Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.005

Under § 656.005(24)(a), arthritis means inflammation of one or more joints.

Karjalainen v. Curtis Johnston & Pennywise, Inc. · filed 2006-10-18(24)(a)

In short, as the ALJ correctly concluded, both the ordinary meaning and the more specialized definitions of the term “arthritis” consistently suggest that it refers to a inflammation of one or more joints. The board erred in rejecting that definition of the statutory term in favor of one based on what it regarded as the most persuasive evidence as to current medical understanding of the term.

For an industrial injury claim involving a nonarthritic condition, symptoms alone do not make the condition preexisting; a diagnosis or medical services for its symptoms must precede the injury.

White v. the Boldt Company · filed 2007-04-11(24)(a)

Thus, the question whether a condition is “preexisting” is not dependent on a preinjury history of symptoms but, rather, specifically on whether claimant has been diagnosed with the condition, or received medical services for the symptoms of the condition, ... before the date of the injury.

A prior compensable out-of-state injury may qualify as a preexisting condition under section 656.005(24)(a).

Kirby v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2007-07-11(24)(a)

Under the plain language of this statute, claimant’s out-of-state injury qualifies as “any injury.” Compensable out-of-state injuries are not listed as exceptions to the general rule that a preexisting condition includes “any injury.” Claimant’s argument that a prior compensable injury cannot be a preexisting injury would require us to insert a new exception into the statute, which we may not do.

A preexisting condition that merely makes a worker more susceptible to a disease is not a contributing cause of the disease.

Murdoch v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2008-10-15(24)(c)

Because this susceptibility cannot, in accordance with ORS 656.005(24)(c), be considered a “cause” for purposes of determining “major contributing cause” under ORS 656.802(2)(a), the board erred in its conclusion.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(B) does not require an employer to expressly use the term “combined condition” to accept one.

Roseburg Forest Products v. Lund · filed 2011-08-17(7)(a)(B)

In light of that prior litigation, employer’s acceptance of claimant’s right shoulder strain and right shoulder rotator cuff tear is properly understood as its acceptance of a combined condition. Employer’s argument that it did not expressly accept a combined condition is not persuasive, because there is no such required formality to accepting a combined condition.

A later workplace injury that combines with a preexisting condition can be compensable if it is the major contributing cause of disability or a need for treatment, even when the facts also support an aggravation claim.

Petock v. Asante · filed 2011-12-30(7)(a)(B)

If the later injury both combined with the preexisting condition "to cause or prolong disability or a need for treatment" and was the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment, then the worker could bring a claim for a compensable injury. See ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) (defining when a combined condition will be compensable).

Section 656.005(7)(a)(B) limits a combined condition to an otherwise compensable injury and statutory preexisting conditions.

Vigor Industrial, LLC v. Ayres · filed 2013-08-07(7)(a)(B)

To recap: We conclude that a “combined condition,” as defined in ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B), consists only of the “otherwise compensable injury” and any statutory preexisting conditions.

A combined condition is compensable only while the otherwise compensable injury is the major contributing cause of its disability or need for treatment.

Keystone RV Co.-Thor Industries, Inc. v. Erickson · filed 2016-04-20(7)(a)(B)

When, however, an injury “combines” with a preexisting condition, the “combined condition” is compen-sable “only if, so long as and to the extent that the otherwise compensable injury is the major contributing cause of the disability of the combined condition or the major contributing cause of the need for treatment of the combined condition.” ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B).

For an accepted combined condition claim, the “otherwise compensable injury” is the accepted medical condition.

Brown v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2017-03-30(7)(a)(B)

The “accepted injury” thus defined and lim- ited what was the “otherwise compensable injury” for pur- poses of ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B).

For a previously accepted combined condition claim, the “otherwise compensable injury” is the accepted medical condition.

Brown v. SAIF · filed 2017-03-30(7)(a)(B)

The “accepted injury” thus defined and lim- ited what was the “otherwise compensable injury” for pur- poses of ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B).

An insurer may deny a combined condition claim when the accepted injury is no longer the major contributing cause of the combined condition, even if the workplace incident remains a cause.

Evans v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2017-05-10(7)(a)(B)

Here, regardless of any causal role that the “work-related injury incident” continues to play in claimant’s combined condition, it is undisputed that, at the time of SAIF’s denial of the compensability of claimant’s combined condition, claimant’s accepted lumbar strain was no longer the major contributing cause of claimant’s combined condition. Accordingly, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, we reject claimant’s first and third assignments of error.

A combined condition remains compensable only while the accepted injury is the major contributing cause of its disability or need for treatment.

Fillinger v. Boeing Co. (In re Fillinger) · filed 2018-02-14(7)(a)(B)

But the statutory texts, cited above, are definitive and permit a denial of a combined condition claim when the "otherwise compensable injury," i.e. , the "accepted injury," is no longer the major contributing cause of the worker's combined condition or the disability or need for treatment from the combined condition.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(B) makes combined conditions a limited exception to the general rule for compensable injuries.

Caren v. Providence Health Sys. Or. (In re Caren) · filed 2019-08-08(7)(a)(B)

Second, the legislature set out the standard for compensability in cases of "preexisting condition[s]" as an exception to the general definition of a "compensable injury," allowing employers to limit their liability for an "otherwise compensable injury."

A combined condition requires two separate conditions; a preexisting condition and its symptoms are not separate conditions.

Carrillo v. SAIF · filed 2021-03-17(7)(a)(B)

A preexisting condition and its symptoms are not separate conditions.

The combined condition rule applies to a death-benefit claim when the injury also causes disability or a need for treatment.

Hammond v. Liberty Nw. Ins. Corp. (In re Comp. of Hammond) · filed 2019-02-27(7)(a)(B)

In that context, benefits resulting from a combined condition are available only if the otherwise compensable injury is the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment of the combined condition; there is no exclusion when the injury also results in the worker's death. Here, the board found that the fractured femur was a combined condition, and there is no dispute that it caused or prolonged Hammond's disability and the need for treatment. We reject claimant's contention that the combined condition analysis does not apply when a claimed injury also contributes to the worker's death.

To deny an otherwise compensable omitted medical condition as part of a combined condition, the insurer must show how it combines with a preexisting condition to cause disability or a need for treatment and that it is not the major cause of that disability or need.

Pedro v. SAIF · filed 2021-07-08(7)(a)(B)

Accordingly, to deny claimant’s claim for that spe- cific medical condition on the grounds that it was part of a combined condition with claimant’s preexisting arthritis, SAIF had to introduce evidence showing (1) how the L4-5 disc protrusion combined with claimant’s preexisting arthri- tis to result in a disability or need for treatment; and (2) that the L4-5 disc protrusion was not the major cause of the dis- ability or need for treatment resulting from that combined condition.

A preexisting condition and its symptoms are not separate conditions that can form a combined condition under ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B).

Interiano v. SAIF · filed 2021-11-10(7)(a)(B)

Because a preexisting condition and its symptoms are not separate conditions, the board erred in determining that claimant had a combined condition within the meaning of ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B).

A combined condition requires two distinct medical conditions; symptoms, worsening of a preexisting condition, or the incident itself cannot serve as the second condition.

Gibson v. ESIS · filed 2022-01-05(7)(a)(B)

Consequently, the board errs if it determines that the symptoms of a preexisting condition, the worsening of a preexisting condition, or an incident itself, as distinct from a new medical condition, combined with the preexisting condition to give rise to a combined condition within the meaning of ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B).

A combined condition is compensable only while the accepted injury is the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment.

Barnes v. Cache Valley Electric · filed 2025-04-02(7)(a)(B)

Under ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B), a “combined condition” exists when an “otherwise compensable injury” combines with a preexisting condition, and the otherwise compensa- ble injury remains the major contributing cause of the com- bined condition.

A combined condition is compensable only while the otherwise compensable injury is the major contributing cause of its disability or need for treatment.

Mooney v. Legacy Health · filed 2026-04-29(7)(a)(B)

That means that the combined condition is compensable only if the “otherwise compensable injury” is the major contributing cause of the disability of the combined condition or the need for treatment of the com- bined condition.

A claimant establishes a combined condition when a compensable injury and a preexisting condition combine to cause a need for treatment, without proving causation separately for each component.

Beamon v. SAIF · filed 2026-06-10(7)(a)(B)

Claimant does not need to prove causation separately as to each component of the combined condition once he has already proven that the otherwise separate conditions com- bined to cause a need for treatment.

A combined condition is compensable only if the otherwise compensable injury is the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment.

Torres v. SAIF · filed 2022-08-24(7)(a)(B)

“However, when an otherwise compensable injury combines with a preexisting condition to cause or prolong a disability or the need for treatment, the combined condition is compen- sable only if the otherwise compensable injury is the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment.”

A combined condition is compensable when the work injury is the major contributing cause of the need for treatment of that condition.

Kenimer v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2002-07-31(7)(a)(B)

In SAIF v. Nehl, 148 Or App 101, 106, 939 P2d 96, on recons 149 Or App 309, 942 P2d 859 (1997), rev den 326 Or 389 (1998), we explained that a claimant’s combined condition is compensable if the work injury, when weighed against the preexisting condition, is the major contributing cause of the need for treatment of the combined condition.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(B) makes a combined condition compensable when an otherwise compensable injury is the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment of that condition.

Campbell Soup Company v. Langan · filed 2023-04-19(7)(a)(B)

We cannot be certain whether a more complete understanding of Broock’s opinion would have affected the board’s analysis of the major contributing cause issue. See ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) (when “an otherwise compensable injury” combines with a preexisting condition, the combined condition is compensable insofar as “the otherwise compensable injury is the major contributing cause of the disability of the combined condition or the major contributing cause of the need for treatment of the combined condition”); ORS 656.266(2)(a) (if a worker establishes an otherwise compensable injury, the burden shifts to the employer to show that that injury “is not * * * the major contributing cause of the need for treatment of the combined condition”).

Section 656.005(7)(a)(B) governs compensability when a work injury combines with a preexisting noncompensable condition; it does not assign responsibility among successive employers for multiple compensable injuries.

SAIF Corp. v. Drews · filed 1993-01-20(7)(a)(B)

ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) defines what is compensable when a work-related injury combines with a preexisting noncompensable disease or condition to cause or prolong disability or a need for treatment. ... We agree with the Board that subparagraph (B) is not intended to apply in the context of assigning responsibility among successive employers for multiple compensable injuries.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(B)’s major contributing cause requirement applies when determining whether responsibility shifts to a later employer, even if the earlier condition was compensable.

SAIF Corp. v. Drews · filed 1993-10-28(7)(a)(B)

We conclude that the legislature intended the “major contributing cause” requirement of ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) to apply to the shifting of responsibility among employers under ORS 656.308(1), whether or not the earlier condition to which subparagraph (B) refers was compensable.

A new injury shifts responsibility from the first employer only if it is the major contributing cause of the need for treatment.

SAIF Corp. v. Vinson · filed 1994-01-05(7)(a)(B)

Under the Supreme Court’s holding in SAIF v. Drews, 318 Or 1, 9, 860 P2d 254 (1993), the first employer remains responsible unless the claimant has suffered a new injury that is the major contributing cause of the need for treatment. ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B); ORS 656.308(1).

Section 656.005(7)(b) does not exclude a mental disorder under the assault or recreational activity provisions when neither assault nor horseplay caused the disorder.

Precision Castparts Corp. v. Davis · filed 1993-08-04(7)(b)(A), (7)(b)(B)

It appears that the Board made the challenged finding in response to employer’s argument that claimant’s condition is not compensable under ORS 656.005(7)(b)(A) or (B), which provide: ... Because the Board found that claimant’s condition was not caused by horseplay or assault, and there is substantial evidence to support that finding, employer’s argument fails.

When a work injury combines with a preexisting condition, determining the major contributing cause requires evaluating each cause’s relative contribution; the event that precipitated the condition is not necessarily the major cause.

Dietz v. Ramuda · filed 1994-10-05(7)(a)(B)

We conclude that, although work activities that precipitate a claimant’s injury or disease may be the major contributing cause, that is not necessarily always true.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(B)'s major contributing cause test does not apply to aggravation claims or claims for continued medical treatment; those claims use the material contributing cause standard.

Olson v. Safeway Stores, Inc. · filed 1995-01-25(7)(a)(B)

In Jocelyn v. Wampler Werth Farms, 132 Or App 165, 888 P2d 55 (1994), we held that ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) does not apply to claims for aggravation under ORS 656.273(1). ... The Board erred in applying the major contributing cause test to the aggravation and medical services claims.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(B) requires weighing the contribution of each cause, including the precipitating injury, to determine the primary cause of a combined condition’s need for treatment.

Saif Corp. v. Britton · filed 1996-12-24(7)(a)(B)

Under ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B), the quantitative contribution of each cause, including the precipitating cause, must be weighed to establish the primary cause of claimant’s need for treatment.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(B) requires the work injury to be the primary cause of the disability or need for treatment of a combined condition.

Robinson v. SAIF Corp. · filed 1997-03-19(7)(a)(B)

Also, the 1995 amendments to ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) make it clear that it is the primary cause of the disability or need for treatment of the combined condition that must be determined.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(A) does not require weighing a consequential condition against a preexisting condition when the two did not combine to cause the condition for which treatment was sought.

SAIF Corp. v. Willcutt · filed 1999-05-19(7)(a)(A)

Taken together, those statements indicate that the Board found that the herniated disc did not combine with the degenerative changes to cause the cervical condition for which claimant sought treatment. We conclude that there is substantial evidence to support that finding. In light of that finding, the Board did not need to weigh the herniated disc against the degenerative changes to determine which was the primary cause of claimant’s cervical condition.

For a combined condition, the major contributing cause test requires weighing the relative contribution of each cause to identify the primary cause.

SAIF Corp. v. Strubel · filed 1999-07-07(7)(a)(B)

ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) requires an assessment of the major contributing cause, which involves evaluating the relative contribution of different causes of an injury or disease and deciding which is the primary cause.

For a combined condition, evidence that a workplace injury caused pain or worsened the condition does not necessarily establish that the injury was the major contributing cause of the need for treatment.

Saif Corp. v. Bryant · filed 2001-04-04(7)(a)(B)

The fact, however, that Keiper found that the injury either caused claimant’s pain or worsened her condition does not necessarily mean that the injury was the major contributing cause of the need for treatment.

An employer with an accepted claim is liable for a consequential condition when the accepted injury is its major contributing cause.

SAIF Corp. v. Webb · filed 2002-05-01(7)(a)(A)

Accordingly, when the evidence establishes that the major contributing cause of a consequential condition is a previously accepted compensable injury, resorting to the judicially created Kearns presumption is unnecessary. Employers with an accepted claim are liable for a consequential condition if the accepted injury is the major contributing cause. ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A).

For a combined condition, the otherwise compensable injury must contribute more to the need for treatment than all other causes combined.

Schuler v. Beaverton School District No. 48J · filed 2002-06-27(7)(a)(B)

To show that an “otherwise compensable injury is * * * the major contributing cause of the need for treatment of the combined condition,” a claimant must show that the otherwise compensable injury contributed more to the need for treatment than all other causes combined.

For a combined injury claim, § 656.005(7)(a)(B) requires proof that work is the major contributing cause of the combined condition.

Arionus v. Precision Castparts · filed 2004-10-27(7)(a)(B)

Substantial evidence supports the board’s alternative finding that, even if the claim is characterized as an injury, the evidence fails to establish that claimant’s work is the major contributing cause of the combined condition, as required by ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B).

For a combined condition, determining the major contributing cause requires comparing the relative contributions of the preexisting condition and the work-related incident.

Cummings v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2005-02-02(7)(a)(B)

In assessing the major contributing cause of a combined condition, ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) requires “a comparison of the relative contribution of the preexisting disease or condition and the work-related incident.”

A combined condition is compensable when the work injury is the major contributing cause of the need for treatment; a medical opinion may establish that cause by weighing and rejecting alternatives.

SAIF Corp. v. Pruitt · filed 2005-03-09(7)(a)(B)

In other words, her clarifying reports, combined with other evidence in the record, demonstrate that she undertook to weigh the alternative causes for the condition, and they not only support the board’s finding that work at SAIF’s insured was the major contributing cause, but also reject the alternative explanations. We therefore conclude that the board did not err in ordering SAIF to accept claimant’s combined condition.

For a combined condition, the precipitating cause cannot be the sole basis for finding major contributing cause, but it may be a highly persuasive factor.

Allied Waste Industries, Inc. v. Crawford · filed 2005-12-28(7)(a)(B)

Although we have held that the precipitating cause of a condition cannot be the sole factor in determining major contributing cause, we have not held that it cannot be a highly persuasive factor in a case, as it apparently was here to Collada and the board.

For a combined condition, the major contributing cause inquiry focuses on the compensable injury that combined with the preexisting condition and on the combined condition that was accepted and denied.

Reid v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2011-03-16(7)(a)(B)

We agree with the board that, in determining whether SAIF properly denied claimant’s combined condition because claimant’s “otherwise compensable injury” was no longer the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment of the combined condition, it is correct under ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) to focus on the compensable injury that was shown to have combined with the preexisting condition, and on the actual combined condition that was accepted and then denied — in this case, the cervical strain that combined with claimant’s preexisting degenerative disc disease.

For a combined condition, section 656.005(7)(a)(B) requires comparing the relative contributions of the preexisting condition and the work-related incident to determine the major contributing cause.

Ryan v. Weyerhaeuser · filed 2015-01-22(7)(a)(B)

As we have explained, “[i]n assessing the major contributing cause of a combined condition, ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) requires ‘a comparison of the relative contribution of the preexisting disease or condition and the work-related incident.’”

An injury is compensable when the worker proves that workplace exposure more likely than not materially contributed to disability or the need for treatment.

Rogers v. CorVel Enterprise Comp, Inc. · filed 2022-01-20(7)(a)

Under that standard, and claimant’s burden to estab- lish her claim by a preponderance of the evidence, claimant was required to establish only that it was more likely than not that her work-place exposure materially contributed to her disability or need for treatment. See ORS 656.005(7)(a); ORS 656.266(1); Albany Gen. Hosp. v. Gasperino, 113 Or App 411, 415, 833 P2d 1292 (1992).

For an initial injury claim, a material contributing cause must be a substantial cause that is more than a minimal cause.

Rogers v. Corvel Enterprise Comp, Inc. · filed 2022-03-30

We therefore modify our opinion to state that a material contributing cause is a substantial cause that is more than a minimal cause.

Section 656.005(7)(a) allows a claimant to establish compensability by showing that the work injury materially contributed to either disability or the need for treatment.

Canchola-Morgan v. SAIF · filed 2022-12-29(7)(a)

We have reviewed the board’s order and conclude that the board understood that compensability can be estab- lished by showing either that the work injury was a mate- rial contributing cause of disability or that the work injury was a material contributing cause of the need for treatment.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(B)'s major contributing cause standard does not apply to aggravation claims under ORS 656.273(1), even when the claimant had a preexisting condition.

Jocelyn v. Wampler Werth Farms · filed 1994-12-28(7)(a)(B)

Because the legislature never intended to change the standard for proving an aggravation claim under ORS 656.273(1) when it enacted ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) in 1990, we hold that the Board erred in applying the major contributing cause standard to claimant's claim.

Section 656.005(14)’s definition of “insurer” includes SAIF.

State Accident Insurance Fund v. Anderson · filed 1995-05-25(14)

SAIF is an “insurer” by definition. ORS 656.005(14).

An assigned claims agent selected by the director under ORS 656.054 is an insurer under the Workers' Compensation Law.

In RE COMPENSATION OF McCOY · filed 2011-12-07(14)

DCBS's argument that Sedgwick is merely an assigned claims agent and not an insurer for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Law, including ORS 656.307(3), is directly contradicted by the statutory definition of "insurer" in ORS 656.005(14), which is "the State Accident Insurance Fund Corporation or an insurer authorized under ORS chapter 731 to transact workers' compensation insurance in this state or an assigned claims agent selected by the director under ORS 656.054."

An assigned claims agent selected by the director under ORS 656.054 is an insurer under ORS 656.005(14).

Department of Consumer & Business Services v. Zurich American · filed 2011-12-07(14)

DCBS’s argument that Sedgwick is merely an assigned claims agent and not an insurer for purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Law, including ORS 656.307(3), is directly contradicted by the statutory definition of “insurer” in ORS 656.005(14), which is “the State Accident Insurance Fund Corporation or an insurer authorized under ORS chapter 731 to transact workers’ compensation insurance in this state or an assigned claims agent selected by the director under ORS 656.054.”

The amended version of ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) applies to the claim and requires reconsideration under the new law.

Saif Corp. v. Terry · filed 1995-11-29(7)(a)(B)

The statute pertinent to this petition, ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B), has been amended by Oregon Laws 1995, chapter 332. Because the amended version of the statute is applicable, we remand for reconsideration in the light of the new law.

The 1995 amendments to section 656.005(7)(a)(B) apply to cases still in administrative proceedings or on review.

Beverly Enterprises v. Michl · filed 1996-01-03(7)(a)(B)

Resolution of this case involves an interpretation of ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B), which was amended by the legislature in 1995. Or Laws 1995, ch 332. The amendments are applicable to all cases still in administrative proceedings or on review.

The 1995 changes to subsections (7)(a)(B) and (24) apply to review of a claim involving a degenerative condition.

Conner v. Connecticut Indemnity Co. · filed 1996-03-06(7)(a)(B), (24)

In 1995, the legislature amended and enacted provisions that potentially affect the Board’s determination of the compensability of claimant’s degenerative condition. ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B); ORS 656.005(24). The amendments are applicable here.

The 1995 amendment to the definition of objective findings applies to claims existing or arising on or after June 7, 1995.

Simon v. PIE Nationwide, Inc. · filed 1996-07-31(19)

The amendment to ORS 656.005(19) applies to all claims existing or arising on or after June 7, 1995, the amendment’s effective date. Or Laws 1995, ch 332, §§ 1, 66(1), 69. Because the claim here existed on that date, the amendment applies.

Section 656.005(7)(b)(C) requires an employer asserting the alcohol defense to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that alcohol consumption was the injury’s major contributing cause and that the employer did not permit, encourage, or know of the consumption.

Ortman v. Laidlaw Transit · filed 2002-02-20(7)(b)(C)

Rather, ORS 656.005(7)(b)(C) requires that, to assert the alcohol defense to compensability successfully, an employer must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) consumption of alcohol was the major ... contributing cause of the injury; and (2) the employer must not have permitted, encouraged or have actual knowledge of the consumption.

Section 656.005(24)(a)(A) defines arthritis as inflammation of one or more joints due to infectious, metabolic, or constitutional causes that results in breakdown, degeneration, or structural change.

Hopkins v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2010-12-09(24)(a)(A)

We conclude that, when the legislature adopted SB 485, it intended the term “arthritis” to mean the inflammation of one or more joints, due to infectious, metabolic, or constitutional causes, and resulting in breakdown, degeneration, or structural change.

A condition qualifies as preexisting arthritis only if the medical record supports a finding of joint inflammation; an expert’s arthritis label alone is insufficient.

Staffing Services, Inc. v. Kalaveras · filed 2011-02-23(24)(a)

In examining the medical record to determine whether it shows that claimant is suffering from arthritis as this court defined it in Karjalainen (as later modified by the Supreme Court in Hopkins), the board properly inquired into whether claimant’s condition involves an inflammation of a joint. Finding no evidence of that, the board correctly determined that claimant’s condition is not arthritic.

Osteoarthritis may qualify as a preexisting arthritic condition when the medical evidence establishes that it meets the statutory criteria.

Slater v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2017-07-26(24)(a)(A)

We conclude that the board permissibly construed the medical evidence as proving that claimant’s osteoarthritis is a qualifying “preexisting condition” that became the major contributing cause of claimant’s left knee combined condition.

Section 656.005(24)'s definition of a preexisting condition does not cover the denied shoulder conditions in this case.

Johnson v. Saif Corp. (In re Comp. of Johnson) · filed 2018-03-28(24)

Although we agree with claimant that the denied shoulder conditions are not legally cognizable preexisting conditions, see ORS 656.005(24) (defining "preexisting condition"), there is another basic reason why we conclude that claimant is not entitled to benefits for the impairment related to those conditions: There is no compensation due for a denied condition.

Section 656.005(24)(a)(B)(iii) applies when determining whether a claimant has a preexisting condition in a worsening claim under ORS 656.273.

BASIN TIRE SERVICE, INC. v. Minyard · filed 2011-02-16(24)(a)(B)(iii)

It follows that it also erred in failing to apply ORS 656.005(24)(a)(B)(iii) to the claim. Hence, the board must address the application of that statute to this case on remand.

Under § 656.005(24)(a)(A), a condition other than arthritis must have been diagnosed or treated for its symptoms to qualify as a preexisting condition.

Schleiss v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2013-12-27(24)(a)(A)

For any condition other than arthritis or an arthritic condition to so qualify, the worker must have “been diagnosed with such condition, or ha[ve] obtained medical services for the symptoms of the condition regardless of diagnosis.” ORS 656.005(24)(a)(A). ... Accordingly, claimant’s accelerated aging would not qualify as a preexisting condition for purposes of a combined condition analysis under ORS 656.005(7).

For occupational disease claims, a predisposition or susceptibility is a preexisting condition only if it actively contributes to disability or need for treatment.

Saif Corp. v. Dunn (In re Comp. of Dunn) · filed 2019-04-24(24)(b)

The upshot of our case law and the statutory changes since 2001 is that, in the occupational disease context, a predisposition or susceptibility may be considered in the causation analysis only if it actively contributes to the disability or need for treatment.

A condition does not qualify as a preexisting condition for combined condition analysis without evidence that it was diagnosed or treated before the workplace injury.

Johnson v. SAIF · filed 2022-04-21(24)(a)

There is no combined condition presented in this case because there was no evidence in the record to suggest that claimant’s denied left rotator cuff tear was previously diagnosed or treated prior to the workplace injury.

A preexisting condition generally must have been treated or diagnosed before the compensable injury, except when the condition is arthritis or an arthritic condition.

Cruz-Salazar v. SAIF · filed 2022-02-02(24)

As we understand the court’s opinion in Caren, it means that a worker’s total impairment is compensable if it is caused in material part by a compensable injury, and that benefits for impairment may not be reduced for impairment caused by a preexisting condition, unless (1) the preexisting condition is one that is “cognizable” under ORS 656.005(24) (to qualify as a preexisting condition, a condition must have been treated or diagnosed before the compensable injury, “[e]xcept for claims in which a preexisting condition is arthritis or an arthritic condition”); and (2), before claim closure, the insurer has formally denied a combined condi- tion involving the preexisting condition.

Section 656.005(24)(c) excludes a condition from the preexisting-condition analysis when it only increases susceptibility to injury and does not actively damage the affected body part.

Corkum v. Bi-Mart Corp. · filed 2015-05-28(24)(c)

Thus, the text, context, and legislative history of ORS 656.005(24)(c) show that a condition merely renders a worker more susceptible to injury if the condition increases the likelihood that the affected body part will be injured by some other action or process but does not actively contribute to damaging the body part.

A condition that merely makes a worker more susceptible to injury is not a preexisting condition and does not enter the major contributing cause analysis.

Hutchings v. Americas Propane · filed 2015-12-23(24)(c)

Accordingly, if a condition merely renders the worker more susceptible to injury, it is not a preexisting condition, and plays no role in the “major contributing cause analysis.”

Section 656.005(24)(c) excludes mere susceptibility, but prior injuries and surgeries can be preexisting conditions when they contribute to disability or a need for treatment.

Vantassel v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2017-03-15(24)(c)

Rather, the board found that “claimant’s preexisting disc herniations and surgeries were the major contributing causes of his disability/need for treatment and did not merely render him more susceptible to his injury.” We conclude that substantial evidence supports that finding and that SAIF met its burden to show that claimant’s incident at work combined with a preexisting condition that was the major contributing cause of claimant’s need for treatment and disability.

An attending physician is the doctor or physician primarily responsible for treating a worker’s compensable injury.

Volk v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. · filed 1985-05-22(13)

The “attending physician” is the “doctor or physician who is primarily responsible for the treatment of a worker’s compensable injury.” ORS 656.005(13). Nickila was claimant’s attending physician.