Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.414

Section 2151.414(E) requires a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent when clear and convincing evidence establishes one or more enumerated factors as to each parent.

In re T.H.C. · filed 2023-03-03(E)

Under R.C. 2151.414(E), the trial court must consider all relevant evidence before making this determination. The trial court is required to enter such a finding if it determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that one or more of the factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) through (16) exist with respect to each of the child's parents.

One section 2151.414(E) factor alone can support a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time.

In re G.R. · filed 2023-05-01(E)

The statute also provides that if the court makes a finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1)-(15), the court shall determine the children cannot or should not be placed with the parent. A trial court may base its decision that a child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with a parent upon the existence of any one of the R.C. 2151.414(E) factors. The existence of one factor alone will support a finding that the child cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time.

Section 2151.414(E)'s reasonable-time placement finding was supported where the parent never addressed the two principal concerns of substance abuse and anger management.

In re T.H.C. · filed 2023-05-15(E)

Father did not complete SUD treatment and recommendations. Father did not commence anger management treatment due to his failure to complete SUD treatment. The two main areas of concern regarding Father were substance abuse and anger management, which Father never addressed. ... Based upon the foregoing, we find the trial court's finding the Children could not be placed with Father within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with him is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The plain language of section 2151.414(E) requires only one enumerated factor to establish that a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent.

In re N.A. · filed 2023-09-28(E)

If one or more of the factors exist, "the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent[.]" R.C. 2151.414(E). Therefore, the plain language of the statute only requires a finding of one to satisfy this part of the test.

A juvenile court need find only one section 2151.414(E) factor to determine that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time.

In re L.S. · filed 2023-10-05(E)

Because the court need find only one R.C. 2151.414(E) factor applies, we will not address the additional factors. ... Our review presents clear and convincing evidence that L.S. could not or should not be placed with his Mother within a reasonable time.

One section 2151.414(E) factor is sufficient to support a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent.

In re T.P. · filed 2023-10-06(E)

A court need only find one (E) factor present to support a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.

When clear and convincing evidence establishes one or more section 2151.414(E) conditions as to each parent, the court must find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent.

In re B.S. · filed 2023-12-14(E)

In light of the foregoing findings, all of which were supported by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court was required by statute to conclude that B.S. cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.

When applying section 2151.414(B)(1)(a), the court needs clear and convincing evidence of only one factor enumerated in section 2151.414(E).

In re B.M. · filed 2024-01-12(E)

When making a finding under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), the court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that only one of the factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(E) exists.

One section 2151.414(E) factor established by clear and convincing evidence is enough to satisfy the first prong of an initial-disposition permanent-custody determination.

In re M.H. · filed 2024-04-24(E)

Where the court finds that just one of the R.C. 2151.414(E) factors exists by clear and convincing evidence, the first prong is satisfied.

One subsection (E) factor alone supports a finding that the child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time.

In re K.C. · filed 2025-03-28(E)

A trial court may base its decision that a child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with a parent upon the existence of any one of the R.C. 2151.414(E) factors. The existence of one factor alone will support the finding that the child cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time.

If clear and convincing evidence establishes any one listed subsection (E) factor, the court must find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent.

In re K.K. · filed 2025-04-07(E)

If a court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of any one of the listed factors, “the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.”

One factor under subsection (E) is sufficient to find that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent.

In re B.G.M. · filed 2025-04-24(E)

A juvenile court is only required to find that one of these factors is met in order to properly find that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent.

Only one subsection (E) factor must be met to find that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent.

In re A.E. · filed 2025-04-24(E)

Although mother challenges each of those factors, only one of the factors outlined in R.C. 2151.414(E) is required to be met in order to properly find that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent.

A juvenile court needs to find only one subsection (E) factor to support a holding that the child cannot or should not be placed with a parent.

In re J.J. · filed 2025-07-25(E)

Notably, the juvenile court “only needed to find that one [R.C. 2151.414(E)] factor applied to support its holding.”

Any one of subsection (E)'s sixteen scenarios can support a finding that a child cannot be placed with either parent.

In re E.T.S. · filed 2025-07-28(E)

That section in turn lists 16 possible scenarios, any one of which can support a trial court’s finding that a child cannot be placed with either parent. ... “The existence of one factor alone will support a finding that the child cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time.”

Any one subsection (E) factor is sufficient to support the conclusion that the child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time.

In re D.M. · filed 2026-01-14(E)

While Mother challenges the juvenile court’s determination under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), the juvenile court’s finding as to any one of the factors under R.C. 2151.414(E) is sufficient to support the conclusion that the children cannot or should not be placed with Mother within a reasonable time.

One subsection (E) factor is enough to support a permanent-custody placement finding, making challenges to alternative subsection (E) findings moot.

In re A.S. · filed 2026-01-28(E)

A trial court’s finding that one (E) factor applies to a parent supports an award of permanent custody to a children services agency. ... Because we have determined that the trial court correctly found that (E)(1) applies to mother, her arguments about the court’s other (E) finding is moot.

If clear and convincing evidence establishes any subsection (E) factor, the court must find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In re K.L. · filed 2026-01-29(E)

If any one or more of the R.C. 2151.414(E) factors are found by clear and convincing evidence, the court “shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.”

A finding of any one subsection (E) factor requires the conclusion that the child cannot or should not be placed with that parent within a reasonable time.

In re D.L. · filed 2026-01-30(E)

Under R.C. 2151.414(E), if the court finds that any one of the enumerated factors exists as to a parent, it must conclude that the child cannot or should not be placed with that parent within a reasonable time.

The existence of one subsection (E) factor supports a finding that the child cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time.

In re M.M. · filed 2026-02-02(E)

Thus, the existence of just one factor will support a finding that the child cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time.

Any one of subsection (E)'s sixteen scenarios can support a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent.

In re M.G. · filed 2026-02-03(E)

That section in turn lists 16 possible scenarios, any one of which can support a trial court’s finding that a child cannot be placed with either parent. “The existence of one factor alone will support a finding that the child cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time.”

One subsection (E) factor alone supports a finding that a child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time.

In re I.F. · filed 2026-06-26(E)

A trial court may base its decision that a child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with a parent upon the existence of any one of the R.C. 2151.414(E) factors. The existence of one factor alone will support a finding that the child cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time.

Section 2151.414(E) permits a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time when one listed factor is established.

In Re Lilley, Unpublished Decision (11-9-2004) · filed 2004-11-09(E)

Because at least one of the R.C. 2151.414 (E) factors applies, the trial court's finding that Monica cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and we need not address appellant's arguments concerning R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(b) and (d).

Section 2151.414(E) requires clear and convincing evidence of at least one listed factor before a court finds that a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent.

In re E.K. · filed 2019-12-09(E)

In making this determination, the court must first find, by clear and convincing evidence, that at least one of the factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(E) applies.

Section 2151.414(E) requires a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent when clear and convincing evidence establishes any one of its listed circumstances.

In Re Eric Patterson · filed 1999-09-01(E)

If it finds, however, by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of one or more of the circumstances enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) through (12), then it is required to rule that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the parents.

Section 2151.414(E) requires clear and convincing evidence that at least one listed factor applies to each parent before a court finds that a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent.

State v. Jefferson, Unpublished Decision (10-25-2000) · filed 2000-10-25(E)

In making such a determination, the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the enumerated factors in R.C. 2151.414 (E) exists as to each of the child's parents.

Evidence supported the child's positive relationship with the foster family under section 2151.414(D)(1)(a) despite the guardian ad litem's inability to contact the family immediately before her final report, where she had contacted them earlier and the caseworker corroborated the relationship.

In re Z.S. · filed 2023-03-01(D)(1)(a)

Thus, contrary to appellant’s assertion, the record does not demonstrate that the GAL failed to contact the foster family or failed to ascertain the family’s suitability to serve as the child’s caregivers. Instead, the GAL had done so at previous times throughout the case. Moreover, the caseworker testified that the child has a positive relationship with the foster family and that the foster family intends to adopt the child if given the opportunity. We therefore disagree with appellant that the trial court’s findings that the child shares a positive relationship with the foster family and that the family intends to adopt the child if the court grants the agency permanent custody are against the manifest weight of the evidence.

A juvenile court deciding legal custody may consider the best-interest factors in Section 2151.414(D)(1).

In re D.L. · filed 2023-04-05(D)(1)

When determining the best interest of a child in a legal-custody dispute, the juvenile court may consider the best-interest factors enumerated under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) or 3109.04(F)(1). Id. Here, the juvenile court applied the facts of this case to the relevant factors in both statutes. Father maintains that the juvenile court’s determination that awarding Maternal Grandmother legal custody of D.L. was in the child’s best interest is not supported by credible evidence. We disagree.

Because the statutory scheme lacks specific best-interest factors for temporary custody, courts may use the permanent-custody factors as guidance.

In re L.O.-D. · filed 2026-05-13(D)(1)

However, as Ohio courts are guided by the best interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D) (relating to permanent custody) and in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) (relating to the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities) in legal custody cases, it is reasonable to seek guidance from those same factors regarding an award of temporary custody.

Best-interest factors relevant to visitation include the child's relationships, wishes, adjustment, involved persons' health, and which parent will facilitate visitation.

In re T.L. · filed 2026-06-05(D)(1)(a)

Some of those factors are “[t]he child’s interaction and interrelationship with the child’s parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interest;” “[t]he wishes of the child, as expressed . . . through the child’s [GAL], with due regard for the maturity of the child;” “[t]he child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school, and community;” “[t]he mental and physical health of all persons involved in the situation;” and “[t]he parent more likely to honor and facilitate court-approved parenting time rights or visitation and companionship rights.” R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) and R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a).

Section 2151.414(B) permits permanent custody when sufficient evidence supports a statutory ground and shows that permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In re A.L. · filed 2015-09-14(B)

Based upon the foregoing, we find the trial court's findings A.L. could not be placed with Father within a reasonable time, and an award of permanent custody was in the child's best interest were not against the manifest weight of the evidence and were based upon sufficient evidence.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)'s best-interest factors supported permanent custody where abused children remained frightened of their mother, refused family counseling with her, and had a secure foster placement.

In re K.F. · filed 2023-04-20(D)(1)

Specifically, the court’s journal entry referred to the children’s ongoing trauma related to Mother and the fact that they were “frightened and hesitant to being in her company.” The court also referred to the wishes of K.F. and T.F., stating that they “voiced their concerns to their [social] worker and advised her that they do not want to be around Mother” and moreover, refused to participate in family counseling with Mother. The court also referred to the children’s custodial history and secure placement with the foster parents. This, together with the ample evidence in the record of Mother’s abuse of the children, shows that clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court’s decision to grant the agency’s motion for permanent custody.

Whether permanent custody is sought by modifying temporary custody or as an original disposition, the court must make the applicable first-prong finding and conduct the section 2151.414(D)(1) best-interest analysis by clear and convincing evidence.

In re L. Children · filed 2023-04-26(B)(1), (D)(1), (E)

To modify temporary custody to permanent custody, as HCJFS sought to do with A.L.1, the court must look to the two-prong test of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). ... To grant permanent custody as part of an original disposition, as HCJFS sought to do with A.L.2 and A.L.3, the court must determine “(1) that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the parent, using the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E), and (2) that permanent custody is in the best interest of the child based on the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).” ... Both approaches also require a best-interest analysis pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) under the second prong.

For permanent custody as an original disposition under section 2151.353(A)(4), the court need not consider section 2151.414(B)'s factors but must consider subsection (E)'s placement factors and determine best interests under subsection (D)(1), all by clear and convincing evidence.

In re Bn.J. · filed 2024-06-13(B), (D)(1), (E)

Under this section, the court does not have to consider the factors in R.C. 2151.414(B), but it must still consider the factors in R.C. 2151.414(E) and determine whether awarding permanent custody to the agency is in the child’s best ... interest under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). ... “All of the court’s findings must be by clear and convincing evidence.”

For an original permanent-custody disposition requested in the abuse, neglect, or dependency complaint, section 2151.414(B) does not apply, but the court must consider subsection (E) and determine best interests under subsection (D)(1).

In re M.B. · filed 2024-12-26(B), (D)(1), (E)

Thus, under R.C. 2151.353(A)(4), the juvenile court “does not have to consider the factors in R.C. 2151.414(B), but it must still consider the factors in R.C. 2151.414(E) and determine whether awarding permanent custody to the agency is in the child’s best interest under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).”

When permanent custody is requested as the original disposition in an abuse, neglect, or dependency complaint, subsection (B) does not apply, but the court must consider subsection (E) and determine best interest under subsection (D)(1).

In re T.W. · filed 2026-01-15(B), (D)(1), (E)

R.C. 2151.414(B) applies when a motion requesting permanent custody is filed. Here, CCDCFS requested permanent custody as part of its neglect and dependency complaint. ... Thus, under R.C. 2151.353(A)(4), the juvenile court “does not have to consider the factors in R.C. 2151.414(B), but it must still consider the factors in R.C. 2151.414(E) and determine whether awarding permanent custody to the agency is in the child’s best interest under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).”

When permanent custody is requested in the original complaint, subsection (B) does not apply, but the court must make the placement determination under subsection (E) and the best-interest determination under subsection (D)(1).

In re L.N. · filed 2026-04-16(B), (D)(1), (E)

R.C. 2151.414(B) applies when a motion for permanent custody is filed. Because CCDCFS requested permanent custody as part of its complaint, that provision does not apply here.

A juvenile court deciding legal custody is guided by section 2151.414(D)(1)'s permanent-custody best-interest factors, including relationships, the child's wishes and custodial history, the need for permanence, and applicable factors from subsections (E)(7) through (11).

In re C.P. · filed 2023-04-26(D)(1)

In that regard, the juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors enunciated in R.C. 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody. ... Those factors include the interaction and interrelationships of the child, the child’s wishes, the custodial history of the child, the child’s need for permanence, and whether any of the factors in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7)-(11) are applicable.

Section 2151.414(D)'s best-interest factors are instructive rather than mandatory in a legal-custody proceeding, so the juvenile court need not make specific findings on each factor.

In re R. Children · filed 2023-06-28(D)

Because the factors are instructive and not mandatory, the juvenile court does not have to make specific findings on each factor.

A juvenile court deciding legal custody is guided by section 2151.414(D)(1)'s permanent-custody best-interest factors, including relationships, the child's wishes and custodial history, and the child's need for permanence.

In re Z.K. · filed 2023-06-28(D)(1)

The juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody. ... Those factors include the interaction and interrelationships of the child, the child’s wishes, the custodial history of the child, and the child’s need for permanence.

No specific statutory factors govern legal custody, but a juvenile court may use section 2151.414(D)(1)'s permanent-custody factors as purely instructive guidance.

In re A.D. · filed 2023-07-17(D)(1)

Although, no specific factors must be followed in a case involving the dispositional alternative of legal custody, we have previously concluded that juvenile courts may be guided by the factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) (the permanent-custody factors) or R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) (factors employed in private-custody disputes) since they are both purely instructive.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)'s factors may guide a legal-custody decision but are not mandatory, and a court cannot require specific findings on each factor when the legislature has imposed no such requirement.

In re I.T. · filed 2023-08-28(D)(1)

Nevertheless, we have previously concluded that juvenile courts may be guided by the factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) (the permanent-custody factors) or R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) (factors employed in private-custody disputes) since they may be instructive. ... However, Aaron’s argument is clearly one that should properly be directed to the legislature because he effectively wants us to codify legal requirements that have not been made by the legislature.

Section 2151.414(D)'s best-interest factors may guide a legal-custody decision, and no one factor has greater weight than the others.

In re F.C. · filed 2023-11-30(D)

The factors listed under R.C. 2151.414(D) may be instructive when determining the child’s best interest in a legal custody case. ... There is not one element that is given greater weight than the others under the statute.

Section 2151.414(D)'s factors may instruct a legal-custody decision, but the juvenile court is not required to consider or weigh them in that proceeding.

In re Che.A · filed 2023-12-14(D)

As noted above, although the factors in R.C. 2151.414(D) may be instructive to the trial court in reaching its determination, consideration of these factors is not required when the trial court makes a best-interest-of-the-child determination in legal custody matters. ... Thus, the trial court is not required to weigh the R.C. 2151.414(D) factors in a legal custody matter.

A juvenile court determining legal custody is guided by section 2151.414(D)'s permanent-custody best-interest factors.

In re W.W. · filed 2024-03-06(D)

In that regard, the juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors enumerated in Revised Code Section 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(D)'s permanent-custody best-interest factors guide a juvenile court's determination of legal custody.

In re M.A. · filed 2024-03-06(D)

In that regard, the juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors enumerated in Revised Code Section 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(D)'s permanent-custody best-interest factors guide a juvenile court deciding which potential custodian should receive legal custody.

In re D.L. · filed 2024-03-06(D)

The juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody.

When a juvenile court uses section 2151.414(D)(1)'s best-interest factors to decide legal custody, the appellate court may use the same factors in its review.

In re W.W. · filed 2024-03-06(D)(1)

In the case at bar, however, the trial court considered the best interest factors contained in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). We therefore will use this same statute when reviewing appellant’s first assignment of error.

Section 2151.414(D)'s permanent-custody best-interest factors guide a juvenile court deciding legal custody.

In re R.D. · filed 2024-06-05(D)

The juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(D)'s permanent-custody best-interest factors guide a juvenile court's legal-custody determination among potential custodians.

In re J.S. · filed 2024-06-20(D)

The juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody.

A juvenile court may look to section 2151.414(D)(1)'s permanent-custody factors for guidance when deciding legal custody.

In re J.S. · filed 2024-10-09(D)(1)

In determining the best interest of the child, this court has held that, although the statute itself does not list factors that should be ... considered when making a legal-custody determination, a juvenile court may look to the factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) or 3109.04(F) for guidance.

A juvenile court deciding legal custody may use section 2151.414(D)'s best-interest factors alone, combine them with section 3109.04(F)(1), or rely on general best-interest considerations.

In re T.A. · filed 2024-10-25(D)

In making such a determination ‘courts have looked to the best interest factors of R.C. 2151.414(D), R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), a combination of the two, or general notions of what should be considered regarding the best interests of the [child].’

Section 2151.414(D)'s permanent-custody best-interest factors guide a juvenile court's legal-custody determination.

In re A.J. · filed 2024-12-26(D)

In that regard, the juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(D)'s best-interest factors may guide legal custody and must be weighed with other relevant factors because no single factor, including the parents' wishes, controls.

In re B.B.J. · filed 2025-01-21(D)

As detailed above, the parents’ wishes were one of many factors to be considered by the trial court. The best interest factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D) and 3109.04(F) are intended to be weighed by the trial court, as no one factor is controlling.

The subsection (D) permanent-custody best-interest factors guide a juvenile court deciding legal custody.

In re J.S. · filed 2025-03-19(D)

In that regard, the juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody.

In deciding legal custody under the subsection (D)(1) factors, a juvenile court may consider the guardian ad litem’s recommendation and the child’s custodial history.

In re M.S. · filed 2025-04-04(D)(1)

Therefore, the trial court did not err when it considered either the GAL’s recommendation or the custodial history of M.S.

Although no statute supplies specific legal-custody factors, courts generally use the subsection (D) permanent-custody best-interest factors as guidance.

In re A.B. · filed 2025-06-30(D)

Although no statute lists specific factors when considering whether to grant or deny a motion for legal custody, courts are generally guided by the same best interest factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D).

In considering legal custody after children have been committed to an agency's permanent custody, the court must consider the applicable subsection (D) conditions and conduct a best-interest analysis.

In re R.K. · filed 2025-07-30(D)(1)

In conducting its independent analysis as it pertains to granting legal custody of a child after he or she has been committed to the permanent custody of JFS, it considered the statutory conditions that must be met under R.C. 2151.414(D), followed by conducting a best-interest analysis.

The permanent-custody best-interest factors guide a juvenile court's decision whether to award legal custody.

In re C.W. · filed 2025-08-13(D)(1)

The juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody. ... Those factors include the interaction and interrelationships of the child, the child's wishes, the custodial history of the child, and the child's need for permanence.

The permanent-custody best-interest factors in subsection (D) guide a juvenile court deciding whether to award legal custody to a parent or relative.

In re E.C. · filed 2025-10-22(D)

In that regard, the juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors enumerated in Revised Code Section 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody.

The subsection (D)(1) best-interest factors guide juvenile courts deciding legal custody.

In re A.M. · filed 2025-11-05(D)(1)

The juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody. ... Those best interest factors include the interaction and interrelationships of the child, the child’s wishes, the custodial history of the child, the child’s need for permanence, and whether any of the factors in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7)-(11) are applicable.

The subsection (D) permanent-custody best-interest factors guide a juvenile court deciding legal custody.

In re A.D. · filed 2026-01-07(D)

In that regard, the juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors enumerated in Revised Code Section 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody.

A court may use the subsection (D) best-interest factors as guidance in deciding legal custody.

In re A.D. · filed 2026-02-17(D)

A court may therefore consider the relevant best interest factors set forth in either R.C. 3109.04(F) or R.C. 2151.414(D) as guidance in determining the best interest of the child.

The subsection (D) permanent-custody best-interest factors guide a juvenile court deciding legal custody.

In re D.W. · filed 2026-04-22(D)

In that regard, the juvenile court is guided by the best interest factors enumerated in Revised Code Section 2151.414(D) relating to permanent custody.

Juvenile courts may use the subsection (D) best-interest factors when deciding legal custody.

In re L.G. · filed 2026-05-08(D)

Once the case reaches the disposition phase, the best interest of the child controls.

Although subsection (D)'s factors concern permanent custody, Ohio courts also use them to decide legal custody.

In re A.B. · filed 2026-05-26(D)

R.C. 2151.414(D) sets forth factors in determining the best interest of the child. While the factors are related to permanent custody decisions, Ohio courts have adopted such standards in making legal custody decisions.

Courts may apply the permanent-custody best-interest factors when deciding legal custody.

In re S.R. · filed 2026-06-26(D)

Those factors are similar to the factors in R.C. 2151.414(D) that govern permanent custody motions, and courts sometimes apply both provisions when considering legal custody.

Section 2151.414(D)’s permanent custody best interest test may guide a court deciding legal custody.

In re R.B. · filed 2021-01-22(D)

Despite the differences between a disposition of permanent custody and legal custody, some Ohio courts have recognized “the statutory best interest test designed for the permanent custody situation may provide some ‘guidance’ for trial courts making legal custody decisions.” In re A.F., 9th Dist. No. 24317, 2009–Ohio–333 at ¶ 7, citing In re T.A., 9th Dist. No. 22954, 2006–Ohio–4468 at ¶ 17; In re S.D. 5th Dist. Stark Nos. 2013CA0081, 2013CA0082, 2013–Ohio–5752, ¶ 33.

The abandonment provisions of sections 2151.414(B)(1)(b) and (E)(10) were satisfied where the mother had only one virtual visit during the child's first ten months and the alleged father had no contact after birth, leaving more than ninety days without parental contact.

In re D.F. · filed 2023-04-27(B)(1)(b), (E)(10)

For example, clear and convincing evidence supports the court’s determination that D.F. was abandoned pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(10) and 2151.414(B)(1)(b). ... From D.F.’s birth in November 2021 to the trial in September 2022, Mother had only one Zoom visit with D.F. The alleged father, who never established paternity, had not visited or contacted D.F. since her birth. Thus, the record supports the trial court’s finding that D.F.’s parents failed to visit or maintain contact with D.F. for more than 90 days, raising the presumption of abandonment.

A court is excused from considering a child's wishes under section 2151.414(D)(1)(b) when credible evidence affirmatively shows that the child is not capable of understanding permanent custody and communicating those wishes.

In re L.R. · filed 2023-04-27(D)(1)(b)

We have previously found that where the record affirmatively shows through credible evidence that a child is not capable of communicating his or her wishes, the trial court is excused from considering the child’s wishes. ... Here, both the GAL’s and the caseworker’s testimony credibly and affirmatively demonstrated that only the oldest child was mature enough to express her wishes regarding custody and that granting permanent custody was in all the children’s best interests.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)'s best-interest factors supported permanent custody where the father lacked a bond with the children, the children were doing well and having their needs met in foster homes, and they needed stability the father could not provide.

In re M.G. · filed 2023-04-24(D)(1)(a), (d)

This includes the testimony from the children's caseworker that Father was not in any way bonded with the children, whereas S.G. was doing "very well" with his foster family, and that the two younger children, D.G. and A.G., were "doing very well, and they are excelling" with their foster families. ... This also includes the caseworker's testimony that the children's needs were being met by their respective foster families and that BCDJFS did not have any concerns about the children's needs being met going forward. This is in addition to the children's guardian ad litem's testimony that the children's best interests would be served by granting permanent custody to BCDJFS because the children "definitely need some stability in their life," which Father could not provide.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)'s best-interest analysis supported permanent custody where the mother failed to secure stable housing, employment, or sobriety, and the child wished to be adopted rather than returned to her.

In re S.S. · filed 2023-08-21(D)(1)(d)

Mother also failed to obtain, let alone maintain, stable housing or employment, two core foundations for providing a secure environment to allow a child to grow and prosper. ... Mother failed to complete significant goals of her case plan and took no serious steps to reunify with Sylvia. ... This is in addition to Sylvia's expressed desire to be adopted rather than be returned to Mother.

Section 2151.414(B)(2) applies only to a permanent-custody motion under section 2151.413(D)(2) after the court has determined that the agency need not make reasonable reunification efforts.

In re S.M.S.B. · filed 2023-05-03(B)(2)

R.C. 2151.414(B)(2) is inapplicable. It applies only to motions made pursuant to R.C. 2151.413(D)(2), which applies only if the court determines under R.C. 2151.419(A)(2) that “the agency is not required to make reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the child from the child’s home, eliminate the continued removal of the child from the child’s home, and return the child to the child’s home.” The juvenile court made no such finding in this case.

An agency need not prove reasonable reunification efforts again at a Section 2151.414 permanent-custody hearing when the court made reasonable-efforts findings earlier.

In re K.B. · filed 2026-04-06

Here, the permanent custody motion is governed by R.C 2151.413 and R.C. 2151.414. Therefore, the Agency was not required to show reasonable reunification efforts at the hearing ... unless it had not been established previously. ... Thus, the court did not need to again find that the Agency used reasonable efforts before it could grant the Agency permanent custody of the children.

Section 2151.414 does not require a reasonable-efforts determination in every permanent-custody motion, and an erroneous reasonable-efforts finding is harmless when the agency was excused from those efforts because of prior permanent removal of siblings.

In re R.H. · filed 2026-06-10

However, the procedures in R.C. 2151.414 do not mandate that the court make a determination whether reasonable efforts have been made in every R.C. 2151.413 motion for permanent custody. ... Thus, the trial court misspoke when it stated that the agency used reasonable efforts to reunify in this case because this finding was not required at the permanent custody hearing. However, this error is harmless in light of the above.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(a) applies only when no other subsection (B)(1) circumstance is triggered; abandonment instead triggers subsection (B)(1)(b).

In re J.C.S. · filed 2023-05-05(B)(1)(a), (b)

This court has explained that the (B)(1)(a) factor applies when none of the other factors under (B)(1) are triggered. ... The factor under subsection (B)(1)(b) is triggered when “[t]he child is abandoned.”

Abandonment satisfied section 2151.414(B)(1)'s first prong where a parent had no contact with the children for more than ninety days before the permanent-custody motion and more than seven months before the hearing.

In re O.D. · filed 2023-05-10(B)(1)

The CSB caseworker testified that Father attended seven visits with the children throughout the 15-month duration of the case. His last contact with the children occurred 108 days before the agency filed its permanent custody motion and more than seven months prior to the hearing. During that period, Father never contributed to the children’s support, attended any of their appointments, or inquired about their well-being. The clear and convincing evidence established that Father had abandoned O.D. and C.D.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) treats twelve months in temporary custody during a consecutive twenty-two-month period as an alternative ground for permanent custody, not as evidence of abandonment.

In the Matter of Hardy, Unpublished Decision (8-23-2004) · filed 2004-08-23(B)(1)(d)

Being in the temporary custody of CSB for twelve months out of a consecutive twenty-two month period is not evidence of abandonment. Rather, it is one alternative in the second prong of the permanent custody test as per R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d), and it is something to consider when reviewing the children's custodial history as per R.C. 2151.414 (D)(3). Abandonment and temporary custody for twelve months are specifically listed as separate and distinct issues in the statute.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(a) requires the court to consider whether a family relationship should be preserved, including evidence that parents made minimal efforts to improve their parenting or establish a relationship with a newborn child.

In re M.S. · filed 2023-05-10(D)(1)(a)

Whether it is in the best interest of the child for the parents to retain residual parental rights involves similar considerations, as R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) explicitly requires the court to examine the child’s interaction and interrelationships with “the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, [and] foster caregivers[.]” If the parents have made minimal effort to improve their parenting abilities and/or establish a relationship with their newborn child, the trial court should consider that evidence in determining whether there is a family relationship that should be preserved.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(a)'s interaction-and-interrelationship factor is not limited to the parent-child bond and may include the consistency of the parent's visitation.

In re J.W. · filed 2023-05-11(D)(1)(a)

‘[R]esolution of [R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)] is not limited to merely the bond between child and parent.’ ... ‘Courts have considered the consistency of a party’s visitation with [the children] when resolving the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) factor.’

The section 2151.414(D)(1)(b) wishes factor weighs neither for nor against permanent custody when the children were not interviewed and no testimony expressed their wishes.

In re B.T. · filed 2023-06-23(D)(1)(b)

B.T. and D.T., who were approximately five and three years old at the time of the permanent custody hearings, were not interviewed by the trial court and no testimony was offered purporting to express their wishes. Accordingly, this factor neither ... weighed in favor nor against granting permanent custody to CCDJFS.

An in-camera interview is an appropriate way to determine a mature child's wishes under section 2151.414(D)(1)(b), and the court may consider those wishes as one factor among many.

In re J.M. · filed 2023-08-11(D)(1)(b)

An in-camera interview with the child can be an appropriate method for the court to make this determination. ... The juvenile court did not err by holding an in-camera interview with J.M., nor by taking his wishes into account as one factor among many in its decision on his disposition.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(b) requires a court to hear and consider a child's wishes but does not require the judgment to explain specifically how that factor informed the decision.

In re N.N. · filed 2023-09-05(D)(1)(b)

The trial court also heard the closing summary of the child's attorney advocate expressing the child's wishes. ... The trial court heard and considered the wishes of the child, but was not obligated to mention “how this factor specifically informs the trial court's decision.”

Section 2151.414(E)(4)'s lack-of-commitment factor was satisfied where a mother completed services but continued choosing a drug-involved, armed, and violent partner over the children and their safety.

In re A.L. · filed 2023-08-16(E)(4)

We further conclude, as to mother’s second assignment of error, that clear and convincing evidence in the record supports the juvenile court’s findings that mother exhibited a lack of commitment to the children due to her unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for the children. ... The record shows that mother completed all of her services, but she failed to change her behaviors, as she continued her relationship with father, who sells and takes ... drugs, has firearms and is violent. The foregoing demonstrates that mother prioritized father over the children and their safety.

Sections 2151.414(D)(1) and (D)(2) are alternative ways to determine best interests; a court that weighs the multiple factors under (D)(1) need not also conduct (D)(2)'s four-part analysis.

In re J.P. · filed 2023-09-11(D)(1), (D)(2)

These two provisions ‘are alternative means for reaching the best-interest determination,’ and ‘[w]here a juvenile court employs the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) [multiple factor weighing] method of determining the child’s best interest, the court need not also conduct the R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) [four-requisite prong] analysis.’

Former sections 2151.414(D)(1) and (D)(2) were alternative best-interest methods; if any mandatory (D)(2) circumstance was absent, the court had to weigh the factors under (D)(1).

In re K.P. · filed 2024-07-24former (D)(1), (D)(2)

Former R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) and 2151.414(D)(2) were “alternative means for reaching the best-interest determination.” ... “[I]f * * * any of ... the circumstances enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) does not exist, then the juvenile court must proceed to a weighing of factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)” to determine the child’s best interest.

Section 2151.414 provides two separate best-interest methods: weighing relevant factors under subsection (D)(1), or mandatory custody when all subsection (D)(2) factors apply.

In re Ju.B. · filed 2025-12-11(D)(1), (D)(2)

The statute provides two separate methods for making the best interest determination.

Subsections (D)(1) and (D)(2) provide two alternative tests for determining a child's best interest.

In re C.M. · filed 2026-06-04(D)(1), (D)(2)

A juvenile court may apply one of two different tests to determine the best interest of the child.

Children remain siblings for section 2151.414(E)(11) after a parent's rights to them are terminated; otherwise the prior-termination factor could never apply.

In re M.L. · filed 2023-09-29(E)(11)

Applying the ordinary meaning of “sibling,” T.L.’s other children fall within the definition, as “[o]ne of two or more persons having one or esp. both parents in common; brother or sister.” ... On the other hand, in applying T.L.’s interpretation of “sibling,” R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) would never apply in any situation in which there was a prior termination of parental rights, an absurd reading of the statute.

A prior involuntary termination concerning a sibling is sufficient to support a cannot-or-should-not-be-placed finding when the parent does not prove an ability to provide secure placement and adequate care.

In re S.M. · filed 2026-02-02(E)(11)

In this case, the record establishes the appellant’s parental rights were involuntarily terminated with respect to four of the appellant’s other biological children. Because the existence of one R.C. 2151.414(E) factor alone supports the finding that S.M. and M.M. cannot be placed with the appellant within a reasonable time, the best interest analysis need not go any further.

Section 2151.414(E)(11) does not require an agency to offer reunification case plan services after a parent’s rights to the child’s sibling were involuntarily terminated.

In re S.J. · filed 2024-10-25(E)(11)

Contrary to Mother’s argument on appeal, there is nothing in R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) that obligated LCCS to offer Mother case plan services aimed at reunification.

Although temporary custody has no specific best-interest test, the factors in Section 2151.414(D)(1) may guide the court when relevant.

In re M.C. · filed 2023-11-02(D)(1)

“There is no specific test or set of criteria that must be applied to determine what is in a child’s best interest when considering temporary custody as a dispositional alternative following an adjudication of abuse, neglect or dependency.” In re Q.S., 2023-Ohio-712, 210 N.E.3d 610, ¶ 119 (8th Dist.), citing In re G.G., 9th Dist. Summit No. 29952, 2022-Ohio-1654, ¶ 33. “Nevertheless, courts have held that the best-interest factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) and/or 3109.04(F)(1) — to the extent they are relevant — may be instructive in making that determination.” Id.

A court deciding temporary agency custody may consider subsection (D)(1)'s permanent-custody best-interest factors when applicable.

In re A.G. · filed 2025-09-18(D)(1)

A court can consider the best-interest factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), which govern permanent custody cases, if applicable.

The permanent-custody statutes do not require an agency to prove that adoption is likely.

In re C.B. · filed 2023-11-13(D)(1)(d)

However, “the permanent custody statutes do not require [an agency] to prove that adoption is likely.”

Because only one first-prong ground under section 2151.414(B)(1) is required, any error in alternative first-prong findings is harmless when another ground is established.

In re D.F. · filed 2023-11-29(B)(1)

Because the trial court was required to find only one first-prong ground for permanent custody, any error in its alternative findings would be harmless. ... Therefore, this Court need not review the propriety of the trial court’s alternative findings that the children cannot or should not be returned to Mother’s custody because of the factors set for in R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) or (2).

Sections 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(d) are alternative first-prong grounds, and either one independently supports permanent custody when coupled with a best-interest finding.

In re P.T. · filed 2024-10-22(B)(1)(a), (d)

As findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) are alternative findings, each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant the motion for permanent custody. One of these findings alone, coupled with best interest finding, is ... sufficient to support the granting of permanent custody.

When the agency alleges and proves section 2151.414(B)(1)(d)'s twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground, that alone satisfies the first prong and the court need not consider unalleged alternative grounds.

In re A.M. · filed 2024-12-31(B)(1)(d)

The agency established its sole first prong allegation, which is all that is necessary to satisfy the first prong of the permanent custody test. ... Accordingly, this Court need not consider Mother’s challenge regarding any other R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) first prong ground. Moreover, we will not address an evidentiary challenge regarding a fact that was neither alleged by CSB nor found by the trial court.

A parent's intent is irrelevant when determining abandonment under section 2151.414(E)(10).

In re L.T. · filed 2023-11-30(E)(10)

A parent’s intent is not pertinent when determining abandonment for the purpose of R.C. 2151.414(E)(10).

Missing subsection (A)(2)’s permanent-custody deadlines does not affect the court’s authority or furnish a basis to attack its jurisdiction or order.

In re C.D. · filed 2025-04-10(A)(2)

The failure of the court to comply with the time periods set forth in division (A)(2) of this section does not affect the authority of the court to issue any order under this chapter and does not provide any basis for attacking the jurisdiction of the court or the validity of any order of the court.

Failure to meet subsection (A)(2)'s 120-day hearing or 200-day disposition deadline does not affect the court's authority or provide a basis to attack jurisdiction or the validity of its order.

In re X.P. · filed 2026-03-25(A)(2)

In fact, R.C. 2151.414(A)(2), like R.C. 2151.28(A)(2), states that a court’s failure to comply with the time periods set forth above “does not affect the authority of the court to issue any order under this chapter and does not provide any basis for attacking the jurisdiction of the court or the validity of any order of the court.”

Missing subsection (A)(2)'s permanent-custody timing requirements does not affect the court's authority, jurisdiction, or the validity of its order.

In re K.G. · filed 2026-06-04(A)(2)

R.C. 2151.414(A)(2) explicitly provides that the trial court’s failure to comply with the statutory time requirements “does not affect the authority of the court to issue any order under this chapter and does not provide any basis for attacking the jurisdiction of the court or the validity of any order of the court.”

Section 2151.414(A)(2)'s time limits are directory; a litigant must seek a writ of procedendo to compel a delayed ruling.

In re K.H. · filed 2014-04-11(A)(2)

Because the time provisions of R.C. 2151.414(A)(2) are directory and not mandatory, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that a litigant must seek a writ of procedendo against the juvenile court if it does not comply with these time limits.

When all four factors in section 2151.414(D)(2) are established, permanent custody is per se in the child's best interest and the juvenile court must commit the child to the agency.

In re A.F. · filed 2023-12-07(D)(2)

If all the factors enumerated under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) are applicable, permanent custody is per se in the child’s best interest, and the juvenile court must commit the child to the permanent custody of the agency.

When every subsection (D)(2) factor applies, the court must find permanent custody is in the child’s best interest and commit the child to the agency.

In re B.V. · filed 2025-03-20(D)(2)

R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) instructs that if all of the factors thereunder apply, “permanent custody is in the best interest of the child, and the court shall commit the child to the permanent custody” of the agency.

When all subsection (D)(2) factors apply, permanent custody is necessarily in the child’s best interest and the court must grant permanent custody to the agency.

In re U.B. · filed 2025-04-10(D)(2)

Since all of the factors under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) apply, “permanent custody was necessarily in the best interest of the child and the juvenile court was required to grant permanent custody to CCDCFS.”

If all four subsection (D)(2) factors apply, permanent custody is per se in the child’s best interest.

In re K.S. · filed 2025-04-17(D)(2)

Stated another way, if a juvenile court finds the above four factors applicable, “granting permanent custody to FCCS is per se in the best interest of the child.”

When every subsection (D)(2) factor applies, permanent custody is necessarily in the child's best interest and the court must grant permanent custody to the agency.

In re Z.L. · filed 2025-10-23(D)(2)

Because all of the factors under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) apply, “‘permanent custody was necessarily in the best interest of the child and the juvenile court was required to grant permanent custody to CCDCFS.’”

The subsection (D)(2)(d) reference to a relative or other interested person seeking legal custody means a nonparent, so a parent's own pending legal-custody motion does not defeat that factor.

In re Z.L. · filed 2025-10-23(D)(2)(d)

However, R.C. 2151.414(D)(2)(d) contemplates legal custody to a “relative or other interested person,” meaning a nonparent. ... Although Father had a pending motion for legal custody, the record does not show any motion for custody by a relative or other interested person.

Section 2151.414(D)(2) requires the court to ascertain a child's wishes when deciding whether permanent custody is in the child's best interest; failing to do so for a child capable of expressing them is reversible error.

In Re T.M., Unpublished Decision (9-30-2004) · filed 2004-09-30(D)(2)

Here, because there was no evidence regarding T.M.'s wishes for placement presented to the trial court, the court did not consider all of the statutorily required factors in determining whether permanent custody was in T.M.'s best interest. The failure of the trial court to ascertain T.M.'s wishes was reversible error.

Section 2151.414(D)(2) requires permanent custody when its listed conditions establish that it is in the child’s best interest; factual inaccuracies in the judgment did not warrant reversal where the evidence supported permanent custody.

In re J.P. · filed 2024-10-10(D)(2)

Appellant does not challenge the juvenile court’s analysis of the case under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) and (B)(1) per se. ... In the final analysis, although the juvenile court’s judgment may contain certain factual inaccuracies, we conclude these factual inaccuracies, either individually or cumulatively, do not render the court’s judgment against the manifest weight of the evidence. ... In sum, after careful review of the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing before the juvenile court, we find there was ample competent, credible evidence to support the court’s conclusion that terminating appellant’s parental rights and granting permanent custody to FCCS was in J.P.’s best interest.

A child's wish to continue weekend visits with the parents did not prevent the section 2151.414(D)(1)(b) wishes factor from favoring permanent custody when the child's overall wish was to remain with the prospective adoptive caregivers.

In re N.C. · filed 2023-11-27(D)(1)(b)

Mother asserts that this factor weighs against granting permanent custody because N.C. ... told Ms. Stachowiak that he would still like to see his parents on weekends. ... Even considering that statement, it is evident that the children’s overall wishes are to remain with the Paces. This factor weighs in favor of granting permanent custody to GCJFS.

An unchallenged abandonment finding under section 2151.414(B)(1)(b) is dispositive because the court need find only one subsection (B) circumstance, regardless of whether an alternative placement finding was proper.

In re G.B. · filed 2023-12-26(B)(1)(b)

Because the trial court need find only one of the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B), the trial court’s finding the Child was abandoned is dispositive without regard to whether the trial court properly found the Child could not be placed with Mother within a reasonable time.

Section 2151.414(B)(2) permits permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence shows that custody serves the child's best interest, the child is abandoned, and the parents cannot be located.

In the Matter of Caldwell, Unpublished Decision (12-30-1999) · filed 1999-12-30(B)(2)

Pursuant to statute, a juvenile court may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court finds "by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody and that [among other possible findings] . . . the child is abandoned and the parents cannot be located." R.C. 2151.414 (B)(2). ... We find that the decision of the trial court was clearly correct and more than supported by competent, credible evidence.

Appellate review of a permanent-custody decision under section 2151.414 uses sufficiency-of-the-evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standards as appropriate, not abuse of discretion.

In re Z.C. · filed 2023-12-27

Given that R.C. 2151.414 requires that a juvenile court find by clear and convincing evidence that the statutory requirements are met, we agree with those appellate courts that have determined that the sufficiency-of-the-evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standards of review are the proper appellate standards of review of a juvenile court’s permanent-custody determination, as appropriate depending on the nature of the arguments that are presented by the parties. We therefore conclude that the court of appeals here erred in applying an abuse-of-discretion standard.

A permanent custody award must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, and an appellate court reviews whether the evidence meets that standard.

In Re Wilkinson, Unpublished Decision (8-6-2004) · filed 2004-08-06(B)(1)

But the trial court's determination to award permanent custody must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. It is not purely a discretionary decision. Therefore, an appellate court does not review the trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion, but instead must determine whether there was sufficient evidence to meet the clear and convincing standard.

Section 2151.414(D)(1) requires the court to select the best option for the child after a first-prong ground is established; it need not find that terminating parental rights is the only possible option or give controlling weight to a nontermination placement.

In re E.A.G. · filed 2024-01-16(D)(1)

Moreover, a trial court that is evaluating a child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement, and whether the child can achieve that type of placement, need not determine that terminating parental rights is “not only a necessary option, but also the only option.” ... Rather, once a court finds the existence of any one of the R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) factors, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) requires the court to weigh “all the relevant factors * * * to find the best option for the child.” ... “The statute does not make the availability of a placement that would not require a termination of parental rights an all-controlling factor. The statute does not even require the court to weigh that factor more heavily than other factors.”

The availability of a placement that avoids terminating parental rights does not control; the court must weigh all relevant factors and select the best option for the child.

In re Z.D. · filed 2025-03-20

However, when ruling on a motion for permanent custody, “[R.C. 2151.414] does not make the availability of a placement that would not require a termination of parental rights an all-controlling factor.” ... Rather, R.C. 2151.414 “requires a weighing of all the relevant factors” and the court to “find the best option for the child . . . .”

A court need not consider legal custody to a relative as a less drastic permanent-custody alternative when no legal-custody motion or supporting evidence is before it.

In re E.R. · filed 2025-09-30(D)(1)(d)

Consequently, Mother has failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred by failing to consider a less drastic option of legal custody to the maternal aunt when the court had no legal custody motion before it.

Section 2151.414 does not require a juvenile court to favor an alternative placement over permanent custody.

In re X.G. · filed 2025-10-06

We have stated previously that R.C. 2151.414 “reveals no requirement that the trial court favor alternate placement over awarding permanent custody.”

The availability of a placement that preserves parental rights is not controlling and need not receive greater weight than other best-interest factors.

In re E.J. · filed 2025-12-03(D)(1)

But although Mother may be able to provide a legally secure placement for E.J., the Supreme Court of Ohio has made clear that R.C. 2151.414 “does not make the availability of a placement that would not require a termination of parental rights an all-controlling factor. The statute does not even require the court to weigh that factor more heavily than other factors.”

Section 2151.414(E)(12) alone satisfied the first permanent-custody prong where the father was incarcerated when the motion was filed and would remain unavailable for at least eighteen months after disposition.

In re B.B.C. · filed 2024-02-15(E)(12)

The court found, under R.C. 2151.414(E)(12), that Father was incarcerated at the time of the filing of the motion for permanent custody and will not be available for at least 18 months after the dispositional hearing, noting that Father is “expected to be released in 2026.” This evidence alone is sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the two-part analysis.

Under section 2151.414(D)(1)(b), a child's changed wish to remain with the foster family was supported where the child became frightened after the father attended a visit under the influence of cocaine.

In re J.R. · filed 2024-02-20(D)(1)(b)

Although J.S. had originally indicated a desire to live with X.S., this changed after the May 13, 2022, visit when X.S. came under the influence of cocaine and scared the children. After that visit, J.S. indicated the desire to remain with the foster family. These findings were supported by the testimony of the GAL and the caseworker.

When parental rights to a sibling were involuntarily terminated, section 2151.414(E)(11) places the burden on the parent to prove by clear and convincing evidence an ability to provide a legally secure placement and adequate care for the child's health, welfare, and safety.

In re A.P. · filed 2024-02-29(E)(11)

Moreover, if the parent has had parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to a sibling of the child, R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) places “ ‘the burden * * * on the parent to provide clear and convincing evidence to prove that he or she can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child.’ ”

A supported finding under subsection (E)(11) alone is sufficient to require the finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent.

In re D.E. · filed 2025-02-27(E)(11)

Moreover, despite mother’s challenges to some of the factors, the R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) factor alone was sufficient to warrant the juvenile court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(E).

When a parent previously had parental rights to a sibling terminated, subsection (E)(11) requires the parent to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent can provide a legally secure placement and adequate care.

In re D.H. · filed 2025-03-06(E)(11)

Further, because Mother has had her parental rights terminated in respect to one of D.H.’s siblings, Mother was required to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that “notwithstanding the prior termination, [she] can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of [D.H.].” R.C. 2151.414(E)(11).

After a prior involuntary termination involving a sibling, the parent must rebut the resulting unsuitability presumption with clear and convincing evidence of an ability to provide secure placement and adequate care.

In re Am.J. · filed 2025-04-11(E)(11)

A finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) places the burden on the parent to present clear and convincing evidence proving that she can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the child’s health, welfare, and safety. ... The parent must “‘essentially rebut a ... presumption that, because her parental rights were involuntarily terminated as to her other children, she is not a suitable parent for additional children.’”

A prior involuntary termination shifts to the parent the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent can provide a legally secure placement and adequate care.

In re T.B. · filed 2025-06-12(E)(11)

R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) states that in these circumstances, the parent must “provide clear and convincing evidence to prove that, notwithstanding the prior termination, the parent can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child.” Id. The burden therefore shifts to mother in these circumstances.

A prior involuntary termination shifts to the parent the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent can provide a legally secure placement and adequate care.

In re M.A. · filed 2025-09-25(E)(11)

Mother, therefore, had the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that she could “provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child.” R.C. 2151.414(E)(11).

A prior involuntary termination creates a presumption of continued parental unfitness that the parent must rebut with proof of ability to provide a suitable home.

In re J.M. · filed 2025-11-26(E)(11)

Notably, Mother has not challenged this finding on appeal, that she failed to rebut the presumption that, because of the prior termination of her parental rights, she remains unable to provide her children with a suitable home.

Proof of a prior involuntary termination shifts to the parent the burden of proving an ability to provide a legally secure placement and adequate care.

In re C.B. · filed 2025-12-17(E)(11)

Given that CSB met its burden to prove the prior involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights to A.B., the statutory burden then shifted to Mother to prove that she was able to provide “a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child.”

A subsection (E)(11) finding shifts to a parent the burden of rebutting presumed unsuitability by clear and convincing proof of ability to provide secure placement and adequate care.

In re J.J. · filed 2026-04-08(E)(11)

A finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) places the burden on father to present clear and convincing evidence proving that he can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the child’s health, welfare, and safety.

Following a prior involuntary termination involving a sibling, the parent bears the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence an ability to provide secure placement and adequate care despite the prior termination.

In re E.D.-P. · filed 2026-04-09(E)(11)

R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) provides that the juvenile court “shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent” if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]he parent has had parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to a sibling of the child . . . and the parent has failed to provide clear and convincing evidence to prove that, notwithstanding the prior termination, the parent can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child.”

Prior services and a temporary reunification do not defeat sections 2151.414(E)(1) and (E)(4) when recurring substance abuse and housing problems show that the services produced no lasting benefit and repeatedly caused removal.

In re T.S. · filed 2024-03-07(E)(1), (4)

While Mother received services and regained custody of T.S. in 2018, those services did not provide a long-term benefit as demonstrated by the 2023 case plan that again addressed substance abuse and lack of housing. ... But here, where the testimony demonstrated ongoing substance abuse and housing concerns that resulted in T.S.’s removal from Mother’s care in 2017, 2020, 2022, February 2023, and March 2023, we find that the record supports the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) and (4).

Sections 2151.414(E)(4) and (E)(10) supported permanent custody where the father had no contact for more than a year, failed to secure adequate housing, and took the children to a home where a registered sex offender lived.

In re C.W. · filed 2024-05-28(E)(4), (10)

The court also found T.W. demonstrated an unwillingness to provide an adequate home or protect the children by his failure to obtain adequate housing and his poor decision to take C.W. and R.W. to a home where a registered sex offender resided. ... In reviewing the record, we find clear and convincing evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(a) does not require a court to wait nearly two years or prolong proceedings for a parent to begin cooperating with case planning when permanent custody is already in the child's best interest.

In re K.H. · filed 2024-06-03(B)(1)(a)

However, "‘a juvenile court is not required to prolong the custody proceedings for a parent to begin to cooperate in the case planning process.' This is especially true where the evidence introduced at the permanent custody hearing demonstrated it was in the [child's] best interest for permanent custody to be granted."

No minimum period of agency custody is required before filing under subsection (B)(1)(a); the twelve-month threshold applies only to the separate subsection (B)(1)(d) pathway.

In re C.F. · filed 2026-06-09(B)(1)(a)

However, no minimum period of Agency custody is required before a motion may be filed under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a). The twelve-month threshold Mother implicitly relies upon applies exclusively to the separate pathway established by R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), which was not the basis for the trial court’s decision this case.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(e) requires consideration, but not express discussion or specific findings, of each factor in subsections (E)(7) through (11).

In re A.W. · filed 2024-06-04(D)(1)(e)

The lack of specific findings regarding those factors is not a fatal flaw. Instead, the statute “requires only that the court consider those factors.” ... Nothing required the court to engage in a discussion of each of the circumstances listed in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) through (11).

Section 2151.414(D)(1)'s best-interest analysis favored permanent custody over relative legal custody where the proposed relative had not shown an ability to protect an infant from parents with continuing drug problems.

In re E.C.-A. · filed 2024-06-05(D)(1)

The trial court reasonably concluded that Grandmother did not demonstrate the ability to protect this infant child from her parents. The trial court did not lose its way by concluding that it was in the best interest of E.C.-A. to be placed in the permanent custody of CSB rather than in the legal custody of Grandmother.

An incarcerated parent's limited visitation does not establish lack of commitment under section 2151.414(E)(4) when prison restrictions and custodians' availability constrained contact and the parent continued paying for virtual visits.

In re L.H. · filed 2024-06-13(E)(4)

Mother has expressed her desire to engage in these visits more frequently but is limited by the availability and schedule of the child’s current custodians. Collectively, the forgoing circumstances do not demonstrate a lack of commitment to the child. Rather, they reflect the inherent realities of incarceration and Mother’s attempt to assimilate to circumstances that are out of her control.

Under section 2151.414(B)(1), the agency retains the burden of persuasion throughout; once it presents clear and convincing evidence, the parent need only make that evidence less than clear and convincing and need not rebut it by the same standard.

In re E.J. · filed 2024-06-26(B)(1)

If the moving party meets its clear-and-convincing burden, the nonmoving party must produce evidence that renders the movant’s evidence less than clear and convincing. ... The burden of persuasion remains with the agency throughout the entire proceeding.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)'s best-interest analysis may favor permanent custody despite periods of parental sobriety when recent relapse, untreated mental health, unstable housing, and failure of treatment leave the child without a secure placement.

In re G.S. · filed 2024-06-17(D)(1)

She was ... arrested for drug possession while living in a car, missed drug screens, and repeatedly tested positive for methamphetamine as recently as 3 months before the permanent custody hearing. She failed to maintain stable housing. The trial court found Mother’s failures to comply with critical parts of the case plan were compelling reasons why permanent custody to the Agency was in Child’s best interest, and we agree.

An unchallenged abandonment finding under section 2151.414(B)(1)(b) is dispositive because only one subsection (B)(1) ground is required, regardless of whether an alternative placement ground was proper.

In re L.T. · filed 2024-07-16(B)(1)(b)

Because the trial court need find only one of the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), the trial court's finding L.T. was abandoned is dispositive without regard to whether the trial court properly found L.T. could not be placed with Mother within a reasonable time.

Abandonment under section 2151.414(B)(1)(b) independently justifies permanent custody and makes disputes about the agency's reasonable reunification efforts immaterial.

In re D.D. · filed 2024-07-22(B)(1)(b)

In the end, while the reasonable efforts question here presents a closer call, it does not alter the outcome, as the issue is moot. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b) explicitly ... states that a finding of abandonment—which the juvenile court found and we have affirmed—independently justifies a grant of permanent custody.

A motion for permanent custody under Section 2151.413 uses Section 2151.414's two-prong test, while permanent custody requested as the original disposition requires an inability-to-place finding under subsection (E) and a best-interest finding under subsection (D)(1).

In re KY.D. · filed 2024-08-22(B), (D)(1), (E)

For a motion for permanent custody sought under R.C. 2151.413, such as the motion filed for Ky.D., a juvenile court must satisfy the two-prong test set forth in R.C. 2151.414 before it can terminate parental rights and grant permanent custody to the agency. The juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that any one of the conditions set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) apply and that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody to the agency.

For legal custody, courts may use subsection (D), R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), a combination of both, or general best-interest principles; they need not specifically enumerate every factor.

In re R.H. · filed 2025-04-17(D)

In making such a determination ‘courts have looked to the best interest factors of R.C. 2151.414(D), R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), a combination of the two, or general notions of what should be considered regarding the best interests of the [child].’ ... Further, there is no requirement that the court specifically enumerate all the factors in making a best interests custody determination.

In deciding legal custody, a trial court may use the subsection (D) factors, the R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) factors, a combination of both, or general best-interest considerations.

In re S.L. · filed 2025-10-03(D)

To determine a child’s best interest, a trial court may consider the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D), R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), ‘a combination of the two, or general notions of what should be considered regarding the best interests of the child.’

In a parental legal-custody dispute, a juvenile court may consider subsection (D) factors it finds relevant but need not specifically review or cite them, and the permanent-custody clear-and-convincing standard does not apply.

In re K.S.J. · filed 2026-06-11(D)

As the list of statutory factors in R.C. 3109.04(F) is non-exhaustive, a court may consider the factors ... in R.C. 2151.414(D) if it finds them relevant; however, the court is not required to specifically review or cite them. ... Even so, the clear and convincing evidence standard for the best interest finding within the latter statute is not applicable, as this is not the initial adjudication or a termination of parental rights; instead, the preponderance of the evidence standard applies to the competing custody requests of the parents.

In legal-custody proceedings, the court may consider any best-interest factors it deems appropriate, including subsection (D)(1)'s nonexhaustive factors.

In re M.L. · filed 2026-06-15(D)(1)

Therefore, we must presume the juvenile court is free to consider any best interest factors it deems appropriate.

Courts apply the version of Section 2151.414 in effect when the permanent-custody motion was filed.

In re C.A. · filed 2024-09-20

Courts should apply the version of the statute in effect at the time the motion for permanent custody was filed. In re P., S., & M. Children, 2024-Ohio-2794, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.); In re M., R., & H. Children, 2017-Ohio-1431, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.).

A court applies the version of section 2151.414 in effect when the permanent-custody motion was filed.

In re C.W. · filed 2024-10-16

We must apply the version of this statute that was in effect at the time that the motion for permanent custody was filed.