Statute Annotations › Oregon › Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.135

Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.135

Modification of decree: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Oregon
Case notes
301
Cited in passing
126
Citing cases indexed
749
Case dates
1973–2025
Screened through
2026-06-17
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-20
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

427 citing cases reviewed of 749 in the citation index: 301 interpreted the section (annotated below), 126 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-17 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.135?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1991 Oregon enacted ORS 107.136, permitting reinstatement of terminated spousal support in specified circumstances. Source
  • 1997 ORS 19.275 permitted a qualifying support-modification motion while an appeal is pending; the trial court may decide it or hold it in abeyance. Source
  • 1999-10-23 Oregon Laws 1999, chapter 587, §§ 2–3, limited modification of compensatory spousal support in proceedings filed on or after that date to an involuntary, extraordinary, and unanticipated change reducing the paying spouse’s earning capacity. Source
  • 2004-01-01 Oregon Laws 2003, chapter 576, § 112, changed the retroactive spousal-support modification and accrued-installment cutoff from filing the motion to serving it. Source

Custody and visitation modification

Section 107.135(1)(a) gives an Oregon court continuing authority to modify the custody provisions of its divorce decree.

Roebuck v. Roebuck · filed 1973-04-02(1)(a)

The Oregon court possessed continuing jurisdiction to modify its original custody award by the express provisions of statute. ORS 107.135(1) (a), provides the court has the power to “Set aside, alter or modify so much of the decree as may provide * * * for the custody, support and welfare of the minor children * * Godfrey v. Godfrey, 228 Or. 228, 364 P.2d 620.
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Section 107.135(1)(a) gives the divorce court continuing power to modify provisions for children's custody and support after the other party receives notice served as a summons.

Kantola v. Kantola · filed 1973-04-23(1)(a)

Furthermore, ORS 107.135 (l)(a) provides: ... “The court has the power at any time after a decree is given, upon the motion of either party and after service of notice on the other party in the manner provided by law for service of a summons, to: ... “(a) Set aside, alter or modify so much of the decree as may provide for the appointment and duties of trustees., for the custody, support and welfare of the minor children, or for the support of a party * * A” ' ... Here the father was at all times a resident of Oregon.
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Section 107.135 authorizes a court to change child custody in divorce proceedings.

R. v. R. · filed 1973-12-03

The court's authority to order a change of custody in divorce proceedings is found in ORS 107.135.
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Section 107.135(1)(a) permits modification of custody when circumstances have changed since the decree; a parent’s voluntary placement of children with the other parent for 14 months can establish that change.

Crane v. Crane · filed 1974-06-17(1)(a)

The issue is whether the mother’s voluntarily leaving the children with their father for 14 months constitutes a substantial change in the circumstances of the parties so as to warrant a change in custody pursuant to ORS 107.135 (1) (a). ... The most substantial change of circumstances, however, is in the mother’s voluntary relocation of the children into the home of the father.
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Section 107.135(1) permits modification of child custody when a material change in circumstances since the decree or its latest modification warrants it in the children’s best interests.

In re the Dissolution of the Marriage of Moffett · filed 1977-05-02(1)

ORS 107.135(1) gives the domestic relations court authority to provide for the continued care and custody of minor children of divorced parents through modification of the decree as it relates to such children. Necessarily taken in the best interests of the children involved, any modification must be based on a material change in the circumstances of the parties occurring since the entry of the decree itself or its most recent modification.
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Section 107.135 requires changed circumstances to modify custody, so courts should exercise restraint when imposing or enforcing conditions that would permit easier modification.

Matter of Marriage of Meier · filed 1978-10-30

First, because the former effect, easy modification, is in derogation of the change-of-circumstances rule of ORS 107.135, discretion to impose or enforce such conditions should be exercised with restraint; particularly, judicial discretion should not be exercised to regulate decisions such as choice of residence which are normally parental not judicial, decisions unless due to exceptional circumstances there is a clear danger to the child's well-being.
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Section 107.135(1)(a) gives an Oregon court jurisdiction to modify its custody decree, but the court may decline to exercise that jurisdiction.

Moore v. Moore · filed 1976-03-15(1)(a)

Respondent contends that the Oregon court had jurisdiction to modify its own divorce decree. We agree. ORS 107.135(1)(a). That it has the power, however, does not, under the Hawkins rationale, necessarily mean that it should exercise it.
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Section 107.135(1) permits modification of visitation when a substantial change in circumstances or a previously unknown material fact adversely affects the child’s welfare, and the modification serves the child’s best interests.

In re the Marriage of Pickens · filed 1976-04-05(1)

ORS 107.135(1) gives the domestic relations court authority to provide for the continued care and custody of minor children of divorced parents through modification of the decree of dissolution as it relates to such child. Two limitations have been judicially imposed on the court’s modification authority: (1) there must be a substantial change in circumstances since the original decree, or the existence of a material fact unknown at the time of the original decree, adversely affecting the welfare of the child; and (2) the proposed modification must be in the best interests of the child. ... Applying these standards to the instant case, it is difficult to see what change has occurred, since the decree of dissolution on May 3, 1974, sufficient to justify the court’s reduction in visitation rights from 12 weeks to two weeks and five days per year.
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Section 107.135(1)(a) does not authorize a dissolution judgment to change child custody automatically when the child reaches a specified age.

In re the Marriage of Jacobson · filed 1987-04-15(1)(a)

We hold that the dissolution court lacked power to provide for an automatic change of custody in this case. The language in the judgment that does that is unenforceable.
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A stipulated visitation order is not a custody order for purposes of the change of circumstances rule governing custody modification.

Matter of Marriage of Ortiz · filed 1990-11-26(1)(a)

We agree with the Court of Appeals that a stipulated visitation order is not a custody order for the purpose of the change of circumstances rule.
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Section 107.135(1)(b) permits a court to modify a dissolution judgment to provide for the custody and support of a child erroneously omitted from it; that modification does not undo the dissolution.

Mell v. W.C. Ranch, Inc. · filed 1991-07-03(1)(b)

The decedent’s motion could only lawfully have been treated as a motion to modify the judgment to provide for the custody and support of the child who was “erroneously omitted from the decree.” ORS 107.135(l)(b). For the same reasons, the second purported dissolution judgment should be treated only as a modification of the original judgment.
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Section 107.135 provides no different visitation standard when a dissolution judgment is modified.

In re the Marriage of Kingsbury · filed 1996-05-29

The legislature has not provided a different standard when visitation is modified. See ORS 107.135.
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Section 107.135 requires a party seeking to modify custody to show a substantial change in circumstances and that the modification serves the child’s best interests.

Matter of Marriage of Johnson · filed 1998-06-24(1)(a)

A party requesting modification of custody must show both a substantial change in circumstances and that the modification of custody would be in the best interest of the children.
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Section 107.135(1)(a) gives the court authority to modify parenting time; a stipulated agreement cannot transfer that decision-making authority to a nonjudicial designee.

In re the Marriage of Heinonen · filed 2000-11-15(1)(a)

Here, the court’s adoption of the parties’ stipulation operates to deprive the trial court of its statutorily mandated authority to modify parenting time because it delegates that authority to a nonjudicial designee. It is therefore in direct conflict with the statutory grant of that power to the court. ... Because of the stipulation’s conflict with the statutory powers of the court, we hold that the renewed incorporation of the parties’ agreement by the trial court into the 1998 judgment was error and that the 1998 judgment must therefore be vacated.
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Section 107.135 requires a party seeking to modify child custody to prove a substantial change in circumstances before the court considers changing custody.

In re the Marriage of Epler · filed 2013-09-11(1)(a)

Under that statute, it is well established that a party seeking to modify a child-custody determination must prove that there has been a substantial change in circumstances before the court can consider whether to modify custody.
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Section 107.135(1)(a) permits modification of parenting time; the moving party must prove that the change is in the child’s best interests.

T. S. R. v. J. B. C. · filed 2013-07-31(1)(a)

In doing so, the court’s focus is on the child’s best interests, and the party moving for modification bears the burden of proving that the modification is in the child’s best interests.
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Section 107.135(1) permits a party to seek modification of a custody judgment in the trial court based on new information.

Renton v. Webber · filed 2016-02-24(1)

To the extent that a party in a domestic relations case seeks to have a court consider custody in light of new information, that party may file a motion to modify in the trial court.
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Section 107.135 permits modification of a dissolution judgment’s custody provisions but does not itself require a substantial change in circumstances.

In Re the Marriage of Epler · filed 2014-12-26(1)(a)

Thus, the change-in-circumstances rule is not a statutory requirement, but rather a judicially created one. ORS 107.135 does not mandate the application of that rule.
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A summary denial of a motion to modify parenting time under ORS 107.135 must be explained when the record otherwise does not permit meaningful review of the court’s exercise of discretion.

Strand v. Garvin · filed 2021-06-03

Father also has a statutory right to review of the trial court’s decision, and without any explanation from the trial court regarding the reason for its summary denial, we have no way to meaningfully review whether the court’s exercise of discretion regarding the motion to modify comported with those legal principles regarding parenting time.
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Section 107.135(1)(a) allows a parent to seek modification of custody and parenting-time judgments.

Dept. of Human Services v. Z. M. · filed 2021-12-15(1)(a)

A parent may always seek to modify custody and parenting-time judg- ments.
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Section 107.135 requires a substantial change in circumstances since the last custody order; earlier school changes cannot support a custody modification.

In re Ibarra · filed 2014-03-19

Mother is correct that two of the three school changes occurred before the last custody order, leaving the parties’ most recent moves and the third school change as the remaining basis for the court’s order.
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Proof of a parent’s arrest alone does not establish the change in circumstances needed to modify custody when the parent is not in custody.

Aguilar v. Badger · filed 2020-06-17

(2) We do not suggest that certain criminal conduct (e.g., domestic violence committed against or in front of the child) or the implications of a parent’s arrest (e.g., incarceration, conviction) could not warrant a finding of a change in circumstances sufficient to permit the court to revisit custody; we hold only that proof of arrest is not, by itself, sufficient to find such a change when the parent is not in custody.
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Changes to support

Section 107.135(1)(a) prevents a decree from being modified to add spousal support when the original decree awarded none.

Matter of Marriage of Koch · filed 1982-07-21(1)(a)

There is no justification here for any award of spousal support. Wife contends that, because a decree cannot be modified to include spousal support if none was initially ordered, ORS 107.135(1)(a), a token award is necessary to allow future modification in the event she were not to prevail in the civil action against husband or her injuries were to become aggravated so that she would need support. As indicated, spousal support is based on the needs of the requesting spouse demonstrated at trial and not on some speculative need based on future events. ... There is no justification for the award of token spousal support.
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Section 107.135(3)(a) permits modification of spousal maintenance for a substantial change in economic circumstances; an income increase anticipated by the original award does not qualify.

O'Brien and O'Brien · filed 2025-12-03(3)(a)

Spousal maintenance support can be modified when there has been a “substantial change in economic circumstances of a party.” ORS 107.135(3)(a). ... Thus, the fact that her income had increased by $1,500 per month—consistent with what had been anticipated—does not constitute a “substantial change in economic circumstances” and was not “unanticipated.”
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Section 107.135 requires a party seeking to modify support payments to prove a material change in the payer’s ability to pay or the recipient’s need for support.

Osterholme v. Osterholme · filed 1973-04-16

The defendant husband, who is seeking modification, is required to show a material change in his ability to pay support, or in the plaintiff’s need for support. ... In this case the defendant failed to prove any material alteration in either his or the plaintiff’s financial situation. ... We hold that the defendant failed to prove any alteration in circumstance sufficient to justify any modification of the support payments.
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Section 107.135(1)(a) governs changes of custody, which require a change in circumstances; an extended temporary order cannot avoid that rule.

In re the Marriage of Gwinner · filed 1976-03-22(1)(a)

Applications for change of custody are governed in part by ORS 107.135(1)(a). ... The change of circumstances rule pertaining to changes of custody cannot be avoided by making "temporary” orders that run for extended periods of time.
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Section 107.135(1)(a) permits modification of child support when an income increase anticipated in the original order does not occur, because that expectation forms part of the basis for measuring changed circumstances.

In re the Dissolution of the Marriage of Phillips · filed 1976-12-06(1)(a)

Here, too, the decree was speculative concerning the anticipated earnings of the husband. We conclude that the facts predicted by the trial court here — return of the husband’s income to its previous level — must therefore be considered as an important factor in making the original child support order and thus, in reality, became a part of the basis from which any subsequent change of circumstances must be determined. Accordingly, because the husband’s income, through no fault of his own, had not returned to its August 1975 level, and remained, as the court found, what in fact it was when the original decree was entered, we conclude that sufficient change in circumstances was shown to warrant modification of the child support to $60 per month per child.
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Section 107.135(1)(a) authorizes a trial court to set aside, alter, or modify a support provision.

Jacobson v. Jacobson · filed 1973-04-23(1)(a)

We note that under ORS 107.135 (1) (a), the trial court has authority to “[s]et aside, alter or modify” a support provision made in favor of a party. Thus, the propriety of any support order must be examined primarily in the light of the conditions existing at the time the decree is entered.
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ORS 107.135(1)(a) allows a party to seek modification of a support order and permits the court to enter an order it finds appropriate from the evidence.

In re the Dissolution of the Marriage of Lairson · filed 1973-11-13(1)(a)

We presume that the trial court in awarding alimony for an indefinite period of time, until further order of the court, necessarily had reference to the right of a party to seek modification of a support order under ORS 107.135 (1) (a), and, pursuant thereto, for the court to enter such order as from the evidence it finds appropriate.
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Section 107.135 allows modification of child support provisions; a parent seeking additional support must apply to the divorce court rather than bring a separate contribution suit.

Asbridge v. Lefever · filed 1973-12-10

This is not a suit to modify the original divorce decree, but is a separate suit for contribution. ... Her only remedy is to apply to have the order modified by the court which granted it. * * *’ * * *” 43 Or at 484-85. This is currently the law in Oregon. ... The provisions of OHS 107.130 referred to were repealed in 1971 and replaced by ORS 107.135, but the provision for modification of support decrees is substantially the same.
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Section 107.135(1)(a) allows a court to modify divorce decree provisions for support when circumstances have changed sufficiently, despite an agreement that the provisions cannot be changed.

Garnett v. Garnett · filed 1974-09-26(1)(a)

It has previously been established that provisions of a settlement agreement relating to a division of property, even though it be through the means of periodic payments of money, are invulnerable to change, while provisions for support may be modified or done away with upon a showing of a sufficient change of circumstances since the decree, despite any provision the agreement and/or decree may have that the support provisions are not subject to change.
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Section 107.135 gives the court continuing authority to modify support provisions in a divorce decree, including provisions drawn from the parties’ agreement.

Davis v. Davis · filed 1974-10-14(1)(a)

When an agreement between the parties to a divorce is incorporated into a divorce decree, the court retains jurisdiction to modify the support provisions under ORS 107.135.
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Section 107.135 permits a court to modify support provisions incorporated into a dissolution decree even when the parties agreed to them.

In re the Dissolution of the Marriage of Thompson · filed 1976-05-17(1)(a)

When an agreement between the parties to a divorce is incorporated into a divorce decree, the court retains jurisdiction to modify the support provisions under ORS 107.135.
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Section 107.135(1)(a) allows modification of payments in a separation decree that function as support, even when the decree calls them judgments.

In re the Dissolution of the Marriage of Dealy · filed 1976-06-01(1)(a)

We find that the two "judgment[s]” were, in effect, provisions for support; as such they are subject to modification.
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Section 107.135(1)(a) permits modification or termination of spousal support when cohabitation substantially changes the recipient’s financial circumstances; cohabitation alone does not warrant modification.

In Re the Dissolution of the Marriage of Vaughn · filed 1976-06-14(1)(a)

Thus, if the evidence establishes a substantial change in the financial circumstances of the ex-wife as a result of the shared living arrangement, then the ex-husband may be entitled to a modification or even termination of the support payments to the ex-wife. On the other hand, if the evidence shows that her financial circumstances as a result of this living arrangement are the same, no modification would be warranted.
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Law changed since Oregon Laws 2003, chapter 576, § 112 (effective January 1, 2004), moved the earliest retroactive modification date from filing the motion to serving it; the filing-date rule governs earlier proceedings.

Section 107.135(2) permits a court to make a support modification retroactive to the filing of the motion, but does not require it.

Bloch v. Bloch · filed 1976-07-26(2)

ORS 107.135(2) is so similar to § 9-915, OCLA, that an interpretation permitting a court to make a modification retroactive to the date of the filing of the motion requesting such change is required by the Supreme Court’s decision in Briggs. While the court has the power to make an award retroactive and probably would make it so in a situation where the obligor spouse has purposefully caused delay, a court is certainly not required to do so.
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Section 107.135(1)(a) provides for modifying child support when circumstances change, rather than setting support based on a speculative future increase in income.

In re the Dissolution of the Marriage of Nussmeier · filed 1976-11-01(1)(a)

ORS 107.135(l)(a), allowing modification of child support based on change of circumstances, is designed to meet future changes and is the procedure the legislature contemplated for future changes.
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Section 107.135 requires a substantial change in the paying spouse’s ability to pay or the receiving spouse’s need before spousal support may be modified.

Brown v. Brown · filed 1977-02-14(1)(a)

A substantial change in a husband’s ability to pay spousal support, or a wife’s necessity therefor, is a prerequisite to the modification of the spousal support provisions of a dissolution decree.
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Section 107.135 permits modification of support orders upon a change of circumstances, but does not permit modification of a division of property, including an award of an income interest in a trust.

In re the Marriage of Horesky · filed 1977-09-12(1)(a)

Because the award of one-half the income from the trust is a division of property, the trial court erred in modifying its decree to terminate the wife’s income interest.
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Law changed since Oregon Laws 2003, chapter 576, § 112 (effective January 1, 2004), moved the cutoff for accrued installments and retroactive modification from filing the motion to serving it; the filing-date rule governs earlier proceedings.

Section 107.135(2) permits modification of support installments retroactive to the filing of a motion to modify, while installments accrued before filing remain final.

In re the Dissolution of the Marriage of Warren · filed 1977-10-17(2)

The rationale of Walker is that ORS 107.135(2) provides expressly that the decree is final as to any instalment which has accrued up to the time either party makes a motion to modify, and that the court does not have the power to set aside or modify the decree with respect to such accrued instalments. It follows that subsequent to the filing of a motion to modify, the instalment payments may be set aside or modified, but until an order is entered on the motion, the obligee is entitled to enforce collection, and any adjustments which may result from a retroactive order must be made prospectively.
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Section 107.135(2) bars a court from setting aside accrued child support payments even when their release was conditioned on compliance with a visitation schedule.

Jacot v. Jacot · filed 1978-12-26(2)

Since the support payments owed to the mother were a judgment under ORS 107.135(2) they could not be set aside upon the failure of this future contingency. To do so would allow the court to do by indirection what the statute forbids it to do directly.
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Section 107.135(1)(a) permits a court to extend spousal support beyond the period set in a dissolution decree upon a sufficient change of circumstances.

McReynolds v. McReynolds · filed 1976-03-29(1)(a)

The language of ORS 107.135(l)(a) gives the court wide powers to modify support provisions of a dissolution decree. ... Having determined that a court has the authority to extend the duration of support beyond the period called for in the decree, we proceed to consider whether the wife has shown a sufficient change of circumstances.
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Section 107.135(1)(a) requires an allegation and showing of changed circumstances before a court may modify a decree to require child support.

In re the Dissolution of the Marriage of Nelson · filed 1976-11-01(1)(a)

Accordingly, in the absence of any allegation or showing of a change in circumstances, the circuit court has no authority to modify the decree to require appellant to pay child support to respondent.
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Section 107.135(2) does not prevent a credit for child support recorded as due after the obligation automatically ended under the decree.

In re the Marriage of Cupp · filed 1977-02-22(2)

Mother appeals, contending that under ORS 107.135(2) the trial court had no power to retroactively modify the support provisions of the dissolution decree and that the increase in the support payment ordered for the third child was inadequate. ... Mother’s contention that the court did not have the power to grant the credit is incorrect. As each child became 18 and left school the obligation of the father to that child under the decree automatically ceased. As of that time there was nothing left to modify.
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Section 107.135(1)(a), as expanded by ORS 107.108, permits modification of a support decree for a child attending school even if the original decree did not provide for support beyond age 18.

State Ex Rel. Wick v. Wick · filed 1978-11-14(1)(a)

We, therefore, hold that ORS 107.108 expands the court’s jurisdiction under ORS 107.135(l)(a) to include a "child attending school” for the purpose of support.
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Section 107.135(1)(a) allows a supporting spouse’s health to be considered as a basis for modifying spousal support.

In re the Marriage of Cook · filed 1976-11-22(1)(a)

The condition of husband’s health can indeed be the basis for modification.
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Section 107.135(1)(a) permits modification of spousal support when circumstances substantially change; remarriage does not automatically end support.

In Re the Dissolution of the Marriage of Grove · filed 1977-11-08(1)(a)

The only statute which is relevant is that which gives the court the authority to “set aside, alter, or modify” the support portion of the decree upon motion of either party. ORS 107.135(1)(a). That authority may be exercised when a substantial change in circumstances since the original decree has been shown.
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Law changed since ORS 107.136, enacted in 1991, now permits reinstatement of terminated spousal support in specified circumstances.

Section 107.135(1)(a) permits modification of spousal support only while the duty to pay support still exists.

In re the Marriage of Park · filed 1979-11-26(1)(a)

In other words, the support requirements may be modified so long as the duty to support exists, but not thereafter.
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Section 107.135(1)(a) provides for modification of a dissolution decree to require child support when the decree requires no support payments.

State Ex Rel. Adult & Family Services Division v. Lester · filed 1980-03-24(1)(a)

The only means the mother has to collect child support from the father is to seek modification of the dissolution decree to provide for payment of child support. ORS 107.135(1)(a). AFSD has the right under ORS 23.789(2) to petition for such a modification. This is not such a petition and, because AFSD has no greater rights or remedies than its assignor has, there is no legal basis for this petition.
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Section 107.135(2) bars a parent from unilaterally crediting a child’s Social Security benefits against support installments that accrued before a motion to modify the decree was filed.

Matter of Marriage of Cope · filed 1980-11-17(2)

Consistent with the rationale of Alspaugh and Chase, we conclude here that father’s sua sponte deduction of his child’s Social Security benefits from his decreed support obligation constitutes an attempted retroactive modification of accrued installments, which is barred by ORS 107.135(2).
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Section 107.135(2) prohibits retroactively modifying accrued child support payments because the obligated parent supported the child while the other parent retained legal custody.

Matter of Marriage of Eagen · filed 1982-02-10(2)

In this case, by operation of the decree, the father's obligation continued as long as the mother had legal custody of the minor child and that state continued to exist until the child's marriage. For us to hold otherwise would be, in effect, a retroactive modification of the custody and support provisions which is prohibited by ORS 107.135(2).
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Section 107.135 does not allow a decree to be modified to add spousal support if none was originally awarded.

McGee v. McGee · filed 1980-09-08(1)(a)

A decree cannot be modified to include spousal support where it was not originally awarded, ORS 107.135(l)(a).
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Section 107.135 does not authorize a dissolution decree to require reexamination of permanent spousal support on a set future date.

In re the Marriage of Hughes · filed 1983-10-12

Wife also assigns as error the provision in the decree requiring that permanent spousal support be “reexamined in May, 1983.” We find no authority for such a provision. It is a nullity. See ORS 107.135; see also Slauson and Slauson, 29 Or App 177, 182, 562 P2d 604 (1977).
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Section 107.135 does not permit a court to add spousal support to a decree if none was initially ordered.

In re the Marriage of Klock · filed 1987-02-11(1)(a)

A court, however, cannot modify a decree to include spousal support if none was initially ordered. See ORS 107.135(l)(a).
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A party seeking to modify spousal support must prove a substantial change in circumstances that could not reasonably have been anticipated when the decree was entered.

In re the Marriage of McDonnal · filed 1981-10-12(1)(a)

Wife had the burden of proving that there had been a substantial change of circumstances since the entry of the decree which could not have reasonably been anticipated at the time of the decree.
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Section 107.135 requires proof of a substantial change of circumstances to modify a previous order, but that rule does not apply to enforcement of an existing decree.

State ex rel. Connecticut v. Levine · filed 1982-07-08

The rule requiring proof of a ‘substantial change of circumstances” applies only in situaions where a party to a previous order is attempting to tmend or modify the order. See ORS 107.135. That is not he situation here.
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Section 107.135(2) allows modification of spousal support only when the moving party shows a substantial change of circumstances that could not have been expected when the decree was entered.

In re the Marriage of Harden · filed 1984-04-11(2)

A court, however, cannot modify spousal support unless the moving party shows that a “substantial change of circumstances has occurred which could not have been expected at the time of the decree.” Moak and Moak, 64 Or App 487, 668 P2d 1249 (1983); Hellweg v. Hellweg, 30 Or App 995, 997, 568 P2d 710 (1977); ORS 107.135(2).
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Section 107.135 permits modification of a support obligation for a substantial change in circumstances, but a circumstance contemplated when the decree was entered is not by itself sufficient.

In re the Marriage of Pope · filed 1985-04-17(1)(a), (2)

Although courts have the authority to set aside, alter or modify any obligation deemed to be support when there has been a substantial change of circumstances, ORS 107.135(l)(a) and (2), a circumstance that was within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the original decree is not by itself sufficient to justify modification.
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An anticipated change in circumstances that the parties addressed through a self-executing spousal support provision does not justify modifying support absent fraud, duress or mistake.

In re Marriage of Pope · filed 1986-04-29(2)

Where, as here, the parties contemplated a change of the underlying factual predicate in respect of the payment of spousal support, and provided for self-executing adjustments to the decree as a result thereof, ... such anticipated factual change cannot be deemed the requisite change of circumstances, absent fraud, duress or mistake.
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Section 107.135(1)(a) permits modification of spousal support after dissolution. The changed circumstances requirement comes from case law, and a court may give effect to an incorporated agreement for later review without that showing if the parties initiated the provision.

Matter of Marriage of McDonnal · filed 1982-11-02(1)(a)

This statute, while granting the court the power to set aside, alter or modify the support provisions of a decree at any time after dissolution, does not specifically require a showing of changed circumstances. It is a rule of case law, not statutory law, that the party seeking the modification bears the burden of showing a substantial change in circumstances since the original decree. ... The inquiry on remand is whether the oral property settlement included the provision for post-decree review by the court. If the provision arose at the initiation of the parties then it should be made effective.
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Section 107.135 permits modification of spousal support when the supported spouse remarries, but remarriage does not automatically terminate support; termination depends on whether the purposes of the initial award have been met.

In re the Marriage of Bates · filed 1987-03-17(1)(a)

We agree that remarriage of the supported spouse may represent a change in circumstances; as we have pointed out, however, it will not automatically terminate a spousal support award. This is so because remarriage of a supported spouse will not always supplant the purposes behind the initial award. Support should be terminated when the purposes of the initial award have been met.
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Section 107.135(1)(a) provides for support adjustments through modification based on a change of circumstances after judgment.

In re the Marriage of Martin · filed 1987-05-06(1)(a)

He is correct that we have held that the proper procedure for adjustments in support is modification based upon change of circumstances after the judgment. ORS 107.135(1)(a).
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A supported spouse’s increased available income after remarriage can be a sufficient change in circumstances to terminate spousal support.

In re the Marriage of Hall · filed 1987-06-24(2)(a)

The trial court has the authority to modify the original award when there has been a change in circumstances represented by “a substantial change in the cost of reasonable and necessary expenses to either party.” ORS 107.135(2) (a). ... Because wife’s available income is greater than that provided by the original judgment, which is presumably the most equitable distribution of income between the parties, there has been a sufficient change in her circumstances to justify the termination of spousal support.
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Section 107.135 requires a party seeking to modify spousal support to show a substantial change in circumstances that was not contemplated when the judgment or a previous modification was entered.

In re the Marriage of Wolf · filed 1988-01-13

A party moving for modification of spousal support must show a substantial change in circumstances which was not contemplated at the time of the judgment or a previous modification.
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A custody provision may be modified only upon a substantial change in circumstances, even when the original custody judgment was not litigated.

In the Matter of Marriage of Welby and Welby · filed 1988-02-10

The trial court found that there was no substantial change of circumstances but decided that, because the original custody judgment was never litigated, a showing of changed circumstances was not required. Father argues that a substantial change in circumstances is required to change custody and that there was none here. We agree with father that a substantial change of circumstances is required.
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Section 107.135(2)(a) permits modification of a dissolution judgment only for a substantial change in circumstances beyond what was contemplated when the judgment was entered.

In re the Marriage of Myers · filed 1988-11-23(2)(a)

A dissolution judgment may be modified only if there is a substantial change of circumstances of a nature and degree beyond that contemplated at the time of the judgment.
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ORS 107.135(2) requires a material change in circumstances to modify a dissolution judgment; circumstances that existed or could have been anticipated before the original judgment do not qualify.

In re the Marriage of Gilmore · filed 1988-11-23(2)

Each circumstance listed by husband existed or could have been anticipated before entry of the original judgment. Because there was no material change of circumstances, the trial court erred in modifying the judgment to eliminate husband’s obligation to maintain his life insurance policy.
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Section 107.135(2)(a) requires a substantial change in economic circumstances that was not contemplated at the last support modification before child support may be modified.

In re the Marriage of Rae · filed 1991-06-19(2)(a)

To modify the award of child support, husband must prove that there has been a substantial change in a party’s economic circumstances that was not contemplated by the parties at the time of the last support modification. ... We are not persuaded that those changes were unanticipated by the parties when the court modified the judgment in August, 1989, or that they bear so materially on the economic circumstances of either party as to justify wife’s being required to pay child support.
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A party seeking to modify child support must first show a substantial change in circumstances before the child support guidelines determine the modified amount.

In re the Marriage of Wuepper · filed 1991-10-09(2)(a)

Wife’s argument is irrelevant because, as we discussed in Gay and Gay, supra, 108 Or App at 124, the moving party must first show a substantial change in circumstances to justify a modification of child support before the guidelines can apply to determine the amount of the modified award.
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Section 107.135 permits modification of spousal support when circumstances have substantially changed, including when an anticipated improvement in the recipient’s ability to support herself does not occur.

In re the Marriage of Winnie · filed 1991-10-23

Modification of spoused support must be based on a substantial change in circumstances. ORS 107.135. ... Although wife intended to complete her education and to find work at a salary sufficient to provide for her own support, she has not been able to do so, because Sarah’s need for special care did not decrease as anticipated when she entered public school. That is a substantial change from the circumstances anticipated at dissolution. ... Therefore, we modify the judgment to award wife permanent spousal support in the amount of $200 per month.
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Law changed since The Oregon Supreme Court in State ex rel. Willis v. Willis (Nov. 5, 1992) rejected a categorical incarceration bar: incarceration alone does not defeat modification if avoiding support was not the primary purpose.

A parent's incarceration does not constitute a substantial change in circumstances that justifies suspending child support.

Matter of Marraige of Willis · filed 1991-11-13(2)(a)

However, the application of the guidelines does not arise unless the party requesting a modification of support first establishes a substantial change in circumstances. ORS 107.135(2)(a); Gay and Gay, 108 Or. App. 121, 124, 814 P.2d 543 (1991). Because we hold that father's incarceration did not constitute a substantial change in circumstances to justify suspension of child support, mother's additional argument based on the guidelines is irrelevant.
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Section 107.135(2) does not permit a dissolution judgment to predetermine a change of circumstances before notice and evidence provide a basis for modifying support.

In re the Marriage of Robertson · filed 1992-07-01(2)

We delete the italicized language, because it constitutes a determination of a change of circumstances in advance of any notice or evidence that would be a basis for modification under ORS 107.135(2).
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Under former ORS 107.135(2)(a), a supported spouse’s remarriage is a change in circumstances, but spousal support should be terminated only when the purposes of the initial award have been met.

Matter of Marriage of Bettiol · filed 1988-08-17(2)(a)

Although remarriage of the supported spouse represents a change in circumstances, it does not automatically justify termination of a spousal support award. Spousal support should be terminated only when the purposes of the initial award have been met.
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Law changed since ORS 107.136, enacted in 1991, now permits reinstatement of terminated spousal support in specified circumstances.

Section 107.135(1)(a) does not authorize a court to reinstate spousal support after a prior modification order terminated the support obligation.

In re Marriage of Woita · filed 1989-08-30(1)(a)

The decisive question is whether the trial court had authority, under ORS 107.135(1)(a), to award spousal support in a modification proceeding when there was no existing support obligation. ... The question here is somewhat different in that the support obligation was terminated by a modification order rather than by the terms of the original judgment. ... We agree, and we hold that the trial court lacked authority to award spousal support.
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A spouse seeking to modify or terminate spousal support must prove a substantial change in economic circumstances; the supported spouse's remarriage does not shift that burden.

Matter of Marriage of Fouts · filed 1989-09-13(2)(b)

ORS 107.135(2)(b) authorizes the modification or termination of a spousal support award when there has been a substantial change in the parties' economic circumstances. As stated in Bates, remarriage may result in such a change. However, nothing in the statute suggests that the economic effects of remarriage should be treated differently than any other change of circumstances. Accordingly, we conclude that there is no authority or justification for shifting the burden of proof in cases where the alleged change of circumstances is remarriage.
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Section 107.135 permits modification of spousal support for a substantial change in circumstances, including a failure to improve when significant improvement was contemplated in the original judgment.

In re the Marriage of Polette · filed 1989-11-08(1)(a)

A modification in an award of spousal support must be based on a substantial change of circumstances. ORS 107.135. A substantial deterioration in health may constitute changed circumstances, as could a failure to improve, if significant improvement was contemplated at the time of the original judgment.
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Section 107.135 requires a substantial change in circumstances unanticipated at divorce to modify spousal support.

In re the Marriage of Page · filed 1990-09-12

In order to obtain a modification of the spousal support provisions of the judgment, husband must prove a substantial change in circumstances unanticipated at the time of the divorce.
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Section 107.135(2)(a) permits a reduction in spousal support when a substantial change in economic circumstances includes household contributions from the recipient’s cohabiting partner.

In re the Marriage of Bliven · filed 1991-02-27(2)(a)

A court may modify a support order when a “substantial change in economic circumstances” has occurred. ORS 107.135(2)(a). ... Thus, without husband’s support, wife has available $1,425, representing her income, $1,050, plus one-half of her partner’s contribution to their household, $375. ... Wife is able to maintain a standard of living nearly commensurate with what the original decree provided. We conclude that husband’s support obligation should be reduced to $125.
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A voluntary decrease in the obligee’s income can justify modifying child support if the obligee acted in good faith and not merely to compel an increase in support.

In re the Marriage of Gay · filed 1991-07-03(2)(a)

To justify a modification based on a voluntary decrease in the obligee’s income, the obligee must show that her action was taken in good faith and not merely to compel an increase in support.
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Section 107.135(1)(a) authorizes modification of a dissolution judgment on either party’s motion when changed circumstances warrant it; a modification motion must follow the applicable order-to-show-cause and affidavit requirements.

In re the Marriage of Dagan · filed 1990-09-19(1)(a)

ORS 107.135(1)(a) authorizes the court to modify a dissolution judgment on the motion of either party when a change in circumstances dictates the modification. ... Father did not initiate the modification proceedings by an order to show cause why the dissolution judgment should be modified. Neither did he support his motion with the required affidavit, describing the changed circumstances on which he relies to alter the judgment. Because father did not comply with those requirements, the trial court properly could have denied his motion on that ground.
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A voluntary reduction in income does not establish bad faith merely because it jeopardizes the children’s interests; the obligor’s purpose matters.

Matter of Marriage of Jones · filed 1991-03-06(3)(b)

We conclude that father was not acting in bad faith. Although we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that his actions have jeopardized the interests of his children, we do not find that that was his purpose.
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A voluntary reduction in income does not justify reducing child support when the parent fails to show that the hardship to the parent is not outweighed by the hardship a reduction would cause the child.

In re Marriage of Zorn · filed 1992-04-01(3)(b)

Even assuming that his voluntary income reduction was done in good faith, he has not shown that the hardship to him is not outweighed by the hardship to the child that the reduction would cause.
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Law changed since The Oregon Supreme Court in State ex rel. Willis v. Willis (Nov. 5, 1992) rejected a categorical incarceration bar: incarceration alone does not defeat modification if avoiding support was not the primary purpose.

Incarceration does not constitute a substantial change in circumstances justifying suspension of a child support obligation.

State ex rel. Willis v. Willis · filed 1991-11-13(2)(a)

Because we hold that father’s incarceration did not constitute a substantial change in circumstances to justify suspension of child support, mother’s additional argument based on the guidelines is irrelevant.
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Section 107.135(2)(a) permits modification of child support when the requesting party proves a substantial change in economic circumstances.

State ex rel. Hogue v. Hogue · filed 1992-10-21(2)(a)

ORS 107.135(2)(a) permits the trial court to modify child support when a party has undergone a “substantial change in economic circumstances.” Father has the burden of proving a change of circumstances.
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Incarceration alone does not bar an obligor’s motion to modify child support when the action leading to incarceration was not taken primarily to avoid the support obligation.

State Ex Rel. Willis v. Willis · filed 1992-11-05(3)(b)

Where the action leading to the incarceration was not taken for the primary purpose of avoiding the support obligation, incarceration alone does not defeat a motion for modification.
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An agreed child support arrangement that becomes unworkable satisfies the change-of-circumstances requirement for modification under ORS 107.135.

In re the Marriage of Horner · filed 1993-03-31

The evidence indicates that the agreed arrangement is unworkable. That change in circumstances meets the requirement of ORS 107.135.
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Section 107.135 permits modification or termination of spousal support upon proof of a substantial change of circumstances.

In re the Marriage of Hearing · filed 1993-08-18

An award of spousal support may be modified or terminated if there is a substantial change of circumstances, ORS 107.135, or if a spouse has not made reasonable efforts to become financially self- supporting. ORS 107.412(2). Husband has not proved that either of these conditions exist.
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A substantial change in one party’s economic circumstances is sufficient for a court to reconsider spousal support.

In re the Marriage of Ball · filed 1994-04-20(2)(a)

Whatever the comparison is between the financial status of the timber industry between 1989 and 1992, ORS 107.135(2)(a) provides that “a substantial change in the economic circumstances of a party * * * is sufficient for the court to reconsider its order of support.” (Emphasis supplied.) Our de novo review of the record leads to a finding that the statutory requirement has been met and that the spousal support award in the 1989 judgment should be modified to $80 per month as of the date of the trial court’s judgment of modification.
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Modification of spousal support requires proof of a substantial change in circumstances that was not anticipated at dissolution.

In re the Marriage of Grady · filed 1994-05-25(2)(a)

In sum, wife has not carried her burden of proving that there has been a substantial change in circumstances that was not anticipated at the time of the dissolution.
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Section 107.135(2)(a) permits modification of spousal support when a substantial, unanticipated change in the parties’ economic circumstances justifies it.

Curtis v. Curtis · filed 1994-09-07(2)(a)

The issue here is whether there has been a sufficient change in the economic circumstances of the parties to justify any modification of the original spousal support award. ORS 107.135(2)(a). The requisite change must be “substantial” and unanticipated at the time of the original judgment.
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Section 107.135(2)(a) permits modification of support when the obligor proves a substantial change in economic circumstances.

Scriven v. Scriven · filed 1995-04-26(2)(a)

We review de novo, ORS 19.125(3), and conclude that there has been a substantial change of circumstances. ORS 107.135-(2)(a).
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Section 107.135(2)(a) permits modification of spousal support when economic circumstances have changed substantially and unexpectedly since the earlier award.

In re the Marriage of Maier · filed 1995-09-27(2)(a)

An award of spousal support may be modified based on a finding that there was a substantial, unanticipated change in economic circumstances since the time of the earlier award. ORS 107.135(2)(a); Newton and Newton, 122 Or App 52, 55, 857 P2d 171, rev den 318 Or 25 (1993).
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For modification based on cohabitation, the court considers whether the recipient’s anticipated living expenses have materially declined and whether the living arrangement is likely to continue.

In re the Marriage of Bishop · filed 1995-09-27(2)(a)

Regardless of whether wife’s cohabiting with boyfriend bears the economic earmarks of a marital relationship, the ultimate inquiry is whether wife’s anticipated living expenses have been materially reduced because of her new living arrangement and whether that arrangement is likely to continue.
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Section 107.135 permits modification of spousal support when a party’s economic circumstances have substantially changed.

In re the Marriage of Simmons · filed 1995-12-13(2)(a)

ORS 107.135 authorizes a court to modify an award of spousal support if the economic circumstances of a party have substantially changed.
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Section 107.135(2) permits modification of spousal support for a substantial change in circumstances; a marriage-equivalent relationship may justify termination but does not do so automatically.

In re the Marriage of Morrison · filed 1996-02-14(2)

Remarriage or the equivalent of a marital relationship does not automatically result in the termination of a spousal support award. However, it is a circumstance that is to be considered in the light of the reasons for the original award when a motion to terminate spousal support is made.
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Section 107.135 permits termination of spousal support when an unanticipated increase in the recipient’s income constitutes a substantial change in circumstances in light of the award’s original purposes.

In re Marriage of Crommett · filed 1996-07-24(5)

Based on our understanding of the original purposes for the spousal support award, her change to a full-time position and the $1,300 monthly increase in her gross income constitute a substantial change of circumstances under ORS 107.135. We therefore conclude that the spousal support award of $400 per month should be terminated under ORS 107.135(5).
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Section 107.135(2)(a) requires a substantial change in economic circumstances beyond what was contemplated when the judgment was entered before child support may be modified.

In re the Marriage of Chirrick · filed 1996-11-13(2)(a)

ORS 107.135(2)(a) provides that a prerequisite to modifying a child support obligation is a substantial change of economic circumstances of a nature and degree beyond that contemplated at the time of the judgment.
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Section 107.135(2)(a) requires an actual change in economic circumstances to reduce spousal support; a possible future decline in income is insufficient.

In re the Marriage of Tiley · filed 1997-03-26(2)(a)

On de novo review, we find no change in husband’s economic circumstances that warrants modification of his spousal support obligation. ... Instead, the record demonstrates husband’s strong, current desire to decrease his spousal support obligation, combined with little more than a possibility that he will have a reduced income at some point in the future.
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Section 107.135 permits a court to consider modifying custody when caregiving circumstances have changed, even if the change resulted from a parent’s unlawful act.

State Ex Rel Johnson v. Bail · filed 1997-06-12

In turn, ORS 107.135 gives the court the power to modify custody judgments. ... The legislature could make that policy choice if it wishes, but at present no statute precludes inquiry into an otherwise sufficient change in circumstances simply because that change can be traced, in whole or in part, to a parent’s unlawful act.
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Section 107.135(2)(a) requires an unanticipated substantial change in a party’s economic circumstances to modify a preexisting support order.

In re the Marriage of Adams · filed 1997-07-23(2)(a)

The modification of a preexisting support order under ORS 107.135(2)(a) requires that there be an unanticipated “substantial change in economic circumstances of a party.”
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Section 107.135 requires a substantial, unanticipated change in circumstances to modify spousal support; an increase in the liquidation value of stock that produces no significant income did not meet that requirement.

In re the Marriage of Gohlman · filed 1997-10-22

We conclude that there has been no substantial change in wife’s financial circumstances as contemplated by the statute. Although the Western States Electric stock has substantially increased in liquidation value, the nature of the share holdings has not changed. Now and at the time of the dissolution the shares did not produce significant income. Neither wife’s accountant nor the company’s treasurer could predict whether in the future wife would receive quarterly distributions greater than her tax burden. We conclude that it would be unreasonable to rely on such possible windfalls as a source of income sufficient to trigger ORS 107.135.
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Section 107.135(3)(a) requires consideration of a new spouse’s potentially available income when evaluating spousal support, absent persuasive evidence that the income is unavailable.

In re the Marriage of Haywood · filed 1993-05-19(3)(a)

In the absence of persuasive evidence that wife’s new husband’s income is not “potentially” available to her, we conclude that it must be considered in evaluating spousal support.
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A new spouse’s increased income may support a child support modification if the resulting benefit to a party is an unanticipated substantial change in circumstances.

In re the Marriage of MacIvor · filed 1993-08-04(3)(a)

ORS 107.135(3)(a) provides that “the court shall consider income opportunities and benefits of the respective parties from all sources * * *” in considering whether a change of circumstances exist. ... Although mother’s husband has no legal obligation to support the children, whether the income opportunities and benefits afforded mother as a result of his increased income constitutes an unanticipated substantial change in circumstances depends on the facts.
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In deciding whether circumstances justify modifying spousal support, the court may consider a party’s earning capacity when the record supports an informed assessment, rather than relying solely on actual earnings.

In re the Marriage of Newton · filed 1993-07-28(3)(a)

As we discussed in Furlong and Furlong, 120 Or App 105, 852 P2d 233 (1993), if there is sufficient information in the record for the trial court to make an informed assessment of a party’s earning capacity, it is permissible for the court to do so. We agree that wife’s earning capacity, rather than her actual earnings, is material.
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Section 107.135(2) ordinarily requires an unanticipated substantial change in circumstances to modify spousal support, but an enforceable settlement may allow modification without that showing.

In re the Marriage of Hearn · filed 1994-05-25(2)

Ordinarily, a party who moves for modification of support must demonstrate that there has been a substantial change of circumstances that was not anticipated when the previous judgment was entered. ... That bargained-for stipulation does not deprive the court of any statutory authority; nor does it contravene any overriding public policy of which we are aware. Accordingly, we find the parties’ agreement enforceable.
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Section 107.135 allows parties to agree to additional grounds for modifying spousal support, but an agreement cannot remove the court’s statutory authority to modify support.

In re the Marriage of Eidlin · filed 1996-05-01(2)(a)

In sum, in the absence of adverse public policy considerations, parties can make it easier to obtain a modification by agreeing to additional grounds therefor, but their stipulations cannot remove the court’s authority to modify a spousal support award on the bases that are articulated in ORS 107.135.
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Section 107.135 permits modification of spousal support based on the parties’ present or ascertainable future circumstances.

In re the Marriage of Seever · filed 1993-10-20

Under ORS 107.135, a trial court has the authority to “set aside, alter or modify” spousal support provisions of a dissolution judgment. However, an order modifying a support obligation must be based on evidence of the parties’ present or ascertainable future circumstances.
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Section 107.135(2)(b) permits modification or termination of spousal support after a substantial change in economic circumstances; remarriage can justify either when the initial award’s purpose has been met.

In re the Marriage of Essig · filed 1994-05-25(2)(b)

ORS 107.135(2)(b) authorizes the modification or termination of spousal support if there has been a substantial change in economic circumstances. Although remarriage will not automatically justify termination of spousal support, it is a circumstance that can justify modification or termination of spousal support, if the purposes of the initial award have been met.
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Spousal support should be terminated when the purpose of the original award has been met.

Marriage of Blake v. Blake · filed 1994-09-14(2)

Spousal support should be ended when the purposes of the initial award have been met.
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Section 107.135(2)(a) treats remarriage like any other economic change; the spouse seeking to modify support bears the burden of proving a substantial change.

In re the Marriage of Ganger & Little · filed 1996-02-28(2)(a)

We continue to believe that our interpretation in Fouts of Ho, as describing the obligee spouse’s burden of rebutting the obligor spouse’s evidence instead of the initial allocation of the ultimate burden of proof, is correct. As we explained in Fouts, nothing in Bates, or in the pertinent statute, ORS 107.135(2)(a), requires that remarriage be treated differently than any other economic change of circumstances.
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Section 107.135(3)(a) requires courts to consider income opportunities and benefits from all sources, including assets that could produce income, when deciding whether changed circumstances justify reconsidering support.

In re the Marriage of Denotta · filed 1997-03-19(3)(a)

We also agree with wife that it is appropriate to give some consideration to husband’s assets in determining his ability to pay his agreed support obligation. Under ORS 107.135(3)(a), in considering whether a change of circumstances is sufficient for reconsideration of spousal or child support provisions, the court shall consider “income opportunities and benefits of the respective parties from all sources[.]”
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Section 107.135(2)(a) requires the court to reconsider child support when a party makes the required showing of changed circumstances, though reconsideration need not result in a reduction.

In Re the Marriage of Glithero · filed 1998-01-08(2)(a)

Under the statutory and regulatory scheme, then, the court’s reconsideration of child support in a modification proceeding may, but need not, result in a reduction of the amount of the obligor’s obligation. But, when faced with an appropriate showing of a change in circumstances, as it was here, the court must engage anew in the process of consideration of the proper amount of child support.
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Section 107.135(2)(a) permits modification or termination of spousal support after a substantial change in economic circumstances; remarriage may qualify but does not automatically end support.

In re the Marriage of Hoag · filed 1998-02-04(2)(a)

ORS 107.135(2)(a) authorizes the modification or termination of a spousal support award when there has been a substantial change in the parties’ economic circumstances. Remarriage may represent such a change, but it does not automatically terminate a support award because remarriage does not always supplant the purposes for the initial award.
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Section 107.135(2) permits modification of spousal support when the supported spouse’s income increases substantially and unexpectedly after the dissolution judgment.

In re the Marriage of Cowden · filed 2001-02-07(2)

The initial issue in a modification hearing is whether there has been a substantial, unanticipated change in circumstances since the date of the dissolution judgment. ORS 107.135(2). ... Husband has established a sufficient change to warrant modification or termination of wife’s spousal support.
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Section 107.135 permits child support modification after a substantial change in circumstances when the change was not caused by a bad faith reduction in earnings primarily intended to avoid support.

In re the Marriage of Cofsky · filed 1998-03-18(3)(b)

In this case, the trial court found that father demonstrated a substantial change in circumstances, and there was no finding that the change was occasioned by bad faith for the primary purpose of avoiding the support obligation. The trial court therefore did not err in modifying child support.
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Section 107.135(3)(b) governs when an obligor who voluntarily reduces income may seek modification of an existing support award; it does not require support to be calculated from actual income rather than earning capacity.

In re the Marriage of Dominguez · filed 1998-06-10(3)(b)

ORS 107.135(3)(b) is not grounds for an obligor to insist that, if the obligor is unemployed or underemployed in good faith, the amount of support must be based on actual income rather than earning capacity.
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Section 107.135 requires a substantial, unanticipated change in a party’s circumstances before a court may modify spousal support.

In re the Marriage of Stutz · filed 1998-09-30

Under ORS 107.135, there must be a substantial, unanticipated change of a party’s circumstances before the court may set aside or modify spousal support.
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Modifying spousal or child support requires proof of a substantial change in a party’s economic circumstances.

In re the Marriage of Labuwi · filed 2000-08-09(2)(a)

The threshold requirement for modifying an award of either spousal or child support is proof of a “substantial change in the economic circumstances of a party[.]” ORS 107.135(2)(a).
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Section 107.135(2)(a) requires a substantial change in circumstances that could not have been anticipated at the time of the judgment to modify child support.

MATTER OF MARRIAGE OF McGINLEY · filed 2001-02-28(2)(a)

"In order to obtain a modification of [a] child * * * support order[ ], [the party requesting modification] must demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances. In addition to being substantial, that change in circumstances must be one that could not have been anticipated at the time of the judgment." ... Based on those facts, we cannot conclude that the award reduction was unanticipated.
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Section 107.135(2)(a) requires an unanticipated substantial change in economic circumstances to modify child support; an anticipated reduction in college financial aid does not qualify.

In re the Marriage of McGinley · filed 2001-02-28(2)(a)

Additionally, we conclude that the decrease in daughter’s financial aid award did not constitute an unanticipated substantial change in economic circumstances. ORS 107.135(2)(a) (1997).
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A substantial change in economic circumstances permits reconsideration of child support, and only the statutory standards govern whether that change occurred.

Matter of Marriage of Nibler · filed 2002-10-02(2)(a)

Under ORS 107.135(2)(a), a substantial change in economic circumstances is sufficient for the court to reconsider its order of support. ... Because proceedings to modify child support awards are statutory in nature, only those standards outlined by the statute may be used to determine if there has been a substantial change in economic circumstances.
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Section 107.135(3)(a) requires courts assessing a change in circumstances to consider the obligor’s income opportunities; an income increase alone can sometimes justify increasing spousal support.

In re the Marriage of Weber · filed 2002-10-09(3)(a)

ORS 107.135(3)(a) (1999) expressly contemplates that, in determining whether a change of circumstances has occurred, courts will consider, among other factors, obligors’ income opportunities, including the reasonable opportunity to acquire future income. It does not provide that, in the absence of other relevant changes, an increase in an obligor’s income never can suffice to justify a support increase.
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Section 107.135(2)(a) permits reconsideration of spousal support after a substantial economic change; an unanticipated loss of ability to work can support modification.

In re the Marriage of Medlyn · filed 2004-02-04(2)(a)

ORS 107.135 controls whether a modification of spousal support is proper. ... Wife has suffered a substantial change in economic circumstances. At the time of dissolution she was able to work, if only in a very limited way. At the time she requested modification, wife was totally disabled and unable to work at all. That change in circumstances was unanticipated.
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A post-dissolution increase in a payor spouse’s income alone ordinarily does not qualify as a substantial change in economic circumstances permitting reconsideration of spousal support.

In Re Marriage of Weber · filed 2004-05-27(3)(a)

Therefore, we conclude that, under ORS 107.135(3)(a), a post-dissolution increase in a payor spouse's income "does not of itself ordinarily" constitute a "substantial change in economic circumstances" requiring a court to reconsider a previous spousal support award.
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Section 107.135(3)(a) permits child support modification when a substantial, unanticipated increase in the parents’ combined income should benefit the child.

In re the Marriage of Nieth · filed 2005-04-27(3)(a)

Since the dissolution, not only has father’s income increased, but so has mother’s. At the time of the original judgment, father’s monthly income was $2,400, and mother’s was $1,400, resulting in a total combined monthly income of $3,800. Approximately four years later, father was earning $2,864 and mother was earning $1,652, a combined monthly income of $4,516. That represents an increase of $716, or 19 percent. That is substantial, and, on the facts in this case, we conclude that the increase should translate into benefit for the minor child. Father’s increase accounts for 64 percent of the total; we therefore also conclude that ordering him to pay child support was fair and equitable.
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Once a substantial, unanticipated change in circumstances is established, Section 107.135(3) permits the court to consider evidence of a party’s employability when deciding how to modify spousal support.

In re the Marriage of Coughlin · filed 1999-04-07(3)

By his motion, husband put in issue his ability to earn income. Under ORS 107.135(3) (1995), the trial court correctly admitted and considered the relevant evidence of husband’s employability in the context of determining the remedy that it would fashion in light of the substantial, unanticipated change of circumstances that arose from termination of the children’s Social Security benefits.
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Section 107.135(3)(a)(A) directs courts to consider each party’s earning potential when deciding whether circumstances have changed enough to modify support.

In re the Marriage of Thomsen · filed 2000-05-10(3)(a)(A)

ORS 107.135(3)(a)(A) (1995) directs us to consider each party’s earning potential in deciding whether a substantial and unanticipated change of circumstances has occurred.
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To terminate spousal support based on a changed income disparity, the moving spouse must prove the parties’ income levels at dissolution.

Matter of Marriage of Bock · filed 2000-12-13(2)(a)

Evidence of the parties’ original income levels is an essential element in proving a change in circumstances based on disparity of income.
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Section 107.135(3)(a) requires courts modifying spousal support to consider both parties’ retirement income, even when the retirement accounts were divided as property in the dissolution judgment.

In re the Marriage of Halsey · filed 2002-03-13(3)(a)

ORS 107.135(3)(a) requires a court to consider, in a proceeding to modify a spousal support award, “income opportunities and benefits of the respective parties from all sources [.]” ... We conclude that it is just and equitable to consider both parties’ retirement benefits in determining a just and equitable amount of spousal support.
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Section 107.135(2)(a) permits termination of spousal support when changed economic circumstances fulfill the purpose of the original award; remarriage alone does not automatically justify termination.

In re the Marriage of Moser · filed 2002-10-16(2)(a)

ORS 107.135(2)(a) authorizes the modification or termination of spousal support when there has been a substantial change in the parties’ economic circumstances. Remarriage alone is not automatically a substantial change. ... The amount of income that wife currently has access to, without spousal support, exceeds that which she had available to her at the time of the dissolution judgment. As a result, the trial court should have terminated husband’s spousal support obligation, because “[t]o continue spousal support would provide wife’s * * * household with significantly more money than the trial judge originally found to represent an equitable distribution of income.”
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Section 107.135 requires a substantial and unanticipated change in circumstances to extend spousal support.

In re the Marriage of Vandenberg · filed 2003-03-06(2)

However, our and the trial court’s authority to extend spousal support is circumscribed by ORS 107.135. ... Without a substantial change in circumstances, we have no authority to extend husband’s obligation.
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Section 107.135(3)(a) requires courts deciding whether circumstances have changed to consider income from all sources, including property awarded in the dissolution.

In re the Marriage of McArdle · filed 2003-03-06(3)(a)

Here, then, the fact that husband ... received the investment accounts as part of the property settlement does not preclude consideration of income from those accounts at the support modification proceeding.
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Section 107.135(1)(a) allows evidence of a spousal support award’s original purpose when deciding whether a substantial change in circumstances justifies modification.

In re the Marriage of Fletcher · filed 2004-07-29(1)(a)

The trial court should have made its ruling under the provisions of ORS 107.135(l)(a), the statute governing husband’s motion, in light of the parties’ marital settlement agreement and supplement. ... Husband does not seek to reargue the validity of the original support award, but rather to demonstrate that the purpose of that original award was no longer being met as a result of a substantial change in circumstances. Thus, the trial court erred when it prohibited husband from offering evidence of the original intent of the parties regarding the agreement for spousal support.
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Section 107.135(3)(a) permits modification of child support when a substantial change in economic circumstances was unanticipated at the time of the original judgment.

In re the Marriage of Nieth · filed 2005-07-13(3)(a)

The evidence in the record permits the inference that the change in incomes was unanticipated, and there is no contradictory evidence. Therefore, we held that the 19 percent increase in the parties’ combined income constitutes a substantial and unanticipated change in economic circumstances.
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Modification of parenting time does not require a showing of a substantial change in circumstances.

Cole v. Wyatt · filed 2005-08-03(1)(a)

We agree with father that the modification of parenting time does not require a showing of a substantial change in circumstances.
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Custody modification under § 107.135 requires a substantial change in a parent's capacity to care for the child before the court considers whether changing custody serves the child's best interests.

Matter of Marriage of Hamilton-Waller · filed 2005-11-09

Under the test, a court must first conclude that there has been a substantial change of circumstances in a party's capacity to parent before it may consider whether a change in custody would be in the best interests of the children.
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A decline in the paying spouse’s earnings does not justify modifying spousal support when it does not amount to a substantial change in circumstances.

In re the Marriage of Miller · filed 2006-08-02(3)(a)

Most significantly, husband admitted that, even with the support obligation, the decline in his income has not affected his standard of living in any way. Accordingly, the decline in husband’s earnings did not constitute a “substantial change” in circumstances justifying modification.
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A spousal maintenance award may be modified for a substantial, unanticipated change in economic circumstances; remarriage may qualify when it supplants the purposes of the original award.

In Re the Marriage of Boni · filed 2006-10-11(3)(a)

An award of spousal maintenance may be modified if there is a substantial, unanticipated change in economic circumstances since the time of the original award. ... Although remarriage itself does not necessarily constitute a substantial change in the economic circumstances of a party, remarriage may represent a substantial change in circumstances requiring termination or modification of support when it supplants the purposes behind the original award.
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Section 107.135(3)(a) permits reconsideration of maintenance support when the moving party shows a substantial, unanticipated change in the parties’ economic circumstances.

In re the Marriage of Sugar · filed 2007-05-02(3)(a)

A court may reconsider its order of maintenance support upon a showing by the moving party that there has been a substantial, unanticipated change in the parties’ economic circumstances.
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A child’s opposition to a proposed medical procedure can support a custody modification hearing if the procedure could affect the custodial parent’s ability to care for the child.

In Re the Marriage of Boldt · filed 2008-01-25(1)(a)

In our view, at age 12, M’s attitude regarding circumcision, though not conclusive of the custody issue presented here, is a fact necessary to the determination of whether mother has asserted a colorable claim of a change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a hearing concerning whether to change custody. That is so because forcing M at age 12 to undergo the circumcision against his will could seriously affect the relationship between M and father, and could have a pronounced effect on father’s capability to properly care for M.
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Section 107.135 permits reconsideration of spousal support after a substantial, unanticipated change in economic circumstances, including changes in necessary expenses or income opportunities.

In the Matter of Marriage of Paresi · filed 2010-03-24

ORS 107.135 provides that a “substantial change in economic circumstances” is a sufficient basis for a trial court “to reconsider its order of support[.]” In determining whether a substantial change in economic circumstances has occurred, the court considers, among other factors, a “change in the cost of reasonable and necessary expenses to either party,” ORS 107.135(3)(a), and the “income opportunities and benefits of the respective parties from all sources,” ORS 107.135(4)(a). ... We conclude that modification was appropriate in 2006 because wife adequately demonstrated that she had experienced a substantial and unanticipated change in economic circumstances between 2002 and 2006.
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Section 107.135 permits reconsideration of spousal support when an unanticipated, substantial drop in income changes a party’s economic circumstances and a future income increase is too speculative to predict.

In Re the Marriage of Luty · filed 2011-09-08(3)(a)

Without that speculative prediction and after considering that husband’s substance abuse disorder caused the unmanageable disparity between his gross monthly income and his spousal support obligation, we conclude that there has been a substantial change in economic circumstances warranting reconsideration of the spousal support award.
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Section 107.135(3)(a) requires an unanticipated substantial change in a party’s economic circumstances to modify spousal support.

In re the Marriage of McKinnon · filed 2013-04-17(3)(a)

A modification of spousal support requires an unanticipated substantial change in the economic circumstances of a party.
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Section 107.135(3)(a) permits an upward modification of spousal support based on the payor’s increased income after an earlier income-based reduction when the modification restores support toward the parties’ stipulated original award.

In re the Marriage of Mitchell · filed 2005-09-28(3)(a)

ORS 107.135(3)(a) authorizes a court to “reconsider its order of support” when there is a “substantial change in economic circumstances of a party [.]” ... To allow husband to obtain a downward modification based on his decrease in income, and not allow wife to obtain an upward modification based on husband’s increase in income, would not only be inequitable, but it would disregard the terms of the original agreement that both parties freely entered into.
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Section 107.135(3)(a) permits modification of child support when a substantial, unanticipated change in economic circumstances occurs; actual income far below the income anticipated when support was set can satisfy that standard.

In the Matter of Marriage of Pierce and Pierce · filed 2006-07-05(3)(a)

Under ORS 107.135(3)(a), a court may modify a child support order when there has been a substantial change in economic circumstances that was not anticipated at the time of the original judgment. ... Husband’s actual income is therefore so far below the original expectations of the parties as to justify a finding of a substantial change in circumstances.
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Section 107.135 requires a substantial and unanticipated change in circumstances to modify spousal support; worsening health that reduces employability can satisfy that requirement.

In re the Marriage of Deboer · filed 2007-05-02

A modification of spousal support must be based on a substantial and unanticipated change in circumstances since the entry of judgment. ... The record before us supports the trial court’s findings that wife has shown a substantial and unanticipated change in circumstances due to a deterioration in health, causing her to be unemployable.
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Section 107.135(4)(a) permits a court to use current earnings to assess reasonable income opportunities when projected employment income is too speculative.

In re the Marriage of Lenhart · filed 2007-06-20(4)(a)

Under those circumstances, the record concerning wife’s employment prospects is too speculative to support a finding of substantial change in her economic circumstances, and we thus consider wife’s actual earnings at the time of the hearing to measure her reasonable income opportunities.
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Section 107.135(4)(a) allows a court modifying spousal support to consider the parties’ earning capacities and potential future income.

In re the Marriage of Harp · filed 2007-08-22(4)(a)

In determining an appropriate spousal support amount, we are not restricted to a consideration of what either party is presently receiving but may consider the parties’ earning capacities and potential future income.
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Section 107.135(3)(c) requires consideration of available retirement funds, including both principal and income, when Social Security is considered in place of spousal support.

In Re the Marriage of Gibson · filed 2007-12-19(3)(c)

Paragraph (3)(c) makes no distinction between the principal and income components of retirement funds.
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Section 107.135(4)(a)(B) requires courts reconsidering spousal support to consider available retirement benefits, but does not require treating potential benefits as current income when doing so would be inequitable.

In the Matter of Marriage of Reaves · filed 2010-07-28(4)(a)(B)

In this case, as in Albrich, ORS 107.135(4)(a)(B) requires that we at least consider the availability of potential retirement benefits from wife’s PERS account. But, also as in Albrich, we find that it would not be just and equitable to treat those potential benefits as current income to wife, in effect, requiring her to take early retirement and suffer a reduction in benefits from the amount that would be available to her were she able to retire later, as she currently plans to do.
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Notes 1–150 of 301, oldest cases first.

126 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Wright v. Wright, the court described a possible future modification; it did not decide a modification request under this section. opinion →
Vanecek v. Vanecek, the court dismissed the appeal because the order quashing service was not appealable; it did not decide whether service satisfied § 107.135. opinion →
Garnett v. Garnett, the discussion of ORS 107.135 appears only in a dissent, not in the court’s decision. opinion →
In re the Dissolution of the Marriage of Hazard, the court describes a possible future modification if the wife acts to avoid the decree; it does not decide a modification under this section. opinion →
In re the Dissolution of the Marriage of Waymire, the court mentions a possible future modification but decides only the present support award; it does not decide a modification under this section. opinion →
In re the Dissolution of the Marriage of Baratta, the court mentions the possibility of a later modification under § 107.135 but decides the amount of support on appeal, not a rule or application of that section. opinion →
In re the Dissolution of the Marriage of Tull, the court notes the possibility of later modification while deciding the original custody award; it does not decide an issue under § 107.135. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Slauson, the discussion of ORS 107.135 is in a special concurrence that expressly disagrees with the majority’s decision on this issue. opinion →
Miller v. Miller, the section appears only in a special concurrence discussing another jurisdiction’s reasoning; the majority did not decide a rule under ORS 107.135. opinion →
In Re the Dissolution of the Marriage of Derby, the court decides the effect of ORS 107.095(2) and ORS 107.105(1)(h) on a pending-suit support arrearage. It cites ORS 107.135(2) as consistent support, rather than deciding that section’s own rules. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Holemar, the court decides whether denying the motion to vacate was an abuse of discretion. It identifies § 107.135 only as the successor to a former statute discussed in another case. opinion →
Matter of Marriage of Meier, the reference to ORS 107.135 appears in a hypothetical statement by the Court of Appeals that this court recounts; it is not this court’s decision about the section. opinion →
Cameron v. Cameron, the discussion of ORS 107.135(1) appears in a dissent, not the court’s decision. opinion →
Matter of Marriage of Bull, the court cites the possibility of modification as background while deciding whether an equitable lien is appropriate; it does not decide a rule of § 107.135. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Praegitzer, the reference to ORS 107.135(3) describes the trial court’s apparent basis for awarding fees, not this court’s own decision about that section. opinion →
Ellis v. Ellis, the court expressly declined to decide whether § 107.135(2) applied and resolved the claim through waiver. opinion →
Matter of Marriage of Cope, the cited ruling is the Court of Appeals’ decision. This court assumed the retroactive-modification issue for the sake of argument and decided the case under ORS 23.765(6). opinion →
Matter of Marriage of Franzke, the court decided the initial support award and mentioned future modification only as a possibility; it did not decide a rule under § 107.135. opinion →
Matter of Marriage of Plaster, the court mentions a possible future modification but decides the terms of the dissolution decree, not a rule or application of § 107.135. opinion →
Matter of Marriage of Mullinax, the court decides whether the decrees are final and appealable; it does not decide a rule of § 107.135. opinion →
In the Matter of Marriage of Tavares, the court decides the limit imposed by ORS 110.022(3), rather than a rule of ORS 107.135. opinion →
Hellesvig v. Hellesvig, the court cites § 107.135(1) to explain the earlier modification proceeding, but decides the preclusive effect of the partition ruling rather than this section’s rules. opinion →
Zirkle v. Zirkle, the statement about ORS 107.135(2) reports the Oregon court’s holding in Cope, not this court’s own decision about the Oregon statute. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Bond, this statement appears in a dissent, not the court's decision. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Nickerson, the court applies an appeal-waiver rule to a motion to modify; it does not decide a rule of ORS 107.135 itself. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Burback, the court cites § 107.135(1)(a) only to compare Oregon law with California law; it decides jurisdiction to modify the California decree, not this section’s rules. opinion →
State ex rel. Renninger v. Renninger, the court decides whether ORCP 71C permits the modification; it does not decide a rule of § 107.135, which it cites alongside the parties’ positions. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Howard, the court decided costs in a dissolution appeal and cited § 107.135(6) only as a comparison; it did not decide that section’s rules in a modification proceeding. opinion →
Spady v. Graves, the discussion of § 107.135 is in a special concurrence that disagrees with the majority’s analysis, so it is not this court’s decision on the section. opinion →
In re the Marriage of McCulloch, the court decides whether the attorney-fee request was sufficiently pleaded under ORCP 68C(2), not a rule of ORS 107.135. opinion →
State ex rel. Hovden v. Hovden, the opinion reports the state's concession about § 107.135(5); the court decides whether ORS 18.360 applies to the state. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Saulsbury, the court cites § 107.135(5) for an agreed premise, but decides whether the credit was permissible under ORS 107.431. opinion →
Mattiza v. Foster, the court lists ORS 107.135(6) only as an example of an attorney-fee exception; it decides no rule under that section. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Schoning, the court rejects an analogy to § 107.135 while deciding whether chapter 188 permits retroactive property division; it does not decide § 107.135’s own rules. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Adams, this sentence reports wife's concession; the court's own analysis addresses modification under ORCP 71C. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Hernandez, the court cites § 107.135 to explain a distinction about support payments, but decides when the ten-year period under ORS 18.360 begins for a property-division judgment. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Grage, this statement appears in a specially concurring opinion, not in the court’s majority decision. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Wylde, the court decides the stipulation procedure under ORS 107.174(1). ORS 107.135 appears only as a cross-reference in the quoted statute. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Thompson, this sentence reports father's argument, which the court did not adopt as a decision about ORS 107.135. The court decided an issue under former ORS 25.285. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Elliott, the court did not decide the ORS 107.135 reduction request; only termination was on appeal. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Bach, the reference to § 107.135 appears only in a concurring and dissenting opinion, not in the court's decision. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Shankle, the court decided the rules for periodic review under former ORS 25.285 and OAR 461-195-072. ORS 107.135(2)(a) was cited only as the basis of mother’s earlier motion. opinion →
McDonald's Corp. v. Wilson, the court cited § 107.135(7) as an example of express attorney-fee language while deciding a question under the Oregon Superfund Statute. It did not decide § 107.135’s rules. opinion →
State Ex Rel. Mikkelsen v. Hill, the court mentions modification as an option while deciding the requirements for criminal contempt; it does not decide a rule under § 107.135. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Harper, the court decides whether it may forecast income when setting support, not a rule governing modification under ORS 107.135. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Henick, the citation describes mother's request for attorney fees, not this court's decision. The court confined its decision to the effect of the Texas judgment on father's support obligation. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Edwards, the court decides the application of ORS 107.136, not any rule of ORS 107.135. opinion →
Franzen v. Borders, the court mentions the Oregon provision to distinguish Oregon cases while deciding a Minnesota support issue; it does not decide the Oregon section’s rules. opinion →
Marriage of Greenfield v. Greenfield, the court cites § 107.135(2) to identify the modification order, but decides the child support issue under other provisions rather than construing this section. opinion →
Boyd v. Boyd, the court decides whether service satisfied ORCP 7; it does not decide a rule of ORS 107.135. opinion →
Hetfeld v. Bostwick, the court cites § 107.135 as an example of an available procedure but decides the elements of an intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim, not the section’s rules. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Adcock, the court decides how to calculate income under the child support rules, not a rule of ORS 107.135. opinion →
In re the Marriage of McLennan, the discussion of ORS 107.135 appears only in a dissent, not in the court’s decision. opinion →
Hollifield v. Hollifield, the court cited § 107.135(3)(b) to distinguish Oregon law while deciding modification under the Texas Family Code; it did not decide the Oregon section’s rules. opinion →
Marriage of Howell-Hooyman v. Hooyman, the court determined from the record that the trial court included the benefits in its calculation; it did not decide a rule of ORS 107.135. opinion →
In Re Marriage of Denton, the discussion of § 107.135 appears only in a dissent, not in the court's decision. opinion →
In re Marriage of Trick, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and did not decide any rule of ORS 107.135. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Mannix, the court decides whether ORS 82.010 permits interest on a judgment that includes accrued interest; it treats ORS 107.135(6) as background for that decision. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Glithero, the supplied opinion is a dissent, so its interpretation of § 107.135 is not this court’s holding. opinion →
Domingo v. Anderson, the only reference to ORS 107.135(7) appears in a footnote citing another court’s decision; this court decides entitlement to fees under a contract. opinion →
State Ex Rel State Office for Services to Children & Families v. Reynolds, the court decides whether ORS 107.137 custody criteria apply to termination of parental rights; it does not decide any rule of ORS 107.135. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Campbell, the citation describes a motion and ruling below; this court decided whether the amended judgment was proper under ORCP 71 C. opinion →
Matter of Marriage of Gayer, the court quotes subsection (6) as background but decides how support payments are applied under the common law; it does not decide a rule of this section. opinion →
State ex rel. Gayer v. Gayer, the court decided how support payments are applied under common law; it did not decide a rule of ORS 107.135. opinion →
In re the Marriage of McGinley, the court cited § 107.135 as background while deciding whether a child support judgment could be stayed under ORS 19.335(1); it did not decide a rule of § 107.135. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Butler, the court describes only a possible future modification; it does not decide a modification issue under ORS 107.135. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Albrich, the court construed the operative section 116, not ORS 107.135, which was inoperative at the time. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Haimovitz, the court decided the trial court’s jurisdiction after an appeal was filed. Section 107.135 appears only in quoted text of ORS 19.275; the court did not decide a rule of section 107.135. opinion →
Redler and Redler, the court mentions § 107.135 only to describe an earlier motion; it decides the rules of other statutes. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Melevin, the opinion applies a custody-modification rule cited to Ortiz, while § 107.135 appears only as the location of a note for a different enactment. opinion →
State Ex Rel Dept. of Human Resources of State of Cal. v. Remirez, the court cites ORS 107.135(6) and cases construing it as an analogy while deciding the rule under ORS 109.100(2). opinion →
In re the Marriage of Deffenbacher, the court expressly declined to decide the challenge to the fee award and did not decide a rule of § 107.135. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Howell, the court cites § 107.135 to identify the modification proceeding, but decides issues under the child support rules rather than this section’s own rules. opinion →
Matter of Marriage of Medill, the discussion of ORS 107.135 appears in the dissent, not the court's majority decision. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Bounds, No. The court mentions a possible future modification if husband’s eyesight declines; it does not decide a modification request under this section. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Shlitter, the court decides whether the original decree may provide an automatic future increase in child support; it mentions ORS 107.135(2) and (3) only to identify the law governing a later request for modification. opinion →
STATE DCS EX REL. ALASKA v. Anderson, the court cites § 107.135(9)(b) as context while deciding whether arrearages remain enforceable under UIFSA; it does not decide a rule of § 107.135. opinion →
State of Oregon DCS ex rel. State of Alaska v. Anderson, the court cites this subsection as context while deciding how UIFSA treats support arrearages; it does not decide a rule under § 107.135. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Austin, the court decides the criteria for an initial award under ORS 107.105(1)(d)(B), not the modification rules of ORS 107.135. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Woods, the court recounts its holding in McInnis; this case decides whether the parties waived a right under ORS 36.425. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Cheever, the court uses ORS 107.135 as context while deciding the reinstatement rule under ORS 107.136; it does not decide a rule of ORS 107.135. opinion →
In the Matter of Marriage of South, the court cites this section as the basis for the modification proceeding, but decides whether the child support calculation was adequately explained, not a rule of this section. opinion →
State v. Cunningham, the court decides how to calculate potential income under OAR 137-050-0360; it does not decide a rule of ORS 107.135. opinion →
In the Matter of Polacek and Polacek, the court identifies ORS 107.135 as the basis for the motion but decides the delegation issue and preservation of an argument under ORS 107.105, without deciding a rule of ORS 107.135. opinion →
In Re the Marriage of Reeves, the court decides whether the agreement is enforceable under ORS 107.104; it mentions ORS 107.135 as a comparison to earlier decisions but does not decide a rule under that section. opinion →
In re the Custody of M. T., the court decides which custody factors apply to unmarried parents under ORS 107.137 and ORS 109.103; it does not decide a rule of ORS 107.135. opinion →
In Re the Marriage of Hook, the court mentions the modification rule to explain why it considers compensatory support first; it decides an initial support award, not a question under § 107.135. opinion →
In the Matter of Hook, the court mentions § 107.135(3)(a) to explain why it considers compensatory support first. It decides the initial support award, not a modification under this section. opinion →
In Re the Marriage of HARRIS, the court cites § 107.135 as context for an initial compensatory spousal support award; it does not decide a rule governing modification under that section. opinion →
In the Matter of Morrison and Morrison, the court decides the initial support award under ORS 107.105 and does not decide a rule under ORS 107.135. It expressly leaves the legal merits of the modification argument unresolved. opinion →
Herring v. Herring, Jr., the Vermont court cites Oregon’s interpretation for comparison; its own decision concerns 15 V.S.A. § 758. opinion →
Young v. State, the court cites the section to distinguish child support cases but expressly declines to decide its rules. opinion →
State v. Keller, the claim about ORS 107.135 was the defendant’s argument, which the court declined to address. opinion →
In Re the Marriage of Kirkpatrick, the court expressly declined to consider the effect of ORS 107.135(11), so it did not decide that subsection’s rules. opinion →
Nice v. Townley, the court decided the custody factors under ORS 107.137; it did not decide any rule of ORS 107.135. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Berry, the citation reflects wife’s request; this court did not decide a rule under ORS 107.135. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Andersen, the court cites the modification rule to explain why compensatory support is more secure, but decides the initial support awards, not a modification under this section. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Gilmore, the court decided how to apply the child support guidelines, not any rule of ORS 107.135 itself. opinion →
In Re the Marriage of Chase, the court cites § 107.135(7) as context for the status of child support installments, but decides the interest rules under ORS 82.010 rather than a rule of § 107.135. opinion →
Hostetler v. Hostetler, the reference to ORS 107.135 describes a prior decision. This court decides the findings issue under ORCP 68, not a rule of ORS 107.135. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Cirina, the court mentions a possible future modification petition but does not decide a question under § 107.135. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Mitchell, this is the trial court’s explanation, reported by the appellate court; the appellate court does not decide a rule under this section. opinion →
Weems v. Winn, the court decided the custody methodology under ORS 107.137; it did not decide any rule of ORS 107.135. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Hoogendam, the reference to ORS 107.135 appears only in the trial court’s judgment; the appellate court did not adopt or decide a rule under that section. opinion →
In re the Marriage of Vaughn, the court decided personal jurisdiction and expressly declined to decide whether the requested relief could modify the dissolution judgment under this section. opinion →
In re the Marriage of DeShaw, the opinion reports the parties’ agreement about modification; the court does not decide a rule of ORS 107.135. opinion →
Callen and Callen, the court cites § 107.135(8) as authority for a discretionary fee award, but decides whether the settlement factor in ORS 20.075(1)(f) was applied correctly. opinion →
Vaughn v. Vaughn, the citation appears in a quoted passage from an earlier opinion, which expressly declined to decide whether adult support could be sought by modifying a dissolution judgment. This court decided personal jurisdiction under other provisions. opinion →
Buchanan and Buchanan, the citation to ORS 107.135(8) describes the trial court’s award; the appellate court does not decide a rule of that section. opinion →
Yocum and Pockett, the court declined to address the unpreserved retroactivity argument and left that decision for the trial court. It did not decide a rule under § 107.135(6). opinion →
Yocum and Pockett, the court leaves retroactivity for the trial court to decide on remand; it does not decide a rule under § 107.135(6). opinion →
In re: Rita Katherine Luetkenhaus, the panel decided whether the fee debt was a domestic support obligation under bankruptcy law; it did not decide a rule of ORS 107.135. opinion →
Dept. of Human Services v. B. L. M., the court decided whether dependency jurisdiction was justified; it cited ORS 107.135 only within a quotation of ORS 107.139(4) and did not decide a rule of ORS 107.135. opinion →
Dept. of Human Services v. B. L. M., the court decides dependency jurisdiction and cites § 107.135 only within a quotation of § 107.139(4); it does not decide a rule of § 107.135. opinion →
Davies and Davies, the court did not decide § 107.135’s change-of-circumstances rule; that determination was unchallenged. It decided whether the record permitted review of the child-support guideline ruling. opinion →
Davies and Davies, the cited change-of-circumstances determination was the trial court’s and was unchallenged on appeal. The appellate court decided the guideline rebuttal issue. opinion →
Rennie and Rennie, the court cites ORS 107.135 only while describing another case; it decides the requirements of ORS 109.119, not this section’s rules. opinion →
Hettwer and Hettwer, the court resolves the appeal on preservation grounds and does not decide any rule of ORS 107.135. opinion →
Hettwer and Hettwer, the court decides preservation, not any rule of ORS 107.135. opinion →
Weaver and Butler, the court decides the custody factors under ORS 107.137; it mentions ORS 107.135 only to identify the modification proceeding. opinion →
Schroeder v. Maitinnara, the court identifies § 107.135(8) as the source of fee authority, but its decision concerns the findings required under ORS 20.075. opinion →
Skaug and Skaug, the court decided whether the order enforced the judgment under ORS 19.270 and ORS 107.434. ORS 107.135(11) appeared only as a cross-reference in quoted statutory text. opinion →
Webb v. Webb, the court identifies ORS 107.135 as the basis for the modification but decides the rules governing support for a child attending school under ORS 107.108 and the child support guidelines. opinion →
Hamilton and Hamilton, the court cites § 107.135(8) for the general standard of review but does not decide a rule of that section. opinion →
Hamilton and Hamilton, the court cites § 107.135(8) for a general standard of review but does not decide any rule of the modification statute. opinion →
State ex rel. Adult & Family Services Division v. McDonald, the court mentions the section only while describing the dissent's irrelevant argument about the father's remedy. opinion →

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