Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.414

A court applies the version of section 2151.414 in effect when the permanent-custody motion was filed.

In re C.C. · filed 2024-10-18

Courts should apply the version of the statute in effect at the time the motion for permanent custody was filed. ... Consequently, we apply the version of the statute in effect on February 10, 2023.

A court applies the version of Section 2151.414 in effect when the agency moved for permanent custody.

In re T.B. · filed 2025-06-25

While the amendment only implemented minor changes, we must apply the version of the statute that was in effect at the time that HCJFS moved for permanent custody. ... We accordingly apply the former version of the statute that was in effect on February 23, 2023.

The applicable version of Section 2151.414 is the version in effect when the permanent-custody motion was filed.

In re C/B Children · filed 2025-07-02

We must apply the version of this statute that was in effect at the time that the motion for permanent custody was filed. ... Accordingly, we will apply the former version of the statute that was in effect on January 18, 2023.

Time remaining under temporary custody does not warrant additional reunification time under sections 2151.414(E)(1) and (E)(4) when the parent had ample opportunity but the original substance-abuse and domestic-violence problems persisted at trial.

In re K.R. · filed 2024-09-27(E)(1), (4)

Although father argues that time remained on the case, such that time had not run on his ability to demonstrate compliance and stability and that the possibility existed that he would be able to provide necessary care and support for K.R., the record indicates that father was given ample opportunity to prove he could safely and adequately provide for K.R., but the same issues which were present at the start of K.R.’s case (and K.R.’s sibling’s case) were present at the time of trial. This lack of progress does not show a commitment and willingness to provide a safe, permanent home, nor does it warrant a grant of additional time for reunification.

The agency need not prove that adoption is likely for permanent custody to be in a child's best interest under section 2151.414(D)(1).

In re A.R.B. · filed 2024-10-07(D)(1)

Additionally, the Agency does not have "to prove that adoption is likely" to make permanent custody in the best interest of the children.

Section 2151.414(E)(10)'s abandonment factor was satisfied where a father did not visit or communicate with his children for roughly two years, despite later resuming contact.

In re L.D. · filed 2024-10-09(E)(10)

“[A] child shall be presumed abandoned when the parents of the child have failed to visit or maintain contact with the child for more than ninety days, regardless of whether the parents resume contact with the child after that period of ninety days.” ... More importantly, father did not communicate with his children during that time.

On a sufficiency challenge to permanent custody under section 2151.414(B), the appellate court independently reviews whether the evidence supporting each required permanent-custody finding satisfies the clear-and-convincing standard.

In re C.C · filed 2024-10-18(B)

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a grant of permanent custody, the role of this court is to independently review the evidence to determine if the trial court’s decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence. ... The evidence supporting each element, or rather each permanent-custody finding, must satisfy the clear-and-convincing standard.

A juvenile court satisfies section 2151.414(B)(1)(a) without expressly citing it when the decision quotes and applies subsection (E), finds by clear and convincing evidence that the children cannot or should not be placed with either parent, and provides supporting facts.

In re V.C. · filed 2024-10-23(B)(1)(a)

Although the juvenile court did not explicitly cite R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), it stated on page six of its entry that it can place the child in the permanent custody of the agency if, under R.C. 2151.414(E), the court determines “that the child cannot be placed with one of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent and . . . it is in the best interest of the child.” ... Thus, the court’s grant of permanent custody was expressly based on R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a).

A permanent-custody judgment must expressly find both a subsection (B)(1) threshold ground and that permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In re K.J. · filed 2025-10-01(B)(1)

This Court has held that R.C. 2151.414 requires that the trial court make “explicit findings” on the two prongs of the permanent custody test. ... Although the fact that temporary custody had been extended twice was relevant to CSB’s “12 of 22” allegation, the court’s mere reference to that fact did not constitute an “explicit finding[]” that CSB had established the “12 of 22” ground under RC. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).

When a parent seeking contact has no visitation for years, the resulting evidence of the parent-child relationship and child's wishes under sections 2151.414(D)(1)(a) and (b) may be distorted and incapable of meaningful measurement.

In re A.R. · filed 2024-12-20(D)(1)(a), (b)

We find persuasive the Ninth District’s reasoning in C.S. that, where there has been “no visitation between a parent and child” for a lengthy period of time, evidence as to the relationship between the parent and child, as well as evidence regarding the wishes of the child, “is distorted and cannot be meaningfully measured.” ... Applying that analysis to the facts and circumstances of this case, we conclude the lack of visitation for more than four years ... “has distorted the significance of evidence on the best interest factors,” especially on the “key factors” with respect to “the parent-child relationship and the child’s wishes for her own custody.”

Section 2151.414(E)(1) affords a parent a reasonable rather than indefinite period to remedy removal conditions, and clear and convincing evidence supported the factor where the mother used a second chance without addressing longstanding mental-health and substance-abuse problems.

In re J.S. · filed 2025-01-02(E)(1)

A parent “is afforded a reasonable, not an indefinite, period of time to remedy the conditions causing [a child’s] removal.” ... We find that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) that mother failed “continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions” that led to J.S.’s removal.

Section 2151.414(E)(1)'s failure-to-remedy factor remained satisfied despite stable income and housing where the mother had not adequately addressed paranoid personality disorder, underlying trauma, or parenting deficiencies.

In re S.M. · filed 2025-01-08(E)(1)

Although Mother was able to obtain stable income and housing during this case, she does not dispute the evidence that she still had not adequately addressed her paranoid personality disorder or its underlying trauma from her past or that she had not completed a parenting program. ... As CSB established that Mother had failed to remedy the concerns underlying the child’s removal from home, the juvenile court’s first prong finding is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Sections 2151.414(E)(1) and (E)(16) may apply despite a parent's prior completion of domestic-violence counseling when the parent continues violent behavior and thus has not remedied the problem.

In re A.S. · filed 2025-01-13(E)(1), (16)

Despite having completed the counseling previously, he continued to engage in violent behavior, particularly with women. All of these findings are supported by the testimony and exhibits at the hearing. As such this Court does not find that the trial court erred in finding the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) and (16) applicable.

Section 2151.414(D)'s best-interest inquiry extends beyond the date the permanent-custody complaint was filed, so parental conduct between filing and trial is admissible.

In re E.B. · filed 2025-01-16(D)

Like consideration of the R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) factors, the issue of best interest of the child “looks far beyond the date of the filing of the complaint for permanent custody.” ... Mother’s conduct from that date of filing the complaint for permanent custody to the time of trial is admissible when considering the best interest of the child.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(b) requires consideration of a young child's wishes through a guardian ad litem or CASA volunteer, but the trial court is not bound by that representative's recommendation.

In re H.F. · filed 2025-01-28(D)(1)(b)

Although the child’s wishes as expressed through the CASA volunteer tended to favor denying the agency’s motion for permanent custody, the trial court was not bound by the volunteer’s recommendations. Further, it is clear that the trial court considered this factor in making its final determinations regarding the child’s best interests. However, the court simply rejected the CASA volunteer’s recommendation, which it was permitted to do.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)'s factors may weigh against permanent custody when a suitable proposed relative can provide a safe, stable home and the child has strong familial bonds and reasonably wishes to preserve them, but not when the proposed relative placement is contrary to the child's best interest.

In re B.M. · filed 2025-01-29(D)(1)

Accordingly, if Father’s proposed legal custodian was suitable to provide a safe and stable permanent home for B.M. who had strong, established familial bonds and reasonably expressed her desire to maintain those relationships, the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) best interest factors would mitigate against an award of permanent custody in this particular case. The evidence demonstrated, however, that an award of legal custody to Grandmother was contrary to the child’s best interest under the circumstances.

A trial court generally does not abuse its discretion by denying another continuance when the permanent-custody hearing is already beyond section 2151.414(A)(2)'s 120-day deadline.

In re C.W. · filed 2025-01-30(A)(2)

Generally, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a request for a continuance when the PCC hearing is already past the 120-day deadline contained in R.C. 2151.414(A)(2). ... By the time of the September 11, 2023 trial, the PCC motion had already been pending for 480 days.

Section 2151.414(E)(2) does not require expert testimony to support a finding of a parent's chemical dependency.

In Re Ross, Unpublished Decision (7-7-2004) · filed 2004-07-07(E)(2)

We note that R.C. 2151.414 (E) does not require, for a finding of chemical dependency, that an expert testify to a parent's chemical dependency.

Section 2151.414(E)(2) does not require expert testimony to establish a parent's chemical dependency.

In Re Ross, Unpublished Decision (7-9-2004) · filed 2004-07-09(E)(2)

We note that R.C. 2151.414 (E) does not require, for a finding of chemical dependency, that an expert testify to a parent's chemical dependency.

Subsection (F)'s termination of a parent's party status operates prospectively and does not bar an appeal or another challenge to the validity of the permanent-custody judgment.

In Re Phillips, Unpublished Decision (9-29-2003) · filed 2003-09-29(F)

We are equally dissuaded by the state's reliance on R.C. 2151.414 (F), which provides that a parent, whose parental rights have been terminated, ceases to be a party to the case. Citing this provision, the state contends that appellant lost standing once his parental rights were terminated. Logically, this provision can only be meant to operate prospectively, excluding the parents from future proceedings relating to the child, such as review hearings. As the provision specifically states, it does not operate to divest the parent of his right to appeal the permanent custody decision, nor does it operate to prevent the parent from otherwise challenging the validity of the judgment rendered in the proceeding to which he was a party.

Under Section 2151.414(D)(1) and (4), a child's bonds with foster parents, the availability of adoption, and the disruption required to transition to a relative may support permanent custody even when the relative could provide a stable home.

In the Matter of McCann, Unpublished Decision (1-26-2004) · filed 2004-01-26(D)(1), (4)

Upon thoroughly reviewing the record, we find that clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's determination that it is in the best interest of the children to be permanently placed in the custody of CCDJFS. The trial court made findings related to the applicable statutory factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414 (D), which are supported by the evidence. ... It further noted that the children needed a legally secure permanent placement and that the foster parents wished to adopt them. It noted that the children do not have a significant relationship with appellant. It also stated that although appellant may be able to provide them a stable home, their lives would be disrupted over a five to six month period to transition them to her care. ... We find that sufficient credible evidence exists to support the trial court's determination.

Section 2151.414(D) requires a court deciding permanent custody to consider the specified best-interest factors, but it does not require the court to prefer an available relative over permanent custody to an agency.

In Re Keaton, Unpublished Decision (11-19-2004) · filed 2004-11-19(D)

R.C. 2151.414 (D) requires a trial court to consider specific factors in determining whether a child's best interests would be served by granting a motion for permanent custody. The factors include: (1) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (2) the wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; (3) the custodial history of the child; (4) the child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency; and (5) whether any factors listed under R.C. 2151.414 (E)(7) to (11) apply. ... The father's argument that the court was required to award the Keatons legal custody because they are an available relative placement is without merit. ... In the case at bar, the trial court was not required to consider placing the children with the Keatons before it could grant RCJFS permanent custody and the court did not abuse its discretion when it considered the children's best interests and determined that their best interests mandated a permanent custody award to RCJFS.

Section 2151.414(D) provides placement guidelines but does not require a court to award custody to a relative rather than to a children’s services agency.

In Re Hilyard, Unpublished Decision (4-13-2006) · filed 2006-04-13(D)

To the extent R.C. 2151.412 (G) is applicable, it and R.C. 2151.414 (D) merely provide guidelines for consideration in placing a child. The statutes do not require that custody be awarded to a relative rather than to an agency.

Under Section 2151.414(D), regular visitation and completion of counseling or parenting programs do not preclude a best-interest finding when the parent cannot permanently remedy the harmful conditions and the child needs stability with a bonded prospective adoptive caregiver.

In the Matter of Reese, Unpublished Decision (2-26-2004) · filed 2004-02-26(D)

In determining the best interest of a child, a trial court shall consider all relevant factors, including those provided in R.C. 2151.414 (D), as follows: ... While it is clear that appellant has regularly visited Joevan and made efforts towards reunification, the testimony of the caseworkers and guardian ad litem was that appellant was not capable of correcting or alleviating the conditions which led to Joevan's removal on a permanent basis. Despite completing two sets of drug counseling and two sets of parenting classes, appellant still had not eliminated the conditions. Appellant's marriage to a man convicted of gross sexual imposition after being warned not to associate with him poses a danger to Joevan. ... Joevan had only lived with appellant for 21 months of her life at the time of the hearing. She has bonded with her foster mother, who has expressed a desire in adopting her if the motion is granted. ... Joevan needs a stable and permanent home, which appellant is unable to provide for her. FCCS did provide clear and convincing evidence that granting the motion for permanent custody was in Joevan's best interest.

Under Section 2151.414(D)(1), the concerns identified in a case plan and the parent's success in addressing them are relevant to evaluating the parent-child relationship in the best-interest analysis.

In Re V.Y., Unpublished Decision (3-31-2004) · filed 2004-03-31(D)(1)

In her appellate brief, Appellant complains that too much attention was placed on compliance with the case plan and that evidence regarding the best interest of the child was lacking. However, the nature of the relationship between a parent and child may certainly be affected by the concerns presented by the case plan and the parent's success in addressing those concerns. See In re P.C ., 9th Dist. Nos. 21734 and 21739, 2004-Ohio-1230, at ¶ 27. In this case, evidence regarding relationships and interrelationships of the child does not weigh in favor of a safe, stable, and healthy relationship with Appellant.

Section 2151.414(D) makes the statutory best-interest factors the primary focus of the permanent-custody inquiry; a parent's case-plan compliance is relevant but not dispositive.

In Re J.J., Unpublished Decision (12-8-2004) · filed 2004-12-08(D)

Before a juvenile court can terminate parental rights and award to a proper moving agency permanent custody of a child, it must find clear and convincing evidence of both prongs of the permanent custody test: (1) that the child is abandoned, orphaned, has been in the temporary custody of the agency for at least 12 months of the prior 22 months, or that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414 (E); and (2) the grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414 (D). ... Evidence of case plan compliance, however, is usually relevant to the trial court's best interest determination but is not dispositive of it. See, e.g., In re A.A. , 9th Dist. No. 22196, 2004-Ohio-5955 , ¶ 9 . Instead, the primary focus of the trial court's best interest determination is on the specific best interest factors listed above.

Section 2151.414(D) makes a parent's compliance with a case plan relevant to placement but leaves the child's best interest as the ultimate issue.

In Re gower/evans, Unpublished Decision (10-24-2006) · filed 2006-10-24(D)

Although evidence regarding a parent's compliance with a case plan may be helpful in determining the proper placement for a child, the ultimate issue is the child's best interest.

Section 2151.414 governs termination of parental rights and does not make substantial compliance with a case plan dispositive of permanent custody.

In Re J. H., Unpublished Decision (8-20-2007) · filed 2007-08-20

Case plan compliance, therefore, is not dispositive of the question of permanent custody. Rather, the termination of parental rights is governed by R.C. 2151.414 and the standards set forth therein. That statute does not mandate the result advocated by Father.

In deciding permanent custody under subsection (D)(1)(d), the court focuses on the child's best interests rather than the parent's case-plan compliance, though compliance may affect the best-interests analysis.

In Re K.J., 08ca14 (9-29-2008) · filed 2008-09-29(D)(1)(d)

Moreover, when considering a R.C. 2151.414 (D)(1)(d) permanent custody motion, the focus is upon the child's best interests, not upon the parent's compliance with the case plan. See In re West , Athens App. No. 03CA20, 2003-Ohio-6299 . However, we also recognize that a parent's compliance with the case plan may impact the child's best interests.

Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing evidence that a statutory permanent-custody condition applies and that permanent custody serves the child's best interests, but it does not require a prior finding that a willing relative is unsuitable.

In Re A v. 08ca31 (2-20-2009) · filed 2009-02-20(B)(1), (D)

{¶ 16} The court must also find by clear and convincing evidence that the grant of permanent custody is in the best interest of the child. Id. R.C. 2151.414 (D) requires the trial court to consider all relevant factors in determining whether the child's best interests would be served by granting the permanent custody motion. These factors include but are not limited to: (1) the interrelationship of the child with others; (2) the wishes of the child; (3) the custodial history of the child; (4) the child's need for a legally secure placement and whether such a placement can be achieved without permanent custody; and (5) whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) apply. Thus, before a trial court may award a children services agency permanent custody, it must find: (1) that one of the circumstances described in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1) applies; and (2) that awarding the children services agency permanent custody would further the child's best interests. In re K.J. at ¶ 16. {¶ 17} We have previously held that "a juvenile court need not find, by clear and convincing evidence, that a relative is an unsuitable placement option prior to granting the permanent custody request." Keaton at ¶ 61, citing In re Dyal , Hocking App. No. 01CA11, 2001-Ohio-2383. Relatives seeking the placement of the child are not afforded the same presumptive rights that a natural parent receives as a matter of law, and the willingness of a relative to care for the child does not alter the statutory factors to be considered in granting permanent custody. Id., citing Dyal. Rather, a juvenile court is vested with discretion to determine what placement option is in the child's best interest. Id. The child's best interests are served by the child being placed in a permanent situation that fosters growth, stability, and security. In re Adoption of Ridenour (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 319 , 324 , 574 N.E.2d 1055 . Therefore, courts are not required to favor a relative if, after considering all the factors, it is in the child's best interest for the agency to be granted permanent custody. Keaton at ¶ 61, citing Dyal.

Section 2151.414 requires the juvenile court to determine the child's best option after finding one of the conditions in subsection (B)(1), but it does not require clear and convincing proof that no suitable relative is available for placement.

In Matter of A.E., 07ap-685 (3-25-2008) · filed 2008-03-25(B)(1), (D)

Under R.C. 2151.414 , a court must find the best option for a child once a determination has been made pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) through (d). In re Schaefer , 111 Ohio St.3d 498 , 2006-Ohio-5513 , at ¶ 64 . R.C. 2151.414 does not, however, include a requirement that a juvenile court find by clear and convincing evidence that no suitable relative was available for placement. In re Schaefer , at ¶ 64.

Section 2151.414(D)(1) contains no express requirement to consider placement with a relative, although relative placement may be evaluated under the interaction-and-interrelationship factor and a remote possibility need not outweigh the other best-interest factors.

In Re C.W., Unpublished Decision (4-23-2004) · filed 2004-04-23(D)(1)

With respect to CW's mother's second argument — that the CSB did not give sufficient consideration to the possibility of placing C.W. with a relative — we note, first of all, that this is not an express statutory requirement. The possibility of placement with a relative is arguably something that ought to be considered in connection with "the interaction and interrelationship with the child, with the child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child," which is a factor to be considered in determining the best interests of the child, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (D)(1). ... We conclude that the remote possibility that a relative might have been found for which a placement would be suitable does not cause this factor to outweigh the other factors that the trial court considered in determining that C.W.'s best interests would be served by awarding permanent custody to the CSB.

Section 2151.414(D) makes the availability of a suitable relative relevant to the best-interest analysis but does not require clear and convincing proof that no suitable relative is available before permanent custody may be awarded to a children services agency.

In re M.O. · filed 2011-04-13(D)

However, R.C. 2151.414(D) does not require a juvenile court to find by clear and convincing evidence that no suitable relative is available for placement before awarding a children services agency permanent custody.

A juvenile court need not prefer a willing relative or find that relative unsuitable before granting permanent custody to an agency when agency custody is in the child's best interest.

In re B.K. · filed 2023-06-01(D)

“[T]he willingness of a relative to care for a child does not alter what the court must consider in determining permanent custody,” and the court “is not required to favor a relative if, after considering all the factors, it is in the child’s best interest for the agency to be granted permanent custody.” In re M.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 101693 and 101694, 2015-Ohio-1028, ¶ 11.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(a) does not require a court to place a child with a relative or give relatives special status, although relative placement may be considered with the child's interactions and relationships.

In re G.D. · filed 2023-06-09(D)(1)(a)

This court has held that the consideration of whether a child can be placed with a relative is not a statutory requirement. In re F.C., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23803, 2010-Ohio-3113, ¶ 24. Instead, “that possibility is a matter that ought to be considered in connection with the child's interaction and relationship with the child's parents, relatives, foster caregivers, out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child.” Id., citing R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a). Accordingly, a trial court has no obligation to consider placing a child with a relative.

A juvenile court is not required to consider family placement before awarding permanent custody to an agency when the statutory factors support agency custody as the children's best interest.

In re E.C. · filed 2023-06-22(B), (D)(1)

The trial court was also not bound to consider family placement prior to its award of permanent custody to FCCS.

The availability of a placement that would preserve parental rights is not entitled to greater weight under Section 2151.414(D)(1)(d).

In re K.B. · filed 2024-02-08(D)(1)(d)

The statute does not even require the court to weigh that factor more heavily than other factors.” Id. at ¶ 64.

The availability of a relative placement that would preserve parental rights is not controlling or entitled to greater weight in the statutory best-interest analysis.

In re D.B. · filed 2024-05-15(D)(1)(d)

R.C. 2151.414 “does not make the availability of a placement that would not require a termination of parental rights an all-controlling factor. The statute does not even require the court to weigh that factor more heavily than other factors.” Id. at ¶ 64.

A juvenile court need not find that permanent custody is the only available custodial option before terminating parental rights.

In re D.J. · filed 2024-05-15(D)(1)(d)

It is well settled that the juvenile court need not find that permanent custody is the only available custodial option for the children before terminating parental rights.

A five-year wait for reunification with an incarcerated parent is not a reasonable time under R.C. 2151.414(E)(12), particularly when the child will have reached majority before the parent's release.

In re R.C. · filed 2014-06-16(E)(12)

Appellant is in the middle of a ten year prison term for aggravated vehicular homicide. T. at 11-12. Any return to appellant of this thirteen year old child would be after the child reaches the age of majority. Father is not interested in placement and has not completed any documents as requested by the caseworker. T. at 12. ... We concur with the trial court's determination that the necessity for permanent custody has been established by sufficient clear and convincing evidence. A five year wait for reunification is clearly not a reasonable amount of time.

Section 2151.414(E)(13) supports a finding that children cannot or should not be placed with a parent when the parent's repeated incarceration prevents the parent from providing care.

In Matter of Travin H., H-08-024 (3-6-2009) · filed 2009-03-06(E)(13)

{¶ 56} ... Moreover, the evidence presented at trail was that Terry H. served multiple periods of incarceration just during the pendency of the action. When asked at trial to state his criminal history, Terry H. was unable to recall it all. Consequently, there was clear and convincing evidence before the court supporting R.C. 2151.414 (E)(4) and (13) findings and a determination that the children cannot now, nor with a reasonable time, be placed with their father.

Section 2151.414(E)(12) supports a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with an incarcerated parent within a reasonable time when the parent's scheduled release date leaves the parent unavailable to care for the child for at least eighteen months, and mere speculation about earlier release does not defeat that finding.

In Matter of M.J.C., 09ca3273 (4-9-2009) · filed 2009-04-09(E)(12)

{¶ 21} In the case sub judice, competent and credible evidence supports the trial court's finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with appellant within a reasonable time. Appellant is currently incarcerated and her scheduled release date is August 2011. Thus, she will not be available to care for the child within eighteen months. Her speculation that she may receive an earlier release does not negate this finding. In fact, appellant has already been denied judicial release. Nothing in the record indicates that she will be released any earlier than August of 2011. Unfortunately she will not, therefore, be able to care for her child within the eighteen-month timeframe of R.C. 2151.414 (E)(12).

Section 2151.414(E)(12) requires a finding that a child cannot be placed with a parent when the parent is incarcerated and will be unavailable to care for the child for at least eighteen months.

In Re Solomon W., Unpublished Decision (8-22-2000) · filed 2000-08-22(E)(12)

Even if we assumed arguendo that a GAL should have been appointed for appellant, we would be compelled to find that omission a harmless error, since, as appellant's appointed counsel has acknowledged, the appointment of a GAL would not have changed the fact that appellant is going to prison for three years and the requirements of R.C. 2151.414 (E)(12) are met.

Section 2151.414(E)(12) supports a finding against parental placement when an incarcerated parent will be unavailable to care for the child for at least eighteen months after the motion or dispositional hearing.

In Re Barnett Children, Unpublished Decision (11-22-2000) · filed 2000-11-22(E)(12)

(12) The parent is incarcerated at the time of the filing of the motion for permanent custody or the dispositional hearing of the child and will not be available to care for the child for at least eighteen months after the filing of the motion for permanent custody or the dispositional hearing. ... Applying the above standards to the matter sub judice, and given the fact appellant is not eligible for parole until 2014, we find no error in the trial court's decision to grant permanent custody to MCCS.

Incarceration leaving a parent unable to care for the children for eighteen months after the permanent-custody motion or dispositional hearing supports the statutory parental-placement ground.

In the Matter of Justin v. Unpublished Decision (12-21-2001) · filed 2001-12-21(E)(12)

Further, Ellen was incarcerated in March 2001 and will remain incarcerated until sometime in early 2003, and thus will be unable to care for the children for eighteen months following filing of the motion for permanent custody or the dispositional hearing. See R.C. 2151.414 (E)(12).

Section 2151.414(E)(12) is satisfied when the parent is incarcerated and will remain unavailable to care for the child for eighteen months measured from either the permanent-custody motion's filing date or the dispositional-hearing date.

In Re v. S., Unpublished Decision (10-22-2003) · filed 2003-10-22(E)(12)

R.C. 2151.414 (E)(12) provides two alternative dates from which the eighteen-month period of incarceration can run: the date of the filing of the motion for permanent custody "or" the date of the dispositional hearing. R.C. 1.42 provides that "[w]ords and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage." See, also, Sears v. Weimer (1944), 143 Ohio St. 312 , paragraph five of the syllabus. The word "or" is most commonly used in the disjunctive and is used to indicate an alternative between different things or a choice between alternatives. Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1993) 1585. Consequently, R.C. 2151.414 (E)(12) is satisfied if the parent was incarcerated either at the time that the motion for permanent custody was filed or the date of the dispositional hearing and will continue to be incarcerated or otherwise will be unavailable to care for the child for at least eighteen months from that date.

Section 2151.414(E)(12) requires the court to examine the parent's prison sentence and determine whether the parent likely will be unavailable to care for the child for at least eighteen months after the permanent-custody motion or dispositional hearing.

In re J.H. · filed 2011-03-09(E)(12)

In assessing the applicability of R.C. 2151.414(E)(12), a trial court should examine the prison sentence of the parent(s) at issue and consider whether it is likely that one or both of the parents will not be available to provide care for the child for at least eighteen months. ... In the case sub judice, appellant was incarcerated on March 25, 2010, when the agency filed its permanent custody motion; however, GCCSB concedes there was no demonstration that appellant’s incarceration would have extended eighteen months after said filing, as anticipated by R.C. 2151.414(E)(12).

A parent’s mere potential eligibility for judicial release does not prevent application of subsection (E)(12) when the record shows a scheduled release more than eighteen months after the permanent-custody motion and contains no evidence that early release will occur.

In re W.B. · filed 2012-08-27(E)(12)

(12) The parent is incarcerated at the time of the filing of the motion for permanent custody or the dispositional hearing of the child and will not be available to care for the child for at least eighteen months after the filing of the motion for permanent custody or the dispositional hearing. ... Brooks’ first argument that his sentence was not definite because he was eligible for judicial release is completely speculative. Karmen Lauth testified at the final hearing that Brooks was indicted and incarcerated in May 2011 for two counts of obstruction of justice, pled guilty to those two counts, and entered into a joint sentencing recommendation consisting of a total four-year prison term. (Tr. at 38-39, 45); (CPSU Ex. 7, 8). This prison term was not scheduled to end until May of 2015. (Tr. at 45). There is nothing in the record to suggest that Brooks will definitely be getting judicial release. ... Nothing else in the record indicates that Brooks has a release date other than May of 2015. The trial court’s finding was thus supported by clear and convincing evidence.

A parent’s speculative hope of obtaining judicial release does not prevent a finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(12) that the incarcerated parent will be unavailable to care for the child for at least eighteen months.

In re M.J.P. · filed 2013-05-28(E)(12)

Section 2151.414(E) of the Revised Code directs the trial court to consider several enumerated factors in determining whether a child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time. In the instant case, trial court relied on R.C. 2151.414(E)(12), which states: The parent is incarcerated at the time of the filing of the motion for permanent custody or the dispositional hearing of the child and will not be available to care for the child for at least eighteen months after the filing of the motion for permanent custody or the dispositional hearing. ... Cathy’s assertion that she will be granted judicial release in May 2013 is purely speculative. ... While Cathy’s intentions to better herself are encouraging, the possibility of her being in a position to be available to parent M.J.P. within eighteen-months of the Agency’s request for permanent custody or the dispositional hearing remains tentative at best. ... Accordingly, for all these reasons, we conclude that the trial court’s finding that M.J.P cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time was supported by clear and convincing evidence and find no error in the trial court’s decision to grant the Agency permanent custody of M.J.P. on this basis.

Section 2151.414(E)(12) applies when a parent is incarcerated at the filing and hearing and will remain unavailable to care for the child for at least 18 months.

In re A.J. · filed 2017-04-14(E)(12)

The trial court found that R.C. 2151.414(E)(12) applies to appellant, who was incarcerated at the time the motion for permanent custody was filed and at the time of the dispositional hearing, and would not be available to care for the child for at least 18 months after the motion for permanent custody was filed or the dispositional hearing. … We find that competent, credible evidence in the record supports this conclusion. … Pursuant to the trial court’s finding of factors R.C. 2151.414(E)(10) as to the father and R.C. 2151.414(E)(12) as to appellant, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding by clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time and should not be placed with either parent under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a).

Section 2151.414(E)(12) makes placement with an incarcerated parent impossible within a reasonable time when the parent will remain unavailable for at least eighteen months after the permanent-custody motion or dispositional hearing.

In re S.I.M. · filed 2020-01-21(E)(12)

Miller’s incarceration in excess of 18 months after the filing of the motion for permanent custody or the dispositional hearing renders placement with him within a reasonable amount of time impossible under R.C. 2151.414(E)(12), and he cannot assert an argument for placement on behalf of Javon, who did not file a motion or otherwise intervene as a party in the matter.

Section 2151.414(E)(5) supports a reasonable-time placement finding when a parent is incarcerated for an offense committed against the child or a sibling.

In re S.P. · filed 2021-01-08(E)(5)

The factor stated in R.C. 2151.414(E)(5) is “The parent is incarcerated for an offense committed against the child or a sibling of the child.” ... Therefore, we hold that the trial court’s determination under R.C. 2151.414(E)(5) is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Section 2151.414(E)(12) supports finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent who is incarcerated and will remain unavailable to care for the child for at least eighteen months after the permanent-custody motion or hearing.

In re L.H. · filed 2023-03-23(E)(12)

... and he was “incarcerated at the time of the filing of the motion for permanent custody or the dispositional hearing of the child and [would] not be available to care for [the Children] for at least eighteen months after the filing of the motion for permanent custody or the dispositional hearing,” pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(12). Father does not challenge the trial court’s R.C. 2151.414(E)(10) and R.C. 2151.414(E)(12) findings. Nonetheless, upon review of the entire record, we find such findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence.

A parent's incarceration that prevents caring for the children supports a finding under Section 2151.414(B)(1)(a) that the children cannot or should not be placed with that parent within a reasonable time.

In re L.W. · filed 2023-03-23(B)(1)(a)

The court’s alternative conclusion, that the children cannot or should not be place with either parent within a reasonable time, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), is supported by the record. As to mother, she admits to being incarcerated until 2025; thus, she cannot care for the children.

Repeated incarcerations that prevent a parent from caring for her children satisfy the factor in section 2151.414(E)(13).

In Re G.C. M.C., Unpublished Decision (10-21-2004) · filed 2004-10-21(E)(13)

Nonetheless, appellant's repeated incarcerations prevented her from being present with her children and providing the care they needed, thereby satisfying not only R.C. 2151.414 (E)(13) but subdivision (E)(14) as well.

The court must consider the subsection (E)(7)-(11) factors but need not find that each factor applies.

In re J.A. · filed 2022-04-21(D)(1)(e)

While none of the remaining factors in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) to (11) apply to Mother, the court was only required to consider all of the factors in 2151.414(D)(1) in determining the best interest of J.A.; it did not have to find that each factor applied.

Only one subsection (D)(1) best-interest factor must favor permanent custody to support termination of parental rights.

In re S.B. · filed 2019-03-14(D)(1)

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). The trial court only needs to find one of the above factors in favor of permanent custody to terminate parental rights.

Only one Section 2151.414(D) factor must favor permanent custody for a court to award permanent custody to an agency.

In re S.F. A Minor Child · filed 2018-06-21(D)

This court has consistently held that only one of the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D) needs to be resolved in favor of the award of permanent custody in order for the court to award permanent custody to a proper agency. In re J.M-R., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98902, 2013-Ohio-1560, ¶ 37, citing In re Z.T., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88009, 2007-Ohio-827, ¶ 56.

Although a trial court must consider all Section 2151.414(D) best-interest factors, only one enumerated factor must favor permanent custody to permit termination of parental rights.

In re S.C. · filed 2018-06-28(D)

While the trial court must consider all best-interest factors, only one of the factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(D) needs to be resolved in favor of the award of permanent custody in order for the court to terminate parental rights.

Section 2151.414(D) requires the juvenile court to consider all enumerated best-interest factors, though it may also consider other relevant factors.

In Re J. B., 24470 (3-11-2009) · filed 2009-03-11(D)(1)-(5)

Although the trial court is not precluded from considering other relevant factors, the statute explicitly requires the court to consider all of the enumerated factors.

Section 2151.414(D) requires the juvenile court to consider all factors relevant to the child’s best interests when deciding whether permanent custody is in the child’s best interest.

In Re Awkal · filed 1994-06-27(D)

R.C. 2151.414(D) is written broadly and requires the juvenile court judge to consider all factors that are relevant to the best interests of the child.

Section 2151.414 requires the court to make factual findings applying the listed best-interest factors specifically to the child and the parent.

In Re Mays, Unpublished Decision (5-17-1999) · filed 1999-05-17

The trial court's conclusions of law quote the factors listed in R.C. 2151.414 regarding the best interest of the child, but the court made no findings of fact regarding those factors as applied specifically to Kevon and to appellant.

Section 2151.414(D) requires the court to consider all relevant factors, including the child's relationships, wishes, custodial history, and need for legally secure placement, when determining the child's best interest.

In Re Estrada, Unpublished Decision (5-24-2000) · filed 2000-05-24(D)

To determine the best interest of the child, the trial court must look at "all relevant factors," including the following: (1) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (2) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; (3) The custodial history of the child; (4) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency. R.C. 2151.414 (D). ... In the instant case, there was no competent credible evidence that a grant of permanent custody to CSB was in the best interest of Angel and Carlos, based on the factors listed in R.C. 2151.414 (D).

Section 2151.414(D) requires the court to consider all relevant factors, including the child’s relationships, wishes, custodial history, need for secure placement, and specified parental factors, when determining the child’s best interest.

In Re Gaugler, Unpublished Decision (6-30-2000) · filed 2000-06-30(D)

The relevant statutory section of R.C. 2151.414 , as written at the time of the case sub judice, mandates as follows: (D) In determining the best interest of a child at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) or (5) of section 2151.353 or division (C) of section 2151.415 of the Revised Code, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (2) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; (3) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in the temporary custody of a public children services agency or private child placing agency under one or more separate orders of disposition issued under section 2151.353 or 2151.415 of the Revised Code for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999; (4) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency; (5) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (12) of this section apply in relation to the parents and child. ... The record, as a whole, provides ample competent and credible evidence upon which the trial court could base its best interest findings pursuant to the factors in R.C. 2151.414 (D)(1), (D)(4), and (D)(5).

Section 2151.414(D) requires the juvenile court to consider all relevant best-interest factors, including the child's relationships, wishes, custodial history, and need for a legally secure permanent placement, with each factor considered on the record and no single factor treated as dispositive.

In the Matter of Ranker, Unpublished Decision (10-06-2000) · filed 2000-10-06(D)

In determining the best interest of the child, R.C. 2151.414 (D) mandates that the juvenile court must consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (2) the wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem , with due regard for the maturity of the child; (3) the custodial history of the child; and (4) the child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency. ... Thus, the failure to discuss each of the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414 (D) when reaching a determination concerning the best interest of the child is prejudicial error. There must be some indication on the record that the trial court considered all four factors found in R.C. 2151.414 (D) when reaching its judgment. Moreover, no factor is solely dispositive of the issue, and each needs to be given proper consideration.

Section 2151.414(D) requires the court to consider a non-exclusive set of factors when determining a child's best interest, including relationships, the child's wishes, custodial history, and the need for a legally secure permanent placement.

In the Matter of Harris, Unpublished Decision (11-2-2000) · filed 2000-11-02(D)

R.C. 2151.414 (D) provides a non-exclusive list of factors to consider when determining the child's best interest. In addition to other relevant factors, R.C. 2151.414 (D) directs the court to consider the following: (1) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (2) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; (3) The custodial history of the child; (4) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency. Appellant mother has failed to show that the juvenile court ignored any applicable factor or considered any improper factor.

Section 2151.414(D) requires the court to consider the listed statutory and other relevant factors when determining a child's best interests.

In Re Brodbeck · filed 1994-10-19(D)

It is evident from the trial court’s judgment entry, as well as testimony, that the factors required by R.C. 2151.414(D), as well as other relevant factors, were appropriately considered in awarding permanent custody of the children to the department.

Section 2151.414(D) sets forth factors to consider, including the child's relationships, wishes, custodial history, and need for a legally secure permanent placement, when determining custody and the child's best interests.

In Re: Hailey Lunsford, Minor Child, Unpublished Decision (2-1-1999) · filed 1999-02-01(D)

R.C. 2151.414 (D) sets forth the factors to be considered in determining custody and the best interests of the child, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (2) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; (3) The custodial history of the child; (4) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency.

Section 2151.414(B) permits an agency to receive permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence shows that the action is in the child's best interests, while § 2151.414(D) requires courts to consider all relevant best-interests factors without assigning greater weight to any particular factor or relationship.

In Re Amanda Williams, Unpublished Decision (9-15-2000) · filed 2000-09-15(B), (D)

Under R.C. 2151.414 (B), the trial court may give an agency permanent custody if it decides, by clear and convincing evidence, that the action is in the best interests of the child. ... At the time CSB was awarded permanent custody, R.C. 2151.414 (D) instructed courts to consider all relevant factors in determining a child's best interests, including (but not limited to): (1) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (2) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; (3) The custodial history of the child; (4) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency. ... In the first place, R.C. 2151.414 (D) says that courts must consider all relevant factors, not just one. Moreover, the statute does not assign different weights to particular factors or relationships. ... And finally, we have previously said that courts do not have to first consider placing children with relatives before they may award permanent custody to a children services agency.

Section 2151.414(C) bars the court from considering the effect of permanent custody on a parent, while subsection (D) requires consideration of all relevant best-interest factors, including the child's relationship with the parents.

Matter of Montgomery, Unpublished Decision (2-18-1999) · filed 1999-02-18(C), (D)

(C) In making the determinations required by this section * * * a court shall not consider the effect the granting of permanent custody to the agency would have upon any parent of the child. * * * (D) In determining the best interest of a child at a hearing * * * the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following. The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; The custodial history of the child; The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency. R.C. 2151.414 . Jason and Becky claim that the trial court failed to consider the bond between them and their children. However, the trial court specifically stated in its journal entry that it considered the relationship between the parents and the children. The trial court considered all the factors listed in R.C. 2151.414 as well as the unusual circumstances of this case. The trial court found that due to the special needs of the children and the special needs of the parents, it would be in the children's best interest for the agency to have permanent custody. Since there is evidence in the record to support this finding, we find no abuse of discretion.

Section 2151.414 allows permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence shows it is in the child’s best interest, considering specified parental and placement factors.

Boyd v. Dept. of Ch. and Fam. Serv., Unpublished Decision (3-25-1999) · filed 1999-03-25

R.C. 2151.414 provides that permanent custody may be granted to a movant if the juvenile court determines by clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the best interest of the child. Factors to be considered include a determination that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the parents; the parents' failure to substantially remedy the conditions which caused the child's removal from the home; chemical dependency of a parent; the parents demonstrated lack of commitment toward the child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the child when able to do so or an unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for the child; the parents' unwillingness to provide food, clothing, shelter, and other basic necessities for the child; or any other factor the court deems relevant.

Section 2151.414(D) requires the court to consider all relevant factors, including specified factors, when determining a child's best interest for permanent custody.

Matter of H., Unpublished Decision (3-31-1999) · filed 1999-03-31(D)

Accordingly, this court finds that: 1) in determining the best interest of Kenneth H., the trial court considered the relevant factors pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (D) and that the trial court's decision was in Kenneth's best interest and 2) the trial court's decision was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing proof of a qualifying parental condition showing a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time, followed by a best-interest determination before permanent custody is granted.

In Re Williams, Unpublished Decision (8-19-1999) · filed 1999-08-19(B), (D), and (E)

When a public agency files a motion for permanent custody, R.C. 2151.414 (A) directs the court to conduct a hearing. In order to terminate parental rights and grant permanent custody to the agency, R.C. 2151.414 (B) requires that the juvenile court determine by clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the best interests of the child. ... R.C. 2151.414 (E) sets forth guidelines for determining whether a child cannot be placed with either of his parents within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with his parents. ... Once the trial court finds from all relevant evidence that one of the factors enumerated in (E) exists, the court must then consider whether permanent commitment is in the best interest of the child. R.C. 2151.414 (B). See In re William S. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 95 , 99 . R.C. 2151.414 (D) provides the relevant factors which the court is required to consider and whether permanent commitment is in the best interest of the child and provides: ... Thus, the evidence presented supports the findings by the trial court that permanent custody is in the best interest of the children.

Section 2151.414(D) requires a court deciding permanent custody to determine the child's best interest by considering relevant factors, including the child's relationships and need for a legally secure placement, and the current version does not expressly require consideration of adoption likelihood.

In Re Torres, Unpublished Decision (12-2-1999) · filed 1999-12-02(D)(1), (D)(4)

Under the former version of R.C. 2151.414 (D), a trial court was also expressly required to consider "the reasonable probability of the child being adopted, whether an adoptive placement would positively benefit the child, and whether a grant of permanent custody would facilitate an adoption." Under the current version of R.C. 2151.414 (D), which became effective September 18, 1996, this factor has been deleted from the list of express factors that a trial court must consider in arriving at a "best interest" determination. ... The court further found that it is in Elizebeth's best interest to be placed in the legal custody of the Hashashes upon consideration of her interaction and interrelationship with her parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents and those persons who may significantly affect her. ... We find that competent and credible evidence supports the conclusions of the trial court in its denial of appellant's motion for permanent custody of Elizebeth and its grant of legal custody to the Hashashes.

Section 2151.414(D) requires consideration of the listed best-interest factors, including adoption probability, family and foster relationships, the children’s wishes, custodial history, and the need for secure permanent placement.

In the Matter of Wurz, Unpublished Decision (11-30-2000) · filed 2000-11-30(D)

The court, when determining the best interests of the children during a permanent custody hearing, must consider the factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414 (D), which include the reasonable probability of adoption, interaction with parents, siblings and foster parents, wishes of the children, custodial history, and the need for a legal secure permanent placement.

Section 2151.414(D)’s best-interest inquiry is not altered by a relative’s willingness to take custody, and the court may choose agency custody over placement with a grandmother who cannot meet the child’s medical needs.

Matter of Davis, Unpublished Decision (12-6-2000) · filed 2000-12-06(D)

The willingness of a relative to care for the child does not alter what a court considers in determining permanent custody. ... It is clearly within the trial court's discretion to determine whether to place the child with the appellant, his grandmother, or with the ACCSB. ... As to the appellant's request for legal custody, the record clearly supports the trial court's finding that it was not in the best interest of the child to be placed with his grandmother.

An unsanitary home with no place for an infant to play or sleep and expert evidence that the mother cannot function independently may support a best-interest finding under section 2151.414(D).

In Re Summerfield, Unpublished Decision (1-29-2001) · filed 2001-01-29(D)

Dr. Bello indicated at the present time appellant was unable to function independently, but if she received skilled services for one year, he would reevaluate her. The court also heard testimony appellant was still involved with a man who was abusing her. DJFS presented the testimony of one of its social workers who had visited appellant's home. She testified the home was unsanitary and inadequate, and that there was no place in the home where a baby could be set down to play or sleep. ... We have reviewed the record, and we find the trial court did not err in finding by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the best interest of the child to award permanent placement of Elijah to the Stark County DJFS.

A foster parent's superior parenting skills do not alone establish that permanently severing a bonded parent-child relationship is in the child's best interest under section 2151.414(D).

In Re Estrep, Unpublished Decision (2-8-2001) · filed 2001-02-08(D)

Nonetheless, the foster mother's better parenting skills do not necessarily mean appellant's are so inadequate that her relationship with her son should be permanently severed.

Section 2151.414(D) requires consideration of all factors relevant to the child’s best interests in deciding whether to terminate parental rights.

In Re Balazy, Unpublished Decision (3-8-2001) · filed 2001-03-08(D)

R.C. 2151.414 (D) is written broadly and requires the juvenile court judge to consider all factors that are relevant to the best interests of the child. The purpose of a far-reaching inquiry is to allow the judge to make a fully informed decision on an issue as important as whether to terminate parental rights, privileges and responsibilities.

Section 2151.414(D)’s consideration of permanent placement does not excuse relatives from the statutory requirement to file a motion for legal custody before the permanent-custody hearing.

In Re bailey/myers Children, Unpublished Decision (3-15-2001) · filed 2001-03-15(D)(4)

We find Perez applicable herein, and upon review of the record and transcript, find the trial court properly considered the "best interest" factors pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (D), including pertinent home studies. Any alleged deficiency in said consideration is attributable not to the court or TCJFS, but to the lack of procedural formality and statutory compliance by the paternal grandparents.

Under Section 2151.414’s best-interest inquiry, a child’s lifelong placement and bond with a foster family can support permanent custody for adoption when parental substance abuse remains unresolved.

In Re Matter of Jessie, Unpublished Decision (3-30-2001) · filed 2001-03-30(D)

The child George Jessie has not lived with his mother in over three years. Naturally, he has bonded instead with the foster family who has cared for him during that time. The record before us leads to only one conclusion as to what is in the child's best interests, namely adoption by the family who has cared for him almost his whole life.

Section 2151.414(D)’s best-interest inquiry permits denial of permanent custody in favor of continued long-term foster care when custody leading to adoption would separate siblings with special needs and adoption prospects are poor.

In the Matter Tanker · filed 2001-04-02(D)

We cannot find that the court abused its discretion by denying the agency’s motion for permanent custody because the evidence supported the court’s determination that continued long-term foster care would be in the best interests of the children. ... With these undisputed facts the court had a choice — it could continue foster care or it could grant permanent custody to the agency. Granting permanent custody to the agency would almost surely ensure that the children would be separated. Because the children have emotional and physical needs, it would be difficult to place them individually, much less as a group. We have little difficulty finding that the court acted in the best interests of the children in continuing long-term foster care.

Section 2151.414(D) requires the best-interest determination to consider the child’s family and foster relationships, wishes, custodial history, and need for legally secure permanent placement.

In the Matter of Walker, Unpublished Decision (4-12-2001) · filed 2001-04-12(D)

In determining the best interests of the child, the court shall consider the interaction of the child with his parents, siblings and foster parents, the wishes of the child, the custodial history, and the need for a legally secure permanent placement. R.C. 2151.414 (D).

Section 2151.414(D) requires consideration of all factors relevant to the child’s best interest so that the court can make a fully informed permanent-custody decision.

In Re Aikens, Unpublished Decision (4-12-2001) · filed 2001-04-12(D)

R.C. 2151.414 (D) is written broadly and requires the juvenile court judge to consider all factors that are relevant to the best interest of the child. The purpose of a far-reaching inquiry is to allow the judge to make a fully informed decision on an issue as important as whether to terminate parental rights, privileges and responsibilities.

A claim that permanent custody improperly punishes a parent for a criminal conviction is assessed against the court's written best-interest findings rather than oral comments suggesting automatic termination.

In Re Honaker, Unpublished Decision (5-10-2001) · filed 2001-05-10(D)

Nothing in the trial court's judgment entry indicates that the trial court found that appellant's conviction for involuntary manslaughter automatically warranted termination of her parental rights. Thus, to the extent the trial court's statement during the hearing suggests an improper basis to grant permanent custody, it does not amount to reversible error.

Substantial personal progress by a parent does not preclude permanent custody when the parent remains unable to integrate the children into her life.

In Re Buford, Unpublished Decision (5-17-2001) · filed 2001-05-17(D)

It is clear that the appellant has made great strides in her life, and like the trial court, this court applauds her progress. The appellant at the moment is spending her time and energy recovering from her past and is not able to articulate how she could integrate the children into her present life. When considering all of the evidence in toto, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that there is clear and convincing evidence that the children should be placed in the permanent custody of CCDCFS.

Section 2151.414(D) requires consideration of best-interest factors but does not require granting grandparent visitation to create a relationship with the child.

In the Matter Battaglia, Unpublished Decision (6-8-2001) · filed 2001-06-08(D)

R.C. 2151.414 (D) is not a list of actions that the juvenile court must take in order to ensure the best interests of the child are met. R.C. 2151.414 (D) is a list of factors, which the court must consider, when determining whether the grant of permanent custody is in the best interests of the child. R.C. 2151.414 (D) does not require the court to allow visitation of a child, by a grandparent.

Section 2151.414(D)’s best-interest inquiry includes the child’s relationships, wishes, custodial history, and need for legally secure permanent placement.

In Re Milella, Unpublished Decision (6-29-2001) · filed 2001-06-29(D)

These factors include: (1) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's family and others; (2) the wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem ; (3) the custodial history of the child; and (4) the child's need for a legally secure permanent placement.

A relative’s willingness to care for a child does not alter Section 2151.414’s statutory permanent-custody factors.

In the Matter of Corey Wright, Unpublished Decision (7-11-2001) · filed 2001-07-11(D)

The willingness of a relative to care for the child does not alter the statutory factors to be considered in granting permanent custody.

Under Section 2151.414(D)’s best-interest inquiry, a court cannot speculate about sibling bonds or harm from separate placements when no evidence of those effects is presented.

In Re Margerum, Unpublished Decision (7-11-2001) · filed 2001-07-11(D)(1)

Much of Kroslak's argument is that separating Joan from her siblings will be detrimental to her. It should be noted that, although such evidence would be relevant to the best interest determination, none was presented at the hearing. The trial court based its decision on the evidence before it; it could not speculate as to the bonding between the children or what the impact of placing them separately would be.

A good parental relationship alone does not resolve Section 2151.414(D)’s best-interest inquiry because the child also needs permanency and a safe, secure environment.

In Re Holyak, Unpublished Decision (7-12-2001) · filed 2001-07-12(D)

But having a good relationship with the children is not enough. A child's best interests require permanency and a safe and secure environment.

The record must show consideration of every Section 2151.414(D) best-interest factor, but no single factor controls the result.

In Re Bailey, Alleged Neglected, Unpublished Decision (7-20-2001) · filed 2001-07-20(D)

Thus, the record must show that the juvenile court considered all of the factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414 (D) when reaching its judgment, however, no one factor is dispositive.

Depression severe enough to impair parenting, unsafe housing, inability to apply parenting skills, and repeated failed reunifications can support Section 2151.414(B)’s finding that permanent custody serves the children’s best interests.

In Re Martin, Unpublished Decision (8-02-2001) · filed 2001-08-02(B)

Mother has demonstrated a history of depression, to the point of threatening suicide in front of her children. Her depression is severe enough to inhibit her ability to properly care for the children. Additionally, a number of witnesses testified regarding the condition of the apartment; it was littered with garbage and infested with cockroaches. Further testimony reveals mother's inability to incorporate and implement the skills she learned through parenting classes. This testimony, in conjunction with the children's history of removals and failed reunifications, demonstrates competent, credible evidence that granting permanent custody to CCDCFS is in the best interest of the children.

A grandmother’s love and desire to raise her grandchild do not require placement with her when the evidence supports a contrary best-interest determination under Section 2151.414(D).

In the Matter of Dyal, Unpublished Decision (8-9-2001) · filed 2001-08-09(D)

While we acknowledge that appellant loves her grandson and has expressed her sincere desire to participate in his upbringing, we cannot say that the trial court's judgment constitutes an abuse of discretion. Again, we find ample evidence in the record to support the trial court's determination.

Section 2151.414 does not support permanent agency custody where the agency fails to prove that disposition serves the child’s best interest and the parent has remedied housing and substance-abuse problems, completed parenting services, and maintained a bond with the child.

In Re Robinson, Unpublished Decision (9-20-2001) · filed 2001-09-20(B), (D)

The county has failed to show that giving permanent custody to the county would be in the best interest of the daughter. The mother and child demonstrated a bond. The mother complied with her case plan and established stable housing, remained drug and alcohol free, attended parenting and domestic violence classes, and appeared to be in a position to provide for daughter's basic and medical needs as required by the case plan.

Section 2151.414(D)’s best-interest factors support agency custody over relatives who love the children but cannot adequately meet their special medical needs.

In Re Wilkenson, Unpublished Decision (10-12-2001) · filed 2001-10-12(D)

Based on the record before us, we conclude that there was competent, credible evidence to support a finding that, although the Bradfords and Brown loved the twins, it was in the best interests of the twins for HCJFS to be awarded custody so that adoption proceedings could begin. ... Here, the court had considered placement of the twins with the Bradfords and with Brown and found that, despite the good intentions of the appellants, theirs were not suitable homes for the twins due to their special medical needs.

Section 2151.414(D) does not require a further home investigation of a relative where the court considers her testimony about long work hours, lack of childcare, and prolonged absence of contact and determines placement is not in the child’s best interest.

In Re Sierra Lim Alleged Dependent Child, Unpublished Decision (10-15-2001) · filed 2001-10-15(D)

The court heard Paula Marvin's testimony regarding her extended hours of work, her lack of childcare options, and her complete lack of personal contact with Sierra for nearly a year. The trial court made a decision based on the best interest of the child, thereby satisfying its legal obligation. The fact that the trial court did not order an investigation into Paula Marvin's home in this circumstance is not error.

Section 2151.414 permits denial of permanent custody where conflicting evidence of parental bonding and case-plan progress supports a realistic prospect of reunification.

In Re Nickol, Unpublished Decision (10-18-2001) · filed 2001-10-18(B), (D)

Because the evidence of parental bonding conflicted, we cannot question the court's resolution of those conflicts to find that the children were not so obviously distanced from their parents that parental rights should be terminated. ... The evidence could show that the parents made enough progress with their case plan to justify the court's decision that reunification could be a realistic possibility. The children appeared to maintain a positive relationship with the parents and both boys recognized mother and father as their biological parents. Nothing in these findings suggests an abuse of discretion.

Section 2151.414(D)(4) supports permanent custody where a child’s developmental delays require consistent therapy and secure placement that an inconsistent parent cannot provide.

In the Matter of Villa, Unpublished Decision (10-26-2001) · filed 2001-10-26(D)(4)

Accordingly, as a result of Christopher's developmental delays and his need for therapy and exercises at home, he is in need of a legally secure permanent placement. As Juanita has not been consistent in visiting Christopher, attending Christopher's therapy sessions, finding reliable transportation, or keeping a job and a residence, this cannot be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency. Therefore, we find that there is clear and convincing evidence that granting permanent custody of Christopher to Children Services is in his best interest.

Section 2151.414(D) requires some indication that the court considered every listed best-interest factor, with proper consideration of each and none solely dispositive.

In Re Litz, Unpublished Decision (11-9-2001) · filed 2001-11-09(D)

There must be some indication on the record that the trial court considered all four factors found in R.C. 2151.414 (D) when reaching its judgment. ... Moreover, no factor is solely dispositive of the issue, and each needs to be given proper consideration.

A gross-sexual-imposition conviction is relevant under section 2151.414(E)(7) only when the victim was the subject child, a sibling, or another child living in the parent's household when the offense occurred.

In Re Lamtman, Unpublished Decision (12-12-2001) · filed 2001-12-12(E)(7)

Fifth, appellant contends that, because the father had been charged with gross sexual imposition involving a minor child in violation of R.C. 2907.05 , the court was obliged to consider further evidence regarding the charge. ... R.C. 2151.414 (E)(7) invites consideration of the fact that a parent has been convicted or pleaded guilty to such a charge. However, the statute invites such consideration only where the victim of the offense was the subject child, a sibling of the child, or another child living in the parent's household at the time of the offense.

Regular visitation is only part of the relationship factor under section 2151.414(D)(1), which also requires consideration of the quality of interaction and the child's reactions.

In Re Keough, Unpublished Decision (01-16-2002) · filed 2002-01-16(D)(1)

Although it is true that the evidence established that she visited her children regularly, that evidence went to only a portion of one of the best interest factors. See R.C. 2151.414 (D)(1). That same factor required the court to consider evidence that Keough had limited interaction with her children during those visits, that her interaction with them was sometimes inappropriate, and that the children exhibited no signs of separation anxiety when each visit concluded.

Inability to manage household finances, including repeatedly allowing other adults to take over the home without contributing, may show inability to provide a legally secure placement under section 2151.414(D)(4).

In Re Rodgers, Unpublished Decision (01-23-2002) · filed 2002-01-23(D)(4)

The fact that the Danellas could not manage their finances, including that they repeatedly allowed others to live with them and essentially take over their home without contributing financially, demonstrated to the trial court that they could not provide a secure placement for their children. Based on this evidence, the trial court did not err in concluding that permanent custody to CSB was in the children's best interests.

The best-interest inquiry under section 2151.414(D) requires consideration of every enumerated factor while permitting other relevant considerations.

In Re Williams, Unpublished Decision (01-30-2002) · filed 2002-01-30(D)

Although the trial court is not precluded from considering other relevant factors, the statute explicitly requires the court to consider all of the enumerated factors.

Knowingly allowing prohibited, unsupervised contact with a parent whose drug abuse endangers the children can support Section 2151.414’s best-interest finding in favor of permanent custody.

In the Matter of Chantel R., Unpublished Decision (2-14-2002) · filed 2002-02-14(D)

Appellant was aware of the court order forbidding contact between the children and Rodgers, and was aware the juvenile court issued the order because Rodgers had a problem with "drug abuse" that interfered with her ability to effectively parent and thus made her a danger to the children, but nevertheless not only allowed her into his home while the children were there but also left them alone with Rodgers when he was unable to obtain alternate child care. ... Thus, clear and convincing evidence was presented that supports the juvenile court's determination that the best interest of the children required the granting of the agency's motion for permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(D)’s consideration of all relevant best-interest factors includes the children’s established special needs.

In Re Willis, Unpublished Decision (3-7-2002) · filed 2002-03-07(D)

We begin this analysis by noting that the trial court is statutorily required to consider all relevant factors when determining the best interest of the child. The trial court's finding that the children have special needs is amply demonstrated in the record and is not contested by the appellant. Under the circumstances of this case, it is clearly relevant, and vitally important, to consider those special needs of the children when determining their best interest.

Section 2151.414(D) requires consideration of all relevant best-interest factors, including the child's custodial history and need for a legally secure permanent placement that cannot be achieved without agency custody.

In the Matter of Azbell, Unpublished Decision (6-7-2002) · filed 2002-06-07(D)(3), (D)(4)

In determining what is to be in the best interests of the children, a court must consider all relevant factors, including the custodial history of the child and the child's need for a legally secure permanent placement (and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency).

Section 2151.414(D)'s best-interest analysis applies when deciding whether to place a child in a planned permanent living arrangement.

In Re Lavery, Unpublished Decision (6-19-2002) · filed 2002-06-19(D)

Upon careful review of the testimony and evidence presented at trial, we hold that the judge did not act contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence in placing Kathleen in a PPLA.

Permanent custody is not supported when the evidence shows that a legally secure, permanent placement can be achieved without granting custody to the agency.

In Re Gill, Unpublished Decision (6-27-2002) · filed 2002-06-27(D)(4)

Thus, the record contains evidence that a legally secure, permanent placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency.

A court applying the best-interest factors need not delay permanency in the hope that an incarcerated parent will obtain early release and later satisfy reunification requirements when the children presently need stability.

In Matter of Steele, Unpublished Decision (7-29-2002) · filed 2002-07-29(D)(4)

Waiting and hoping that appellant will be released early and will follow through on the requirements to obtain custody of her children is not in the best interest of the children, who clearly need stability in their lives.

The legally-secure-placement factor supports permanent custody when children need a safe home that acknowledges and treats their abuse and that structure cannot be obtained from the parent.

In Re Ritter, Unpublished Decision (7-31-2002) · filed 2002-07-31(D)(4)

After careful review of the record, this Court finds that Joseph and Selina have not had this type of structure at any time with appellant, and they cannot obtain it without a grant of permanent custody to CSB.

Section 2151.414(D)'s best-interest inquiry requires consideration of all relevant evidence, including the child's bonds, the parent's case-plan progress and visitation, and the guardian ad litem's recommendation.

In Matter of Marsh, Unpublished Decision (8-5-2002) · filed 2002-08-05(D)

Based on the factors in R.C. 2151.414 (D) and all relevant evidence in the record, we find that there was clear and convincing evidence before the trial court that it was in Levi's best interest for WCCSB to be granted permanent custody. The testimony at the permanent custody hearing shows that appellant's bond to Levi was not strong, while he had developed a significant bond with his foster parents and was thriving in their care. Additionally, appellant failed to complete any portion of her case plan, including participation in HomeWorks, Mother's Group, and drug and alcohol abuse assessments. Appellant displayed a marked lack of interest in Levi by failing to exercise her visitation rights. Finally, Levi's guardian ad litem strongly recommended that permanent custody be granted to the state.

Section 2151.414(D)'s best-interest analysis may weigh a parent's repeated relapses after treatment, long lapses in visitation, minimal parental bond, the children's recurring foster placements, and the guardian ad litem's recommendation despite recent appropriate visits and treatment completion.

In the Matter of Johnson, Unpublished Decision (9-9-2002) · filed 2002-09-09(D)

The trial court carefully considered each statutory factor and made relevant findings supported by the record. ... The trial court noted that although appellant completed drug and alcohol abuse treatment, she had done so many times before without any measurable degree of success. Her history of substance abuse dates back more than 20 years. ... Finally, the children's guardian ad litem strongly advocated that the permanent custody motion be granted. ... Based on our review of the factors in R.C. 2151.414 (D) and all relevant evidence in the record, we find that there was clear and convincing evidence before the trial court that it was in the children's best interest that BCCSB be granted permanent custody.

Subsection (D) requires evidence addressing every relevant best-interest factor, including the children's relationships, wishes, custodial history, and need for a legally secure placement.

In Re Clever, Unpublished Decision (10-18-2002) · filed 2002-10-18(D)

{¶ 22} Our review of the record reveals that evidence was presented on every relevant factor that R.C. 2151.414 (D) requires the court to consider. There is an abundance of testimony in the record demonstrating that the children have bonded with each other, with their biological parents, and with their foster parents. (T. 84, 157, 161, 163, 165) There also was testimony that Nichole has concerns about returning to live with her biological parents. (T. 80, 99) There was testimony concerning the duration of time the children have been in the temporary custody of MCCS. (T. I93) Finally, there was testimony about the children's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement could be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to MCCS. (T. 83-84, 94, 162-63) {¶ 23} Based upon the evidence presented at trial, we do not find that the trial court's decision to award permanent custody to MCCS was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Because the award was based upon a substantial amount of credible and competent evidence, we must defer to the trial court's factual determination that it was appropriate for MCCS to receive permanent custody of the children. We overrule this assignment of error.

The agency must present clear and convincing evidence on all enumerated subsection (D) best-interest factors; conclusory or missing evidence on those mandatory factors cannot support permanent custody.

In Re A.D., Unpublished Decision (11-6-2002) · filed 2002-11-06(D)

{¶ 16} ... Although the trial court is not precluded from considering other relevant factors, the statute explicitly requires the court to consider all of the enumerated factors. ... {¶ 17} In this case, a review of the record reveals that, although the trial court indicated in its order that it considered all of the best interest factors, LCCS presented so little evidence on these factors that it would have been impossible for the court to adequately consider them. The evidence presented by LCCS certainly did not rise to the level of clear and convincing. ... {¶ 28} As detailed above, because there were so many holes in the evidence on the mandatory factors, LCCS did not present clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody was in the best interests of A.D. or M.D.

A child's lengthy agency custody, lack of parental contact, specialized medical needs, bond with trained foster caregivers, and need for a secure placement may clearly and convincingly satisfy the best-interest criteria.

In the Matter of Cleckley, Unpublished Decision (12-2-2002) · filed 2002-12-02(D)

{¶ 8} Upon examination of the record, we find that the trial court's determination that it was in the best interest of Isaiah to be permanently placed in the custody of BCCSB is supported by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court outlined the required factors and applied the evidence in its consideration of the motion for permanent custody. ... {¶ 10} The trial court noted that appellant was incarcerated and had not seen Isaiah since his birth. Conversely, the trial court found that Isaiah was bonded with his foster family, with whom he had been placed since August 2000. The foster family received extensive medical training while Isaiah was hospitalized and could attend to Isaiah's complicated medical needs and numerous medical appointments. The foster parents had expressed an interest in adopting Isaiah. ... {¶ 12} The trial court stated, "Isaiah requires a legally secure, stable environment in which he can improve his physical condition and continue to develop without placing him at further risk. This court does not believe that such a placement exists at this time, or will be available in a reasonable amount of time, outside of a grant of permanent custody."

Although the court must consider all subsection (D) best-interest factors, only one factor needs to be resolved in favor of permanent custody.

In Re M.Z., Unpublished Decision (12-5-2002) · filed 2002-12-05(D)

{¶ 20} The factors listed in R.C. 2151.414 (D) are as follows: 1) the interaction of the child with the parent, siblings and foster parents; 2) the wishes of the child; 3) the custodial history of the child; 4) the child's need for legally secure placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody; and 5) whether any of the factors listed in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in relation to the parents and child. Notably, "only one of these factors needs to be resolved in favor of the award of permanent custody." ... {¶ 22} Clearly, the court complied with the best interest determination outlined in R.C. 2151.414 (D).

The best-interest inquiry focuses on the child, and section 2151.414(C) bars consideration of how permanent custody would affect the parents.

In Re Cook a Dependent Child, Unpublished Decision (2-27-2003) · filed 2003-02-27(C)

The focus of the "best interest" determination is upon the child, not the parent, 16 as R.C. 2151.414 (C) specifically prohibits the court from considering the effect a grant of permanent custody would have upon the parents.

A trial court deciding a child's best interest need not specifically enumerate each section 2151.414(D) factor in its decision.

In Matter of Nicholas R., Unpublished Decision (3-13-2003) · filed 2003-03-13(D)

A trial court is not required to specifically enumerate each factor under R.C. 2151.414 (D) in its decision.

The section's best-interest and placement criteria were satisfied where the child had bonded with a foster family able to meet her special needs, the mother had a long history of substance abuse and prior involuntary terminations and was incarcerated, and the father had abandoned the child.

In Re Rucker, Unpublished Decision (12-16-2002) · filed 2002-12-16(D), (E)(10)-(12)

Based on our review of the factors in R.C. 2151.414 and all relevant evidence in the record, we find clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's finding that placement of Anna in the permanent custody of BCCSB was in her best interest and met the criteria set forth in R.C. 2151.414 . We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

The best-interest and placement criteria can be satisfied where the children need the secure placement offered by a bonded foster family, one parent cannot carry learned parenting skills into practice, and the other parent fails to complete substance-abuse treatment.

In Re Moore, Unpublished Decision (1-6-2003) · filed 2003-01-06(D), (E)(1)

Based on our review of the factors in R.C. 2151.414 and all relevant evidence in the record, we find that clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's finding that placement of the children in the permanent custody of BCCSB was in their best interest and met the criteria set forth in R.C. 2151.414 . We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Permanent custody may serve a special-needs child's best interests when a parent persistently interferes with the treatment and service providers the child needs.

In Re J.J. v. Jacobson, Unpublished Decision (12-31-2002) · filed 2002-12-31(D)

J.J. has special needs and will continue to have them. Several witnesses testified that Mother interferes with J.J.'s treatment and growth and, unless her access to the child is limited or cut off, she will continue to do so. The trial court had before it ample evidence that permanent custody to CSB was in the best interest of J.J.

A special-needs child's best interests supported permanent custody where the parent inconsistently followed the case plan, could not secure suitable housing, and lacked the patience and knowledge required for the child's care.

In the Matter of Butts, Unpublished Decision (11-27-2002) · filed 2003-01-08(D)

As demonstrated by the evidence, various reasons clearly justify the trial court's conclusion that the child would be better cared for in another home, including Appellant's failure to consistently comply with the ordered case plan, her inability to secure a suitable home environment, and her lack of patience and knowledge for the care of Tyler. Consequently, because the trial court's grant of permanent custody is supported by clear and convincing evidence, we find Appellant's assignment of error to be without merit, and it is hereby overruled.

Evidence of a parent-child bond and an absence of physical abuse or deprivation does not necessarily establish that remaining with the parents is in the children's best interests.

In the Matter of Gang, Unpublished Decision (1-21-2003) · filed 2003-01-21(D)

Although the parents argue that testimony showed that they had a bond with the children and that the children were never physically abused or deprived of necessities, such a finding does not necessarily mean that it would be in the children's best interest to remain with their parents. The record shows by clear and convincing evidence that the children are thriving in an emotionally secure environment, without the problems the children exhibited when they were living with Gang and Carpenter.

Section 2151.414 requires specific findings before permanent custody is granted, and appellate review determines whether the trial court followed the statutory best-interest factors or abused its discretion by departing from them.

In the Matter of Hugle, Unpublished Decision (4-7-2003) · filed 2003-04-07(D)

Before granting permanent custody of a child to the state, the trial court is required to make specific statutory findings. A reviewing court must determine whether the trial court followed the statutory factors in making its decision or abused its discretion by deviating from the statutory factors.

Section 2151.414(D)(4) requires the permanent-custody best-interest analysis to consider whether a legally secure permanent placement can be achieved without granting permanent custody to the agency.

In Re Mourey, Unpublished Decision (4-8-2003) · filed 2003-04-08(D)(4)

One of the factors the trial court must consider in determining whether it is in a child's best interest to terminate parental rights, is whether a "legally secure permanent placement" can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency.

Because § 2151.414(D) requires consideration of all relevant best-interest factors, a court may consider concerns that arose after the agency's initial complaint.

In Re Heavenli Cummings, Unpublished Decision (4-30-2003) · filed 2003-04-30(D)

In making this determination, the court was required "to consider all relevant factors."

A settlement memorandum extending temporary custody does not limit the court's consideration of the statutory best-interest factors or the parent's case-plan compliance when deciding permanent custody.

In Re Dunaway, Unpublished Decision (5-19-2003) · filed 2003-05-19(D)

In the case sub judice, the trial court considered the children's best interest as required by R.C. 2151.414 (D). ... Further, the agreement did not preclude the trial court from considering the requirements of appellant's case plan.

The division (D) best-interest finding may be supported by repeated removals for severe neglect, improvement in foster care, the parent's lengthy incarceration, the children's need for permanency, and the absence of a suitable relative placement.

In Re Gross, Unpublished Decision (6-30-2003) · filed 2003-06-30(D)

The testimony at the permanent custody hearing shows that the children were not cared for and had been in and out of BCCSB custody. The children have been removed from appellant's home on more than two occasions. The children had currently been in BCCSB custody for more than a 12-month period. Appellant resides in jail, serving two consecutive 18-month sentences. The court noted that she would be incarcerated until late 2004. The children's therapist testified that the children needed permanency. According to one of the BCCSB caseworker's testimony, Hamilton County found that the Vallejos home was not a viable placement for the children.

The legally-secure-placement factor did not support permanent custody where transportation problems impeded the case plan and the parents lacked an adequate opportunity to show they could provide a secure home.

In the Matter of Knuckles, Unpublished Decision (8-21-2003) · filed 2003-08-21(D)(4)

We find that the record fails to show that the Knuckles were unable to provide the children with legally secure placement in their home. The record shows that the Knuckles did not have an adequate opportunity to show that they could provide legally secure placement following the initial removal. With this opportunity, the Knuckles can show whether reunification is possible, or whether permanent custody with BCCSB is truly the only possibility.

A failed planned permanent living arrangement and repeated relapse after reunification supported finding that permanent custody, rather than continued foster care, was in the children's best interest.

In the Matter of Marlow, Unpublished Decision (8-25-2003) · filed 2003-08-25(D)(3)-(4)

The trial court further found that it had previously granted a Planned Permanent Living Arrangement as an alternative to permanent custody because appellant was making progress in her treatment. However, the court further found that within three months of unification with her children BCCSB again filed a complaint based on numerous referrals and concerns for the children. The court determined that based on her history appellant has had numerous opportunities to rectify the problems in her life in order to provide stability to her children, but that she has continued to fail. The record thoroughly supports the trial court's findings.

Time spent outside a parent's home cannot by itself count against the parent under the custodial-history factor without considering that period's implications for the children.

In Re J.B., Unpublished Decision (9-10-2003) · filed 2003-09-10(D)(3)

As this court stressed in In re Smith , 9th Dist. No. 20711, 2002-Ohio-34 , however, "the time period in and of itself cannot be held against the parent without considering * * * the implications that it had on [these children]."

Section 2151.414(D)'s best-interest determination was supported where the evidence addressed the children's custodial history and showed they had spent over twelve of the preceding twenty-two consecutive months in agency custody.

In the Matter of Utt Children Minor, Unpublished Decision (8-27-2003) · filed 2003-08-27(D)

R.C. 2151.414 (D) sets forth the factors a trial court is to consider when determining best interest. ... Finally, the trial court found that, in considering the custodial history of the children, the children have been in the temporary custody of SCDJFS for over twelve of the past twenty-two consecutive months. {¶ 36} The trial court's findings concerning best interests and decision to grant permanent custody to SCDJFS is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. There is relevant, competent and credible evidence to support the trial court's decision.

The child's interaction and relationship with a parent is only one of the factors the court must consider when determining the child's best interest.

In Re Cornett, Unpublished Decision (9-11-2003) · filed 2003-09-11(D)(1)

However, it is but one of many factors that the trial court must consider under R.C. 2151.414 (D) when making the best interest determination.

The best-interest provisions in subsection (D) are mandatory and must be scrupulously observed.

In the Matter of Cornell, Unpublished Decision (9-19-2003) · filed 2003-09-19(D)

We have previously held that the provisions of R.C. 2151.414 (D) are mandatory and must be scrupulously observed.

In determining a child's best interest, the court must consider all relevant factors, including the child's relationships, wishes, custodial history, and need for a legally secure permanent placement.

In Re Helen Estepp, Unpublished Decision (9-24-2003) · filed 2003-09-24(D)

R.C. 2151.414 (D) provides that in determining best interest, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including but not limited to the interaction and relationship of the child with his parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents, and other care providers; the wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the guardian ad litem; the custodial history of the child, including whether he has been in the temporary custody of children's services for twelve or more months of consecutive twenty-two month period; and the child's need for a legally-secure permanent placement, and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(D) requires the juvenile court to consider every enumerated best-interest factor, though it may also consider other relevant factors.

In Re J. H., Unpublished Decision (10-22-2003) · filed 2003-10-22(D)

Although the trial court is not precluded from considering other relevant factors, the statute explicitly requires the court to consider all of the enumerated factors.

Section 2151.414(D) permits a broad inquiry into all relevant factors bearing on the child's best interests.

In the Matter of Tiffany Y. Danielle Y., Unpublished Decision (11-12-2003) · filed 2003-11-12(D)

The statute is written broadly to allow a free-ranging inquiry by the juvenile court judge.

The record must indicate that the juvenile court or magistrate specifically considered each of the five best-interest factors in subsection (D).

In the Matter of Salsgiver, Unpublished Decision (11-26-2003) · filed 2003-11-26(D)

There must be some indication in the record that the magistrate or juvenile court specifically considered each of the five factors found in R.C. 2151.414 (D) before making its decision.

A court must consider every subsection (D) best-interest factor, but only one factor needs to favor permanent custody.

In Re C.H., Unpublished Decision (12-18-2003) · filed 2003-12-18(D)

Although the court must consider each of the factors listed in R.C. 2151.414 (D) in making its permanent custody determination, "only one of these factors needs to be resolved in favor of the award of permanent custody." See Moore, supra.

Section 2151.414(D)(4) requires consideration of the child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that placement can be achieved without permanent agency custody; a medically fragile child's heightened need, the absence of willing relatives, and a parent's continuing unsuitability can support permanent custody.

In Re N.P., Unpublished Decision (1-14-2004) · filed 2004-01-14(D)(4)

Due to her fragile medical condition, H.P. is in need of a legally secure placement more so than a typical three-year-old. There are no relatives who have expressed a willingness to care for her on an ongoing basis. The evidence further demonstrated that Castner would not be an appropriate placement now or in the near future. Thus, the trial court could reasonably conclude that a secure placement could not be achieved without granting CSB permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(D) requires a trial court deciding custody issues to apply the best-interest-of-the-child standard.

In Re Sellers, Unpublished Decision (12-8-2004) · filed 2004-12-08(D)

A trial court must apply the "best interest" standard when determining custodial issues. R.C. 2151.414 (D). ... Upon review, we are unpersuaded that the court erred or abused its discretion in adopting the magistrate's decision that legal custody of Keciol to the Flynn family would be in the child's best interest.

Section 2151.414(D) requires a juvenile court deciding whether permanent custody is in a child's best interest to consider all enumerated factors, including the child's relationships, wishes, custodial history, and need for a legally secure permanent placement.

In Re D.P., Unpublished Decision (12-30-2004) · filed 2004-12-30(D)

When determining whether a grant of permanent custody is in the child's best interest, the juvenile court must consider the following factors: "(1) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; "(2) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; "(3) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999; [and] "(4) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency[.]" R.C. 2151.414 (D)(1)-(4). 1 "Although the trial court is not precluded from considering other relevant factors, the statute explicitly requires the court to consider all of the enumerated factors."

Section 2151.414(D) requires a court determining a child's best interest to consider all relevant factors.

In Re M.S., Unpublished Decision (1-5-2005) · filed 2005-01-05(D)

R.C. 2151.414 (D) provides that "[i]n determining the best interest of a child * * * the court shall consider all relevant factors[.]" {¶ 13} In this case, the juvenile court considered a variety of factors before awarding custody to the Ohrnbergers.

Section 2151.414(D) requires a juvenile court to consider every applicable enumerated factor when deciding whether permanent custody is in a child's best interest, while permitting consideration of other relevant factors.

In Re A.B., Unpublished Decision (3-23-2005) · filed 2005-03-23(D)

When determining whether a grant of permanent custody is in the child's best interest, the juvenile court must consider the following factors: ... "Although the trial court is not precluded from considering other relevant factors, the statute explicitly requires the court to consider all of the enumerated factors."