Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.005

Section 656.005(7) defines a claim as a written request for compensation or a compensable injury of which the employer has notice or knowledge; a telephone request to reopen a claim does not satisfy the written-request requirement.

Wetzel v. Goodwin Bros. · filed 1981-01-19(7)

Claimant’s telephone call cannot be said to be "filing a claim for aggravation.” ... It is not disputed that neither claimant nor his attorney filed a written request for a reopening due to aggravation, and there is no evidence that the employer had notice or knowledge of any worsening of the injury.

A worker's attorney's written request for compensation for a back condition is a claim under subsection (7).

Ohlig v. FMC Marine & Rail Equipment Division · filed 1981-09-16(7)

This claimant made a claim by his request for compensation for his back condition. Under ORS 656.005(7) claimant's attorney's letter of October 4, 1977, was a claim.

Section 656.005(7) defines a claim to include an injury of which a subject employer has notice or knowledge; a worker’s report of an injury and request for a claim form can establish that notice.

Hubbard v. Imperial Fabrics · filed 1984-09-12(7)

“Claim” is defined as “a written request for compensation from a subject worker or someone on the worker’s ... behalf, or any compensable injury of which a subject employer has notice or knowledge.” ORS 656.005(7). ... Accordingly, Elastomeric had notice and knowledge of the injury on December 9, 1981.

Section 656.005(6) defines “claim” for interpreting Oregon’s workers’ compensation statutes; that definition does not govern judicial claim or issue preclusion rules absent legislative intent.

Drews v. EBI Companies · filed 1990-07-11(6)

The definition of the term “claim” provided in ORS 656.005(6) governs the construction of ORS chapter 656, unless the context requires otherwise. ... It does not govern claim or issue preclusion rules made by judges, ... unless the legislature manifests its intent that the definition do so. Such an intent is not present here.

Section 656.005(6) defines a claim to include a compensable injury of which the employer has notice or knowledge; the worker need not file with the insurer.

Priest v. City of Hermiston · filed 1991-04-24(6)

The worker’s claim is against his employer, not its insurer. ORS 656.005(6) defines a claim as “a written request for compensation from a subject worker or someone on the worker’s behalf, or any compensable injury of ... which a subject employer has notice or knowledge.”

A physician’s report requesting medical treatment for a specified condition constitutes a claim.

Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Smith · filed 1992-12-16(6)

We agree with the Board that, under those statutes, a physician’s report requesting medical treatment for a specified condition constitutes a claim.

Section 656.005 defines a claim to include a written request for medical services, because medical services are compensation, as well as a compensable injury known to the employer.

Saif Corp. v. Allen · filed 1994-09-29(6), (8)

Applying the Astleford standard, we finding nothing in the context of ORS 656.386(1) that requires that we apply definitions of the terms "claim" and "compensation" that are different than those specified by ORS 656.005(6) and (8). Insurer's argument amounts to a request that we judicially nullify one-half of the definition of "claim" in ORS 656.005(6). We cannot do that. Under those definitions, a claim for medical benefits is a "claim for compensation" under ORS 656.386(1).

An award of permanent partial disability is compensation, not a written request for compensation that constitutes a claim under section 656.005(8).

Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Johnson · filed 1995-05-24(8)

An award of PPD is compensation; it is not a written request for compensation.

Section 656.005(6) defines a claim, as relevant here, as a written request for compensation.

Stephenson v. Meyer · filed 1997-10-01(6)

Under ORS 656.005(6), a “claim” is a “written request for compensation.”

Section 656.005(6) treats a physician’s medical records and billing as a claim when they request compensation on a worker’s behalf.

Reynolds Metals v. Rogers · filed 1998-11-04(6)

Manley’s submission of medical records and his billing constituted a workers’ compensation claim. A claim is any written request for compensation tendered by the injured worker or by someone else on the worker’s behalf. ORS 656.005(6).

Section 656.005(6) treats an allegedly work-related injury as a claim when the employer has notice or knowledge of it, even if the employer disputes its compensability.

Allied Systems Co. v. Nelson · filed 1999-02-24(6)

Similarly, here, we conclude that the second definition of “claim” in ORS 656.005(6) does not make the existence of a claim contingent on the employer’s knowledge of actual compensability.

For claim processing, a claim under § 656.005(6) is the written request for compensation, even though an injury creates the basis for it.

Simmons v. Lane Mass Transit District · filed 2000-12-06(6)

Thus, although an injury creates the basis for a claim, for the purposes of processing, the “claim” is the written request for compensation.

A workers’ compensation claim can arise from a compensable injury of which a subject employer has notice or knowledge, without a request from the worker.

Day v. Advanced M & D Sales, Inc. · filed 2004-03-25(6)

That requirement need not be triggered at the request of the worker, as ORS 656.005(6) defines “claim” as “a written request for compensation from a subject worker or someone on the worker’s behalf, or any compensable injury of which a subject employer has notice or knowledge.”

A claim may encompass an initial injury claim and related claims for benefits, including supplemental disability benefits.

Department of Consumer & Business Services v. Muliro · filed 2016-06-16(6)

Thus, by definition, a compen- sable injury may result in a multi-faceted initial claim, i.e., the first or original work injury claim and, depending on the circumstances, other related claims, or sub-claims, for ben- efits such as the supplemental disability benefits at issue.

Section 656.005(6) allows a compensable injury to give rise to an initial claim and related claims for benefits, including supplemental disability benefits.

DCBS v. Muliro · filed 2016-06-16(6)

Thus, by definition, a compen- sable injury may result in a multi-faceted initial claim, i.e., the first or original work injury claim and, depending on the circumstances, other related claims, or sub-claims, for ben- efits such as the supplemental disability benefits at issue.

Section 656.005(6) defines a claim to include a compensable injury of which the employer has notice or knowledge, even without a request for insurer benefits.

Vasquez v. Double Press Mfg., Inc. · filed 2019-04-04(6)

Thus, a claim for purposes of ORS chapter 656 is not necessarily-or not only-a request for compensation made to a workers' compensation insurer; under the second part of the definition, it also may be a "compensable injury" of which the employer has notice or knowledge.

Section 656.005(6) broadly defines a workers’ compensation claim to include a written request for compensation or a compensable injury known to the employer.

Schoen v. Freightliner LLC · filed 2009-01-29(6)

Oregon’s workers’ compensation statute and rules define what is required to “invoke” a workers’ compensation claim very broadly, and Schoen’s first litigation with Freightliner clearly comes within these definitions.

Former § 656.005(8)(a) treats diagnostic services as medical services when a claimant has an occupational disease, even if no treatment is recommended.

Finch v. Stayton Canning Co. · filed 1988-09-14(8)(a)

Former ORS 656.005(8)(a) makes no distinction between diagnosis and treatment.

Section 656.005(8) allows a non-disabling occupational disease to qualify when it requires only medical services, but there must be an actual disease.

Johnsen v. Electric · filed 1988-03-09(8)

We conclude, in view of the Supreme Court’s opinion indicating that those definitions are pertinent with regard to occupational diseases, that it is possible to have a non-disabling occupational disease, i.e., one that requires medical services only. However, the definitions contained in ORS 656.005(8) still require that there in fact be an injury, or in this case, a disease.

Medical services may be required for work-caused symptoms even when a physician finds no objective evidence of those symptoms.

Collins v. Hygenic Corp. of Oregon · filed 1987-07-22(8)(a)

If claimant suffered the symptoms which he described, and if his exposure to 3 TCE was their major contributing cause, the medical services which Shultz performed were “required,” even though Shultz found no objective evidence of the symptoms.

Section 656.005(8)(a) treats an occupational disease as a compensable injury when it requires medical services or results in disability; disability can arise when the worker develops the underlying allergy.

State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. v. Baer · filed 1982-10-27(8)(a)

As in Bracke, claimant proved that he contacted the allergy and suffered “disability” when he became allergic to the chemical.

Section 656.005(8) makes an injury or disease, including a worsening of it, compensable when it requires medical services or results in disability.

Weller v. Union Carbide Corp. · filed 1979-11-06(8)

The statutes, ORS 656.005(8), 656.802(l)(a) and 656.804, make an injury or disease, or worsening thereof, compensable if it either requires medical services or results in disability. The courts cannot require more.

Section 656.005(7)(a) covers an exposure requiring diagnostic or preventive medical services even when the claimant has no diagnosed disease or symptoms.

K-MART v. Evenson · filed 2000-05-03(7)(a)

The medical services need not be directed toward the cure of any existing, identifiable disease; diagnostic or other medical services will suffice.

An injury is compensable under subsection (7)(a) only if the workplace injury requires medical services; diagnostic services prompted by an unrelated condition do not suffice.

Wagner v. JELD WEN, INC. · filed 2012-04-25(7)(a)

In contrast, here, the record supports the board’s finding that the workplace incident did not require claimant to seek medical services.

Section 656.005(7)(a) permits a compensable injury claim when medical services are needed to diagnose symptoms, even without a confirmed diagnosis.

Horizon Air Industries, Inc. v. Davis-Warren · filed 2014-10-15(7)(a)

Under ORS 656.005(7)(a), a “compensable injury” is “an accidental injury * * * arising out of and in the course of employment requiring medical services or resulting in disability or death [.]” ... That conclusion is consistent with our opinions in both Finch and Collins, which held that a claimant may prove that medical services are necessary by showing that they will help diagnose his or her symptoms.

Section 656.005(8) includes medical services within the definition of compensation, so a claim for medical services is a claim for compensation.

SAIF Corp. v. Bales · filed 2015-11-04(8)

The first element of that definition is met because a claim for medical services is a “claim for compensation.”

Section 656.005(7)(a) does not cover an injury during a commute after an employer’s errand is complete, even when the employee is carrying materials for later work.

Hendrickson v. Lewis · filed 1988-11-23(7)(a)

Here, plaintiff had completed the errand for his employer and was simply on his way home. The fact that he would later have to transport the materials to his place of work or to use the materials at his home did not convert the commuting trip to a business trip for the benefit of his employer.

An employe required to bring a personal car for work use is within the course of employment while going to or from work, including while walking to the car after a shift.

Jenkins v. Tandy Corp. · filed 1987-06-24(8)(a)

If an employe, as part of his job, is required to bring his own car to work for use during his working day, his trip to and from work is, by that fact alone, embraced within the course of employment. ... In this case, employer required claimant to bring his personal car to work and to have it available for use in employer’s business during the work-day and to make deliveries after work. Claimant was enroute to his car after finishing his work in the store for the day. He had only walked a few feet from the front of the store when he was injured. We conclude that the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment.

Section 656.005(8)(a) covers an injury sustained while coming to work by the only practicable route across an area subject to the employer’s control.

Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Malinen · filed 1984-12-19(8)(a)

It makes no difference that claimant had been performing a civic duty or that she was coming to work instead of leaving from it. What is controlling is that she was coming to work by the only practicable route across an area that was subject to her employer’s control.

A trip home does not arise out of employment under the dual-purpose exception when the employer would not have required the work-related trip on its own.

Compensation of the Beneficiaries of Brown v. State Accident Insurance Fund · filed 1979-11-26(8)(a)

Although we find evidence to support claimant’s contention that Brown flew the plane home May 2, 1977, intending to perform repairs on it, we concur with the referee and the Board that the fatal flight did not arise out of Brown’s employment.

Section 656.005(7)(a) can cover an injury on a trip home when an unusual after-hours work trip primarily benefits the employer and adds commuting hazards.

Hickey v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. · filed 1990-12-19(7)(a)

A compensable injury or death is one “arising out of and in the course of employment.” ORS 656.005(7)(a). ... We hold that, because of the added hazard, the deviation from normal working hours, the lack of advance notice and primary benefit to employer, decedent’s trip home was within the special errand rule and his injury was compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Law.

An injury sustained while commuting home after work is not compensable when no exception to the going and coming rule applies.

Krushwitz v. McDonald's Restaurants of Oregon, Inc. · filed 1996-07-11(7)(a)

For the following reasons, we agree with plaintiff that Theu-rer’s death did not occur in the course of his employment and, therefore, that Theurer did not suffer a compensable injury under ORS 656.005(7)(a).

An injury sustained while traveling to a work station falls outside the course of employment under the going and coming rule, even when the worker first reports to the wrong station.

Alltucker v. City of Salem · filed 1999-12-29(7)(a)

We agree with the Board that claimant’s injury did not occur “in the course of’ his employment. The going and coming rule applies. Claimant has not established any exception to the going and coming rule.

A commuting injury may satisfy the course-of-employment requirement when the route into work exposes the employee to a greater hazard than the general public faces.

Beaver v. Mill Resort & Casino · filed 2002-03-27(7)(a)

The “greater hazard” exception is one of several exceptions to the general rule that an injury sustained while going to and coming from work is not compensable. ... As the board correctly observed, the greater hazard exception applies “[i]f the employee’s employment requires [the employee] to use an entrance or exit to or from * * * work which exposes [the employee] to hazards in a greater degree than the common public.”

An injury on a public sidewalk while going to work does not fall within the parking lot exception when the employer’s limited duty to maintain the sidewalk has no connection to the injury.

Compton v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2004-09-15(7)(a)

We conclude that, in the absence of a connection between claimant’s injury and employer’s duty to maintain the public sidewalk in good order, employer’s limited right of control over the condition of the sidewalk was insufficient to bring the sidewalk within the purview of the parking lot exception to the going and coming rule.

Hurrying back from an unpaid break to avoid returning late does not, by itself, make the trip a compensable special errand.

J a K Pizza, Inc. - Domino's v. Gibson · filed 2007-02-28(7)(a)

To the extent that claimant chose the route that he did in order to avoid overextending his lunch break, he cannot claim to have done so for employer’s benefit under the “special errand” rule; such a conclusion would render the “going and coming” rule inapplicable whenever a worker incurred an injury due to his or her hurry to get to work on time.

An injury sustained while coming to or going from work falls within the course of employment under the parking lot exception only if the employer controls the premises where the injury occurs.

Frazer v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. · filed 2016-05-18(7)(a)

Under the parking lot exception, “[a]n injury sustained on premises controlled by the employer while an employee is coming to or going from work occurs within the ‘course of employment.’” ... The board’s findings that employer did not control, or have any right to control, the area where claimant fell and was injured is supported by substantial evidence.

Section 656.005(7)(a)’s course-of-employment requirement is satisfied when an employee is injured in a parking area over which the employer exercises some control.

SAIF v. Lynn · filed 2021-11-24(7)(a)

The conclusion that employer had “some control” over the annex parking area is supported by substantial evi- dence and, therefore, we conclude that the board correctly held that the “in the course of” prong of the unitary work- connection test is satisfied.

An injury during a physical capacity evaluation is compensable when it arises out of and in the course of employment.

Getz v. Wonder Bur · filed 2002-08-28(7)(a)

Because the injury arose out of and in the course of employment, it is compensable, and the board erred in concluding otherwise.

A heart attack is a compensable injury when work exertion materially contributes to it, even if similar exertion outside work might have caused it.

Costello v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. · filed 1977-03-21(8)(a)

As it happened, however, the crucial exertion did occur in the course of claimant’s employment — his injury is therefore compensable.

Section 656.005(8)(a) does not retain the former Act’s requirement that a compensable injury be caused by violent or external means.

Sauer v. Pioneer Adjustment Co. · filed 1980-02-25(8)(a)

Given that the Workman’s Compensation Act in 1931 provided compensation only for "a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment caused by violent or external means” (O.C. 1930, 8 49-1827), Larsen is not apt authority today. See ORS 656.005(8)(a).

Section 656.005(8)(a) treats an injury as accidental when its result is an accident, even if the means were not accidental.

Frasure v. Agripac, Inc. · filed 1980-11-04(8)(a)

A compensable injury is an accidental injury whether or not due to an accident.

Section 656.005(8)(a) requires an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment for compensability.

Matter of Compensation of Grable · filed 1981-07-28(8)(a)

At the time Olson’s claim arose, the statutes were differently numbered and worded than now, but then, as now, one of the requirements of compensability has been that the worker shall have sustained an accidental injury “arising out of and in the course of’ employment.

Section 656.005(8)(a) treats an occupational disease as a compensable injury when it arises out of and in the course of employment and requires medical services or results in disability.

Matter of Compensation of Bracke · filed 1982-06-22(8)(a)

Claimant’s disease is deemed a “compensable injury” because it arises “out of and in the course of employment requiring medical services or resulting in disability,” ORS 656.005(8)(a).

An injury must have a sufficient work relationship to arise out of and occur in the course of employment.

MacKay v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. · filed 1982-12-08(8)(a)

Although these elements are not to be applied as separate tests, an injury that has sufficient work relationship necessarily arises out of and in the course of employment.

Section 656.005(8)(a) covers a resident employee’s injury during meal preparation on the employer’s premises when the activity has a sufficient connection to the work.

Wallace v. Green Thumb, Inc. · filed 1983-11-29(8)(a)

His status as a resident employee continuously on call necessitated that he be on the premises during meal preparation, and because the employer had provided no means by which claimant could prepare hot meals other than cooking in his mobile home, his injuries arising from that activity are compensable.

Section 656.005(8)(a) excludes an injury from compensation when the claimant actively participates in an assault or combat that is unconnected to the job assignment and deviates from customary duties.

Kessen v. Boise Cascade Corp. · filed 1984-12-19(8)(a)

The statutory provision — often referred to as the “aggressor defense” — clearly contemplates a four-part test. In order to be barred from receiving compensation, (1) the claimant must be an active participant, (2) in assaults or combats, (3) which must not be connected to the job assignment and (4) which must amount to a deviation from customary duties.

A compensable injury must arise out of and in the course of employment, with a sufficient relationship between the injury and the work.

Mellis v. McEWEN, HANNA, GISVOLD, RANKIN & VAN KOTEN, EMPLOYERS, AND MISSION INS. CO. · filed 1985-07-17(8)(a)

A compensable injury is an “accidental injury * * * arising out of and in the course of employment.” ORS 656.005(8)(a). The ultimate inquiry under the statute is whether the relationship between the injury and the employment is sufficient that the injury should be compensable.

A workplace injury that requires medical treatment is compensable even when the claimant’s account of the extent of disability is not credible.

Mashadda v. Western Employers Insurance · filed 1985-08-21(8)(a)

Claimant’s lack of credibility as to the extent of his disability goes to the compensation to be awarded. We are satisfied that the accident resulted at least in the need for medical treatment, and the amount of compensation can be determined on remand.

Section 656.005(8)(c) requires proof of actual physical or mental harm; asbestos exposure alone is not a compensable injury.

Brown v. SAIF Corp. · filed 1986-04-30(8)(c)

We hold that claimant’s exposure to asbestos was not by itself an “injury.” Although the legislature enacted ORS 656.005(8)(c) to provide compensation for non-disabling injuries, we do not believe that it intended to provide compensation if the claimant does not prove that he has suffered actual physical or mental harm.

Section 656.005(8)(a) requires a sufficient relationship between the injury and employment for the injury to be compensable.

Preston v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. · filed 1987-11-18(8)(a)

The sole question is whether claimant’s injury “aros[e] out of and in the course of employmént.” ORS 656.005(8)(a). The ultimate inquiry under that statute is whether “the relationship between the injury and the employment [is] sufficient that the injury should be compensable * * *.”

Section 656.005(7)(a) requires a sufficient connection between work and an injury for the injury to be compensable; an injury on a public sidewalk outside the employer's control, with no employer-created hazard, lacks that connection.

Cope v. West American Insurance · filed 1990-01-25(7)(a)

A compensable injury is "an accidental injury * * * arising out of and in the course of employment." ORS 656.005(7)(a). ... When an employee is injured on a public sidewalk over which the employer has no control, and on which there are no employer-created hazards, the connection between the injury and the employment is insufficient to make the injury compensable.

Section 656.005(7)(a) excludes a death resulting from personal activities unrelated to the worker’s employment.

Burge v. SAIF Corp. · filed 1991-07-03(7)(a)

Even if decedent was a traveling employee, see SAIF v. Reel, supra, 303 Or at 216, his death is not compensable, because it occurred during personal activities that had nothing to do with the job or the requirement that he live near the job site and that, therefore, constituted a “departure” from his employment.

A preexisting condition is not a compensable injury when the work incident did not independently contribute to the condition or cause the need for medical services.

Taylor v. Multnomah County School District No. 1 · filed 1991-11-13(7)(a)

Dr. Silver, the neurosurgeon who operated on claimant’s disc, concluded that the mat incident did not independently contribute to the herniation. There is substantial evidence to support the Board’s finding that claimant’s preexisting condition, rather than the February 9 incident, caused him to need medical services.

A compensable injury must arise out of and in the course of employment; work can contribute to an injury even when the worker is ill.

Benefiel v. Waremart, Inc. · filed 1992-04-22(7)(a)

A compensable injury is “an accidental injury * * * arising out of and in the course of employment.” ORS 656.005(7)(a). ... The fact that she fell at work was not merely fortuitous. There is no evidence to support the Board’s finding that claimant’s work did not contribute to her injury.

Disabling symptoms of a pre-existing disease are compensable when an occupational injury causes them, even if the disease itself has not worsened.

Scarratt v. H. A. Anderson Construction Co. · filed 1991-08-28(7)(a)

However, disabling symptoms of an underlying disease are compensable if they are caused by an occupational injury, even if the underlying disease has not worsened.

Section 656.005(7)(a) requires objective medical findings to prove a compensable injury, but the injury need not occur instantaneously.

LP Co. v. Disdero Structural · filed 1993-02-03(7)(a)

Under ORS 656.005(7)(a), proof of the injury must now be by objective medical findings. However, we do not agree with LP’s argument as to the effect of the new language. There is nothing in ORS 656.308(1) or in ORS 656.005(7), as amended, that requires a change in the principle established by case law that an injury need not be instantaneous.

Section 656.005(7)(a) requires medical evidence of an injury, but expert medical testimony is not always required to prove that work caused it.

Barnett v. Saif Corp. · filed 1993-08-04(7)(a)

The fact of an injury must be established by medical evidence. ORS 656.005(7)(a). ... On these facts, the Board erred in holding that claimant was required to introduce expert medical testimony to prove causation.

Section 656.005(7)(a) governs initial determinations of whether an injury or condition is compensable; it does not govern continued medical treatment of an accepted condition.

Beck v. James River Corp. · filed 1993-11-17(7)(a)

ORS 656.005(7)(a), which defines a compensable injury, applies to initial determinations of compensability of a condition, ... It does not apply to a claim for continued medical treatment of a compensable condition under ORS 656.245(1).

Section 656.005(7) covers an episode of colitis as an accidental injury even when job stress caused it.

DiBrito v. SAIF Corp. · filed 1994-06-23(7)

The Board erred, however, in not analyzing separately, under ORS 656.005(7), claimant’s episode of colitis, alleged to have been caused by the stress of the May 14, 1991, meeting at work. Claimant is entitled to the Board’s review of that portion of her claim under the standards that apply to injuries.

Section 656.005(7)(a) treats a heart attack as an accidental injury whether caused by physical exertion, job stress, or both.

Mathel v. Josephine County · filed 1994-06-23(7)(a)

We hold that a heart attack, whether it is caused by physical exertion, by job stress, or by both, is an accidental injury within the meaning of ORS 656.005(7).

Section 656.005(7)(a) defines a compensable injury through a work connection that considers both whether the injury arose out of employment and whether it occurred in the course of employment.

Krushwitz v. McDonald's Restaurants of Oregon, Inc. · filed 1994-08-24(7)(a)

The same alleged negligence by the employer that caused the injury also made the drive hazardous, took it outside the going and coming rule and brought it within the time, place and circumstances of Theurer’s employment. Therefore, plaintiffs allegations themselves disclose that there is sufficient connection here to show, under both the “arising out of’ and the “in the course of’ parts of the test, that the injury was compensable within the meaning of ORS 656.018.

Section 656.005(7)(a) includes the major contributing cause limits in subparagraphs (A) and (B) when defining a compensable injury.

Errand v. Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, Inc. · filed 1995-02-02(7)(a)

The entire text of the statute is the legislature's definition of "compensable injury." The definition includes the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B). That is, unless the major contributing cause standard is satisfied, consequential conditions (subparagraph (A)) and resultant conditions (subparagraph (B)) are not "compensable injuries."

Work-related stress arising from an enhanced risk in the job environment can be a compensable injury under § 656.005(7)(a).

Blackthorne v. Posner · filed 1995-03-28(7)(a)

In this case, Defendant correctly asserts that Plaintiff’s alleged injury arose out of his employment with Computerland, and resulted from an enhanced risk created by the job environment. Plaintiff essentially seeks tort damages for work-related stress which is an injury commonly covered under Workers’ Compensation.

Section 656.005(7)(a) requires consideration of both whether an injury occurred in the course of employment and whether it arose out of employment; the Mellis factors are not an independent, dispositive test of work connection.

First Interstate Bank v. Clark · filed 1995-04-19(7)(a)

The analytical framework set out in Norpac Foods does not significantly change the nature of our inquiry under ORS 656.005(7)(a); it essentially incorporates the tests for work-connection that have been established through case law. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the factors identified in Mellis should no longer be used as an independent and dispositive test of work-connection.

Section 656.005(7)(a) does not make an injury automatically noncompensable because the worker violated an employer’s rule; compensability depends on the injury’s connection to the work.

Andrews v. Tektronix, Inc. · filed 1996-05-09(7)(a)

The essential legislative statement regarding entitlement to workers’ compensation is found at ORS 656.005(7)(a). ... We conclude, then, that, regardless of the type of rule involved, an employee’s violation of an employment rule does not render his or her claim per se noncompensable.

Section 656.005(7)(a) does not require a final determination that an injury is work-related before the injury qualifies as compensable.

Armstrong v. Rogue Federal Credit Union · filed 1998-12-17(7)(a)

Nothing in the statutory definition of “compensable injury” in ORS 656.005(7)(a) indicates that the definition refers only to an injury that the Board and the courts, after exhaustion of all legal proceedings, have determined to be work-related.

Section 656.005(7)(a) covers a work accident that injures a worker’s person and requires medical services, including an accident causing chest pain and disfigurement.

SAIF Corp. v. Smith · filed 2001-10-31(7)(a)

Applying that standard here, we find no need to decide whether claimant also suffered an injury to a prosthetic appliance under ORS 656.005(7)(a), because substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that claimant suffered an injury to her person. As noted above, claimant received a forceful blow to her chest in the course of her work, experienced immediate pain in her chest, and suffered a notable disfigurement to her body as a result of the blow. The workplace accident resulted in “injury” to claimant under any definition of that term.

An otherwise compensable injury is a work-related injury that would meet the material contributing cause standard if it did not combine with a preexisting condition.

Coleman v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2005-12-28(7)(a)(B)

The term “otherwise compensable injury” is also used in ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B). It refers to a work-related injury that would be compensable under the material contributing cause standard of proof if not for the fact that it combines with a preexisting condition.

An injury from a permitted personal activity is not compensable when the activity lacks a reasonable relationship to employment.

Griffin v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2007-01-24(7)(a)

Accordingly, the board correctly concluded that claimant’s injury did not occur in the course of employment and that the injury was not compensable.

Section 656.005(7)(a) requires some support that an injury both arose out of and occurred in the course of employment, but neither requirement alone is dispositive.

SAIF Corp. v. Uptegrove · filed 2009-02-18(7)(a)

The requirement that the injury occur in the course of employment concerns the time, place, and circumstances of the injury. The requirement that it arise out of employment requires a causal link between the injury and the employment. Those requirements are two prongs of a single work-connection inquiry. In order for the injury to be compensable, there must be some support for each prong, but neither prong is dispositive.

Section 656.005(7)(a) requires work to materially contribute to an injury for the injury to be compensable; the causation standard for medical services claims does not change that requirement.

Knaggs v. Allegheny Technologies · filed 2008-10-15(7)(a)

In this case, the operative statute is ORS 656.005(7)(a), which defines a “compensable injury” as “an accidental injury * * * arising out of and in the course of employment requiring medical services or resulting in disability or death.” ... Since at least the 1930s, the Oregon Supreme Court has construed the “arising out of’ component of that definition to require proof that work “materially contribute[d]” to the injury. ... In the absence of any such amendments, we must assume that the standard remains as it has over the years.

Section 656.005(7)(a) does not treat damages from an employer’s alleged fraud as a compensable injury when they cannot be treated by medical services or result in disability or death.

Merten v. Portland General Electric Co. · filed 2010-03-24(7)(a)

Moreover, plaintiffs fraud claim is not the sort that can be compensated by the Workers’ Compensation Act. It cannot be treated by “medical services or result[ ] in disability or death,” as required by ORS 656.005(7)(a).

Section 656.005(7)(a) defines a compensable injury to include an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment that requires medical services.

Petock v. Asante · filed 2010-09-01(7)(a)

Viewing plaintiffs averments and Versteeg’s testimony in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a factfinder reasonably could conclude that plaintiff suffered a compensable workplace injury — that is, an “accidental injury * * * arising out of and in the course of employment requiring medical services,” ORS 656.005(7)(a) — when she tore her meniscus in 2005.

An injury that is not excluded under subsection (7)(b) must still arise out of and occur in the course of employment under subsection (7)(a).

Schutz v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2012-11-15(7)(a)

The inquiries under the two paragraphs are separate: If an injury was not incurred under circumstances that render it noncompensable under ORS 656.005(7)(b), “it must still pass the ‘arise out of and in the course of employment’ test” under paragraph (7)(a).

Section 656.005(7)(a) defines a compensable work injury; measuring impairment from an accepted injury does not decide that injury’s compensability again.

Jeld Wen, Inc. v. Cooper · filed 2015-04-01(7)(a)

As pertinent here, the term “compensability” relates to the compensability of a work-related injury. More precisely, as defined in ORS 656.005(7)(a), a “compensable injury” is “an accidental injury *** arising out of and in the course of employment requiring medical services or resulting in disability or death; an injury is accidental if the result is an accident * * * if it is established by medical evidence supported by objective findings,” subject to certain ... limitations not relevant here. ... In other words, the medical arbiter permissibly determined whether claimant was impaired as a result of that 2008 injury, as contemplated by statute.

Section 656.005(7)(a) defines “compensable injury” as the accepted injury, and that meaning applies in ORS 656.245.

Saif Corp. v. Carlos-Macias (In re Comp. of Carlos-Macias) · filed 2018-03-21(7)(a)

We have reviewed the statutes cited as context by claimant and reject claimant's contention that they require that the term "compensable injury" be given a different meaning in ORS 656.245 from its meaning in ORS 656.005(7)(a).

Section 656.005(7)(a) defines a compensable workplace injury and supplies the material contributing cause standard for determining whether an injury caused a new or omitted condition’s disability or need for treatment.

SAIF v. Williams · filed 2020-05-13(7)(a)

A workplace injury is compensable in a workers’ compensation action so long as it is “an accidental injury, * * * arising out of and in the course of employment requiring medical services or resulting in disability or death.” ORS 656.005(7)(a). ... Thus, to prove the existence and compensability of a new or omitted medical condition, the claimant must prove that his or her injury was the “material contributing cause” of the disability or need for treatment of the new or omitted condition.

Section 656.005(7)(a) requires both the “arising out of” and “in the course of” employment requirements to be satisfied to some degree, even when an injury occurs during a personal-comfort activity.

Watt v. SAIF · filed 2022-01-20(7)(a)

Although the facts of the two prongs of the unitary work-connection test might be present in different degrees, both prongs must be satisfied to some degree.

An injury can arise out of and occur in the course of employment when a worker interrupts a personal trip to perform a work errand, even before changing routes.

SAIF v. Sumner · filed 2021-07-21(7)(a)

We agree with the board’s conclusion that claimant was in the course of her employment. ... We also conclude that substantial evidence sup- ports the board’s determination that claimant’s injury arose out of claimant’s employment.

A worker's attorney is not a party entitled to appeal a Workers' Compensation Board order merely because the attorney represented the worker.

Adams v. Transamerica Insurance Group · filed 1980-04-14(22)

Because plaintiff was not a party, ORS 656.005(22), he could not have appealed the Board order.

An insurer named as a party remains a “party” under § 656.005(19) even when the Board absolves it of responsibility for benefits.

Zurich Insurance v. Diversified Risk Management · filed 1985-09-17(19)

The statute is clear that both Zurich and Diversified are “parties” because they were insurers of the employe and named as parties by claimant.

Section 656.005(20)’s definition of “party” includes an employer whose claim was heard in a consolidated proceeding, even when the request for Board review addresses only another claim.

Mosley v. Sacred Heart Hospital · filed 1992-05-27(20)

A party requesting Board review cannot limit the scope of that review by seeking review of only selected cases out of a group consolidated in the same proceeding before the referee, because an appeal is for Board review of a referee’s order, not just particular claims. OML was aparty to the referee’s order, so it was a party on review. The plain language of the statute requires that OML be served.

Section 656.005(19) treats a noncomplying employer as a party to a workers’ compensation proceeding.

Trojan Concrete v. Tallant · filed 1991-05-29(19)

Under ORS 656.005(19), employer was a party to the workers’ compensation proceeding and had a right, under ORS 656.283(1), to request a hearing to contest compensability.

Section 656.005(20) includes the injured worker’s employer at the time of injury in the definition of “party,” including a noncomplying employer.

Astleford v. Saif Corp. · filed 1993-08-25(20)

Employer argues that “the parties” include a noncomplying employer. We agree. ORS 656.005(20) defines “party” to include “the employer of the injured worker at the time of injury[.]”

Section 656.005(20)’s definition of “party” yields when the context requires it; DIF is a party entitled to notice when the Board reviews its noncompliance order.

Kelsey v. NCE · filed 1994-05-18(20)

Its definition of “party” does not apply “where the context otherwise requires.” ORS 656.003. We conclude that, when the Board’s adjudication is to include review of an order of DIF regarding noncompliance, context requires otherwise, and DIF must be treated as a party entitled to be served with notice under ORS 656.295(2).

Section 656.005(20) defines “party” to include a noncomplying employer for purposes of a disputed claim settlement under ORS 656.289(4).

Astleford v. SAIF Corp. · filed 1994-06-23(20)

We conclude, therefore, that the statutory definition of “party” in ORS 656.005(20) applies to ORS 656.289(4). Under ORS 656.289(4), a noncomplying employer is a “party” who “may * * * by agreement make such disposition of the claim as is considered reasonable.”

Section 656.005(21) defines a workers’ compensation party as the claimant, the injured worker’s employer at the time of injury, and that employer’s insurer; the definition does not include a party’s attorney.

Haskell Corp. v. Filippi · filed 1998-01-07(21)

ORS 656.005(21) defines "party" as "a claimant for compensation, the employer of the injured worker at the time of injury and the insurer, if any, of such employer." ... Nothing in ORS 656.295(7) or (8) expands the definition of "party" or requires service on or mailing to a party's attorney before the 30-day period is triggered.

Section 656.005(21) defines “party” to include the claimant, employer, and insurer, but not the claimant’s attorney.

Steiner v. E.J. Bartells Co. · filed 2000-11-08(21)

As previously discussed, an attorney is not a party to a proceeding before the Board. ORS 656.005(21); OAR 438-005-0040(11).

A deceased worker’s beneficiary does not become a party to the worker’s compensation claim solely because the worker died.

In Re Compensation of Wild · filed 2010-09-29(21)

We disagree with the board for the further reason that it has not identified a source of law or principle that supports its conclusion that Wild’s daughter automatically became a party to Wild’s workers’ compensation claim when Wild died. Generally, people become parties to claims or cases by taking some action, for example, by filing a claim, pleading, motion, or other document. The daughter could have become a party to Wild’s claim and perhaps, as a consequence, a claimant, by doing or submitting something regarding the claim, but we are not persuaded that she became a party simply because, and when, her father died.

A deceased worker’s statutory beneficiary does not automatically become a party to the worker’s compensation claim when the worker dies.

SAIF v. Wild · filed 2010-09-29(21)

The daughter could have become a party to Wild's claim and perhaps, as a consequence, a claimant, by doing or submitting something regarding the claim, but we are not persuaded that she became a party simply because, and when, her father died.

A worker’s share of a cooperative’s profits is remuneration for labor even when the amount varies with the cooperative’s profits.

Associated Reforestation Contractors, Inc. v. State Workers' Compensation Board · filed 1982-09-15(28)

The legislature chose the broad word “remuneration” to define a subject employer; we see no reason that the recompense that a worker receives for his labor should not be considered remuneration just because the amount varies with the profits of the organization.

Section 656.005(31) does not treat the possibility of future employment as remuneration for worker status.

Dykes v. State Accident Insurance Fund · filed 1980-07-21(31)

Claimant argues that the possibility of future employment constitutes "remuneration.” This argument is untenable.

Section 656.005(31) requires remuneration for services to qualify as a worker; voluntary help and repayment of past loans do not satisfy that requirement.

Konell v. Konell · filed 1980-10-06(31)

We agree the testimony establishes Emanuel Konell was not a worker as defined in ORS 656.005(31). He testified he helped his son when and as little or as much as he wanted. No salary was involved. Though the testimony did establish money was given by employer to Konell, these sums were repayments for past loans by Konell to his son and not in the nature of any remuneration for work performed.

Section 656.005(31) excludes a hauler operating a separate business from the definition of a worker when the circumstances do not establish an employment relationship.

Lockard v. Murphy Co. · filed 1980-11-10(31)

Applying these factors to the case before us, we conclude that the plaintiff is not an employe for purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Law. It is clear that the plaintiff operated a business separate from the defendant.

Section 656.005 defines a paid truck driver subject to the hiring business’s direction and control as a worker, and the hiring business as an employer, regardless of whether the driver was acting in the course of employment when injured.

Blain v. Owen · filed 1991-03-06(13), (27)

Therefore, claimant was a “worker” as defined in ORS 656.005(27), and employer was an “employer,” as defined in ORS 656.005(13), regardless of whether claimant was acting in the course of his employment when he was injured.

Former subsection (27) includes volunteers as workers when conditional per diem payments create a contract for hire and the organization controls the details of their work.

Oregon County Fair v. Filings of the National Council on Compensation Insurance · filed 1994-07-06(27)

In such circumstances, where “the expectation of pay is uncertain in the sense of being conditional on the prosperity of the enterprise[,]” there was a contract for hire between the Fair and the core group volunteers. ... In these circumstances, the Fair’s substantial supervision of the details of the volunteers’ work was sufficient, by itself, to satisfy the “right to control” inquiry. ... Thus, DIF correctly concluded that the Fair had direction and control of the core group workers. ... Having affirmed DIF’s conclusion that core group members were “workers” for purposes of former ORS 656.005(27), we next consider whether they qualify for exemption under ORS 656.027(10).

Section 656.005(28) includes minors in the definition of worker regardless of their age or whether their employment is lawful, if the definition’s other requirements are met.

Clevidence v. Portland School Dist. No. 1 · filed 1994-01-05(28)

If the other requirements of ORS 656.005(28) are satisfied, Randy is a worker for purposes of workers’ compensation, despite his age or the legality of his employment relationship.

Food, lodging, and cash provided for accepted services can satisfy the remuneration element of the worker definition.

Department of Consumer & Business Services v. Clements · filed 2010-12-29(30)

Scott accepted those services by allowing him to drive, and Scott provided remuneration to claimant in the form of food, lodging, cash for cigarettes, and $100 in cash. That is sufficient to satisfy the statutory element of engaging to furnish services for remuneration.

Under the 2019 definition, a person is not a worker of an entity that did not remunerate the person for services.

Mendoza v. Ron Dickson Corp. · filed 2023-08-30(30)

Unlike the dissenting opinion, we conclude that there is evidence in the record that supports the director’s factual finding that RDC did not remunerate claimant. Accordingly, claimant was not a “worker” of RDC as that term was defined by ORS 656.005(30) (2019).

Section 656.005(8) does not require mental injury to be disabling to an average worker; the inquiry is whether the claimant sustained the injury.

James v. State Accident Insurance Fund · filed 1981-01-20(8)

In injuries or diseases other than mental illness, the inquiry is not would an average worker have incurred the injury or disease? The question is did the claimant worker sustain the injury or disease? Workers’ compensation is covered by statute and there is nothing in the Oregon Workers’ Compensation Law that would distinguish between the test for mental illness and other kinds of injury or disease.

Section 656.005(21) defines “medically stationary” to mean that no further material improvement would reasonably be expected from medical treatment or the passage of time.

Matter of Compensation of Brown · filed 1981-05-11(21)

Dr. Campagna’s February 2, 1979, letter to the employer indicating that the claimant was being hospitalized for orthopedic consultation, together with Dr. Campagna’s supplemental report to the employer dated March 14, 1979, enclosing a copy of the hospital discharge summary, ... satisfies us that the claimant was not "medically stationary” ... at the time his claim was closed.

Section 656.005(21) defines “medically stationary” as a condition for which no further material improvement is reasonably expected from treatment or the passage of time.

Harmon v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. · filed 1981-10-05(21)

"Medically stationary” is defined in ORS 656.005(21) to mean "no further material improvement would reasonably be expected from medical treatment, or the passage of time.” ... The repeated conclusions of claimant’s examiners were that his medical condition is chronic and stationary.

A condition is medically stationary when no further material improvement would reasonably be expected from medical treatment or the passage of time.

Berliner v. Weyerhaeuser Co. · filed 1981-11-09(21)

"Medically stationary” is defined in ORS 656.005(21) as happening when "no further material improvement would reasonably be expected from medical treatment, or the passage of time.” Claimant had the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the medical evidence, that his condition was not medically stationary at the time his claim was closed. Austin v. SAIF, 48 Or App 7, 12, 615 P2d 1188 (1980). Here he has done so.

Section 656.005(17) defines a medically stationary condition as one for which no further material improvement is reasonably expected from treatment or time.

Paine v. Widing Transportation · filed 1982-09-15(17)

The evidence indicates that his condition was medically stationary both at the time of and subsequent to the issuance of the determination order.

A worker who is not medically stationary is not necessarily unable to work.

Edwards v. Employment Division · filed 1983-06-15(17)

The fact that claimant may not be “medically stationary,” as that term is defined, ... does not necessarily mean that she is unable to work.

Under § 656.005(17), a condition can fluctuate and still be medically stationary if no further material improvement is reasonably expected.

Maarefi v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. · filed 1984-08-29(17)

Neither meaning is consistent with the statute. The statutory definition is that “no further material improvement would reasonably be expected from medical treatment or the passage of time.” ORS 656.005(17). One whose medical condition fluctuates may still be medically stationary in this sense.

Section 656.005(17) defines a claimant as medically stationary when further material improvement is not reasonably expected from treatment or the passage of time.

Aldrich v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. · filed 1984-11-28(17)

The test for determining whether a claimant is medically stationary is whether “further material improvement would reasonably be expected from medical treatment, or the passage of time.” ORS 656.005(17); Harmon v. SAIF, 54 Or App 121, 634 P2d 274, rev den 292 Or 232 (1981). ... Claimant was not medically stationary on April 21,1981, and the determination order is therefore invalid.

Section 656.005(17) defines “medically stationary” by whether further material improvement could reasonably be expected from treatment or time, based on the evidence available at claim closure.

Alvarez v. GAB Business Services, Inc. · filed 1985-03-06(17)

To support a conclusion that a claimant is “medically stationary,” ORS 656.005(17) requires only that “no further material improvement would reasonably be expected from medical treatment, or the passage of time.” The reasonableness of medical expectations at the time of claim closure must be judged by the evidence available at the time, not by the subsequent development of the case.

A later change in a claimant’s condition does not establish that the claimant was not medically stationary when the claim was closed if the closure relied on informed medical opinion.

Sullivan v. Argonaut Insurance · filed 1985-05-22(17)

A subsequent change in a claimant’s condition may not be used to second-guess informed medical opinion relied on at the time a claim was closed.

Section 656.005(17) defines a condition as medically stationary when no further material improvement is reasonably expected, judged from the evidence available when the claim is closed.

Martin v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. · filed 1986-01-29(17)

To support a conclusion that a claimant is ‘medically stationary,’ ORS 656.005(17) requires only that ‘no further material improvement would reasonably be expected from medical treatment, or the passage of time.’ The reasonableness of medical expectations at the time of claim closure must be judged by the evidence available at the time, not by the subsequent development of the case.

A claimant is not medically stationary when treatment is expected to materially improve a work-related mental condition, even if the physical condition is stationary.

Bracke v. Baza'r, Inc. · filed 1986-02-26(17)

A claimant is “medically stationary” when “no further material improvement would reasonably be expected from medical treatment, or the passage of time.” ORS 656.005(17). A mental condition may require continuance of TTD even after a claimant has become medically stationary physically. ... Thus, claimant was not medically stationary on September 13,1978, and the Board erred in finding that she was.

A claimant is medically stationary when no further material improvement is reasonably expected from treatment or time; hope that treatment may help does not establish an expectation of material improvement.

Emery v. Adjustco · filed 1986-10-29(17)

Before a claim may be closed, the claimant must be “medically stationary,” ORS 656.268, which “means that no further material improvement would reasonably be expected from medical treatment, or the passage of time.” ORS 656.005(17). ... Thus, his report does not indicate that he “expected” “material improvement” but merely that he was hopeful of improvement. ORS 656.005(17).

A condition is not medically stationary when proposed treatment offers a reasonable prospect of further medical improvement.

Schuening v. J.R. Simplot & Co. · filed 1987-04-08(17)

ORS 656.005(17) provides that “medically stationary” means that “no further material improvement would reasonably be expected from medical treatment, or the passage of time.” ... Graham was the first doctor to suggest that claimant might benefit from surgery. That treatment was not palliative, but was suggested for the purpose of improving claimant’s ankle problem. Although, as the referee stated, there is no evidence that Weeks had “misdiagnosed” claimant’s condition, Graham offered treatment that had not been proposed before and did so with a reasonable hope of further medical improvement. We conclude that claimant’s condition was not medically stationary on the date of closure.

Section 656.005(17) defines a worker as medically stationary when no further material improvement is reasonably expected from treatment or time.

Rodgers v. Weyerhaeuser Co. · filed 1987-11-25(17)

In order to show that he was no longer medically stationary after August 20, 1983, claimant had to prove that a material improvement in his condition could be expected from medical treatment or the passage of time.

A condition is not medically stationary when further treatment is reasonably expected to improve it.

Nordstrom, Inc. v. Gaul · filed 1991-07-24(17)

Worthington’s diagnosis after the determination order was issued confirmed that, at the time that it was issued, there was a reasonable medical expectation that further treatment would improve claimant’s condition and that, therefore, his medical condition was not stationary.

Section 656.005(17) excludes treatment prescribed solely to improve functional abilities from the medically stationary determination.

Clarke v. SAIF Corp. · filed 1993-05-12(17)

Consequently, medical treatment prescribed solely to improve a claimant’s functional abilities is not pertinent to ... the determination of a claimant’s medically stationary date under ORS 656.005(17).

Section 656.005(17) defines a medically stationary condition as one for which no further material improvement is reasonably expected; a finding that a worker is medically stationary can support an inference that documented impairment is permanent.

Martin v. Hewlett-Packard Co. · filed 1997-06-18(17)

When a person’s condition is medically stationary, “no further material improvement would reasonably be expected from medical treatment, or the passage of time.” ORS 656.005(17). In view of the simultaneous finding in Warren’s report that claimant is medically stationary, at least one reasonable finding is that the impairment described in the report is not reasonably expected to improve from medical treatment or the passage of time. That is evidence of permanent impairment.

Section 656.005(17) defines a worker as medically stationary when no further material improvement is reasonably expected from treatment or the passage of time.

Daquilante-Richards v. CIGNA Ins. Cos. · filed 1997-09-10(17)

An injured worker is medically stationary when “no further material improvement would reasonably be expected from medical treatment, or the passage of time.” ORS 656.005(17). ... Because substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that claimant failed to establish that the accepted conditions were not medically stationary at the time of closure, the Board did not err in sustaining the notice of closure.

Section 656.005(17) defines when a condition is medically stationary, but does not identify which conditions must be stationary at claim closure.

Manley v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2002-05-08(17)

The Board’s reliance on ORS 656.005(17) begs the question. That subsection defines when a condition will be medically stationary. It does not address which conditions must be medically stationary, which is the question presented here and in Neeley.

Section 656.005(17) defines a medically stationary condition as one for which no further material improvement is reasonably expected from treatment or time; treatment aimed at overall improvement can support a finding that a condition is not yet stationary.

Skyline/Homette Corp. v. Boling · filed 2002-06-19(17)

An injured worker is medically stationary when “no further material improvement would reasonably be expected from medical treatment, or the passage of time.” ORS 656.005(17). ... Even if the orthotics only permitted claimant to function better, they were prescribed as part of a course of treatment aimed at overall improvement of claimant’s condition. ... Because Puziss’ opinion constitutes substantial evidence that claimant’s accepted conditions were not medically stationary through the date of the second closure notice, the board did not err.

A condition can be medically stationary despite continuing care aimed at improving function when no material improvement from treatment or time is reasonably expected.

Saif Corp. v. Ramos · filed 2012-09-26(17)

Similarly, here, the record would permit a reasonable person to find that the physical therapy and MRI — which were prescribed after claimant’s condition had become medically stationary — were “continuing medical care,” aimed at improving claimant’s functional abilities, and not an indication that claimant’s accepted condition would reasonably be expected to materially improve as a result of that treatment or the passage of time.

Section 656.005(8)(a) covers an injury at an employer-sponsored picnic when the employer’s involvement makes the activity part of the course of employment, even if the injury occurs after normal work hours.

Colvin v. Industrial Indemnity · filed 1986-12-17(8)(a)

We hold that claimant’s injury arose out of and was within her course of employment under ORS 656.005(8)(a).

An injury during a recreational activity requires a sufficient connection to employment; an employer’s tacit approval of participation does not itself bring the activity within the course of employment.

Richmond v. State Accident Insurance Fund · filed 1982-07-21(8)(a)

At most, the evidence amounts to tacit approval by the police and fire departments that the employes participate in the game, but it falls short of the supervision or complusion necessary to bring the recreational activity within the course of employment.

When an employer requires attendance at a recreational or social event, activities that are part of the required event are not solely for the worker’s personal pleasure.

Town & Country Chrysler v. Mitchell · filed 1992-06-10(7)(a)(B)

When an employer requires a worker’s attendance at a recreational or social activity, activities that are part of the required activity are not performed solely for the worker’s personal pleasure.

Section 656.005(7)(b)(B) asks whether the activity’s primary purpose was the worker’s personal pleasure; enjoying a work activity does not by itself meet that test.

Kaiel v. NCE Cultural Homestay Institute · filed 1994-08-10(7)(b)(B)

The proper inquiry under ORS 656.005(7)(b)(B) is, what is the primary purpose of the activity? The fact that a worker derives pleasure from a work activity does not necessarily mean that the worker engages in the activity primarily for personal pleasure.

Section 656.005(7)(b)(B) does not exclude an injury caused by eating candy while the worker is primarily performing work duties.

Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. v. Nichols · filed 2003-03-06(7)(b)(B)

Rather, it is whether claimant, at the time of the injury, was engaged in a social or recreational activity primarily for his personal pleasure. Again, the answer is no. Primarily, he was setting up a delivery for his employer. Incidentally, he was eating a piece of candy at the time.

Section 656.005(7)(b)(B) can exclude an injury incurred during an on-the-job recreational activity primarily for the worker’s personal pleasure.

Roberts v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2004-12-08(7)(b)(B)

The word “any” suggests that “recreational activities” as used in the statute are not limited to recreational activities engaged in or performed off the job. Thus, it is logical to conclude that engaging in or performing recreational activities on the job falls within the scope of the exclusion.

Section 656.005(7)(b)(B) excludes an injury incurred during a recreational or social activity when personal pleasure was the worker's principal reason for engaging in it, relative to work-related reasons.

Roberts v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2006-06-15(7)(b)(B)

Only if the worker's personal pleasure was the fundamental or principal reason, in relation to work-related reasons, for engaging in the activity will the resulting injury be noncompensable.

An activity may be social under § 656.005(7)(b)(B) even if the worker did not stand to gain personally from it.

Washington Group International v. Barela · filed 2008-03-19(7)(b)(B)

The board did not explain, and we do not understand, why the fact that claimant did not stand to personally gain from the activity necessarily means that it was not a “social” activity within the meaning of the statute. ... At the least, it is clear that the board did not apply the correct legal standard in determining that claimant was not engaged in a “recreational or social activity” at the time of his injury.

Section 656.005(7)(b)(B)’s recreational activity exclusion does not cover walking to a credit union during a paid break to deposit a personal check.

Legacy Health Systems & Legacy Health System v. Noble · filed 2009-11-18(7)(b)(B)

Claimant’s activity in the present case does not fit the established definition, nor is it the kind of activity that we have previously recognized as “recreational.” Claimant was walking to the bank, while on the clock; by no stretch of the imagination can we conclude that she was refreshing her strength and spirits after toil or engaged in play, diversion, or entertainment.

A meeting with a friend during a mandatory, paid break does not trigger the social-activity exclusion when the meeting is incidental to the work-related reason for the break.

U.S. Bank v. Pohrman · filed 2015-06-24(7)(b)(B)

Substantial evidence supports the board’s finding that the personal nature of claimant’s meeting with her friend was incidental or secondary to the work-related reason for the break, and that finding supports the board’s conclusion that the injury did not occur during a recreational or social activity.

A worker’s enjoyment of and voluntary participation in a work task does not by itself make the recreational or social activities exclusion apply.

Sedgwick Claims Management Services v. Norwood · filed 2015-12-30(7)(b)(B)

That claimant derived recreational enjoyment from performing a work task and volunteered to perform it does not mean that the task lost its significance as a work-related task. The board did not err in concluding that the exclusion did not apply.

An injury excluded as resulting from a recreational activity primarily for the worker’s personal pleasure is not compensable even if the activity otherwise arose out of and in the course of employment.

Greenblatt v. Symantec Corp. · filed 2017-08-30(7)(b)(B)

The fact that claimant’s recreational activity otherwise might arise out of and in the course and scope of the employment under ORS 656.005(7)(a) does not make it compensable if it is subject to exclusion under ORS 656.005(7)(b)(B).

Section 656.005(8)(a) covers injuries to traveling employees that result from activities reasonably related to their travel status, including a reasonable tavern visit during a forced layover.

Slaughter v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. · filed 1982-12-08(8)(a)

We believe that the general rule of continuous coverage in Simons is best understood as a statement that injuries are compensable when resulting from activities reasonably related to the claimant’s travel status. ... His activity in passing time at a tavern during a forced layover was reasonable, and the claim is compensable.

Under § 656.005(8)(a), a traveling employee's death can arise out of and in the course of employment despite excessive drinking when the employee has not made a distinct departure on a personal errand.

McBroom v. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. · filed 1986-02-12(8)(a)

After examining the totality of the circumstances we find that decedent was a “traveling employe” and that his presence at the weekend conference was directly connected with his employment. Accordingly, we hold that his death arose out of and in the course of his employment and not out of a distinct departure or personal errand.

A traveling employee’s brief personal errand remains within the course of employment when it is reasonably related to work travel and is not a distinct departure.

Savin Corp. v. McBride · filed 1995-05-17(7)(a)

For an injury to be compensable under Oregon’s workers’ compensation law, it must “arise out of’ and be “in the course of’ employment. ORS 656.005(7)(a). ... We agree with the Board’s conclusion that claimant’s personal errand was not so unrelated to her travels as to be excluded from the broad scope of coverage for traveling employees.

Section 656.005(7)(a) covers a traveling employee’s injury once the employee’s activity again becomes reasonably related to travel status after a personal departure.

Sosnoski v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2002-10-02(7)(a)

It matters not whether claimant had earlier departed from his employment on a distinctly personal errand; that departure ended when claimant’s activities again became reasonably related to his status as a traveling employee and not inconsistent with the business trip’s purpose or employer’s directive.