Statute Annotations › Oregon › Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110

Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110

Limitation of actions: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Oregon
Case notes
323
Cited in passing
266
Citing cases indexed
696
Case dates
1955–2026
Screened through
2026-05-06
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-03
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

589 citing cases reviewed of 696 in the citation index: 323 interpreted the section (annotated below), 266 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-05-06 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1957 Oregon Laws 1957, chapter 374, moved overtime and premium-pay actions from former ORS 12.120(3)'s one-year limit to ORS 12.110(3)'s two-year limit; the vacation-pay distinction remained. source Source
  • 1966-12-28 Berry v. Branner overruled Vaughn v. Langmack and applied discovery rather than the negligent act alone to medical-malpractice accrual. Source
  • 1967 Oregon Laws 1967, chapter 406, added subsection (4)'s two-year discovery period and seven-year outside limit for medical injuries from retained foreign substances. Source
  • 1969 Oregon Laws 1969, chapter 642, broadened subsection (4)'s discovery and repose rules to injuries from medical, surgical or dental treatment, omission or operation generally. source Source
  • 1971 Oregon Laws 1971, chapter 473, shortened subsection (4)'s outside limit from seven to five years and allowed filing within two years after discovering fraud, deceit or misleading representation that prevented timely filing. source Source
  • 1975 Oregon Laws 1975, chapter 796, made subsection (4)'s five-year outside limit apply notwithstanding ORS 12.160's disability tolling. source Source
  • 1981 Oregon Laws 1981, chapter 149, removed the express reference to criminal conversation from subsection (1); its general two-year injury rule remained. source Source
  • 1983-06-08 DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters adopted the federal six-month period for hybrid collective-bargaining and union fair-representation claims in place of a state malpractice period. Source
  • 1985-04-17 Wilson v. Garcia required § 1983 claims to borrow the state's personal-injury limitations period, displacing the earlier Oregon six-year statutory-liability approach. Source
  • 1987 Oregon Laws 1987, chapter 705, added subsection (5)'s separate two-year discovery and substantial-change rules for bodily injury from nuclear incidents. Source
  • 1987-06-19 Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co. required then-existing § 1981 claims to borrow the state's personal-injury period instead of Oregon's six-year statutory-liability period. Source
  • 1989 Oregon Laws 1989, chapter 643, enacted ORS 12.117 as an exception to § 12.110 for actions based on child abuse; later amendments changed its coverage and deadlines. Source
  • 2004-05-03 Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co. applied the federal four-year period in 28 U.S.C. § 1658 to § 1981 claims made possible by the 1991 Act; Oregon's borrowed two-year period still governs claims available before that Act. Source
  • 2010-01-01 Oregon Laws 2009, chapter 879, extended ORS 12.117's child-abuse deadline from age 24 to age 40 and its discovery period from three to five years, subject to its rule for existing judgments. Source
  • 2019-06-20 Oregon Laws 2019, chapter 448, enacted ORS 12.118 with a five-year discovery period for adult sexual-assault actions, including actions already time-barred before that date if commenced afterward. source Source
  • 2025-06-26 Oregon Laws 2025, chapter 447, allowed child sexual-abuse and adult sexual-assault claims to be commenced at any time and expanded coverage of conduct allowing or encouraging abuse or assault, subject to the act's rules for earlier claims and final judgments. source Source

Application to equitable suits involving fraud

Section 12.110 imposes a two-year limitation on actions for fraud, but does not apply to an equitable suit seeking a resulting trust rather than based on fraud.

Kelly v. Tracy · filed 1956-12-19

Turning now to the evidence on the question of laches, we observe that ORS 12.110 is a limitation on actions, not suits. It imposes a two-year limitation on actions for fraud. Assuming that its purview is extended by ORS 12.040 to suits in equity based on fraud, the fact remains that this case is not based on fraud. Pleading and proof establish a resulting and not a constructive trust. ... In our opinion ORS 12.110 is inapplicable.
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Discovery of fraud or deceit; reasonable diligence

Section 12.110 requires a fraud or deceit action to be commenced within two years after discovery, and a delayed complaint must specifically plead facts showing diligent discovery and why the limitation does not apply.

Heise v. Pilot Rock Lumber Co. · filed 1960-05-25

Defendant next contends that it appears from the complaint that the action was not commenced within two years from the date the alleged fraud was discovered or could have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence and hence is in violation of OES 12.110, which provides that actions for fraud or deceit must be commenced within two years “from, the discovery of the.fraud or deceit.” ... The rule in this state is now well established that when the complaint is filed after the period provided by the statute, it must negative lack of diligence in the discovery of the fraud and in that regard must specifically and precisely plead the facts showing that the statute of limitations does not apply. ... Further, the exercise of reasonable diligence to discover the fraud is essential. ... When a positive representation is made as to the quantity of land in the absence of special knowledge of other facts and circumstances reasonably calculated to put the misrepresentee on notice, he is not required to make a survey, or in the case of timber, a cruise. ... We are, therefore, of the opinion that defendant’s contentions with respect to the statute of limitations cannot be sustained.
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For an action at law based on fraud or deceit, the two-year limitation period begins when the fraud or deceit is discovered, meaning when it was known or could have been discovered through reasonable care.

Salem Sand & Gravel Company v. City of Salem · filed 1971-12-30(1)

Under OBS 12.110(1), an action at law for fraud and deceit must be commenced within two years from the “discovery of the fraud or deceit.” “Discovery” means from the time the fraud was known or could have been discovered through exercise of reasonable care.
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Section 12.110(1) supplies the two-year limitations period for SEC Rule 10b-5 actions in Oregon, with accrual upon actual discovery of fraud or when a reasonably prudent person should have discovered it.

Hoffert v. E. F. Hinkle & Co. · filed 1972-08-18(1)

The two year period of limitations in ORS 12.110(1) is subject to a proviso: “the limitation shall be deemed to commence only from the discovery of the fraud or deceit.” ... The adoption of ORS 12.110 as the applicable Oregon statute of limitations would be consistent with the policy expressed in prior Ninth Circuit decisions. I conclude that in SEC Rule 10b-5 cases in Oregon the proper statute of limitations to apply is the two year period of ORS 12.110. I further con-elude, as a matter of federal law, that the claim accrues and the period of limitations starts to run either upon actual discovery of the fraud, or at such time as a reasonably prudent person, similarly situated, should have discovered the fraud.
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Section 12.110(1) gives a two-year limitations period for fraud or deceit claims, beginning when the fraud is actually known or could have been discovered through reasonable care.

Winkelman v. Blyth & Co., Inc. · filed 1973-08-31(1)

There is no federal statute of limitations applicable to the remaining claims. It is now clear that the Oregon statute of limitations under ORS 12.-110(1) is to be applied. The two-year period is subject to the proviso that the limitation shall be deemed to commence only from the discovery of the fraud or deceit.
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Section 12.110 requires fraud-or-deceit actions to be filed within two years after the fraud is discovered or could have been discovered through reasonable diligence, and whether that occurred is a factual question.

Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Virgil N. Lee, Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Margaret L. Pagett · filed 1962-11-14

the fraud could have been discovered. ... However, the question is a factual one.
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Section 12.110(1)'s discovery-based limitations rule applies to fraud or deceit claims, not to negligent-misrepresentation claims treated as negligence.

Duyck v. Tualatin Valley Irrigation District · filed 1987-09-22(1)

As stated, the plaintiffs have not asserted, here, in the Court of Appeals or in the trial court, that ORS 12.110(1), the deceit statute of limitations, applies. Though a damage claim for negligent misrepresentation involves a misrepresentation, we believe that the theory of recovery is in negligence rather than deceit.
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For a fraud or deceit action, the two-year limitation period begins when the fraud is discovered, meaning when the plaintiff learns of the misrepresentation or has facts sufficient to require inquiry; whether the facts require inquiry is generally for the factfinder.

McGann v. Boyd · filed 1993-11-03(1)

The statute of limitations begins to run on a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation when the fraud is “discovered.” ORS 12.110. A fraud is discovered when the plaintiff either learns of the misrepresentation or has knowledge of facts sufficient to excite attention and put a party on guard or call for an inquiry. Mathies v. Hoeck, 284 Or 539, 542-43, 588 P2d 1 (1978). Whether a person has sufficient knowledge to call for an inquiry is ordinarily a question of fact, unless only one conclusion can reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Mathies v. Hoeck, supra.
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Two-year limitation for personal injury actions

Section 12.110(1) requires actions for personal injuries arising from negligence, rather than from contract, to be commenced within two years.

Dowell v. Mossberg · filed 1961-02-21(1)

OES 12.110 (1) applies the two-year period of limitations to actions for injuries to the person “not arising on contract.” ... Plaintiff alleged the contract as a matter of inducement, and the balance of her pleading was for damages for negligence. ... The substance of her complaint was injury to her person through negligence and nothing more. The action should have been brought within the two-year period provided for actions based upon negligence.
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Section 12.110 imposes a two-year limitation period on actions based on common-law torts.

Hoffman v. Keller · filed 1961-04-25

This court has determined that the gist of plaintiff’s action is based upon alleged common-law tortious acts of the defendants and that therefore the Oregon statute3 providing for a two-year limitation of such actions is controlling.
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Section 12.110(1) imposes a two-year limitations period on actions for injury to another’s rights that do not arise on contract and are not otherwise enumerated.

Hyatt Chalet Motels, Inc. v. Salem Building & Construction Trades Council · filed 1968-10-22(1)

Under normal circumstances, the two year statute of limitations would be applicable to actions under § 303.
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Section 12.110(1) bars a personal-injury action when service on the Administrator is not accomplished within the statute’s two-year period.

Peterson v. Day · filed 1978-09-12(1)

Because plaintiff did not serve the Administrator within the two years allowed by ORS 12.110(1), the plaintiffs action is barred.
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Section 12.110(1) imposes a two-year limitation on residual injury actions that do not arise on contract, but it does not convert a contract-breach claim into a tort claim merely because the same conduct could independently be tortious.

Securities-Intermountain, Inc. v. Sunset Fuel Co. · filed 1980-06-03(1)

Given the need under ORS 12.080 and 12.110 to characterize an action commenced after two years as either contractual or noncontractual, Dowell v. Mossberg and its sequels were concerned to forestall the transformation of actions based on liability independent of any specific agreement into actions for breach of contract for the sole purpose of circumventing the two-year limitation of ORS 12.110. Still, contracting parties are free to specify services and standards of performance that may overlap noncontractual obligations. ORS 12.110 certainly does not contemplate that a defendant can defeat an action for breach of his contract by asserting that, independent of the contract, his own conduct constituted a tort, whether negligence or, for instance, fraud.
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Section 12.110(1) applies only when an action neither arises on contract nor falls within another statute specifically enumerating the action.

Beveridge v. King · filed 1982-04-06(1)

In order for the part of ORS 12.110(1) with which we are here concerned to control disposition of an action, two factors must be present: (1) the action must not be one “arising on contract” and (2) the action must be “not especially enumerated in this chapter [12].”
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Section 12.110(1) requires an action for an injury to another's person or rights, when not arising on contract or specially enumerated elsewhere in the chapter, to be commenced within two years.

Morrison v. Ardee Pest Control, Inc. · filed 1983-04-13(1)

Thus, the property was not injured by defendant’s conduct; it was injured by the dry rot.1 Neither was there an injury to plaintiffs’ interest in the property. The injury caused by the allegedly negligent inspection was to plaintiffs’ pocketbook. Accordingly, we hold that plaintiffs’ negligence count is barred by ORS 12.110(1).
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Subsection (1) requires actions for personal injury not arising on contract or otherwise specially enumerated to be commenced within two years; an insurer's agreement to allow more time waives its limitations defense temporarily but does not create a new statutory limitations period.

Johnson v. Kentner · filed 1984-11-21(1)

The applicable limitation in this case is two years, provided in ORS 12.110(1): ... “An action * * * for any injury to the person or rights of ... another, not arising on contract, and not especially enumerated in this chapter, shall be commenced within two years * * * ... Neither of Mutual’s decisions to allow plaintiff additional time in which to file an action created a new Statute of Limitations; that is a function reserved for the legislature. Although Mutual may have mischaracterized its action as “extending” the Statute of Limitations, the legal effect of that action was no more than a waiver of its right to assert the limitation as an affirmative defense until the stated date.
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Section 12.110(1) imposes a two-year limitations period on noncontractual actions for injury to another’s rights, including fiduciary-duty claims arising independently of contract.

Sabre Farms, Inc. v. Jordan · filed 1986-04-09(1)

In this case, plaintiff claims that all of the defendants breached their fiduciary duties by usurpation of alleged corporate opportunities and by self-dealing. Those duties are binding by reason of the relationships between the parties, independently of contract. Therefore, under SecuritiesIntermountain, the two-year limitation would apply.
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Section 12.110(1) requires an action for an injury to a person or another's rights, when not arising on contract or otherwise specifically enumerated, to be commenced within two years.

Erickson Air-Crane Co. v. United Technologies Corp. · filed 1987-05-27(1)

We conclude that ORS 30.905 is not applicable and that ORS 12.110(1) and 12.115(1) are applicable. There is no dispute that plaintiff brought its action within the time limitations of these latter statutes.
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Subsection (1) supplies the two-year limitation period that governs personal injury actions sounding in tort.

Jones v. Bierek · filed 1987-10-21(1)

Her action is in tort and is accordingly governed by the two-year limitation in ORS 12.110.
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Section 12.110(1) requires a negligence action to be filed within two years after damage first occurs, even if the full extent of the damage is not yet identifiable.

DeJonge v. Mutual of Enumclaw · filed 1988-04-20(1)

Similarly here, plaintiffs were aware that Keesecker had not procured the insurance which they had requested and that, as a result, they hired an attorney to protect their interests. That decision was reasonable in the light of Keesecker’s alleged negligence. It was at that time that their damage occurred. The statute began to run no later than January, 1984, when they had notice that the insurance procured by Keesecker was inadequate to cover liquor liability and they retained the first attorney. This action was not filed until June 6,1986, which was beyond the two-year limitation period for filing a negligence action. ORS 12.110(1).
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Section 12.110(1) requires an action for personal injury or injury to another’s rights, when not arising on contract or otherwise specially enumerated, to be commenced within two years.

Richlick v. Relco Equipment, Inc. · filed 1993-05-12(1)

ORCP 23C requires that the defendant receive notice of the action “within the period provided by law for commencing the action.” The stipulated facts show that, at the time defendant received notice of the action, the limitation period of ORS 12.110(1) had run, but the time for service of summons and complaint had not. ORS 12.020(2). Plaintiff would have us interpret ORCP 23C to permit relation back if the defendant receives notice within the limitation period plus the additional 60 days permitted by ORS 12.020 for service of summons. For purposes of relation back under ORCP 23C, the party to be brought in must have received notice of the action within the period of limitations for the particular action. ... In this case, that is two years from the injury. ORS 12.110(1). Defendant did not receive notice of the action until, at the earliest, September 24,1990, when Rusina sent a facsimile copy of the complaint to Bachman. That was two days after the limitation period had passed. It did not receive the notice required by ORCP 23C.
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Section 12.110(1) requires claims for injury to the person or rights of another to be commenced within two years, with fraud claims measured from discovery of the fraud.

Stull v. Hoke · filed 1996-05-22(1)

In order to survive the applicable statute of limitations, plaintiffs claims for infliction of emotional distress and conversion must have been brought within two years of the date of the alleged injury, May 22,1994. ORS 12.110(1). Similarly, plaintiff’s claim of fraud must be brought within two years of the discovery of the fraudulent acts. ORS 12.110(1).
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Section 12.110 imposes a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, and filing on the second anniversary of the injury is timely even when an intervening leap year occurs.

Kowalski v. L'Oasis · filed 2003-10-22

Plaintiff’s claim was subject to the two-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury claims. See ORS 12.110. After the trial court dismissed the action, we held in Neff v. Jackson County, 187 Or App 402, 408, 67 P3d 977 (2003), that the word “year,” as used in a statute of limitations, refers to a calendar year, not a 365-day period. We therefore rejected the defendant’s argument in that case that the plaintiff’s complaint, filed on the anniversary of the accrual of her cause of action, nevertheless was time barred because of an intervening leap year. Id. Neff disposes of defendants’ argument that the original complaint in this action was untimely filed. Because the original complaint was filed within the applicable two-year limitations period, the dispositive issue is whether plaintiffs failure to serve defendants with summonses and copies of that complaint required dismissal of this action.
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Section 12.110(1) provides a two-year limitation period for personal-injury claims, subject to tolling under ORS 12.160 for qualifying disability.

Simonsen v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2004-12-08(1)

As also described above, the generic two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims, ORS 12.110(1), may be tolled by operation of ORS 12.160, allowing a plaintiff a maximum of seven years after the date of the injury to commence an appropriate action.
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Section 12.110(1) requires a personal-injury action to be filed within two years, with the period running under Oregon’s discovery rule when the plaintiff knew or should have known of harm, causation, and tortious conduct.

Cecil Smith v. Evraz Inc. Na · filed 2018-06-04(1)

Oregon’s statute of limitations for a personal injury action provides that “[a]n action for . . . any injury to the person . . . shall be commenced within two years[.]” Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1). ... Because Smith’s complaint was not filed until almost four years from the date of injury, this court is not persuaded that he “exercised due diligence to discover the requisite facts.” ... Accordingly, the court concludes as a matter of law that any rational juror would find that Smith knew or should have known of a substantial possibility that EVRAZ was a responsible party more than two years before he filed suit.
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Section 12.110(1) provides a two-year statute of limitations for Oregon personal-injury actions.

Jackson v. Nelson · filed 2021-07-02(1)

The statute of limitations for personal-injury actions in Oregon is two years. Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1).
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Section 12.110(1) supplies a two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, running from the date the cause of action accrues, subject to applicable tolling.

A.F. v. Evans · filed 2021-09-17(1)

In Oregon, the applicable statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is two years from the date upon which the cause of action accrues. Id.; ORS 12.110(1).
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Subsection (1) supplies a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims.

Ljubich v. Oregon Department of Corrections · filed 2023-04-27(1)

In Oregon, the statute of limitations for a section 1983 lawsuit is two years. Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (section 1983 claims are “characterized as personal injury suits for statute of limitations purposes,” and “Oregon’s statute of limitations for such suits is two years”) (citing ORS § 12.110(1)). ... Therefore, any alleged injuries that arose prior to March 2, 2019, are barred by the two-year statutes of limitations that apply to plaintiff’s tort claims, see ORS § 30.275(9), and his § 1983 claim, see ORS § 12.110(1).
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ORS 12.110(1)'s two-year limitation does not control a civil action based on conduct constituting child abuse when ORS 12.117 applies.

Levi v. Chapman · filed 2023-05-12(1)

As this is a civil matter, and Defendants plead a civil claim for battery against Raygosa based on the rape of a minor, the controlling statute is ORS 12.117. That statute provides that, notwithstanding ORS 12.110 (which Plaintiff alleges is the controlling statute), civil actions based on conduct that constitutes child abuse must be commenced before the victim attains 40 years of age.
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Section 12.110(1) imposes a two-year statute of limitations on personal-injury claims under Oregon law.

Addison v. City of Baker City · filed 2018-11-16(1)

The statute of limitations for personal injury claims under Oregon law is two years. Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1). The alleged conduct that gave rise to Addison’s First Amendment retaliation claim “included the conversations that Lohner had with [Addison’s employers], the later allegedly harassing conduct by the BCPD, and the BCPD’s purported involvement in preparing and providing Addison’s [fact file] to New Directions,” all of which occurred within the two-year statute of limitations period.
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Section 12.110(1) imposes a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions, including § 1983 claims in Oregon.

Glass v. Lake County · filed 2020-06-10(1)

In Oregon, an action under § 1983 is governed by the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, ORS 12.110(1).
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Section 12.110 supplies a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, subject to Oregon’s discovery rule when applied to § 1983 claims.

The Puff Factory, LLC v. Port of Cascade Locks · filed 2020-11-06

In Oregon, the personal injury limitations period is two years. Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110. Defendants argue that this limitations period began to run in 2016 when Plaintiffs had the opportunity to but did not engage in discovery during the State Litigation. Oregon’s discovery rule, however, also applies to claims asserted under § 1983. Thus, the relevant limitations period begins, or accrues, either when the discriminatory conduct occurred or when the plaintiff learns of, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of, previously undiscovered facts supporting a discrimination claim, whichever occurs later. See Bonneau v. Centennial Sch. Dist. No. 28J, 666 F.3d 577, 581 (9th Cir. 2012).
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Section 12.110(1)'s two-year residual personal-injury limitations period applies to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Wilson v. State of Oregon · filed 2021-08-25(1)

The residual statute is ORS § 12.110(1),4 which establishes a two-year statute of limitations. See Cooper v. City of Ashland, 871 F.2d 104, 105 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Oregon’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”).
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Section 12.110(1) supplies a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, including as the borrowed Oregon limitations period for federal claims.

L.O.K v. Greater Albany Public School District 8J · filed 2022-06-28(1)

For claims under § 1983 and Title IX, federal courts borrow the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions. ... “In Oregon, the statute of limitations for personal injury claims is two years,” borrowing the statute of limitations from ORS 12.110(1).
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Section 12.110(1) supplies a two-year limitations period for an emotional-distress claim.

Szanto v. Szanto · filed 2024-01-03(1)

Szanto’s emotional distress claim is similarly barred, since under both Oregon and California law the statute of limitations is two years. See CCP 335.1; ORS 12.110(1).
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Section 12.110(1) provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies as Oregon’s borrowed limitations period to federal civil-rights claims.

Robert Parker, Jr. v. Barlow · filed 2024-07-03(1)

and “federal civil rights claims under sections 1981 [and] 1983” are “governed by the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions.” ... In Oregon, the limitations period for personal injury actions is two years. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1); see also Bonneau v. Centennial Sch. Dist. No. 28J, 666 F.3d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Oregon has a two-year statute of limitations for general personal injury claims . . .”) (citation omitted).
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Section 12.110(1) requires personal-injury claims to be commenced within two years of the injury.

Foshee v. Lane County · filed 2024-08-26(1)

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations, Ninth Circuit courts apply the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Butler v. Nat’l Cmty. Renaissance of Cal., 766 F. 3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2014). In Oregon, personal injury claims must be commenced within two years of the injury. See ORS § 12.110(1). Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are thus subject to a two-year statute of limitations.
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Section 12.110(1) requires Oregon personal-injury claims to be commenced within two years after the injury.

Monpas v. Multnomah County · filed 2024-09-09(1)

Personal-injury claims in Oregon must be commenced within two years of the injury. Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1). ... The last events that form the basis of Plaintiff’s claims occurred no later than July 15, 2021, when Plaintiff was seen by MCDC medical staff and transported to the hospital for treatment. Accordingly, the limitations period for Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims expired July 15, 2023.
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Section 12.110(1) requires personal injury claims to be filed within two years.

Jason v. Adobe, Inc. · filed 2025-01-10(1)

Under Oregon law, personal injury claims have a two-year statute of limitations. Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1). ... The allegations set forth in the complaint occurred on or before September 2021, meaning that under the applicable statute of limitations, the personal injury claims should have been filed no later than September 2023. ... Because the undisputed timeline reflects that plaintiff's intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims are time-barred, they are dismissed.
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Section 12.110(1) provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury torts, including § 1983 claims characterized as personal injury actions.

Lincoln v. Sweet Home Fire & Ambulance District · filed 2025-05-02(1)

Claims brought under § 1983 are characterized as personal injury actions. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 261. Oregon has a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury torts. ORS 12.110(1). Therefore, Plaintiff’s Third Claim has a two-year statute of limitations period.
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Section 12.110(1) requires personal-injury claims to be commenced within two years of the injury.

Ofodrinwa v. Kizzar · filed 2024-07-23(1)

Under Oregon law personal-injury claims must be commenced within two years of the injury.
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Section 12.110 supplies Oregon’s two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims, including federal civil-rights claims when no federal limitations period applies.

Washington v. City of Lake Oswego · filed 2024-08-30

For Plaintiff’s federal law claims, the Court applies Oregon’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claim set forth in ORS § 12.110.
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Section 12.110 provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, including claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Rose v. Pina · filed 2025-02-03

Oregon’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions in Oregon Revised Statute § (“ORS”) 12.110 applies to claims brought under Section 1983.
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Section 12.110(1) provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Reyes v. City of Hillsboro, Or · filed 2025-02-24(1)

The district court properly dismissed Reyes’s action as time-barred because Reyes failed to file this action within the applicable statutes of limitations. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1) (providing a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims); ... Douglas v. Cal. Dep’t of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 823 n.11 (9th Cir. 2001) (same for Rehabilitation Act claims).
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Section 12.110 establishes a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, including injuries arising from medical treatment or its omission.

Boyd v. Reyes · filed 2025-07-03

Oregon's statute of limitations for personal injuries, including for injuries arising from medical treatment or omission of treatment, is two years.
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Section 12.110 provides a two-year limitations period that serves as Oregon’s general or residual personal-injury limitations period for a § 1983 claim.

Kruesi v. Oregon Department of Corrections · filed 2025-07-09

Here, the Court must apply the two-year statute of limitations from Oregon’s general personal injury statute, ORS 12.110, to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.
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Section 12.110(4) requires an action for injuries arising from medical, surgical, or dental treatment, omission, or operation to be filed within two years after the injury is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered.

DeRaedt v. La Clinica · filed 2025-07-28(4)

This claim is outside the applicable statute of limitations, as Plaintiff’s case was filed more than two years after his alleged injury. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(4) (“An action to recover damages for injuries to the person arising from any medical, surgical or dental treatment, omission or operation shall be commenced within two years from the date when the injury is first discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered”); see also Butler v. Nat’l Cmty. Renaissance of California, 766 F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2014) (federal courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
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Section 12.110(1) provides a two-year statute of limitations for general personal-injury claims.

Evers v. McKinney · filed 2025-09-29(1)

“Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations.” ... “Federal courts in § 1983 actions apply the state statute of limitations from personal-injury claims.” ... Oregon has a two-year statute of limitations for general personal injury claims. Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1).
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Section 12.110(1) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, running from the injury or discovery of the injury.

DeBernardi · filed 2026-04-01(1)

As relevant here, the statute of limitations for all of Plaintiff’s claims is two years. See ... ORS 12.110(1) (Oregon’s personal injury statute of limitations is two years from the date of injury, or discovery of such injury); ... . ... Plaintiff’s contention is incorrect. ... To the extent that Plaintiff’s claims are based on conduct that occurred more than two years before he filed his Complaint, those claims are time-barred and are dismissed.
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Section 12.110(1) provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, and that limitation applies to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Cooper v. City of Ashland Brian Almquist Vic Lively Mel Clements John Does I-V · filed 1989-05-11(1)

Oregon’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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Section 12.110(1) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, including section 1983 actions in Oregon.

Lane v. Art Martinak · filed 1991-12-11(1)

In Oregon, the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to section 1983 actions.
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Section 12.110(1) provides a two-year limitation period for commencing a personal-injury action.

Stanwood v. Royster · filed 1996-03-25(1)

Oregon law provides for a two-year limitation period to commence an action for personal injury.
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Section 12.110(1) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, which the court applies to determine the timeliness of a § 1983 claim.

Plumeau v. School District 40 · filed 1997-12-04(1)

Oregon’s general tort statute provides a 2-year statute of limitations. Or.Rev.Stat. § 12.110(1). The district court in this ease apparently assumed a timely filing. We agree, since the date of discovery was May 29,1992, shortly following Amanda’s attempted suicide. The action was filed on May 20,1994.
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Section 12.110(1) imposes a two-year limitations period on personal-injury claims arising in Oregon.

Pelster Ex Rel. Boyer v. Walker · filed 2001-08-20(1)

Personal injury claims arising in Oregon are subject to a two-year statute of limitations under Or.Rev.Stat. § 12.110(1).
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Section 12.110(1) requires a battery action to be commenced within two years.

Robert C. Torre Sherrill M. Polk v. James R. Brickey, Jr. · filed 2002-01-24(1)

Oregon Revised Statutes § 12.110(1) requires an action for battery to be commenced within two years.
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Section 12.110 limits the time to bring a personal injury action to two years.

Wheeler v. Williams · filed 1955-01-30

The time for the commencement of this action was limited to two years. ORS 12.110.
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Section 12.110 provides a two-year limitation period for personal injury claims; a newly added defendant must receive notice within that period for an amended complaint to relate back.

Krauel v. Dykers Corp. · filed 2001-04-04

That phrase in ORCP 23 refers to the limitation period in ORS 12.110 and not to the grace period for service in ORS 12.020.
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Section 12.110(1) sets a two-year limit for personal injury actions, including § 1983 claims brought in Oregon.

Ball v. State of Oregon · filed 2010-03-09(1)

The district court properly determined that Ball’s due process claim is time- barred. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1) (statute of limitations governing personal injury actions is two years); Carpinteria Valley Farms, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara, 344 F.3d 822, 828 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The applicable statute of limitations for actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions.”); Montana Pole & Treating Plant v. I.F. Laucks & Co., 993 F.2d 676, 678 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he critical determination of when an action accrues is knowledge of the facts essential to the cause of action.”).
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Section 12.110(1) imposes a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

Deal v. Dasch · filed 2023-03-30(1)

The statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s claims is two years. See City of Rancho Palos Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 123 n. 5 (2005) (“The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is generally the applicable state-law period for personal-injury torts”); see also Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1) (imposing a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims).
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Fraud actions—discovery rule and recoupment

Section 12.110 gives fraud actions a two-year limitations period running from when the fraud was known or could have been discovered with reasonable care; it bars affirmative counterclaim recovery but does not bar recoupment arising from the same matter to the extent of the plaintiff’s claim.

Dixon Et Ux v. Schoonover Et Ux · filed 1961-03-15

Our statute of limitations, ORS 12.110, provides that an action at law for fraud and deceit must be commenced within two years from the “discovery of the fraud or deceit.” ... “Discovery of the fraud or deceit” means from the time the fraud was known or could have been discovered through the exercise of' reasonable care. ... When the pleading discloses that the action was not commenced within the two years provided by the statute, it is necessary, in order to toll the statute, to negative lack of diligence and set forth the reasons why there was not an earlier discovery of the fraud. ... The rule for applying the statute of limitations to actions based on fraud applies to counterclaims where it is sought to obtain affirmative relief. However, recoupment arising out of the same matter can be allowed to the extent of the relief demanded by plaintiffs on their first cause of action even though an independent action conld not be maintained because of tbe statute.
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For an action based on fraud or deceit, the two-year limitations period begins when the fraud or deceit is discovered; when discovery and reasonable diligence are disputed, the issue is for the jury.

Carey v. Hays · filed 1967-11-22(1)

In an action at law based on fraud or deceit, the two-year limitation shall be deemed to commence only from the discovery of the fraud or deceit. ORS 12.110 (1). ... Where the evidence is in conflict, it is for the trier of the fact to determine when the statute of limitations commences to run. Carey v. Hays, supra. In the instant case the evidence of reasonable diligence and time of discovery was in conflict. The issue was properly submitted to and decided by the jury.
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Under ORS 12.110, the two-year fraud limitation period begins when the plaintiff knew or objectively should have known of the fraud; inquiry notice requires knowledge sufficient to prompt attention and a reasonably diligent inquiry that would disclose the fraud.

Mathies v. Hoeck · filed 1978-12-19

Consequently, the period of limitations for fraud begins to run when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the alleged fraud.
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Section 12.110(1) imposes a two-year limitation period for injury claims and, for fraud or deceit, starts the period when the fraud is discovered or should have been discovered.

Loewen v. Galligan · filed 1994-09-14(1)

The applicable statute of limitations is ORS 12.110(1), which provides, in part: ... “An action * * * for any injury to * * * the rights of another* * *shallbe two years, provided, that in an action at law based upon fraud or deceit, the limitation shall be deemed to commence only from the discovery of the fraud * * *” ... The statute of limitations in ORS 12.110(1) begins to run when a plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the alleged fraud. ... We have already concluded that plaintiffs discovered or should have discovered the facts on which the first claim was based no later than August 2,1988. That conclusion is equally applicable to plaintiffs’ fourth claim. Plaintiffs had two years from August 3, 1988, in which to file a claim alleging fraud based on the 1984 transactions. ... plaintiffs’ fraud claim does not relate back to their original complaint and is barred by the statute of limitations in ORS 12.110(1).
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Subsection (1) gives a fraud plaintiff two years to sue from when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the alleged fraud.

Blackthorne v. Posner · filed 1995-03-28(1)

Third, the statute of limitations for a fraud claim is two years from the date “when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the alleged fraud.”
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For a fraud or deceit action, the two-year limitation period begins when the plaintiff learns of the misrepresentation or of facts sufficient to prompt a reasonable inquiry that would reveal the fraud.

Bodunov v. Kutsev · filed 2007-08-01(1)

A fraud is discovered when a plaintiff learns either of the misrepresentation itself or of facts sufficient to “excite attention and put [the plaintiff on] guard or call for an inquiry,” if reasonable inquiry would then reveal the fraud. ... Thus, in order for defendants to prevail, the face of the complaint must reveal that plaintiffs brought their claim more than two years from the time that they learned of the misrepresentation or of facts sufficient to excite their attention and call for an inquiry.
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For a fraud action, the two-year limitation period begins when the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should discover, facts indicating harm, causation, and tortious conduct.

Murphy v. Allstate Insurance · filed 2012-07-25(1)

To determine when a fraud claim accrues, ORS 12.110(1) incorporates a discovery rule, which operates in conjunction with the general claim-accrual principle that applies to all claims — viz., that a claim accrues when all of the facts exist that the plaintiff must prove in order to recover on the claim. ... The discovery rule in ORS 12.110(1) creates the following disjunctive test for fraud-claim accrual: a fraud claim accrues when the plaintiff has discovered facts or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered facts that would alert a reasonable person to the existence of the three elements of an actionable injury, which are (1) harm, (2) causation, and (3) tortious conduct — viz., the alleged fraud. ... Therefore, we conclude that the determination whether plaintiff should have discovered that he had suffered an actionable injury as a result of Gould’s allegedly fraudulent statements is one that must be made by the jury, and, accordingly, the court erred in granting summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff’s claim was not timely.
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For fraud or deceit actions, § 12.110(1)'s limitations period begins when the fraud is discovered, meaning when the plaintiff knew or should have known of it after sufficient facts prompted a reasonably diligent inquiry.

Puri v. Khalsa · filed 2017-01-06(1)

The defendants argue the plaintiffs’ fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims against Lane Powell and Horowitz are untimely under Oregon’s two-year statute of limitations governing fraud claims. That limitations period is subject to a discovery rule. See ORS 12.110(1) (“[I]n an action at law based upon fraud or deceit, the limitation shall be deemed to commence only from the discovery of the fraud.”); Bell v. Benjamin, 222 P.3d 741, 744 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (“For purposes of that statute, a plaintiff ‘discovers’ the fraud ‘when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the alleged fraud.’ ‘Whether the plaintiff should have known of the alleged fraud depends on a two-step analysis. First, it must appear that plaintiff had sufficient knowledge to excite attention and put a party upon his guard or call for an inquiry.’ ‘If plaintiff had such knowledge, it must also appear that a reasonably diligent inquiry would disclose the fraud.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Mathies v. Hoeck, 588 P.2d 1, 2-3 (Or. 1978))).
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Section 12.110 requires a fraud action to be filed within two years of discovery; a complaint filed after that period must plead facts excusing the delay in discovering the fraud.

Heard v. COFFEY · filed 1959-10-07

ORS 12.110 provides that an action at law for fraud or deceit must be commenced within two years from the discovery of the fraud or deceit. ... The plaintiff’s complaint in this case does not show any excuse for the delay in bringing this action. The circuit court properly determined the issue as a matter of law and sustained the demurrer. The complaint, on its face, showed that the statute of limitations had run before it was filed, and no facts were pleaded to toll the statute.
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Statute of limitations—Injury to person or rights

Section 12.110(1) requires an action for an injury to a person or another's rights, not arising on contract and not specially enumerated, to be commenced within two years.

Hoffman v. Wair · filed 1961-04-25(1)

So, it must follow under the above definition of “a liability created by statute” that any liability on the part of either of the defendants in favor of the plaintiff under the allegations of plaintiff’s amended complaint arises from a breach of the defendants’ common-law duties to the plaintiff, and not from a duty otherwise created and imposed by the language of Title 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. So far as this case and plaintiff’s alleged grievances are concerned, Title 28 U.S. C.A. § 1343 and Title 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, are merely procedural and remedial vehicles to carry plaintiff’s instant action through federal law and court institution, prosecution and enforcement. See Monroe v. Pape, 1961, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492. Therefore, it is the conclusion of this Court that the two-year limitation imposed by ORS 12.110, supra, is controlling in this case.
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Section 12.110 describes damages actions for injury to a person or another’s rights that do not arise on contract, including tort actions against public bodies or employees for purposes of ORS 12.160’s minority tolling rule.

Bradford v. Davis · filed 1981-04-21

An action for damages for an alleged tort, or more compendiously "for any injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract,” ORS 12.110, is one of those "mentioned in ORS... 12.070 to 12.160”; and a person entitled to bring such an action therefore comes within ORS 12.160, notwithstanding that his particular action is against a public body or public employee.
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Section 12.110(1) covers tort actions for injury to a person or another’s rights that are not based on contract and are not specifically enumerated in chapter 12.

Kearney v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. · filed 1982-01-25(1)

ORS 12.110 by its express language excludes from its purview only actions “for any injury to the person” arising from contract or especially enumerated in ORS chapter 12. This action for product liability is a tort action which is not enumerated in ORS chapter 12. By the literal language of ORS 12.160 and 12.110(1), the statute of limitations is tolled during the minority of the plaintiff, and we find no other basis for holding that ORS 12.160 does not toll the two-year limitations period provided in ORS 30.905(2).
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Subsection (1) covers actions for injury to a person or another's rights when the injury does not arise from contract, including injuries to rights other than personal injuries.

Gregory v. Lovlien · filed 2001-06-06(1)

The question, however, in Davies was whether the statute of limitations set out in ORS 12.080(4) or in ORS 12.110(1) applied to legal malpractice claims. ... Conversely, the fact that the Dawes court held that the statute of limitations in ORS 12.110(1) applies to a legal malpractice claim does not advance defendant’s argument. That statute of limitations applies to an action “for any injury to the person or rights of another, not arising out of contract.” By its terms, ORS 12.110(1) is not limited to personal injury claims but also applies when other rights are injured.
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Section 12.110(1) supplies the limitations period for actions for injury to a person or another's rights when the action does not arise on contract and is not otherwise enumerated in chapter 12.

Waldner v. Stephens · filed 2008-12-31(1)

The common-law negligence claim that we already have identified in plaintiffs’ complaint does not rely on the ORLTA as direct authority in the sense we have described. It is not subject to the statute of limitations set out at ORS 12.125 but, instead, is limited by the statute of limitations for actions for “an injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract and not especially enumerated in [ORS chapter 12].” ORS 12.110(1).
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Counterclaims—Statute of limitations

Section 12.110(1)'s limitations period is suspended for a counterclaim arising from the complaint's transaction when the counterclaim existed and was not barred when the action was filed.

Lewis v. Merrill · filed 1961-10-25(1)

The action is governed by the two-year statute of limitations, ORS 12.110 (1), and would have been barred after March 27, 1960. ... Others cannot be distinguished, but, in our opinion, the better rule is that where a counterclaim arises out of the transaction alleged in the complaint and is in existence at the time that the complaint is filed and is not then barred by a statute of limitations, it will not be barred by the running of the statutory time thereafter, but the statute will be suspended until the counterclaim is filed.
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Section 12.110's two-year period does not apply merely because a statutory liability causes an injury to another's person or rights; a statutory liability is not thereby excluded from the six-year limitations period.

Hyatt Chalet Motels, Inc. v. Carpenters Local 1065; Reimann Construction Co. v. Carpenters Local 1065 · filed 1970-07-29

The last area of discussion involves the Unions' contention that if § 303 is considered to be "a liability created by statute", this court should recognize that the § 303 remedy is "also `for any injury to the person or rights of another'". The Unions then say that since § 303 could thus be contained within either the 2-year statute or the 6-year statute, or both, we must hold that § 303 is governed by the 2-year statute since the 6-year statute excepts those actions "mentioned in ORS 12.110 [the 2-year statute]". As Hyatt points out, every statutory liability covers an "injury to the person or rights of another". Acceptance of the Unions' logic on this point would completely vitiate the 6-year statute.
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Section 12.110's two-year limitations period does not govern conversion claims asserted as offsets in this action; ORS 12.080(4) applies instead.

DeCicco v. Uniroyal Inc. · filed 1968-10-24

ORS 12.080(4) is, in my opinion, the applicable statute.
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For a fraud action, the two-year limitation period begins when the plaintiff knew or, through reasonable care, should have known of the fraud.

Kinyon v. Cardon · filed 1984-08-29

We conclude that as a matter of law plaintiff, in the exercise of reasonable care, could have discovered in the fall of 1979 or winter of 1979-80 that the conditions of the property were not as represented.
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Section 12.110(a) provides a two-year statute of limitations for common-law fraud claims in Oregon.

Nudo v. McNeil · filed 1988-12-08(a)

In Oregon, the federal court applies the two-year statute of limitations for common law fraud (ORS 12.110(a)).
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For breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims subject to ORS 12.110, the two-year limitation period begins when the claimant knows or reasonably should know that the fiduciary's wrongful conduct caused damage.

Thompson v. Telephone & Data Systems, Inc. · filed 1994-09-14

The limitation period for breach of fiduciary duty claims does not begin to run until the party asserting the claim knows or reasonably should know that he or she has been damaged by the fiduciary’s wrongful conduct.
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Section 12.110(1) gives IIED claims a two-year statute of limitations, so conduct occurring more than two years before filing is not actionable.

Amadi v. Conagra Foods, Inc. · filed 2012-07-27(1)

Under Oregon law, an IIED claim is subject to a two year statute of limitations. ORS 12.110(1); see also Campbell, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1157. Because Amadi filed his lawsuit on July 18, 2011, any comments *1242allegedly causing his emotional distress must have occurred after July 18, 2009, to be actionable.
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Section 12.110(1) provides a two-year statute of limitations for Oregon personal-injury claims.

Higuera v. City of Portland · filed 2020-05-08(1)

Federal claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 borrow the statute of limitations from the state law statute of limitations for personal injury claims. See Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 371 (2004) (§ 1981); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (§ 1983). Oregon’s personal injury statute of limitations is two years. ORS § 12.110(1). Plaintiff filed his original complaint on March 23, 2018. Accordingly, he may assert federal claims only for hiring decisions by Defendants on or after March 23, 2016.
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Section 12.110 supplies Oregon’s two-year limitations period for § 1983 personal-injury actions, measured from accrual.

French v. Roberts · filed 2023-09-14

In Oregon, the applicable statute of limitations for a § 1983 action is two years from the date that the cause of action accrues. Sain v. City of Bend, 309 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110.
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Section 12.110(1) gives negligence claims a two-year statute of limitations.

Doe v. Kosicek · filed 2025-06-27(1)

The Court notes that the statue of limitations for negligence in Oregon is two years. ORS § 12.110(1). Any claim for negligence based on the conduct alleged in the complaint is time barred.
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Section 12.110 supplies a two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, subject to tolling for up to five years while the plaintiff is a minor.

Frank v. Kotek · filed 2025-07-17

Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, ORS § 12.117, which tolls the limitations period for victims of child abuse until the age of 40, does not apply. Under Bonneau, ORS §§ 12.110 and 12.160 apply, meaning there was a two-year statute of limitations that was tolled for up to five years because Plaintiff was a minor. This means that Plaintiff was required to file his § 1983 claims by March of 2023 at the latest.
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Section 12.110(1) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, which governs § 1983 claims in Oregon.

Quinones-Miranda v. Inmate Services Unit · filed 2025-08-28(1)

Oregon has a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. ORS § 12.110(1). Accordingly, a § 1983 action in Oregon must be brought within two years after the allegedly wrongful conduct.
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Section 12.110 sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions in Oregon.

Hart · filed 2026-02-19

For § 1983 claims, federal courts look to the applicable state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims. ... Oregon has a two-year time limit for personal injury actions. ORS § 12.110; J.M. v. Oregon Youth Authority, 364 Or. 232, 236 (2019).
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Section 12.110 provides Oregon's two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions, which governs § 1981 claims when no federal limitations period applies.

Taye Addisu Mokhtar Al-Saeed Ghassan Abu Hemdeh v. Fred Meyer, Inc., a Delaware Corporation · filed 2000-01-04

Because there is no specifically stated or otherwise relevant federal statute of limitations for a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Supreme Court teaches that we must utilize the most analogous state statute of limitations, Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 660-661, 107 S.Ct. 2617, 96 L.Ed.2d 572 (1987), and that § 1981 claims are governed by the state statute of limitations governing personal injury actions. 482 U.S. at 661-662, 107 S.Ct. 2617. Because Oregon’s statute of limitations for personal injury is two years, Appellant’s claims are subject to the two-year statute of limitations. Or.Rev.Stat. § 12.110.
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Two-year limitations period for torts to a person

Section 12.110 provides a two-year limitations period for torts to a person, while claims involving injury to personal property fall under the six-year period in ORS 12.080(4).

Teren v. Howard · filed 1963-09-04

We think it clear that ORS 12.110 with its 2 year period applies to torts to a person and that ORS 12.080(4) with a 6 year period applies in this case.
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Section 12.110(1) requires a professional-malpractice action to be filed within two years, with the period beginning when the harm occurs and it becomes reasonably probable that the damage was caused by the defendant's negligence; discovery is judged objectively.

Melgard v. Hanna · filed 1980-03-10(1)

The applicable statute of limitations is therefore ORS 12.110(1), which allows a two year period in which to file an action. ... The statute does not commence to run until the occurrence of the harm and until such time as it appears reasonably probable that the damage complained of was caused by the negligence of defendants and not by some other cause. ... When discovery of professional negligence may be said to occur is an objective matter, for a claimant is charged with knowledge which exercise of reasonable care would disclose when facts are known from which the inference flows.
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Section 12.110 provides a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims governed by Oregon’s personal-injury limitations law.

Gowin v. Multnomah County · filed 1998-08-31

Accordingly, based on ORS 12.110, Gowin’s Section 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.
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Section 12.110(1) imposes a two-year statute of limitations, so claims based on events before two years before filing are barred.

Nielson v. Legacy Health Systems · filed 2001-06-12(1)

The statute of limitations for plaintiffs claims is two years. ORS 12.110(1). His last complaint was filed on March 2, 2001. Therefore, he can only bring this action for claims arising after March 2, 1999. Plaintiff cannot recover for events that took place before March 2, 1999. The portions of plaintiffs claims relying on those events are dismissed for this additional reason.
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Section 12.110(1) provides a two-year statute of limitations under Oregon’s general tort law.

Hess v. Multnomah County · filed 2001-12-07(1)

Since 42 USC § 1983 does not provide a statute of limitations, the limitations period is borrowed from state law and these claims are characterized as personal injury actions for statute of limitations purposes. ... Oregon’s general tort statute provides a two-year statute of limitations. ORS 12.110(1).
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ORS 12.110 provides a two-year statute of limitations applicable to the claim, and commencement of the class action tolled that period for later-identified plaintiffs.

Miller v. Yamhill County · filed 2009-05-15

The two-year statute of limitations as set forth in ORS 12.110 applies. ... Thus, the filing of the class action on December 1, 2006 tolled the statute of limitations, not just to plaintiff Jacob Miller, but also to the other later identified plaintiffs, including Daniel Miller. Therefore, the March 28, 2005 search was within the applicable two year statute of limitations.
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Section 12.110(1) applies a two-year limitations period to misrepresentation claims that are not contractual or otherwise specially enumerated, subject to the applicable discovery rule.

Riverview Condominium Ass'n v. Cypress Ventures, Inc. · filed 2014-10-29(1)

Accordingly, consistently with our decision in Morrison, we hold that the two-year statute of limitations in ORS 12.110(1) governs the Association’s misrepresentation claims.
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Section 12.110(1) requires covered tort actions to be filed within two years, with accrual under the discovery rule when the injury is actually or reasonably discoverable.

Padrick v. Lyons · filed 2016-04-13(1)

It is also undisputed that the two-year limitation period set forth in ORS 12.110(1) applies to plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claim, as does the rule of discovery described in that statute.10 Under the discovery rule, the statutory period begins to run from the earlier of (1) the date the plaintiff actually discovers the injury or (2) the date when the plaintiff, exercising reasonable care, should have discovered the injury, including learning facts that an inquiry would have disclosed.
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Section 12.110(1) imposes a two-year limitations period on personal-injury-based civil-rights and negligence claims, running under Oregon's discovery rule when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of harm, causation, and tortious conduct.

Camarata v. Portland Community College · filed 2019-09-26(1)

In Oregon, the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, ORS 12.110(1)[,] applies to civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... These claims are also governed by the two-year statute of limitations in ORS 12.110(1). ... ORS 12.110(1) also contains an implicit “discovery rule.” See, e.g. Berry v. Branner, 245 Or. 307, 309, 421 P.2d 996 (1966), superseded by statute as stated in Lesch v. DeWitt, 118 Or. App. 397 (1993). ... “That rule provides that the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known facts that would make a reasonable person aware of a substantial possibility that each of the three following elements exists: harm, causation, and tortious conduct.”
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Section 12.110(1) requires an action for an injury to a person or another's rights, not arising on contract and not otherwise specially enumerated, to be commenced within two years, with fraud or deceit claims accruing upon discovery.

Waterfront Pearl Condo. Owners v. Waterfront Pearl · filed 2021-07-08(1)

ORS 12.110(1)—the applicable statute of limitations here—provides: ... An “injury” is discovered when a plaintiff knows or should have known of the existence of three elements: (1) harm; (2) causation; and (3) tortious conduct.
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Section 12.110(4) generally requires medical-negligence claims to be commenced within two years, with the limitations period running when the plaintiff discovers the alleged tortious conduct rather than merely the full extent of the damages.

Cambrium v. CSL Plasma · filed 2023-09-27(4)

Second, Plaintiff's medical malpractice claim is likely barred by the statute of limitations. Actions for claims for medical negligence must generally be commenced within two years. ORS 12.110(4). Here, the incident took place on August 21, 2021, and Plaintiff filed his Complaint on September 26, 2023. Plaintiff acknowledges this discrepancy, and he explains that he “wasn’t positively diagnosed as diabetic until 9/27/21 and was in denial, a mental fog with little energy because of his elevated blood sugar levels.” Complt Ex 1 Att. C. However, based on the allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiff knew immediately that something was wrong with the plasma procedure, and he claims that the more experienced phlebotomist told him directly that the other person had “set the machine to draw the amount of plasma for a heavier person,” and that was the reason Plaintiff experienced certain symptoms in reaction. Complt. Ex 2. Thus, while Plaintiff may have been unaware of the extent of his damages, Plaintiff “discovered” the alleged tortious conduct immediately at the time of the incident. See Frohs v. Greene, 253 Or. 1, 4, 452 P.2d 564, 565 (1969) (discovery rule affords opportunity for plaintiff to discover that claim exists).
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Section 12.110 gives fraud claims a two-year statute of limitations.

Ouma v. Asher · filed 2021-08-25

The district court properly dismissed Ouma’s action as time-barred because Ouma failed to file this action within two years of the alleged fraud, and Ouma failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that equitable tolling applies. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110 (two-year statute of limitations for fraud claims); Torre v. Brickey, 278 F.3d 917, 919 (9th Cir. 2002) (courts apply the forum state’s substantive law when subject matter is based on diversity of citizenship, except to the extent inconsistent with federal law); see also Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005) (requirements of equitable tolling).
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Section 12.110(1) imposes a two-year statute of limitations on personal-injury lawsuits and unjust-enrichment claims grounded in tort.

Emanuel Displaced Persons Association 2 v. City of Portland · filed 2023-12-01(1)

In Oregon, the statute of limitations for personal injury lawsuits is two years. Or. Rev. Stat. (ORS) § 12.110(1). Similarly, under Oregon law, a two-year statute of limitations applies to unjust enrichment claims grounded in tort. ORS § 12.110(1).
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Section 12.110(1) provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims, and that limitations period applies to § 1983 claims when federal law supplies no limitations period.

Conn v. Multnomah Co. Sheriff · filed 2025-03-20(1)

The residual statute is ORS § 12.110(1),1 which establishes a two-year statute of limitations.
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Section 12.110(1) supplies a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, including § 1983 claims.

Chalkley v. State of Oregon · filed 2025-06-12(1)

Oregon’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, ORS 12.110(1) applies to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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Section 12.110(1) imposes a two-year limitations period on wrongful termination, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.

Kozierachi v. St. Charles Health System · filed 2025-09-17(1)

Plaintiff’s remaining claims for common law wrongful discharge, whistleblower retaliation, defamation, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress carry limitations periods of one to two years. ORS 12.110(1) (providing a two-year limitations period for wrongful termination, NIED, and IIED); Stupek v. Wyle Laby’s. Corp., 327 Or. 433, 435 (1998) (citing ORS 12.110(1); ORS 659A.875(1)(A) (providing a one-year limitations period for whistleblower retaliation); Kraemer v. Harding, 159 Or. App. 90, 103 (1999) (applying a one-year limitations period for defamation).
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Section 12.110(1) provides a two-year limitations period for general tort and personal-injury claims, which applies as the forum state's limitations period to § 1983 claims.

Davidson · filed 2025-11-26(1)

“Oregon’s general tort statute provides a 2-year statute of limitations.” Plumeau v. School District No. 40, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1)). ... Because Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim accrued in 2017 and she did not file this action until 2025, the two-year statute of limitations bars this claim.
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Section 12.110(1) provides a two-year statute of limitations for general tort claims and supplies the limitations period for § 1983 and non-employment ADA claims when Oregon law governs.

Barrett · filed 2025-12-02(1)

Statutes of limitation “limit the time a party has to initiate an action once a claim has accrued.” ... Similarly, Oregon’s general tort statute of limitations is two years. ORS 12.110(1). And Plaintiff’s federal claims under § 1983 and the ADA are subject to the two-year statute of limitations in ORS 12.110(1). Pouncil v. Tilton, 704 F.3d 568, 573 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[F]ederal courts look to the law of the state in which the cause of action arose and apply the state law of limitations governing an analogous cause of action.”); Savona v. S. Oregon Univ., No. 1:17-CV-01604-AA, 2018 WL 1547843, at *4 (D. Or. Mar. 29, 2018) (applying the two-year statute of limitations in ORS 12.110(1) to the plaintiff’s non-employment ADA claims).
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Section 12.110 supplies the two-year catchall limitations period for tort claims such as fraudulent misrepresentation, intentional interference, and IIED when no more specific limitations statute applies; claims accrue when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the conduct.

Hunt v. Goffman · filed 2025-09-04

All that occurred later was plaintiff received additional evidence supporting the conclusion that defendants were, indeed, obfuscating regarding the irrigation and liens. Similarly, plaintiff’s intentional interference and IIED claims were also based on events that occurred during the contract period. The trial court did not err in concluding that plaintiff’s claims were filed too late.
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Section 12.110(1) supplies a two-year statute of limitations for the claim at issue.

Deyoung · filed 2026-04-08(1)

Here, the applicable statute of limitations is two years. See Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1)).
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Section 12.110(1) gives breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims a two-year limitations period that runs from when the claimant knew or should have known of the injury.

Mitchell v. Burt & Vetterlein · filed 1996-03-29(1)

Under Oregon law, Stein had to file his claim for breach of fiduciary duty within two years of the date on which he knew or should have known that he was damaged by B & G's breach of duty. Or.Rev.Stat. § 12.110(1); Condon v. Bank of California, 759 P.2d 1137, 1139 (Or.Ct.App.1988).
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Section 12.110(1) bars an action brought more than two years after the injury occurred, subject to applicable tolling.

Fort v. Hailey · filed 1996-06-14(1)

Thus, to the extent Fort's action has accrued, it is barred by Oregon Revised Statute § 12.110(1) because it was brought more than two years after the injury occurred.
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Section 12.110 sets a two-year statute of limitations for fraud claims.

Adidas-America, Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc. · filed 2008-02-22

Here, adidas’ claims are governed by Oregon’s two-year statute of limitations for fraud claims, Or.Rev.Stat. § 12.110.
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Section 12.110(1) sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, including § 1983 claims arising in Oregon.

Rodriguez v. Williams · filed 2011-08-17(1)

The district court properly granted summary judgment as to Rodriguez’s claims regarding the conditions of his confinement because these claims were barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations, and Rodriguez failed to establish circumstances warranting equitable tolling.
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Section 12.110(1) provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions that applies to § 1983 claims.

Britton v. Klamath County · filed 2020-12-16(1)

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Britton’s Fourth Amendment claim because the claim is time-barred. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1) (providing a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1009 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is the state law statute of limitations for personal injury cases).
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Section 12.110(1) sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims brought in Oregon.

Kazalonis v. Harney County, Oregon · filed 2022-07-18(1)

The district court properly dismissed Kazalonis’s claims regarding 2002 civil forfeiture proceedings as barred by the statute of limitations. See Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004) (“In determining the proper statute of limitations for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we look to the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the forum state.”); Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1) (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); see also Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.160(3)-(4) (allowing five years of tolling for persons with a “disabling mental condition”); Simonsen v. Ford Motor Co., 102 P.3d 710, 719 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (“[I]n general, ORS 12.110(1), tolled by ORS 12.160, allows a plaintiff suffering such a disability to commence an appropriate action a maximum of seven years after the date of the injury.”).
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Section 12.110(1) supplies a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, including the § 1983 retaliation claim at issue.

Holloway v. Clackamas River Water · filed 2022-08-10(1)

The district court properly found the First Amendment retaliation claim is barred by the statute of limitations because the claim accrued more than two years before Holloway amended the complaint to state the claim and add allegations related to it. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1) (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims); Soto v. Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865, 871-72 (9th Cir. 2018) (reasoning that while state statutes of limitations apply to § 1983 actions, federal law governs when a claim accrues, which is “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Section 12.110(1) provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which applies to analogous ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims.

Smith v. Hein · filed 2023-08-07(1)

Dismissal of the claims against defendants Hein and Transition Projects, Inc. was proper because these claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (two-year statute of limitations for claims under the Fair Housing Act); Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1) (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims); Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1137 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002) (for Americans with Disabilities Act claims, courts apply the statute of limitations for the most analogous state law); Douglas v. Cal. Dep’t of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 823 n.11 (9th Cir. 2001) (same for Rehabilitation Act claims).
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Torts to a person

Section 12.110 imposes a two-year limitations period on torts to a person.

Teren v. Howard · filed 1963-09-04

We think it clear that ORS 12.110 with its 2 year period applies to *955torts to a person and that ORS 12.080(4) with a 6 year period applies in this case.
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Medical malpractice—accrual of claim

Law changed since Berry v. Branner (Dec. 28, 1966) overruled Vaughn and made discovery govern medical-malpractice accrual; ORS 12.110(4) later codified a discovery period.

Section 12.110(1) gives a two-year limitation period for malpractice actions, running from accrual at the negligent act or injury rather than from discovery.

Vaughn v. Langmack · filed 1964-03-11(1)

It is not disputed that OES 12.110 (1) applies to this case. But plaintiff contends that his cause of action did not accrue until he knew or should have known of the injury and that therefore, the statute did not *545commence to run until that time. We held otherwise in the similar case of Wilder v. Haworth, 187 Or 688, 213 P2d 797. We adhere to that decision.
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Section 12.110(1)'s two-year limitation for personal-injury actions begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the tort, including medical malpractice.

Berry v. Branner · filed 1966-12-28(1)

The case of Vaughn v. Langmack is overruled.
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For a legal-malpractice claim governed by § 12.110, the limitations period begins when the plaintiff has suffered actual damage and knows or should know that the attorney’s negligence caused it, not merely when the plaintiff is sued over advice given by the attorney.

Fliegel v. Davis · filed 1985-05-15

The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the action. ORS 12.110. The dispositive question is when Parker’s claim for relief accrued. ... In U.S. Nat’l Bank v. Davies, 274 Or 663, 548 P2d 966 (1976), the Supreme Court held that a claim for legal malpractice accrues when the plaintiff has both been damaged in fact and knows or should know that the defendant’s negligence is the cause of the damage. ... Our original decision in the previous case gave Parker no reason to believe that its attorneys were guilty of malpractice. It was not until the Supreme Court reversed our decision and, thus, concluded the entire case that Parker could have known that its attorneys’ advice was negligent. ... This action was timely.
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Relation back of amendments adding or substituting defendants

Section 12.110's limitation period bars a personal-injury action against a different corporate defendant added after the period expired when the amendment cannot relate back to the original filing.

Maslov v. Manning, Chapel of the Roses, Inc. · filed 1964-12-31

The precise question presented, the propriety of an amendment substituting, after the running of the limitation period, a corporate defendant for the individual defendant originally sued, is one of first impression in this state. ... The underlying rationale of the oases, albeit seldom expressed, is that where different assets may be subjected to execution, the amendment should not be allowed, or being allowed, it should not relate baek so as to efface a valid but perhaps harsh defense of the entity sought to be brought in as party defendant after the running of the limitation period. ... Plaintiff’s action against respondent, Chapel of the Roses, Inc., was not commenced within the period of the statute. The granting of the directed verdict on the basis of the statute of limitations was proper and the judgment for defendant based upon that order is affirmed.
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When the limitations period begins in fraud actions

Section 12.110 starts the two-year limitations period for a fraud action when the fraud is discovered or should have been discovered.

Carey v. Hays · filed 1966-01-19

If it is at law, a fraud action for damages, the two-year statute of limitations commenced to run when the plaintiffs discovered, or should have discovered, the fraud. ORS 12.110; Linebaugh v. Portland Mortgage Co., 116 Or 1, 8, 239 P 196 (1925). There was conflicting evidence upon the issue of when the fraud was discovered. It would be necessary for the trier of fact to make a determination of this issue.
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For fraud or deceit claims, § 12.110(1)'s two-year period begins when the fraud is discovered, including when reasonable diligence would have given the plaintiff constructive knowledge.

Forest Grove Brick Works, Inc. v. Strickland · filed 1977-01-27(1)

The period of limitation in fraud cases commences "from the discovery of the fraud or deceit.” ... The word "discovery” in the statute has been interpreted, however, in an objective as opposed to a subjective manner. Not only knowledge but imputed or constructive knowledge will commence the period of limitations.
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Section 12.110(1) imposes a two-year limitations period that begins when a reasonably prudent person associates symptoms with a serious or permanent condition and recognizes the defendant's role in causing it.

Colvin v. FMC Corp. · filed 1979-12-17(1)

The allegation in paragraph X is sufficient to survive demurrer under the Schiele test.
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Section 12.110(1) requires a fraud action to be brought within two years after discovery of the fraud, and when the plaintiff should have discovered the fraud is ordinarily a question for the jury unless only one reasonable conclusion is possible.

Durham v. Warnberg · filed 1983-03-23(1)

Defendants argue that plaintiffs did not prove that their claim was brought within two years of the discovery of the fraud. ORS 12.110(1). Although there was evidence that plaintiffs could have known as early as 1973 that defendants never intended to reconvey the property without further consideration, the evidence does not show as a matter of law that plaintiffs discovered the fraud more than two years before commencing the action. When plaintiffs should have known of the fraud is a question of fact for the jury, except where only one conclusion can reasonably be drawn from the evidence.
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For an action based on fraud or deceit, the two-year limitations period begins only upon discovery of the fraud, judged by an objective inquiry into whether the plaintiff had enough knowledge to prompt investigation and whether reasonably diligent inquiry would reveal it.

McCraw v. Stapp · filed 1986-10-29(1)

The test of when fraud is “discovered” is an objective one.
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Section 12.110(1) imposes a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knew or should have known that the property had diminished in value because of the defendant’s alleged culpability.

McDonald v. United States National Bank · filed 1992-05-13(1)

At trial, defendant moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the action was barred by ORS 12.110(1), the two year Statute of Limitations. ... The Statute of Limitations was triggered when plaintiffs knew, or should have known, that the property had diminished in value as a result of defendant’s alleged culpability.
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Section 12.110(1) begins running when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of a substantial possibility of harm, causation, and tortious conduct, including the defendant’s negligence causing the harm.

Timber By-Products, Inc. v. Sloan · filed 1997-06-11(1)

The statute of limitations for accounting malpractice is two years. ORS 12.110(1); ... An injury under ORS 12.110(1) means a legally cognizable harm consisting of three elements: (1) harm; (2) causation; and (3) tortious conduct. ... The statute begins to run “when the plaintiff knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known facts which would make a reasonable person aware of a substantial possibility that each of the three elements (harm, causation, and tortious conduct) exists.” ... A plaintiffs discovery of the injury includes discerning the defendant’s negligence in causing the harm.
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Section 12.110(1) starts the two-year limitations period for a fraud action when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the fraud.

Bell v. Benjamin · filed 2009-12-16(1)

ORS 12.110 provides that, in an action for fraud or deceit, the two-year limitation period “shall be deemed to commence only from the discovery of the fraud or deceit.” For purposes of that statute, a plaintiff “discovers” the fraud “when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the alleged fraud.”
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Section 12.110(1)'s two-year limitations period begins under Oregon's discovery rule when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know facts indicating a substantial possibility of harm, causation, and tortious conduct.

Ckh Family Limited Partnership v. Holt Homes, Inc. · filed 2019-05-22(1)

In Oregon, “the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known facts which would make a reasonable person aware of a substantial possibility that each of the three elements (harm, causation, and tortious conduct) exists.” Gaston v. Parsons, 864 P.2d 1319, 1324 (Or. 1994). The application of this “discovery accrual rule is a factual issue for the jury unless the only conclusion a reasonable jury could reach is that the plaintiff knew or should have known the critical facts at a specified time and did not file suit within the requisite time thereafter.” T.R. v. Boy Scouts of America, 181 P.3d 758, 765 (Or. 2008).
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Section 12.110’s two-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff knows or should know of harm, causation, and tortious conduct.

Cattell v. Deeks · filed 2020-06-08

Finally, PwC argues that the fiduciary-duty claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitation in ORS 12.110. ... The two-year limitation period begins to run when the plaintiff knows or should know of harm, causation, and tortious conduct. PwC correctly argues that the complaint demonstrates that Cattell was actually aware of all three elements no later than December 22, 2017. ... The limitation period began to run no later than December 22, 2017. Under state law, the complaint was untimely when filed in January 2020.
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Section 12.110(1) generally requires fraud, negligent-misrepresentation, and tortious-interference claims to be commenced within two years.

Puri v. Khalsa · filed 2019-12-23(1)

Oregon law provides that claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and tortious interference must generally be commenced within two years. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1); see also Spirit Partners, LP v. Stoel Rives LLP, 157 P.3d 1194, 1201 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (fraud and negligent misrepresentation); Butcher v. McClain, 260 P.3d 611, 614 (Or. Ct. App. 2011) (tortious interference).
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Section 12.110(1) gives fraud claims a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should discover, facts indicating harm, causation, and tortious conduct.

Ditech Holding Corporation · filed 2021-10-03(1)

“The discovery rule in ORS 12.110(1) creates the following disjunctive test for fraud-claim accrual: a fraud claim accrues when the plaintiff has discovered facts or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered facts that would alert a reasonable person to the existence of the three elements of an actionable injury, which are (1) harm, (2) causation, and (3) tortious conduct—viz., the alleged fraud.” ... The Estate Representatives contend, and the Court agrees, that fraud claims relating to the origination of the Reverse Mortgage accrued on the later of the date that the Claimant executed the Note and the date that the Deed of Trust was recorded.
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Section 12.110(1) gives fraud claims a two-year limitations period running from discovery of the fraud or deceit, and a plaintiff must plead facts showing timeliness when the claim appears untimely.

Provino v. First American Property Exchange · filed 2025-07-30(1)

Under Oregon law, a plaintiff must file a lawsuit asserting fraud within two years from the discovery of the “discovery of the fraud or deceit.” ORS § 12.110(1).
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Section 12.110(1) imposes a two-year limitations period on personal-injury claims based on fraud or deceit, beginning when the fraud is discovered.

Sehat v. Gemological Institute of America, Inc. · filed 2024-11-21(1)

Oregon law sets a two-year limitations period for bringing lawsuits for personal injury claims like Plaintiff’s that are “based upon fraud or deceit.” ORS 12.110(1). The two-year period starts running when the fraud is discovered. Id.
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Pleading and waiver of the limitations defense

Section 12.110’s two-year limitation applies to a common-law duty to account, but a limitations defense apparent on the complaint’s face is waived unless raised by demurrer.

Commercial Securities, Inc. v. General Insurance Co. of America · filed 1966-09-19

During oral argument on the motion to remand, it was conceded by plaintiff that the cause of action against defendant Lama is governed by the two year statute of limitations, ORS 12.110, since Lama’s duty to account to the plaintiff is a common-law obligation, independent of statute. ... The complaint, on its face, shows that the action against Lama was barred by the statute of limitations. However, counsel did not, as required by the Oregon practice, assert the bar by demurrer. Where the matter appears on the face of the pleadings, the objection must be taken by demurrer, or it is waived.
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Two-year limitation for overtime or premium pay claims

Section 12.110(3)'s two-year limitations period applies to claims for overtime or premium pay, not to claims for bonuses.

Rake v. City Lumber Co. of Bridgeport, Inc. · filed 1967-08-31(3)

A bonus, such as claimed by the plaintiff, is not “overtime or premium pay” as contemplated by the statute.
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Subsection (1)'s two-year limitation does not govern a claim whose gravamen is breach of contract rather than tort.

Hollin v. Libby, McNeill & Libby · filed 1969-04-02(1)

Defendant contends the complaint seeks to state an action in tort, for the wrongful “ouster,” and is controlled by the two-year statute of limitations. ORS 12.110(1). ... We think defendant’s contention with reference to the two-year limitation is untenable. A fair appraisal of the language quoted from the complaint leaves a clear conclusion: that plaintiffs were alleging a contract which defendant breached by particular conduct. The allegation of wrongful ouster in Paragraph VIII of the complaint alleges breach of contract, and did not change the action to one for tort. ... The gravamen of the complaint was breach of contract.
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Section 12.110(1) imposes a two-year limitations period that barred the plaintiff's negligence claim.

Port of Portland v. Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co. · filed 1983-05-11(1)

We held that plaintiffs first count in negligence was barred by the two-year statute of limitations, ORS 12.110(1).
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Section 12.110(1) supplies a two-year limitation period for tort claims, but it does not govern an implied-warranty action arising from a home-sale contract.

Cabal v. Donnelly · filed 1986-02-26(1)

In Beveridge v. King, supra, a majority of this court held that an action on the implied warranty was one for breach of contract and subject to the six-year Statute of Limitations governing contract claims (ORS 12.080(1)), rather than the two-year Statute of Limitations governing tort claims (ORS 12.110(1)). ... We reaffirm our holding in Beveridge v. King, supra, believing that the implied obligation of the vendor is not distinguishable from the express obligations involved in Schmauch v. Johnston, supra.
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Section 12.110(1) imposes a two-year limitations period on tort claims for damage to property itself, including construction-defect claims unless another specifically enumerated limitation applies, with the period tied to discovery of the injury or damage.

Goodwin v. Kingsmen Plastering, Inc. · filed 2016-06-16(1)

ORS 12.135(1) provides that construction defect claims may be subject to different statutes of limitation, depending on the nature of the claim—whether for breach of contract, tort, or something else. A construction defect claim for damage to the property itself is subject to the two-year limitation period of ORS 12.110, unless another limitation period “especially enumerated” in ORS chapter 12 applies. In this case, no other such limitation period applies.
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Section 12.110 imposes a two-year statute of limitations on tort and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.

Johnson v. Milwaukie City Hall · filed 2024-06-04

However, any tort or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims premised on events that transpired on or around April 2021 are precluded by the statute of limitations. See Sain v. City of Bend, 309 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004) (tort and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims are subject to a two year statute of limitations under Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110); see also Stanley v. Tr. of Cal. State Univ., 433 F.3d 1129, 1134 (9th Cir. 2006) (for statute of limitations purposes, “[t]he proper focus is upon the time of the [wrongful] acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful”) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
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Section 12.110(3) requires overtime-pay actions to be filed within two years and does not incorporate a discovery rule, although equitable tolling may still apply.

Denley · filed 2026-01-28(3)

ORS § 12.110(3) does not contain a discovery rule under Oregon law, but Plaintiff’s claim for unpaid wages may be subject to equitable tolling.
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Discovery rule for medical malpractice

Section 12.110(1)'s two-year limitations period for medical malpractice runs from when the plaintiff discovers, or with reasonable diligence should have discovered, the malpractice, not automatically from the date of the negligent act.

Frohs v. Greene · filed 1969-04-02(1)

We do not believe that the danger of spurious claims is so great as to necessitate the infliction of injustice on persons having legitimate claims which were undiseoverable by the exercise of ordinary care prior to the lapse of two years from the time of the act inflicting the injury. Nor do we believe the legislature intended such a result.
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Law changed since Oregon Laws 1971, chapter 473, shortened the medical-malpractice outside limit to five years and added a fraud, deceit or misleading-representation exception; Phillips quoted the earlier seven-year text applicable to its claim.

Section 12.110(4) requires a medical-treatment injury action to be filed within two years after the injury was discovered or reasonably should have been discovered, subject to a seven-year limit from the treatment, omission, or operation.

Phillips v. Wood · filed 1972-09-08(4)

“ (4) An action to recover damages for injuries to the person arising from any medical * * * treatment, omission or operation shall be commenced within two years from the date when the injury is first discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered; provided that such action shall be commenced within seven *503years from the date of the treatment, omission or operation upon which the action is based.” ... The evidence proved as a matter of law that the statute of limitations had run. ... It would be a futile exercise of judicial process to send the case back for retrial before the court and the jury as the plaintiff conclusively testified that she *505discovered the alleged tortious acts of defendant more than two years prior to September 15, 1970, the date her complaint was filed.
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Section 12.110(4)'s discovery period begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury, its attribution to the alleged tortfeasor, and the tortfeasor's negligence.

Hoffman v. Rockey · filed 1982-01-25(4)

A plaintiff should discover that he has a cause of action when he realizes (1) that he has been injured, (2) that the injury can be attributed to an act of the alleged tortfeasor, and (3) that the act of the alleged tortfeasor was somehow negligent.
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For claims arising from medical treatment, the two-year limitations period begins when the injury is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered, including when the plaintiff knows of an injury caused by a possibly negligent act even if the injury's full extent is not yet known.

Gannon v. Rogue Valley Medical Center · filed 1988-08-03(4)

It is conceded in this case that plaintiffs realized in 1982 that defendant’s administration of the myelogram was possibly negligent. It is also undisputed that plaintiffs were aware in 1982 that defendant’s act may have caused injury, that is, meningitis. We hold that the statute began to run in 1982, and that plaintiffs’ claims are barred by ORS 10.110(4).
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Section 12.110(4) starts the two-year medical-malpractice limitations period when the injury is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered; whether negligence should reasonably have been discovered can be a jury question when the physician’s assurances delayed discovery.

Gaston v. Parsons · filed 1993-01-06(4)

ORS 12.110(4) provides, in part, that an action for medical malpractice must be commenced “within two years from the date when the injury is first discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered.” ... Regardless of how the test is phrased, the question is: When did plaintiff have reason to know that defendants’ negligence may have been the cause of the loss of feeling in his arm? ... Here, there is a question of fact as to when plaintiff should reasonably have discovered that the cause of his injury was defendants’ negligence.
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Section 12.110(4) starts the two-year limitations period for a medical-negligence action when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know facts showing a substantial possibility of harm, causation, and tortious conduct.

Gaston v. Parsons · filed 1994-01-06(4)

In light of the text and the context of ORS 12.110(4) and the legislative history of that provision, we hold that the legislature intended the word “injury,” as used in ORS 12.110(4), to mean legally cognizable harm. In the tort context of ORS 12.110(4), a harm is legally cognizable if it is the result of tortious conduct. Therefore, “injury,” as used in ORS 12.110(4), consists of three elements: (1) harm; (2) causation; and (3) tortious conduct.
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For medical, surgical, and dental-treatment injuries, the two-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know facts showing a substantial possibility of harm, causation, and tortious conduct; separately caused injuries are analyzed separately.

McClure v. Leroy · filed 1995-02-22(4)

“Injury,” for purposes of that statute, consists of three elements: (1) harm; (2) causation; and (3) tortious conduct.
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For medical, surgical, or dental injury claims, the two-year period starts when the claimant discovers, or reasonably should discover, harm, causation, and tortious conduct.

Minisce v. Thompson · filed 1997-09-10(4)

“[i]njur[y]” within the meaning of ORS 12.110(4) “consists of three elements: (1) harm; (2) causation; and (3) tortious conduct.”
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Notes 1–150 of 323, oldest cases first.

266 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Willis v. City of Salem, Oregon, the Ninth Circuit’s disposition mentions ORS 12.110(1) as the forum-state limitations period for a § 1983 claim; it does not construe or independently decide the statute. opinion →
Traxtle v. Holman, the Ninth Circuit’s disposition cites ORS 12.110(1) as the forum-state limitations period while deciding accrual of an access-to-courts claim; it does not construe or independently decide the statute. opinion →
Thunderbird v. State of Oregon, the Ninth Circuit’s disposition mentions ORS 12.110(1) as the forum-state limitations period for federal claims; it does not construe or independently decide the statute. opinion →
Samuelson v. Oregon State University, the opinion cites ORS 12.110(1) as the state-law personal-injury limitations period for a Title IX claim, but does not construe or independently decide the statute. opinion →
Cecil Smith v. Ictsi Oregon, Inc., the opinion cites ORS 12.110(1) while applying a discovery rule to the claim, but the stored passage does not support the former note and the court does not independently construe the statute. opinion →
Weems v. Oregon University System, the Ninth Circuit’s disposition cites ORS 12.110 as the forum-state limitations period while applying federal accrual rules to § 1983 claims; it does not construe or independently decide the statute. opinion →
Bonneau v. Centennial School District No. 28J, the federal court borrows Oregon’s limitations period for a § 1983 claim and addresses tolling, but the stored passage does not support the former note as a holding about § 12.110. opinion →
Addison v. City of Baker City, the opinion addresses the timeliness of a defamation claim, but the stored passage does not support the former note’s quotation as a confirmed holding about § 12.110(2). opinion →
Fairview Farms, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Company, the statute is mentioned only as part of Reynolds’s rejected limitations argument and identified in a footnote; the court held that ORS 12.080’s six-year period for trespass controlled. opinion →
Reynolds Metals Company, a Corporation v. Paul Martin and Verla Martin, Husband and Wife, the opinion mentions ORS 12.110 only while recounting the company's argument and the prior Oregon Martin case's statute-of-limitations issue; this court decided primary administrative jurisdiction under ORS 449.820, not the meaning or application of ORS 12.110. opinion →
Warn v. Brooks-Scanlon, Inc., the court mentions ORS 12.110(1) as the underlying limitations bar, but the decision construes and applies ORS 12.220's saving provision; it does not interpret or otherwise decide what ORS 12.110(1) requires. opinion →
West Los Angeles Institute for Cancer Research v. Ward Mayer, the court mentioned ORS 12.110 only in a footnote while expressly declining to resolve which limitations period applied; it decided the case on laches and rescission instead. opinion →
Haworth v. Ruckman, the court used ORS 12.110(1) only as the background two-year limitations period; its actual holding construed and applied the one-year savings provision in ORS 12.220, not the meaning or scope of ORS 12.110(1). opinion →
State Ex Rel. Western Seed Production Corp. v. Campbell, the court mentions ORS 12.110 only in a comparison of the limitation periods for warranty and tort actions. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Kenner v. Schmidt, ORS 12.110 is mentioned only to identify the applicable two-year statute of limitations. The court's actual holding concerns ORS 12.030 and whether a subsequent summons could be served during its 60-day extension period. opinion →
Janisch v. Mullins, the court mentions ORS 12.110 only as an example of an Oregon legislative amendment adopting a discovery rule. Its actual construction and application concern Washington statutes RCW 4.16.010 and 4.16.080(2), so it holds nothing about ORS 12.110. opinion →
Fuller v. Safeway Stores, Inc., the statute is mentioned only as the limitations basis for the defendant’s demurrer in the procedural history. The court decides the case under ORS 12.220 and does not interpret or apply ORS 12.110. opinion →
Gifford v. Saunders, the Kansas court merely discussed ORS 12.110 while describing and relying on a Ninth Circuit decision interpreting Oregon law; it did not itself decide what ORS 12.110 means or how it applies. opinion →
Josephs v. Burns, the court cited § 12.110(4) to describe the medical-malpractice statute and compare its legislative enactment with § 12.115(1); it decided the meaning and effect of § 12.115(1), not § 12.110(4). opinion →
Hawkins v. Barber, the opinion mentions ORS 12.110(1) only in describing the trial court’s theory and reproduces the statutory text; the appellate court’s analysis concerns whether the complaint alleged trespass, without construing or independently applying this statute. opinion →
Chaney v. Fields Chevrolet Co., ORS 12.110 appears only in the quoted exceptions to ORS 12.080; the court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about ORS 12.110. opinion →
Weinberger v. Rall, the opinion mentions ORS 12.110 (1) only in describing the trial court's statute-of-limitations ruling. The appellate court construed and applied ORS 12.030, not ORS 12.110. opinion →
Moser v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., the court mentions ORS 12.110 only to describe the trial court’s stated basis for dismissal; the holding construes ORS 12.030, not ORS 12.110. opinion →
State Ex Rel. Nilsen v. Ben Jacques Chevrolet Buick, Inc., the court applied ORS 12.080's general six-year limitation period. ORS 12.110 appears only as an exception listed in the quoted text of ORS 12.080; the court did not interpret or apply § 12.110. opinion →
Salmon v. Miller, ORS 12.110 appears only in a footnote quoting ORS 30.075 and is not construed or applied by the court; the appeal was decided on the guest passenger statute and gross-negligence evidence. opinion →
Thoenes v. Tatro, ORS 12.110 is mentioned only in a footnote to identify the normally applicable limitations period. The court did not construe or decide an issue under the statute; it expressly declined to opine on whether waiver or estoppel would prevent reliance on the statute. opinion →
Mt. Hood Radio & Television Broadcasting Corp. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., ORS 12.110 (1) appears only in plaintiff’s argument about when the cause of action accrued. The court decided the case under ORS 12.115 (1), relying on Johnson, and did not construe or apply ORS 12.110. opinion →
Johnson v. Star MacHinery Company, ORS 12.110(1) appears only as part of the plaintiff’s argument about the applicable limitations period. The court did not construe or apply that statute; it decided the case under ORS 12.115(1). opinion →
Urban Renewal Agency v. Lackey, the opinion mentions ORS 12.110 only in a footnote as one example in a comparison of statutes of limitations. The court did not construe, apply, or decide anything about ORS 12.110. opinion →
Duncan v. Dubin, the court merely identified the two-year limitations period under ORS 12.110(1) while describing the timing of service. It decided the case under ORS 12.155's tolling provision and expressly left the substituted-service issue undecided. opinion →
Robert C. Cameron, et al. v. E. M. Adams & Co., et al., the court did not construe or decide the meaning, requirements, or scope of ORS § 12.110(1). It noted the parties' agreement that the limitations period applied and held only that individual limitations-compliance issues did not defeat predominance under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). opinion →
Cameron v. E. M. Adams & Co., the statute is mentioned in describing the parties' agreement and limitations arguments. The court's holding concerns whether individual limitations issues defeat class-action predominance; it does not construe or independently decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of ORS § 12.110. opinion →
Bliven v. Goodrich, the court merely identifies the two-year limitation in ORS 12.110(1) as background to the procedural facts. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about that statute; the decision concerns ORS 12.020(2). opinion →
West American Insurance v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance, ORS 12.110(1) was raised only as part of the defendant's affirmative defense and quoted in a footnote; the court decided the case on the reimbursement/arbitration issue and expressly did not reach the statute-of-limitations matter. opinion →
Securities-Intermountain, Inc. v. Sunset Fuel Co., ORS 12.110(1) appears only in a footnote. The court did not construe or apply that subsection's language, including its fraud-or-deceit discovery proviso; it resolved the case by characterizing the pleaded claims as tort and discussing the applicable limitation framework, principally ORS 12.135(1). opinion →
Holman Transfer Co. v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., the court mentions ORS 12.110 only in a footnote reproducing the exception in ORS 12.100(2), while discussing other limitation statutes; it does not interpret or apply ORS 12.110. opinion →
Amfac Foods, Inc. v. Fred A. Snyder Roofing & Sheet Metal Corp., the court held that ORS 12.080(1), not ORS 12.135(1), governed the contract action. ORS 12.110 appears only in the quoted text of ORS 12.080(1) as one of the exceptions to that six-year statute; the court did not interpret or apply ORS 12.110. opinion →
Bradford v. Davis, the court describes plaintiff’s reliance on ORS 12.110(4), but expressly says it need not decide timeliness under those provisions because they do not apply. The statute is therefore only mentioned in explaining an argument the court rejects as inapplicable, not construed or applied by the court. opinion →
DeLay v. Marathon LeTourneau Sales & Service Co., the opinion mentions ORS 12.110(4) only while recounting the Supreme Court's legislative-history discussion in Josephs. The decision itself construes and applies the ten-year ultimate-repose statute in ORS 12.115(1), not subsection (4) of ORS 12.110. opinion →
White v. Gurnsey, ORS 12.110(1) is mentioned only as the statute applicable to medical-malpractice claims in the discussion of Berry v. Branner. The court does not construe or apply § 12.110; its holding concerns the discovery rule under ORS 12.120(2). opinion →
Sculace v. Rogers, the court affirmed on preservation and waiver grounds, expressly assuming without deciding that the instruction on ORS 12.110(4) was erroneous; its discussion of the statute's discovery standard was incidental to that procedural ruling. opinion →
Holdner v. Columbia County, ORS 12.110 appears only in the court’s summary of the defendant’s argument in a cited Ninth Circuit precedent; Holdner does not construe, apply, or decide anything about that statute. opinion →
State v. Charles, the court expressly declined to decide whether ORS 484.730 was a forfeiture statute subject to ORS 12.110(2); it only stated that the proceeding was timely even assuming the two-year limitation applied. opinion →
DeLay v. Marathon LeTourneau Sales & Service Co., the court mentions ORS 12.110(4) only as statutory history explaining why the tolling statute's cross-reference included the medical-malpractice repose provision. The decision construes the effect of insanity on ORS 12.115(1), not the meaning or application of ORS 12.110. opinion →
Johnson v. MacGregor, the court merely identifies ORS 12.110(1) as the applicable two-year limitations period in describing the procedural history; it decides the appeal under ORCP 23C and ORS 12.020(2), without construing or applying the meaning of ORS 12.110(1). opinion →
Guiley v. Hammaker, the court quoted ORS 12.110(1) only in a footnote. Its actual holding concerned ORS 12.160(1), the minor-disability extension, and when the discovery rule makes a personal-injury claim accrue; it did not construe or apply the requirements of ORS 12.110(1) itself. opinion →
Dortch v. AH Robins Co., Inc., the opinion discusses ORS 12.110(1) only by recounting Berry's and other courts' treatment of accrual and discovery, as background for construing ORS 30.905 in this product-liability case. It does not decide what ORS 12.110 requires or how that statute applies to this claim. opinion →
Philpott v. A.H. Robins Company, Inc., the opinion reports Philpott’s argument about ORS 12.110(1) but does not adopt or construe it. The court instead holds that ORS 30.905 applies to all of her product-related claims and bars them. opinion →
Welch v. Bancorp Management Advisors, Inc., the court mentions ORS 12.110(1) only to identify the limitations period in the procedural background. Its actual ruling concerns relation back under ORCP 23C, not the meaning or application of ORS 12.110. opinion →
Towerhill Condominium Ass'n v. American Condominium Homes, Inc., ORS 12.110 is mentioned only in a footnote recounting the defendant's argument that the negligence claim was time-barred. The court did not decide the limitations issue; it noted that the trial court dismissed on other grounds and that the claim could be repleaded. opinion →
Taylor v. Settecase, the court identified the limitations issue involving ORS 12.110 but expressly declined to decide it, affirming instead on the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. opinion →
Withers v. Milbank, the court expressly declined to determine whether ORS 12.110(1) supported the dismissal and affirmed solely under ORS 12.115(1). The statute is also described in a footnote, but that description is incidental to the decision. opinion →
Harris v. Craig, the court mentions ORS 12.110(4) only as an example of a burden accompanying restored civil rights. Its holding concerns the implied repeal of ORS 12.160(3), not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of ORS 12.110(4). opinion →
Holien v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., the statute is mentioned only in Sears’s argument to identify the two-year limitations period for the common-law wrongful-discharge claim; the court did not construe ORS 12.110 or decide its scope or application. opinion →
Anais v. Dias, the statute is cited only in reporting the trial court’s limitations ruling; the appellate court’s holding concerns tolling under ORS 12.155 and the advance-payment statutes, not the meaning or application of ORS 12.110(1). opinion →
Sheppard v. Weekly, the court merely identifies ORS 12.110(1) in a footnote as the applicable limitations period; its holding concerns tolling under ORS 12.155, not the meaning or application of ORS 12.110. opinion →
Erickson Air-Crane Co. v. United Technologies Corp., the court quoted ORS 12.110 only as an example of another statute whose limitations period ORS 12.115(2) does not extend; it did not interpret or apply ORS 12.110. opinion →
Stromme v. Nasburg and Co., the statute appears as the basis for the trial court’s ruling and in the parties’ summary-judgment dispute, but the appellate court decides only that the denial of summary judgment on the limitations defense was not reviewable because the defense required an evidentiary showing. It does not decide whether ORS 12.110 applies. opinion →
Mattson v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., the court cited ORS 12.110(1) only to identify the two-year limitations period used by analogy in discussing laches. It did not construe the statute or decide that the statute governed or barred the plaintiffs' claims. opinion →
Cabal v. Donnelly, the opinion discusses § 12.110(1) only while recounting the limitations argument and alternative grounds in Beveridge, and quotes it as background to the contract-versus-tort issue. This court does not construe the statute or decide a limitations question under it; it holds that the warranty claim is contractual and awards attorney fees. opinion →
Richard v. Portland General Electric Co., the court cited ORS 12.110 only in passing to identify the limitations bar to one tort claim, without interpreting the statute or discussing what it requires or how it applies beyond the case's procedural disposition. opinion →
Simpson v. Simpson, the court merely identified and quoted the statute; it held that the defendant waived the limitations defense under ORCP 19B, without deciding what ORS 12.110(1) requires or how its discovery rule applies. opinion →
Evans v. Salem Hospital, the opinion reports the trial court's limitations-based dismissal and treats ORS 12.110(1) as the two-year limitations period, but the appellate court's decision construes and applies ORCP 23C's relation-back rule rather than deciding what ORS 12.110(1) means or requires. opinion →
Donohoe v. Mid-Valley Glass Co., ORS 12.110(1) is cited as one of the applicable statutes of limitations, but the court did not construe or apply its terms; it addressed whether equitable estoppel could prevent defendants from asserting the limitations defense. opinion →
Torgeson v. Connor, the statute appears only in a footnote reporting the parties’ limitations arguments; the court expressly declined to decide whether the action was timely under the statute. opinion →
Little v. Wimmer, section 12.110 is mentioned only in the quoted text of ORS 12.115(2) as an example of a limitation period otherwise established by law. The court did not decide what § 12.110 means or how it applies; its holding concerned ORS 12.115 and 12.135. opinion →
Federal Deposit Insurance v. Former Officers & Directors of Metropolitan Bank, the opinion only reports a defendant's contention about ORS 12.110(1) and expressly declines to reach the issue because it resolves the limitations question under federal law. opinion →
Bruner v. Cascade Western Corp., the statute appears only in a footnote describing the defendant's argument raised for the first time on appeal. The court expressly declined to address whether the action was timely commenced, so it did not decide anything about ORS 12.110. opinion →
Dotson v. Smith, the court mentions ORS 12.110(1) only to identify the baseline two-year limitations period and decides the case by construing and applying the tolling provision in ORS 12.155; it does not interpret or otherwise decide what ORS 12.110(1) requires. opinion →
Dotson v. Smith, the opinion merely identifies the two-year limitation period in ORS 12.110(1) as the period applicable to the underlying negligence action. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about that statute; the decision concerns ORS 12.155 and ORCP 21A(9). opinion →
Riddle v. Eugene Lodge No. 357 of the Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks of the United States, ORS 12.110 appears only in the quoted exception language of ORS 12.100(2). The court did not interpret or apply ORS 12.110; it held that ORS 12.100(2) supplied the applicable three-year limitation. opinion →
Sealey v. Hicks, the opinion mentions ORS 12.110 only as part of plaintiffs’ argument about which limitation period governs. The court decides instead that ORS 30.905 applies to the negligence claim and does not construe or apply ORS 12.110. opinion →
Hoyt v. Paulos, the opinion mentions ORS 12.110 only to identify the filing deadline. The court decided whether the action was timely commenced under ORS 12.020 and expressly did not construe or apply ORS 12.110. opinion →
Press v. Todd Investment Co., the statute is cited only to identify the two-year limitations period and the procedural filing date. The court decided whether the amendment related back under ORCP 23C and whether dismissal was proper under ORCP 21A(9), without construing or applying the meaning or requirements of ORS 12.110. opinion →
Erickson v. Christenson, the statute appears in ALC-NPD’s limitations argument. The court did not interpret or decide the statute’s application; it held only that the complaint’s face did not establish that the injuries occurred more than two years before filing. opinion →
Sealey v. Hicks, the court mentioned ORS 12.110 only conditionally while addressing whether the complaint adequately pleaded a continuing failure to warn; it did not construe or apply the statute because it held that theory was not adequately pleaded. opinion →
Moresi v. Nationwide Mutual, the statute is mentioned only to identify the filing deadline and to report the trial court’s procedural ruling. The Supreme Court’s decision construes ORS 36.310 and does not decide what ORS 12.110 means or requires. opinion →
Baker v. Foy, the opinion mentions ORS 12.110(1) only in a footnote to identify the applicable two-year limitations period; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute’s meaning or requirements. opinion →
Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., the statute is cited as the basis for the trial court’s judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but the appellate court reverses on the procedural ground that the defendant failed to raise the limitations issue by motion for a directed verdict. The court does not decide what ORS 12.110(1) means or how it applies, and expressly leaves the remaining arguments unresolved. opinion →
Alderson v. State of Oregon, the opinion only reports that the trial court may have relied on ORS 12.110 as a two-year limitation period. The appellate court does not interpret or apply ORS 12.110; it decides the limitations issue under ORS 12.080(1) and ORS 30.275(8). opinion →
Hendgen v. Forest Grove Community Hospital, the court merely cites ORS 12.110(4) to describe the limitations period for the original negligence action. The decision turns on relation back under ORCP 23C and whether the amended emotional-distress claim stated a claim, without interpreting or applying the meaning or requirements of ORS 12.110(4). opinion →
Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., ORS 12.110(1) is mentioned as the basis of a pretrial motion and is quoted in a footnote, but the court expressly says the statute-of-limitations issue was not before it. The decision addresses appellate preservation and review of an unraised procedural argument, not the meaning or application of the statute. opinion →
Akh v. Rct, the court mentions ORS 12.110(1) as part of the procedural history and in stating the certified question, but it does not construe or decide what the statute means or requires. The decision concerns the retroactive application and constitutionality of ORS 12.117. opinion →
A.K.H. v. R.C.T., ORS 12.110(1) appears only in the procedural background as a limitations provision cited in defendant's motion and as part of the context for the certified retroactivity question. The court did not interpret or decide what the statute requires or how it applies. opinion →
O'Brien v. State, the opinion dismisses review after a legislative amendment and expressly states that the dismissal does not signal agreement with the Court of Appeals' result or reasoning; it therefore does not decide what ORS 12.110(4) means or how it applies. opinion →
Beals v. Breeden Bros., Inc., the statute is mentioned in the plaintiffs’ description of the trial court’s ruling and in their argument about when the limitation period began. The court did not construe or apply ORS 12.110; it affirmed dismissal because the complaint lacked sufficient factual allegations. opinion →
Pipkin v. Zimmer, the court used ORS 12.110 to identify the underlying two-year limitation period and concluded the action was timely after applying the tolling rule in ORS 12.155. It did not construe or decide what ORS 12.110 itself requires. opinion →
Baker v. Kennedy, the court merely identifies the two-year limitations period under ORS 12.110(1); it does not interpret or apply that statute. The operative holding concerns suspension of the limitations period under ORS 12.155. opinion →
Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., the statute is cited only to identify the limitations defense in the procedural history. The court does not interpret or apply § 12.110; its discussion and holding concern preservation of the alleged procedural error and tolling under ORS 12.155. opinion →
Duber v. Zeitler, the court cites ORS 12.110(1) only to identify that the complaint was timely filed; it does not interpret or apply the statute's requirements. opinion →
Cereghino v. Boeing Co., ORS 12.110 is mentioned only in the quoted text of ORS 12.115(2). The court construes and applies the statute of ultimate repose in ORS 12.115, not the cited limitations statute. opinion →
Moore v. Ball, Janik & Novack, ORS 12.110 is mentioned only as the statute underlying the trial court’s ruling. The appellate court does not interpret or apply § 12.110; its holding concerns whether the refiling statute, ORS 12.220, applied after the prior dismissal. opinion →
Baker v. Kennedy, the court identifies the two-year personal-injury limitation in ORS 12.110(1), but the decision construes and applies the tolling rule in ORS 12.155; it does not decide the meaning, requirements, scope, or independent application of ORS 12.110(1). opinion →
Lesch v. DeWitt, the opinion recounts the parties’ and lower courts’ positions concerning ORS 12.110(4), but resolves the case on the separate ORCP 67 B jurisdictional issue and expressly does not reach the statute’s merits. opinion →
McKechnie v. Stanke, the statute is cited only as the basis for the trial court’s ruling below; the Court of Appeals dismisses the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and does not decide what ORS 12.110(4) means or requires. opinion →
Cropp v. Interstate Distributor Co., the statute is mentioned while reporting plaintiffs’ argument and is quoted in a footnote; the court did not adopt or construe ORS 12.110(1). Instead, it held under ORS 12.430 that California substantive law and California’s limitations period governed. opinion →
Richer v. Poisson, the statute is mentioned only while reporting the trial court’s procedural ruling. The appellate court decides the continuing-tort issue under case law and does not construe or independently apply ORS 12.110. opinion →
Paschall v. Crisp, ORS 12.110 appears only in describing defendant's argument about when the statute of limitations ran. The court did not construe or apply that statute; it decided the appeal under ORS 12.020(2) and ORCP 7 concerning timely and reasonably calculated service. opinion →
In Re Complaint as to the Conduct of Butler, the court mentions the statute in the factual background to explain the filing deadline in the underlying disciplinary matter. It does not construe, analyze, or decide any issue about the statute; the decision concerns the appropriate professional-discipline sanction. opinion →
Edmonds v. Cytology Services of Maryland, Inc., the court merely lists Oregon's statute in a comparative catalog of medical-malpractice limitation and repose statutes; it does not decide what § 12.110 means, requires, covers, or how it applies. opinion →
Gehrke v. CrafCo, Inc., the court mentions ORS 12.110(1) in describing when the original complaint was filed and reproduces the statute in a footnote, but does not construe or apply that statute. The court’s limitations analysis concerns the discovery rule, and the opinion identifies ORS 12.120(2) as the controlling one-year statute of limitations. opinion →
Cooksey v. Portland Public School District No. 1, the opinion does not construe or apply ORS 12.110(4); it cites Gaston’s definition of “injury” under that statute as an analogy while deciding the meaning of ORS 30.275(8). opinion →
Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists, the statute appears only in a parenthetical citation to Richer v. Poisson; this opinion does not construe or apply ORS 12.110. opinion →
Dauven v. St. Vincent Hospital & Medical Center, the statute appears only in the procedural history describing the trial court’s prior dismissal and the plaintiffs’ first appeal. This opinion decides the real-parties-in-interest issue and does not construe or apply ORS 12.110(4). opinion →
Harmon v. Meyer, the court cites § 12.110(1) only to state the applicable two-year limitations period. The decision construes ORCP 23 C’s relation-back rule, not § 12.110. opinion →
Davis v. United States Employers Council, Inc., Incidental: ORS 12.110(1) appears only as the plaintiff’s second assignment of error and in the explanation that the first, workers’ compensation exclusivity issue was potentially dispositive regardless of the statute of limitations. The court resolved the exclusivity issue and did not construe or decide the limitations statute. opinion →
Lourim v. Swensen, the court cites ORS 12.110(4) and (5)(a) only as a contextual comparison while construing ORS 12.117; it does not decide what § 12.110 means or how it applies. opinion →
Walthers v. Gossett, the opinion holds only that ORS 12.117 applies to the negligence claim; ORS 12.110 appears solely as a cross-reference in the quoted text of ORS 12.117 and is not interpreted or applied. opinion →
Bradbury v. Teacher Standards & Practices Commission, the court mentioned ORS 12.110(1) only while recounting the reasoning from Magenis; the decision itself construed and applied the one-year defamation limitation in ORS 12.120(2), not the meaning or application of ORS 12.110(1). opinion →
Wright v. Osborne, the court does not construe or decide the meaning or application of ORS 12.110(1); it reports the trial court’s limitations ruling and addresses plaintiffs’ tolling argument under ORS 12.150 instead. opinion →
Diaz v. Coyle, the opinion quotes ORS 12.110 only as an exception embedded in the text of ORS 12.100(2); the court decides whether ORS 12.100(2) applies to double damages under ORS 609.140(1), not what ORS 12.110 means or how it applies. opinion →
Yen Linh Thi Pham v. Faber, the opinion merely identifies the applicable two-year limitations period in a footnote; it does not interpret, explain, or decide anything about ORS 12.110. The court's holding concerns service of process under ORCP 7. opinion →
Stull v. Hoke, the Court of Appeals is reporting the Supreme Court's prior statute-of-limitations ruling in procedural history; on remand, it does not construe or apply ORS 12.110(1). opinion →
Quillen v. Roseburg Forest Products, Inc., the court merely mentions ORS 12.110(1) to identify the limitations period for the proposed intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim; it does not interpret or apply that statute. opinion →
Shasta View Irrigation District v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., ORS 12.110 appears only in the court's reproduced text of ORS 12.115; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about ORS 12.110. opinion →
Gladhart v. Oregon Vineyard Supply Co., ORS 12.110 appears only in plaintiffs’ appellate argument as an alternative statute of limitations; the court did not adopt that argument or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Sandgathe v. Jagger, the statute is cited only in describing the limitations argument and trial-court ruling in the earlier Stevens litigation. Sandgathe does not construe or apply ORS 12.110; its holding addresses dismissal with prejudice of a premature malpractice action. opinion →
Nike, Inc. v. Northwestern Pacific Indemnity Co., the opinion mentions ORS 12.110(4) only in a footnote as analogous authority describing another court’s interpretation. The court itself construed an insurance policy’s contractual discovery-of-loss provision, not this statute. opinion →
Metropolitan Property & Casualty v. Harper, the court mentions ORS 12.110 only in describing the statute-of-limitations issue addressed in prior cases and expressly states that it was not called on to address that issue here. opinion →
Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Russell, the opinion cites ORS 12.110(1) only while describing the parties’ limitations-related reason for choosing an indemnity theory; it does not construe or decide the statute’s meaning or application. opinion →
Kambury v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., the opinion cites ORS 12.110 (4) only as one example in quoting ORS 30.020(1)(b); it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the meaning or operation of ORS 12.110 (4). opinion →
Holdner v. Oregon Trout, Inc., the court mentioned ORS 12.110(4) only as an example of legislative codification of the judicial discovery rule. It did not interpret or apply that statute; the decision instead addressed the one-year defamation limitation in ORS 12.120(2). opinion →
Gladhart v. Oregon Vineyard Supply Co., the court cited ORS 12.110(1) and (4) only as examples of other statutes that expressly state discovery rules, while construing ORS 30.905(2). It did not interpret or apply ORS 12.110. opinion →
Lyons v. H & R TRANSPORT, INC., the court cited ORS 12.110(1) only to identify the applicable two-year personal-injury limitations period. Its decision construed and applied ORS 12.020 concerning commencement and service, not ORS 12.110. opinion →
Lelouis v. Western Directory Co., the court cited ORS 12.110 as an example in assessing whether the arbitration agreement was unconscionable because its one-year deadline was shorter than applicable legal periods. It did not construe or apply the statute to decide a limitations issue. opinion →
Walters v. Hobbs, the court cited ORS 12.110(4) only to identify the applicable two-year limitations period while deciding whether the amended complaint related back under ORCP 23 C; it did not construe or apply the statute beyond that incidental reference. opinion →
Kambury v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., the court mentions ORS 12.110(1) only in recounting the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Erickson. Kambury itself construes and applies ORS 30.905 to product-liability claims; it does not decide what ORS 12.110(1) means or how it applies. opinion →
Smith v. American Legion Post 83, the opinion merely presumes in a footnote that ORS 12.110(1) supplies the applicable limitations period; it does not decide what the statute means or how it applies. The holding concerns ORS 12.020 and service of process. opinion →
Tillamook Country Smoker, Inc. v. Tillamook County Creamery Ass'n, the court only identifies ORS 12.110(1) as the analogous two-year tort limitations period proposed by Smoker; it does not interpret the statute or decide its requirements or application. opinion →
Archambault v. Ogier, ORS 12.110 appears only in defendants’ argument that the claim was for misrepresentation; the court rejected that characterization and held the claim sounded in contract, applying the six-year limitation in ORS 12.080 instead. opinion →
Towne v. Robbins, the court mentions ORS 12.110 only as a comparison to contrast the Oregon Franchise Act's limitations provision; it does not decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of ORS 12.110. opinion →
Blanton v. Beiswenger, the court cited § 12.110(1) only to state the background two-year limitations period while deciding the meaning and application of ORS 12.155; it did not construe or independently decide anything about § 12.110(1). opinion →
Keller v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., the court cited and compared ORS 12.110(4) only as an interpretive aid in construing the asbestos statute, ORS 30.907; it did not decide an issue about the medical-malpractice statute itself. opinion →
Keller v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., the opinion construed ORS 30.907(1), not § 12.110(4); it cited § 12.110(4) only as interpretive context for a similar discovery phrase. opinion →
Ashcroft v. State of Oregon, the disposition merely cited § 12.110(1) to identify the personal-injury limitations period supporting dismissal; it did not construe or independently apply the statute. opinion →
Meoli v. Brown, the opinion mentions ORS 12.110(1) only in recounting the defendant's statute-of-limitations affirmative defense; the court's holding concerns ORS 12.155 and whether certain insurance payments toll the limitations period. opinion →
McLain v. Maletis Beverage, the court mentions ORS 12.110(1) only to identify the limitations period as a temporal fact in its relation-back analysis under ORCP 23 C; it does not construe or decide anything about the statute itself. opinion →
Hamilton v. Paynter, the opinion merely reports the trial court's ruling under ORS 12.110(1); the appellate decision addresses tolling under ORS 12.155 and does not construe or apply ORS 12.110(1). opinion →
Batzer Construction, Inc. v. Boyer, the statute is mentioned only in describing plaintiffs’ cross-assignment of error about the trial court’s ruling that the counterclaims were timely. The court rejects that cross-assignment on procedural grounds without construing or applying ORS 12.110(1). opinion →
T. R. v. Boy Scouts of America, the opinion merely identifies ORS 12.110(1) as Oregon’s two-year tort limitations period. Its dispositive accrual analysis applies federal law governing section 1983 claims, without construing or independently applying this statute. opinion →
Johnson v. Swaim, the opinion mentions ORS 12.110 only to identify the two-year statute of limitations deadline in the procedural background. The court decides the attorney-fee issue under ORS 20.080 and does not construe or apply ORS 12.110. opinion →
Hamilton v. Paynter, the court did not interpret or apply ORS 12.110(1); it merely reported defendants’ limitations defense and quoted the statute in a footnote. The holding concerned ORS 12.155 and tolling of the limitations period. opinion →
Waldner v. Stephens, the opinion mentions ORS 12.110 only as the plaintiffs’ proposed limitations statute; the court rejects that position and holds that ORS 12.125 governs. It does not construe or apply ORS 12.110. opinion →
Wiederhorn v. Multnomah Athletic Club, the court mentioned ORS 12.110(1) to identify the plaintiff's proposed two-year tort limitations period, but it did not construe or apply that statute independently. The holding was that ORS 65.167(4)'s one-year limitations period governed proceedings challenging the expulsion. opinion →
Ram Technical Services, Inc. v. Koresko, ORS 12.110(1) appears only in a footnote summarizing the defendants’ statute-of-limitations argument; the court resolved the appeal on claim preclusion and expressly declined to decide whether the statute of limitations barred the action. opinion →
Johnson v. Swaim, the court cited ORS 12.110(1) only to recount the insurer's warning about the filing deadline and explain why the plaintiff filed suit before the demand period expired; the court decided the attorney-fee requirements of ORS 20.080(1), not the meaning or application of ORS 12.110. opinion →
Schmidt v. Archdiocese of Portland, the court construed ORS 12.117, not ORS 12.110. Section 12.110 appears only in ORS 12.117(1)'s quoted notwithstanding clause and is not interpreted or applied independently. opinion →
Landauer v. Landauer, ORS 12.110(1) appears only as part of the plaintiff’s theory about when the limitation period began. The court decided an evidentiary issue and did not construe or decide the statute’s discovery rule. opinion →
Wright v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, the court mentions ORS 12.110 only to contrast the ordinary personal-injury limitation period with the separate UIM accrual requirement under ORS 742.504(12)(a); it does not interpret or decide what ORS 12.110 requires. opinion →
McDonald v. Sun Oil Company, the court expressly states that § 12.110(1) is not at issue; it mentions the statute only as a comparison while deciding whether CERCLA § 309 applies to Oregon’s separate statute of repose, § 12.115(1). opinion →
BOARDMASTER CORPORATION v. Jackson County, ORS 12.110(1) appears only in Pacific Power’s alternative argument and in the court’s description of the prior Davis case. The court did not decide or construe that statute; it resolved the appeal under the tariff and analyzed the applicable limitations issue under ORS 30.275(9). opinion →
Abbott v. DeKALB, the court recited the statute and its two-year limitations period as background, but dismissed review as improvidently allowed and expressly did not decide the merits of the statute-of-limitations issue. opinion →
Schmidt v. Abbey, the court did not interpret or apply ORS 12.110. It appears only in the quoted text of ORS 12.117(1), while the court's holding concerns ORS 12.117(2)(a)(B) and (d). opinion →
Snyder v. ESPINO-BROWN, ORS 12.110(1) is mentioned only to report the trial court's statute-of-limitations ruling; the appellate court decided the case under ORS 12.155 and did not construe or apply ORS 12.110(1). opinion →
Pollard v. Geo Group, Inc., the court cites ORS 12.110(4) only as an example in comparing state tort laws to support its separate conclusion that state remedies are not uniform for purposes of the Bivens analysis. It does not construe, decide, or apply the statute. opinion →
Pollard v. the GEO Group, Inc., the court cites § 12.110(4) only as an example of Oregon's limitations period while comparing the nonuniformity of state tort remedies in its Bivens analysis; it does not interpret or decide the statute. opinion →
Abraham v. T. Henry Construction, Inc., the statute appears only in a footnote reciting the applicable limitations periods as background. The court did not construe or apply ORS 12.110; the limitations issue it addressed concerned the contract claim under ORS 12.080(1), and review of that issue was declined. opinion →
Rogue River Education Ass'n/Southern Oregon Bargaining Council/OEA/NEA v. Rogue River School District No. 35, the court cited ORS 12.110(4) only as an analogy while construing the discovery rule in ORS 243.672(3); it did not decide the meaning or application of ORS 12.110(4). opinion →
Scott v. Jackson County, the opinion merely reports the Ninth Circuit’s prior application of ORS 12.110(1) to the federal § 1983 claim and considers whether that ruling has preclusive effect. The Oregon Court of Appeals did not decide the statute’s meaning or independently apply it to resolve the present claims; it held that issue preclusion was not established. opinion →
Klutschkowski v. PeaceHealth, the court discussed ORS 12.110(4) only to summarize the earlier Christiansen decision and its reasoning. The present case decided the application of ORS 31.710's noneconomic-damages cap, not the meaning or application of ORS 12.110(4). opinion →
Gambaro v. Oregon Department of Justice, the court cited ORS 12.110(1) as the applicable limitations period, but did not construe or apply the statute; it resolved the limitations issue because plaintiffs failed to argue it on appeal. opinion →
Bell v. Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District, ORS 12.110(4) is mentioned only while recounting the procedural history and statutory background of Giulietti, an earlier case. Bell's holding concerns the interaction of ORS 30.275(9) and ORS 30.075(1), not the meaning or application of ORS 12.110. opinion →
Worthington v. Estate of Davis, the court merely identifies ORS 12.110 as the ordinarily applicable two-year limitations period for negligence claims. Its decision concerns relation back under ORCP 23 C and the separate operation of ORS 12.190(2), not the meaning or application of ORS 12.110. opinion →
Rice v. Rabb, the opinion cites ORS 12.110(1) only while describing the holding in Berry and the plaintiff’s argument by analogy. Rice v. Rabb decides whether ORS 12.080(4) contains a discovery rule, not what ORS 12.110(1) means or requires. opinion →
Macnab v. State, ORS 12.110 appears only in a footnote describing how the parties framed the issue below. The court held that the claim was governed by the Oregon Tort Claims Act, ORS 30.275(9), and did not interpret or apply ORS 12.110. opinion →
Sunset Presbyterian Church v. Brockamp & Jaeger, Inc., the court did not construe or apply ORS 12.110(1); it only identified the statute in describing the general contractor’s argument. The court’s analysis and ruling concerned the contractual accrual clause and the absence of evidence of the architect’s certified substantial-completion date. opinion →
Wood Park Terrace Apartments Ltd. Partnership v. Tri-Vest, LLC, the court noted ORS 12.110 only in a footnote describing an argument defendants did not make; the court applied the parties' agreed six-year period under ORS 12.080(3) instead. opinion →
Doe v. Lake Oswego School District, the court described Gaston's construction of ORS 12.110(4) as background for applying the discovery rule to claims under the Oregon Tort Claims Act. It did not decide a medical-malpractice claim or otherwise construe or apply ORS 12.110(4) itself. opinion →
Doe v. Lake Oswego School District, the court describes Gaston's interpretation of ORS 12.110(4) as background and uses it by analogy while deciding the discovery rule under the Oregon Tort Claims Act; it does not construe or apply ORS 12.110(4) itself. opinion →
Bell v. Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District, the court mentioned ORS 12.110(1) only as the underlying two-year limitation while deciding whether ORS 30.075(1)'s three-year survival-action period is superseded by ORS 30.275(9); it did not interpret or independently apply ORS 12.110. opinion →
Klutschkowski v. PeaceHealth, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote to report an undisputed point about a negligence claim based on Powell’s conduct; the court did not construe or apply ORS 12.110(4). opinion →
Rice v. Rabb, ORS 12.110 is mentioned as an example within defendant’s argument and in the court’s discussion of the earlier Berry decision; the court’s holding construes ORS 12.080(4) together with ORS 12.010, not ORS 12.110. opinion →
Clackamas County Assessor v. Crew, the court cited ORS 12.110(4) only as an example of a statute using a known-or-should-have-known discovery rule; it decided the appeal under ORS 305.280(1) and did not construe or apply ORS 12.110(4). opinion →
Sohn v. Lam Thanh Thuy Thi, the opinion merely recounts the defendant's assertion that service was outside the statute's two-year period; the court decided the case under ORCP 54 A and did not construe or apply ORS 12.110. opinion →
Sunset Presbyterian Church v. Brockamp & Jaeger, Inc., the opinion mentions ORS 12.110 in a footnote while describing the parties' arguments, but expressly states that the court does not decide which statute of limitations applies. opinion →
Davis v. State, the opinion mentions ORS 12.110 only as an example of a statute of limitations for personal-injury claims, in contrast to the saving statute; it does not interpret or apply ORS 12.110. opinion →
Grants Pass Imaging & Diagnostic Center, LLC v. Marchini, the court merely reports plaintiffs’ challenge to the trial court’s use of the two-year tort limitations period and then disposes of the fiduciary-duty claim on the separate ground that the contractual duties did not survive defendant’s withdrawal. It does not interpret or decide the application of ORS 12.110. opinion →
Concienne v. Asante, the court mentions ORS 12.110(4) only to identify the limitations period involved in Kather’s argument. Its holding is that the amended complaint related back under ORCP 23 C, so the claim was timely; it does not construe or independently apply subsection (4). opinion →
Wieck v. Hostetter, the statute appears in the defendant’s argument and in the trial court’s alternative ruling, but the appellate court affirmed on the release and expressly declined to address the statute-of-limitations ruling. opinion →
Gibson v. Bankofier, the opinion only reports that the trial court relied on ORS 12.110(1), then expressly affirms on an alternative ground rather than deciding the statute-of-limitations issue. opinion →
Doe v. Silverman, the statute appears only in a footnote describing the parties’ limitations arguments and citing the general rule applicable to negligence and IIED claims. The court did not decide the timeliness or application of ORS 12.110(1); it resolved the appeal under ORS 12.117. opinion →
Doe v. Silverman, ORS 12.110 appears only within the quoted text of ORS 12.117 as a statute subject to that provision's notwithstanding clause. The appellate court construed ORS 12.117 and the retroactivity of its 2009 amendment, not the meaning or application of ORS 12.110. opinion →
Hoag Living Trust Dated Feb. 4, 2013 v. Hoag, ORS 12.110(1) appears only in a parenthetical describing Htaike's holding; this court instead selected the six-year period under ORS 12.080(1) for these quasi-contract claims and did not construe or apply § 12.110(1). opinion →
Holloway v. Clackamas River Water, the court cited § 12.110(1) only to support the statute-of-limitations cutoff for the retaliation claims; it did not interpret or otherwise decide what the statute means or requires. opinion →
J. M. v. Or. Youth Auth., the statute is mentioned only as the defendant's asserted limitations defense in the procedural history. The court decided the federal accrual rule for a 42 USC section 1983 claim and did not construe or independently apply ORS 12.110(1). opinion →
Perez-Rodriguez v. State, the court cited ORS 12.110(4) only as an example when discussing reasonableness standards and mental-capacity considerations. It decided the escape clause in ORS 138.510(3), not the meaning or application of ORS 12.110(4). opinion →
Brinkman v. Abm Onsite Servs. W., Inc., the court mentioned ORS 12.110 only while describing the exception in ORS 12.080(2); it did not interpret or apply ORS 12.110 itself. opinion →
Leonetti v. Bray, Incidental: the court cites § 12.110(1) only as the source of Oregon’s two-year personal-injury limitations period; it does not interpret or independently analyze the statute, and the accrual discussion concerns federal law. opinion →
Jenkins v. Little, the statute appears only in a string citation supporting the general two-year limitations period; the court did not construe or independently apply Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110. opinion →
Williams v. Smith & Nephew Inc., the court mentions § 12.110(1) in a footnote as part of a passing comparison to Oregon’s shorter limitations period. It dismisses the case as untimely under Washington law and does not interpret or independently apply the Oregon statute. opinion →
Sherman v. Dept. of Human Services, the court cites ORS 12.110(4) only as an example supporting its analysis of ORS 12.117; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about ORS 12.110(4). opinion →
Sherman v. Dept. of Human Services, the opinion does not construe or apply ORS 12.110(4) in deciding this case. It mentions the statute only while recounting the lower-court ruling and legislative history of O’Brien, and quotes ORS 12.110 in the text of ORS 12.117’s notwithstanding clause. opinion →
US Bank NA v. Glogowski Law Firm, the court mentioned § 12.110 only to compare Oregon’s two-year limitations period and to recount defendants’ argument; it selected Minnesota law and did not interpret or apply § 12.110. opinion →
Diens v. Bonome, the court mentioned ORS 12.110(1) while explaining why the residual statute, ORS 12.140, did not apply, but expressly declined to decide whether ORS 12.110(1) was the statute that actually governed. The ruling was therefore not a holding about ORS 12.110(1). opinion →
Willms v. AmeriTitle, Inc., the opinion describes ORS 12.110(1)'s general two-year fraud limitations rule as background, but the court's actual statutory-application holding concerns the six-year period in ORS 12.080(3), which it applied instead. opinion →
Marshall v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, the court was construing ORS 12.115(1); it mentioned ORS 12.110(1) only as contextual contrast about the statutes’ wording and did not decide what § 12.110 means or how it applies. opinion →
Clark v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the court cites ORS § 12.110(1) in a string cite, with a parenthetical describing Oregon’s two-year personal-injury limitations period, while affirming dismissal of claims as time-barred. It does not construe the statute or decide a statute-specific issue. opinion →
Reyes v. City of Hillsboro, OR, the court cites Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110 as support for Oregon’s two-year limitations period, but does not interpret or independently apply the statute; its analysis concerns the federal accrual rule for a § 1983 claim. opinion →
City of Portland v. Iheanacho, the court cited Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110 only parenthetically as authority for the settled two-year limitations period applicable to the federal civil-rights claims. It did not interpret the statute’s text or independently decide a question about the statute. opinion →
Unigestion Holding, S.A. v. UPM Technology, Inc., the court’s actual limitations analysis applied the two-year period under 47 U.S.C. § 415. ORS § 12.110(1) was mentioned only in a footnote as a supporting citation for the general two-year period applicable to Oregon tort claims, without construing or independently applying the statute. opinion →
Romero v. Amburn, ORS 12.110 appears only in a footnote listing statutes that create exceptions to ORS 12.080(1); the court expressly says those exceptions are not relevant and does not interpret or apply § 12.110. opinion →
Hathaway v. B & J Property Investments, Inc., the opinion mentions ORS 12.110(1) only in describing the trial court's reasoning. The Court of Appeals construed ORS 12.125 and did not decide what ORS 12.110 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Schoene v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., the court mentions § 12.110(1) only while summarizing Plaintiff's argument that Oregon's two-year tort limitations period should apply. It does not construe or apply that statute; it dismisses the emotional-distress claim on federal preemption grounds and resolves the contract claim under the airline contract's six-month limitation. opinion →
Davoodian v. Rivera, ORS 12.110(1) appears only in the procedural history and a footnote. The court declined to address the declaratory-judgment limitations argument on appeal, and the footnote’s passing observation that ORS 12.110(1) appears inapposite because of ORS 12.118 is not a holding construing or applying § 12.110. opinion →
D. S., the opinion mentions ORS 12.110 only within a footnote quoting ORS 30.075(1); the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about ORS 12.110. opinion →
Davoodian v. Rivera, the court merely noted in a footnote that § 12.110(1) appeared inapplicable, while declining to address the declaratory-judgment claim; it did not decide the statute’s meaning or application. opinion →
D. S., the opinion quotes ORS 12.110 only in a footnote while describing ORS 30.075(1); it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the limitations period in ORS 12.110. opinion →
Marshall v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, the court mentions ORS 12.110(1) and (4) only as contextual comparisons while construing ORS 12.115(1); it does not decide what ORS 12.110 means or how it applies. opinion →
Marshall v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, the court discussed ORS 12.110(1) and (4) only as contextual and historical comparators in construing ORS 12.115(1); it did not decide what ORS 12.110 means or how it applies. opinion →
Marshall v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, the court construed ORS 12.115(1), not ORS 12.110. It mentioned ORS 12.110(1) and (4) only as contextual comparison and legislative-history background, and did not decide what ORS 12.110 means or requires. opinion →
Mouton v. Tri-County Metro. Dist., the court mentions ORS 12.110(1) only to identify the limitations period underlying Yeager’s case. Its holding construes the temporary COVID-19 legislation, HB 4212, and decides when that extension ended; it does not interpret or apply ORS 12.110(1) itself. opinion →
Flanders v. Winco Foods, LLC, the opinion mentions ORS 12.110(1) only to identify the basis for a party's motion and the underlying limitations period. The court construed temporary COVID-19 legislation, HB 4212, rather than the meaning or operation of ORS 12.110 itself. opinion →
Yeager v. Montgomery, the court merely identifies ORS 12.110(1) as the underlying two-year limitations period in the procedural facts. Its statutory-construction holding concerns temporary HB 4212 and when that legislation's extension of civil statutes of limitations ended; it does not construe or independently decide the meaning or application of ORS 12.110(1). opinion →
Mouton v. Tri-County Metro. Dist., ORS 12.110(1) is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify the limitations period underlying Yeager’s case. The court construed the temporary HB 4212 extension and its repeal date, not the meaning or application of ORS 12.110(1). opinion →
Flanders v. Winco Foods, LLC, ORS 12.110(1) is mentioned only as the underlying statute of limitations supporting a motion for summary judgment and the trial court's ruling. The Court of Appeals construed the temporary HB 4212 extension, not ORS 12.110(1). opinion →
Samuelson v. Jewell School District 8, the court cited ORS § 12.110(1) only to identify the two-year limitations period borrowed for federal § 1983 claims. It did not construe or decide the meaning, scope, or direct application of the Oregon statute. opinion →
Mitchell v. Kott, the court mentions ORS 12.110 only in passing as one of several potentially applicable limitation periods; it did not construe or decide its application, and dismissed the claims as time-barred based on the broader allegations and other statutes. opinion →
Marshall v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLC, the opinion decides that ORS 12.115(1) has no continuous-relationship exception. ORS 12.110 is mentioned only as legislative-history context for interpreting ORS 12.115(1), so the court makes no holding about the meaning or application of § 12.110. opinion →
Marshall v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLC, the opinion's holding concerns ORS 12.115(1); ORS 12.110(4) is mentioned only as legislative-history context for interpreting ORS 12.115(1), and the court does not construe or apply ORS 12.110(4). opinion →
Calhoon v. Richard Thierolf, Jr., the court's disposition rested on other statutes governing claims brought after death. Section 12.110(1) was mentioned only in a parenthetical summarizing Mathies and was not construed or applied to decide Calhoon's claims. opinion →
Newberg Crestview, LLC v. City of Newberg, the court merely recites the parties’ agreement that ORS § 12.110(1) supplies the limitations period for the § 1983 claim. It does not construe the statute or decide a disputed issue about its application; the ruling instead concerns accrual and possible equitable tolling. opinion →
Chapman v. City of Coos Bay Oregon, the court expressly declined to decide which statute of limitations applied and merely listed ORS 12.110(1) as one possible two-year limitations period; the claims were barred under any of the potentially applicable periods. opinion →
Logan v. Waterford Operations, LLC, the court decided whether the wrongful-death action was timely under ORS 30.020(1). It mentioned ORS 12.110(4) only in describing Gaston’s framework and the analogous meaning of “injury”; it did not apply or decide a claim under ORS 12.110(4). opinion →
Bortnick v. Housing Authority of Lincoln County, the court cited ORS 12.110(1) as one authority for a two-year limitations period governing an ORS 659A.142(5) claim, but it did not interpret or independently apply ORS 12.110; the citation was incidental to the court’s statute-of-limitations ruling. opinion →
Western States Land Reliance Trust v. Linn County, the court cited ORS 12.110(1) only as the agreed source of the two-year limitations period for the plaintiff’s federal § 1983 claim. The court’s holding concerned when that claim accrued under federal law, and it did not interpret or independently decide the meaning, scope, or application of ORS 12.110. opinion →
Western States Land Reliance Trust v. Linn County, the court cited ORS 12.110(1) only as the agreed two-year limitations period applicable to the § 1983 claim. The opinion did not construe what the statute means or requires; its accrual analysis was based on federal law. opinion →
Beaston v. Nickelson, the court treated ORS 12.110 as the agreed background limitations period. Its decision concerned whether ORS 12.150 tolled that period and whether disputed residency facts precluded summary judgment; it did not interpret or decide what ORS 12.110 means or requires. opinion →
Beaston v. Nickelson, the court only recited the parties’ agreement that ORS 12.110 supplied a two-year limitations period as background to the dispute over tolling under ORS 12.150; it did not interpret or decide any issue about ORS 12.110. opinion →
Hathaway v. B & J Property Investments, Inc., ORS 12.110(1), (4), and (5) are mentioned only as comparative statutes or as part of the court’s discussion of prior precedent while deciding whether ORS 12.125 contains a discovery rule. The court does not decide what ORS 12.110 means or how it applies. opinion →
Hathaway v. B & J Property Investments, Inc., the court construed ORS 12.125, not ORS 12.110. It mentioned ORS 12.110(4) only as a comparator showing an express discovery provision and discussed prior cases involving ORS 12.110 as background to deciding the different statute. opinion →
Athena v. Pelican Brewing Co., the court mentions ORS 12.110(3) while summarizing the competing limitations periods, but it does not construe or apply that provision. It holds that the claim at issue is an unpaid-wage claim governed by the six-year period in ORS 12.080. opinion →
Athena v. Pelican Brewing Co., the court mentioned ORS 12.110(3) while listing potentially applicable limitations periods, but it did not construe or apply the statute to the claims. Its holding was that the meal-period wage claims are governed by the six-year period in ORS 12.080. opinion →
Yeager v. Montgomery, the opinion construed the temporary HB 4212 extension, while ORS 12.110(1) appeared only as the underlying limitations period in the procedural history. opinion →
Gibson v. City of Portland, the opinion cites § 12.110(1) only to identify Oregon’s two-year personal-injury limitations period for § 1983 claims; it does not interpret or otherwise decide what the statute means or requires. The decision concerns federal claim accrual and malicious-prosecution timing. opinion →
Chirre, the court cites ORS § 12.110 only to identify the limitations period for the § 1983 claims, relying on Sain v. City of Bend. It does not interpret the statute or decide how it applies; the statute is mentioned as one factor in deciding whether to extend the service deadline. opinion →
Burns v. Bell, the Oregon statute appears only in a footnote string cite listing statutes from states said to use the discovery rule. The court applied and construed District of Columbia law, and did not interpret or apply Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110. opinion →
Myrick v. James, the opinion mentions Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(4) only in a footnote list of statutes from other jurisdictions that codify a discovery rule; the court does not interpret or apply the Oregon statute. opinion →
McNaughton v. Dillingham Corp., the opinion mentions § 12.110 only while recounting the prior Ninth Circuit decision and its rationale. The decision here concerns whether Del Costello applies retroactively, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 12.110. opinion →
Harrison v. County of Alameda, the opinion mentions Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1) only while reporting the Ninth Circuit's decision in Cooper v. Ashland as comparative guidance. This court construed California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(3), not the Oregon statute. opinion →
Adamson v. City of Provo, Utah, the opinion does not construe or apply Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110. It cites the statute only in reporting the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Cooper, and the court’s own decision concerns Utah statutes of limitation. opinion →
Kingsley v. Ashworth, the court mentions Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110 only as one of two alternative statutes of limitations under which the fraud claim would be untimely; it does not interpret the statute or explain its requirements or application. opinion →
Peggy Rose Revocable Trust v. Eppich, Or.Rev.Stat. § 12.110(1) appears only in footnote 8's string citation listing jurisdictions with fraud discovery rules. The court did not analyze, interpret, or apply Oregon law. opinion →
Eddings v. City of Jefferson, the opinion cites Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1) as one of the statutes of limitations supporting the result, but it does not interpret or explain the statute; the first cited conclusion is expressly reported as the district court’s ruling. opinion →
C.O. v. Portland Public Schools, the court only recites the defendants’ limitations argument and declines to determine from the complaint whether the claims are time-barred or equitably tolled. It does not interpret or decide the scope or application of Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1). opinion →
Wilke v. City of Burns, the court merely cited § 12.110(1) in affirming the district court’s time-bar dismissal; it did not interpret the statute or independently explain its requirements or application. opinion →
CollegeNET, Inc. v. XAP CORP., the court cited § 12.110(1) as authority for the analogous limitations period used in setting the Lanham Act laches standard. It did not construe or independently apply the Oregon statute; its holding concerned whether the Lanham Act claim was barred by laches. opinion →
Adidas America, Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., the court cites § 12.110 to identify the analogous two-year limitations period for its laches analysis, without interpreting the statute or deciding its application as an independent claim limitation. opinion →
Bergin v. McCall, the court cited ORS § 12.110(1) only to describe the basis for the district court’s dismissal and did not construe or independently apply the statute. opinion →
Methodist Healthcare System of San Antonio, Ltd., L.L.P., W.C. Schorlemer, M.D., and Robert Schorlemer, M.D. v. Rankin, the opinion mentions Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(4) only in a footnote listing other states' repose periods as part of a nationwide survey. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Oregon statute. opinion →
Calista Enterprises Ltd. v. Tenza Trading Ltd., the court cites § 12.110(1) only to identify the borrowed two-year limitations period used in its Lanham Act laches analysis; it does not construe, apply, or decide any issue under the Oregon statute itself. opinion →
Adidas America, Inc. v. Payless Shoesource, Inc., the court mentions § 12.110 only in a footnote to identify the analogous two-year limitations period used in analyzing laches. It does not construe the statute or decide what it requires, whom it covers, or how it otherwise applies. opinion →
Actkinson v. Vargo, the court cited ORS 12.110(1) only to identify Oregon's two-year personal-injury limitations period. Its decision turned on when the federal claim accrued and whether the complaint was timely, not on interpreting or applying this statute's meaning or scope. opinion →
McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., the court expressly states that § 12.110(1) is not at issue. It mentions and describes the statute only to contrast Oregon’s statute of limitations with the statute of repose at issue under CERCLA; it does not decide what § 12.110 requires or how it applies. opinion →
Appleton Pickett, Jr. v. Williams, the Ninth Circuit merely affirmed summary judgment as time-barred while citing § 12.110(1) as Oregon’s personal-injury period; it did not construe or independently apply the statute. opinion →
Urban Renewal Agency v. Lackey, the court mentions the section's two-year period to contrast tort actions with statutory claims while deciding whether Tort Claims Act notice was required. opinion →
Cavan v. General Motors Corp., the court mentions ORS 12.110 only in a footnote while deciding whether ORS 12.115 bars the claims. opinion →
Workman v. Rajneesh Foundation International, the court mentions § 12.110(1) as background on the discovery rule while deciding whether it applies to defamation actions under § 12.120(2). opinion →
Fessler v. Quinn, the court mentions the section only while describing the limitations issue in Beveridge. opinion →
Massey v. Oregon-Washington Plywood Co., the court interprets former ORS 12.120(3) and mentions ORS 12.110 only to identify where that subsection was later incorporated. opinion →
Villalobos v. University of Oregon, the court quotes a prior decision mentioning ORS 12.110 but holds that ORS 30.275(3) supplies the applicable limitations period. opinion →
McCulloch v. Price Waterhouse LLP, the court cited section 12.110(4) through a prior medical negligence decision while deciding when the UTPA’s limitations period began. opinion →
Keller v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., the court uses § 12.110(4) as context for applying the discovery rule in § 30.907(1) to an asbestos claim. opinion →
FLIR Systems, Inc. v. Sierra Media, Inc., the court uses the section’s two-year fraud limitations period by analogy to assess laches on trademark claims. opinion →
Richardson v. Dept. of Rev., the court rejects taxpayers’ reliance on ORS 12.110 because the tax appeal statutes do not give it power to correct the 2001 assessment. opinion →
O'Callaghan v. City of Portland, the magistrate judge recommended applying the section’s two-year limitation period, but the opinion does not show that the district judge adopted the recommendation. opinion →
Logan v. Waterford Operations, LLC, the court uses the established meaning of “injury” under this section to decide when the wrongful death deadline in ORS 30.020(1) began. opinion →

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