Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.005

An injury is compensable when it arises out of and occurs in the course of employment; a traveling employee who trips while walking can satisfy that rule if the employee has not made a distinct departure on a personal errand.

Saif Corp. v. Scardi · filed 2008-03-12(7)(a)

For an injury to be compensable under Oregon’s workers’ compensation law, it must arise out of and occur in the course of employment. ORS 656.005(7)(a). ... Because tripping while walking is a risk inherent in travel, claimant’s injury also arose out of her employment. Claimant’s injury is compensable.

Section 656.005(7)(a) covers an injury during travel in an employer’s vehicle when the worker has resumed the work-related journey after a personal stop.

DEHIYA v. Spencer · filed 2008-08-13(7)(a)

We conclude on the above undisputed facts that the “employer conveyance” rule applies and that, under that rule, plaintiffs injuries “arose out of’ and occurred “in the course of’ employment because they originated “from some risk to which the work environment exposes the worker.”

For a worker with concurrent employers, wages used to calculate permanent total disability benefits include only wages from the job where the injury occurred.

Reed v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. · filed 1983-05-11(30)

The Board concluded that that definition “could hardly be more clear in its terms” and held that “when calculating a claimant’s permanent total disability benefits, he will receive benefits based on his wages on the job he was working when injured.” We concur in the Board’s analysis. ORS 656.005(30) expressly addresses the point in time when wages are to be determined and what is included in that calculation.

Section 656.005(26) limits wages used to calculate an employer’s temporary disability liability to wages from the job where the injury occurred; earnings from another job do not increase that liability.

Bolton v. Oregonian Publishing Co. · filed 1988-10-05(26)

At the pertinent time, ORS 656.005(26) provided, in part: ... They cannot be required to pay greater benefits for temporary disability than the maximum benefits that would be due on the basis of wages that the claimant was receiving in their employ. The fact that a claimant had other employment cannot enhance an employer’s liability.

Section 656.005(8) distinguishes disabling from non-disabling compensable injuries; medical treatment alone does not establish disability, and the definitions do not determine when disability begins.

State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. v. Gupton · filed 1983-05-25(8)(b)-(c)

ORS 656.005(8)(c) defines a non-disabling compensable injury as one which “requires medical services.” Under ORS 656.005(8)(b) a disabling compensable injury is one “which entitles the worker to compensation for disability or death.” The two statutes imply that a disability involves more than medical treatment alone — perhaps, for example, time loss or loss of earning capacity. However, the statutes address compensability rather than fix a method for determining liability for a disability. They leave open the question of determining the onset of disability.

Section 656.005 distinguishes a disabling injury, which entitles a worker to compensation for disability or death, from a nondisabling injury, which requires medical services only.

Miller v. Wagon Trail Ranch · filed 1992-07-08(8)(b) and (c)

The Board applied ORS 656.005(8)(b) and (c),... which were the correct legal standards for determining if an injury was disabling at the time of the injury.

Section 656.005(7)(d) defines a nondisabling injury as one requiring medical services only; an injury causing temporary disability does not meet that definition.

SM Motor Co. v. Mather · filed 1992-12-16(7)(d)

Under ORS 656.005(7)(d), a nondisabling injury is one that requires medical services only. Because claimant had 3 days of temporary disability after his injury, it was not nondisabling under that definition.

Section 656.005(7)(c) permits reclassification as disabling when a current condition could lead to a ratable impairment; the condition need not already be ratable.

Saif Corp. v. Schiller · filed 1997-10-22(7)(c)

Accordingly, we hold that the Board properly interpreted ORS 656.005(7)(c) to require proof of a current condition that could lead to a ratable impairment under the DCBS’s impairment standards, not proof of a condition presently ratable under the standards, in order to reclassify a claim from nondisabling to disabling.

An injury can remain compensable when a worker violates an employer’s rule about how to perform an assigned task but stays within the scope of the worker’s job responsibilities.

Patterson v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. · filed 1983-09-28(8)(a)

His disregard of the employer’s rules was deliberate but did not involve a prohibited overstepping of the boundaries defining his ultimate job responsibilities. Rather, his misconduct involved a violation of the employer’s rules governing the method of accomplishing his ultimate work, and therefore he remained within the scope of his employment.

An injury sustained while returning to work in a shopping mall parking lot is compensable when the employer’s control over the area makes it part of the employer’s premises.

Ward v. Cutter · filed 1983-10-05(8)(a)

Although we need not answer that question fully here, we hold that the portion of the parking lot where claimant was injured was a part of the employer’s premises and that claimant is entitled to compensation.

Section 656.005(7)(a) covers injuries caused by conditions on an employer’s premises when employment requires the worker to live there, even if the worker is not continuously on call.

Orchards v. Hernandez · filed 1993-08-04(7)(a)

We agree with the Board that the bunkhouse rule is consistent with the work connection requirement of ORS 656.005(7)(a). When an employee is required to live on an employer’s premises and is injured as a result of the condition in which the employer maintains those premises, there is a sufficient connection between injury and employment to establish compensability. Whether the resident employee is continuously on call is not determinative.

Under § 656.005(7)(a), an injury in an employer-owned parking lot is not compensable based on location alone; it must also have a causal connection to employment.

Norpac Foods, Inc. v. Gilmore · filed 1994-02-25(7)(a)

As we have stated, however, the mere fact that an injury occurs in a parking lot that is owned and maintained by an employer when an employee is going to and coming from the employee’s regular place of employment does not, in and of itself, establish compensability. Claimant’s injury must also “arise out of’ the employment, i.e., some causal connection must be demonstrated.

An unexplained fall can arise out of employment when the worker was performing required duties on the employer’s premises and eliminates idiopathic causes.

Phil A. Livesley Co. v. Russ · filed 1983-11-15(8)(a)

In such a situation, where the “course of employment” test is so fully met, where the cause-in-fact cannot be directly established, and where claimant has met his burden of eliminating idiopathic causes, we construe the Workers’ Compensation Law to allow the inference that the unexplained fall “arose out of’ claimant’s employment.

An unexplained fall at work is not compensable when the claimant fails to persuasively eliminate possible idiopathic causes.

Blank v. US Bank · filed 2012-09-26(7)(a)

For that reason, we uphold the board’s determination that claimant failed to adequately eliminate all possible idiopathic factors, and we conclude that the board did not err in determining that claimant’s fall is not compensable.

An idiopathic fall on level ground does not arise out of employment merely because the employee was required to stand on a hard workplace floor.

Hamilton v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2013-04-17(7)(a)

In this case, claimant points to two employment-related factors: the hardness of the floor and the height of her fall due to the employer’s requirement that she stand while working. As a matter of law, those two employment-related factors do not greatly increase the danger or seriousness of injury.

An unexplained fall in the course of employment can satisfy the arising-out-of requirement when idiopathic causes are less than equally likely to have caused it; the claimant need not rule out every possibility.

Sheldon v. US Bank · filed 2016-10-12(7)(a)

A “com-pensable injury” is “an accidental injury *** arising out of and in the course of employment requiring medical services or resulting in disability.” ORS 656.005(7)(a). ... In the context of an unexplained fall, that means that a claimant must establish that idiopathic factors are less than equally likely as work-related factors to have caused the injury.

A truly unexplained injury occurring in the course of employment arises out of employment under § 656.005(7)(a).

Guill v. M. Squared Transportation, Inc. · filed 2016-04-06(7)(a)

A “truly unexplained” injury, as a matter of law, arises from the claimant’s employment.

An injury after fainting can arise out of employment when the cause of the fainting is unexplained and qualifies as a neutral risk.

SAIF v. Kelkay · filed 2024-11-27(7)(a)

It follows from our decision in Guill that the reason why claimant fainted in this case can result from a neutral risk, contrary to SAIF’s argument on judicial review.

A beneficiary is a person entitled to workers’ compensation payments; a spouse seeking loss-of-consortium damages is not a beneficiary on that basis.

State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. v. Cowart · filed 1983-11-30(3)

A “beneficiary” is a person entitled to receive payments under the workers’ compensation laws. ORS 656.005(3). Obviously, claimant’s wife is not a beneficiary for purposes of ORS 656.587, because she would not be entitled under the workers’ compensation laws to payment for loss of consortium.

Under the 2019 version, spouses were living in a state of abandonment when their conduct showed that they had forsaken the marriage for more than a year; separate residences were not required.

YRC Worldwide, Inc. v. Corrigan · filed 2024-07-10(2)(b)(A)

Given that history, we understand the phrase “living in a state of abandonment for more than one year at the time of the injury or subsequently” in the first sentence of ORS 656.005(2)(b)(A) to refer to circumstances in which the parties have, through their conduct, forsaken the marriage for a period of more than a year.

Under the 2019 version of this subsection, a spouse could be excluded as a beneficiary if the spouses’ conduct showed they had forsaken the marriage for more than a year; separate residences were not required.

YRC Worldwide, Inc. v. Corrigan · filed 2024-07-10(2)(b)(A)

Although “living separate and apart” is a requirement under a related sentence of ORS 656.005(2)(b)(A), the legislature did not make it a prerequisite for “living in a state of abandonment,” the exception at issue in this case.

Section 656.005(13) includes licensed psychologists within its definition of “physician” because psychology is a healing art.

Crooke v. Gresham Transfer · filed 1987-11-12(13)

We conclude that psychologists practice one of the healing arts as the term is used in ORS 656.005(13) and that they are therefore capable of providing medical verification of an inability to work as required by ORS 656.273.

Section 656.005(12) includes nurse practitioners as doctors or physicians and permits those practicing in Oregon to be designated as attending physicians.

Cook v. Workers' Compensation Department · filed 1988-07-06(12)

We have already concluded that a nurse practitioner is included in the phrase, a "doctor or physician," as that term is used broadly in ORS 656.005(12). Nurse practitioners are licensed to provide primary health care and are, by rule, "independently responsible" for health services. We therefore hold that those nurse practitioners who practice in Oregon are eligible to be designated as attending physicians.

A physician who advises the worker’s attending physician without treating the worker is a consulting physician under § 656.005(13).

Scheidemantel v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. · filed 1984-06-27(13)

We conclude that Dr. Golden was merely a consulting physician. He did not treat claimant. He advised Dr. Cox as to the etiology of her back problems.

A doctor who examines a worker at the employer’s request while other doctors treat the injury may be found not to be the worker’s attending physician under § 656.005(12).

Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Little · filed 1991-05-22(12)

There is substantial evidence to support the Board’s finding that Baker was not claimant’s attending physician. He examined claimant at employer’s request, and claimant was then seeing other doctors for her back condition.

A licensed physical therapist satisfies the definition of “physician” because physical therapy is a healing art.

Driver v. Rod & Reel Restaurant · filed 1994-01-05(12)(a)

Under that definition, a physical therapist treats a patient’s physical disability and, where the nature of the problem permits, restores the patient to health. The Board erred in concluding that a physical therapist does not satisfy the definition of “physician” in ORS 656.005(12).

For a chiropractor’s limited period as an attending physician, “claim” includes aggravation claims as well as initial claims.

Altamirano v. Woodburn Nursery, Inc. · filed 1995-02-15(12)(b)

The word “claim” has a common meaning in the context of workers’ compensation statutes: It is commonly used to refer to initial requests for compensation for a compensable injury or disease, and to requests to reopen a previously closed claim for additional compensation for the worsening of a compensable condition. There is nothing in the text or the context of ORS 656.005(12)(b) to indicate that the legislature intended “claim” to mean anything other than what it is commonly understood to mean. Accordingly, we conclude that the legislature intended to use the term in that way.

Section 656.005(12)(a) defines “doctor” or “physician” by licensure in the healing arts; it does not limit who can provide medical treatment to people with medical degrees.

SAIF Corp. v. Johnson · filed 2005-03-23(12)(a)

Although ORS 656.005(12)(a) defines “doctor” or “physician” as a person licensed to practice in the “healing arts,” that definition does not limit the ability to provide “medical treatment” to professionals who possess a medical degree.

A doctor who retains primary responsibility for treating a worker’s compensable injury remains the attending physician despite referring the worker to another provider for treatment.

Sparling v. Providence Health System Oregon · filed 2013-08-21(12)(b)

Tsai, as claimant’s attending physician in 2008, could refer claimant to other medical service providers for treatment and, in doing so, would not abandon his role as the attending physician.

A worker’s choice of physician is relevant to whether a doctor was primarily responsible for treating the worker’s injury and therefore was the attending physician.

Precision Castparts Corp - PCC Structurals v. Cramer · filed 2022-06-15(12)(b)

We agree with the board that, contrary to employer’s contention, in addition to the treatment that was actually provided, claimant’s choice of an attending physician was relevant to whether Anderson was “primarily responsible” for her treatment.

Former § 656.005(22) classifies an employer that fails to comply with § 656.017 as a noncomplying employer.

Tri-State Construction, Inc. v. Columbia Casualty Co./CNA · filed 1984-12-24(22)

Tri-State failed to comply with Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.017 and was thus a ''noncomplying employer" under former Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.005(22).

Under the 1976 version of § 656.005(6), benefits for a child ordinarily ceased at age 18, but an invalid dependent child could qualify regardless of age.

State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. v. Calkins · filed 1986-07-23(6)

ORS 656.005(6) provided that an invalid dependent child of any age is to be considered to be a child under age 18. It clearly implied that benefits would ordinarily cease when a child other than an invalid dependent child reached age 18.

A worker who did not voluntarily assume a child’s support or hold himself out as a parent did not stand in loco parentis to the child under the statutory definition of “child.”

Mell v. W.C. Ranch, Inc. · filed 1991-07-03(5)

There is substantial evidence to support those findings, and they support the Board’s conclusion that the decedent did not stand in loco parentis to Katie.

Section 656.005(5) excludes a child born after the worker’s injury from the permanent total disability rate calculation when the child was not a member of the worker’s family at the time of injury.

Jackson v. Bogart Construction · filed 1991-11-27(5)

The latter statute strongly suggests that, in order for a child to be counted in determining the rate of compensation, the child must have been a member of the worker’s family at the time of injury.

Section 656.005(5) treats a child as under age 18 unless an express qualification includes another age or circumstance.

Cato v. Alcoa-Reynolds Metals Co. · filed 2007-02-07(5)

It reveals the legislature’s implicit understanding that the term “child” means a child under the age of 18, unless the term is expressly qualified to include some other age or circumstance.

Section 656.005(6) includes an illegitimate child in the definition of “child” for workers’ compensation benefits.

Amos v. SAIF Corp. · filed 1985-02-06(6)

A “child” includes an illegitimate child. ORS 656.005(6).

Section 656.005(23) defines “person” nonexclusively, allowing a deceased worker’s estate to qualify as a person.

Sather v. SAIF · filed 2015-04-09(23)

We conclude that, by using the word “includes” in ORS 656.005(23), the legislature likely intended a non-exclusive meaning for the word “person.” ... If, as the term is used in ORS 656.218(3), “persons” is understood to include, in addition to the categories of entities listed in ORS 656.005(23), other entities that are recognized by law as subject to legal rights and duties, an estate, too, would qualify.

Section 656.005(21) defines “person” to include a partnership.

EBI Companies v. Erzen · filed 1985-04-17(21)

Pursuant to that section, any “person,” defined by ORS 656.005(21) to include a partnership, to whom a contract is let for the performance of labor, could be considered a subject worker.

Section 656.005(21) defines “person” to include a partnership.

Kistner v. BLT Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1985-06-05(21)

“Person” includes partnership. ORS 656.005(21).

Section 656.005(23) defines “person” broadly enough to cover a managed care organization seeking civil damages immunity under the workers’ compensation law.

Kahn v. Providence Health Plan · filed 2003-06-12(23)

Defendant is a “person” for the purposes of that statute. See ORS 656.005(23) (respecting ORS chapter 656, “ ‘[p]erson’ includes partnership, joint venture, association, limited liability company and corporation”).

Section 656.005(23) defines “person” nonexclusively, allowing a deceased worker’s estate to qualify as a person.

Sather v. Saif Corp. · filed 2015-04-09(23)

We conclude that, by using the word “includes” in ORS 656.005(23), the legislature likely intended a non-exclusive meaning for the word “person.” ... Based on that analysis, which includes the text and context of ORS 656.218, including ORS 656.005(23), we conclude that “the persons described in subsection (5),” as the term is used in subsection (3), include a deceased worker’s estate.

An occupational injury under subsection (8)(a) does not require proof that the injury worsened an underlying disease.

Barrett v. D & H DRYWALL · filed 1985-11-26(8)(a)

Weller involved a claimed gradual worsening of pain over a period of years — an occupational disease case as defined in ORS 656.802(1)(a). That standard is not the same standard as for occupational injury, defined by ORS 656.005(8)(a).

Section 656.005(7)(a) distinguishes an injury from an occupational disease by when the condition itself arose; sudden symptoms alone do not make a condition an injury.

Smirnoff v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2003-07-02(7)(a)

The proper inquiry is whether the condition itself, not its symptoms, occurred gradually, rather than suddenly.

A condition that developed gradually over time is not an injury under section 656.005(7)(a), even if its symptoms first appear at work.

Jewell v. SAIF Corp. (In re Jewell) · filed 2018-05-16(7)(a)

When, as here, the medical evidence identifies a condition causing the claimant's symptoms and establishes that the condition developed gradually over time, the claimant has not experienced an injury, and the claim must be analyzed as an occupational disease.

Former subsection (27) used “received from the employer” to identify the source of an item included in wages.

Nelson v. SAIF Corp. · filed 1987-01-06(27)

Former ORS 656.005(27) identified the source of what is received. The source must have been the employer under the former statute.

Employer-paid medical insurance and pension benefits are excluded from wages when calculating workers’ compensation benefits.

Nelson v. SAIF Corp. · filed 1986-02-26(27)

The issue, one of first impression in Oregon, is whether employer-paid medical insurance and pension benefits should be included in the Workers’ Compensation Act definition of wages in the calculation of benefits. ORS 656.005(27). The Board held that they are not encompassed by the definition. We agree.

Section 656.005(29) excludes WARN plant closure payments from wages because they are damages, not contractual compensation for services.

Stone Forest Industries, Inc. v. Bowler · filed 1997-03-19(29)

Although the WARN payments resulted from claimant’s prior employment, they were not contractual compensation for his services. Under the reasoning of Ring, they were not wages for purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Law and do not affect his right to temporary disability payments.

Section 656.005(29) includes a cooperative member’s patronage dividends in wages when they compensate the member for work under a membership agreement.

SAIF Corp. v. Ekdahl · filed 2000-10-04(29)

Based on the definition of “wages” in ORS 656.005(29) and the nature of the cooperative of which claimant was a member, we are persuaded that the patronage dividends that claimant received were wages.

Section 656.005(29) treats a later-negotiated collective bargaining agreement with a retroactive wage increase as the contract of hiring in force on the injury date when it covers that date.

United Airlines v. Anderson · filed 2006-08-30(29)

We therefore agree with the board that the retroactive CBA is the “contract of hiring in force at the time of the accident,” within the meaning of ORS 656.005(29) and ORS 656.210(2)(d)(A).

Section 656.005(29) excludes short-term disability benefits from its definition of wages because they are not a similar advantage to board, rent, housing, or lodging.

Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Martinez · filed 2010-12-01(29)

Short-term disability benefits are not a "similar advantage" to board, rent, housing, and lodging.

Section 656.005(29) includes fixed subsistence and travel payments in wages when the worker receives them regardless of actual expenses.

SAIF Corp. v. Sparks · filed 2013-08-21(29)

Accordingly, as the board reasoned, we conclude that the particular circumstances in claimant’s case support the conclusion that his subsistence and travel pay were part of his “wages” as defined in ORS 656.005(29) — or, in other words, as the board reasoned, that claimant’s subsistence and travel pay were part of the payment that he was “contractually entitled to receive” pursuant to his employment contract and “irrespective of any expenses actually incurred.”

Section 656.005(29) defines a worker’s wage by the contract of hiring in force at the time of injury; the statutory minimum wage does not replace that wage when the employer did not agree to pay wages.

Rehfeld v. Sedgwick Claims Management Services · filed 2017-01-05(29)

A worker’s “wage” is “the money rate at which the service rendered is recompensed under the contract of hiring in force at the time of the accident.” ORS 656.005(29). ... There is no indication in the text or context of the pertinent statutes or administrative rules that minimum-wage laws have any bearing on the calculation of a worker’s benefits.

A parent may qualify as a dependent based on partial support from a worker’s earnings; the worker need not have supplied more than half the parent’s income.

Gallegos v. Amalgamated Sugar Co. · filed 1986-09-03(11)

ORS 656.005(11) defines “dependent” as one “who at the time of the accident, [is] dependent in whole or in part for their support on the earnings of the worker.” ORS 656.204(5) provides that “a monthly payment shall be made to [a] dependent equal to 50 percent of the average monthly support actually received by such dependent from the worker.” Thus, it would be sufficient for claimant to show that she was dependent in part for her support on the earnings of the decedent. Her benefit would then be 50 percent of the average monthly support she had actually received from him. The Board erred in adopting the referee’s conclusion.

A new injury sustained during a trip to a physician for treatment of a compensable injury is also compensable.

Fenton v. SAIF Corp. · filed 1987-08-26(8)(a)

We conclude that, when a worker is injured in an accident which occurs during a trip to see a physician for treatment of a compensable injury, the new injury also is compensable.

Section 656.005(7)(a)’s test for compensable injury does not apply to inmate injuries covered by ORS chapter 655.

State v. Spear · filed 1989-01-11(7)(a)

Contrary to petitioner’s argument, nothing in ORS chapters 655 or 656 makes the test for compensability under ORS 656.005(7)(a) applicable to inmate injuries covered by ORS chapter 655.

Injuries from horseplay are compensable only when the claimant shows a causal link between the injury and a risk connected with employment.

Brown v. Liberty Northwest Insurance · filed 1990-12-26(7)(a)

Thus, it is clear that injuries resulting from horseplay are not “always” compensable. An employer is not liable for any and all injuries to its employees regardless of the cause. A claimant must show a causal link between the occurrence of the injury and a risk connected with his or her employment.

An employee who does not participate in horseplay is not barred from compensation merely because the coworker who caused the injury deviated from employment.

Kammerer v. United Parcel Service · filed 1995-08-23(7)(a)

The Board erroneously determined that claimant’s injury did not arise from her employment because the employee who hit her with the tag was engaging in horseplay and had deviated from his employment. Because claimant was not a participant in the horseplay, she was not precluded from receiving compensation on the ground that her injury arose from horseplay.

An injury caused by a coworker’s horseplay may be compensable when the employee did not initiate or actively participate in it and the injury has a sufficient causal connection to employment.

Liberty Northwest Insurance v. Johnson · filed 1996-07-03(7)(a)

Those findings are supported by substantial evidence and support the Board’s determination that claimant was a victim of his coworker’s horseplay. Thus, as in Kammerer, the fact that claimant’s injury was the result of his coworker’s horseplay does not preclude him from receiving compensation for his injury. We conclude that there was a sufficient causal connection between the injury and the employment. Accordingly, the Board properly concluded that claimant’s injury was compensable.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(A) excludes an injury to an active participant in an assault or combat unrelated to the job assignment; the participant need not be the aggressor.

SAIF Corp. v. Barajas · filed 1991-05-15(7)(a)(A)

If the injury is incurred by an active participant in an assault or combat that is not an actual part of the job, it is not compensable. ... Although an aggressor is clearly an active participant, aggressiveness is not the only criterion.

The exclusion for injuries sustained by active participants in fights does not apply when a worker had no opportunity to withdraw and did not voluntarily assume an active or aggressive role.

Irvington Transfer v. Jasenosky · filed 1992-12-02(7)(a)(A)

According to the Board’s findings, claimant did not have an opportunity to withdraw from the situation and he did not voluntarily assume an active or aggressive role in the altercation. The Board did not err in concluding that claimant was not an active participant in the fight and that, accordingly, former ORS 656.005(7)(a) did not exclude claimant’s injuries from compensability.

A heated exchange of words alone does not make an injured worker an active participant in an assault or combat.

C.W. McCallen Construction Co. v. MacDonald · filed 2001-02-28(7)(b)(A)

To be an active participant in an assault or combat requires more than just a heated exchange of words.

The consequential-condition limitation does not apply when a fall damages sutures from treatment of a compensable injury but causes no new injury or condition.

Roseburg Forest Products v. Ferguson · filed 1992-01-20(7)(a)(A)

The Board reasoned that the fall at home did not give rise to a new ‘ ‘injury, ’ ’ as such, and that the provisions of ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A) therefore are not applicable. ... We agree.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(A) requires a compensable injury to be the major contributing cause of a condition caused by that injury; a condition caused directly by the industrial accident remains subject to the material contributing cause standard.

Albany General Hospital v. Gasperino · filed 1992-06-10(7)(a)(A)

The distinction is between a condition or need for treatment that is caused by the industrial accident, for which the material contributing cause standard still applies, and a condition or need for treatment that is caused in turn by the compensable injury. It is the latter that must meet the major contributing cause test.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(A)’s major-contributing-cause requirement for consequential conditions does not apply when the hearing was convened before July 1, 1990.

Boeing Co. v. Viltrakis · filed 1992-04-22(7)(a)(A)

We note that ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A) was enacted in 1990: ... It is not applicable here, because the hearing was convened before July 1,1990.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(A)’s major contributing cause requirement for consequential conditions does not apply when the referee’s hearing occurred before July 1, 1990.

Atlas Cylinder v. Epstein · filed 1992-07-08(7)(a)(A)

Since the referee’s hearing in this case, ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A): “No injury or disease is compensable as a consequence of a compensable injury unless the compensable injury is the major contributing cause of the consequential condition.” Or Laws 1990, ch 2, § 3. That is not applicable here, because the hearing was before July 1, 1990. Or Laws 1990, ch 2, § 54(2).

Section 656.005(7)(a)(A) makes a consequential condition compensable when a compensable injury is its major contributing cause.

Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Pitzer · filed 1993-09-01(7)(a)(A)

We agree with the Board that the claim is compensable under ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A).

Section 656.005(7)(a)(A) makes an injury or condition that is not directly related to the industrial accident compensable only when the compensable injury is its major contributing cause.

Hicks v. Spectra Physics · filed 1992-12-23(7)(a)(A)

Under ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A), any injury or condition that is not directly related to the industrial accident is compensable only if the major contributing cause is the compensable injury.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(A) requires the compensable injury to be the major contributing cause of a subsequent injury sustained during vocational rehabilitation.

Kephart v. Green River Lumber · filed 1993-02-03(7)(a)(A)

The injury that claimant experienced during vocational rehabilitation is not directly related to the industrial accident. Rather, he experienced it as a consequence of the industrial injury, which had necessitated vocational rehabilitation. Accordingly, under ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A), it is compensable only if the compensable injury is the major contributing cause.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(A) does not permit relitigation under its major contributing cause standard of conditions finally determined compensable before the 1990 amendments; treatment for those conditions remains compensable under the earlier standard.

Cox v. SAIF Corp. · filed 1993-07-14(7)(a)(A)

As we have held, claimant’s three conditions are compensable under the material contributing cause standard, as applicable before the 1990 legislative amendments, and that issue is not subject to relitigation under ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A). We further conclude that medical treatment for those conditions is compensable under the same standard.

A consequential condition caused in major part by a compensable injury is itself a compensable injury.

Roseburg Forest Products v. Zimbelman · filed 1995-08-09(7)(a)(A)

If that emotional condition was caused in major part by the carpal tunnel syndrome and the cervical condition, the emotional condition constitutes a compensable consequential condition. Under ORS 656.005(7)(a), a compensable consequential condition is itself a compensable injury.

Actions by an employer or insurer in processing a claim are not part of the compensable injury when determining whether that injury is the major contributing cause of a consequential condition.

Baar v. Fairview Training Center · filed 1996-02-21(7)(a)(A)

If a claimant’s stress pertaining to the claims process cannot be said to be caused by the compensable injury, it necessarily follows that the actions of the employer and its insurer in processing an injury claim are not part of the compensable injury. Thus, we conclude that the Board properly considered the actions of employer and its insurer in processing claimant’s injury claim as “non-injury” factors for purposes of ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A).

Section 656.005(7)(a)(A) treats a compensable injury as the major contributing cause of a new injury directly caused by reasonable and necessary treatment of the original injury.

Barrett Business Services v. Hames · filed 1994-09-07(7)(a)(A)

Where, as here, a claimant suffers a new injury as the direct result of reasonable and necessary treatment of a compensable injury, the compensable injury is the major contributing cause of the consequential condition for purposes of ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A).

An injury incurred during an independent medical examination is compensable as a consequence of a compensable injury only if the original injury was the major contributing cause of the new condition.

Robinson v. Nabisco, Inc. · filed 1996-08-28(7)(a)(A)

In view of our decisions in Hicks and Kephart, as well as the apparent legislative intent to limit what is included as part of the “natural consequences” of an injury, we conclude that in order for an injury incurred during an IME to be compensable as a consequence of a compensable injury, it must be established that the original injury was the major contributing cause of the consequential condition.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(A) requires a prior compensable condition to be the major contributing cause of a later consequential condition.

Wheeler v. Liberty Northwest Insurance · filed 1997-06-11(7)(a)(A)

The Board correctly concluded that claimant failed to establish that her 1989 wrist tendinitis is the major contributing cause of her 1994 fibrositis and lateral epicondyli-tis, ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A), and, thus, properly concluded that claimant had not established that her aggravation claim is compensable.

A consequential condition under § 656.005(7)(a)(A) is a separate condition caused by a compensable injury; another occurrence of the same condition does not qualify.

Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Crompton · filed 1997-10-15(7)(a)(A)

Both decisions make clear that a consequential condition is a separate condition that arises from the compensable injury, for example, when a worker suffers a compensable foot injury that results in an altered gait that, in turn, results in back strain. ... Thus, there is no consequential condition, and ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A) does not apply.

Under Section 656.005(7)(a)(A), exercises done solely to prevent future injury after recovery are not reasonable and necessary medical treatment for purposes of compensating a consequential condition.

Rogers v. Cascade Pacific Ind. · filed 1998-02-25(7)(a)(A)

Claimant was doing the exercises to remain conditioned in his back and abdomen in order to avoid future injuries. We agree with the Board that such activities do not constitute reasonable and necessary medical treatment for purposes of determining if the injury is a consequential condition of a compensable injury.

A compensable injury must be the major contributing cause of a consequential condition for that condition to be compensable.

Conner v. B & S LOGGING · filed 1998-04-01(7)(a)(A)

In order for Liberty to be held responsible for the ACL instability and the defect in the lateral femoral condyle, there must be substantial evidence in the record to support a finding that the 1985 injury was the major contributing cause of the consequential injury.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(A)’s major contributing cause requirement does not apply when an injury is compensable because it arose out of and in the course of employment.

Robinson v. Nabisco, Inc. · filed 2000-09-28(7)(a)(A)

If, as here, the injury is compensable due to its connection to work, the limitation in ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A) is not applicable. ORS 656.005(7)(a) does not require claimant to meet the additional proof requirement that the 1981 injury was the major contributing cause of the 1992 CME injury.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(A) requires a claimant to prove that a compensable injury is the major contributing cause of a consequential condition.

Jackson County v. Wehren · filed 2003-02-19(7)(a)(A)

Our resolution of this case is governed by several precepts. First, claimant has the burden of proving that his compensable 1992 injury is the major contributing cause of his current condition, that is, the current condition is a “consequential condition” under ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A).

A consequential condition must arise from an accepted condition; treatment of both conditions does not, by itself, make one consequential.

Sprague v. United States Bakery · filed 2005-05-11(7)(a)(A)

Moreover, it did not find that claimant’s obesity arose from claimant’s knee condition, which is required for it to be a consequential condition of an accepted condition. The statutory definition of a “consequential condition” is not satisfied, as the board reasoned, simply because the gastric bypass surgery was performed, in part, to treat claimant’s obesity and, in part, to treat his knee condition.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(A) requires a compensable work injury to be the major contributing cause of a consequential condition; the injury need not have been accepted by the insurer against whom the claim is filed.

Garoutte v. Mail-Well Corp. · filed 2005-07-06(7)(a)(A)

To establish the compensability of the degenerative knee condition as a consequential condition under ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A), claimant was required to establish that "a compensable work injury" was its major contributing cause. He was not required to establish that the injury accepted by GAB was the major contributing cause of the condition.

Treating obesity to enable care for a compensable knee condition does not, by itself, make the obesity a combined or consequential condition under subsection (7)(a).

Sprague v. United States Bakery, Saif Corp. · filed 2005-07-13(7)(a)

The second sentence of the statute does not apply to claimant’s circumstances because claimant’s obesity is neither a combined condition nor a consequential condition as defined by ORS 656.005(7)(a).

Section 656.005(7)(a)(A) makes a consequential condition compensable when a previous compensable injury is its major contributing cause, with responsibility falling on the employer or insurer at risk for that injury.

In Re Compensation of Pruitt · filed 2008-12-03(7)(a)(A)

The claim is compensable if the previous injury is the major contributing cause of the condition. Necessarily, although ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A) does not expressly relate to the assignment of responsibility, responsibility for a consequential condition claim falls on the insurer or employer at risk at the time of the previous compensable injury.

A condition arising from surgery for a compensable injury may qualify as a consequential condition.

SAIF Corp. v. Sprague · filed 2009-08-27(7)(a)(A)

We agree with the board and the parties that claimant’s arthritic knee condition is best classified as a consequential condition. The medical evidence in the record supports the board’s conclusion that claimant’s current arthritic knee condition is “a consequence of’ claimant’s original 1976 surgery, which in turn was performed as “a consequence of’ his compensable 1976 injury.

A condition arising directly from an industrial accident is subject to the material contributing cause standard; a condition caused by the compensable injury must meet the major contributing cause standard.

SAIF Corp. v. Pepperling · filed 2010-09-01(7)(a)(A)

Thus, when the board determined that “the persuasive medical evidence establishes that the MRSA infection arose directly from the workplace accident,” it applied the proper test, as set out in Gasperino.

A condition caused by a compensable injury, rather than directly by the industrial accident, requires proof that the injury was its major contributing cause.

Vasquez v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2010-09-01(7)(a)(A)

We agree with the board, therefore, that claimant’s carpal tunnel syndrome is the result of the injury, and not the industrial accident. For that reason, the board correctly held that the major contributing cause standard of proof applies.

A worsening of a preexisting condition can be considered a consequential condition under subsection (7)(a)(A).

SAIF Corp. v. Walker · filed 2013-12-26(7)(a)(A)

We therefore consider the worsening of the disc herniation as a consequential condition under ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A).

A consequential condition is compensable when the work-related injury incident is its major contributing cause, regardless of which conditions the employer accepted.

English v. Liberty Northwest Insurance · filed 2015-05-13(7)(a)(A)

Although the compensability of a consequential condition does not depend upon what conditions the employer has accepted, ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A) nonetheless requires that the “work-related injury incident” be the major contributing cause of the consequential condition.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(A) assigns liability for a consequential condition to the employer responsible for the prior compensable injury when that injury is the major contributing cause of the later condition.

SAIF Corp. v. Durant · filed 2015-05-13(7)(a)(A)

Our cases have emphasized that, when a claimant brings a consequential condition claim, and the board finds a claimant’s condition compensable as a consequential condition of a previously accepted injury, then liability is to be assigned to that employer under ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A), rather than according to one of the judicially created rules for assigning responsibility among multiple employers.

In deciding whether a consequential condition is compensable, the board must consider the contribution of every part of the compensable injury, including swelling.

SAIF Corp. v. DeMarco · filed 2015-05-13(7)(a)(A)

Thus, in determining whether claimant’s infection-related conditions were a compensable “consequential condition,” the board was required to consider the contribution from claimant’s “compensable injury,” which — as the board found— included soft tissue swelling. We reject SAIF’s suggestion that the board could evaluate the contribution of claimant’s compensable injury without considering the contribution of a part of that injury.

A condition caused by a compensable injury can be consequential even without a separately identifiable intervening condition.

Allen v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2016-06-22(7)(a)(A)

So long as the submitted condition arose from a com-pensable injury rather than an underlying workplace accident, it is immaterial that there is no separately identifiable intervening condition between the compensable injury and the submitted condition at issue.

A claimant seeking compensation for a consequential condition must prove that the compensable injury was its major contributing cause.

Dugas v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. · filed 2022-03-02(7)(a)(A)

But claimant still bears the burden to prove that his work-related hip injury was the major contributing cause of the rotator cuff tear.

Section 656.005(19) treats a doctor’s report noting patellar crepitus during motion and internal rotation as objective medical findings.

Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Holden · filed 1992-09-30(19)

Additionally, the Board found that claimant’s doctor noted claimant’s subjective complaints of sharp pain, a catching sensation, particularly with twisting motions and, also, “notable patellar crepitus” in response to motion and internal rotation. The doctor’s report constitutes objective findings.

Tenderness with palpation is an objective finding for purposes of establishing a compensable injury under § 656.005(7)(a).

SAIF Corp. v. Cruz · filed 1993-05-12(7)(a)

SAIF, on behalf of employer, denied the claim on the ground that it is not supported by an “objective finding,” as required by ORS 656.005(7)(a). The referee and the Board found that “tenderness with palpation” is an objective finding. We agree, Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Ferrer, 114 Or App 471, 835 P2d 949 (1992), and affirm the Board on the petition.

Section 656.005(19) defines objective findings as verifiable indications of injury or disease, distinct from proof of medical causation.

Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Hofstetter · filed 1997-10-22(19)

“Objective findings” refer to “verifiable indications of injury or disease,” while medical causation pertains to the causal link between the claimed injury or disease and the employment.

When objective findings are disputed, the Board must make findings addressing whether they support compensability under ORS 656.005(7) and (19).

Thriftway v. Kneeland · filed 1999-04-07(19)

Even though insurer and employer argued to the Board that the denied conditions were not compensable because there were no objective findings sufficient to satisfy the requirements of ORS 656.005(7) and (19), the Board made no explicit factual findings of its own regarding the existence of objective findings and did not explain why, if at all, the ALJ’s opinion was sufficient with regard to that issue. Thus, the Board’s order is inadequate for review.

Section 656.005(19) permits objective findings to include verifiable evidence of worsened symptoms.

SAIF Corp. v. Walker · filed 2000-03-16(19)

Stated differently, ORS 656.005(19) demonstrates that, in the context of proving an aggravation claim under ORS 656.273(1) (1995), a worker’s medical evidence may be supported by objective findings that demonstrate that his or her symptoms have worsened.

Objective findings require medical verification of an injury or disease; a claimant’s description of symptoms alone does not qualify, even when a medical expert believes it.

SAIF Corp. v. Lewis · filed 2000-10-04(19)

In sum, the language of ORS 656.005(7)(a), ORS 656.802(2)(d), and ORS 656.005(19), as amended in 1995, compels the conclusion that a claimant's description of his or her own symptoms, including reported past symptoms that no longer are present, cannot alone constitute "objective" findings, even if believed and relied on by a medical expert.

The Board must consider evidence of edema and reduced grip strength when deciding whether a claim is supported by objective findings.

Iles v. Fred Meyer, Inc. · filed 2001-03-28(19)

We reverse and remand to the Board to consider whether the chart note containing evidence of edema and reduced grip strength constitute objective findings.

Section 656.005(19) treats measured diminished range of motion as an objective finding.

Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Toy · filed 2001-05-09(19)

Moreover, Rung’s measurement of claimant’s diminished range of motion is a statutorily enumerated “objective finding.” See ORS 656.005(19).

When the Board finds that evidence does not qualify as objective findings under § 656.005(19), it must explain why evidence that qualifies in other contexts fails here.

Wantowski v. Crown Cork & Seal · filed 2001-08-08(19)

On remand, if the Board makes a similar finding, it needs to provide a sufficient explanation why evidence that in other contexts constitutes objective findings does not satisfy the requirements of ORS 656.005(19) in this instance.

Range of motion measurements constitute objective findings under § 656.005(19), though the Board may explain why particular measurements do not qualify.

Stapleton v. Liberty Northwest Insurance · filed 2001-08-08(19)

However, the Board failed to explain why the chart note’s range of motion measurements, which by statute constitute objective findings, did not constitute objective findings in this instance or otherwise did not satisfy the requirements of ORS 656.273(3).

Section 656.005(19) permits an indication of disease to qualify as an objective finding if it was verifiable at some time, even if it is absent during a later examination.

SAIF Corp. v. Lewis · filed 2002-11-29(19)

We agree with the board that that circumstance does not preclude a determination that claimant’s indications of disease were verifiable within the meaning of ORS 656.005(19). All that the statutory definition requires is that the indication of disease be verifiable at some time. The definition does not require that the indication of disease be present during a physical examination of the claimant, including an examination that occurs after the claimant’s symptoms have subsided.

Section 656.005(19) includes self-reported symptoms as objective findings when they are reproducible, measurable, or observable; a doctor may rely on those reports without personally verifying the symptoms.

Merle West Medical Center & Health Future, LLC v. Parker · filed 2006-07-19(19)

In sum, the definition of objective findings includes a claimant’s self-reported symptoms so long as those symptoms are either reproducible, measurable, or observable. Such symptoms are “verifiable indications of disease or injury” within the meaning of ORS 656.005(19), and a doctor may properly rely on a patient’s report of such symptoms in forming a medical opinion.

Section 656.005(19) defines objective findings the same way for permanent impairment as for compensability.

SAIF Corp. v. Drury · filed 2005-10-12(19)

Our review of ORS chapter 656 does not reveal any indication that the legislature intended the statutory requirement for objective findings to have a different meaning when the issue is the extent of permanent impairment rather than compensability.

Section 656.005(19) permits a medical finding of significant limits on repetitive use to qualify as an objective finding supporting chronic condition impairment.

SAIF Corp. v. Ramirez · filed 2007-06-13(19)

We readily conclude that Kane’s opinion that claimant is significantly limited in his ability to repetitively use the cervical and lumbar spine regions is an “objective finding” that supports the board’s finding of chronic condition impairment.

Section 656.005(20) includes fringe benefits in payroll unless an exemption applies; unsegregated vacation pay may be included with other fringe benefits.

Paul Bros. v. National Council on Compensation Insurance · filed 1992-11-04(20)

Accordingly, the fringe benefits are included as payroll, unless they are exempted under ORS 656.005(20). Although subsection (20) exempts some fringe benefits, such as vacation pay, it does not exempt all fringe benefits. Because vacation pay was not segregated from other fringe benefits, DIF did not err in concluding that Liberty could properly include all fringe benefits in employer’s payroll.

A claim involving a possible combination of a compensable injury and a preexisting condition must be considered under § 656.005(7)(a)(B).

SAIF Corp. v. Edison · filed 1992-12-30(7)(a)(B)

Although employer argued that subparagraph (B) was applicable, the referee did not consider it. The Board adopted the referee’s findings and decision on this question without discussion. Given the record and, because employer has argued all along that the claim should be considered under ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B), the case must be remanded for reconsideration.

ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) requires an injury to be the major contributing cause of disability or need for treatment when it combines with a preexisting, noncompensable condition, including in an initial claim.

Tektronix, Inc. v. Nazari · filed 1993-06-02(7)(a)(B)

We conclude that the statute is applicable in the context of an initial injury claim if the injury combines with a preexisting, noncompensable condition to cause or prolong disability or a need for treatment. If, in an initial claim, there is disability or a need for treatment as a result of the injury alone, then the claim is compensable if the injury is a material contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment. If, in an initial claim, the disability or need for treatment is due to the combination of the injury and a preexisting, noncompensable condition, then the injury is compensable only if it is the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(B) requires a compensable injury that combines with a preexisting condition to be the major contributing cause of the resulting disability or need for treatment.

Gray v. SAIF Corp. · filed 1993-06-23(7)(a)(B)

Because claimant’s preexisting degenerative condition combines with her compensable injury to cause her disability and need for treatment, claimant must show that the compensable injury is the major contributing cause of the disability and need for treatment.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(B) makes a work-related injury that combines with a preexisting condition compensable only if the injury is the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment.

Tektronix, Inc. v. Nazari · filed 1992-12-30(7)(a)(B)

Likewise, under ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B), when a work-related injury' combines with a preexisting condition to cause disability or a need for treatment, the work-related injury is compensable only if it is the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment.

When a compensable injury combines with a preexisting condition, the injury must be the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment.

U-Haul of Oregon v. Burtis · filed 1993-05-19(7)(a)(B)

Subsection (B) requires the Board to determine whether claimant’s compensable injury was the major contributing cause of his disability or need for treatment.

When a compensable injury combines with a preexisting condition, the major contributing cause standard governs compensability of the resulting condition.

Denny v. Crane · filed 1994-07-27(7)(a)(B)

In this case, the inquiry focuses on subparagraph (B), not (A). The carrier argued, and the Board agreed, that because claimant’s Scheuermann’s Disease was a preexisting condition, the major contributing cause standard in subparagraph (B) applied to determine the compensability of claimant’s current condition. The Board further found that claimant’s Scheuermann’s Disease, and not his compensable injury, was the major contributing cause of his current condition. That determination accords with substantial evidence.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(B) applies when a compensable injury combines with a preexisting condition.

Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Walton · filed 1997-04-30(7)(a)(B)

Neither the former nor the current version of ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) applies to claimant’s claim. In order for the statute to apply, a compensable injury must combine with a preexisting condition. Claimant’s ankle injury and rheumatoid arthritis have previously been determined to be compensable. Employer does not contend that those compensable injuries have combined with any other condition to cause disability or a need for treatment. Hence, the Board did not err in failing to apply ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) to this case.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(B) makes a combined condition compensable when the work injury is the major cause of the claimant’s need for treatment, even if it is not the major cause of the condition itself.

SAIF Corp. v. Nehl · filed 1997-07-23(7)(a)(B)

However, the statute expressly refers to the compensability of the combined condition and says that the combined condition itself is compensable when the on-the-job injury is the major cause of claimant’s disability or need for treatment. Accordingly, we hold that in this case, that the Board correctly applied ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) in concluding that claimant’s work injury, when weighed against the extent of his preexisting condition, is the major cause of his need for treatment.

A denial of medical treatment can deny the compensability of a combined condition when the treatment is for an accepted injury combined with a preexisting condition.

Active Transportation Co. v. Wylie · filed 1999-03-10(7)(a)(B)

The Board did not err in finding that employer’s denial of claimant’s medical treatment denied the compensability of claimant’s combined condition.

For a combined condition, the work injury must be the major contributing cause of the need for treatment, not of the combined condition itself.

SAIF Corp. v. Nehl · filed 1997-05-21(7)(a)(B)

The statute provides that the on-the-job injury must be the major contributing cause of the need for treatment, not the major contributing cause of the combined condition.

The combined-condition standard applies when an injury combines with a preexisting condition; separate past injuries do not establish such a condition.

Beverly Enterprises v. Michl · filed 1997-10-01(7)(a)(B)

Given the medical evidence available to the Board, it was reasonable for it to conclude that claimant’s knee dislocations were specific, discrete injuries, not the result of an ongoing condition predisposing claimant’s knee to dislocation. Accordingly, the Board did not err in refusing to apply the standard set forth in ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) for injuries combined with preexisting conditions.

Under subsection (24), a condition is not preexisting when the claim is the initial claim for that condition, even if the condition arose during earlier employment.

The New Portland Meadows v. Dieringer · filed 1998-04-15(24)

We agree with the Board that this is the initial claim for claimant’s bilateral upper extremity condition and that, therefore, it is not a preexisting condition under ORS 656.005(24). Consequently, neither ORS 656.802(2)(b) nor ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) applies.

A combined condition is compensable only when the workplace injury is the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment.

Gray v. Western Panel Mfg & EBI Companies · filed 1999-09-29(7)(a)(B)

Under ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B), a combined condition is compensable only if “the otherwise compensable injury is the major contributing cause of the disability of the combined condition or the major contributing cause of the need for treatment of the combined condition.”

A combined condition exists when a compensable injury combines at any time with a preexisting condition to cause or prolong disability or a need for treatment.

Croman Corp. v. Serrano · filed 1999-09-29(7)(a)(B)

Under ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B), a combined condition exists when a compensable injuxy combines at any time with a preexisting condition to cause or prolong disability or a need for treatment.

A combined condition requires a compensable injury to combine with a preexisting condition; conditions accepted as independently compensable are not a combined condition merely because they together cause a need for treatment.

Freightliner Corp. v. Christensen · filed 1999-09-29(7)(a)(B)

A combined condition in the legal sense is a compensable injury that combines with a preexisting condition or conditions. ORS 656.005(7)(b)(B). Here, the accepted conditions are each of the conditions that are deemed accepted under Piwowar. Although, as a matter of fact, the preexisting conditions did combine to give rise to claimant's need for treatment, they are compensable in their own right as a matter of law under Piwowar and may not be denied.

For a combined condition, determining the major contributing cause of the need for treatment requires weighing the relative contributions of work-related and preexisting causes.

Schuler v. Beaverton School District No. 48J · filed 1999-12-15(7)(a)(B)

The Board relied on Dietz for the proposition that the determination of the major contributing cause requires evaluation of the relative contribution of different causes, both work-related and preexisting. That is equally true whether what is being evaluated is the major contributing cause of the need for treatment of the combined condition or the compensability of the combined condition itself.

A combined condition exists when a work injury and a preexisting condition merge or exist in a close relationship.

Luckhurst v. Bank of America · filed 2000-05-03(7)(a)(B)

However, the Board’s findings and conclusions implicitly indicate that it believed that there were two conditions here that combined. We hold that the Board’s findings and conclusion that this claim involved a “combined condition” is within the legal meaning of the terms.

A combined condition exists when a compensable injury and a preexisting condition combine to cause disability or a need for treatment, regardless of which condition worsens the other.

Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Evans · filed 2000-12-27(7)(a)(B)

ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B), the standard for combined conditions, applies when a “compensable injury combines at any time with a preexisting condition” to cause a disability or need for treatment. The statute contains no wording that limits its applicability to cases in which a preexisting condition makes a compensable injury worse, and not vice versa. It simply requires that the compensable injury and the preexisting condition “combine[ ] at any time” to create a disability or need for treatment.

A combined condition is compensable when a work-related injury combines with a preexisting unrelated condition and is the major contributing cause of the current condition.

Birrer v. Principal Financial Group · filed 2001-02-28(7)(a)(B)

A “combined condition” occurs when a work-related injury combines with a preexisting unrelated condition to cause the claimant’s current condition. In order for a combined condition to be compensable, the work-related injury must be the major contributing cause of the current condition. ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B).

Section 656.005(24)’s definition of “preexisting condition” includes naturally occurring, age-related diseases.

Wantowski v. Crown Cork & Seal · filed 1999-11-24(24)

We rejected the argument, holding that nothing in the statute evinced an intention to exclude “naturally occurring” conditions from the meaning of the term “disease.” ... We decline claimant’s invitation and conclude that the Board did not err in considering his presbycusis in evaluating whether he had shown that employment exposure was the major contributing cause of his hearing loss.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(B) covers combined conditions in which two conditions integrate or have a close relationship without integrating.

Multifoods Specialty Distribution v. McAtee · filed 1999-12-29(7)(a)(B)

There is nothing in the text or context of ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) to suggest that the legislature intended to limit the term “combined” to only one of those possible common meanings. We therefore conclude that a combined condition may constitute either an integration of two conditions or the close relationship of those conditions, without integration.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(B) governs the substantive effect of accepting a combined condition but does not prescribe how to accept one.

Columbia Forest Products v. Woolner · filed 2001-10-31(7)(a)(B)

We have held that an employer accepts a combined condition “pursuant to” ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B). ... However, that statute does not provide a procedure for accepting combined conditions but, rather, explains the substantive effect of the acceptance of such conditions.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(B) defines a combined condition and makes it compensable only while the new injury is its major contributing cause.

Multifoods Specialty Distribution v. McAtee · filed 2002-04-11(7)(a)(B)

A combined condition occurs when a new injury combines with an old injury or pre-existing condition to cause or prolong either disability or a need for treatment. ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B). A “combined condition” is compensable “only if, so long as and to the extent that” the new injury is the major contributing cause of the combined condition.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(B) makes a combined condition compensable only when the otherwise compensable injury is the major contributing cause of the condition’s disability or need for treatment.

SAIF Corp. v. Wart · filed 2004-03-24(7)(a)(B)

Pursuant to ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B), if an "otherwise compensable injury" is not the major contributing cause of the disability of the combined condition or the need for treatment of the combined condition, the combined condition is not compensable.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(B)'s combined condition analysis applies when the insurer's denial encompasses a combined condition, as determined from the denial and its context.

SAIF Corp. v. Allen · filed 2004-06-09(7)(a)(B)

The dispute before us, then, is whether the board erred in evaluating the claim under ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B); as SAIF phrases it, we must decide whether “the issue of the compensability of a ‘combined condition’ was properly before the ALJ.” ... We therefore conclude that substantial evidence supports the board’s finding that SAIF’s denial did encompass a combined condition.

A worsening of an accepted injury is not a combined condition when a separate preexisting condition did not influence the worsening.

Vencor Nursing Center v. Rigel · filed 2006-09-27(7)(a)(B)

We conclude that the board did indeed consider employer’s evidence that claimant’s preexisting condition had caused the accepted disc herniations to become worse, but rejected it, favoring instead evidence that claimant did not have a combined condition, but suffered from the same condition that CSSC had previously accepted — i.e., that the herniated disc condition itself had become worse, but without influence from a separate preexisting condition.

A combined condition is compensable only so long as the work injury is the major contributing cause of the need for treatment.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Young · filed 2008-04-16(7)(a)(B)

As a general rule, if a compensable injury combines with a preexisting injury to cause or prolong the need for treatment, the combined condition is compensable “only if, so long as and to the extent that the otherwise compensable injury is the major contributing cause * * * of the need for treatment of the combined condition.” ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B).

A combined condition is compensable only if an otherwise compensable injury combines with a preexisting condition and is the major contributing cause of the resulting disability or need for treatment.

Bluemer v. Southland Industries · filed 2008-07-23(7)(a)(B)

As we have noted, ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) provides that a combined condition is compensable only if an otherwise compensable injury combines with a preexisting condition and the otherwise compensable condition is the major contributing cause of the resulting disability or need for treatment of the combined condition. In this case, the otherwise compensable injury is the 2003 injury, which the board has found was not the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment of the combined condition. That is all the law requires, regardless of who had the burden of proof before the board.

Section 656.005(7)(a)(B) applies the major contributing cause standard when an otherwise compensable injury combines with a preexisting condition to cause disability or a need for treatment.

SAIF Corp. v. Kollias · filed 2010-02-03(7)(a)(B)

Thus, if an otherwise compensable injury “combines” with a preexisting condition to cause disability or a need for treatment, a more rigorous, “major contributing cause” standard of proof is applicable.

Section 656.005(24)(b) excludes mere predisposition from the definition of a preexisting condition in occupational disease claims.

Multnomah County v. Obie · filed 2006-08-30(24)(b)

The records of the legislative proceedings clearly indicate that the amendments made to ORS 656.005(24) in 2001 were intended to eliminate a predisposition as a preexisting condition in the context of both injury and occupational disease claims.

A combined condition may arise at any time, including after the compensable injury.

Oregon Drywall Systems, Inc. v. Bacon · filed 2006-09-27(7)(a)(B)

A combined condition may arise “at any time.” It may cause disability or a need for treatment subsequent to the occurrence of the compensable injury; it also may resolve before the compensable injury becomes medically stationary.