Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.005

When a known work activity causes an accidental injury, the claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment, but need not disprove all idiopathic causes.

Folkenberg v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. · filed 1984-07-11(8)(a)

Under these circumstances, claimant is not required to disprove all idiopathic causes to permit an inference of work connection; his only burden of proof is to show by a preponderance of the evidence that his injury “arose out of and in the course of employment.” See ORS 656.005(8)(a).

Section 656.005(8)(a) does not cover an injury sustained on a personal side trip after the trip’s business purpose has ended, even when the employee is on call.

Johnson v. Employee Benefits Insurance · filed 1976-04-19(8)(a)

The central issue in this workmen’s compensation appeal is whether or not the injuries which claimant suffered in an automobile-truck collision arose out of and in the course of claimant’s employment, as required by former ORS 656.002(7)(a) (now ORS 656.005(8)(a)). ... Based upon our de novo review, and assuming without deciding that under Bebout v. SAIF, 22 Or App 1, 537 P2d 563, aff'd 273 Or 487, 541 P2d 1293 (1975), claimant’s claim was filed within the time prescribed by law, we conclude that claimant’s injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. The collision occurred on claimant’s day off while he was traveling on a personal side trip. The business purpose of the trip ended at Bend.

Section 656.005(8)(a) requires an injury to occur in the course of employment to be compensable.

Hansen v. State Accident Insurance Fund · filed 1977-01-24(8)(a)

Taken as a whole the weight of the evidence included in the record before us indicates that claimant was not injured in the course of his employment as a ski instructor; his injury is not, therefore, compensable.

An injury during a lunch break may arise out of and in the course of employment when it occurs on the employer’s premises while the employee helps a coworker with transportation to work.

Olsen v. State Accident Insurance Fund · filed 1977-04-20(8)(a)

To be compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Law an accidental injury must of course be one "arising out of and in the course of employment.” ORS 656.005(8)(a). ... Under these circumstances we agree with the circuit court that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment.

Section 656.005(8)(a) requires a sufficient connection between a personal errand and employment for an injury during the errand to arise out of employment.

Allen v. State Accident Insurance Fund · filed 1977-06-01(8)(a)

Looking to all the circumstances, we hold that the decedent’s death may conceivably have occurred in the course of his employment, but that there is not sufficient connection of decedent’s personal errand with the employment to justify a holding that it arose out of the employment.

Section 656.005(8)(a) requires proof that an injury arose out of and in the course of employment.

Napier v. State Accident Insurance Fund · filed 1977-10-24(8)(a)

Claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the act which he contends precipitated his heart attack arose out of and in the course of his employment, ORS 656.005(8),... and, also, he has failed to prove that the heart attack which, as noted above, occurred four days after the act in question was materially contributed to by that activity.

A parking-lot fall on the way to work, on facts identical to Rohrs, is not a compensable injury under § 656.005(8)(a).

Williams v. State Accident Insurance Fund · filed 1977-12-27(8)(a)

The relevant facts are identical to those in Rohrs v. SAIF, 27 Or App 505, 556 P2d 714 (1976). For the same reasons, claimant’s injury is not compensable. We affirm the portion of the judgment below which so finds.

An on-call employee’s injury while bringing groceries home outside fixed duty hours, when she has not been called, does not arise out of and in the course of employment.

Morgan v. State Accident Insurance Fund · filed 1978-02-07(8)(a)

Claimant, an assistant manager of an apartment complex, injured her ankle while bringing her groceries home at a time outside of her fixed duty hours and when she was on call, but not called. Both the hearing officer and the Workers’ Compensation Board concluded that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment. See ORS 656.005(8)(a). We agree for the reasons we have previously stated in Allen v. SAIF, 29 Or App 631, 564 P2d 1086 rev den (1977), and Walker v. SAIF, 28 Or App 127, 558 P2d 1270 (1977).

An injury on the employer’s premises during an extended trip to work can arise out of and in the course of employment even when the employee arrived early and was heading back to meet a co-worker.

Benafel v. State Accident Insurance Fund · filed 1978-04-17(8)(a)

It is no doubt unusual for an employe to misset an alarm clock and arrive early for work. The occurrence of such unusual event should not preclude claimant from recovering for injuries suffered on employer’s premises during what was actually an extended trip to get to work.

Section 656.005(8)(a) requires a compensable injury to arise out of employment; worsening symptoms alone is insufficient unless work caused the injury or significantly worsened the underlying condition.

Weller v. Union Carbide Corp. · filed 1978-08-01(8)(a)

We now hold that a worsening (purposely avoiding the term of art "aggravation”) of symptoms is not compensable. Only the onset or significant worsening of injury or disease arising out of, i.e., caused by, employment can be compensable.

Section 656.005(8)(a) requires a causal connection between employment and injury for an injury to arise out of employment.

Otto v. Moak Chevrolet, Inc. · filed 1978-09-06(8)(a)

While Oregon, like Arizona, gives effect to the personal comfort doctrine, the "arising out of" language of ORS 656.005(8)(a) requires that there be a causal connection between the employment and the injury.

Section 656.005(8)(a) does not cover an injury from an employee’s self-directed exercise to meet a job fitness requirement when the employer does not prescribe the activity.

Haugen v. State Accident Insurance Fund · filed 1978-12-18(8)(a)

The critical fact is that the risk of injury from claimant’s physical conditioning program did not arise out of but rather was a condition to or qualification for the employment. Claimant’s employment contract requires that he maintain himself in good physical condition and establishes objective criteria in terms of weight and a biennial physical for measuring that qualification. The employer does not prescribe what police officers must do to satisfy those criteria. The employee assumes the responsibility for, and correspondingly any attendant risk of, meeting the job qualifications. He may follow a program of careful diet and walking, or engage in vigorous contact sports. In either event, the activity and any injury resulting therefrom is neither in the course of nor does it arise out of the employment.

An injury from arm wrestling during a lengthy personal delay on a work trip does not occur in the course of employment when the activity has no relationship to the employer’s business.

Hackney v. Tillamook Growers Co-Op. · filed 1979-04-23(8)(a)

The sole issue is whether the "arm wrestling" arose in the course of claimant's employment as required by ORS 656.005(8)(a). ... In the instant case, the claimant's injury arose after 5 1/2 hours of delay and the consumption of "three or four" beers. Claimant's arm wrestling had no relationship to his employer's business. ... We conclude that the injury did not occur while claimant was acting in the course and scope of his employment.

An injury occurs in the course of employment when it is closely connected in time and place to a work-related altercation, even if the worker has briefly left the work area.

Youngren v. Weyerhaeuser Co. · filed 1979-07-30(8)(a)

His departure from that place and his almost immediate encounter with the steel drum, while not on a route designed to carry claimant directly back to his duty station, were nonetheless so closely connected in time and space with the altercation that we find them to have occurred within the scope of claimant’s employment.

Section 656.005(8)(a) is satisfied when an injury has a sufficient relationship to the worker’s employment, assessed through a unitary work-connection inquiry.

Rogers v. State Accident Insurance Fund · filed 1980-09-10(8)(a)

If the injury has sufficient work relationship, then it arises out of and in the course of employment and the statute is satisfied.

An injury during an off-premises break is compensable when the employee’s activity has a sufficient connection to the work, even if the injury occurs during a scheduled unpaid lunch period.

Compensation of Halfman v. State Accident Insurance Fund · filed 1980-11-03(8)(a)

We conclude that, although claimant’s injury occurred off the employer’s premises and during the time scheduled for an unpaid lunch period, claimant has established a sufficient work connection between the activity which resulted in the injury and his employment. That activity was of some benefit to the employer, it was contemplated by the employer and employe at the time of hiring or thereafter, it was an ordinary risk and incidental to this particular employment situation, it was acquiesced in by the employer, and claimant was not on a personal mission of his own when injured. The injury is compensable.

Section 656.005(8)(a) covers an injury sustained while preparing for work when the activity is sufficiently related to the employment.

Bailey v. Peter Kiewit & Sons · filed 1981-03-30(8)(a)

We conclude that claimant’s activity was sufficiently work-related to make his injury compensable.

An injury on a public street while arriving at work does not arise out of and in the course of employment when the employer does not control the street and the employee faces no greater risk than the public.

Adamson v. Dalles Cherry Growers, Inc. · filed 1981-09-28(8)(a)

Finally, we do not think that use of the street exposed the claimant to a greater risk of injury than any other member of the public. ... We conclude that the injury was not related to claimant’s employment and did not arise out of and in the course of her employment.

An injury from walking can arise out of employment when walking is part of the worker’s job and the injury has a sufficient work relationship.

Hubble v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. · filed 1982-03-08(8)(a)

Walking was part of claimant’s job; hence the risk of injury from walking was a risk of that job. He has established a sufficient work relationship between his injury and his job to recover under the statute.

An injury sustained while playing softball on an employer-sponsored team may fall outside the requirement that it arise out of and in the course of employment.

Puderbaugh v. Woodland Park Hospital · filed 1986-05-14(8)(a)

Applying the analysis we used in Rose v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 77 Or App 167, 711 P2d 218 (1985), and Richmond v. SAIF, 58 Or App 354, 648 P2d 370, rev den 293 Or 634 (1982), to the facts here, we conclude, on de novo review, that his injury did not arise “out of and in the course of employment.” ORS 656.005(8)(a).

Section 656.005(8)(a) requires an injury to arise out of and in the course of employment; the parties’ employment agreement helps determine whether it does.

State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. v. Reel · filed 1987-04-14(8)(a)

We believe that the problem is best resolved, not by reference to any "traveling employe rule," but by examining the contractual relationship of the parties to determine if the claimant's injury "arose out of and in the course of" his employment. ORS 656.005(8)(a).

An injury is compensable only if it arises out of and in the course of employment.

Timberline Lodge v. Kyle · filed 1989-06-14(7)(a)

To be compensable, an injury must arise out of and in the course of employment. ORS 656.005(7)(a).

An injury does not arise in the course of employment when the task causing it is outside the employee’s work and serves another party’s benefit.

Progressive Casualty Insurance v. Marca · filed 1989-11-29(7)

Moving the tractor, however, was not shown to be an integral part of the salvage project and, therefore, was not a part of Robbins’ employment. On this record, moving the tractor was entirely for the benefit of the fire department, not Marca.

A temporary departure from a worker’s usual duties can remain in the course of employment under the compensable injury definition.

Progressive Casualty Insurance v. Marca · filed 1990-03-14(7)(a)

The fact that Robbins was killed while performing a task that was unrelated to the salvage project just before he and Marca were to depart from the work site did not remove Robbins from the protection of the Workers' Compensation Law. ... We hold that the task performed by Robbins, although it was a departure from his usual duties, was in the course of his employment and that the trial court properly held that Progressive had no duty to defend or indemnify Marca in the wrongful death action.

An assault by a third person arises out of employment when it results from the nature of the work or a risk of the work environment.

Barkley v. Corrections Division · filed 1992-01-22(7)(a)

An assault by a third person is deemed to arise out of a claimant’s employment when the assault is the result of the nature of the work or when it originates from some risk to which the work environment exposes the employee.

Under former § 656.005(8)(a), an injury sustained while leaving work on the employer’s premises is compensable if the employer expressly or impliedly allowed the conduct that caused it.

Agripac, Inc. v. Zimmerman · filed 1989-07-12(8)(a)

Claimant’s on-premises injury occurred as he was leaving work. Therefore, whether his injury is compensable turns on whether employer expressly or impliedly allowed him to jump from the dock.

An injury is compensable when it arises out of and in the course of employment; both elements are assessed together to determine its work connection.

Henderson v. S.D. Deacon Corp. · filed 1994-04-20(7)(a)

An injury is compensable if it “aris[es] out of and in the course of employment.” ORS 656.005(7)(a). ... Both elements of the work-connection-test are sufficiently satisfied here to support the holding that claimant’s injury was work related.

An injury from a neutral risk arises out of employment only if work conditions put the worker in a position to be injured; efforts to jump start a car after work can break that causal connection.

SAIF Corp. v. Marin · filed 1996-03-13(7)(a)

Claimant’s efforts to jump start his car and the circumstances that followed more directly caused him to be in a position to be injured by the flower box. We conclude that those activities were sufficiently removed from his normal ingress and egress to and from work as to break the causal connection between his normal conditions of employment and his injury. Thus, the Board erred in holding that claimant’s injuiy arose from his employment.

Section 656.005(7)(a) requires a work-connection analysis that addresses both whether a condition arose out of employment and whether it occurred in the course of employment.

Freightliner Corp. v. Arnold · filed 1996-07-03(7)(a)

The determinative question is whether the Board’s work-connection analysis— by reference to seven factors or otherwise — adequately addresses both the “arising out of’ and the “in the course of’ components of the unitary work-connection test.

A coworker assault provoked by an employee’s racially derogatory remarks does not arise out of employment when the dispute is personal rather than work-related.

Redman Industries, Inc. v. Lang · filed 1996-07-31(7)(a)

The question here is whether the risk of being assaulted by a coworker for using racially derogatory remarks is sufficiently connected with claimant’s employment. For the following reasons, we hold that it is not.

An injury arises out of employment when the events giving rise to it are causally related to the worker’s employment.

SAIF Corp. v. Burke · filed 1996-12-24(7)(a)

An injury is compensable if it “aris[es] out of and in the course of employment.” ORS 656.005(7)(a). ... We conclude that the totality of those events gave rise to claimant’s injury and that the injury was causally related to his employment. Consequently, the Board did not err in holding that claimant’s injury arose out of his employment.

An injury in an employer’s parking lot may arise out of employment when the events causing it are causally connected to the work; the employer’s control over the hazard is not the sole test.

Torkko v. SAIF Corp. · filed 1997-04-30(7)(a)

Here, as in Marin, the Board improperly focused on whether the employer controlled the instrumentality that caused claimant’s injury. The proper focus is on whether claimant’s injury, which was caused when her head struck an object in her employer’s parking lot while she was taking school materials from her car to her classroom, is causally connected with her employment.

Section 656.005(7)(a) includes a reasonable period after work to leave the employer’s premises within the course of employment, and requires the injury to arise from a risk connected with the work or work environment.

Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Hayes · filed 1997-08-07(7)(a)

"In the course of" employment also includes a reasonable period of time after work for the worker to leave the employer's premises, including the employer's parking lot. ... Rather, a worker's injury is deemed to "arise out of" employment if the risk of the injury results from the nature of his or her work or when it originates from some risk to which the work environment exposes the worker.

An injury may arise out of employment even when a worker uses an unusual method to carry out a work-related task.

Wilson v. State Farm Insurance · filed 1998-02-12(7)(a)

In short, the fact that employer did not contemplate or expect claimant’s precise method of rounding the corner as she returned to her office does not render her resulting injury noncompensable.

Section 656.005(7) covers a coworker assault when workplace interactions created the risk, while its active-participant exclusion requires more than having earlier angered the assailant.

Redman Industries, Inc. v. Lang · filed 1997-08-21(7)(a), (7)(b)(A)

An injury arises out of employment if the risk of injury results from the nature of the claimant’s work or from the work environment. That test does not require that the motivation for a coworker’s assault be an argument over job performance or some other work-related factor. ... Based on the foregoing reasoning, we hold that the risk of an assault by a coworker in the workplace is a risk to which the work environment exposes an employee. ... Those terms require more than that a claimant anger an assailant in such a way that the assailant later assaults the claimant.

Compensability depends on the totality of the circumstances connecting the injury to employment; the risk of injury alone is not dispositive.

SAIF Corp. v. Fortson · filed 1998-09-02(7)(a)

Rather, it is the totality of the circumstances surrounding the injury that determines compensability.

An injury during an employer-directed trip to deliver an off-work authorization can occur in the course of employment.

Iliaifar v. SAIF Corp. · filed 1999-04-28(7)(a)

In light of the Board's finding under the circumstances that "the employer directed claimant to drop off a copy of his off-work slip," the requirement that the injury occur in the course of his employment is satisfied.

Section 656.005(7)(a) requires some support for both the course-of-employment and arising-out-of-employment prongs of a single work-connection test; strong support for one can offset minimal support for the other.

McTaggart v. Time Warner Cable · filed 2000-10-18(7)(a)

The requirement that the injury occur in the course of employment concerns the time, place and circumstances of the injury; the requirement that it arise out of employment requires a causal link between the injury and the employment. Although they are stated separately, those requirements are two prongs of what is in fact a single work-connection inquiry. There must be some support for each prong, but neither is dispositive. Strong support for one prong and minimal support for the other may be sufficient to satisfy the test. The basic question is whether the causal connection between the injury and the employment is sufficient to warrant compensation.

Section 656.005(7)(a) requires some showing that an injury both occurred in the course of employment and arose from a risk connected to the work.

RFPD v. Leopard · filed 2002-03-27(7)(a)

Consequently, on this record, claimant did not meet his burden of establishing a causal connection between the injury and work, and he therefore did not satisfy the arises-out-of-employment prong of the work-connection test. Because both prongs of the test must be satisfied to some degree, the board erred in concluding that claimant’s injury was compensable.

Section 656.005(7)(a) makes the assailant’s motivation decisive in determining whether a workplace assault arose out of employment.

Panpat v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc. · filed 2002-07-11(7)(a)

Stated another way, whether the motivation for the assault was a workplace event or an “event unique” to the romantic relationship is determinative.

An on-call worker’s injury can be compensable when a required work errand and a risk connected with the job sufficiently link the injury to employment.

American Medical Response v. Gavlik · filed 2003-08-20(7)(a)

Under ORS 656.005(7)(a), only injuries that “aris[e] out of and in the course of employment” are compensable. ... Having examined both parts of the statutory test, we agree with the board that there is a sufficient connection to claimant’s work to hold her injury compensable.

Section 656.005(7)(a) covers an injury sustained during a medical arbiter exam when the injury arises out of and in the course of employment.

McAleny v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2003-11-26(7)(a)

In light of the foregoing principles, we conclude that the injury sustained by claimant in the MAE arose out of and in the course of his employment.

An injury during a worker’s return from a road relief location to retrieve a vehicle is compensable when the trip is reasonably incidental to the job and exposes the worker to a risk arising from employment.

Tri-Met, Inc. v. Lamb · filed 2004-06-09(7)(a)

Her return to the garage to retrieve her personal vehicle was within the course of her employment because it was reasonably incidental to the performance of her ongoing employment duties for that day. ... That incident of employment exposed her to the risk of injury and satisfies the requirement that her injury arises out of her employment.

An injury sustained on an employer-controlled path while returning from lunch can arise out of and occur in the course of employment.

Hearthstone Manor v. Stuart · filed 2004-02-11(7)(a)

Her injury arose out of her employment as we have construed that phrase, and for that reason it met both aspects of the unitary work-connection test.

An injury during a dispute over work-related discipline can arise out of employment even when the worker’s conduct is not a job duty.

Columbia River Dairy v. Sepulveda · filed 2006-11-08(7)(a)

Although claimant’s act of placing his foot near the tire in order to prevent his supervisor from driving away was not a specific duty of his employment, because claimant’s conduct occurred in the context of employment discipline, we agree with the board that the injury arose out of the employment.

An injury can occur in the course of employment despite a worker’s violation of an employer’s instruction about how to perform assigned work.

Sisco v. Quicker Recovery · filed 2008-03-12(7)(a)

How claimant interacted with police officers, including with respect to presenting identification upon demand, related to the “method” of performing that “ultimate work.” Consequently, claimant’s violation of employer’s directive notwithstanding, his injury was incurred “in the course of’ his employment.

An injury during an activity outside the worker’s duties that the employer prohibits does not occur in the course of employment.

Van Der Vaarte v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2009-05-13(7)(a)

Consistently with the Supreme Court’s explanation of “reasonably incidental,” in the context of an activity that is not “fulfilling the duties of employment,” if an employee was injured while engaged in an activity that was neither expressly nor impliedly allowed by the employer—or, as in this case, was prohibited by the employer—that injury cannot be deemed to have occurred in the course of employment.

An injury arises out of employment when a worker encounters a risk of employer-required home work premises in connection with performing work, even if the employer does not control that risk.

Sandberg v. JC PENNEY CO. INC. · filed 2011-06-01(7)(a)

If an employer, for its own advantage, demands that a worker furnish the work premises, the risks of those premises encountered in connection with the performance of work are risks of the work environment, even if they are outside of the employer’s control, and injuries resulting from those risks arise out of the employment.

An injury arises out of employment when the worker’s duties expose the worker to the risk that caused the injury.

City of Eugene v. McDermed · filed 2012-06-27(7)(a)

With respect to risks associated with the nature of claimant’s work, the nature of that work — that is, claimant’s job responsibilities — included a community policing component, which, as the board found, “required interacting with people on the streets to discuss public issues.” That, in turn, exposed claimant to the risks of street-based interactions, including being struck by a motor vehicle as she crossed the street.

An injury arises out of employment only if the worker’s duties or work environment exposed the worker to the risk that caused it.

Legacy Health Systems v. Noble · filed 2012-06-27(7)(a)

We conclude, on review, that claimant’s injury did not arise out of her employment because neither claimant’s work nor her work environment exposed her to the risk of the injury that she suffered.

An injury occurs in the course of employment when a worker performs a job duty in a manner allowed by the employer and for the employer’s benefit.

Mendoza v. Liberty Northwest Insurance · filed 2013-06-12(7)(a)

In sum, claimant’s injuries occurred while she was performing a duty of her employment in a manner allowed by employer and for employer’s benefit. Accordingly, her injuries occurred in the course of her employment.

Section 656.005(7)(a) requires a causal link between a worker’s injury and employment, which can be satisfied by injury during work-related air travel.

Toohey v. Aviation Adventures, LLC · filed 2015-03-04(7)(a)

Second, we reject plaintiffs argument that the trial court erred in concluding that there was a causal link between Toohey’s injuries and Ketcheson’s employment, as required by ORS 656.005(7)(a).

An injury during travel to work can satisfy the course-of-employment requirement when the worker is subject to the employer's direction and control at the time of injury.

SAIF Corp. v. Massari (In re Massari) · filed 2018-04-18(7)(a)

And an injury incurred when the worker is going to work is compensable if the worker is within the employer's direction and control at the time of the injury.

An injury from an unexplained fall at work may satisfy the requirement that a compensable injury arise out of employment.

Sheldon v. U.S. Bank (In re Comp. of Sheldon) · filed 2019-05-23(7)(a)

Thus, a claimant may prove that an injury arose out of employment if the injury resulted from an unexplained fall that occurred on the job.

An injury on a leased common area can occur in the course of employment when the employer has some control over that area, including the right to request repairs.

Bruntz-Ferguson v. Liberty Mutual Ins. · filed 2021-04-14(7)(a)

Therefore, we conclude that those facts, taken together, establish that employer had “some control” over the area in the parking lot where claimant was injured. Accordingly, because employer had some control over the area where claimant was injured, we conclude that the “in the course of” prong is satisfied.

Section 656.005(7)(a) treats an injury caused partly by an employment risk as arising out of employment even when a personal risk also contributes.

SAIF v. Blankenship · filed 2021-08-18(7)(a)

When an injury results at least in part from an employment-related risk, it arises out of the employment, even if a personal risk is also in play.

Section 656.005(7)(a) makes an injury compensable when it arises out of and occurs in the course of employment, including when work exposes an employee to a hazard in a parking lot over which the employer exercises some control.

Miles v. Bi-Mart Corp. · filed 2021-12-22(7)(a)

Ultimately, we conclude that the injury arose out of and in the course of claimant’s employment, and that the injury is compensable. ... When a person is injured at work, that injury is compensable if it “aris[es] out of and in the course of employment.” ORS 656.005(7)(a).

An injury caused by a neutral risk arises out of employment when work conditions place the worker in a position to be injured.

SAIF v. Chavez-Cordova · filed 2021-08-18(7)(a)

We conclude that the board did not err in determin- ing that claimant’s employment placed him in a position to be injured and that the injury therefore arose out of the employment.

An employe can have more than one employer for workers’ compensation purposes; compensation and the right to direct and control help establish the relationship.

Blacknall v. Westwood Corp., Developers & Contractors · filed 1987-12-30(13), (27)

The tests for the existence of an employer-employe relationship include the payment of compensation and the right to direct and control. For purposes of worker’s compensation, an employe can have more than one employer.

Section 656.005(28) defines a worker as someone who furnishes services for remuneration; a person who voluntarily retires from the work force no longer meets that definition.

Cutright v. Weyerhaeuser Co. · filed 1985-06-25(28)

There is not one word in the statute that refers to a person who no longer engages in furnishing services for remuneration. Certainly, one who retires voluntarily from the work force is no longer a "worker" as defined.

A person who was a worker when originally injured remains a worker for increased disability benefits after aggravation, even if retired when the aggravation occurs.

Pacific Motor Trucking Co. v. Standley · filed 1988-09-28(27)

Implicit in our opinion is our conclusion that a person is a “worker” for purposes of increased disability benefits for aggravation if he or she was a “worker” at the time of the original compensable injury, whether or not he or she is retired at the time of the aggravation.

Section 656.005(27) includes a person who works for remuneration under an employer’s direction and control even when another company pays that person directly.

Blacknall v. Westwood Corporation · filed 1988-11-16(27)

In deciding whether the plaintiff was a “subject worker of the [defendant] employer,” we first look to the definition of “worker” contained in ORS 656.005(27). ... That his remuneration came directly from Adia does not take him out of the definition of “worker.”

An independent contractor is not a worker under the statutory definition.

Bisbey v. Thedford · filed 1984-05-09(28)

If a person is an independent contractor, then he is not a worker as defined in ORS 656.005(28).

Section 656.005 excludes an unpaid vocational trainee from the definition of “worker” and a contracting rehabilitation organization from the definition of “employer.”

Firkus v. Alder Creek Lumber · filed 1980-09-22(16), (31)

Under the Act, neither a contracting vocational rehabilitation organization nor an employer supplying an on-the-job position is required to provide compensation coverage for a trainee placed in a non-remunerative, on-the-job training program, because the organization is not an "employer” and the trainee is not a "worker” within the meaning of the Act, ORS 656.005(16), (31).

Section 656.005(16) and (30) recognize an employment relationship when a person agrees to perform specific work for specific compensation under another’s direction.

Crampton v. Bullis · filed 1980-09-08(16), (30)

Claimant testified that there was an explicit agreement that she do specific work for specific compensation, under the direction of respondent. Accepting that testimony as credible, we conclude, as did the referee and the Board, that an employment relationship existed. See ORS 656.005(16) and (30).

An owner's instructions for a one or two race engagement do not make a freelance jockey the owner's employee.

Bell v. Hartman · filed 1980-01-14(30)

We agree with the Illinois court's reasoning. Freelance jockeys are engaged as specialists in their field, and an owner's instructions about how to ride a horse during a one or two race engagement no more makes the jockey the owner's employee than a patient's informed consent to a surgical procedure makes the physician an employee of the patient.

A log hauler’s own workers’ compensation coverage and a potential subrogation action do not affect whether he is the logger’s workman.

Louvring v. Excel Logging Co. · filed 1977-11-29(28)

We hold that this circumstance is irrelevant to whether plaintiff was defendant’s "workman” or was an "independent contractor.”

Section 656.005(25) allows a worker employed by one company to be a subject worker of another company that controls the worker’s work.

Gibson v. Safeway Stores, Inc. · filed 1988-11-16(25)

As in Blacknall, and for the reasons set forth in Black-nall, it is established that the plaintiff was a subject worker of the defendant, ORS 656.005(25), and that the defendant was the plaintiffs employer under ORS 656.017(1).

A job applicant performing a welding test without remuneration is not a worker under the statute.

BBC Brown Boveri v. Lusk · filed 1991-09-04(27)

As in Dykes, claimant was not performing services for remuneration when his hearing loss was first discovered. It follows that ... he was not a “worker,” and that BBC could not have been an employer under ORS 656.005(13).

Section 656.005(27)’s definition of “worker” may include someone who left the work force voluntarily but seeks to return and is prevented by a compensable injury.

SAIF Corp. v. Stephen · filed 1989-05-31(27)

A claimant who seeks to re-enter the work force after voluntary withdrawal, but is prevented from doing so by a compensable injury, may qualify as a worker although not presently engaged “to furnish services for a remuneration.”

A person who was a worker when the initial claim was filed does not lose worker status for temporary disability benefits merely because of later incarceration.

Forshee & Langley Logging v. Peckham · filed 1990-03-14(27)

Here, claimant was a “worker” when he filed his initial claim. He injured his back while engaged in regular gainful employment. His departure from the workforce was the direct consequence of the disabling effects of that compensable injury.

Section 656.005(30)’s engagement requirement can be satisfied by an express or implied contract for hire.

Montez v. Roloff Farms, Inc. · filed 2001-08-01(30)

A contract for hire that satisfies the “engagement” requirement of ORS 656.005(30) may be based on either an express or implied contract.

Section 656.005(30)'s definition of “worker” does not require a person to choose freely to enter or leave the work relationship.

Wallowa County v. Fordice · filed 2002-05-01(30)

Indeed, ORS 656.005(30) explicitly excludes from the definition of “workers” those “whose services are performed as an inmate or ward of a state institution or as part of the eligibility requirements for a general or public assistant grant.” Had the definition of “worker” inherently included a volitional requirement, this part of the statute would have been unnecessary.

An applicant who performs actual work during a pre-employment evaluation can be a worker because the law implies an obligation to pay for that work.

Gadalean v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2017-06-14(30)

Thus, claimant was “engage [d] to furnish services for a remuneration” under ORS 656.005(30), and the board erred in concluding otherwise.

A person invited to orientation and paid training may qualify as a worker before completing the orientation.

Meyers v. SAIF Corp. (In re Meyers) · filed 2018-04-18(30)

In light of the evidence in the record and the board's findings, we conclude that the board's conclusion that claimant was not a "worker" at the time of her injury within the meaning of ORS 656.005(30) is not supported by substantial evidence or substantial reason.

Section 656.005(30) requires a person furnishing services to reasonably expect remuneration; a legal entitlement to pay alone does not make that person a worker.

Gadalean v. Saif Corp. (In re Comp. of Gadalean) · filed 2019-04-18(30)

The statute's requirement that a claimant have reasonably expected remuneration is at odds with an application of an implied-in-law contract that would make a claimant a "worker" based entirely on an entitlement to remuneration, in the absence of any expectation of that benefit.

A person invited to an unpaid orientation immediately before paid training can be a worker before completing the orientation if she reasonably expects to be paid for the training.

Randall v. SAIF · filed 2020-10-07(30)

Thus, as distinct from Gadalean, at the time claimant arrived for the orientation, she had a reasonable expectation that she would be paid for the training.

Section 656.005(14) defines the class of employers considered for Second Injury Fund benefits, but does not require benefits for every employer in that class.

Crouse v. Workmen's Compensation Board · filed 1976-09-20(14)

The establishment of eligibility criteria within the statutory delegation does not conflict with the statutory definition of that class, employers, among whom eligibility is established. ORS 656.005(14) defines "employer” as used in ORS 656.622. The administrative rule determines which among that class receive benefits.

Under § 656.005(14), employers who share control need not each control every aspect of an employee’s work.

Spore v. Camac Veneer, Inc. · filed 1983-04-13(14)

It also follows that, where there is mutual control, neither of the two employers can singly control everything the employe does.

A supervisor who hires and directs a worker on an employer’s behalf does not thereby become that worker’s employer.

Vestal v. Barrett Business Services · filed 2000-01-05(13)

As Barrett points out, however, those actions are consistent with the Board’s conclusion that Allen acted as Jackson’s supervisory employee rather than on his own account. ... The evidence supports the Board’s conclusions, and the Board adequately explained how it reached them.

Section 656.005(13)(a) includes a trustee within the definition of an employer, allowing a trust to employ workers separately from its creator.

US Bancorp v. Mulrooney · filed 2005-03-02(13)(a)

Consequently, the trustee of the Bula Buck Arveson Trust — an entity legally distinct from Bula Arveson individually — had the ability to hire and retain its own employees; and the trust (again, as distinct from Arveson individually) had the ability to secure workers’ compensation coverage for those employees. See ORS 656.005(13)(a) (“[e]mployer” includes, inter alia, “trustee”).

Section 656.005(13)(a) defines “employer” for chapter 656 to include public employers, including school districts.

Preble v. Centennial Sch. Dist. No. 287 · filed 2019-06-26(13)(a)

The law then provides, in ORS 656.005(13)(a), that the term "employer" as used in chapter 656, means "any person, including receiver, administrator, executor or trustee, and the state, state agencies, counties, municipal corporations, school districts and other public corporations or political subdivisions, who contracts to pay a remuneration for and secures the right to direct and control the services of any person." Thus, when ORS 656.019(2)(a) states a limitation period that applies to actions against an "employer," that expressly includes public employers.

A temporary service provider’s client is not the employer of the workers it supplies; an implied-in-fact contract can establish the client relationship.

Employer Solutions Staffing Group v. SAIF · filed 2025-09-04(13)(b)

“[T]he client of a temporary service provider is not the employer of temporary workers provided by the temporary service provider.” ORS 656.005(13)(b) (2023), amended by HB 2800 § 24 (2025). ... The conclusion that BRF was a client of ESSG through an implied-in-fact contract also leads us to reject the remainder of ESSG’s arguments. There was no employer-employee relationship between decedent and BRF for several reasons.

Section 656.005(9) defines compensation as benefits provided for a compensable injury; it does not include attorney fees for legal services.

Dotson v. Bohemia, Inc. · filed 1986-07-02(9)

We think that the legislature intended “benefits * * * provided for a compensable injury” to refer to those set forth in ORS 656.202 to ORS 656.258. These include payments for a worker’s death, disability, medical services and vocational assistance. Attorney fees are provided for legal services, and not for a compensable injury, and are addressed in ORS 656.382 to ORS 656.388.

Section 656.005(9) distinguishes an award of compensation or benefits from a finding that a condition is compensable.

Shoulders v. SAIF Corp. · filed 1985-05-22(9)

A referee’s finding of compensability is not the same as an award of compensation, or benefits, as the term is defined by ORS 656.005(9).

Section 656.005(9) includes chiropractic treatment within compensation when the treatment is related to the injury and is reasonable and necessary.

State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. v. Belcher · filed 1984-12-19(9)

The Board reasoned that chiropractic treatments are a form of compensation to which claimant is entitled if he establishes that the treatments are related to his injury and that they are reasonable and necessary for treatment of the condition resulting therefrom. ORS 656.005(9); 656.245(1); ... We agree with the Board’s reasoning in Dykstra.

Section 656.005(9) includes medical services expenses within the definition of compensation.

State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. v. Mathews · filed 1982-01-25(9)

On appeal, SAIF first contends that because ORS 656.313(1) speaks in terms of “compensation to the claimant,” payments to medical services providers are not compensation within the meaning of the former rule. We indicated the contrary in ... Compensation, as defined by ORS 656.005(9), includes medical expenses of the type at issue here: “ ‘Compensation” includes all benefits, including medical services, provided for a compensable injury ***.’”

Section 656.005(9) includes medical services in the definition of compensation.

Dethlefs v. Hyster Co. · filed 1983-07-19(9)

Medical services are included in the term “compensation.” ORS 656.005(9).

Section 656.005(9) defines compensation to include medical expenses for a compensable injury.

Wisherd v. Paul Koch Volkswagen, Inc. · filed 1977-02-14(9)

Compensation, as defined by ORS 656.005(9),includes medical expenses of the type at issue here: " 'Compensation’ includes all benefits, including ... medical services, provided for a compensable injury ‡ ”

Section 656.005(9)’s definition of compensation is not strictly binding when context requires a different meaning; compensation includes interim payments under ORS 656.262.

Jones v. Emanuel Hospital · filed 1977-10-18(9)

However, the definitions in ORS 656.005 are not meant to be strictly binding in all situations. ... In the context of ORS 656.262, the word "compensation” includes what we have called interim compensation.

Section 656.005(9) defines compensation to include medical services.

State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. v. Parker · filed 1982-12-22(9)

“Compensation” includes medical services. ORS 656.005(9).

Section 656.005(9) defines compensation under Oregon’s workers’ compensation law to exclude VA disability benefits.

American Building Maintenance v. McLees · filed 1983-09-21(9)

We are left with the conclusion that ORS 656.222 applies only to successive awards for disability for injuries to the same scheduled member — those enumerated in ORS 656.214(2) through (4) — when both awards are made pursuant to ORS ch 656, the Oregon Workers’ Compensation law. Our reading of ORS 656.005(9) confirms that conclusion. Accordingly, we hold that “compensation” as that term is used in ORS 656.222, does not include disability benefits received from the VA.

Section 656.005(9) defines compensation as benefits paid under Oregon’s workers’ compensation laws; prior VA disability benefits do not qualify.

American Building Maintenance v. McLees · filed 1984-04-17(9)

Under ORS 656.005(9) “compensation” means benefits for a compensable injury as well as benefits payable to particular individuals. The statute uses the words “subject worker.” We interpret this to mean a worker who is subject to the provisions of the Oregon workers’ compensation laws and who is to be paid by a direct responsibility employer or the State Accident Insurance Fund Corporation pursuant to the Oregon workers’ compensation laws. Applying this interpretation to ORS 656.222, we conclude, and now hold, that the provisions of this statute requiring that an award of compensation for a subsequent disability shall be made with regard to the combined effect of his injuries and his past receipt of money for such disabilities refers only to previous compensation paid a worker under the Oregon workers’ compensation system.

Section 656.005(9) defines compensation to include medical services for a compensable injury.

Shoulders v. SAIF Corp. · filed 1986-03-25(9)

Thus, when a claim is determined to be compensable, medical services must be provided and, under ORS 656.005(9), medical services are defined as compensation.

Section 656.005(9) defines compensation to include all benefits provided to a worker for a compensable condition, including temporary total disability.

Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Hughes · filed 1987-05-06(9)

“Compensation” under chapter 656 consists of all the benefits provided to a worker for a compensable condition, including temporary total disability. ORS 656.005(9).

Section 656.005(9) includes vocational rehabilitation assistance within compensation.

Nicholson v. Blachly · filed 1987-08-05(9)

Compensation includes vocational rehabilitation assistance. ORS 656.005(9); ORS 656.340(3).

A payment under a disputed claim settlement that leaves the claim denied is not “compensation” under the statutory definition.

Howard v. Liberty Northwest Insurance · filed 1988-12-07(8)

“Compensation” is defined as “all benefits, including medical services, provided for a compensable injury to a subject worker or the worker’s beneficiaries by an insurer or self-insured employer pursuant to this chapter.” ORS 656.005(8). (Emphasis supplied.) ... On the merits, as we have stated, the payment to which claimant was entitled under the agreement is not “compensation.”

Section 656.005(8) excludes an insurer’s reimbursement to a private health insurer from “compensation” because the payment is not made to the worker.

Lloyd v. Employee Benefits Insurance · filed 1989-05-17(8)

That construction ignores the limiting phrase, “to a subject worker.” The payments by EBI to Bankers Life were not made to claimant and thus were not “compensation” within the meaning of ORS 656.005 (8).

Section 656.005(8) defines “compensation” to include both permanent and temporary disability benefits.

Trice v. Tektronix, Inc. · filed 1990-11-28(8)

Unlike its predecessor, which solely concerned permanent partial disability, the current version of ORS 656.218 expressly refers to “compensation,” ORS 656.218(1), which includes both permanent disability and temporary disability benefits. See ORS 656.005(8).

Section 656.005(8) includes medical services resulting from an accepted condition within compensation.

Stratis v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. · filed 1989-05-24(8)

Compensation, however, includes medical services resulting from the accepted condition. ORS 656.005(8).

Section 656.005(8) defines compensation to exclude attorney fees.

Harrington v. Board of Trustees · filed 1990-03-14(8)

However, ORS 656.027(6) provides for equivalent “compensation.” That term does not include attorney fees.

Section 656.005(8) defines compensation to include disability benefits and medical services provided for a compensable injury.

Buddenberg v. Southcoast Lumber · filed 1993-05-06(8)

Thus, “compensation” encompasses benefits paid for death, ORS 656.204, permanent total disability, ORS 656.206, temporary total disability, ORS 656.210, temporary partial disability, ORS 656.212, and permanent partial disability, ORS 656.214, as well as medical services, ORS 656.245.

Under § 656.005(8), noncompensable palliative care is not compensation.

Hathaway v. Health Future Enterprises · filed 1994-12-02(8)

We conclude that claimant’s request for a hearing regarding insurer’s disapproval of noncompensable palliative care is not a “matter[] in which a worker’s right to receive compensation, or the amount thereof, [is] directly in issue,” within the meaning of ORS 656.704(3), because noncompensable palliative care is not “compensation” within the meaning of ORS 656.005(8).

Noncompensable palliative care is not compensation under § 656.005(8), and the director’s disapproval does not change that status.

Nicholson v. Salem Area Transit & Saif Corp. · filed 1994-12-02(8)

Nothing in the text suggests that disapproval by the director changes the noncompensable character of the requested care.

Section 656.005(8) excludes a penalty under ORS 656.268(4)(g) from “compensation” because the penalty is imposed to penalize the employer, not to compensate the worker for an injury.

Nero v. City of Tualatin · filed 1996-07-31(8)

Furthermore, a penalty under ORS 656.268(4)(g) is “provided” to penalize the employer, and not to compensate the claimant for his or her injury. Therefore, the penalty here is not “compensation” out of which attorney fees may be paid under ORS 656.386(2), and the Board correctly denied attorney fees on that basis.

Section 656.005(8) treats a lump sum payment for past, present, and future benefits of an accepted injury claim as compensation.

Turo v. SAIF Corp. · filed 1994-12-14(8)

Under the wording of the CDA, the $15,000 paid to claimant was a lump sum payment of past, present and future benefits of an accepted injury claim. We agree with the Board that the payments are “compensation.”

Section 656.005(8) treats medical services as compensation for an injury.

Rogers v. Hewlett-Packard Co. · filed 1998-04-22(8)

Because medical services are themselves compensation for the injury, ORS 656.005(8), an actual worsening that requires only medical services could justify an aggravation claim under this section.

Section 656.005(8) defines compensation as benefits provided for a worker’s compensable injury; rights to compensation under that definition are the claimant’s rights.

Rash v. McKinstry Co. · filed 1999-04-28(8)

ORS 656.005(8) defines compensation for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Statutes as including "all benefits, including medical services, provided for a compensable injury to a subject worker or the worker's beneficiaries by an insurer or self-insured employer pursuant to this chapter." The phrase "all rights to compensation" in ORS 656.236(1)(a) by definition relates only to claimant's rights.

Section 656.005(6) treats an employer’s knowledge of a compensable injury as a workers’ compensation claim, even before the worker gives written notice to perfect it.

McPhail v. Milwaukie Lumber Co. · filed 2000-02-23(6)

ORS 656.005(6) defines a workers’ compensation claim as “a written request for compensation from a subject worker or someone on the worker’s behalf, or any compensable injury of which a subject employer has notice or knowledge” (Emphasis added.) Thus, if Milwau-kie Lumber knew that plaintiff had an occupational disease, then that knowledge constituted a claim, even if plaintiff had not given the written notice that was required to perfect it.

Section 656.005(8) defines compensation as benefits provided to a worker or beneficiary and excludes an insurer’s lien from that definition.

Rash v. McKinstry Co. · filed 2001-03-15(8)

Thus, by definition, the phrase “all rights to compensation” in ORS 656.236(l)(a) relates only to a worker’s right to benefits and does not include an insurer’s statutory lien, which is a benefit to the insurer.

Section 656.005(8) does not treat reclassification of an injury as compensation when the order awards no benefits.

Express Services, Inc. v. Conradson · filed 2002-04-10(8)

While the reclassification from nondisabling to disabling created the possibility that there might be compensation when the claim was closed, no compensation was awarded by the reconsideration order, and therefore an award of compensation was not upheld.

Section 656.005(8)’s definition of compensation includes the costs and related services an insurer must pay for a worker to attend an insurer medical examination, even after claim denial.

Darling v. Johnson Controls Battery Group, Inc. · filed 2003-06-12(8)

And such benefits plainly satisfy the definition of compensation. See ORS 656.005(8).

Section 656.005(8) includes medical services in compensation but excludes attorney fees paid to a claimant’s attorney.

Liberty Northwest Insurance v. Watkins · filed 2008-12-24(8)

Compensation is defined in ORS 656.005(8) as including all benefits, including medical services, provided for a compensable injury to a claimant by an insurer or employer. Because an insurer or employer does not provide attorney fees to a claimant and instead provides attorney fees to an attorney, attorney fees are not compensation.

Section 656.005(8) defines compensation to include benefits for a compensable injury; penalties and attorney fees are not compensation.

Cayton v. Safelite Glass Corp. · filed 2013-06-19(8)

“Compensation” includes “all benefits, including medical services, provided for a compensable injury to a subject worker or the worker’s beneficiaries by an insurer or self-insured employer pursuant to this chapter.” ORS 656.005(8). It is well settled that penalties and attorney fees are not “compensation,” and that attorney fees are not awarded for prevailing on an issue of penalties and attorney fees.

Section 656.005(8) defines compensation to exclude penalties.

Cayton v. Safelite Glass Corp. · filed 2013-09-11(8)

As we recently reiterated in another case arising from claimant’s claim, penalties are not “compensation” under the Workers’ Compensation Law.

An injury from an on-premises personal comfort activity is compensable for a resident employee continuously on call if the employer expressly or impliedly allowed the activity.

Wallace v. Green Thumb, Inc. · filed 1983-02-16(8)(a)

We hold that the Clark test applies to injuries from on-premises personal comfort activities of resident employees who are on call continuously. An injury is compensable if the employer has expressly or impliedly allowed the conduct in question.

An employer’s acquiescence in a workplace personal comfort activity continues until it communicates a new prohibition to the affected workers, so an injury during that activity can be compensable.

U. S. Plywood v. Clark · filed 1983-05-11(8)(a)

Because the employer acquiesced in the practice before the charger was added, that acquiescence continued after the addition of the charger in the absence of the employer’s communication to the graveyard shift of the new prohibition. We conclude that the preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that no such communication to that shift occurred here; therefore, the employer’s acquiescence in the use of the press for heating lunches on the graveyard shift continued. Accordingly, the claim is compensable.

Section 656.005(8)(a) excludes injuries from personal comfort conduct so unreasonable that it cannot fairly be considered incidental to employment.

Clark v. U. S. Plywood · filed 1979-02-06(8)(a)

ORS 656.005(8)(a) provides that only injuries which arise out of and in the course of covered employment are compensable. ... Unreasonableness of the employee’s conduct in pursuit of personal comfort must be determined in light of all the circumstances. ... The conduct from which Clark’s fatal injuries resulted was so unreasonable that it cannot fairly be considered incidental to his employment.

For on-premises injuries during personal comfort activities, Section 656.005(8)(a) asks whether the employer expressly or impliedly allowed the worker’s conduct.

Clark v. U. S. Plywood · filed 1980-01-02(8)(a)

We believe that the compensability of on-premises injuries sustained while engaged in activities for the personal comfort of the employee can best be determined by a test which asks: Was the conduct expressly or impliedly allowed by the employer?

A medical report identifying a disease does not constitute a claim without notice that the worker alleges the disease arose from employment.

U. S. Bakery v. Duval · filed 1987-06-24(7), (8)(a)

Without an allegation that the disease arose from work, the medical report did not constitute a claim. ORS 656.005(7); ORS 656.005(8)(a). The absence of notice to employer that claimant was asserting that the disease arose from his employment prevents the medical reports of Paget’s Disease from constituting a claim.

Section 656.005(7) does not treat a request for compensation that has already been acted on and paid as a continuing claim for a new hearing.

Reed v. Del Chemical Corp. · filed 1979-06-11(7)

We conclude from this definition that petitioner no longer has "a claim” under ORS 656.283. Petitioner long ago acted under the first provision by making a request for compensation and did, in fact, receive compensation.