-07

We conclude, therefore, that a careful analysis of the elements of the Rhode Island murder statute and the M’Naghten test for legal insanity does not support defendant’s argument that legal insanity and the criminal intent for murder cannot coexist at the time of the commission of a homicide.

Section 11-23-1 permits a jury to find a defendant charged with murder guilty of a lesser included offense, including assault with a dangerous weapon when the facts support it.

State v. Cipriano · filed 1981-06-16

In the present case we are of the opinion that defendant had notice under G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §§ 11-23-1 and 12-17-14 that the jury could find him guilty of a lesser offense to murder. In the review of the facts of this case, a conviction of assault with a dangerous weapon was possible. Here, the charge of assault with a dangerous weapon was included within, but not congruent with the murder charge.

Section 11-23-1 permits a jury to find a lesser degree of murder or a lesser included offense if the state has not proved the charged offense.

State v. Tarvis · filed 1983-08-30

The murder statute empowers the jury to utilize the provisions of § 12-17-14 to find a defendant guilty of a lesser degree of murder or any lesser included offense if the jurors find that the state has not demonstrated that defendants committed the charged offense.

First-degree murder requires malice aforethought, and manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder.

State v. DePina · filed 2002-12-03

As such, first-degree murder requires proof of a fact that manslaughter does not require, specifically, malice aforethought. But, manslaughter does not require proof of a fact that first-degree murder does not require. Therefore, manslaughter is a lesser-ineluded offense of first-degree murder.

Section 11-23-1 requires the state to prove malice aforethought to convict a defendant of first or second degree murder.

State v. Hockenhull · filed 1987-05-27

In order to convict a defendant of first or second degree murder, the state must prove that the defendant acted with malice aforethought. G.L.1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 11-23-1.

Section 11-23-1 requires malice aforethought for murder; without evidence disputing malice, a voluntary manslaughter instruction is unwarranted.

State v. Ruffner · filed 2006-12-15

The distinguishing element between voluntary manslaughter and murder is the presence vel non of malice aforethought. Murder, both first and second degree, is “[t]he unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.” G.L.1956 § 11-23-1. ... Thus there is no actual and adequate dispute about the distinguishing element between the lesser and greater crimes, ie., malice aforethought, and the trial justice did not commit reversible error by declining to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter.

Section 11-23-1 requires express or implied malice for murder; mere recklessness does not suffice unless it rises to malice.

People Ex Rel. Daley v. Strayhorn · filed 1988-03-23

Accordingly, we reject the respondent’s assertion that mere recklessness which does not rise to either express or implied malice is sufficient to support a murder conviction in Rhode Island. We hold that section 11 — 23 — 1 of Rhode Island’s General Laws is substantially similar to section 9 — 1 of the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961 for purposes of the multiple-murder aggravating factor in subsection 9 — 1(b)(3).

Malice for murder may be inferred from a disparity in size or strength between adults; the inference is not limited to killings of children or elderly people.

State v. Payette · filed 2012-03-14

Although it is true that many cases relying on this principle do involve children or elderly victims, this Court has never limited this legal doctrine to such victims, nor are we constrained to do so today.

Section 11-23-1 requires malice aforethought for murder; evidence of adequate provocation or sudden heat of passion can support an instruction on the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter.

State v. Xaykosy · filed 2026-03-18

In Ruffner, this Court recognized that the element of malice aforethought is the distinguishing factor between voluntary manslaughter and murder. See Ruffner, 911 A.2d at 686. “Murder, both first and second degree, is ‘the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.’” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting G.L. 1956 § 11-23-1). ... Therefore, it is our view that the trial justice did not err when he determined that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of adequate provocation or sudden heat of passion.

Evidence that could negate the malice required for second-degree murder may warrant an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.

State v. Esdel · filed 2024-07-15

In refusing to instruct on the lesser-included offense, the trial justice abused his discretion and committed reversible error. The record before us contains more than minimal evidence, which, if credited by the jury, could have supported a conviction for voluntary manslaughter.

Section 11-23-1 makes willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killings, as well as felony murders, first-degree murder; all other murders are second-degree murder.

State v. Amazeen · filed 1987-06-02

Willful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated killings (as well as those falling within the parameters of the felony-murder rule) are murder in the first degree. All other murders are murder in the second degree. Section 11-23-1.

Section 11-23-1 defines murder as an unlawful killing with malice aforethought and classifies murder outside the first degree as second-degree murder.

State v. Brown · filed 2006-05-09

The General Assembly has defined the crime of murder as the “unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.” G.L.1956 § 11-23-1. ... All other murder is second-degree murder. Section 11-23-1.

Section 11-23-1 requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a first-degree murder was committed with malice aforethought, willfully, deliberately, maliciously, and with premeditation.

State v. Diaz · filed 1995-02-20

Thus, in order to prove first degree murder, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant, with malice aforethought, caused the death of another person willfully, deliberately, maliciously, and with premeditation.

Section 11-23-1 classifies willful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated killings, as well as killings covered by its felony murder rule, as first-degree murder.

State v. Edwards, P1/99-4284a (2001) · filed 2001-02-06

The statute provides that any kind of "willful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated killing," as well as those falling within the expressed parameters of the felony murder rule, is murder in the first degree.

Section 11-23-1 defines murder as an unlawful killing with malice aforethought; first-degree murder requires a willful, deliberate, premeditated killing.

State v. Garcia · filed 2005-10-21

The crime of murder is defined by G.L.1956 § 11-23-1 as “[t]he unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.” First-degree murder is a willful, deliberate, premeditated killing of a human being with malice aforethought.

Section 11-23-1 requires proof that the accused intended to kill, considered that intent for an appreciable length of time, and then engaged in homicidal conduct to establish first-degree murder.

State v. Ros · filed 2009-07-01

In order to prove first-degree murder, the state must show that the accused formed an intent to kill, thought about or deliberated on that intent to kill for some appreciable length of time (premeditation), and then engaged in homicidal conduct.

Section 11-23-1 distinguishes first-degree from second-degree murder by the extent of premeditation; several hours of premeditation did not warrant a second-degree murder instruction.

Tarvis v. Moran · filed 1988-12-22

The record in this case clearly reveals that Tarvis premeditated the murder of Bruce Ottiano for several hours prior to the fatal shooting of Mary Wendolowski. ... Thus he was not entitled to a second-degree-murder instruction.

A second-degree murder charge under § 11-23-1 may proceed on theories of momentary premeditation, wanton recklessness, and felony murder.

State v. Iovino · filed 1989-03-07

It is our conclusion that the charge of second-degree murder was reinstated without limitation. Therefore, we hold that the state may properly proceed with its prosecution on all three theories of second-degree murder.

Section 11-23-1 distinguishes first-degree murder from second-degree murder by premeditation; a second-degree murder instruction requires some evidence that the defendant acted without premeditation.

State v. Figueras · filed 1994-07-07

First-degree murder is defined by G.L.1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 11-23-1, as amended by P.L.1990, ch. 284, § 4, as “[t]he unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.” ... In order to have been entitled to a jury charge on second-degree, there must have been minimal evidence produced tending to show that defendant did not act with premeditation.

Section 11-23-1 requires an intentional killing for second-degree murder, but the intent may be formed only momentarily.

State v. Banach · filed 1994-10-27

Under the statute, murder in the second degree requires an intentional killing, though the formation of the intent need only be momentary.

Section 11-23-1 permits an unlisted felony to support second-degree murder if the felony was inherently dangerous in the manner it was committed.

State v. Stewart · filed 1995-08-11

To serve as a predicate felony to a charge of second-degree murder, a felony that is not specifically enumerated in § 11-23-1 must therefore be an inherently dangerous felony.

Section 11-23-1 distinguishes first-degree murder from second-degree murder by requiring more than momentary premeditation and deliberation for first-degree murder; a second-degree instruction is unnecessary when the evidence cannot support it.

State v. Campbell · filed 1997-03-20

Our review of DuVally’s testimony has led us to the ineluctable conclusion that Cruz was viciously murdered in a manner that demonstrated more than momentary intent. Furthermore, we have gleaned no evidence in the record before us that has suggested that the defendant did not act with premeditation of more than a momentary duration. Because there was no evidence upon which a second-degree-murder conviction could rest, the defendant was not entitled to the requested instruction. Consequently, we hold that the trial justice properly refused to instruct the jury on second-degree murder.

Section 11-23-1 does not require premeditation for second degree murder; in an intent-to-kill prosecution, the State must prove an intent to kill that lasted at least a moment.

State v. Gillespie, P1/99-1304a (r.I.super. 2006) · filed 2006-06-30

The fact that this Court omitted the term premeditation in defining second degree murder is not error because the term is absent from the statutory definition of second degree murder and is unnecessary when supplanted by the requirement that the State prove a conscious intent to kill of at least momentary duration.

Section 11-23-1 requires malice aforethought, but not premeditation, for second-degree murder.

State v. Gillespie · filed 2008-12-03

Because § 11-23-1 defines first-degree murder as a “willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing,” and second-degree murder as “[a]ny other murder,” it necessarily follows that second-degree murder does not encompass “willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated” killings. Rather, the only requirement for a killing to qualify as second-degree murder is that it be committed with malice aforethought.

Section 11-23-1 does not require proof that a second-degree murder was committed by any particular method or instrumentality.

State v. Pineda · filed 2011-03-02

Unlike Pineda, the defendant in Butler, 107 R.I. at 493-95, 268 A.2d at 435-36, advanced a self-defense theory that had the possibility of excusing the underlying charge, murder in the second degree, which does not require the commission of the killing to be proven by any particular method or instrumentality.

For second-degree felony murder under § 11-23-1, the factfinder decides whether the underlying felony was inherently dangerous and could serve as the predicate felony.

State v. Patino · filed 2018-06-29

If the factfinder determines that a defendant committed an inherently dangerous felony, then that felony may serve as the predicate felony for second-degree felony murder.

Section 11-23-1 defines first-degree murder to include a killing committed with a premeditated design, and the evidence supported a finding of premeditation here.

State v. Smith · filed 2001-02-08

First-degree murder is defined as “murder * * * perpetrated from a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being * * * ” G.L.1956 § 11-23-1. ... In respect to the finding that the murder was premeditated, the evidence is again overwhelmingly supportive of this finding.

Section 11-23-1 requires premeditation lasting more than a mere moment for first-degree murder.

State v. Rodriguez · filed 2003-05-14

Thus, for first-degree murder to exist, premeditation must have existed for more than just a mere moment.

First-degree murder requires an intent to kill formed more than momentarily before the killing.

State v. Texieira · filed 2008-04-03

The premeditation required for first-degree murder requires the formation of “an intent to kill for a period more than momentarily prior to the killing itself.”

Section 11-23-1 permits a first-degree murder conviction when evidence of planning before the killing supports premeditation.

State v. Greenslit · filed 2016-03-11

However, the trial justice looked not only to the content of the conversation, but also the timing of the phone call as evidence that he had planned the murder with premeditation. Accordingly, it is our view that the trial justice did not err when she determined that the evidence was adequate to support a conviction for first-degree murder.

Section 11-23-1 permits a first-degree murder conviction when circumstantial evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant killed with premeditation and malice aforethought.

State v. Otero · filed 2002-01-24

As a whole, the facts and testimony presented in this case provided sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the jury’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant brought an unlicensed gun to the bar and killed Lara with premeditation and malice aforethought.

Section 11-23-1 requires jurors to agree unanimously that a defendant unlawfully killed a person with malice aforethought, but not on whether the defendant acted as a principal, aider and abettor, or coconspirator.

State v. Delestre · filed 2012-01-12

In the instant case, the burden was at all times on the prosecution to prove the presence of the elements set forth in the statute defining murder — viz., (1) that there was an unlawful killing of a human being and (2) that it was done with “malice aforethought.” See § 11-23-1. It follows that unanimity was required only as to those “bottom line” elements, not as to whether defendant was acting as a principal, as an aider and abettor, or as a coconspirator. See Schad, 501 U.S. at 631-32, 111 S.Ct. 2491.

Section 11-23-1 remains valid even though the penalty for murder appears in the next statutory section.

In re Petitions for Writ of Certiorari Seeking Review of Denials of Applications for Postconviction Relief · filed 2019-11-19

Rather, each is part of a clear statutory scheme in which the prohibited conduct is plainly laid out in one section of a chapter in our general laws, and the penalty is set forth in the subsequent section. We reject petitioners’ arguments that this arrangement somehow renders the statutes without legal force and effect.