Or. Rev. Stat. § 183.482

Section 183.482(8)(c) defines substantial evidence as evidence that would permit a reasonable person viewing the record as a whole to make the finding, while subsection (8)(b)(B) requires an agency exercising discretion to follow its prior practice or explain its departure.

AFSCME Council 75, Local 3694 v. Josephine County · filed 2010-03-31(8)(c), (8)(b)(B)

“Substantial evidence to support a finding of fact is evidence that, viewing the record as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding. ORS 183.482(8)(c); ... Under that standard, we reject the county’s challenge to ERB’s credibility findings. ... The parties agree on the legal principle that ERB has discretion in remedying violations of PECBA. In the exercise of its discretion, ERB must either act consistently with its prior practice or else explain why it has not done so. ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B). ... ERB acted within its discretion in ordering reinstatement as a remedy for the county’s unfair labor practice.”

Subsection (8) governs judicial review of agency orders for erroneous legal interpretation and substantial evidence, including substantial reason.

Hessel v. Board of Parole · filed 2026-06-10(8)(a), (8)(c)

We review the board’s order for legal error, Morrison v. Board of Parole, 277 Or App 861, 863, 374 P3d 948, rev den, 360 Or 465 (2016), and substantial evidence, ORS 144.335(1), (3); ORS 183.482(8), including substantial reason, Jenkins v. Board of Parole, 356 Or 186, 195, 335 P3d 828 (2014). “Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c). ... Petitioner first argues that the board erred in finding that his misconduct qualified as serious. We therefore first review the board’s order to determine whether the board “erroneously interpreted a provision of law.” ORS 183.482(8)(a); ORS 144.335(3). In this case, the “provision of law” is the board’s rule itself.

Section 183.482(8)(a) and (c) requires appellate courts to review agency factual findings for substantial evidence and legal conclusions for errors of law.

Marholin v. SAIF · filed 2025-08-27(8)(a) and (c)

We review the board’s factual findings for substantial evidence and its legal conclusions for errors of law. ORS 183.482(8)(a) and (c).

Section 183.482(8)(a) and (c) requires appellate courts to review agency factual determinations for substantial evidence and legal conclusions for errors of law.

Reed v. Helmsman Management Services, Inc. · filed 2025-07-02(8)(a) and (c)

Under ORS 183.482(8)(a) and (c), we review factual determinations of the Board for substantial evidence, and we review legal conclusions for errors of law.

Section 183.482 applies to petitions for judicial review of administrative agency orders, not appeals from court judgments.

Servis One, Inc. v. Weeden · filed 2025-10-01

The rule, and the statute that it implements, ORS 183.482, apply only to petitions for judicial review from orders of administrative agencies, not to appeals of judgments issued by courts.

Section 183.482(8)(a) requires legal-error review of the board’s legal interpretations, while subsection (8)(c) requires substantial-evidence review of its factual findings, meaning evidence that would permit a reasonable person to make the finding.

Travelers Ins. Co. v. Arevalo (In re Comp. of Arevalo) · filed 2019-03-13(8)(a), (8)(c)

Whether the board correctly interpreted the statutes is a question that we review for legal error. ORS 183.482(8)(a) ; ... We review the board's finding that Travelers did not have a legitimate doubt as to the correct method for calculating claimant's wages for substantial evidence under ORS 183.482 (8)(c). ... "Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding."

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires affirmance when the record as a whole contains substantial evidence supporting an agency’s findings, including sufficiently reliable hearsay, while subsection (7) bars substituting the court’s judgment for the agency’s on factual or discretionary issues.

Osuna-Bonilla v. Teacher Standards & Practices Commission · filed 2016-11-16(8)(c), (7)

We review for substantial evidence in the record, ORS 183.482(8)(c), but “we do ‘not substitute [our] judgment for that of the agency as to any issue of fact or agency discretion.’” ... “Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ... For those reasons, we conclude that the testimony of the student witnesses, although hearsay, met the “statutory test of reliability” under ORS 183.450(1). ... Viewing the record as a whole, we hold that substantial evidence permitted TSPC to make its findings of fact and reach its conclusions of law, revoking for one year petitioner’s privilege to reapply for a teaching license. ORS 183.482(8)(c). Therefore, we affirm.

Section 183.482(8)(c) directs courts to review agency factual findings for substantial evidence, while subsection (8)(a) directs review of the resulting legal determination for substantial reason and legal error.

Kroetch v. Employment Department · filed 2014-12-10(8)(c) and (8)(a)

We review the evidentiary support for the board’s factual findings that are pertinent to its good cause determination for substantial evidence, ORS 183.482(8)(c), and review the legal sufficiency of the resulting good cause determination for substantial reason and legal error, ORS 183.482(8)(a).

Section 183.482(8)(a) permits reversal of an agency order when it is unlawful in substance because the agency incorrectly construed or applied the governing statute.

U.S. Soil v. Oregon State Department of Agriculture · filed 1976-04-26(8)(a)

There is no dispute in the evidence. The question presented to us is purely one of statutory construction. Hence, we may reverse in the context of this case only if the order is unlawful in substance, that is, if it incorrectly construes or applies the regulatory statute involved. ORS 183.482(8)(a).

Section 183.482(8)(d) permits an agency order to stand when the record contains substantial evidence supporting the agency’s factual finding.

Tolonen v. Employment Division · filed 1976-06-01(8)(d)

Claimant’s quoted testimony constitutes substantial evidence supporting the Board’s finding that claimant left his work out of fear that his drug addiction would be discovered. ORS 183.482(8)(d). This finding supports the Board’s decision that claimant voluntarily left work without good cause.

Subsection (7) precludes the reviewing court from reexamining an agency factual determination when the agency’s finding is supported by substantial evidence.

Holdaway v. Employment Division · filed 1976-08-30(7)

Therefore, we are precluded from examining this question further. ORS 183.482(7).

Section 183.482(7) makes substantial-evidence review the standard for reviewing findings in APA contested cases, but that standard does not apply to an informational hearing.

Oregonians for Nuclear Safeguards v. Myers · filed 1976-09-10(7)

Other parties have suggested that our role is to determine if there is any substantial evidence to support the Secretary of State’s findings. That is the scope of judicial review of findings in contested cases under the APA. ORS 183.482(7). The difficulty with the application of that scope of review is that because the hearing was conducted by the Secretary of State and the parties as an "informational” hearing, much of the evidence would not rise to the quality of "substantial.” ... We are of the opinion that the scope of review standard, — was there substantial evidence to support the administrator’s findings, — is not applicable.

Section 183.482(8)(a) permits judicial reversal when an agency order is unlawful in substance because it incorrectly construes or applies the regulatory statute involved.

U. S. Soil, Inc. v. Oregon State Department of Agriculture · filed 1976-09-30(8)(a)

Review by the Court of Appeals was under ORS 183.482(8)(a), which provides for judicial reversal if the order of the Department is unlawful in substance; "that is, if it incorrectly construes or applies the regulatory statute involved.” 25 Or App at 317. We conceive our scope of review to be the same.

Section 183.482(8)(d) requires reversal of an agency order that is not supported by substantial evidence in the whole record.

McDevitt v. Employment Division · filed 1976-11-01(8)(d)

The order of the Board is not, therefore, supported by substantial evidence in the whole record. ORS 183.482(8)(d).

On judicial review, an agency order may be reversed as unlawful in substance when it rests on an incorrect interpretation, or when the record lacks evidence supporting the result.

Accident Prevention Division v. Fought & Company, Inc. · filed 1976-10-25(8)(a), (8)(d)

To the extent that the Referee’s conclusion that respondent had not violated Rule 7-6-1 was based upon an incorrect interpretation of the “exception” embodied in the Board’s “policy statement,” the order dismissing the citation charging a violation of that rule was "unlawful in substance.” ORS 183.482(8)(a). Assuming that the Referee correctly construed the exception, the record is devoid of evidence supporting a conclusion that it would apply under the circumstances of this case. ORS 183.482(8)(d).

ORS 183.482(4) requires the record in contested-case review to include the entire record of the proceeding, while ORS 183.482(8)(c) applies the same substantive review standard to rules reviewed in a contested case as applies on direct rule review, although the available record may differ.

International Council of Shopping Centers v. Oregon Environmental Quality Commission · filed 1976-11-15(4), (8)(c)

The manner for review in contested cases includes transmittal to us "of the entire record of the proceeding under review.” ORS 183.482(4). Read together, ORS 183.400(1) and 183.482(4) would seem to support petitioners’ request that we review the entire record in this proceeding. ... Under either direct review of rules, ORS 183.400, or review of rules as part of our review in a contested case, ORS 183.482(8)(c), the substantive standard of review is the same — that spelled out in ORS 183.400. The important difference is that in the contested-case context we will have a record sufficient to apply those substantive standards, whereas in the direct-review context the record will not necessarily be sufficient given the reality that the agency rulemaking can be based on matters not of record.

Section 183.482(8) permits the court to uphold an agency decision when the record contains sufficient evidence to support the agency’s determination.

Sandlin v. Oregon Women's Correctional Center · filed 1977-02-14(8)

First, we have examined the record and conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the committee’s determination that petitioner had violated Major Rule 7 as charged. ORS 183.482(8).

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires a court to set aside or remand an agency order unsupported by substantial evidence, while subsection (7) permits remand for material procedural error or failure to follow prescribed procedure.

Babcock v. Employment Division · filed 1985-03-06(8)(c), (7)

The The standard for our review of these administrative proceedings is provided in ORS 183.482(8)(c): ... “(c) The court shall set aside or remand the order if it finds that the order is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.” ... This court may remand if: ... “[E]ither the fairness of the proceedings or the correctness of the action may have been impaired by a material error in procedure or a failure to follow prescribed procedure.” ORS 183.482(7).

Section 183.482 does not authorize review of a proclamation that is not a final order in a contested case.

Dinsdale v. Young · filed 1985-03-20

The proclamation is neither a rule that is reviewable under ORS 183.400, see ORS 183.310(8), nor a final order in a contested case that is reviewable under ORS 183.482. See ORS 183.310(5)(b), 183.470.

Section 183.482(8) limits judicial reversal or remand of an agency order to the statutory grounds specified in that subsection, including legally cognizable defects in the agency’s exercise of discretion.

Price v. Board of Parole · filed 1986-08-05(8)

We conclude by repeating that neither this court nor the Court of Appeals has authority to reverse or remand an order of the Board based upon an alleged “abuse of discretion” by the Board in setting a prisoner’s parole date, unless the petitioner shows that the Board has exercised its discretion in a manner prohibited by ORS 183.482(8).

On judicial review, a court may reverse an agency decision only when the evidence permits only the reasonable deduction that the decision was incorrect.

Bureau of Labor & Industries v. City of Roseburg · filed 1985-09-18(8)(c)

“On judicial review under ORS 183.482(8)(c), a court can reverse the Commissioner only if the only reasonable deduction to be drawn from the evidence as a whole, including that presented by the City, is that the disparity in pay was other than ‘because of [complainant’s] female sex.

ORS 183.482(7) limits a court-appointed master to taking evidence and making factual findings, while subsection (8)(a) makes an agency’s application of a complete legislative policy reviewable as legal error.

Samuel v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners · filed 1985-12-26(7), (8)(a)

Judicial review of an agency’s application of a term representing a complete expression of legislative policy to the facts of a particular case is review for error of law under ORS 183.482(8) (a): ... The Board’s decision that a vasectomy is not within the definition of “minor surgery” is within the legislative policy, because it is a reasonable interpretation of that term. ... The legal conclusions are not binding on this court, because, under ORS 183.482(7), the master’s duty is limited to taking evidence and making findings of fact. It is our duty to determine whether those findings persuasively show that “either the fairness of the proceeding or the correctness of the action may have been impaired by a material error in procedure or a failure to follow prescribed procedure.” ORS 183.482(7).

Section 183.482(8) permits review of whether an agency erroneously interpreted the law or acted outside its range of discretion.

AFSCME Local 1246 v. Fairview Training Center · filed 1986-09-10(8)

The question is whether ERB erroneously interpreted a provision of law or acted outside of its range of discretion in ordering binding arbitration as a sanction for the unfair labor practice. ORS 183.482(8). ... Accordingly, we find no misinterpretation of the law by ERB and cannot say that it acted outside its range of discretion in imposing the sanction it chose.

Section 183.482 limits APA review of agency orders to orders made in contested cases.

Pen-Nor, Inc. v. Oregon Department of Higher Education · filed 1987-03-25

Our authority to review orders under the APA, however, is limited to those made in contested cases. ORS 183.480 and ORS 183.482. Otherwise, a petitioner must seek review in the circuit court. ORS 183.484. ... We conclude, therefore, that we lack jurisdiction to review SBHE’s action under ORS 183.480 and ORS 183.482.

Section 183.482(8) permits a court to set aside, modify, or remand an agency order only for specified legal, discretionary, or substantial-evidence errors.

Oregon School Employees Ass'n v. Pendleton School District 16R · filed 1987-05-06(8)

We may set aside, modify or remand ERB’s order only if ERB has erroneously interpreted a provision of law, improperly exercised its discretion or found facts which are not supported by substantial evidence in the record. ORS 183.482(8).

Section 183.482(8)(a) directs review for legal error of an agency’s statutory interpretation by determining whether the interpretation coincides with the legislative policy inherent in the statute.

Salem Police Employees Union v. City of Salem · filed 1988-08-10(8)(a)

We review ERB’s interpretation of the term “other conditions of employment” for errors of law under ORS 183.482(8)(a) to determine whether it coincides with the legislative policy which inheres in the statute.

Section 183.482(8) requires courts to distinguish among legal error, delegated agency discretion, and factual findings when selecting the standard of review, and subsection (8)(b) requires remand for specified defects in an agency's exercise of discretion.

Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Fillmore · filed 1989-09-27(8)(b)

ORS 183.482(8) requires v. to distinguish between three types of agency action in contested cases in order to determine the appropriate standard of review. ... Our standard of review is described in ORS 183.482(8)(b): ... The Board’s attorney fee award in this case is not defective in any of the ways contemplated by ORS 183.482(8)(b). In particular, contrary to claimant’s argument, the Board is not required to make a finding as to each of the factors described in OAR 438-15-010(6); the regulation requires only that the listed factors be considered. The Board’s explanation of its award is detailed enough to inform v. that it considered all of the factors and had a reasonable basis for its decision. No more is required.

Section 183.482 provides for Court of Appeals review of final orders in contested cases.

Ferland v. McMurtry Video Productions · filed 1992-11-18

The Board held that review of DIF’s final order is only by the Court of Appeals under ORS 183.482 and that the Board did not have jurisdiction of claimant’s appeal. We agree.

Section 183.482(6) permits an agency to withdraw and revise an order while it is under judicial review, and permits the challenger to renew review of the amended order by filing an amended petition.

AFSCME Local 2623 v. Department of Corrections · filed 1992-12-24(6)

This is a permissible process. A challenge to the validity of a rule is conducted by the Court of Appeals “in the manner provided for review of orders in contested cases.” ORS 183.400(1). Judicial review of orders in contested cases is governed by ORS 183.482. Under the latter statute, an administrative agency can withdraw and revise an order during the judicial review process, and a party challenging the order may renew its challenge to the agency’s amended order by filing an amended petition for judicial review. ORS 183.482(6).

Section 183.482(8)(a) authorizes appellate review of contested-case agency orders for erroneous applications or interpretations of law, including an agency’s failure to recognize discretion it has under law.

City of Klamath Falls v. Environmental Quality Commission · filed 1994-04-07(8)(a)

ORS 183.482(8)(a) authorizes the Court of Appeals and this court to review an agency order in a contested case for erroneous applications or interpretations of law. ... Therefore, in reviewing an agency contested case order for the agency’s possible failure to recognize that it has discretion to decline to apply a rule to a certain factual setting, we are reviewing the order for the agency’s erroneous interpretation of the law. ORS 183.482(8)(a).

Section 183.482(8)(a) authorizes a court to overrule an agency's interpretation of a rule only when the agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law; a plausible interpretation of the agency's own rule that is consistent with the rule, its context, and other law is not erroneous.

Don't Waste Oregon Committee v. Energy Facility Siting Council · filed 1994-09-29(8)(a)

As noted, this court is authorized to overrule an agency's interpretation of a rule if an agency has "erroneously interpreted a provision of law." ORS 183.482(8)(a). In this case, the "provision of law" is the rule itself. Where, as here, the agency's plausible interpretation of its own rule cannot be shown either to be inconsistent with the wording of the rule itself, or with the rule's context, or with any other source of law, there is no basis on which this court can assert that the rule has been interpreted "erroneously." It follows that, in circumstances like those presented here, this court cannot overrule, under ORS 183.482(8)(a), an agency's interpretation of its own rule.

Subsection (1) gives the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to review final orders in contested cases.

Wheaton v. Kulongoski · filed 2006-11-29(1)

If not, and if they were final orders in contested cases, then this court had jurisdiction to review them. See ORS 183.482(1); Oregon Health Care Assn. v. Health Div., 329 Or. 480, 488, 992 P.2d 434 (1999) (petitions for judicial review are available under ORS 183.482 and ORS 183.484 only as to final orders); Oregon Env. Council v. Oregon State Bd. of Ed., 307 Or. 30, 37, 761 P.2d 1322 (1988) (orders in contested cases are reviewed in this court).

Section 183.482(8)(b) limits remand of an agency’s discretionary action to action outside the authority delegated by law, inconsistent with an agency rule or stated agency position without explanation, or otherwise violating a constitutional or statutory provision.

Labor Ready Northwest, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Industries · filed 2006-09-27(8)(b)

Although litigants — and this court — commonly characterize our review pursuant to ORS 183.482(8) as being for “abuse of discretion,” that term, however convenient, is imprecise and arguably misleading. ... In all events, and however properly labeled, our authority to remand under ORS 183.482(8) is limited to three circumstances: ... “An agency abuses its discretion when its action is (1) outside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by law; (2) inconsistent with an agency rule or an officially stated agency position; or (3) otherwise in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision.”

Section 183.482(7) and (8) prescribe judicial review of agency orders, requiring remand when an agency's exercise of discretion is outside its delegated authority or is unexplainedly inconsistent with an agency rule, officially stated position, or prior practice.

Fred Meyer Stores v. Godfrey · filed 2008-03-19(7), (8)(b), (8)(b)(A), and (8)(b)(B)

ORS 656.298(7) governs our standard of review and provides that "[r]eview shall be as provided in ORS 183.482(7) and (8)." Because the board purported to exercise its discretion, the applicable standard of review is pursuant to ORS 183.482(8)(b). ... ORS 183.482(8)(b) provides: "The court shall remand the order to the agency if the court finds the agency's exercise of discretion to be: "(A) Outside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by law; "(B) Inconsistent with an agency rule, an officially stated agency position, or a prior agency practice, if the inconsistency is not explained by the agency; or "(C) Otherwise in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision." Under ORS 183.482(8)(b)(A), we inquire whether the board's exercise of discretion is outside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by law.

Section 183.482(8)(a) permits judicial review of agency statutory interpretations for errors of law and allows affirmance, reversal, or remand, while subsection (8)(c) requires substantial-evidence review without reweighing agency fact findings.

Waisanen v. Clatskanie School District 6J · filed 2009-07-15(8)(a) (8)(c)

On judicial review under the APA, the court may affirm, reverse, or remand the order. ORS 183.482(8)(a). ... We review the FDAB's interpretation and application of a statute for errors of law. ORS 183.482(8)(a). ... We review all the FDAB final orders for substantial evidence. ORS 183.482(8)(c). Substantial evidence review "does not entail or permit the reviewing tribunal to reweigh or to assess the credibility of the evidence that was presented to the factfinding body." ... Dispositively, the question is whether a reasonable person could have reached the conclusion that the majority of the FDAB panel did. We conclude that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the FDAB's findings of fact.

Section 183.482(8)(b)(B) requires remand when an agency’s exercise of discretion is inconsistent with an applicable agency rule.

O'CONNOR v. Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. · filed 2009-12-09(8)(b)(B)

That inconsistency requires remand under ORS 183.482(8)(b).

Section 183.482 requires reviewing courts to assess whether an agency acted outside its delegated discretion or lacked substantial evidence, without substituting the court’s judgment for the agency’s on factual issues.

Industrial Customers of Northwest Utilities v. Public Utility Commission · filed 2010-12-29(8)(b)(A), (c), (7)

Our review of PUC orders is the same as our review of orders in contested cases. ORS 756.610(1). Thus, we must determine whether the commission’s order embodies an exercise of discretion that is “[o]utside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by law,” and whether “the order is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.” ORS 183.482(8)(b)(A), (c). In conducting our review, we bear in mind that we may not substitute our judgment for that of the commission “as to any issue of fact.” ORS 183.482(7).

Section 183.482(8) requires reversal and remand when an agency decision lacks substantial reason or falls outside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by law.

JRP Construction Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Consumer Business Services · filed 2015-02-25(8)

However, alternatively, if the director dismissed insurer’s request for review under some other concept of mootness created by the agency in the course of carrying out the authority delegated to it by statute, the director’s decision is not supported by substantial reason — that is, it does not “articulate a rational connection between the facts and the legal conclusions it draws from them” — and we must reverse and remand on that basis. ... In the absence of any such rational explanation, we are unable to review whether the director’s decision to dismiss insurer’s request for review comports with the director’s obligation under ORS 656.704(2) to conduct review of ALJ orders, is consistent with the requirements of any other applicable statutes or rules, or otherwise falls “[ojutside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by law.” ORS 183.482(8) (articulating applicable standard of review).

Section 183.482(8) authorizes a court to set aside or remand a contested agency order on judicial review only for specified legal, discretion, or substantial-evidence errors, and only in a justiciable case.

Association of Oregon Corrections Employees v. State · filed 2014-10-22(8)

That kind of “vacatur” — which is what we understand the AOCE to request here — is not among the actions that this court has authority to take with respect to agency orders in contested cases that, like this one, are on judicial review under ORS 183.482. To the contrary, we have authority to set aside or remand such an order only if we conclude — in a case that is justiciable on judicial review— that the agency has misinterpreted the law, acted outside its lawful range of discretion, or has issued an order that is not supported by substantial evidence. ORS 183.482(8).

ORS 183.482(8)(c) treats a factual finding as supported by substantial evidence when the whole record would permit a reasonable person to make it, and ORS 183.482(7) and (8) govern review of the board's order.

Minor v. SAIF Corp. (In re Minor) · filed 2018-02-28(7) and (8)(c)

We review orders of the Workers' Compensation Board "as provided in ORS 183.482(7) and (8)." ORS 656.298(7). As pertinent here, we review for substantial evidence, which "exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding." ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Section 183.482(8)(a) requires a reviewing court to set aside, modify, or remand an agency order when the agency erroneously interpreted a provision of law, while subsection (8)(c) requires the court to set aside or remand an order that is not supported by substantial evidence.

Wiggins v. SAIF · filed 2019-10-30(8)(a) and (8)(c)

Regardless of whether we treat the question as one of fact or, instead, as one of law, the board erred. And regardless of whether we treat the question as one of fact or, instead, as one of law, that error requires us to remand to the board. See ORS 183.482(8)(a) (where agency has “erroneously interpreted a provision of law,” reviewing court shall “[s]et aside or modify the order” or “[r]emand the case to the agency for further action under a correct interpretation of the provision of law”); ORS 183.482(8)(c) (where agency order is not supported by substantial evidence, “court shall set aside or remand the order”).

ORS 183.482(8)(a) requires nondelegative statutory terms to be reviewed for legal error without deference, while subsection (8)(b) requires deferential review of an agency's application of delegative terms within its lawful discretion.

Vaughn v. Marion County · filed 2020-06-24(8)(a) and (8)(b)

The words “disciplinary” and “corrective” are not delegative terms,3 so we review the board’s order to determine whether it reflects an erroneous interpretation of those provisions and, if so, whether the correct interpretation requires the board to take a particular action. Tono, 265 Or App at 528; ORS 183.482(8)(a). ... “Reasonable” is a delegative term5 so we review under ORS 183.482(8)(b) to determine whether the board’s exercise of discretion in implementing that term is “within the range of discretion allowed by the more general policy of the statute.” Springfield Education Assn. v. School Dist., 290 Or 217, 229, 621 P2d 547 (1980).

ORS 183.482(8) uses paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) to provide permissible dispositions for different agency-order defects, and review under paragraph (c) includes substantial-evidence and substantial-reason review even when the agency exercised discretion.

Sachdev v. Oregon Medical Board · filed 2021-06-16(8), (8)(b), (8)(c)

The board’s argument that subsections (a), (b), and (c) describe exclusive, alternative methods of review “depending on whether the ruling challenged is legal, discretionary, or factual,” does not survive a plain reading of the statutory text. We read paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of ORS 183.482(8) to describe the permissible dispositions we may employ depending on whether the agency ruling was a violation of law, an abuse of discretion, or a failure of evidence or reason.

Section 183.482(8)(b) limits review of an agency’s discretionary decision to whether it is outside delegated authority, inconsistent with agency rules or stated practice without explanation, or otherwise violates constitutional or statutory law.

Baker v. Board of Parole · filed 2020-08-12(8)(b)

Our abuse-of-discretion review is limited in this context; we review the agency’s exercise of discretion only to determine whether it was “[o]utside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by law,” ORS 183.482(8)(b)(A), “[i]nconsistent with an agency rule, an officially stated agency position, or a prior agency practice,” ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B),” or “[o]therwise in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision,” ORS 183.482 (8)(b)(C).

Section 183.482(8) limits judicial review of agency action to errors of law and substantial evidence and reason, and subsections (8)(a)-(c) do not authorize de novo review.

Kyei v. Div. of Child Support · filed 2021-09-15(8), (8)(a)-(c)

On judicial review, we review for errors of law and for substantial evidence and reason. ORS 183.482(8); Endres v. DMV, 255 Or App 226, 228-29, 297 P3d 505 (2013). This is not a case in which we could or would accept petitioner’s request for de novo review. See ORS 183.482(8)(a) - (c) (standards of review of agency action do not include de novo review); ORS 19.415(3)(b) (authorizing de novo review of an “equitable action or proceeding”).

Section 183.482 requires review of contested-case agency orders for legal error and substantial evidence, restricts review to the record, and treats a finding as substantially supported when the whole record would permit a reasonable person to make it.

Dorn v. Teacher Standards and Practices Comm. · filed 2021-12-08(8)(a), (8)(c), (7)

We review an agency’s order in a contested case for errors of law, ORS 183.482(8)(a), substantial evidence, ORS 183.482(8)(c), and substantial reason, Sachdev v. Oregon Medical Board, 312 Or App 392, 405, 494 P3d 1018 (2021). Our review is restricted to the record. ORS 183.482(7). A finding is supported by substantial evidence so long as “the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c).

On judicial review of an agency order, substantial-evidence review under § 183.482(8) includes a substantial-reason requirement: the order must articulate a rational connection between the facts and its legal conclusions.

Creekside Valley Farms v. Dept. of Agriculture · filed 2024-07-03(8)

We review the department’s order in this contested case for substantial evidence, abuse of discretion, and errors of law. ORS 183.482(8). Our decision turns on the requirement of substantial evidence, focusing in particular on that requirement’s component of substantial reason. ... Meaningful review requires us to do more than simply verify that the department gave an explanation for its conclusions. Meaningful review requires us to read the content of the explanation to ensure that it supplies the required “rational connection between the facts and the legal conclusions it draws from them.” Id.

Section 183.482(8)(a) requires reversal, modification, or remand when an agency has erroneously interpreted the law, while subsection (8)(c) requires setting aside or remanding an order unsupported by substantial evidence, measured by whether the record as a whole would permit a reasonable person to make the finding.

Employer Solutions Staffing Group v. SAIF · filed 2025-09-04(8)(a), (8)(c)

We review the board’s interpretation of law for legal error and findings of fact for substantial evidence. ORS 183.482(8)(a), (c). “If the court finds that the agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law and that a correct interpretation compels a particular action,” the court shall “[s]et aside or modify the order; or [r]emand the case to the agency for further action under a correct interpretation of the provision of law.” ORS 183.482(8)(a). If the court finds that the order is not supported by substantial evidence in the record, the court shall set aside or remand the order. ORS 183.482(c). “Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” Id.

Section 183.482(8)(a) requires legal-error review of an agency’s legal conclusions, while subsection (8)(c) requires substantial-evidence review of its factual findings and final order.

Your House LLC v. BOLI · filed 2025-12-03(8)(a), (8)(c)

We review BOLI’s legal conclusions for legal error and its factual findings and final order for substantial evidence. ORS 183.482(8)(a); ORS 183.482(8)(c). “[I]f a reasonable person on the evidence in the record could draw the inference [reached by BOLI], the Commissioner’s decision on the facts must prevail, no matter what the court might believe from the evidence.” City of Portland v. Bureau of Labor and Ind., 298 Or 104, 119, 690 P2d 475 (1984) (explaining the standard of review under ORS 183.482(8)(c)).

Section 183.482(8)(a) requires review of an agency’s statutory interpretation for legal error, while subsection (8)(c) requires setting aside or remanding orders unsupported by substantial evidence and permits review for substantial reason without reweighing the evidence.

Smicz v. Deschutes County 911 Service Dist. · filed 2026-02-11(8)(a), (8)(c)

We review the Board’s interpretation for legal error. ORS 183.482(8)(a). ... ORS 183.482(8)(c) requires us to set aside or remand an order that is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. “Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c). ... We do, however, consider “whether the findings provide substantial reason to support the legal conclusion reached by the agency.”

Section 183.482(8)(b) requires review of whether an agency’s exercise of discretion stays within its delegated authority, follows applicable rules, and otherwise complies with law.

Citizens for Resp. Devel. in The Dalles v. Walmart · filed 2026-06-03(8)(b)

Accordingly, we review to determine whether the agency’s exercise of discretion was within the range of discretion delegated to it, consistent with applicable rules and otherwise in accordance with applicable law.

Under § 183.482(8)(a), appellate relief for an erroneous legal interpretation is available only when the correct interpretation would compel different agency action; under § 183.482(8)(c), relief for insufficient evidence requires that the unsupported findings affect the validity of the order.

Steele v. Water Resources Commission · filed 2012-02-15(8)(a), (8)(c)

As the emphasized portion of ORS 183.482(8)(a) indicates, even if the agency has interpreted the law incorrectly, we may set aside or modify its order, or remand the case to the agency, only if a correct interpretation compels the agency to take a particular action that is different from the action that it has already taken or, at the least, to reconsider that action. ... It is the order that must be supported by substantial evidence. We may not set aside or remand a final order, even if some findings are not supported by substantial evidence, unless the erroneous findings somehow affect the validity of the order.

Section 183.482(8) requires a petitioner to show a specified ground for judicial review before a court may reverse or remand an agency order; an abuse-of-discretion claim alone is insufficient.

Evensizer v. Board of Parole · filed 1986-08-05(8)

Therefore, we hold the petitioner’s claim of an abuse of discretion to be insufficient to invoke the court’s authority to reverse or remand under ORS 183.482(8).

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires substantial evidence and substantial reason review of agency orders.

Jenkins v. Board of Parole · filed 2013-09-05(8)(c)

The text of ORS 144.335(3) contradicts the board’s position. The second sentence of ORS 144.335(3) plainly states that our court “may affirm, reverse or remand the order on the same basis as provided in ORS 183.482(8)” (Emphasis added.) As we recognized in Castro, given that second sentence, ORS 144.335(3) requires us to review the board’s order for substantial evidence and reason— requirements under ORS 183.482(8).

Section 183.482(8)(a) and (d) require sustaining an agency decision unless it is unlawful in substance or procedure or unsupported by substantial evidence in the whole record.

Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Bureau of Labor · filed 1977-03-21(8)(a) and (8)(d)

As I read the applicable statutes, the result reached by the Labor Commissioner must be sustained unless "unlawful in substance or procedure," or not based on "substantial evidence in the whole record." ORS 183.482(8)(a) and (d).

Section 183.482(8) sets the standards for judicial review of final orders in contested cases.

Buchanan v. Water Resources Commission · filed 2023-08-09(8)

The Court adopts a similar approach here. Although a stay denial under ORS § 536.075(6) is not a “final order” for all purposes, the Court will review the stay denial according to the standards of judicial review that apply to final orders. See ORS § 183.482(8) (setting standards of judicial review for final orders in contested cases); ORS § 183.484(5) (setting the same standards for final orders other than contested cases).

Section 183.482(6) allows an agency to withdraw and reconsider its orders unilaterally at any time before the hearing in the reviewing court.

Boise Cascade Corp. v. Board of Forestry · filed 1994-12-07(6)

Under ORS 183.482(6), the board could have unilaterally withdrawn and reconsidered the orders at any time before the time set for the hearing in this court.

Section 183.482(8)(a) requires the reviewing court to review an agency’s legal conclusions for legal error and permits remand when the agency applies an erroneous legal premise.

Wright Schuchart Harbor v. Johnson · filed 1995-04-12(8)(a)

That “bright line” requirement of an explicit disclaimer, which was not related to the parties’ particular circumstances, embodies a legal conclusion, and we review it for legal error. ORS 183.482(8)(a).

Section 183.482(7) requires the reviewing court to respect the agency’s fact-finding role and prohibits substituting the court’s judgment for the agency’s.

Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. v. Verner · filed 1996-02-21(7)

It is the Board’s role to find the facts of a case; we are not to substitute our judgment. ORS 183.482(7).

Section 183.482 provides Court of Appeals review for persons or parties adversely affected by final agency orders, but the specific review statute for ERB orders controls.

Central Catholic Education Ass'n v. Archdiocese of Portland · filed 1996-05-09

The judicial review provided in ORS 183.482 is available to any person or party adversely affected by a final order of an administrative agency. ORS 183.480(1). ... To give consistent effect to such different treatment of ERB orders, the specific statute must control over the general. ... After our review of the text and context of ORS 183.482 and 663.220, we conclude that the legislature intended for ORS 663.220 to apply to judicial review of an ERB order.

Section 183.482 supplies the route for judicial review of the administrative law judge’s order when the Workers’ Compensation Board lacks jurisdiction over the matter.

Lankford v. Copeland · filed 1996-05-22

Because the Director’s determination, affirmed by the ALJ, was not a matter concerning a claim, the Board did not have jurisdiction to review that decision, ORS 656.704, and review of the ALJ’s order is pursuant to ORS 183.482. ORS 656.704(2).

When an agency exercises discretion, it must explain its reasoning sufficiently for a reviewing court to determine whether the decision is within the range of discretion delegated by law.

Schoch v. Leupold & Stevens · filed 1997-03-27(8)(b)(A)

It is crucial that an agency’s order reveal a rationale for an award of attorney fees. At a minimum, where the basis for an agency’s discretionary choice is not obvious, an agéncy must provide sufficient explanation to allow a reviewing court to examine the agency’s action in relation to the range of discretion granted by the legislature, the agency’s own “rule, officially stated agency position, or a prior agency practice,” and other statutory and constitutional provisions. ORS 183.482(8)(b).

Section 183.482(8)(b)(A) requires remand when an agency exercises discretion outside the range delegated by law, and meaningful review requires the agency to rationally explain why its decision falls within that range.

Martin v. Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision · filed 1997-03-12(8)(b)(A)

The sole question before us here is whether the Board’s order, imposing the condition that petitioner avoid nearly all of Lane County, is “[o]utside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by law.” ORS 183.482-(8)(b)(A). ... We do hold, however, that, to establish that it exercised its discretion within the range delegated to it by law and to provide a basis for meaningful judicial review, the Board must offer a rational explanation of its decision that the special conditions it imposes are necessary to effectuate the objectives of the statute.

Section 183.482(8)(b) limits judicial review of a discretionary agency decision to whether the agency acted outside the allowable range of discretion.

Mar Pacifico, Inc. v. Department of Fish & Wildlife · filed 1997-06-11(8)(b)

The Board’s decision with regard to the waiver of eligibility requirements for a commercial fishing permit is thus a discretionary one, and we review it to determine whether the Board has erroneously interpreted the statutes and whether the correct interpretation compels a different result. We may not set aside or modify the Board’s decision unless it has acted outside the allowable range of discretion. ORS 183.482(8)(b).

Section 183.482(8) requires review of an agency order for correct legal principles, substantial evidence, and substantial reason; under subsection (8)(c), substantial evidence is evidence that, viewing the record as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make the finding.

Pat v. Mult. Sch. Dist. 1 · filed 2000-12-27(8)(c)

In testing whether the record supports ERB's resolution of that issue, we review for whether ERB has correctly identified the applicable legal principles; we further review for substantial evidence and for substantial reason. See generally ORS 183.482(8). Substantial evidence to support a finding of fact is evidence that, viewing the record as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding. ORS 183.482(8)(c); Armstrong v. Asten Hill Co., 90 Or.App. 200, 206, 752 P.2d 312 (1988). In reviewing for substantial reason, however, we go one step further: We examine not only the evidence that supports ERB's findings but also the reasoning that leads ERB from the facts that it has found to the conclusions that it draws from those facts. See Drew v. PSRB, 322 Or. 491, 500, 909 P.2d 1211 (1996). Specifically, we review ERB's reasoning for whether ERB correctly interpreted and applied legal principles in the individual case before it, and whether it did so consistently with other similar cases rather than arbitrarily or ad hoc.

Section 183.482 authorizes Court of Appeals judicial review of contested cases only for a final order, not a nonfinal order.

Oregon Health Care Ass'n v. Health Division · filed 1999-12-03(1)

The legislature intended that a person or party would make the showings required by the second and third exceptions in ORS 183.480(3) in an “action or suit” in circuit court, and that the process of judicial review under ORS 183.482 and ORS 183.484 would address claims of error only in a final order.

Section 183.482(8)(a) requires judicial review of agency legal conclusions for errors of law, while § 183.482(8)(c) asks whether the whole record permits a reasonable person to find substantial evidence supporting the agency’s factual finding.

Worldmark the Club v. Travis · filed 1999-07-07(8)(a), (8)(c)

We review the Board’s legal conclusions for errors of law and determine whether its findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. ... Substantial evidence supports a finding when the record, viewed as a whole, permits a reasonable person to make that finding.

Section 183.482(8)(c) provides for substantial-evidence review of agency findings, and subsection (8)(b)(B) requires remand when an agency exercises discretion inconsistently with an agency rule, official position, or prior practice without explaining the inconsistency.

Thomas Creek Lumber & Log Co. v. Board of Forestry · filed 2003-05-29(8)(c), (8)(b)(B)

We review the board’s findings for substantial evidence. ORS 183.482(8)(c). ... Under ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B), an agency order shall be remanded if the agency’s exercise of discretion was “[inconsistent with an agency rule, an officially stated agency position, or a prior agency practice, if the inconsistency is not explained by the agency.” ... In this case, even assuming that the department typically granted waivers of the 15-day waiting period, it adequately explained the reason for its different action: that it was concerned about the possible existence of a Type D stream.

Section 183.482(8)(c)’s substantial evidence standard includes a substantial reason requirement for parole board orders.

Jenkins v. Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision · filed 2014-09-18(8)(c)

However, the legislature’s failure to alter the remainder of ORS 144.335(3), together with the over- all legislative history set out above, suggests that the leg- islature ultimately did not intend to modify the standard of review, that is, substantial reason—a standard that is implicit in ORS 183.482(8)(c), as that standard actually was applied in Martin.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires substantial reason in parole board orders: the board must explain the connection between the facts and its decision.

Jenkins v. Board of Parole · filed 2014-09-18(8)(c)

But the substantial evidence standard of review under ORS 183.482(8)(c) (to which this court in Roseburg City Firefighters also related the substantial reason requirement) does apply to the board.

Section 183.482(8)(c) treats a factual finding as supported by substantial evidence when the record viewed as a whole would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.

Burnard v. PSRB · filed 2025-07-02(8)(c)

“Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c). ... Having considered the entire record, we conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the board’s finding that petitioner presents a substantial danger to others because of his bipolar disorder, even if the record also would have allowed a different finding.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires an agency order to be supported by substantial evidence, meaning the record as a whole would permit a reasonable person to make the factual finding.

Luechtefeld v. Bd. of Lic. Pro. Counselors and Therapists · filed 2025-09-10(8)(c)

We review the board’s order for errors of law and substantial evidence. ORS 183.482(8). Substantial evidence exists to support a factual finding “when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c). Moreover, the order must be supported by substantial reason, which exists where the board has articulated “the rational connection between the facts and the legal conclusion it draws from them.” Ross v. Springfield School Dist. No. 19, 294 Or 357, 370, 657 P2d 188 (1982).

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires review of whether substantial evidence supports an agency order and treats substantial evidence as evidence that, considering the record as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make the finding.

Haskins v. PSRB · filed 2025-10-29(8)(c)

We review to determine whether substantial evidence supports the board’s order. ORS 183.482(8)(c). “Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Section 183.482(8)(c) supports an agency factual finding only when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.

Norgren v. PSRB · filed 2025-11-05(8)(c)

“Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c). ... “Turning back to this case, we have considered the record and the PSRB’s order in light of our standard of review, and we conclude that the PSRB’s order was not supported by substantial evidence.”

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires a court to set aside a board order that is not supported by substantial evidence, meaning the record viewed as a whole would not permit a reasonable person to make the challenged finding.

Pierce v. Board of Parole · filed 2025-11-19(8)(c)

ORS 183.482(8)(c) requires the court to set aside a board order if it is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. ... a finding is supported by substantial evidence if “the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.”

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires judicial review of an agency’s factual determinations for substantial evidence, including substantial reasoning.

Mamuyac v. Columbia Sportswear · filed 2025-12-31(8)(c)

We review the Board’s factual determinations for substantial evidence, which includes substantial reasoning. ORS 183.482(8)(c); Compton v. SAIF, 195 Or App 329, 333, 97 P3d 669, rev den, 337 Or 669 (2004); see also Garcia v. Boise Cascade Corp., 309 Or 292, 294, 787 P2d 884 (1990) (substantial evidence supports a finding when the record, viewed as a whole, permits a reasonable person to make the finding).

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires substantial-evidence review of an agency order, asking whether the whole record would permit a reasonable person to make the challenged finding.

Newman v. PSRB · filed 2026-01-28(8)(c)

Under ORS 183.482(8)(c), and given petitioner’s assignment of error, we review the board’s order for substantial evidence. “Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” Id. In reviewing for substantial evidence, “our task is not to make our own findings but rather to determine whether, viewing all the evidence in the record, the board could reasonably make the findings that it did.” Knotts v. PSRB, 250 Or App 448, 455, 280 P3d 1030 (2012).

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires review of agency factual findings for substantial evidence and substantial reason, without reweighing the evidence or substituting the court’s judgment for the agency’s.

Dean v. Multnomah County · filed 2026-04-29(8)(c)

We review the board’s factual findings for substantial evidence in light of the whole record and its legal conclusions for errors of law. ORS 183.482(8)(b), (c); Luton v. Willamette Valley Rehabilitation Center, 272 Or App 487, 356 P3d 150 (2015); Compton v. SAIF, 195 Or App 329, 333, 97 P3d 669, rev den, 337 Or 669 (2004). Under the substantial evidence standard, we do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for the board’s on matters of fact, but we do determine whether the board’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and substantial reason. ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Section 183.482(8)(c) treats an agency finding as supported by substantial evidence when the record as a whole would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.

Jones v. Board of Parole · filed 2026-06-10(8)(c)

When evaluating whether substantial evidence supports an agency’s finding, we ask whether “the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires a reviewing court to set aside or remand an agency order that is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Kirsch v. Department of Consumer & Business Services · filed 2012-05-09(8)(c)

ORS 183.482(8)(c) (court shall set aside or remand agency order “if the court finds that the order is not supported by substantial evidence in the record”). Specifically, petitioner contends that the director, in each instance, failed to “articulate a rational connection between the facts and the legal conclusions that it draws from them.” (Boldface and internal quotation marks omitted.) That is a “substantial reason” argument. ... So framed, the issue before us reduces to whether the director articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the legal conclusions that she drew from those facts — that is, her conclusions that the department properly applied each of the statutory criteria in approving the rate filing. ... Under that standard, we reject petitioner’s first assignment of error.

Section 183.482(8)(c) supports a factual finding when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.

Vedder v. Board of Parole · filed 2025-06-04(8)(c)

“Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding of fact.”

Section 183.482(8) requires affirmance of an agency finding when it is supported by substantial evidence and the agency order explains a rational connection between the facts and the result.

Hessel v. Board of Parole · filed 2025-12-17(8)

Reviewing that finding for substantial evidence and substantial reason, ORS 144.335(3); ORS 183.482(8), we affirm. ... The record provides substantial evidence for the board’s finding that petitioner’s emotional disturbance was severe and constituted a danger to the community. ... The board’s order, which relied on those facts, explained its decision and provided a rational connection between the facts it found and the result it reached from them.

Section 183.482(8)(c) limits review of an agency’s factual findings to whether substantial evidence supports them, meaning the record as a whole would permit a reasonable person to make the finding.

Pullam v. Employment Department · filed 2010-10-20(8)(c)

Our review of EAB’s factual findings is limited to the question whether the agency’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. ORS 183.482(8)(c); ... Substantial evidence exists to support a factual finding “when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make the finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Section 183.482(8)(d) limits review of agency findings to whether substantial evidence in the whole record supports them.

Archuletta v. Oregon Women's Correctional Center · filed 1976-04-19(8)(d)

Our review of the Disciplinary Committee’s findings is limited to a determination of whether they are "supported by substantial evidence in the whole record.” ORS 183.482(8)(d); see Bonney v. OSP, 16 Or App 509, 519 P2d 383, aff’d 270 Or 79, 526 P2d 1020 (1974). The committee based its findings on substantial evidence tending to show that petitioner conspired and attempted to procure drugs for herself and a fellow inmate from a contact outside the institution to whom she had telephoned and written requesting illicit drugs.

Subsection (8)(d) permits reversal or remand of a contested-case order when it lacks substantial evidence in the whole record.

Corcoran v. Board of Examiners for Speech Pathology & Audiology · filed 1976-06-21(8)(d)

The findings of the Board noted above were, therefore, supported by "substantial evidence” in the record.

A licensee’s admissions of errors and omissions can constitute substantial evidence supporting agency charges under ORS 183.482(8)(d).

Voelz v. BD. OF ENGINEERING EXAMINERS, ETC. · filed 1977-09-06(8)(d)

As such, it is clear that the foregoing each constitutes substantial evidence of the respective charges mentioned within the meaning of ORS 183.482(8)(d).

Section 183.482(8)(d) provides for substantial evidence review of an agency’s factual findings.

Williams v. Civil Rights Division · filed 1977-09-19(8)(d)

We hold ERB’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, ORS 183.482(8)(d), and ERB’s conclusions are supported by substantial reason, McCann v. OLCC, 27 Or App 487, 556 P2d 973 (1976), Sup Ct review denied (1977).

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires courts to review challenged agency findings of fact for substantial evidence.

Steamboaters v. Winchester Water Control District · filed 1984-09-05(8)(c)

We review challenged findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence. ORS 183.482(8)(c). Examination of the record convinces us that these are.

The amended substantial-evidence standard in section 183.482(8)(c) applies only to proceedings commenced after September 20, 1985.

Bergun v. Employment Division · filed 1986-10-15(8)(c)

The amendment to ORS 183.482(8) (c) applies only to proceedings commenced after the effective date of the amendment, September 20,1985.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires a court to set aside or remand an agency order when the record as a whole lacks substantial evidence to support a factual finding.

Bunnell v. Employment Division · filed 1987-08-24(8)(c)

There is no substantial evidence in the record “when viewed as a whole” that would permit the referee or the EAB to make a finding that claimant’s act amounted to more than an isolated instance of poor judgment.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires substantial evidence review of LCDC acknowledgment orders when a challenge to the evidence is properly raised.

1000 Friends v. Land Conservation & Development Commission · filed 1988-03-29(8)(c)

The Court of Appeals correctly identified its responsibility to apply a substantial evidence test to decisions of LCDC when a challenge to the evidence has been properly raised. ORS 197.650 provides that decisions of LCDC shall be appealed to the Court of Appeals in the manner provided in ORS 183.482. ORS 183.482(8) (c) specifically states that “[t]he court shall set aside or remand the order if it finds that the order is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.”

Section 183.482(8)(c) calls for review of whether an agency decision is supported by substantial evidence on the whole record, regardless of whether the reviewing court agrees with it.

Doherty v. Oregon Water Resources Director · filed 1988-10-12(8)(c)

We add only that, whether or not we agree with it, the Director’s decision is supported by substantial evidence on the whole record.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires courts to review the Board’s factual findings for substantial evidence; the Board’s order must contain enough findings to permit that review.

Brown v. Argonaut Insurance Company · filed 1988-10-26(8)(c)

Even if the Board applied the correct legal standard, its order is not sufficient to permit our review for substantial evidence.

Section 183.482(8)(c) permits a court to set aside an agency order when the record cannot reasonably support a material finding.

Applebee v. Motor Vehicles Division · filed 1989-09-06(8)(c)

On this record, the referee could not reasonably have reached that finding. ORS 183.482(8) (c); City of Portland v. Bureau of Labor and Ind., 298 Or 104, 119, 690 P2d 475 (1984); see Armstrong v. Asten-Hill Co., 90 Or App 200, 206-07, 752 P2d 312 (1988).

Subsection (8)(c) requires substantial evidence to support an agency finding; an officer cannot rely on one statement while ignoring contrary statements by the same witness.

Matney v. Adult & Family Services Division · filed 1989-12-06(8)(c)

Substantial evidence means any evidence that a reasonable person would use to reach the same conclusion. ... It was unreasonable for the hearings officer to rely solely on one statement of petitioner while ignoring other statements that he made to the contrary.

Section 183.482(8)(c) permits a reviewing court to uphold a finding supported by substantial evidence when the factfinder chose between conflicting medical opinions.

Garcia v. Boise Cascade Corp. · filed 1990-10-03(8)(c)

The trier of fact was entitled to believe either of the two conflicting medical opinions. Substantial evidence supports the decision that the work was not the major contributing cause of the condition. ORS 183.482(8)(c); Garcia v. Boise Cascade Corp., supra, 309 Or at 295.

Section 183.482(7) confines contested case review to the record and requires substantial evidence review of agency factfinding without substituting the court’s judgment.

Teamey v. Employment Division · filed 1990-12-12(7)

ORS 183.482(7) provides, in pertinent part: “Review of a contested case shall be confined to the record, the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to any issue of fact or agency discretion.” Thus, on review, we examine the record for substantial evidence.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires substantial evidence in the record to support an agency order on judicial review.

Oregon School Employees Ass'n v. Rainier School District No. 13 · filed 1991-03-21(8)(c)

There is also substantial evidence in the record to support ERB’s findings of fact that the notices provided to Gamble complied with the contract requirements, and its conclusion that the misconduct, duly noticed, constituted just cause for discharge. ERB’s order on remand is, therefore, supported by substantial evidence in the record, and we affirm it. ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Substantial evidence review does not require the Workers’ Compensation Board to adopt a referee’s findings or explain differences between its findings and the referee’s.

Erck v. Brown Oldsmobile & EBI Companies · filed 1991-07-25(8)(c)

Although the Board should seriously consider the testimony the referee believes to be reliable, the “substantial evidence” standard does not require the Board to adopt the referee’s findings or to “explain away” disparities between the Board’s and the referee’s determinations.

Under subsection (8)(c), a reviewing court may uphold an agency’s inferred finding when a reasonable person could deduce it from the basic facts, and the agency must state the basis for its inference.

Miller v. Board of Nursing · filed 1992-08-26(8)(c)

We will uphold the Board’s findings if a reasonable person could deduce from the basic facts the ultimate fact that petitioner will likely invade the privacy and offend the dignity of patients. ... The order must state the basis of the Board’s inference.

Subsection (8)(c) requires substantial evidence to support an agency finding about a person’s mental condition at the time of the hearing.

Garcia v. Psychiatric Security Review Board · filed 1992-12-09(8)(c)

PSRB’s finding is not supported by substantial evidence.

Section 183.482(8)(c) permits a factual finding to stand when the record as a whole would allow a reasonable person to make it.

Bhattarai v. Stein · filed 1993-03-31(8)(c)

We have reviewed the record and conclude that the finding that the driveway’s angle causes poor visibility is supported by substantial evidence. ORS 183.482(8)(c) provides, in part: ‘ ‘Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” The testimony of the owner regarding his difficulty to see ahead of and behind his vehicle while using the driveway supports the Board’s finding.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires substantial evidence supporting an agency’s findings in the evidence the agency expressly relied on.

Hodgin v. Psychiatric Security Review Board · filed 1994-04-27(8)(c)

In reviewing a PSRB order, it is not enough that the record contain substantial evidence to support the PSRB’s findings. “The question is whether the evidence on which PSRB expressly relied supports what the agency did.”

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires courts to review agency factual findings for substantial evidence.

Reed v. Labor Force of Oregon · filed 1998-09-02(8)(c)

Our review of the Board’s factual findings is for substantial evidence, ORS 183.482(8)(c), and we cannot say, on this record, that the Board’s conclusion was untenable.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires courts to consider the whole record, including evidence against an agency finding, when deciding whether substantial evidence supports it.

Bingham v. Employment Department · filed 1999-10-13(8)(c)

Before addressing the particular sufficiency of those findings, we recount the evidence bearing on claimant’s refusal to give a written statement, that is, the “evidence against the finding as well as evidence supporting it.”

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires a court to review the whole record and uphold a finding if a reasonable person could make it.

Schuler v. Beaverton School District No. 48J · filed 1999-12-15(8)(c)

Substantial evidence supports a finding when the record, viewed as a whole, permits a reasonable person to make the finding. Garcia v. Boise Cascade Corp., 309 Or 292, 295, 787 P2d 884 (1990); ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Subsection (8)(c) requires reversal of an agency finding when the record as a whole would not permit a reasonable person to make it.

Oregon Occupational Safety & Health Division v. Northwest Shake Tile, Inc. · filed 2000-02-09(8)(c)

However, we agree with employer that the administrative law judge’s (AU) ultimate determination that employer’s anchorage devices violated 29 CFR § 1926.502(d)(15) is not supported by substantial evidence. ORS 183.482(8)(c). Consequently, we reverse with respect to that citation.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires a court reviewing an agency inference to determine whether substantial evidence supports the underlying facts and whether reason connects those facts to the inference.

City of Roseburg v. Roseburg City Firefighters, Local No. 1489 · filed 1981-12-29(8)(c)

Judicial review of an inference is thus in two stages: (1) whether the basic fact or facts are supported by substantial evidence, and (2) whether there is a basis in reason connecting the inference to the facts from which it is derived.

Section 183.482(8)(c) calls for a court reviewing agency factfinding to determine whether the agency could reasonably draw its conclusion from the evidence.

Bank of Newport v. Wages · filed 1996-07-03(8)(c)

The inquiry thus reduces to whether the Board, as a trier of fact, could reasonably read Schumann’s opinion as concluding, albeit implicitly, that cognizable stressors were the “major contributing cause” of claimant’s adjustment disorder. ORS 183.482(8)(c); ORS 656.802-(2)(a). We conclude that the Board could reasonably so read Schumann’s opinion.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires a factual finding to be supported by evidence that would permit a reasonable person, viewing the whole record, to make that finding.

Portland Ass'n of Teachers v. Multnomah School District No. 1 · filed 2000-12-27(8)(c)

Substantial evidence to support a finding of fact is evidence that, viewing the record as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires courts to review agency findings for substantial evidence rather than decide the facts de novo.

Klamath County v. Department of Transportation · filed 2005-08-03(8)(c)

Our review under ORS 183.482(8)(c), however, is for whether there is substantial evidence to support ODOT’s findings; we do not review those findings de novo.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires substantial evidence review of an LCDC order even when the underlying local government decision is legislative in nature.

City of West Linn v. Land Conservation & Development Commission · filed 2005-09-08(8)(c)

Thus, whether or not the decisions were, strictly speaking, “legislative” in nature, they are subject to review for adequate support in the record. LCDC does not explain, and we do not understand, how that review differs in any significant way from the substantial evidence review that is described in ORS 183.482, at least in the context of this case.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires the court to consider the whole record, including contrary evidence, when deciding whether substantial evidence supports an agency finding.

Port of Portland Ocip v. Cierniak · filed 2006-09-06(8)(c)

“[Substantial evidence supports a finding when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make the finding.” Garcia v. Boise Cascade Corp., 309 Or 292, 295, 787 P2d 884 (1990); ORS 183.482(8)(c). “If a finding is reasonable in light of countervailing as well as supporting evidence, the finding is supported by substantial evidence.” Garcia, 309 Or at 295. In this case, the record provides substantial evidence for the board’s conclusion that working conditions at Port of Portland independently contributed to claimant’s left-side CTS.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires substantial evidence review of the board’s factual findings; a finding is supported when the record as a whole permits a reasonable person to make it.

Bluemer v. Southland Industries · filed 2008-07-23(8)(c)

Substantial evidence supports a finding when the record, viewed as a whole, permits a reasonable person to make the finding.

Under subsection (8)(c), an agency’s factual finding stands if the record as a whole would permit a reasonable person to make it.

Thompson v. Land Conservation & Development Commission · filed 2009-04-01(8)(c)

We will affirm LCDC’s factual finding if “the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c). ... Accordingly, we cannot say that LCDC erred in making the factual finding that it did.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires courts to review agency factual findings for substantial evidence, asking whether the record as a whole would permit a reasonable person to make the finding.

Kercher v. Employment Department · filed 2012-06-13(8)(c)

We review the board’s factual ... findings for substantial evidence, which exists when “the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires a reviewing court to set aside or remand an agency final order that lacks substantial evidence.

WaterWatch of Oregon, Inc. v. Water Resources Department · filed 2014-12-31(8)(c)

Under ORS 183.482(8)(c), we are required to set aside or remand the department’s final orders if they are not supported by substantial evidence.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires substantial evidence to support an agency's factual findings on judicial review.

Angel MedFlight Worldwide Air Ambulance Serv. v. SAIF Corp. (In re Keely) · filed 2018-09-06(8)(c)

We review the director's final order for substantial evidence and substantial reason. ... Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence does not support the director's order.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires a reviewing court to set aside or remand an agency order when the record as a whole would not permit a reasonable person to make a finding necessary to that order.

Rinne v. Psychiatric Sec. Review Bd. · filed 2019-05-15(8)(c)

Having reviewed the record, we agree with petitioner that PSRB's finding of that nexus is not supported by substantial evidence, because the record, viewed as a whole, would not permit a reasonable person to make that finding.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires agency findings of fact to be supported by substantial evidence in the record viewed as a whole.

NW Environ. Advocates v. DEQ · filed 2026-04-29(8)(c)

On the second assignment of error, we have determined that EQC’s findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record such that the ... evidence “would permit a reasonable person to make that finding,” ORS 183.482(8)(c), and its conclusions derived from those findings were adequately explained with substantial reasoning.

Under subsection (8)(c), an expert hearsay report based partly on multiple hearsay may fail to provide substantial evidence when its methods are seriously questioned and the expert does not testify.

Supension of Driving Privileges of Cole v. Driver & Motor Vehicle Services Branch · filed 2004-04-08(8)(c)

When, as here, critical evidence is in the form of a hearsay report that is prepared by an expert witness who does not testify and that is based partially on hearsay and multiple hearsay, and when significant questions have been raised as to the methods used to prepare that evidence, we are not satisfied that a reasonable person could rely on the report to support a conclusion that a driver has been either reckless or criminally negligent. We therefore hold that the reports that DMV offered at Dinsmore’s hearing did not constitute substantial evidence under ORS 183.482(8)(c) to support the hearing officer’s finding of criminal negligence or recklessness, which formed the basis for the agency’s decision to continue to suspend Dinsmore’s license.

Section 183.482(8)(c) does not permit remand for unsupported factual findings unless they affect the validity of the agency’s order.

Innovative Design & Construction, LLC v. Construction Contractors Board · filed 2016-05-25(8)(c)

Rather, because the erroneous findings were not material and, therefore, did not affect the validity of the order, they do not provide a basis for remand.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires a court to set aside or remand an agency order that is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Messer v. Polk County District Boundary Board · filed 1983-10-12(8)(c)

Judicial review of the Board’s action is provided for by ORS 330.101(6), which states that review shall be governed by ORS 183.482, subsection (8)(c) of which provides that: ... “The court shall set aside or remand the order if it finds that the order is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.” ... The record here does not contain substantial evidence that would support a finding that the Fasts’ exclusive motive in initiating the petition was to obtain a tax advantage.

The section defines substantial evidence as whether the record as a whole would permit a reasonable person to make the finding.

Tew v. Driver & Motor Vehicle Services Branch · filed 2002-02-13(8)(c)

We have treated substantial evidence under that statute as equivalent to the standard in ORS 183.482(8)(c), which provides that “substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.”

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires the Court of Appeals to set aside or remand a Board order unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.

Miller v. Oregon Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision · filed 2011-01-18(8)(c)

However, Oregon Revised Statute section 183.482 grants the Oregon Court of Appeals jurisdiction to review Board orders, and subsection 8(c) provides that the “court shall set aside or remand the order if the court finds that the order is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 183.482(8)(c).

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires a Board decision to deny sentence conversion to be supported by substantial evidence, meaning a reasonable person could have reached the same decision.

Fisher v. Oregon Board Of · filed 2011-01-18(8)(c)

Oregon law provides that the Board’s decision to deny Fisher the sentence conversion must have been supported by “substantial evidence,” meaning a reasonable person could have reached the same decision.

ORS 183.482(8)(c) defines substantial evidence by whether the record as a whole would permit a reasonable person to make the finding.

Khalaf v. Dept. of Rev. · filed 2021-09-30(8)(c)

In 1995, “substantial evidence” review was widely used in review of administrative rulings. ORS 183.482(8)(c) (1995) provided in part, as it does today: ... “The court shall set aside or remand the [agency] order if the court finds that the order is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ... Because the term “substantial evidence” had a well-established legal meaning when the legislature adopted it, we presume that the legislature intended this court to apply that meaning as the standard to review Tax Court decisions. ... When reviewing the Tax Court’s findings of fact, then, we consider whether “the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.”

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires the reviewing court to determine whether substantial evidence supports an agency’s conclusion, without reweighing the evidence.

Gresham Grade Teachers Ass'n v. Gresham Grade School District No. 4 · filed 1981-06-29(8)(c)

Our function on review is not to weigh the evidence but only to determine whether the agency’s conclusion is supported by substantial evidence.

Section 183.482(8)(c) treats agency findings as supported by substantial evidence when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make the finding.

Charlemagne v. Board of Parole · filed 2026-03-18(8)(c)

“Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8) (c). ... The PSED finding was thus not supported by substantial evidence and substantial reason.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires the court to set aside or remand an agency order only when it is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Walker v. Board of Parole · filed 2024-12-26(8)(c)

Because that condition is supported by substantial evidence, ORS 183.482(8)(c), we affirm.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires an appellate court to set aside or remand an agency order that is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Rusten v. Employment Dept. · filed 2025-05-29(8)(c)

Under our standard of review, we will set aside or remand the board’s order if the order is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. ORS 183.482(8)(c)

Section 183.482(8)(c) treats evidence as substantial when the record as a whole would permit a reasonable person to make the finding; applying that standard, the court found PSRB’s causation finding unsupported.

Rinne v. PSRB · filed 2023-07-06(8)(c)

“Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c). ... In sum, PSRB’s conclusion that petitioner’s dangerousness was “because of” his anxiety disorders is not supported by substantial evidence and reason.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires affirmance of an agency factual finding when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.

Mendoza v. Ron Dickson Corp. · filed 2023-08-30(8)(c)

Rather, under ORS 183.482(8)(c), we affirm the director’s order where the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires the court to set aside or remand an agency order unsupported by substantial evidence, judged by whether the whole record would permit a reasonable person to make the finding, and permits review of whether the findings provide substantial reason for the agency’s legal conclusion.

East Valley Water v. Water Resources Commission · filed 2023-11-01(8)(c)

Under ORS 183.482(8)(c), we must set aside or remand the order if we find that “the order is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” “Our review for substantial evidence does not entail or permit [us] to reweigh or to assess the credibility of the evidence that was presented to the factfinding body. As part of our substantial evidence review, we [also] look at whether the findings provide substantial reason to support the legal conclusion reached by the agency.” ... We conclude that there is substantial evidence in the record upon which a reasonable person could find that the proposed reservoir and resulting inundation of the creek would conflict with the habitat needs of cutthroat trout, and the beneficial purpose of the instream water right would be frustrated. For that reason and the additional reasons expressed above, we affirm the commission’s final order.

Section 183.482(8)(c) permits setting aside or remanding an agency order that is not supported by substantial evidence, measured by whether the whole record would permit a reasonable person to make the finding.

Champion v. Employment Dept. · filed 2023-03-29(8)(c)

We will set aside or remand a board’s order if “the order is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c). “Substantial evidence” includes “substantial reason.” Put another way, the board must provide an explanation for how it reached its conclusion.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires review of agency factual findings for substantial evidence based on the whole record and supports substantial-reason review requiring a rational connection between supported facts and the agency’s conclusions.

Gaines v. Employment Department · filed 2017-09-07(8)(c)

In addressing that contention, we review the board’s factual findings for substantial evidence, which exists when “the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c); ... Thus, on review, we consider whether the board articulated a rational connection between factual findings that the record supports and the board’s ultimate legal conclusion—that claimant quit her employment without good cause. We conclude that it did not.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires a court to set aside or remand an agency order that lacks substantial evidence, including findings and conclusions supported by substantial reason.

Lockett v. Teacher Standards & Practices Comm'n · filed 2017-12-28(8)(c)

We must set aside or remand an agency's order if it is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. ORS 183.482(8)(c). "[I]mplicit in the requirement that the order be supported by substantial evidence is a requirement that the agency's findings and conclusions be supported by 'substantial reason.'"

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires an agency order to be supported by substantial evidence and, implicitly, substantial reason connecting the facts found to the conclusions drawn.

Taylor v. SAIF Corp. (In re Taylor) · filed 2018-12-05(8)(c)

Substantial reason is "[i]mplicit in the requirement that the order be supported by substantial evidence" under ORS 183.482(8)(c). ... Here, although the board's order identifies the applicable factors and states that the board has considered them, the order fails to articulate a connection between those factors in its conclusion sufficiently to allow us to understand the board's reasoning. ... Because we cannot determine why the board made the fee award that it did, we conclude that the order lacks substantial reason.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires an appellate court to set aside or remand an agency order unsupported by substantial evidence, including when the agency’s findings and conclusions lack substantial reason.

Roadhouse v. Employment Department · filed 2017-02-23(8)(c)

We are directed to set aside or remand the order if “the order is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.” ORS 183.482(8)(c). Implicit in the requirement that the order be supported by substantial evidence is a requirement that the agency’s findings and conclusions be supported by “substantial reason.”

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires an agency order reviewed by the court to be supported by substantial evidence and reason.

Federal Express Corp. v. Estrada · filed 2015-12-09(8)(c)

With those arguments in mind, we consider whether the board’s order is supported by substantial evidence and reason, as ORS 183.482(8)(c) requires.

ORS 183.482(8)(c) requires review of an agency factual finding to determine whether the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make it, while ORS 183.482(8)(a) provides for review of legal error.

City of Eugene v. McDermed · filed 2012-06-27(8)(a), (8)(c)

In considering such a challenge, we assess whether “the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make” the disputed finding. ORS 183.482(8)(c); ... With that factual predicate reiterated, we turn to whether the board committed legal error, ORS 183.482(8)(a), in determining that claimant’s injury occurred “in the course of’ her employment.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires setting aside a contested-case agency order unsupported by substantial evidence, while subsection (7) bars substituting the court’s judgment for the agency’s on facts or agency discretion.

Day v. Elections Division of the Secretary of State · filed 2011-10-19(8)(c), (7)

Under ORS 183.482(8)(c), we are required to set aside an agency order in a contested case if we determine “that the order is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” In making that assessment, we do “not substitute [our] judgment for that of the agency as to any issue of fact or agency discretion.” ORS 183.482(7).

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires the court to uphold an agency factual finding when the whole record would permit a reasonable person to make it, and subsection (7) bars the court from substituting its judgment for the agency’s on fact or agency discretion.

BWK, Inc. v. Department of Administrative Services · filed 2009-09-30(8)(c) and (7)

We review a factual finding of an agency to determine if it is “supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c). We are not authorized to reweigh the evidence or assess its degree of persuasiveness. ORS 183.482(7) (“[T]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to any issue of fact or agency discretion.”).

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires an agency finding to be supported by substantial evidence, meaning the record as a whole must permit a reasonable person to make the finding.

Werth v. Employment Dept. · filed 2010-09-29(8)(c)

"Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding." ORS 183.482(8)(c). We question whether it is reasonable to infer that, merely because claimant intended to seek an SPO, she perceived that as the best guarantee of her safety. Nevertheless, even assuming that claimant initially perceived a permanent SPO as the best guarantee of her safety, the record does not support the finding that she held that perception when she decided to quit her job.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires review of an agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence, meaning the whole record would permit a reasonable person to make the finding.

Stacy v. Employment Dept. · filed 2010-12-29(8)(c)

As such, we understand claimant to argue that the board's conclusion that claimant voluntarily left work without good cause is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. ORS 183.482(8)(c). Therefore, we review the board's factual findings for substantial evidence, which exists when "the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding." Id.

Section 183.482(8)(c) permits remand when an agency order is not supported by substantial evidence, but immaterial factual errors do not require remand.

McDowell v. Employment Department · filed 2008-09-03(8)(c)

Although we are authorized to remand an order if we find “that the order is not supported by substantial evidence in the record,” ORS 183.482(8)(c), the factual errors identified by claimant do not affect the critical determination that claimant voluntarily left work without good cause. Accordingly, remand is not appropriate.

Section 183.482(8)(c) requires a reviewing court to set aside a contested-case agency order unsupported by substantial evidence, while § 183.482(7) bars substituting the court’s judgment for the agency’s on facts or agency discretion.

BERNARD FOR COM'R v. Elections Div. · filed 2009-07-01(8)(c), (7)

ORS 183.482(8)(c) requires that we set aside an agency order in a contested case if we determine "that the order is not supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding." ORS 183.482(7) cautions that a reviewing court "shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to any issue of fact or agency discretion."

Section 183.482(8)(c) treats a finding as supported by substantial evidence when the whole record would permit a reasonable person to make it.

Pietrzykowski v. Albertsons, Inc. · filed 2005-05-04(8)(c)

ORS 183.482(8)(c) provides, “Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” In order for us to conduct a review under ORS 183.482(8)(c), “we must be able to know what the Board found as fact and why it believes that its findings led to the conclusions that it reached. That requires a reasoned opinion based on explicit findings of fact.”

Subsection (8)(c) provides that substantial evidence supports a factual finding when the record viewed as a whole would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.

Express Services, Inc. v. Conradson · filed 2002-04-10(8)(c)

ORS 183.482(8)(c) provides that “[substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, ... viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.”

Section 183.482(8)(c) defines substantial evidence as evidence that, considering the record as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make the finding of fact.

Lecangdam v. SAIF Corp. · filed 2002-12-11(8)(c)

According to ORS 183.482(8)(c), “ [substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.”