R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7

Section 15-7-7 did not permit adoption without the mother's consent where her conduct did not clearly and convincingly establish willful desertion and she arranged and monitored the child's financial support.

Gillis v. Main · filed 1963-03-25

In our judgment, however, the circumstances of the instant case are not such as to show by clear and convincing evidence that the conduct of respondent amounted to willful desertion. ... In our judgment this contention is unassailable. Not only did respondent make provision for the direct payment of financial support to petitioners but, it is conceded by all parties, she made periodic inquiries to assure herself that the child’s financial requirements were not neglected.

Section 15-7-7 considers a parent's earning ability and attendant circumstances, as well as income and assets, when determining financial ability to support a child.

In re Robert J. · filed 1974-10-17

We do not agree, but rather hold that in interpreting the words “financially able,” the proper test is a consideration of the actual income, property, assets and earning ability as well as other attendant circumstances.

Section 15-7-7 measures a parent's failure to provide care and maintenance during the year immediately before the adoption petition is filed.

In Re Gregory · filed 1977-05-02

We therefore hold that §15-7-7 should be strictly construed and literally applied, and that the year in question must relate to the year immediately preceding the filing of the petition of adoption which in the instant case is the period April 17, 1974 to April 17, 1975.

Section 15-7-7 permits adoption only when a child’s integration into the natural parents’ home is improbable in the foreseeable future.

In Re Joseph J. · filed 1983-08-23

The foster parents’ contention that G.L.1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 15-7-7 provides them with standing to adopt is also without merit. That section provides that adoption should be permitted only if the integration of the child into the home of the natural parents is improbable in the foreseeable future. In this case, reunification was not improbable, but was, in fact, imminent and did actually occur.

Section 15-7-7(1)(a) requires courts assessing proper care and maintenance to consider more than child-support payments, including the parent's personal care, attention, and other support.

In re Oscar C. · filed 1991-11-01(1)(a)

The nonpayment of child support was only one of many pieces of evidence that could have been considered in determining neglect. There was an abundance of testimony relating to “kindness” and “attention,” and, in fact, other evidence of financial support. In this instance, justice requires a broader interpretation of the term “proper care and maintenance” than the narrowly focused one afforded it by the trial justice.

Section 15-7-7 requires an agency seeking termination for permanent neglect to make continuing efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship.

In Re LaFreniere · filed 1980-10-03

The obligation of CWS to foster the parental relationship is of a continuing nature-it may not merely be contemporaneous with the failure of the parents to maintain contact with and plan for the future of their children. We therefore hold that by discouraging family visits during the years the children were living in foster homes, CWS did not comply with the requirements of § 15-7-7 to strengthen the parental relationship and is thus precluded from seeking to terminate the rights of the LaFrenieres on the ground of permanent neglect.

Section 15-7-7 requires clear and convincing proof that the department made efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship before parental rights may be terminated.

In Re Kenneth · filed 1982-01-14

Section 15-7-7 requires as a condition precedent to termination of parental rights that the department prove by clear and convincing evidence that, regardless of the parent’s behavior, the department made efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship.

Section 15-7-7 requires reasonable efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship under all six grounds for termination, judged under the totality of the circumstances.

In Re William, Susan, and Joseph · filed 1982-08-06

When the General Assembly amended § 15-7-7 in its January 1980 session, P.L. 1980, ch. 364, § 1, it extended the “reasonable efforts” requirement previously found only in the permanent-neglect provision to actions brought under any of the six grounds for termination. ... An informed evaluation of DCF’s efforts to strengthen the bond between the parents and the child can best be achieved through a “totality of the circumstances” approach.

Section 15-7-7(c) requires the state to prove reasonable efforts to reunite the family and that return of a child in agency care for six months is improbable because of conditions unlikely to change.

In Re Kristina L. · filed 1987-02-05(c)

Stated simply, G.L.1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 15-7-7(c), as amended by P.L. 1984, ch. 204, § 3 requires the state to prove, after the child has been in the care of a child-placement agency for six months, that it made reasonable efforts to reunite the family and that it is improbable in the foreseeable future that the child will be returned to the home owing to conduct or conditions unlikely to change.

Section 15-7-7(b)(1) requires DCYF to make reasonable efforts to reunify a family before the Family Court may grant a petition to terminate parental rights.

In Re Nathan F. · filed 2000-12-11(b)(1)

Under § 15-7-7(b)(1), DCYF was required to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family before the Family Court could grant the termination petition.

Section 15-7-7(a)(3) requires the agency to make reasonable efforts to provide services designed to correct the situation that led to the child’s placement.

In Re Christopher B. · filed 2003-05-30(a)(3)

Further, in light of this holding that DCYF must employ reasonable efforts at reunification before petitioning for termination under § 15-7-7(a)(3), the services offered or received must be designed to address or correct the situation that led to the child or children’s placement in DCYF care or custody.

Section 15-7-7(b)(1) requires DCYF to make reasonable efforts to strengthen the parental relationship so the child can safely return home.

In Re Kayla N. · filed 2006-06-30(b)(1)

The respondents are correct that, pursuant to § 15-7-7(b)(1), DCYF was required to make reasonable efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship so that Kayla could safely return to the family.

Section 15-7-7 requires DCYF to offer services addressing the reasons for a child’s removal and to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family before parental rights are terminated.

In Re Diamond Y. · filed 2007-02-27(a)(3), (b)(1)

In our opinion, the hearing justice’s finding that DCYF made reasonable efforts at reunification, as required by the statute, was supported by the record, and was not clearly wrong.

Section 15-7-7(a)(3) requires DCYF to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts to reunify the family before seeking termination of parental rights; those efforts must address the barriers to reunification.

In Re Natalya C. · filed 2008-04-30(a)(3)

In our opinion, the trial justice erred when she terminated Stephanie’s parental rights under § 15-7-7(a)(3) and (a)(2)(iii) because we conclude that DCYF did not prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that it made reasonable efforts to achieve reunification between Stephanie and Natalya before it filed the TPR petition.

Section 15-7-7(a)(3) requires the agency to make reasonable efforts to strengthen the parental relationship before seeking termination; parental unfitness alone is insufficient.

In Re Brianna D. · filed 2002-06-03(a)(3)

However, a finding of parental unfitness is insufficient unless the agency can also establish that, “pursuant to § 15-7-7(a)(3), [the agency made] reasonable efforts to strengthen the parental relationship until a termination petition is filed pursuant to § 15-7-7(b)(2).” ... We are satisfied that the trial justice was neither clearly wrong nor did he overlook or misconceive material evidence when he concluded that DCYF had made reasonable efforts to reunify respondent and her child and that mother was simply unable to comply with these numerous case plans.

Section 15-7-7 requires DCYF to make reasonable efforts toward reunification before parental rights may be terminated under either subsection (a)(3) or (a)(2)(iii).

In re Steven D. · filed 2014-06-27

Whether a petition to terminate rights is based on grounds enumerated in § 15-7- 7(a)(3)—that the child was unlikely to return to the parent’s care within a reasonable period—or § 15-7-7(a)(2)(iii)—that a parent is unfit by reason of conduct or conditions seriously detrimental to the child, such as chronic substance abuse—reasonable efforts toward reunification must be made by DCYF before parental rights may be terminated.

Section 15-7-7 requires DCYF to prove reasonable efforts to reunify parent and child by clear and convincing evidence before parental rights may be terminated.

In re Jah-nell B. · filed 2015-06-17(a)(3)

When a petition to terminate parental rights is filed pursuant to § 15-7-7, and before a parent’s rights can be terminated, “DCYF must prove by ‘clear and convincing evidence that regardless of the parent’s behavior, [DCYF] has made reasonable efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship’ * * *.” ... Therefore, we are convinced that the record supports the trial justice’s finding that DCYF provided reasonable efforts at reunification, and that, notwithstanding such efforts, there was not a reasonable probability that Jah-nell would be able to be reunified within a reasonable period of time.

Section 15-7-7(a)(3) requires DCYF to make reasonable efforts to reunify a child with a parent before parental rights may be terminated.

In re Gelvin B. · filed 2021-05-26(a)(3)

Although DCYF certainly did not engage in “extraordinary efforts,” the trial justice’s finding that DCYF engaged in “reasonable efforts” to reunify mother and Gelvin is likewise supported by legally competent evidence.

Section 15-7-7(b)(1) requires DCYF to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts to strengthen the parental relationship so the child can safely return home.

In re Rachelle L-B. · filed 2022-05-27(b)(1)

In addition, DCYF must prove by clear and convincing evidence that it made “reasonable efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship so that the child may safely return to the family.” In re Jose Luis R.H., 968 A.2d 875, 882 (R.I. 2009); see § 15-7-7(b)(1). ... Based on the foregoing, we are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial justice’s finding that respondent was unfit given his failure to engage in the services provided by DCYF, and that DCYF made reasonable efforts at reunification.

Section 15-7-7(a)(2)(vii) requires DCYF to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts to strengthen the parental relationship before parental rights may be terminated.

In re N.O.; In re K.O. · filed 2025-06-17(a)(2)(vii)

Although we acknowledge that Matthew deeply cares for his children, it is nevertheless our opinion that the trial justice appropriately found that DCYF made sufficient reasonable efforts to reunify him with his children.

Section 15-7-7(a)(3) requires DCYF to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it offered reasonable services to address the circumstances that led to a child’s removal.

In re Jae&39La G., In re Jae&39Ona G., In re Jae&39Ona G., In re Jae&39La G. · filed 2022-06-17(a)(3)

“Section 15-7-7(a)(3) ‘mandates that DCYF establish by clear and convincing evidence that it offered services that amount to a reasonable effort to correct the situation that led to the child[ren]’s removal from the parent’s care.’” In re Gelvin B., 251 A.3d 503, 510 (R.I. 2021) (quoting In re Violet G., 212 A.3d at 167).

Section 15-7-7(b)(2) does not require DCF to make reunification efforts before seeking termination for cruel or abusive conduct toward any child.

In Re Frances · filed 1986-03-18(b)(2)

It is argued that an inconsistency exists between the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 and § 15-7-7(b)(2), which does not require reasonable efforts to be made by DCF for reunification before filing a termination petition when a parent is unfit because of cruel or abusive conduct toward any child or because of conditions surrounding the child that are cruel or abusive. We find no inconsistency because the case plan required by federal guidelines before a termination petition is filed can be a plan for permanent placement of the child when reunification is either inappropriate or impossible. The mother’s position on this issue has no merit.

Section 15-7-7 does not require an agency to make reasonable reunification efforts when it seeks termination for cruel and abusive parental conduct under subsection (1)(b)(ii).

In Re Jean Marie W. · filed 1989-06-01(2)(a)

Under § 15-7-7(2)(a) any agency filing a termination petition pursuant to subsections (l)(a), (l)(b)(i), or (l)(b)(iii) must show that it made reasonable efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship. However, no such condition exists for petitions filed under subsection l(b)(ii).

Section 15-7-7(b)(1) does not require reunification efforts when termination is based on cruel and abusive parental conduct.

In Re Nicole B. · filed 1997-12-08(b)(1)

The Legislature’s cognizance of this fundamental difference is manifest in its decision to exempt the “cruel and abusive” basis for termination from the so-called reasonable-efforts requirement of § 15-7-7(b)(1).

When abandonment is alleged under § 15-7-7(a)(4), DCYF has no obligation to make reasonable efforts to preserve or reunify the family.

In Re Cody F. · filed 2001-02-16(a)(4)

We deem respondent’s assertion that DCYF failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify him with his child to be without merit. This Court recently held that in cases where abandonment is alleged pursuant to § 15-7-7(a)(4), “the department has no obligation to engage in reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify a family.”

Section 15-7-7(b)(1) does not require DCYF to attempt reunification when parental rights are terminated for cruel or abusive conduct under subsection (a)(2)(ii).

In Re Peter S. · filed 2009-06-19(b)(1)

Because respondent’s rights were terminated pursuant to § 15 — 7—7(a)(2)(ii), DCYF was under no obligation to attempt reunification.

When a petition seeks to terminate parental rights for abandonment under subsection (a)(4), DCYF has no obligation to make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family.

In Re Devone S. · filed 2001-05-30(b)(1)

Further, we have repeatedly stated that in abandonment situations, pursuant to § 15 — 7—7 (b)(1), “in the event that a petition to terminate parental rights is filed pursuant to § 15-7-7(a)(4), ‘the department has no obligation to engage in reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify a family.’ ”

Section 15-7-7(b)(1) does not require DCYF to make reasonable efforts to reunify a family when it seeks termination for abandonment under subsection (a)(4).

In Re Daniel D. · filed 2010-12-09(b)(1)

However, in a petition for termination of parental rights filed under § 15-7-7(a)(4), as here, DCYF “has no obligation to engage in reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify a family.”

Section 15-7-7’s reasonable efforts requirement can be satisfied through counseling, parenting classes, and psychological evaluation and treatment.

In Re Frederick · filed 1988-07-18

The evidence was clear and convincing that DCF had made reasonable efforts to strengthen the parental relationship. ... The DCF’s efforts to strengthen and encourage the parental relationship also included counseling, parental-skills classes, and psychological testing, evaluation, and treatment.

Section 15-7-7(2)(a)’s reasonable-efforts requirement depends on the particular facts and circumstances of the case.

In Re Antonio G. · filed 1995-06-08(2)(a)

Furthermore, “reasonable efforts” is a subjective term defined by the particular facts and circumstances of the case.

Section 15-7-7 requires DCF to make reasonable efforts to reunite the family; evidence of increased visitation and an individualized reunification program was sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss.

In Re Lori D. · filed 1986-06-06

Although increased visitation rights and the creation of an individualized, novel eight-week program may in the final analysis be deemed insufficient in light of DCF’s statutory duty to make reasonable efforts to reunite this family, we find that the aforementioned efforts, when viewed in the light most favorable to DCF, constitute evidence that is sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss.

Section 15-7-7 requires reasonable efforts to reunify parent and child; those efforts are assessed in light of the parent's conduct and cooperation.

In Re Ryan S. · filed 1999-04-28(a)(3)

Despite her assertions to the contrary, the evidence adduced at trial established that DCYF’s efforts to reunify mother and son were reasonable and substantial, and the trial justice properly so found.

Section 15-7-7(a)(3) evaluates reasonable reunification efforts case by case, taking the parents’ conduct and cooperation into account.

In re Lara F. · filed 2000-05-24(a)(3)

We have held that' “reasonable efforts” under § 15-7-7(a)(3) “is a subjective standard subject to a case-by-case analysis, taking into account, among other things, the conduct and cooperation of the parents.” In re Nicole B., 703 A.2d 612, 618 (R.I.1997). ... For these reasons, we are satisfied that the trial justice was not clearly wrong, nor did he misconceive or overlook material evidence, when he determined that DCYF made reasonable efforts to reunify these parents and to prevent or eliminate the need for removing the children from the home.

Section 15-7-7(b)(1)'s reasonable efforts standard was satisfied by DCYF's repeated case plans and reunification services, despite the parents' lack of compliance.

In re Michael B. · filed 2002-04-19(b)(1)

The sole issue raised on appeal was whether (DCYF) made “reasonable efforts” to reunify Michael with his parents, as required by § 15-7-7(b)(l). ... We are of the opinion that the record in this case amply supported the trial justice’s findings, including his finding that DCYF made “reasonable efforts” to reunify Michael with his parents.

Section 15-7-7(b)(1) requires DCYF to offer services addressing a primary barrier to reunification, even when a parent denies the problem.

In re Steven D. · filed 2011-06-29(b)(1)

Even if, as DCYF contends, Kathleen was in denial as to whether she had a substance abuse problem and may have provided inaccurate information regarding her use of alcohol to evaluators, it is nevertheless clear to us that, if DCYF continued to believe that alcohol abuse was a primary barrier to reunification, then it was required at the very least to offer services to her so as to attempt to help her overcome her denial.

Section 15-7-7(b)(1) requires DCYF to make reasonable efforts to strengthen the parental relationship before parental rights are terminated.

In re Lyric P. · filed 2014-05-16(b)(1)

Given the evidence of DCYF’s actions, this Court cannot conclude that the trial justice clearly erred in finding that the department had met its burden to make reasonable efforts under § 15-7-7(b)(1).

Section 15-7-7(b)(1) requires reasonable efforts to reunify a family; case planning and opportunities for visits can satisfy that requirement when a parent refuses further services.

In re Max M. · filed 2015-06-04(b)(1)

Accordingly, there is sufficient evidentiary support for the trial justice’s finding that DCYF had satisfactorily engaged in the efforts required by our precedent, including case planning and providing the opportunity for visits between parent and child.

Section 15-7-7(a)(3) requires DCYF to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it offered services amounting to a reasonable effort to correct the circumstances that led to a child’s removal; extraordinary efforts are unnecessary.

In re Briann A.T. · filed 2016-10-18(a)(3)

In addition, pursuant to § 15-7-7(a)(3), DCYF must establish by clear and convincing evidence that it “offered services that amount to a reasonable effort to correct the situation that led to the children’s removal from the parent’s care.” ... Under no circumstance have we enlarged these requirements to a point where DCYF need demonstrate that it took “extraordinary efforts.”

Section 15-7-7(a)(3) requires DCYF to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it offered services amounting to a reasonable effort to correct the circumstances that led to a child’s removal.

In re Violet G. · filed 2019-06-19(a)(3)

In addition, § 15-7-7(a)(3) mandates that DCYF establish by clear and convincing evidence that it offered “services that amount to a reasonable effort to correct the situation that led to the [child’s] removal” from the parent’s care. ... After reviewing the record, we are of the opinion that the Family Court justice correctly concluded that DCYF complied with its statutory obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunify respondent with Violet.

Section 15-7-7(a)(3)’s reasonable-efforts requirement can be satisfied when DCYF offers services and reunification assistance despite the parents’ refusal to cooperate.

In re Nolan V-S. · filed 2022-06-15(a)(3)

We hold that the record of this case demonstrates that DCYF made reasonable efforts to reunify Brittaney and Elias with Nolan, sufficient to satisfy its statutory burden.

Mental health treatment a parent receives during hospitalization can satisfy the requirement that the parent receive services to correct the condition that led to the child’s placement.

In re R.M. · filed 2023-06-30(a)(3)

Therefore, because it is undisputed that Esmeralda received mental health treatment during the time when she was committed to Eleanor Slater Hospital, we are satisfied that DCYF met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Esmeralda “received services to correct the situation that led to [R.M.] being placed” in its custody. Section 15-7-7(a)(3).

Section 15-7-7 requires DCYF to make reasonable efforts to reunify a parent and child, assessed in light of the circumstances of each case.

In re Manuel P., In re Angel P., In re Isaiah M., In re Victoria M. · filed 2021-06-17(b)(1)

Therefore, we conclude that the trial justice did not err when he found by clear and convincing evidence that DCYF made reasonable efforts to address the underlying issues that led to the termination of respondent’s parental rights.

Section 15-7-7(a)(3) requires reasonable reunification efforts, assessed in light of the parent's conduct and cooperation.

In re R.M. · filed 2023-06-02(a)(3)

Thus, taking into account that it was ultimately respondent’s own criminal conduct that interrupted his visitations with R.M. and his refusal to meaningfully cooperate with DCYF, we decline to disrupt the trial justice’s finding that DCYF’s efforts were reasonable under the circumstances.

Section 15-7-7 does not require an adoption petition to be filed before an agency’s petition to terminate parental rights is considered.

In Re David · filed 1981-03-17

A reading of the statute as a whole does not lend itself by strict construction or otherwise to the interpretation that a petition for adoption must be filed prior to consideration of the petition to terminate parental rights.

Section 15-7-7(c) permits the court to consider events occurring after a petition to terminate parental rights is filed.

In re Ann Marie · filed 1986-02-04(c)

Premised upon our interpretation of the statute and the above language, as set forth, it is clearly evident that the evidentiary scope of the trial court’s inquiry in parental termination proceedings under § 15-7-7(c) is not limited to events occurring prior to the petition’s filing.

Section 15-7-7 allows a court to decide each parent's termination petition on its own merits, even if only one parent's rights are terminated.

In Re Amanda C. · filed 1997-02-11

To be sure, one purpose of § 15-7-7 is to make the child available for adoption. ... And a trial justice presented with termination-of-parental-rights petitions involving both parents need not either grant or deny the petitions in tandem. Rather, the trial justice should consider and determine each petition on its own merits, allowing for the possibility that, as here, one petition will warrant termination and the other will not.

Section 15-7-7 requires a parent whose children are in agency care to maintain contact with them and plan for their future substantially and repeatedly.

In Re Armand · filed 1981-08-20

Section 15-7-7 imposes two requirements on a parent whose children are in the care of an authorized agency: (1) to maintain contact with the children and (2) to plan for the children’s future. The section specifies that the parent must perform these duties “substantially and repeatedly.”

Section 15-7-7(c) requires a parent whose child is in agency care to maintain contact with the child and plan for the child’s future.

In Re Kristen B. · filed 1989-04-27(c)

Section 15-7-7 imposes two requirements on a parent whose child is in the care of an authorized agency: (1) to maintain contact with the child and (2) to plan for the child’s future.

Section 15-7-7(b)(1) and (c) require clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness and an extended inability to care for the child, along with agency efforts to address the barriers to reunification.

In Re Gabriel G. · filed 1983-05-26(b)(1), (c)

Under § 15-7-7(b)(l) the agency must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is unfit by reason of conduct or conditions seriously detrimental to the child and that it is improbable that the parent will be able to care for the child for an extended period of time. Under § 15-7-7(c) the agency must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that it has cooperated with the parent to design an appropriate program; has made suitable arrangements for visitation; has provided services and other assistance so that the problems preventing discharge from foster care may be resolved or ameliorated; and has informed the parent of information about the child’s health, progress, and development. ... Our review of the record convinces us that the petitioning agency has met its burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 15-7-7 provides the authority and grounds for terminating parental rights; ending visitation rights does not terminate parental rights.

Seravo v. Seravo · filed 1987-05-26

First of all, his parental rights have not been terminated. Such an event could occur only under G.L.1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 15-7-7, as amended by P.L. 1983, ch. 232, § 1, which provides the authority and the grounds for which parental rights may be terminated. What did occur in this case was a termination of the father’s visitation rights until he can prove a substantial change in circumstances warranting a modification of the earlier decree.

Section 15-7-7(1) permits DCYF or another public agency, but not a private individual, to petition for termination of parental rights.

In Re John · filed 1992-03-19(1)

This rule makes it clear that for purposes of § 15-7-7 a “duly filed” petition is a petition filed by DCYF or another state agency. Thus only DCYF or some other public agency can petition the Family Court for termination of parental rights under § 15-7-7.

Section 15-7-7(1)(b)(iv) applies only when the prior termination of parental rights was involuntary.

In Re Kyle S. · filed 1997-04-14(1)(b)(iv)

For the foregoing reasons we conclude that § 15-7-7(l)(b)(iv) does not apply to the voluntary termination of parental rights.

Section 15-7-7 permits termination of parental rights when evidence supports findings of prolonged agency care, unresolved drug problems, and a parent’s failure to maintain contact or plan for the child.

In re Unique L. · filed 1998-10-22(a)(2)(iii), (a)(3)

In accordance with G.L.1956 § 15-7-7(a)(2)(iii) & (3), the trial justice determined that Unique had been in the care of DCYF for at least twelve months, that there were no assurances that the mother’s drug problem had been eliminated, and that she had failed to maintain contact with the child or to plan for her future. ... Our review of the record in this case discloses that there was ample competent evidence to support the findings and conclusions of the trial justice.

Section 15-7-7(a)(2)(iv) allows termination based on a prior involuntary termination when the parent remains unable or unwilling to respond to rehabilitative services and further services are unlikely to achieve reunification within a reasonable time. DCYF need not make reasonable reunification efforts on this ground.

In Re Dennis P. · filed 2000-04-28(a)(2)(iv)

As an initial matter, respondent’s parental rights were appropriately terminated on the basis of § 15-7-7(a)(2)(iv). ... As was previously stated, DCYF is not obligated to engage in reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family when a petition is filed based on this ground.

Section 15-7-7 does not require a separate finding of physical or emotional harm before parental rights may be terminated.

In Re Crystal A. · filed 1984-05-16

Section 15-7-7 does not require a finding of harm as an essential prerequisite to the termination of parental rights.

Section 15-7-7 supports terminating parental rights when evidence establishes parental unfitness and shows that unsafe home conditions are unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

In Re Jennifer R. · filed 1995-12-13(1)(c), (d)

It is our opinion that the evidence supports the trial justice’s findings of unfitness as well as his finding that the conditions of the home ... are not likely to change in the foreseeable future.

Section 15-7-7 permits termination of parental rights when imprisonment makes a parent unavailable to care for a child for an extended period or the parent has engaged in cruel and abusive conduct toward a child.

In re Richard M. · filed 1996-03-20(1)(b)(i) and (ii)

Clearly, that length of imprisonment satisfies subsection (i), above, since the father will never be available to render care for the children. Moreover, the father has been sentenced on nine counts of first degree child molestation, a crime that certainly involves conduct toward a “child of a cruel and abusive nature,” as described in subsection (ii), above.

Section 15-7-7(8) requires the Family Court to give primary consideration to a child’s physical, psychological, mental, and intellectual needs when deciding whether to terminate parental rights.

In Re Christopher H. · filed 1997-06-03(8)

It is true that under § 15-7-7(8) the Family Court must “give primary consideration to the physical, psychological, mental, and intellectual needs of the child.” ... However, in view of Harris’s recalcitrant, self-centered attitude with respect to her chronic drug addiction and the expert testimony suggesting that the children in this appeal were at high risk, we are not persuaded by our review of the trial record that the trial justice either misconceived or overlooked any material evidence regarding the best interests of these children.

Section 15-7-7(a)(2)(ii) permits prior abuse of one child to weigh in assessing fitness to parent another, but past conduct alone does not establish permanent unfitness.

In Re Kelly S. · filed 1998-07-31(a)(2)(ii)

Thus, although we are of the opinion that abusive conduct toward one child must be seriously considered as a factor detrimental to a parent’s fitness with regard to another child and that the threshold of evidence with regard to this other child is diminished in the face of such horrific prior actions, past actions alone are not sufficient to brand a parent unfit for life. Therefore, we conclude that § 15-7-7(a)(2)(ii) passes constitutional muster on its face.

Section 15-7-7(a)(2)(ii) permits termination when a parent allows cruel or abusive conduct toward a child; the state need not prove which parent inflicted the abuse.

In Re Chester J. · filed 2000-07-12(a)(2)(ii)

We are satisfied that the state is not required to prove which parent actually; inflicted the abuse. Allowing parents to ignore or to stand by while such abuse and neglect occurs is tantamount to the parents inflicting the abuse themselves for purposes of a termination pursuant to § 15-7-7(a)(2).

Section 15-7-7 permits termination of parental rights when the children have been in DCYF custody for at least twelve months, DCYF has offered services, and safe reunification is not substantially probable within a reasonable time.

In re Olivia C. · filed 2001-10-24

In concluding that the respondent’s rights should be terminated under G.L. 1956 § 15-7-7, the trial justice found by clear and convincing evidence that the children had been in the care and custody of DCYF for at least twelve months, that DCYF had offered the respondent numerous services and case plans, and that there was no substantial probability that the children could be safely returned to their mother’s care within a reasonable period of time. The trial justice also found that the respondent had been involved in a series of violent relationships, including a relationship with a man whom she knew had physically assaulted her daughter, that she had sexually abused Christopher and Olivia, and that she was unfit. He concluded that it was in the best interest of each of the five children that the respondent’s parental rights be terminated. The record in this case is replete with evidence supporting these conclusions. Accordingly, we summarily deny and dismiss the respondent’s appeal and affirm the judgment of the Family Court, to which we return the papers in the case.

Section 15-7-7 permits termination of parental rights on grounds including chronic substance abuse, imprisonment, and prolonged DCYF custody when the grounds are supported and DCYF has made reasonable reunification efforts.

In Re Caleb W. · filed 2010-04-02

In termination of parental rights cases based on chronic substance abuse, imprisonment of the parent, or DCYF custody for at least twelve months, we also “consider whether DCYF made reasonable efforts at reunification.” ... Having reviewed the record, we see no basis therein for nullifying the trial justice’s credibility determinations; and we are unable to perceive a basis in the record for ruling that the trial justice was clearly wrong or overlooked and misconceived material evidence in reaching his determination with respect to the grounds for termination of respondent’s parental rights.

Section 15-7-7 permits termination when clear and convincing evidence establishes that a parent is unfit because of conduct or conditions seriously detrimental to the child and termination serves the child’s best interests.

In re Samuel Y. · filed 2006-04-12(a)(2)(vii)

The trial justice in this case found that DCYF had established by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was unfit to parent Samual “by reason of his conduct and/or conditions seriously detrimental to the child.” She further found that terminating respondent’s parental rights was in Samual’s best interests. It is our opinion that there is ample legally competent evidence in the record to support the trial justice’s findings in these respects.

Once DCYF makes a prima facie case based on past abusive conduct, the parent must present evidence that the conduct no longer endangers a child, but DCYF retains the burden of proving unfitness by clear and convincing evidence.

In Re Corryn B. · filed 2007-01-26(a)(2)(ii)

Although once DCYF has made out a prima facie case, it becomes incumbent upon a parent to present evidence tending to show that his or her past abusive conduct no longer endangers the safety of a child, the burden at all times remains on DCYF to prove the parent unfit by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 15-7-7(a)(2)(ii) permits termination of parental rights based on cruel or abusive conduct toward any child when supported by clear and convincing evidence.

In Re Destiny D. · filed 2007-05-25(a)(2)(ii)

In this case, we are satisfied that the trial justice did not err in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, competent proof to support the termination of Delestre’s parental rights in accordance with § 15 — 7—7(a)(2)(ii), for “[cjonduct toward any child of a cruel or abusive nature.”

Section 15-7-7(a)(2) treats a parent who stands by while a child is abused or neglected as if the parent inflicted the abuse for purposes of terminating parental rights.

In Re Alexis L. · filed 2009-06-12(a)(2)

It is the law in this jurisdiction that a parent who ignores or stands by while child abuse or neglect occurs is tantamount to the parent inflicting the abuse him/herself for purposes of a termination proceeding.

Section 15-7-7(a)(2)(ii) permits termination of parental rights to one child when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent caused or allowed cruel or abusive injuries to another child.

In re Kristopher J. · filed 2015-05-28(a)(2)(ii)

The trial justice’s finding that the respondent caused Christina’s injuries was certainly reasonable, based on the clear and convincing evidence that he was the ... sole caretaker at the time of the fatal injuries; therefore, a finding that he violated § 15-7- 7(a)(2)(ii) was warranted, and the termination of the respondent’s parental rights to his son, Kristopher, logically followed.

Section 15-7-7(a)(2)(ii) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that parents committed or allowed cruel or abusive conduct toward their child.

In re Rylee A. · filed 2020-07-01(a)(2)(ii)

The Family Court justice’s finding that respondents are unfit parents by reason of conduct or conditions seriously detrimental to Rylee, in that they either committed or allowed conduct toward Rylee of a cruel and abusive nature, was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 15-7-7(a)(2)(ii) requires clear and convincing evidence that a parent is unfit because of cruel or abusive conduct toward a child; allowing abuse through a lack of protective capacity can satisfy that standard.

In re Lucas D. · filed 2022-04-12(a)(2)(ii)

General Laws 1956 § 15-7-7(a)(2)(ii) provides that a court shall “terminate any and all legal rights of the parent to the child” if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit by reason of conduct “seriously detrimental” to the child, such as “conduct toward any child of a cruel or abusive nature[.]” Thus, under that statutory section, before terminating parental rights, a court must first find a parent unfit by reason of having committed conduct of a cruel or abusive nature toward the child. ... Accordingly, Kaitlyn’s refusal to accept that fact coupled with her continued relationship with Anthony (which would certainly mean that Anthony would be in the presence of Lucas) is competent evidence on which the trial justice could have found by clear and convincing evidence that Kaitlyn lacked protective capacity, committed or allowed to be committed cruel and abusive conduct toward Lucas, and was an unfit parent.

Section 15-7-7 requires a determination of parental unfitness before the child's best interests are considered.

In re Shy C. · filed 2015-11-05

We would also briefly note that we have specifically instructed the Family Court that, when applying G.L. 1956 § 15-7-7, a determination as to unfitness of the parent must be made before the best interests of the child are considered. See In re Kristina L., 520 A.2d 574, 582 (R.I. 1987); see also In re Amber P., 877 A.2d 608, 615 (R.I. 2005). Therefore, Ms. Charron’s argument also lacks substantive merit.

Section 15-7-7 bars a parent from invoking a confidentiality privilege concerning the parent’s illness in a proceeding to terminate parental rights.

In Re Rene B. · filed 1988-06-29

This language tells the reader in clear and simple language that in parental-termination proceedings, a parent may not invoke any privilege of confidentiality relating to the parent’s illness or any maladies mentioned in § 15-7-7.

Section 15-7-7(2)(a) permits the Family Court to order DCF to provide housing assistance when homelessness prevents family reunification.

In Re Nicole G. · filed 1990-07-05(2)(a)

Specifically stated, the question is whether the Family Court may order DCF to provide housing assistance to the families of children in its care as part of DCF’s statutory duty to make reasonable efforts to reunite families under G.L.1956 (1988 Reenactment) § 15-7-7, when the court first finds that family reunification cannot be achieved because of a family’s homelessness. We answer in the affirmative.

Section 15-7-7 requires DCYF to make reasonable efforts to reunite families; a court may order housing assistance when inadequate housing is the primary barrier to reunification.

In Re Amanda M. · filed 1993-06-25

Pursuant to G.L.1956 (1988 Reenactment) § 15-7-7, as amended by P.L.1992, ch. 206, § 2, DCYF has a duty to make reasonable efforts to reunite families. ... In In re Nicole G. we specifically held that the Family Court had the authority to order DCYF to provide housing assistance in cases “in which homelessness is found to be a primary factor preventing reunification of a family.” ... Nowhere in the record do we find any indication that homelessness was the primary barrier to reunification.

Section 15-7-7(a)(3) permits a court to consider a parent’s refusal of DCYF services before an abuse or neglect adjudication, but that refusal should not be the principal ground for terminating parental rights.

In Re Christina V. · filed 2000-04-21(a)(3)

Furthermore, a parent’s unwillingness to cooperate with DCYF before a commitment adjudication occurs — particularly because a child may have come into DCYF care on a mere allegation of abuse or neglect that later turns out to be unfounded — should not be the principal grounds for terminating parental rights. Rather, it may be considered as one appropriate factor to be weighed, at least in cases like this one where other siblings have already been committed to DCYF’s care.

Section 15-7-7(a)(3) requires clear and convincing evidence that the parents were offered or received services to correct the conditions that led to the child’s placement.

In Re Raymond C. · filed 2000-05-15(a)(3)

Pursuant to § 15-7-7(a)(3) the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that “the parents were offered or received services to correct the situation which led to the child being placed.” This Court need not address whether the language of subsection (a)(3) requires DCYF to make “reasonable efforts” in fulfilling its obligations, because the record of this case supports the trial justice’s finding that DCYF did in fact engage in reasonable efforts to achieve reunification.

For petitions under subsection (a)(2)(ii) or (a)(2)(iv), DCYF need not make reasonable efforts to preserve or reunify the family and may decline services it determines would be ineffective.

In Re Jared S. · filed 2002-01-11(b)(1)

Moreover, neither the General Laws nor our Constitution requires that DCYF undertake extraordinary measures to reform unfit parents. Section 15-7-7(b)(1) provides, “In the event that a petition is filed pursuant to subsection (a)(2)(ii) [or] (a)(2)(iv), * * * [DCYF] has no obligation to engage in reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify a family.”

Services offered to correct the conditions that led to a child’s placement may come from providers other than DCYF.

In Re Raymond C. · filed 2005-01-21(a)(3)

The statute does not require that DCYF be the sole provider of services to the parents. Section 15-7-7(a)(3). Services can be provided elsewhere, as long as these services are intended to correct the situation that led to the placement.

Section 15-7-7(a)(3) allows a court to consider a parent’s refusal of reunification services before the child’s formal commitment to DCYF.

In re Jennifer G. · filed 2001-03-19(a)(3)

In this case, then, the trial justice properly weighed and considered the respondent’s failure to comply with services offered by DCYF both before and after her child’s formal commitment. Accordingly, there was no error on the part of the trial justice.

Section 15-7-7(a)(3) requires that parents be offered or receive corrective services, but does not require services throughout the child’s twelve months in DCYF custody.

In Re Chaselle S. · filed 2002-06-04(a)(3)

The plain language of § 15-7-7(a)(3) requires only that the justice find that “the parents were offered or received services to correct the situation which led to the child being placed.” The statute does not require that parents be offered services for the entire period during which the child is in DCYF custody, and we decline to read such a requirement into the statute.

Section 15-7-7(a)(3) requires DCYF to show that parents were offered or received services to correct the circumstances leading to placement; it does not require an explanation of why additional services were needed.

In Re Robert S. · filed 2004-02-11(a)(3)

We conclude that it was not necessary for Ms. Aylward to provide an explanation at the trial. The reason behind the need for additional parental aide services is immaterial. The DCYF need show only that “the parents were offered or received services to correct the situation which led to the child being placed.” Section 15-7-7(a)(3).

Section 15-7-7(b)(2) ends DCYF’s duty to make reasonable efforts to strengthen the parental relationship when a termination petition is filed.

In Re Destiney L. · filed 2011-06-14(b)(2)

Thus, the statute did not require DCYF to assist Shakiyyah in accessing after-care services following the completion of CO-DAC in December 2006 because the termination petition already had been filed.

Section 15-7-7(a)(3) requires services to address the reason for a child’s placement, but DCYF need not duplicate services a parent already receives elsewhere.

In Re Gabrielle D. · filed 2012-03-26(a)(3)

Similarly, in the instant case, DCYF was not required to provide additional substance abuse counseling to Armand — since he had already been receiving such counseling from Becky Chartier of NRI Community Services since July of 2008.

Under the then applicable section, termination of parental rights required a finding that the children had been in DCYF care for at least six months.

In re Ruddy T. · filed 1994-12-15(l)(c)

Having made that determination, the trial justice then found that because the children had been in the care of DCYF for at least six months and because the children are currently in the care of foster parents, the best interests of the children will be served by the termination of parental rights. We concur with the judgment of the Family Court.

Section 15-7-7 requires a finding that a child has been in DCYF care for twelve months before parental rights are terminated.

In re Joseph G. · filed 1997-09-26

General Laws 1956 § 15-7-7 was amended, effective July 8, 1994, to require a finding of twelve months in DCYF care before termination of parental rights. P.L.1994, ch. 194, § 1. The termination petition in this case was filed on July 20, 1994, after the effective date of the amended statute. However, the record clearly discloses that Joseph had been in DCYF care for well over the requisite twelve months at the time of the filing of the petition.

Section 15-7-7(1)(c)’s six-month requirement is satisfied when DCYF files a termination petition more than six months after the children are formally committed to its care.

In re Lori Ann D. · filed 1995-11-01(1)(c)

The children were formally committed to DCYF’s care on December 20, 1991. Six months and ten days later, on June 30, 1992, DCYF filed the termination-of-parental rights petition. The requirements of G.L.1956 (1988 Reenactment) § 15-7-7(l)(c) have been satisfied.

Section 15-7-7(c) permits termination after at least twelve months of DCYF care when parents have been offered or received services and the child is unlikely to return home within a reasonable time.

In Re John W. · filed 1996-09-10(c)

In this case, John has been in DCYF’s care since he was six years old. Despite extensive efforts to teach the mother how to care for her son’s condition, the mother has failed to change her conduct and to improve the conditions that caused John to enter DCYF care initially.

Section 15-7-7(1), now designated (2)(i), permits termination when a child has spent more than twelve months in DCYF care and the parent remains unfit to care for the child.

In re Nadene · filed 1997-09-26(1)

In this case, the trial justice carefully applied the pertinent statutory guidelines prescribed by G.L.1956 § 15-7-7(1) ... and found Nadene had been in the care of DCYF for a period exceeding twelve months and that the mother was unfit to care for Nadene due to her repeated incarceration. ... After examining the record, this Court finds the trial justice’s conclusions well supported by the evidence.

Section 15-7-7 requires the court to consider whether a child can return to a parent’s care within a reasonable time, taking account of the child’s age and need for a permanent home.

In re Cody · filed 1998-02-19(c)(1)

Pursuant to § 15-7-7(c)(l), the trial justice is required to consider this issue whenever a petition for the termination of parental rights is before the court. Therefore, it would have been error for the trial justice not to take into account the probability that Cody would not be able to return to Barber’s care within a reasonable time in light of his age and need for a permanent home.

Section 15-7-7(1)(c) requires a child to spend the statutory period in agency care before parental rights may be terminated; the 1994 amendment increased that period to twelve months.

In re Amanda M. · filed 1998-02-20(1)(c)

In 1994, § 15 — 7— 7(1 )(c) was amended by P.L. 1994, ch. 194, § 1', which raised the period a child must be in the legal custody or care of DCYF to twelve-months. However, since the record indicates that Amanda had been in the legal custody of DCYF for a period exceeding twelve-months, we do not find the amended version to be of any consequence in this case.

Section 15-7-7(a)(3)’s twelve-month period begins when a child enters DCYF’s temporary legal custody or care; formal commitment is unnecessary.

In Re Delicia B. · filed 2000-12-11(a)(3)

Today, we hold that formal commitment following a hearing and finding of abuse, neglect or dependency is not a prerequisite for the commencement of the twelve-month period under § 15—7—7(a)(3). DCYF need prove only that the child had been legally in its temporary custody or care for a period of twelve months before the TPR petition was filed.

Section 15-7-7(a)(2)(iv) does not require a child placed with DCYF to be removed from a parent’s or relative’s home.

In Re Micaela C. · filed 2001-04-19(a)(2)(iv)

Micaela was placed with the department at the time this petition was filed, although DCYF allowed her grandmother to have custody of her temporarily. There is no requirement in the statute that a child be removed from a parent’s home or relatives in these circumstances.

Section 15-7-7(a)(3) permits termination when a child has been in DCYF custody for at least twelve months, the parent has been offered services, and a safe return within a reasonable time is unlikely.

In Re Natasha M. · filed 2002-06-11(a)(3)

The department made three separate attempts to provide mother with safe transitional housing. ... Despite the services provided by the department, Natasha remained in the care and custody of the department for well over twelve months. Mother’s erratic and unstable living environment is convincing proof that Natasha would not be returned to her within a reasonable period of time.

Section 15-7-7(a)(3) requires the court to consider the child’s age and need for a permanent home when deciding whether safe reunification is substantially probable within a reasonable time.

In Re Mariah M. · filed 2006-03-14(a)(3)

Section 15-7-7(a)(3) instructs the court to “consider[ ] the child’s age and the need for a permanent home” when determining whether a substantial probability of reunification exists. ... We hold that the trial justice did not err when he found that, taking into account Mariah’s age and need for a permanent home, there was no substantial probability that she could return to respondent’s safe care within a reasonable amount of time.

Section 15-7-7(a)(3) permits termination when a child has been in DCYF custody for more than twelve months, the parent has received services, and safe reunification is unlikely within a reasonable time.

In re Dakota G. · filed 2006-04-14(a)(3)

Based upon the evidence in his case, we conclude there was not a substantial probability that Dakota would be able to return safely to his mother’s care within a reasonable period of time. Because we find that there is legally competent evidence in the record to support the trial justice’s decision to terminate the respondent’s parental rights under § 15-7-7(a)(3), it is not necessary for us to address the alternative ground for termination that is cited in the trial justice’s decision.

Section 15-7-7(a)(3) permits termination when a child has spent at least twelve months in DCYF custody, the parents were offered or received services, and safe return within a reasonable time is not substantially probable.

In Re Dayvon G. · filed 2010-12-14(a)(3)

After reviewing the record and the trial justice's decision, we are fully satisfied that the trial justice did not err in finding that the children had been placed with DCYF for at least twelve months and there was no substantial probability that the children could return to the respondent's care within a reasonable period of time.

Section 15-7-7(a)(3) permits termination when a child has spent at least twelve months in DCYF care, reasonable services were offered to address the cause of placement, and safe return within a reasonable time is unlikely.

In Re Julian D. · filed 2011-04-11(a)(3)

Based on the foregoing, this Court is satisfied that the record supports the trial justice’s findings for each element of § 15-7-7(a)(3) and holds that he was not clearly wrong when he terminated Vallejo’s parental rights based on this statutory provision.

Section 15-7-7(a)(3) permits termination when a child has spent at least twelve months in state care, the parent has been offered or received services, and safe return within a reasonable time is not substantially probable.

In Re Shawn M. · filed 2006-05-17(a)(3)

Given the foregoing, and in recognition of Shawn’s age and need for permanency, the trial justice concluded that Catherine was unfit to parent Shawn in accordance with 15 — T—7(a)(3)—a finding with which this Court agrees.

Section 15-7-7(a)(3) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows at least twelve months in DCYF care, services amounting to reasonable efforts, and no substantial probability of safe return within a reasonable time.

In re Lauren B. · filed 2013-11-04(a)(3)

In sum, we are satisfied that the record supports the trial justice’s findings that the elements of § 15-7-7(a)(3) were proven by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 15-7-7(a)(3) permits termination when a child has been in DCYF care for at least twelve months, the parent was offered or received services, and the child is unlikely to return safely within a reasonable time.

In re Mandy M. · filed 2020-10-29(a)(3)

He found by clear and convincing evidence that, based on the evidence, there was “not a substantial probability that the child will be able to be returned safely to the father’s care within a reasonable period of time[.]” Although respondent had been “offered or received services to correct the situation which led to the child being placed[,]” the trial justice found that respondent was unfit to parent Mandy, given his “failure to comply with services so as to receive his daughter into his home.” We agree and discern no error in the trial justice’s determination that DCYF granted respondent many opportunities and services to enable him to reunite with his daughter, and that respondent did not take advantage of those services.

Section 15-7-7(a)(3) permits termination when a child has been in DCYF care for at least twelve months, the parents were offered or received services, and the child is unlikely to return safely to their care within a reasonable time.

In re Donnell R-H Jr., No. 21-6 (June 15, 2022) · filed 2022-06-15(a)(3)

We have reviewed the record and the trial justice’s decision, and we cannot conclude that the trial justice erred in finding that Donnell had been placed with DCYF for at least twelve months and that there was not a substantial probability that Donnell could return to respondent’s care within a reasonable period of time. Because we have determined that respondent is unfit on the basis of § 15-7-7(a)(3), we need not address the termination of respondent’s parental rights on the grounds of her substance-use disorder under § 15-7-7(a)(2)(iii).

Recent progress in substance-abuse treatment does not prevent termination when the evidence establishes parental unfitness under § 15-7-7(a)(2)(iii).

In Re Tinisha P. · filed 1997-07-07(a)(2)(iii)

Our review of the record indicates that the trial justice’s findings were supported by overwhelming, competent evidence of a long history of drug and alcohol abuse. She did not overlook any relevant or material evidence and gave due weight to the testimony that was favorable to the mother. She recognized the mother’s progress at SStarbirth but found that this progress did not override other evidence that compelled a finding of unfitness to parent the subject children.

Section 15-7-7 supports termination of parental rights when clear and convincing evidence establishes parental unfitness.

In re Kayla B. · filed 1998-06-25

In this case, the trial justice carefully applied the pertinent statutory guidelines prescribed by G.L.1956 § 15-7-7. ... We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial justice’s findings that the respondent was unfit.

Section 15-7-7(a)(3) permits a finding of parental unfitness when a parent’s misconduct causes a child’s special needs and the parent cannot safely care for the child.

In Re Alex B. · filed 2000-06-15(a)(3)

In a situation in which a parent’s own misconduct may cause a child to develop special needs and those special needs then make it impossible for the parent to safely care for that child, it is appropriate to conclude that the parent is unfit, as did the trial justice in this case with whose finding we agree.

Section 15-7-7(a)(2)(iii) permits termination for chronic substance abuse when the parent’s prognosis shows the child cannot return within a reasonable time; recent progress in treatment must be considered alongside the parent’s history.

In Re Eric K. · filed 2000-08-02(a)(2)(iii)

In light of Gloria’s history of chronic substance abuse, and her unwillingness or inability to successfully engage in treatment, coupled with the fact that at the time of the trial she had been in the year-long SSTARbirth program for only two months, we are satisfied that clear and convincing evidence was presented to support the decision of the trial justice and, further, that before terminating her parental rights he accorded adequate consideration to Gloria’s progress.

Section 15-7-7(a)(2) treats mental illness and a need for continued specialized care as grounds for finding a parent unfit to care for her children.

In re William R. · filed 2004-01-09(a)(2)

The trial justice, therefore, did not err because the mothers mental illness, coupled with her need for continued specialized care, demonstrated her unfitness under § 15-7-7(a)(2).

Section 15-7-7(a)(2)(iii) permits termination when a child is in DCYF care, the parent has a chronic substance abuse problem, and the parent's prognosis makes reunification unlikely within a reasonable time.

In Re Maya C. · filed 2001-01-08(a)(2)(iii)

Section 15-7-7 provides that clear and convincing evidence of chronic substance abuse is prima facie evidence of parental unfitness.

Section 15-7-7(a)(2)(iii) permits termination for chronic substance abuse despite sobriety at the time of trial when the evidence supports a finding that the child cannot return within a reasonable time.

In Re Pricillion R. · filed 2009-06-05(a)(2)(iii)

Although Mr. Renfro quite accurately notes that the trial justice is required to consider all the evidence up to the termination hearing, including recent success in maintaining sobriety, we repeatedly have stated that termination may nevertheless be appropriate despite sobriety at the time of trial.

Section 15-7-7(a)(2)(iii) treats twelve months of inability to care for a child due to substance abuse as prima facie evidence of a chronic substance abuse problem.

In re Evelyn C. · filed 2013-06-18(a)(2)(iii)

We are satisfied that there is a copious amount of evidence in the record to support the trial justice’s finding of chronic substance abuse by clear and convincing evidence.

A termination decree must be vacated when the findings of parental unfitness cannot be separated from criminal convictions and prison sentences that have since been vacated.

In re Izabella G. · filed 2016-07-07(a)(2)(i), (a)(3)

Our careful review of the record convinces us that the respondent’s criminal convictions and concomitant prison sentences are so intertwined with the Family Court decision that it is ... impossible to separate the convictions from the remaining findings. ... Therefore, it is our opinion that the decision must be vacated in light of the changed circumstances.

A parent’s refusal to cooperate with reunification case plans can support a finding of parental unfitness when proved by clear and convincing evidence.

In re James H. · filed 2018-04-09(a)(3)

We are further of the opinion that Crystal’s refusal to cooperate with the objectives of the case plans constitutes clear and convincing evidence of her lack of interest in her three children and, as such, could properly serve as a basis for a finding of parental unfitness.

Section 15-7-7(a)(2)(vii) permits a finding of parental unfitness when seriously detrimental conduct has persisted long enough to make extended care of the child improbable.

In re Adele B. · filed 2020-06-17(a)(2)(vii)

The record in this case contains legally competent evidence that respondent has exhibited behavior that is seriously detrimental to Adele for such a duration as to render it improbable that she will be able to care for Adele for an extended period of time.

A parent's failure to engage in reunification services and inability to protect the child can support termination of parental rights under subsection (a)(3).

In re Domenic B. · filed 2021-10-27(a)(3)

We are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial justice’s finding that respondent was unfit given her failure to fully engage in the services provided by DCYF and lack of protective capacity.

Section 15-7-7(a)(4) treats at least six months without contact or communication with a child as prima facie evidence of abandonment or desertion.

In Re Ariel S. · filed 2001-01-30(a)(4)

We are satisfied that DCYF established a prima facie case of abandonment and desertion that was not rebutted by respondent.

Section 15-7-7(a)(4) allows termination for abandonment even when contact has not ceased entirely; a parent must maintain substantial and repeated contact and show consistent interest in the child.

In re Danesha J. · filed 2006-01-19(a)(4)

The lack of visits or contact need not be total; rather, as this Court has held, the parent has an affirmative obligation to maintain substantial and repeated contact with the child, and he or she must demonstrate consistent interest in or concern for the child.

Section 15-7-7(a)(4) does not require willfulness to establish abandonment.

In Re Craig G. · filed 2001-01-30(a)(4)

Contrary to respondent’s contention, the statute upon which DCYF relies, § 15-7-7(a)(4), does not include the element of willfulness to show abandonment.

Section 15-7-7(a)(4) permits termination for abandonment without proof that the parent intended to abandon the child.

In Re Michael T. · filed 2001-04-24(a)(4)

The TPR statute provides that the court can terminate parental rights if “[t]he parent has abandoned or deserted the child.” G.L.1956 (2000 Reenactment) § 15-7-7(a)(4). ... The TPR statute “does not include the element of willfulness to show abandonment.”

Section 15-7-7(a)(4) treats at least six months without contact with a child as prima facie evidence of abandonment.

In Re Diamond I. · filed 2002-05-20(a)(4)

A review of the record reveals that the father abandoned his son by failing to visit or to have any contact, with his son from May 11, 1998 until June 1, 1999. This thirteen-month time span constituted pri-ma facie evidence of abandonment under § 15-7-7(a)(4).

A parent who makes only halfhearted or no attempts to contact a child during the six-month statutory period has abandoned the child; later efforts do not necessarily undo that abandonment.

In Re David L. · filed 2005-07-12(a)(4)

Further, “[a] parent who makes only ‘halfhearted or no attempts to visit or contact his or her child within the six-month statutory period’ has abandoned the child.” ... Here, the trial justice’s finding of abandonment and/or desertion is correct and well supported by the evidence.

Section 15-7-7(a)(4) permits termination when abandonment is proven by clear and convincing evidence; failure to cooperate with offered services does not excuse abandonment for more than six months.

In Re Ariel N. · filed 2006-02-01(a)(4)

It is our opinion that respondent’s lack of cooperation with offered services in no way contradicts or excuses her abandonment of her children for more than the statutory six-month period. The trial justice did not err when he found that the abandonment allegation of the petition had been proven by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 15-7-7(a)(4) permits termination for abandonment when a parent’s few attempts at contact over nineteen months fail to rebut clear evidence of abandonment.

In Re Serenity K. · filed 2006-02-24(a)(4)

We are satisfied that Mr. Virasak’s four or five attempts to contact his daughter over a period of nineteen months were insufficient to rebut the clear evidence of abandonment, and that the trial justice’s findings were supported amply by competent evidence.

Section 15-7-7(a)(4) requires meaningful parent-child contact; sending gifts through an agency does not satisfy it.

In Re Shanelly C. · filed 2001-12-07(a)(4)

Mother argued to the Supreme Court that she remained in contact with Shanelly by sending some clothing, books and candy to her through DCYF. This “contact,” however, does not satisfy § 15-7-7(a)(4); it is, at best, indirect contact indicative of an unwillingness to promote and further the parent-child relationship. Meaningful contact between a parent and child is not satisfied by dropping off books and candy to a social worker.

Section 15-7-7(a)(4) makes at least six months without contact prima facie evidence of abandonment, which claimed efforts to arrange prison visits did not rebut after nine years without contact.

In Re Shawn B. · filed 2005-01-21(a)(4)

The TPR statute provides that “lack of communication or contact with the child for at least a six (6) month period shall constitute prima facie evidence of abandonment or desertion.” G.L.1956 § 15-7-7(a)(4). ... The respondent presented no evidence either at the trial or on appeal that he ever attempted to contact his children. ... We, therefore, affirm the Family Court’s finding that respondent abandoned his children.

Incarceration and no-contact orders do not excuse a parent’s lack of contact during the six-month period that creates prima facie evidence of abandonment.

In re Malachii O. · filed 2017-01-31(a)(4)

Therefore, neither respondent’s incarceration nor the no-contact orders relieved respondent of his obligation to remain in contact with his son.

Under § 15-7-7(a)(4), a parent's lack of contact with a child for at least six months is prima facie evidence of abandonment, even when the parent is incarcerated.

In re Kyeshon J. · filed 2017-02-14(a)(4)

Having carefully reviewed the record and the findings of fact of the trial justice, we conclude that she did not err in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent had abandoned Kyeshon and Jarell for the six-month period referenced in § 15-7-7(a)(4).

Section 15-7-7(a)(2)(i) requires the court to consider the probable duration of a parent’s imprisonment when determining unfitness, but does not require it to consider parole eligibility.

In Re Mercedes V. · filed 2001-12-20(a)(2)(i)

In order to be considered unfit pursuant to § 15-7-7(a)(2)(i) it is required that the trial justice find that the “[ijnstitutionalization of the parent, including imprisonment, [is] of such a duration as to render it improbable for the parent to care for the child for an extended period of time.” ... However, the trial justice is not required to consider parole eligibility, he or she is only required to consider the probable duration of imprisonment at the time of the termination.

Section 15-7-7(a)(2)(i) permits termination when the probable duration of a parent’s imprisonment makes it improbable that the parent can care for the child for an extended period.

In Re Alvia K. · filed 2006-11-14(a)(2)(i)

While this Court agrees with respondent that parental rights cannot be terminated solely on the basis of a parent’s conviction of a crime and subsequent incarceration, the extended length of a parent’s incarceration is, pursuant to § 15-7-7(a)(2)(i), in and of itself, grounds to terminate parental rights.

Section 15-7-7(a)(2)(i) permits termination when the duration of a parent's imprisonment makes it improbable that the parent can care for the child for an extended period.

In Re Jose Luis RH · filed 2009-04-15(a)(2)(i)

In light of the duration of Rivera's sentence, his child's age and development, and the uncertain home environment pending release, the trial justice was not clearly wrong when she found that Rivera's imprisonment rendered it improbable for him to care for the child for an extended period of time.

Section 15-7-7(a)(2)(i) permits termination when a parent’s imprisonment, considered with other circumstances, makes it improbable that the parent can care for the child for an extended period.

In Re Faith H. · filed 2003-01-07(a)(2)(i)

It is our opinion that there was sufficient evidence in the record for the Family Court justice to find that respondent’s incarceration was “of such a duration that renders it improbable for the parent to care for the child for an extended period of time,” one of the factors enumerated in § 15-7-7(a)(2)(i).

Section 15-7-7(a)(2)(i) permits a finding of parental unfitness when the likely duration of imprisonment makes it improbable that the parent can care for the child for an extended period.

In Re Amber P. · filed 2005-06-28(a)(2)(i)

Contrary to Pandolfi’s assertions, our review of the record convinces us that the trial justice primarily relied on the duration of Pandolfi’s sentence when he concluded that it would be improbable that Pandolfi could care for either child for an extended period. We see no error in this conclusion.

Section 15-7-7(a)(3) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence establishes parental unfitness, including when parents refuse reunification services despite DCYF’s reasonable efforts.

In Re Rosalie H. · filed 2006-01-09(a)(3)

Therefore, we affirm the trial justice’s finding of unfitness pursuant to § 15-7-7(a)(3).

Subsection (a)(2)(vii) allows a finding of unfitness without graphic abuse or neglect when clear and convincing evidence shows seriously detrimental conduct lasting long enough to make extended care improbable.

In Re Charles L. · filed 2010-10-29(a)(2)(vii)

We observe, however, that the statute does not require that there be graphic instances of abuse or neglect before a finding of unfitness can be made. Rather, the trial justice must determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the parent “exhibited behavior or conduct that is seriously detrimental to the [children] for such a duration as to render it improbable [that she could] care for [them] for an extended period of time.”

Section 15-7-7(a)(3) allows a court to consider a parent’s full history when assessing parental fitness, rather than only circumstances at trial.

In re J.R.; In re E.R.; In re A.R.; In re D.R · filed 2025-06-23(a)(3)

A determination of parental fitness is not predicated solely on the circumstances at the time of trial; rather, the trial justice may consider the entirety of the record and the overall history of respondents.

Section 15-7-7(a)(2)(i) permits termination of parental rights when a parent’s imprisonment makes it improbable that the parent can care for the child for an extended period.

In re Amiah P. · filed 2012-10-25(a)(2)(i)

In our opinion, based on the facts in evidence, the trial justice was not clearly wrong in finding respondent-father to be unfit under § 15-7-7(a)(2)(i). Although the fact of the incarceration of a parent is not a sufficient ground to terminate one‟s parental rights, we have held that “the extended length of a parent‟s incarceration is, pursuant to § 15-7-7(a)(2)(i), in and of itself, grounds to terminate parental rights.”

Section 15-7-7(a) terminates a parent's rights to a child but does not automatically end the parent's child support obligation.

State v. Fritz · filed 2002-06-12(a)

The plain language of Rhode Island's termination of parental rights statute, § 15-7-7, addresses only the "legal rights of the parent to the child" and not the reciprocal rights of the child with respect to the parent.

Termination of a parent’s rights under § 15-7-7 extinguishes a grandparent’s derivative interest in placement of the child.

Lacera v. Department of Children, Youth, and Families · filed 2022-04-27

We are constrained, however, to conclude that those rights were divested when the Family Court terminated the parental rights of Mr. Lacera’s son on October 7, 2020.

Section 15-7-7(5) allows parents’ health-care records to be used in termination-of-parental-rights litigation despite the privilege in § 9-17-24.

In re Marie G. · filed 1988-12-16(5)

It was our opinion that the “no privilege” language of G.L. 1956 (1988 Reenactment) § 15-7-7(5) prevails in termination-of-parental-rights litigation over the privilege afforded by § 9-17-24.