R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-35-15

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on witness credibility or the weight of factual evidence.

Lewiss v. R.I. Ethics Commission, 97-1209 (2000) · filed 2000-03-07(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits reversal of an agency decision that is clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious; a court may not reweigh evidence supporting the decision.

Thompson v. Defeo, 98-0730 (2000) · filed 2000-03-29(g)(5), (g)(6)

The evidence in this matter indicates that the decision of the Hearing Committee was not "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence of the whole record," or "arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." G.L. 1956 (1993 Reenactment) § 42-35-15(g)(5)(6).

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on factual questions when substantial evidence supports the agency’s findings.

R.I. Dept., Environmental v. R.I. State Labor Relations Bd., 99-3151 (2000) · filed 2000-06-20(g)

This Court cannot substitute its judgment for the judgment of the Board on the issue of whether an impasse in negotiations over the part-time position was, or was not, reached. The Board found that DEM did not negotiate the wages, hours of employment, time off and work schedule or other benefits for the position before it was posted. This finding of fact was supported by the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence of record.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a court to vacate an agency penalty when the record lacks substantial evidence to support it and the appellant’s substantial rights are prejudiced.

Metropolitan Property v. Hittner, 97-0302 (1998) · filed 1998-05-15(g)

Because the record lacks reliable, probative, and substantial evidence upon which director could exercise his discretion to impose a $2,386.00 administrative penalty against Metropolitan, and because substantial rights of Metropolitan were prejudiced thereby, the penalty is vacated.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on a fact-bound question when the evidence conflicts.

Harbor Realty v. Coastal Resources Management Council, Pc 97-2747 (1999) · filed 1999-02-19(g)

In any event, since the reasonableness of fairway space between proposed and actual, lawful or unlawful, obstacles to navigation is a highly fact-bound determination, this Court cannot substitute its judgment, where there is conflicting evidence, even if it wished to, for that of the Council. §42-35-15 (g); Strafach v. Durfee, 635 A.2d 277, 280 (R.I. 1993). There was substantial evidence before the Council that, even if the plaintiffs are correct in their claim of the location of the riparian line, there was no violation of any resource plan. This Court is constrained to affirm the decision of the Council based on its legitimate fact-finding function.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits the Superior Court to reverse, modify, or remand an agency decision for specified legal or evidentiary errors.

Johnston Ambulatory Surgical Associates, Ltd. v. Nolan · filed 2000-07-12(g)

The court may, however, “reverse, modify, or remand the agency’s decision if the decision is violative of constitutional or statutory provisions, is in excess of the statutory authority of the agency, is made upon unlawful procedure, is affected by other errors of law, is clearly erroneous in view of the rehable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record, or is arbitrary or capricious and is therefore characterized by an abuse of discretion.” Id. (citing § 42 — 35—15(g)).

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility in a contested agency case.

Hammond v. Retirement Board of the Employees, 99-5791 (2000) · filed 2000-07-24(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency with regard to the credibility witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency's on witness credibility or the weight of factual evidence.

Warren v. Reitsma, 99-0385 (2000) · filed 2000-10-10(g)

This Court is precluded from substituting its judgment for that of the agency with respect to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits review of a contested agency decision to whether the certified record contains legally competent evidence supporting it.

Ramos v. R.I. Dept. of Human Services, 00-2374 (2001) · filed 2001-01-16(g)

Pursuant to this section, this Court's review is limited to "an examination of the certified record to determine if there is any legally competent evidence therein to support the agency's decision."

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency's on witness credibility or the weight of factual evidence.

Shola v. Flaminio, 99-4532 (2001) · filed 2001-01-23(g)

This section prohibits a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency with regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing witness credibility or factual evidence in a contested agency case.

Arrow Cab Company v. Public Utilities Commission Division, 00-2890 (2001) · filed 2001-02-01(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars the Superior Court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on factual questions when substantial evidence supports the agency’s findings.

Town of North Kingstown v. Rhode Island State Lab. Rel. Bd., 97-0679 (2001) · filed 2001-02-07(g)

When reviewing a decision of an agency, a justice of the Superior Court may not substitute his or her judgment for that of the agency board on issues of fact or as to the credibility of testifying witnesses, ... where substantial evidence exists on the record to support the board's findings.

Section 42-35-15(g) requires a reviewing court to defer to agency factfinding when substantial evidence supports the decision.

Silva v. Bristol Bd. of License Comm., 00-3511 (2001) · filed 2001-04-19(g)

In reviewing decisions of the State Liquor Control Administrator, this court must give due deference to the decision of the Administrator if it is based upon substantial evidence in the record. ... After a review of the record, this Court finds the decision by the Hearing Officer ordering a four day suspension is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and that substantial rights of the appellant have not been prejudiced.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing factual evidence and limits it to determining whether legally competent evidence supports the agency’s decision.

McKnight v. City of Warwick Board of Public Safety, 98-251 (2001) · filed 2001-05-04(g)

The Court may not weigh the evidence upon which rests the findings of fact; instead, the Court "merely reviews the record in order to determine whether there is legally competent evidence to support the administrative decision." Bunch, 690 A.2d at 337; Cahoone v. Bd. of Rev. Dept. Employ. Sec., 104 R.I. 503, 506 (1968), 246 A.2d 213, 214-215.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing witness credibility or factual evidence.

David v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 00-1046 (2001) · filed 2001-05-10(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility on questions of fact.

Warren v. Reitsma, 99-0385 (2001) · filed 2001-06-28(g)

This Court is precluded from substituting its judgment for that of the agency with respect to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) calls for affirming an agency decision when the record contains reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and the decision is neither clearly erroneous nor an abuse of discretion.

Nissan v. Dolan, 99-6400 (2001) · filed 2001-06-29(g)

The Dealers' Office's decision is not arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion . . . is [not] affected by error of law and is [not] clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record. See, G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15 (5), (6).

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility when reviewing an agency decision.

Puchalski v. Coastal Resources Mgmt. Council, 93-477 (2001) · filed 2001-08-09(g)

Section 42-35-15(g) also precludes the reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence regarding questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing witness credibility or factual evidence in a contested agency decision.

J. Aliosio Enterprises, Inc. v. Dept., Business Regulation, 01-0574 (2001) · filed 2001-08-17(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency with regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for the agency’s on factual questions or witness credibility when substantial evidence supports the agency’s findings.

Newport School Committee v. Rhode Island State L.R.B., 94-0017 (2001) · filed 2001-08-24(g)

As stated above, when reviewing a decision of the Board, this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Board on issues of fact or as to the credibility of testifying witnesses.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for the agency’s on witness credibility or the weight of evidence on factual questions.

Blue Cross Blue Shield of Rhode Island v. McConaghy, 01-1570 (2001) · filed 2001-09-05(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency with regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on witness credibility or the weight of factual evidence.

Pelleccione v. R.I. D.H.S., 00-5246 (2001) · filed 2001-12-12(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits the reviewing court to decide questions of law freely while limiting its review of agency factual findings.

Interstate Navigation Co. v. Division of Public Utilities, 99-5058 (2002) · filed 2002-01-09(g)

Questions of law, however, are not binding upon a reviewing court and may be freely reviewed to determine what the law is and its applicability to the facts.

Section 42-35-15 bars the Superior Court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on factual issues or witness credibility.

Best in the Bay v. the R.I. Dept. of Environmental Mgmt., 00-5266 (2002) · filed 2002-02-22(g)

When reviewing a decision of an agency, a justice of the Superior Court may not substitute his or her judgment for that of the agency on issues of fact or as to the credibility of testifying witnesses.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility when reviewing an agency’s factual findings.

Desrosiers v. Department of Human Services, 01-1578 (2002) · filed 2002-03-01(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence and permits reversal when an agency decision is clearly erroneous on the whole record.

Parrillo v. Department of Human Services, 99-0920 (2002) · filed 2002-03-04(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact. ... Her decision was clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility when reviewing an agency decision.

Blue Cross Blue Shield of R.I. v. McConaghy, 01-1570 (2002) · filed 2002-03-05(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency with regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits the Superior Court’s review of agency factfinding to the certified record and requires it to uphold a decision supported by competent evidence.

Lopez v. Personnel Appeal Bd., 99-4151 (2002) · filed 2002-03-05(g)

In conducting its review, the Superior Court is limited to "an examination of the certified record to determine if there is any legally competent evidence therein to support the agency's decision." ... After review of the entire record, this Court finds that the decision of the Board was not clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits the Superior Court’s review of an agency decision to determining whether substantial evidence supports it.

Chapman Street Realty v. Dept. of Business Reg., 2001-2217 (2002) · filed 2002-03-12(g)

Therefore, this Court's review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the agency's decision.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on witness credibility or the weight of factual evidence.

Dominguez v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 01-2161 (2002) · filed 2002-03-25(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence on factual questions and permits reversal when an agency decision meets the listed grounds for relief.

Coutu v. Department of Human Services, 01-509 (2002) · filed 2002-04-02(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits courts to review an agency’s legal conclusions while leaving the credibility of witnesses and the weight of factual evidence to the agency.

C C Distributors, Inc. v. McConaghy, 01-6295 (2002) · filed 2002-06-11(g)

When reviewing an agency decision, a reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of the witnesses or weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact. ... Questions of law are not binding upon a reviewing court and may be reviewed to determine what the law is and its applicability to the facts.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars the Superior Court from substituting its judgment for the agency’s on the weight of factual evidence.

Certain Property Owners v. Pawtucket Bd., License Comm., 00-2953 (2002) · filed 2002-08-27(g)

Moreover, the Court notes that it must limit its review of the Director's decision to the record, R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-35-15(f), and that it cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Director as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact, R.I. Gen. Laws 1956 § 42-35-15(g).

Section 42-35-15 bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency's on witness credibility or the weight of factual evidence.

Woods v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 02-1599 (2002) · filed 2002-12-05(g)

In accordance with G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15, this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency under review regarding the credibility of witnesses and/or the weight of the evidence concerning issues of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility in a contested agency case.

Pakse Market Corp. v. McConaghy, Dbr., City of Woonsocket, 01-0927 (2003) · filed 2003-03-14(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency with regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) governs judicial review of contested agency decisions and permits reversal when specified errors prejudice an appellant's substantial rights.

Marzilli v. R.I. Department of Human Services, 96-6571 (2003) · filed 2003-05-20(g)

The standard of review for this Court's appellate consideration of a decision of the Department of Human Services is governed by G.L. §42-35-15(g) of the Administrative Procedures Act.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits judicial review of agency fact findings to whether substantial evidence supports the decision.

Pinto v. Roy, 02-2398 (2003) · filed 2003-05-27(g)

This Court's review is limited, therefore, to determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the agency's decision.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits the Superior Court to reverse or modify an agency decision when the agency exceeds its statutory authority.

Interstate Navigation Co. v. Division of Public Utilities & Carriers of the State · filed 2003-06-13(g)

The trial justice may, however, reverse or modify the agency’s decision if it is: “(1) [i]n violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2)[i]n excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3)[m]ade upon unlawful procedure; (4)[a]ffected by other error or law; (5)[c]learly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6)[a]rbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.” Section 42-35-15(g).

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency's on witness credibility or the weight of factual evidence.

Mills v. Nolan, 01-4153 (2003) · filed 2003-11-13(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a court to reverse an agency decision that is arbitrary, capricious, or clearly erroneous in view of the evidence in the record.

Big Daddy Taxi Serv. v. Rhode Island Pub. Utilities Comm., 02-6091 (2004) · filed 2004-01-14(g)

A careful, complete, and impartial review of the record, pursuant to G.L. § 42-35-15(g) leads this Court to the inescapable conclusion that the PUC's order denying the Plaintiff's application for a license to operate one taxi in Providence, Cranston, North Providence, Johnston, Lincoln, and T.F. Green Airport is arbitrary, capricious, and clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility when reviewing an agency's factual findings.

Town of Burrillville v. Rhode Island State Labor Rel. Board, 02-2513 (2004) · filed 2004-01-30(g)

This section of the Administrative Procedures Act precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of an agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits Superior Court review of agency decisions to determining whether competent evidence in the record supports the decision.

Alicea v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 03-3144 (2004) · filed 2004-02-18(g)

Pursuant to § 42-35-15, the Superior Court acts in the capacity of an appellate court when reviewing a decision of an administrative agency. ... The Superior Court is confined to "an examination of the certified record to determine if there is any legally competent evidence therein to support the agency's decision."

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on questions of fact and permits reversal of a clearly erroneous decision.

Cameron v. Rhode Island Department of Business, 03-0319 (r.I.super. 2004) · filed 2004-03-23(g)

The legislative intention underlying this statute provides that the court ought not to substitute its judgment on questions of fact for that of the respondent agency.

Section 42-35-15(g) requires the Superior Court to review a contested agency decision for substantial evidence and errors of law.

Johnston School Committee v. Rhode Island State Labor Rel Bd, 03-0141 (2004) · filed 2004-04-05(g)

The standard of review for this Court's appellate consideration of a decision of the Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board is governed by G.L. § 42-35-15(g) of the Administrative Procedures Act. ... After review of the entire record, this Court finds that the decision directing the Committee to bargain was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and was not affected by error of law.

Subsection (g) requires a court reviewing an agency decision to uphold findings supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Strakaluse v. Retirement Board, 99-3030 (2004) · filed 2004-04-08(g)

This Court's review of the Retirement Board's decision is controlled by G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15 of the Administrative Procedures Act. ... This Court finds the Retirement Board's decision to deny the accidental disability benefit is not clearly erroneous in view of the substantial evidence on the whole record.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a court to modify an agency decision when its findings are clearly erroneous in view of the evidence in the record.

Japonica Partners v. State, 00-1393 (2004) · filed 2004-05-07(g)

The Court finds that the Department's calculation of the arrearage pay award due to Garabedian must be modified because it was "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the record." Section 42-35-15(g).

Section 42-35-15(g) limits the court’s review of agency factfinding to whether competent evidence in the administrative record supports the decision.

Summit Neighborhood Assoc. v. Rhode Island Dept. of Hlt., 03-5200 (2004) · filed 2004-05-27(g)

The Court's role is limited to examining the record to determine if there is any competent evidence to support the agency's decision.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars the Superior Court from substituting its judgment for the agency's on factual questions.

Dimario v. Rhode Island Dept. of Business Regulation, Pc/02-1642 (2004) · filed 2004-06-16(g)

When reviewing a decision under this statute, the Superior Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the DBR on questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing witness credibility or other factual evidence when reviewing an agency decision.

Rossi v. Employees Retirement System, 03-3186 (2004) · filed 2004-10-18(g)

This statute precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a court to affirm an agency decision supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and unaffected by legal error or arbitrariness.

Spry v. Dhs, 03-6641 (2004) · filed 2004-11-09(g)

After review of the entire record, the Court finds the decision of the Department of Human Services is supported by the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence of record and is not arbitrary or affected by error of law.

Subsection (g) limits review of an agency’s factual decision to whether substantial evidence supports it.

Younes v. Nolan, 2004-6053 (2005) · filed 2005-01-19(g)

The Court's review is limited to a determination of whether substantial evidence existed to support the Board's decision.

Section 42-35-15(g)(5) permits a court to reverse an agency decision that is clearly erroneous in view of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.

Sinin v. Dhs, 03-5735 (2005) · filed 2005-01-28(g)(5)

He further contends that the hearing officer's conclusion that his impairment did not meet a listed impairment is clearly erroneous in light of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence, and should be reversed, pursuant to § 42-35-15(g)(5). The Court agrees.

Section 42-35-15(g) requires a reviewing court to affirm an agency decision supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence when no ground for reversal is shown.

Pawtucket v. Ri Labor Relations Bd., 03-5843 (r.I.super. 2005) · filed 2005-04-07(g)

This Court finds reliable, probative, and substantial evidence as discussed above to support the Board's decision, and as such, finds no violation of G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15(g) in the Board's decision.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars the Superior Court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility when reviewing a PUC decision.

Sterry Street Towing v. Puc, 03-5810 (r.I.super. 2005) · filed 2005-05-03(g)

The Superior Court reviews a decision of PUC pursuant to R.I.G.L. §42-35-15(g), which precludes a reviewing court from substituting its own judgment for that of the PUC in regards to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents the Superior Court from substituting its judgment for the agency's when reviewing an agency decision.

Wilkinson v. Univ. of Ri, 03-0573 (r.I.super. 2005) · filed 2005-05-18(g)

Based on the standard of review set forth under § 42-35-15(g), this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Board.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility on questions of fact.

Blue Cross v. McConaghy, 04-6806 (r.I.super. 2005) · filed 2005-07-11(g)

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g)(5) permits a court to reverse or modify an agency decision that is clearly erroneous in light of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.

Brenton's Cove Condo Assoc. v. Tikoian, 03-6066 (r.I.super. 2005) · filed 2005-04-13(g)(5)

However, the Court may reverse or modify a final decision of an agency if it is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. ... After a review of the entire record, this Court finds that the decision of the CRMC was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.

Section 42-35-15(g) gives the Superior Court a limited scope of review over contested agency decisions, including review for substantial evidence.

Laporte v. Dhs, 05-0077 (r.I.super. 2005) · filed 2005-11-09(g)

"When reviewing an agency decision pursuant to § 42-35-15, the Superior Court sits as an appellate court with a limited scope of review." MineSafety Appliances Co. v. Berry, 620 A.2d 1255, 1259 (R.I. 1993). Accordingly, the reversal of an agency's decision by this Court is only proper if there is a lack of substantial evidence to support the agency's decision.

Section 42-35-15 requires a court to uphold agency factual findings supported by competent evidence in the record.

Riesman v. Crmc, 93-5078 (r.I.super. 2005) · filed 2005-11-16(g)

When this Court reviews agency decisions pursuant to § 42-35-15, it must uphold the agency's findings so long as competent evidence exists in the record.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits review of agency fact findings to the certified record and whether substantial evidence supports the decision.

American Legion Post 12 v. Susa, W.C./04-0461 (r.I.super. 2005) · filed 2005-11-30(g)

In reviewing an agency decision, this Court is limited to an examination of the certified record in deciding whether the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars the Superior Court from substituting its judgment for an agency's on witness credibility or the weight of factual evidence.

Scituate v. Rhode Island State Labor Bd, 05-0976 (r.I.super. 2006) · filed 2006-01-24(g)

Under the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act, this Court, sitting as an appellate court with a limited scope of review, is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of an agency with respect to the credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the evidence as to questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for the agency's on the weight of factual evidence.

Town v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 03-6427 (r.I.super. 2006) · filed 2006-05-10(g)

This Court's review of an administrative decision is guided by the provisions of R.I. Gen. Laws 1956 § 42-35-15(g), as follows: The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency's on questions of fact.

State v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board, 05-3668 (r.I.super. 2006) · filed 2006-06-08(g)

The Superior Court's judicial review of a contested Board decision is governed by the Administrative Procedures Act, §42-35-15(g), which provides as follows: ... Under the terms of this statute, the reviewing Court is precluded from substituting its judgment on questions of fact for that of the agency.

A reviewing court must uphold an agency's factual findings and conclusions if competent evidence supports them.

City of East Providence v. Narragansett Electric, 06-2888 (r.I.super. 2006) · filed 2006-06-15(g)

Essentially, this Court is required to uphold the agency's findings and conclusions of fact if they are supported by competent evidence.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits judicial review of an agency decision to the certified record and whether substantial evidence supports the decision.

Joint v. Demarkey, Pc/05-0421 (r.I.super. 2006) · filed 2006-09-22(g)

In reviewing an administrative agency's decision, this Court is limited to an examination of the certified record to determine whether said decision is supported by substantial evidence.

Section 42-35-15(g) gives the Superior Court a limited, appellate-like scope of review over agency decisions.

Johnson v. Rhode Island Dept. of Human · filed 2006-12-15(g)

In reviewing an administrative agency decision pursuant to § 42-35-15, this Court acts in the same manner as an appellate court with a limited scope of review.

Section 42-35-15 directs the Superior Court to review agency decisions in an appellate capacity.

Spirito v. Employees' Retirement System · filed 2007-01-04

When acting pursuant to Sec. 42-35-15, the Superior Court sits as an appellate court.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits judicial review of agency decisions and permits affirmance when substantial evidence supports the decision and no error prejudices the appellant's substantial rights.

Houghton v. Contractors' Reg. Board · filed 2007-01-04(g)

This Court's review of an administrative agency decision under §42-35-15 is limited in scope. ... After a thorough review of the entire record in this matter, this Court finds that the Board's denial of the Motion to Vacate is supported by substantial, reliable, and probative evidence and was not made upon unlawful procedure or in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions, or affected by other error of law. Substantial rights of the Appellants have not been prejudiced. Accordingly, the Board's decision is affirmed.

Subsection (g) limits judicial review of agency fact findings to the certified record and bars the court from reweighing the evidence.

Aubin v. Gifford · filed 2007-01-09(g)

In reviewing an agency decision, this Court will not weigh the evidence upon which findings of fact are based, but will limit itself to an examination of the certified record in deciding whether the agency had substantial evidence to support its decision.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing an agency's factual findings when legally competent evidence supports its decision.

Trombley v. City of Warwick · filed 2007-01-11(g)

This Court's review of a decision of the Warwick Board of Public Safety is controlled by G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15 of the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"). ... Therefore, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the agency on whether Plaintiff's disability was directly and exclusively work-related. Accordingly, the Board's decision was supported by the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence of record, was not clearly erroneous, and was not affected by error of law.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits judicial review of contested agency decisions to the record and bars the court from reweighing factual evidence.

Loans for Res. Mortgage Corp. v. State · filed 2007-04-25(g)

The Superior Court of Rhode Island reviews contested agency decisions pursuant to the provisions of the Rhode Island Administrative Procedures Act, § 42-35-15(g). ... In reviewing an agency decision, this Court will not weigh the evidence upon which findings of fact are based, but will limit itself to an examination of the certified record in deciding whether the agency had substantial evidence to support its decision.

Section 42-35-15(g) requires the Superior Court to determine whether legally competent evidence in the record supports an agency decision.

Town of Burrillville v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board · filed 2007-05-04(g)

The Superior Court’s review of an administrative decision is governed by § 42-35-15 of the APA. ... The Superior Court’s review of an administrative decision is limited to a determination of whether or not legally competent evidence exists in the record to support the agency’s decision. ... Accordingly, we hold that there is insufficient competent evidence in the record to support the SLRB’s determination that the Union did not waive its right to bargain with the Town concerning General Order No. 1.

Under subsection (g), a court reviewing an agency decision examines the certified record for substantial evidence and does not reweigh the evidence.

Peoples Liquor v. Dept. of Bus. Reg. · filed 2007-05-21(g)

The Court reviews contested agency decisions pursuant to the provisions of the Rhode Island Administrative Procedures Act, G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15(g). ... In reviewing an agency decision, the Court will not weigh the evidence upon which findings of fact are based, but will limit itself to an examination of the certified record in deciding whether the agency had substantial evidence to support its decision.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits judicial review of an agency decision to the certified record and requires the court to assess whether substantial evidence supports the decision.

Richter v. R.I. Dept. of Human Serv. · filed 2007-05-30(g)

In reviewing an agency decision, this Court is limited to an examination of the certified record in deciding whether the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing factual evidence and requires it to leave an agency decision undisturbed when the agency applied the law correctly and competent evidence supports its decision.

Cotroneo v. Town of Narragansett · filed 2007-10-30(g)

In conducting its review, "[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15(g). ... In short, if an agency has applied the law correctly and an examination of the record reveals that the agency's decision is supported by some credible or competent evidence, this Court shall not disturb the agency's determination.

Section 42-35-15(g) governs Superior Court review of final agency decisions and bars the court from reweighing factual evidence.

Town of Cumberland v. Susa · filed 2007-11-02(g)

Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g) governs the Superior Court's standard of review of a final agency decision.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing evidence when reviewing an agency's factual findings.

The Rhode Island Mortgage Store v. Orifice · filed 2007-12-17(g)

The hearing officer's reliance upon the competent evidence presented by the Appellee was not clearly erroneous, and the Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Department concerning the weight of the evidence.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a court to affirm, reverse, or remand an agency decision and limits its review of the agency's factual findings.

Westerly Nursing Home v. Ri D.H.S. · filed 2007-12-18(g)

Under § 42-35-15(g), this Court is empowered to affirm, reverse or remand an agency's decision. ... In short, if an agency has applied the law correctly and an examination of the record reveals that the agency's decision is supported by some credible or competent evidence, this Court shall not disturb the agency's determination.

Section 42-35-15(g)(6) permits a court to reverse an agency decision that is arbitrary or capricious or reflects an abuse of discretion.

Blinn v. City of East Providence · filed 2007-12-18(g)(6)

The Court may affirm, remand, or reverse should it find that the agency's decision was, inter alia, "[a]rbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."

Section 42-35-15(g) limits a court's review of agency factfinding and permits relief when specified errors prejudice an appellant's substantial rights.

MacBain v. State of Rhode Island · filed 2008-01-30(g)

When reviewing a decision under the Administrative Procedures Act, this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency on questions of fact. ... Substantial rights of the Appellants have not been prejudiced. Accordingly, this Court denies the appeal.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars the Superior Court from reweighing factual evidence when reviewing an agency decision.

Schultz v. State · filed 2008-05-06(g)

The Court reviews the decision pursuant to § 42-35-15(g), which provides that [t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits judicial review of agency decisions: a court may not reweigh factual evidence and may reverse or modify a decision when specified errors prejudice the appellant's substantial rights.

Additional Personnel v. Carvajal · filed 2008-07-22(g)

The standard of review is codified, as follows: The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits judicial review of an agency decision to the certified record and whether legally competent evidence supports the decision.

Worley v. Retirement Board of the Employees' · filed 2008-07-28(g)

The Superior Court's review of a decision rendered by the Retirement Board is governed by § 42-35-15 of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). ... When reviewing an agency decision under the APA, the Court is limited to examining the certified record to determine whether the agency's decision is supported by legally competent evidence.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits review of agency factfinding and requires the Superior Court to uphold an agency decision supported by substantial evidence.

Arnold v. Rhode Island Dept. of Human Serv. · filed 2008-08-05(g)

This Court's review of a final agency decision is governed by the provisions of § 42-35-15(g) of the Rhode Island General Laws. ... In fact, as long as "substantial evidence" supports the agency's determination, the Superior Court must uphold the agency's decision.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a court to reverse an agency decision when an error of law substantially prejudices the appellant's rights.

Auto Body Asso. v. State · filed 2008-08-13(g)

The Court may reverse, modify, or remand an agency's decision if the decision substantially prejudices the appellant by satisfying any of the six criteria explicitly stated in § 42-35-15(g). ... Accordingly, the Court further concludes that DBR's Decision was affected by error of law. As such, ABARI's rights were substantially prejudiced. The Decision issued by DBR is reversed.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits Superior Court review of agency decisions to the certified record and requires legally competent evidence to support an agency decision.

Harbor Cruises v. Dept. of Labor · filed 2008-11-10(g)

As this statutory provision indicates, the Superior Court's review of agency decisions is limited to "`an examination of the certified record to determine if there is any legally competent evidence therein to support the agency's decision.'" Nickerson v. Reitsma, 853 A.2d 1202,1205 (R.I. 2004) (quoting Barrington School Comm. v. R.I. State LaborRelations Bd., 608 A.2d 1126, 1138 (R.I. 1992)).

Section 42-35-15(g) limits judicial review of agency factfinding: a court may not reweigh the evidence and may set aside findings that are clearly erroneous in view of the record.

Cavanaugh v. Contractors' Registration Board · filed 2008-12-08(g)

In reviewing the Board's decision, this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency unless its findings are clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence contained in the record.

Section 42-35-15 requires limited judicial review of an agency decision and permits remand when gaps in the record prevent meaningful review.

Aldo's Place v. Greer · filed 2009-01-02

When considering an administrative appeal pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15, the Court must apply a limited standard of review. ... Such deficiencies in the record preclude this Court from reviewing DBR's administrative decision to uphold the Town's denial of Appellant's application for a Class C liquor license on the grounds that to do so would violate the 200-foot rule of § 3-7-19. Accordingly, the Court remands this case to DBR to conduct, in accordance with § 3-5-17, whatever additional evidentiary hearing is necessary to enable it to render a decision consistent with this Decision.

Section 42-35-15(g) prohibits a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency's on the weight of factual evidence.

Mellor v. Employees' Retirement of Ri · filed 2009-08-05(g)

The Superior Court's review of the Retirement Board's decision is governed by § 42-35-15(g) which provides: The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for the agency's on witness credibility or the weight of factual evidence.

Marcantonio v. R.I. Dept. of Health · filed 2010-02-12(g)

When reviewing an agency decision pursuant to § 42-35-15, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency with respect to credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing an agency's factual findings and requires it to uphold a decision supported by legally competent evidence.

McElroy v. Employees Retirement Bd. of Ri · filed 2010-03-24(g)

This Court's review of the factual findings of the agency must conform to the standards set forth in § 42-35-15. Thus, this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility when reviewing an agency decision.

Zaccagnini v. Town of Johnston Police · filed 2010-03-30(g)

When reviewing an agency decision pursuant to § 42-35-15, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency with respect to credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) requires courts reviewing agency decisions to defer to supported factual findings and bars them from reweighing the evidence.

Bergantini v. R.I. Dept. of Bus. Regul. · filed 2010-04-28(g)

After a review of the record, this Court finds the Decision of the Department of Business Regulation did not violate substantial rights of the Appellant in violation of § 42-35-10 or § 42-35-15. This Court affirms the DBR's finding that Appellant did not follow the USPAP, did not exercise reasonable diligence in his appraisals, and misrepresented an appraisal with the intent to benefit himself or another. The Decision of the DBR was supported with substantial evidence and was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

Section 42-35-15(g) limits review of an agency decision to the certified record when the court determines whether substantial evidence supports it.

Raimondo v. Sullivan · filed 2010-10-14(g)

The court reviews a contested administrative decision pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15(g). ... In reviewing an agency decision, this Court is limited to an examination of the certified record in deciding whether the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a court to affirm an agency decision when its interpretation is reasonable and is neither clearly erroneous nor an abuse of discretion.

Gtech Corporation v. Kent County Water · filed 2010-11-18(g)

As such, the PUC's interpretation of the Regulations as precluding master metering for separately owned parcels of realty is neither clearly erroneous nor an abuse of discretion and is not in excess of statutory authority.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents the reviewing court from reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility on questions of fact.

Prov. Water v. Div. of Public Utilities · filed 2010-12-28(g)

Under this section, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency with respect to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) requires courts to defer to agency factual findings but review questions of law de novo.

Horbet v. New Penn, Inc. · filed 2011-01-10(g)

The Court reviews a contested administrative decision pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15(g). ... Thus, while the factual determinations of an agency are afforded great deference, questions of law are reviewed by the Court de novo without deference to the agency's interpretation.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing an agency’s factual findings, even when both sides presented ample evidence.

Holland v. Employee Retirement Syst. · filed 2011-01-31(g)

Although ample evidence was presented on both sides, this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ERSRI.See § 42-35-(g).

Section 42-35-15(g) limits judicial review of a contested agency decision to the certified record and permits reversal when the decision lacks substantial evidence or contains legal error.

Biagetti v. R.I. Dept. of Human Serv. · filed 2011-02-25(g)

The court reviews a contested administrative decision pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, § 42-35-15(g). ... In reviewing an agency decision, this Court is limited to an examination of the certified record in deciding whether the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence. ... Thus, DHS's decision is not affected by error of law and is supported by the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence of record.

Section 42-35-15(g) requires a reviewing court to affirm an agency decision if the record contains any legally competent evidence supporting it.

Gregory v. Ri Commission for Human · filed 2011-03-10(g)

This Court must affirm the agency's decision if any legally competent evidence to support it exists in the record.

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing witness credibility or factual evidence in an agency decision.

Shaw v. Marques · filed 2011-04-04(g)

Under this section, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency with respect to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) requires a reviewing court to defer to agency factual findings supported by legally competent evidence.

Richard v. Employees' Retirement System · filed 2011-04-18(g)

Accordingly, this Court defers to the administrative agency's factual determinations provided that they are supported by legally competent evidence.

Section 42-35-15(g)(5) permits reversal of agency fact findings that are clearly erroneous in view of the evidence on the whole record.

Sullivan v. City of Providence · filed 2008-08-21(g)(5)

The four findings of fact singled out by Sullivan are not in violation of the clearly erroneous standard set forth in R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-35-15(g)(5).

Section 42-35-15(g) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing the evidence on questions of fact.

Pierre v. Smithfield Sch. Committee · filed 2009-09-09(g)

Additionally, when examining the certified record, this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g) bars a reviewing court from reweighing agency fact findings supported by competent evidence.

Kent v. Rhode Island Dept. · filed 2011-07-20(g)

Although ample evidence was presented on both sides by competent individuals who had both engineering and biological experience in the field of freshwater wetlands, this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the DEM as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Section 42-35-15(g)(5) permits a court to reverse an agency decision that is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.

M.G.C. Remodeling v. Rhode Island Contr. · filed 2009-04-08(g)(5)

After a review of the entire record, this Court finds that the Board's decision to affirm the Hearing Officer's finding that M.G.C. breached its contract with Claimant DiNobile and the Hearing Officer's subsequent award of $3000 (and the assessment of the $500 fine) were not "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record." Section 42-35-15(g)(5).

Section 42-35-15(g) requires a reviewing court to affirm an agency decision supported by substantial evidence when the appellant’s substantial rights have not been prejudiced.

Cramer v. Olsen · filed 2010-06-16(g)

After a thorough review of the entire record, this Court finds that the Board's decision was not clearly erroneous in light of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or affected by error of law. This Court further finds that the Board's decision was neither arbitrary nor characterized by an abuse of discretion. Substantial rights of Appellant have not been prejudiced. Accordingly, this Court affirms the Board's decision.

Section 42-35-15 permits the Superior Court to affirm an agency decision supported by substantial evidence when the appellant’s substantial rights have not been prejudiced.

Div. Resource Ctr. v. Ri Dept. of Labor · filed 2011-04-04

Having done so, this Court is satisfied that the Hearing Officer's Decision is supported by the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is not an abuse of discretion or clearly erroneous. Substantial rights of Appellant have not been prejudiced.

Section 42-35-15(g) requires a reviewing court to defer to an agency's assessment of witness credibility and evidentiary weight when its factual findings have competent support in the record.

Interstate Nav. v. Coastal Res. Mgt. · filed 2010-10-19(g)

Giving deference to the CRMC's determination as to the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence pursuant to § 42-35-15(g), this Court finds that the Council's findings of fact on the issue of homeland security were based on competent evidence in the record and were not clearly erroneous.

Section 42-35-15(g) requires a court to uphold an agency decision when legally competent evidence supports it.

Power Test Realty Co. v. Sullivan · filed 2011-09-01(g)

Under this statute, the Court must uphold the agency's decision if legally competent evidence exists in the record.

Section 42-35-15(g) provides a deferential standard for reviewing agency factfinding that a court may adopt when reviewing a municipal retirement board's decision.

Retirement Bd. of Employees v. Corrente · filed 2011-09-28(g)

However, having adopted the standard of review set forth in § 42-35-15(g), the Court must now afford the Retirement Board's determination the appropriate deference.

Section 42-35-15(g)'s standard of review may be used for a municipal retirement board decision when the governing ordinance's civil action operates as an administrative appeal.

Retirement Board of the Employees' Retirement System of the City of Providence v. Frank E. Corrente and Mayor of the City of Providence · filed 2017-12-15(g)

The trial justice correctly construed the language in the HSO mandating that the board “initiate a civil action in the [S]uperior [C]ourt” as akin to an administrative appeal and appropriately applied the standard of review set forth in the APA.

On judicial review of a contested agency case, courts defer to agency factual findings but review questions of law, including statutory interpretation, de novo.

Grasso v. Raimondo · filed 2018-02-12(g)

As such, while the Court affords an agency’s factual findings great deference, “questions of law — including statutory interpretation — are reviewed de novo.” Iselin v. Retirement Board of Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island, 943 A.2d 1045, 1049 (R.I. 2008). Accordingly, and in the interest of absolute clarity given the two actions before us, it is our judgment that, in reviewing the decision of the trial justice in the instant case, we shall apply a de novo standard of review.

Section 42-35-15 requires reversal or remand when an agency’s failure to make required findings constitutes an error of law.

Barrington School Committee v. Walters, 92-7250 (1993) · filed 1993-12-01

That failure on the part of the hearing officer constitutes an error of law which pursuant to §42-35-15 R.I.G.L. mandates reversal or remand.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits reversal of an agency decision when the agency exceeds its statutory authority and prejudices the appellant's substantial rights.

Clarke v. Morsilli, 96-4217 (1998) · filed 1998-02-03(g)

The record evidences that the commission did not timely amend the complaint to include the charges against Clarke, and because it failed to complete its investigation by December 22, 1994, the commission exceeded its statutory authority in pursuing this action and finding the foregoing ethical violations. Consequently, Clarke's substantial rights were prejudiced, in violation of § 42-35-15 (g), compelling the court to conclude that the decision of the commission must be reversed.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits the Superior Court to vacate and remand an agency decision when legal error prejudices a claimant’s substantial rights.

Camacho v. R.I. Dhs 01-2502 (2002) · filed 2002-06-19(g)

After review of the entire record, this Court finds that the substantial rights of the Appellant have been prejudiced because the DHS decision was in violation of statutory provisions and was affected by error of law. Accordingly, the DHS decision is vacated, and this matter is remanded to the appeals officer for reevaluation of entitlement to benefits consistent with this decision.

Subsection (g) permits a court to reverse an agency decision affected by legal error or unsupported by substantial evidence.

Almonte v. Rhode Island Department, Human Services, 01-0904 (2002) · filed 2002-08-26(g)

The scope of this Court's review of administrative decisions is confined by R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-35-15(g). ... After reviewing the entire record, this Court finds that the Hearing Officer's decision is not supported by the reliable, probative and substantial evidence of record and is infected by errors of law.

Section 42-35-15(g) allows a reviewing court to reverse an administrative ruling on constitutional grounds.

DiBattista v. State · filed 2002-11-08(g)

Notably, this statute includes constitutional violations as grounds for reversing an administrative ruling.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits reversal when an agency decision prejudices substantial rights because its findings lack substantial evidence, are arbitrary or capricious, or exceed the agency's authority.

Boat Cove Dock Assn. v. Coastal Resources Mangt. Council, Wc99-0230 (2002) · filed 2002-11-25(g)

After a review of the entire record, this Court finds that the May 30, 2000 CRMC decision, which denied BCDA's application, is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; is arbitrary and capricious and characterized by an abuse of discretion; and exceeded its statutory authority. As a result, the substantial rights of BCDA have been prejudiced. Accordingly, this Court reverses the May 30, 2000 decision of CRMC and remands this case to CRMC with instructions that CRMC issue an assent for the construction of the proposed dock, as described in the application submitted to CRMC, with all staff stipulations.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits the Superior Court to reverse and remand an agency decision when legal errors, unsupported findings, or arbitrary action prejudice the appellant's substantial rights.

Rotondo v. Ri Dhs, 04-1319 (2004) · filed 2004-11-12(g)

Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15(g) governs the Superior Court's scope of review for an appeal of a final agency decision. ... After reviewing the entire record, this Court finds that the Hearing Officer's decision is not supported by the reliable, probative and substantial evidence of record and is affected by errors of law, is in violation of statutory provisions, and is arbitrary. ... Accordingly, the Court reverses DHS's decision and remands this case for further proceedings and findings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits the Superior Court to reverse an agency decision that exceeds the agency's statutory authority.

State v. Lrb, 04-1899 (r.I.super. 2005) · filed 2005-11-14(g)

This Court finds that the Board's decision is in excess of its statutory authority. Consequently, this Court reverses the Board's decision holding that home day care providers are state employees.

Section 42-35-15 permits a court to reverse an agency decision that exceeds the agency’s statutory authority and prejudices an appellant’s substantial rights.

Northeast Lightning v. Rhode Island Dept. of Lab., 05-3164 (r.I.super 2006) · filed 2006-01-03

This appeal is from a decision made by an administrative agency, and, as such, the standard implemented by this Court is set forth in G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15, which provides the following: ... The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: ... (2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency; ... As a result, substantial rights of the plaintiffs have been prejudiced. Accordingly, the Court reverses the Board's decision, thereby vacating the cease and desist orders and quashing all fines imposed in connection with Northeast's work at the Rhode Island Hospital project.

Section 42-35-15(g)(6) permits a court to reverse an agency decision that is arbitrary and capricious.

Sheehan v. Employees Retirement Board, 03-3970 (r.I.super. 2006) · filed 2006-05-02(g)(6)

For all of these reasons, this Court finds that the decision of the Retirement Board was arbitrary and capricious. R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-35-15(g)(6).

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a court to reverse an agency decision when legal error, excess authority, or arbitrary action prejudices substantial rights.

United Service v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Bd., Pc/05-4784 (2006) · filed 2006-08-07(g)

This Court finds that the Labor Board's granting of the Motions to Dismiss was in violation of statutory and regulatory provisions, was in excess of the authority granted to the Labor Board, and was arbitrary and capricious. The Labor Board's decision also was affected by error of law and was characterized by an abuse of discretion. Substantial rights of the intervenor union have been prejudiced. Accordingly, this Court reverses the Labor Board's decision.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a court to remand an arbitrary agency decision that prejudices the appellant’s substantial rights.

Loungxay v. Rhode Island Dept. of Labor · filed 2008-08-13(g)

This Court's review of an administrative decision is guided by the provisions of R.I. Gen. Laws 1956 § 42-35-15(g), which states as follows: ... For the reasons stated here within, this Court finds that the decision of the hearing officer was arbitrary. Substantial rights of petitioner have been prejudiced. Accordingly, this Court remands this case to the Department for further proceedings consistent with this Decision, to be adjudicated within a reasonable period of time.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits remand when an arbitrary or capricious agency decision prejudices the appellant’s substantial rights.

Ricci v. Rhode Island Dhs · filed 2008-02-28(g)

After a review of the entire record, this Court finds that the hearing officer's decision to deny Emanuelle medical assistance through the Katie Beckett Program was arbitrary and capricious. Consequently, substantial rights of plaintiff have been prejudiced.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a court to reverse, modify, or remand an agency decision when one of its six listed grounds substantially prejudices the appellant.

Heaney v. Reitsma · filed 2008-04-14(g)

The Court may reverse, modify, or remand the agency's decision if the decision substantially prejudices the appellant by satisfying any of the six criteria explicitly stated in § 42-35-15(g).

Section 42-35-15(g)(6) permits reversal of an agency decision when the absence of findings supporting a charge makes the decision arbitrary and capricious and substantially prejudices the appellant.

Sherman v. Gifford · filed 2009-08-21(g)(6)

This Court finds that the Board's finding as to Count V is arbitrary and capricious, substantially prejudicing the rights of Dr. Sherman, because it neglected to make any finding of fact supporting Dr. Sherman's guilt.

Section 42-35-15(g)(5) permits a court to find an agency determination clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.

401 Auto Sales v. Ri Motor. Veh. Dealers' · filed 2011-04-04(g)(5)

Consequently, the Court concludes that the Hearing Officer's finding that the doctrine of administrative finality was inapplicable to the instant matter because "the Board chose to treat the applications as one application" is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. See G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15(g)(5).

Section 42-35-15(g)(2) permits a court to reverse or modify an agency decision that exceeds the agency's statutory authority.

Fransson v. State · filed 2011-04-07(g)(2)

If the Board did not have such authority, then its decision is "[i]n excess of the statutory authority of the agency," and this Court may reverse or modify the decision. Section 42-35-15(g)(2). ... Because the Board's decision was ultra vires and exceeded the scope of the Board's statutory authority, the portion of the decision that orders the Personnel Administrator to exercise his statutory duties and allocate or reallocate Fransson's position is vacated.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits remand when an agency's disregard of relevant, material evidence makes its decision clearly erroneous and prejudices substantial rights.

Gomes v. Orefice · filed 2011-08-12(g)

After review of the entire record, this Court finds that the decision was clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record, and that substantial rights of Appellant have been prejudiced. Further, the Department abused its discretion when it placed no weight at all on the relevant and material evidence. The Court sustains the appeal and the matter is remanded to the Department for entry of an administrative order consistent with this Decision.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a court to reverse an agency decision when legal error or clear error prejudices the appellant’s substantial rights.

Sullivan v. Ret. Bd. of Emp. Ret. System · filed 2011-09-14(g)

After a review of the entire record, the Court concludes that the Board's decision was affected by error of law and clearly erroneous. Sullivan's substantial rights have been prejudiced. Accordingly, this Court reverses the Board's decision denying Sullivan's request to purchase credits for retirement purposes.

Section 42-35-15(g) allows a court to reverse and remand an agency decision made upon unlawful procedure or affected by legal error.

Corsi v. State · filed 2011-11-10(g)

For the reasons stated in this Decision, this Court finds that the Contractors' Registration and Licensing Board's Final Order was made upon unlawful procedure and affected by error of law in that it violated the due process rights of Appellant Vincent Corsi Jr. and Quality Swimming Pools Spas, Inc. Accordingly, the Final Order of the Contractors' Registration and Licensing Board's is reversed and the matter is remanded to the Board for a new hearing.

Section 42-35-15(g) permits a court to reverse or modify an agency decision only if the error prejudices the appellant's substantial rights.

Woonsocket Housing Authority v. R.I. St. Labor Rel. Bd., Pc-93-0085 (1994) · filed 1994-06-01(g)

Nevertheless § 42-35-15(g) has a built-in harmless error rule, because this Court will reverse or modify the Board's decision only "if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced."

Section 42-35-15(g) permits reversal for a clearly erroneous finding only when the error prejudices the appellant’s substantial rights; a harmless error does not warrant reversal.

Board of Engineers v. Ri State Labor Relations Board, 90-1351 (1995) · filed 1995-01-09(g)

R.I.G.L. § 42-35-15 allows a reviewing court to reverse or modify the decision of an agency "if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced" due to a finding which is clearly erroneous. ... For these reasons, the Board's finding that Paul Hanlon's job title was "Fire Fighter/Ambulance Attendant" rather than "Ambulance Attendant/Driver Trainee" constitutes harmless error which was not prejudicial to the respondent/employer's rights.

Section 42-35-15(g) does not require reversal of an agency decision for an error that did not prejudice the appellant's substantial rights.

Chappell v. R.I. Department of Human Services, 02-4586 (2003) · filed 2003-05-28(g)

Even if the Hearing Officer's written decision may offer some inaccurate interpretations of law, there is no evidence that any such mistake seriously affected the propriety of his ruling or prejudiced any substantial rights of the appellant.

Section 42-35-15(c) gives a reviewing court discretion to stay an agency order while it reviews the merits; the Harsch criteria are not rigid requirements for every stay.

State Department of Corrections v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board · filed 1995-05-22(c)

In any event, we do not construe the Harsch case as being applicable in respect to the stay of every agency order that may be subject to review pursuant to G.L.1956 (1993 Reenactment) § 42-35-15(c). That section provides in respect to judicial review of contested eases that the agency may grant, “or the reviewing court may order, a stay upon the appropriate terms.” We are of the opinion that this section grants to the reviewing court the power to grant a stay of an agency order under circumstances which in the trial justice’s sound discretion should require that matters be held in status quo pending review of the agency decision on its merits. While the Harsch criteria may be persuasive in a given context, we do not consider that they are rigid requirements that the reviewing court must meet in each instance.

Section 42-35-15 is not the proper route for challenging a Department of Corrections good-time credit calculation; the challenge should be filed as an application for postconviction relief.

Leonardo v. Vose · filed 1996-03-11

He sought review by way of the Administrative Procedures Act, G.L.1956 § 42-35-15, of a calculation by the Department of Corrections of his “good time” credit pursuant to G.L.1956 § 42-56-24, as amended by P.L. 1991, ch. 183, § 2. ... On appeal, applicant contends that Rule 80 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides the proper mode of review of a good-time calculation by the Department of Corrections. The applicant is mistaken. ... This court has previously directed that issues regarding the computation of good-time credit should properly be filed as an application for postconviction relief.

Section 42-35-15 requires a party to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review.

Erklauer v. the Town of Warren Zoning Board of Review, 95-4923 (1996) · filed 1996-04-24

As the plaintiffs did not exhaust the administrative remedies as required by § § 42-35-15, this matter is not properly before this Court.

Section 42-35-15(a) provides judicial review after administrative remedies are exhausted; a wetlands applicant ordinarily must use that process before bringing a separate court action.

Mall at Coventry Joint Venture v. McLeod · filed 1998-12-09(a)

We do this to indicate that only in the most egregious circumstances, not present in this case, would an applicant for alteration of a wetland ever be justified in bringing an action against DEM before having filed a formal application, having had that application denied, and further having availed itself of judicial review, as provided in G.L.1956 § 42-35-15(a) and further referenced in G.L. 1956 § 2-1-21 of the Wetlands Act as well as § 2-1-20.1 which makes the Administrative Procedures Act applicable to a Wetlands appeal.

Section 42-35-15 permits judicial review only after available administrative remedies are exhausted and the agency has issued a final order; a dismissal that allows the petitioner to return to the agency lacks the required finality.

Rhode Island Laborers' v. Rhode Island State Labor Rel. Brd, 97-3841 (2000) · filed 2000-01-06

The Decision and Order specifically declines to make a final determination and affirmatively preserves the Union's right to resubmit a petition. Thus, the Union has not exhausted its administrative remedies, the pursuit of which are clearly not futile, the instant matter lacks the requisite finality necessary for review pursuant to G.L. § 42-35-15.

Section 42-35-15(a) requires exhaustion of agency remedies before judicial review of a contested case, but does not impose that requirement when the matter is not a contested case.

Lime Rock Fire District v. Iaff · filed 2007-01-26(a)

Pursuant to the APA, "any person . . . who has exhausted all administrative remedies available to him or her within the agency, and who is aggrieved by a final order in a contested case is entitled to judicial review" of that order. G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15(a). ... However, if a case does not constitute a "contested case," then a party is not required to exhaust any administrative remedies and may seek judicial review instead.

Section 42-35-15(a) generally requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before judicial review, but a court may hear an appeal involving predominantly legal questions despite nonexhaustion.

Archer v. Empl. Retirement Sys. of Ri · filed 2009-03-18(a)

Generally, when exhaustion is statutorily mandated, as § 42-35-15(a) of the APA provides, the failure to exhaust administrative remedies will divest the court of jurisdiction. ... Therefore, in accordance withPower, supra, this Court finds that Appellants' administrative appeal is properly before the Court.

Section 42-35-15 permits judicial review of a final agency decision only after the aggrieved party exhausts available administrative remedies.

Sullivan v. Reilly · filed 2012-07-05

However, judicial review of an administrative agency’s final decision is available if, and only if, the aggrieved party has exhausted all the administrative remedies available to him within the agency.

Section 42-35-15(b) requires an appeal from a final agency decision within 30 days after notice of the decision is mailed.

Burrillville Sch. Committee v. Rhode Island Dept., Children, 96-1774 (1996) · filed 1996-10-03(b)

The jurisdictional provisions of the APA provide that all appeals to this Court from final agency decisions must be made within 30 days of the mailing of the notice of such decisions. R.I.G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15(b). The day of the event triggering the running of the statutory limitation is never included in the calculation when computing this, or any period of time prescribed by law in a civil action. R.I. Sup. Ct. R. Civ. Pro. 6. A finding that the letter postmarked March 9, 1996 represents a final order by the DCYF dictates that this Court acknowledge a 30 day period, beginning on March 10, 1996, within which a filing of an appeal would be timely. Because this action was filed on April 8, 1996, and the 30 day period mentioned above runs until April 8, 1996, this action is timely.

Section 42-35-15 requires an appeal from an administrative decision within 30 days; an untimely appeal leaves the decision final and binding.

Pina v. Dos Anjos · filed 2000-05-19

Even if plaintiffs had properly named Pride as a party defendant in this case, their action against that defendant would be barred in that plaintiffs failed to file a timely appeal from the decision of the board, an action governed by the Administrative Procedures Act, G.L.1956 (1993 Reenactment) § 42-35-15. The plaintiffs were required to appeal from the decision of the administrator of adjudication within 30 days of the decision rendered on April 6, 1998. The complaint, however, was not filed until May 19, 1998 — some 43 days after the decision of the administrator was rendered. Therefore, plaintiffs’ complaint against Pride was not timely filed pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act. Thus, the administrative decision was final and binding on the parties.

A corrected notice can be the agency’s amended final decision for purposes of the thirty-day period to seek judicial review.

Fass v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Rhode Island, 97-0679 (1997) · filed 1997-11-21(b)

Since the corrected letter was technically the amended, final decision of the agency, appellee's argument is without merit.

Section 42-35-15(b)'s thirty-day appeal period for a labor board representation decision begins when the results of a subsequent election are certified.

Bristol Ct. W. Auth. v. Rislrb Teamsters Loc. Un. No. 251, 02-0936 (2003) · filed 2003-07-16(b)

As a result, the thirty-day period for timely filing an appeal under § 42-35-15(b) tolled until the election results were certified by RISLRB. The Court therefore finds that the relevant date for commencing the appeal period was not the date of mailing notice, but rather the date that the subsequent election results were certified by the RISLRB, which occurred on February 11, 2002.