Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.414

A court need not prolong permanent-custody proceedings to allow a parent additional time to begin cooperating with case-plan services.

In re A.E. · filed 2025-05-05(E)(1)

The juvenile court was not required to prolong the custody proceedings for appellant-mother to accept and cooperate in the case planning process. ... The permanent custody law does not contemplate holding A.E. and B.E. in custodial limbo beyond the juvenile court’s permanent custody decision on December 11, 2024, for appellant-mother to finally accept and cooperate with her case plan services.

A juvenile court deciding between permanent custody and extending temporary custody must conduct the subsection (D) best-interest analysis.

In re J.G. · filed 2018-12-26(D)

Moreover, the trial court was required to conduct a best interest analysis to determine whether to place the children in the permanent custody of CSB or to extend temporary custody. When determining the children’s best interest under R.C. 2151.414(D), the juvenile court must consider all relevant factors, including the interaction and interrelationships of the children, their wishes, the custodial history of the children, and the need for permanence in the children’s lives.

A trial court deciding between permanent custody and an extension of temporary custody must conduct the subsection (D) best-interest analysis.

In re N.K. · filed 2019-02-06(D)

“Moreover, the trial court was required to conduct a best interest analysis to determine whether to place the children in the permanent custody of CSB or to extend temporary custody.”

If permanent custody is in the child's best interest, extending temporary custody is not an appropriate alternative disposition.

In re S.F. · filed 2016-08-03(D)

If permanent custody was in the best interest of S.F., the alternative disposition of extending temporary custody was not.

Once permanent custody is determined to be in the children's best interest, a further temporary-custody extension is unnecessary.

In re H.S. · filed 2017-02-03(D)

Furthermore, the magistrate need not order temporary custody to continue for an additional six months when the magistrate had determined that permanent custody is in the children’s best interests.

Section 2151.414 concerns permanent custody and does not govern a juvenile court's award of temporary custody.

Smith v. Camp · filed 2017-12-04

However, R.C. 2151.414 and In re Arnold are inapplicable as they solely concern permanent custody which is not involved here.

Section 2151.414 applies only to permanent custody and does not govern an award of temporary custody.

C.S. v. J.C. · filed 2017-12-04

However, R.C. 2151.414 and ... are inapplicable as they solely concern permanent custody which is not involved here.

A further extension of temporary custody is not warranted when extensive evidence shows the parent disregarded the case plan and failed to remedy the causes of removal during the prior 18 months.

In re D.M. · filed 2018-06-11(D)(1)

Although Father testified he loved his children and believed reunification was in their best interest, there are compelling reasons to weigh the best interest factors in favor of permanent custody to PCDJFS. The record contains extensive evidence concerning Father's disregard for progressing within his case plan and refusal to substantially remedy the conditions causing the children's removal. Despite Father's assertion otherwise, the evidence does not indicate another six-month extension of temporary custody will have a different result than the prior 18 months of temporary custody.

Section 2151.414(A) allows an agency with current temporary custody under a dispositional order to seek permanent custody without readjudicating abuse, neglect, or dependency.

In Re Miller · filed 1995-02-15(A)

In our view, the legislature intended to allow only public children services agencies that have current temporary custody of an abused, neglected, or dependent child pursuant to an order of disposition under R.C. 2151.353(A)(2) to move for permanent custody of that child “unencumbered by readjudication” of the issues of whether the child is, in fact, abused, neglected, or dependent. See R.C. 2151.414(A) (last sentence).

Former Section 2151.414(A) requires the agency to have current temporary custody of the child when it moves for permanent custody.

In re Hayes · filed 1997-06-18(A)

The use of the words “has custody” in former R.C. 2151.414(A) anticipated that the child was currently in the agency’s temporary custody.

For the twelve-of-twenty-two-month rule, the statutory deemed-entry date applies regardless of whether temporary custody was actually held by an agency, relative, or third party.

In re L.T. · filed 2016-08-05(B)(1)

The statute does not require that a child be in the temporary custody of an agency as a matter of fact, but rather provides for when a child shall "be ... considered to have entered the temporary custody of an agency" for purposes of applying the 12 of 22 rule.

For the twelve-of-twenty-two-month calculation, a child enters agency custody on the earlier of the adjudication date or sixty days after removal from the home.

In re B.M. · filed 2023-03-30(B)(1)(e)

Applying the statutory calculation enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(e), Billy and Josh are considered to have entered the Agency's temporary custody on January 24, 2021, which was 60 days after being removed from Father's and Mother's home. Billy and Josh were therefore in the Agency's custody more than 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period at the time the Agency moved for permanent custody on February 10, 2022.

For the twelve-of-twenty-two-month calculation, a child enters agency custody on the earlier of the adjudication date or sixty days after removal from the home.

In re B.M. · filed 2023-04-03(B)(1)(e)

Applying the statutory calculation enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(e), Billy and Josh are considered to have entered the Agency's temporary custody on January 24, 2021, which was 60 days after being removed from Father's and Mother's home. Billy and Josh were therefore in the Agency's custody more than 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period at the time the Agency moved for permanent custody on February 10, 2022.

For the twelve-of-twenty-two-month calculation under section 2151.414(B)(1)(d), a child enters temporary agency custody on the earlier of adjudication or sixty days after removal; where the latter date was earlier, it controlled the calculation.

In re Z.J. · filed 2023-04-26(B)(1)(d)

For the purposes of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), “a child shall be considered to have entered the temporary custody of an agency on the earlier of the date the child is adjudicated pursuant to section 2151.28 of the Revised Code or the date that is sixty days after the removal of the child from home.” ... In the present case, the earlier of the two dates referenced in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) is August 14, 2020, 60 days after the removal of the child from the home.

Applying the statutory deemed-entry rule, nineteen months of temporary custody before the agency's motion satisfies the twelve-of-twenty-two-month requirement.

In re E.W. · filed 2024-01-24(B)(1)

Consequently, at the time CSB moved for permanent custody, the children had been in its temporary custody for 19 months of a consecutive 22-month period.

For the twelve-of-twenty-two-month calculation, temporary custody begins on the earlier of adjudication or sixty days after removal.

In re C.W. · filed 2024-09-25(B)(1)

Because 60 days after the child’s April 4 removal was June 3, 2022, three days earlier than the adjudication date, June 3 is the date to be used in this time calculation. The record reveals that, at the time CSB moved for permanent custody of C.W. on August 15, 2023, the child had been in its temporary custody for more than 14 months of the prior consecutive 22 months.

For section 2151.414(B)(1)(d)'s twelve-of-twenty-two-month calculation, temporary custody begins on the earlier of the dependency adjudication or sixty days after removal; where adjudication came first, that date controlled.

In re P.M. · filed 2024-10-15(B)(1)(d)

With respect to the 12 of 22 provision, temporary custody is deemed to begin on the date that the child is adjudicated as abused, neglected, or dependent or 60 days after the child's removal from the home, whichever occurs earlier. ... In the present case, the earlier date was the date of the neglect adjudication (April 19, 2022), as 60 days following P.M.'s removal from parental custody (March 31, 2022) was not until May 30, 2022.

For the twelve-of-twenty-two-month calculation, the earlier adjudication date controls when it precedes the date sixty days after removal.

In re A.P. · filed 2024-12-02(B)(1)(d)

A.P. was adjudicated to be a dependent and neglected child on May 5, 2022. Thus, the date to be used for the calculation is May 5, 2022 as it is the earlier of the two.

A child enters temporary agency custody on the earlier of the dependency adjudication date or sixty days after removal from the home.

In re T.M. · filed 2025-03-13(B)(1)(d)

Under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), “a child shall be considered to have entered the temporary custody of an agency on the earlier of the date the child is adjudicated pursuant to section 2151.28 of the Revised Code or the date that is sixty days after the removal of the child from home.” ... On this record, the juvenile court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

For the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground, temporary custody begins on the earlier of the dependency adjudication date or sixty days after removal from the home.

In re J.M. · filed 2025-04-21(B)(1)(d)

With respect to the 12 of 22 provision, temporary custody is deemed to begin on the date that the child is adjudicated as abused, neglected, or dependent or 60 days after the child's removal from the home, whichever occurs earlier. ... In the present case, the earlier date was the date of the dependency adjudication (August 19, 2022), as 60 days following J.M.'s removal from parental custody (June 24, 2022) was not until August 23, 2022.

A child enters temporary custody on the earlier of the adjudication date or sixty days after removal, not when the complaint is filed or on the initial-removal date.

In re P.G. · filed 2025-04-22(B)(1)

But R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) does not state that a child is considered to enter the agency’s temporary custody on the date that the agency files an abuse, neglect, or dependency complaint or on the date of the child’s initial removal from the home. Instead, according to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), a child is considered to have entered the agency’s “temporary custody” on the earlier of the adjudication date or the date that is 60 days after the child’s removal from the home.

A child enters temporary agency custody for statutory purposes on the earlier of the adjudication date or sixty days after removal from the home.

In re R.W. · filed 2025-10-16(B)(1)

A child enters the temporary custody of a children services agency for statutory purposes on the earlier of the date that the child is adjudicated pursuant to R.C. 2151.28, or the date that is sixty days after the removal of the child from home.

For the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground, temporary custody begins on the earlier of the dependency adjudication date or sixty days after removal.

In re M.B. · filed 2025-10-22(B)(1)(d)

This division contains a special definition of temporary custody: “a child shall be considered to have entered the temporary custody of an agency on the earlier of the date the child is adjudicated pursuant to section 2151.28 of the Revised Code or the date that is sixty days after the removal of the child from home.”

A child enters an agency’s temporary custody on the earlier of adjudication or 60 days after removal from the home.

In re S.P. · filed 2026-03-11(B)(1)

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) provides that a child is considered to have entered the temporary custody of an agency based on the date when the child was adjudicated, or the date that is 60 days after the child was removed from their home, whichever is the earlier date. ... Accordingly, the children entered HCJFS’s temporary custody on February 9, 2022, which is 60 days after the children were removed from the previous custodian’s care.

A constitutional challenge to Section 2151.414(E)(11) is waived when the prior-termination ground was raised before the permanent-custody hearing but not challenged in the trial court.

In re C.W. · filed 2016-08-12(E)(11)

Since the fact that M.W. had previously lost permanent custody of children, under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), was raised as a basis for M.W. losing custody of C.W. well before the permanent custody hearing was held, the issue of the constitutionality of R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) should have been raised before the trial court.

Section 2151.414’s permanent custody framework is facially constitutional.

In the Matter of Thompson, Unpublished Decision (2-6-2003) · filed 2003-02-06

We do not find Ohio's statutory scheme for determining issues of permanent custody unconstitutional.

A trial court need not experiment with a child's best interest to let a parent prove future ability to regain custody.

In re B.K.F. · filed 2016-08-22(D)

A trial court is not required to experiment with the child's best interest in order to permit a parent to prove that he will be able to regain custody of the child.

A parent's late case-plan efforts do not overcome the child's need for permanence under Section 2151.414(D)(1)(d).

In re A.G. · filed 2024-05-13(D)(1)(d)

Although Lamarcus testified that he had made progress on the case plan and was a viable option, his late efforts do not overcome the child’s need for permanency. The trial court determined that this factor weighed in favor of granting the permanent custody motion, and we find that the evidence supports that finding.

Poverty alone does not satisfy § 2151.414(E)(1) or (4), but those factors may be established when an impoverished parent's conduct results in neglect and the parent fails over an extended period to obtain income or otherwise become able to meet the children's basic needs.

In re T.C. · filed 2016-11-04(E)(1), (4)

Notably, in In re K., the Eighth District continued, “When an impoverished parent’s actions, however, result in parental neglect, our society would be remiss if it did not intervene for the sake of the child’s welfare. Appellant had more than two years to remedy the situation in which she found herself. Her children should not be penalized because she did not do so.” ... Thus, the evidence demonstrates that in the 21 months since the children were removed, appellant has not changed her circumstances; appellant has no income, has difficulty providing food for herself, is relying on her older son to pay her rent—which he will not commit to continuing to do—has not maintained employment, and has not demonstrated any realistic possibility of receiving a financial settlement from her previous injury. ... Therefore, we hold that the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) and (4) are not against the manifest weight of the evidence and are not in violation of the equal protection clauses of the United States and Ohio constitutions.

A parent's love and appropriate interaction during brief visits do not outweigh the child's need for permanence when the parent has not demonstrated an ability to keep the child safe and provide a stable full-time home.

In re Z.G. · filed 2016-11-07(D)(1)(a), (d)

Notwithstanding Father’s ability to interact with his son during brief periods at visitations, Father has not demonstrated that he would be able to keep his child safe and provide him with a stable home on a full-time and permanent basis. ... This Court concludes that the trial court did not clearly lose its way and create a manifest miscarriage of justice when it found that permanent custody was in Z.G.’s best interest.

The court need not extend temporary custody to give a parent another opportunity to prove suitability when past conduct shows an inability to provide a legally secure permanent placement; the child's present condition, not hoped-for future improvement, controls.

In re H.W. · filed 2016-11-16(D)(1)(d)

Moreover, we have continuously recognized that a trial court is not required to experiment with a child’s welfare in order to permit a parent an opportunity to prove his or her suitability: ... “The child’s present condition and environment is the subject for decision not the expected or anticipated behavior of unsuitability or unfitness of the * * * [parent]. * * * The law does not require the court to experiment with the child’s welfare to see if he will suffer great detriment or harm.” ... Thus, we disagree with the suggestion that the trial court should have given C.P. one more chance to prove her suitability.

A court need not extend temporary custody when a parent has continuously failed to remedy the removal conditions and the record gives no reason to believe that delaying permanency would change the result.

In re T.C. · filed 2023-06-09(B)(1)(a), (E)(1)

As such, the factor under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) has been met and the record contains no indication that delaying permanency for the children for another seven months would lead to a different result. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying mother’s oral motion for an extension of time.

A permanent-custody case focuses on whether the removal conditions were remedied and whether permanent custody serves the child's best interest, not whether abuse, neglect, or dependency continues.

In re AsF(F) · filed 2016-11-21(D), (E)(1)

Second, in a permanent custody case, the focus is not upon whether the child continues subject to abuse, neglect, or dependency, but whether the conditions causing removal have been remediated and whether permanent custody is in the child's best interest with reference to the statutory factors.

Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing evidence both that permanent custody is in the child's best interest and that one of the alternative statutory circumstances exists.

In re A.C. · filed 2018-02-01(B)

The statute requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) granting permanent custody of the child to the agency is in the best interest of the child under R.C. 2151.414(D), and (2) either the child (a) cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with either parent if any one of the factors in R.C. 2151.414(E) are present; (b) is abandoned; (c) is orphaned and no relatives are able to take permanent custody of the child; or (d) has been in the temporary custody of one or more public or private children services agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive 22-month period. R.C. 2151.414(B).

Section 2151.414 establishes a two-part test for deciding an agency's motion for permanent custody.

In re A.C. · filed 2019-05-24(B)(1)

R.C. 2151.414 establishes a two-part test for courts to apply when determining a motion for permanent custody of a child to a public children services agency.

Division (B) establishes a two-pronged analysis for deciding a motion for permanent custody.

In re L.F. · filed 2020-02-19(B)

Therefore, R.C. 2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody.

Division (B) establishes a two-pronged analysis for deciding permanent custody.

In re L.S. · filed 2020-09-30(B)

Therefore, R.C. 2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody.

Division (B) establishes a two-pronged analysis for deciding permanent custody.

In re J.H. · filed 2020-10-05(B)

Therefore, R.C. §2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody.

Division (B) establishes a two-pronged analysis for deciding permanent custody.

In re R.W. · filed 2020-10-07(B)

Therefore, R.C. §2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody.

Division (B) establishes a two-pronged analysis for ruling on permanent custody.

In re B.M.S. · filed 2021-02-16(B)

Therefore, R.C. 2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody.

Section 2151.414 requires both a qualifying first-prong ground and a finding that permanent custody is in the child's best interest under division (D).

In re R.H. · filed 2021-02-19(B), (D)

The two-part test of R.C. 2151.414 requires the juvenile court to find (1) that child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time, or the child is abandoned, orphaned, or has been in temporary custody of the Agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period as provided by R.C. 2151.414(B), and (2) that the grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child, applying the factors under R.C. 2151.414(D).

Division (B) establishes a two-pronged analysis for ruling on permanent custody.

In re K.P. · filed 2021-03-01(B)

Therefore, R.C. §2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody.

Division (B) requires a two-pronged analysis when ruling on permanent custody.

In re L.G. · filed 2021-03-11(B)

Therefore, R.C. 2151.414(B) provides a two-pronged analysis the trial court is required to apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody.

Section 2151.414 establishes a two-part test for deciding an agency's permanent-custody motion.

In re K.M.W. · filed 2021-03-12(B)(1)

R.C. 2151.414 establishes a two-part test for courts to apply when determining a motion for permanent custody to a public services agency.

Permanent custody under subsection (B)(1) requires clear and convincing evidence both that permanent custody serves the child’s best interest and that at least one enumerated subsection (B)(1) factor exists.

In re J.Y. · filed 2021-06-25(B)(1)

{¶ 9} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) provides a two-part test for courts to apply when determining whether to grant a motion for permanent custody to a public services agency. In re R.L., 2d Dist. Greene Nos. 2013-CA-46, 2013-CA-50, 2014-Ohio-3955, ¶ 7. The statute requires the trial court to find by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) an award of permanent custody to the agency is in the child’s best interest; and (2) any one of the factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) exist.

Subsection (B)(1) uses a two-part permanent-custody test, and only one enumerated finding need be met for its second prong.

In re G.M. · filed 2022-10-17(B)(1)

{¶18} Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), the juvenile court may terminate parental rights and award permanent custody of a child to a children services agency if the court makes findings pursuant to a two-part test. ... Only one of these findings must be met to satisfy the second prong of the two-part permanent custody test.

The Section 2151.414(D)(1) inquiry focuses on the children's interests, requires consideration of every factor, and gives no factor greater weight.

In re S.H. · filed 2024-09-12(D)(1)

The best-interest determination focuses on the best interests of the children, not the parents. In re N.B., 2015-Ohio-314, ¶ 59 (8th Dist.). The juvenile court is required to consider each R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factor, and no factor is afforded greater weight than the others.

The permanent-custody best-interest determination focuses on the child rather than the parent.

In re K.Y. · filed 2025-03-28(D)(1)

But the best interest determination focuses on the child, not the parent.

A parent's repeated refusal to permit required home inspections may support findings under section 2151.414(E)(1) and (14) that the parent failed to remedy unsafe housing conditions and was unwilling to provide basic necessities.

In re W.H. · filed 2016-12-19(E)(1), (14)

Notably, the case plan specifically required that Appellants permit the county code enforcement officer into their home for inspections. However, Appellants’ repeated conduct in refusing admittance to the county code enforcement officer into the house to assess the conditions of the home only served to buttress the Agency’s position that Appellants had made insufficient progress in remedying the deplorable conditions to make the home suitable for the children’s return. See R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (14).

Section 2151.414(E)(1)'s failure-to-remedy factor was satisfied where stable housing caused the child's removal and the incarcerated father could not provide a home at the hearing or for at least another year.

In re J.C. · filed 2023-12-06(E)(1)

The evidence was not disputed that Father was unable to meet J.C.’s basic needs for a home at the time of the hearing or in the foreseeable future. Father was incarcerated and would be for at least another year. An adult penal institution obviously was not an appropriate home in which a young child could reside. Given that a lack of stable housing was one of the reasons that J.C. was removed from her parents’ custody, Father has failed to demonstrate any error in the trial court’s finding that he had failed to substantially remedy the conditions that had caused the ongoing placement of J.C. outside her parents’ custody.

Subsection (A)(2) requires a juvenile court to dispose of a permanent-custody motion no later than 200 days after the agency files it, supporting denial of a delay that would exceed that limit.

In re B.T.H. · filed 2017-10-30(A)(2)

R.C. 2151.414(A)(2) provides that "[t]he court shall issue an order that grants, denies, or otherwise disposes of the motion for permanent custody, and journalize the order, not later than two hundred days after the agency files the motion." ... Granting B.T.H.'s request would have significantly extended the juvenile court's resolution of the permanent custody motion beyond the statutory limit.

Section 2151.414(A)(2)'s hearing and decision deadlines are directory rather than jurisdictional, so noncompliance does not invalidate a permanent-custody order; the remedy for delay is a writ of procedendo.

In re M.C. · filed 2016-12-19(A)(2)

Based on this express language, courts, including this one, have held that these time periods are not jurisdictional and that noncompliance with them do not warrant reversal or dismissal of a permanent custody award. ... Because these time limits are directory rather than mandatory, the remedy for a party aggrieved by a judge’s delay in conducting a hearing and ruling on a motion for permanent custody is to petition an appellate court for a writ of procedendo to compel action; a failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the issue for purposes of appeal.

A permanent-custody hearing must ordinarily occur within 120 days after the agency files its motion, subject to a reasonable continuance for good cause, and the court must journalize its disposition within 200 days.

In re A.V. · filed 2025-03-20(A)(2)

Lastly, R.C. 2151.414(A)(2) requires a juvenile court hold a hearing on a public children services agency’s motion for permanent custody no later than 120 days after the agency files a motion for permanent custody, though a reasonable continuance may be granted “for good cause shown.” The statute further provides that a court must issue and journalize an order disposing of the motion for permanent custody no later than 200 days after the motion’s filing.

For good cause, a juvenile court may continue a permanent-custody hearing for a reasonable time beyond 120 days, but it must journalize its disposition within 200 days after the motion was filed.

In re L.M. · filed 2025-10-07(A)(2)

However, R.C. 2151.414(A)(2) permits the juvenile count to continue the merits hearing for a reasonable time beyond the one-hundred-twenty day deadline for good cause shown. Subsection (A)(2) reads in relevant part, “[t]he court shall issue an order that grants, denies, or otherwise disposes of the motion for permanent custody, and journalize the order, not later than two hundred days after the agency files the motion.”

A trial court generally does not abuse its discretion by denying a continuance when the permanent-custody hearing is already beyond subsection (A)(2)'s 120-day deadline.

In re J.H. · filed 2026-01-02(A)(2)

Generally, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a request for a continuance when the [permanent custody] hearing is already past the 120-day deadline contained in R.C. 2151.414(A)(2).

A permanent-custody hearing ordinarily must occur within 120 days after the motion, but the court may continue it for a reasonable period on good cause.

In re K.G. · filed 2026-01-15(A)(2)

R.C. 2151.414(A)(2) provides that motions to modify temporary custody to permanent custody “shall” be heard not later than 120 days after the motion is filed, but the court may continue the hearing for a “reasonable period of time” for good cause shown.

A court may proceed with a permanent-custody hearing rather than continue it where the motion is already beyond the statute's 120-day hearing deadline.

In re E.H. · filed 2026-02-27(A)(2)

By that time, MCCS’s motion for permanent custody had been pending beyond the 120-day deadline for holding the hearing.

A juvenile court generally does not abuse its discretion by denying a continuance when the permanent-custody hearing is already beyond subsection (A)(2)'s 120-day deadline.

In re A.S. · filed 2026-04-09(A)(2)

Generally, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a request for a continuance when the PCC hearing is already past the 120-day deadline contained in R.C. 2151.414(A)(2).

Subsection (A)(2) directs the trial court to hold a permanent-custody hearing no later than 120 days after the agency files its motion.

In re R.S. · filed 2026-03-05(A)(2)

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(A)(2), the trial court is to hold a hearing on a motion for permanent custody no later than 120 days after the public children services agency files said motion.

An erroneous custody-duration finding is harmless when multiple subsection (E) factors establish the first prong and only one is required.

In re C.B. · filed 2022-09-08(E)

The trial court’s finding that the five-month-old child was in agency custody for twelve or months of the consecutive twenty-two-month period was in error; however, that error is harmless where, as here, the trial court determined that multiple R.C. 2151.414(E) factors were present though only one is required.

When a child has spent at least twelve of twenty-two consecutive months in agency custody, Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is the applicable threshold provision, and reliance on other threshold provisions is harmless if the best-interest finding is supported.

In re I.J.H. · filed 2023-03-23(B)(1)(d)

Though we agree that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is the relevant provision in this case, not R.C. 2151.414(B)(2) nor 2151.414(B)(1)(a), any error on the part of the juvenile court with regard to the R.C. 2151.414(B)(2) and 2151.414(B)(1)(a) analysis is harmless error given our conclusion that the weight of the evidence supports error the juvenile court’s best interest determination.

An erroneous twelve-of-twenty-two-month finding is harmless when supported Section 2151.414(E) findings independently establish the alternative inability-to-place ground.

In re T.J. · filed 2024-12-19(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d)

CCDCFS acknowledges that this finding is erroneous, but argues that this is not reversible error because the court also included appropriate findings in satisfaction of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through its findings pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E). We agree.

Section 2151.414(E)(1)'s reasonable-efforts inquiry asks whether the agency did enough to satisfy the reasonableness standard, not whether it could have done more.

In re J.H. · filed 2020-04-24(E)(1)

“The issue in a reasonable-efforts determination is not whether the agency could have done more, but whether it did enough to satisfy the reasonableness standard in R.C. 2151.414(E)(1).”

A diligent-efforts finding under Section 2151.414(E)(1) is unnecessary when the twelve-of-twenty-two-month threshold applies.

In re A.C.-B. · filed 2017-02-01(B)(1)(d)

Such a finding is not required in a case, such as the present one, where a juvenile court makes the "12 of 22" first prong finding.

A juvenile court need not make a reasonable-efforts finding at a permanent-custody hearing when prior stages already addressed reasonable efforts.

In re B.F. · filed 2017-02-17(B)(1)(d)

Therefore, we find that the juvenile court was not required to make a reasonable-efforts finding under R.C. 2151.419.

Section 2151.414 does not require a reasonable-efforts determination on every permanent-custody motion filed under section 2151.413, but the agency must establish reasonable efforts before parental rights are terminated.

In re R.M. · filed 2017-06-16

Moreover, “the procedures in R.C. 2151.414 do not mandate that the court make a determination whether reasonable efforts have been made in every R.C. 2151.413 motion for permanent custody.” Id. at ¶ 42, 862 N.E.2d 816. Nevertheless, the agency must establish that it made such efforts prior to the termination of parental rights.

A trial court need not repeat reasonable-efforts findings at a Section 2151.414 permanent-custody hearing when it made those findings at earlier temporary-custody stages.

In re T.A.M. · filed 2018-12-17(A)

In this case, the trial court made reasonable-efforts findings both at the time that the agency was awarded temporary custody of T.A.M. and at the time that the agency was granted an extension of temporary custody over T.A.M., and McIe does not offer argument or evidence refuting these findings. ... As a result, the trial court was not required to make reasonable-efforts findings at the permanent custody hearing before awarding permanent custody of T.A.M. to the agency.

A Section 2151.414 permanent-custody hearing need not revisit reasonable reunification efforts when the agency established those efforts at earlier custody proceedings.

In re S.T. · filed 2020-01-03(A)

The statute makes no reference to a hearing on a motion for permanent custody. ... Therefore, “[b]y its plain terms, the statute does not apply to motions for permanent custody brought pursuant to R.C. 2151.413, or to hearings held on such motions pursuant to R.C. 2151.414.” ... Accordingly, GCCS was not required to adduce evidence establishing reasonable efforts to reunify the family during the permanent custody hearing if the record established that GGCS made reasonable efforts to reunify the family during prior custody proceedings.

An agency need not prove reasonable reunification efforts again at a Section 2151.414 permanent-custody hearing when the trial court made supported reasonable-efforts findings in earlier custody proceedings.

In re L.L. · filed 2020-04-20(A)

In sum, because the trial court previously made reasonable-efforts findings, CPSU was not required to prove, nor was the trial court required to find, that CPSU used reasonable efforts to reunify Johnson with L.L. before the trial court could grant permanent custody of L.L. to CPSU.

A permanent-custody hearing under section 2151.414 need not redetermine reasonable efforts when the agency proved those efforts at earlier stages of the case.

In re S.G. · filed 2022-11-17

Thus, it is only when the agency “has not already proven reasonable efforts [that] the agency must do so at the permanent custody hearing.” ... Consequently, there was no need to re-establish the efforts at the permanent custody hearing.

The reasonable-efforts requirement in section 2151.419(A)(1) does not apply to a permanent-custody hearing under section 2151.414 when reasonable efforts were established before the permanent-custody motion.

In re of A.G. · filed 2024-06-04

Because this statute makes no reference to a hearing on a permanent custody motion, it does not apply to motions for permanent custody brought pursuant to R.C. 2151.413, or to hearings held on such motions pursuant to R.C. 2151.414. ... This exception does not apply here because, as discussed, the juvenile court addressed the reasonable efforts on multiple occasions before FCCS filed the motion for permanent custody.

Although a permanent-custody hearing does not always require a new reasonable-efforts finding, the agency remains obligated to make reasonable efforts and must prove them at the hearing if it did not do so earlier.

In re C.W. · filed 2024-09-03(A), (E)(1)

Nonetheless, “[t]his does not mean that the agency is relieved of the duty to make reasonable efforts” before seeking permanent custody.” Id. at ¶ 42. “[If] the agency has not established that reasonable efforts have been made prior to the hearing on a motion for permanent custody, then it must demonstrate such efforts at that time.” Id. at ¶ 43.

A permanent-custody hearing under Section 2151.414 is not among the hearings at which Section 2151.419 requires a reasonable-efforts finding.

In re R.M. · filed 2025-04-18(A)

However, in reviewing this statute, this Court finds that it does not apply to a permanent custody hearing pursuant to R.C. 2151.414. R.C. 2151.419 governs hearings on efforts of agencies to prevent removal of children from homes. R.C. 2151.419 lists the types of hearings where the statute applies and R.C. 2151.414 is not included in that list.

A reasonable-efforts finding generally occurs before the permanent-custody hearing and need not be reestablished there if already made earlier in the proceedings.

In re B.R.H. · filed 2025-11-17(A)

The statutory requirement that a court shall determine whether an agency has made reasonable efforts to return a child to the parents’ home, however, does not apply in a permanent custody proceeding. ... However, “[i]f the agency has not established that reasonable efforts have been made prior to the hearing on a motion for permanent custody, then it must demonstrate such efforts at that time.”

Chronic mental or emotional illness that prevents a parent from providing an adequate home presently and within one year supports permanent custody under Section 2151.414(E)(2).

In re T.T. · filed 2017-02-10(E)(2)

The trial court concluded that the agency provided clear and convincing evidence of the elements set forth under R.C. 2151.414(E)(2).

A parent's chronic mental illness can support a finding that children cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time when repeated hospitalizations and continuing instability prevent adequate care.

In re M.D. · filed 2022-08-04(E)(2)

The juvenile court found, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(2), that the children could not be placed with Mother within a reasonable time due to her chronic mental illness. Evidence showed that Mother had 20 mental health related hospitalizations, including at least three hospitalizations in 2018 and one hospitalization in 2020 related to a second suicide attempt while Mother was pregnant with I.S. ... The GAL testified that the children could not be placed in Mother’s care primarily because of Mother’s lack of mental stability.

A parent's chronic mental illness does not satisfy section 2151.414(E)(2) unless it is so severe that the parent cannot provide an adequate permanent home at the hearing or within one year; seeking needed assistance may demonstrate caregiving capacity rather than incapacity.

In re A.H. · filed 2024-11-21(E)(2)

We disagree with CCDCFS, however, that this means that father cannot care for himself or A.H. Indeed, we agree with the juvenile court that father asking his case manager and peer support representative for help when he needs food, transportation, diapers, and other items shows that father is capable of caring for himself and A.H. Parents unable or failing to seek the help and resources they need is more problematic than the situation here. ... After reviewing the evidence in this case, we cannot say that the juvenile court’s judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence when it found that father’s mental illness was not so severe that it made him “unable to provide an adequate permanent home for the child at the [time of the hearing] and, as anticipated, within one year after” the hearing. R.C. 2151.414(E)(2).

Untreated recurring mental-health instability, missed visitation, and the child's success in foster care support inability-to-place and best-interest findings.

In re M.K. · filed 2024-11-22(B)(1)(a), (D)(1)

Based upon the foregoing, we find the trial court's finding the Child could not and should not be placed with Mother in a reasonable time was supported by competent, credible evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We further find the trial court's finding it was in the Child's best interests to grant permanent custody to TCJFS was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

A parent's mental-health diagnoses do not satisfy subsection (E)(2) without evidence causally linking them to an inability to provide an adequate home.

In re J.R. · filed 2026-04-20(E)(2)

As noted by Mother, ECDJFS presented no evidence that causally linked Mother’s diagnoses with an inability to provide an adequate home for her children. ... As to this factor, therefore, the juvenile court’s finding is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Participation in case-plan objectives does not negate abandonment established by more than 90 days without contact.

In re D.H. · filed 2022-12-13(B)(1)(b), (E)(10)

The record in this case demonstrates the juvenile court’s determination that Father abandoned D.H. was supported by the clear and convincing evidence.

A parent's later motion to restore visitation does not overcome abandonment once more than 90 days have passed without visits or contact.

In re I.C. · filed 2022-09-06(B)(1)(b)

The fact that she filed motions seeking to reestablish visitations in September 2021 is of little consequence, as the motion was filed well after 90 days had passed since the date of her last visit or contact with the children.

Later virtual contact does not negate a preceding year of abandonment, which must also be considered in the best-interest analysis.

In re D.S. · filed 2022-09-21(D)(1)(e), (E)(10)

Although they resumed some virtual contact a few months before the permeant custody hearing, that did not negate their abandonment of these young children for the previous year.

A parent's abandonment may outweigh substantive progress toward parenting and arguments that the agency could have done more to place the child with family.

In re R.F. · filed 2021-09-13(D)(1)(e), (E)(4), (E)(10)

Assuming, arguendo, that Hein has made substantive progress towards being able to effectively parent R.F. and that there was more that Lake Job and Family Services could have reasonably done to place R.F. with family, such considerations are outweighed in the analysis of R.F.’s best interests by the fact of Hein’s abandonment of R.F.

Subsection (E)(10) requires abandonment by one or both parents, not by a person excluded as a non-parent.

In re R.B.-B. · filed 2021-03-17(E)(10)

Under the plain and unambiguous language of this provision, the trial court was required to find that one or both parents had abandoned R.B.-B. It was not required to find that D.V., a non-parent, had also abandoned the child.

Subsection (E)(10)'s abandonment finding was supported where parental visitation ceased before COVID-19 protocols and claims that the protocols prevented visits were speculative.

In re M.G. · filed 2020-11-13(E)(10)

Thus, we find that clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court’s determination that M.G. was abandoned under R.C. 2151.414(E)(10).

A parent subject to a protection order may be found to have abandoned the children under subsection (E)(10) when the parent knew the order could be modified but made no meaningful effort for nearly four years to obtain contact.

In re P/W Children · filed 2020-06-30(E)(10)

Therefore, we hold that the court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(10) that father abandoned his children, and that, therefore, the children could not or should not be placed with either parent, was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

A father who acknowledged his parental status but took no action to secure visitation until the permanent-custody motion was filed may be found to have abandoned the child despite the absence of a prior formal paternity determination.

In re K.R. · filed 2017-08-07(B)(1)(b)

Father testified at the hearing that he was K.R.'s father. Father also testified that he first inquired about establishing visitation with K.R. in March 2016. Accordingly, approximately ten months prior to the permanent custody hearing Father recognized his parental rights and took minimal steps to exercise them. Nonetheless, Father did nothing to secure visitation until the agency filed the permanent custody motion. Accordingly, sufficient credible evidence exists that Father abandoned K.R.

When a parent abandons the child, the agency need not make or prove reasonable reunification efforts at the permanent-custody hearing.

In re L.M. · filed 2017-02-17(B)(1)(b)

Here, the trial court found appellant had abandoned L.M. Thus, appellee was under no duty to use reasonable efforts to reunify the family and was not required to prove reasonable efforts to reunify the family at the hearing on the motion for permanent custody.

For the 12-of-22-month threshold, temporary custody is calculated from the earlier of the dependency adjudication or 60 days after removal from the home.

In re F.B. · filed 2020-12-09(B)(1)(d)

For purposes of calculating this time, this period runs from the earlier of the date that the child was adjudicated dependent or 60 days from the date that the child was removed from the home.

For the twelve-of-twenty-two-month calculation, a child enters an agency's temporary custody on the earlier of the adjudication date or sixty days after removal from the home.

In re C.A. · filed 2016-10-17(B)(1)(d)

For the purposes of division (B)(1) of this section, a child shall be considered to have entered the temporary custody of an agency on the earlier of the date the child is adjudicated pursuant to [R.C. 2151.28] or the date that is sixty days after the removal of the child from home. ... The fact that C.A. had been in the temporary custody of the Agency for more than twelve-months in a twenty-two-month period was admitted by Anderson at trial. Thus, the portion of the judgment entry finding that C.A. was subject to the provisions of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is supported by the record.

For the twelve-of-twenty-two calculation, a child enters agency temporary custody on the earlier of the adjudication date or sixty days after removal from the home.

In re I.K. · filed 2018-09-10(B)(1)

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(e) states that, “[f]or the purposes of division (B)(1) of this section, a child shall be considered to have entered the temporary custody of an agency on the earlier of the date the child is adjudicated pursuant to section 2151.28 of the Revised Code or the date that is sixty days after the removal of the child from home.”

Time between the filing of a permanent-custody motion and the permanent-custody hearing does not count toward subsection (B)(1)(d)'s twelve-month period.

In re H.K. · filed 2018-09-10(B)(1)(d)

When calculating this time period, the Court in C.W. cautioned, “the time that passes between the filing of a motion for permanent custody and the permanent custody hearing does not count toward the 12- month period set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).”

The twelve months of temporary custody required by Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) may accrue in separate portions during the twenty-two months before the permanent-custody motion.

In re A.D. · filed 2023-05-22(B)(1)(d)

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) anticipates that the applicable period of 12 months of temporary custody may accrue in portions. In re M.Z., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 11CA010104, 2012-Ohio-3194, ¶ 10. The statute calls for the accumulation of 12 months of temporary custody over the span of the 22 months directly prior to the filing of the motion for permanent custody.

Separate periods of agency custody within the relevant twenty-two months count toward the twelve-month threshold in Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d).

In re N.C. · filed 2023-06-12(B)(1)(d)

The minor children were returned to Mother on September 29, 2020. The minor children returned into Agency’s care on February 23, 2021. In the past 22 months, the minor children were in Agency’s temporary custody in excess of 16 months. Thus, there is clear and convincing evidence to support the juvenile court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights and award of permanent custody to Agency under the first prong of the permanent custody test. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).

Continuous agency custody beginning with the initial removal counts toward the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground even when the dependency complaints expire and are refiled.

In re T.C. · filed 2024-12-12(B)(1)(d)

The record confirms by clear and convincing evidence that the children have been in the temporary custody of the Agency since their initial removal on November 21, 2021 (Case Nos. AD21910432-43), the instant cases were refiled on July 12, 2022, and the children have remained in the Agency’s custody throughout. The first prong has been met.

The twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground is measured from entry into agency custody to filing of the permanent-custody motion, and the agency need not wait twenty-two months before filing once twelve qualifying months have accrued.

In re T.R. · filed 2025-07-17(B)(1)(d)

Of relevance here, “[t]he time period for R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is calculated from when the child enters custody of the agency and the filing of the motion for permanent custody.” ... While R.C. 2151.44(B)(1)(d) considers whether the child has been in temporary custody for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period, there is “nothing in the plain language of [R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d)] that requires a public agency to wait until a child has been in its custody for [22] months before filing a motion for permanent custody.”

For the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground, time between filing the permanent-custody motion and the hearing does not count toward the required twelve months.

In re M.S. · filed 2025-07-21(B)(1)(d)

When calculating this period, the Court in C.W. cautioned, “the time that passes between the filing of a motion for permanent custody and the permanent-custody hearing does not count toward the 12-month period set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).”

The child must already have accumulated twelve months in temporary custody when the agency moves for permanent custody under subsection (B)(1)(d); time through the later hearing cannot establish that ground.

In re K.D. · filed 2026-04-15(B)(1)(d)

It is well settled that, for an agency to establish the “12 of 22” ground under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), a child must have already been in its temporary custody for 12 months at the time it moves for permanent custody. ... Consequently, the trial court erred in finding that the “12 of 22” ground had been satisfied based on the facts in this record.

Subsection (B)(1)(d) gives parents twelve months before the agency may move on the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground, and time after the motion is filed does not count.

In re C.H. · filed 2026-05-07(B)(1)(d)

It is well settled that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) “clearly provides parents with 12 months to demonstrate their ability and fitness to care for their child before an agency can move for permanent custody on R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) grounds.” ... Significantly, however, “the time that passes between the filing of a motion for permanent custody and the permanent-custody hearing does not count toward the 12-month period set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).”

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(e) starts the temporary custody period on the earlier of adjudication or 60 days after removal when applying the 12 of 22 month permanent custody ground.

In re J.J. · filed 2023-04-11(B)(1)(e)

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(e) sixty days from November 5, 2020 would be January 4, 2021. The juvenile court adjudicated the child as an abused child by Judgment Entry filed February 2, 2021. ... Accordingly, the “earlier date” that the child will be deemed to have enter the temporary custody of SCJFS for purposes of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is January 4, 2021.

Any failure by a guardian ad litem to determine the custody wishes of children aged five and three is harmless when both are too young to express an informed choice.

In re J.W. · filed 2018-05-07(D)(1)(b)

With respect to Mother's argument that the guardian ad litem failed by not determining the children's wishes, any error, if it occurred, would be harmless. As of the time of the hearing, the older of the two children was five years old and the younger child was three years old. Thus, both children were too young to express an informed choice as to their custody.

A guardian ad litem's recommendation is a relevant consideration under section 2151.414(D)(1) when the court determines a child's best interest, including where a young child cannot express wishes directly.

In re B.J. · filed 2016-10-24(D)(1)(b)

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) provides that a court "shall consider all relevant factors" in determining whether permanent custody is in a child's best interest. (Emphasis added.) A relevant consideration for a juvenile court in awarding permanent custody is the recommendation of the children's GAL.

A court properly considers a young child’s wishes through the guardian ad litem when the guardian does not ask the child for a preference because of suspected coaching and immaturity but recommends a disposition after investigation.

In re C.C.-L. · filed 2017-12-29(D)(1)(b)

The statute requires consideration of “[t]he wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child[.]” (Emphasis added.) Id. ... The guardian ad litem further reported that the child was not mature enough to definitively express a consistent preference. The guardian opined that the young child’s expressed preference would likely be to remain where she was at the time she was asked, whether that be with Mother, Father, or even grandparents with whom she had a close relationship. With these considerations in mind, the guardian ad litem recommended the disposition, specifically legal custody to Father, based on the best interest of the child as evidenced by her investigation. Accordingly, the juvenile court properly considered and weighed the evidence relating to the wishes of the child.

When children are too young to express their wishes, the juvenile court may consider the guardian ad litem's permanent-custody recommendation under subsection (D)(1)(b).

In re B/K Children · filed 2020-03-25(D)(1)(b)

The juvenile court properly considers the GAL’s recommendation on the permanent-custody motion as part of the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) analysis where the children are too young to express their wishes.

Subsection (D)(1)(b)'s child-wishes factor is satisfied by considering the guardian ad litem's opinion when the children are unable to express their own wishes.

In re H & J Children · filed 2020-06-24(D)(1)(b)

Contrary to grandmother’s assertion, the trial court did not fail to consider the wishes of the children when granting permanent custody.

A guardian ad litem's recommendation is distinct from a child's wishes, so subsection (D)(1)(b) is inapplicable when children are too young to express their wishes.

In re G. Children · filed 2020-07-08(D)(1)(b)

However, although the wishes of a child may be expressed through the GAL, the GAL’s recommendation is separate and distinct from a child’s wishes.

When a child cannot competently communicate placement wishes, subsection (D)(1)(b) does not require the court to assess that child's wishes in the best-interest analysis.

In re J.B. · filed 2021-03-16(D)(1)(b)

When the evidence demonstrates that a child is not capable or competent to communicate his or her wishes, a trial court is not required to assess the wishes of that child in determining whether permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

A child's wishes must be weighed against the other subsection (D)(1) best-interest factors.

In re M.A. · filed 2021-03-31(D)(1)(b)

The court appropriately weighed the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) factor against the other factors present in the case.

Subsection (D)(1)(b) expressly allows the juvenile court to consider a child's statements to the guardian ad litem when determining the child's wishes.

In re K.F. · filed 2021-04-07(D)(1)(b)

We find no merit to Father's argument, as the record indicates the juvenile court considered Father's bond with K.F. before granting permanent custody to the agency and R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) expressly allows the juvenile court to consider K.F.'s statements to the guardian ad litem when determining K.F.'s wishes.

Under section 2151.414(D)(1)(b), a juvenile court may rely on the guardian ad litem's recommendation when a child is too young to express custody wishes.

In re I.N. · filed 2024-03-14(D)(1)(b)

Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b), it is proper for the juvenile court to consider the GAL’s recommendation where the children are too young to express their wishes.

Children's expressed desire for family reunification is only one best-interest factor and must be weighed with all other statutory factors.

In re B.O. · filed 2024-05-06(D)(1)(b)

Even though three of the children expressed their desire for reunification of the family, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) is but a single best interest factor to be considered and weighed in conjunction with the other factors.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(b) does not require a CASA report to state the child's maturity or the effect of removal, nor does it require additional testimony from a mental-health professional.

In re B.G. · filed 2024-05-06(D)(1)(b)

Nevertheless, there was no requirement for the CASA to address these issues in her report and no requirement for additional testimony. The juvenile court was able to weigh the CASA's report along with the other evidence.

The court may consider a child's wishes through the guardian ad litem rather than conducting an in-camera interview.

In re N.A.-S. · filed 2025-10-31(D)(1)(b)

However, “R.C. 2151.414(D), concerning permanent custody, provides that the court may consider the wishes of the child if expressed through the guardian ad litem. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b).”

A grant of permanent custody accords with children's wishes when their guardian ad litem reports that they desire to remain with their foster family.

In re G.N. · filed 2025-11-03(D)(1)(b)

The guardian ad litem’s report detailed the children’s desire to stay in the home of their foster family. ... Accordingly, we find that granting permanent custody was in concert with the desires of the children as described by the guardian ad litem in her report.

A juvenile court properly considers the guardian ad litem's recommendation when a child is too young to express custody wishes.

In re L.W. · filed 2026-06-25(D)(1)(b)

“‘[t]he juvenile court properly considers the GAL’s recommendation on the permanent- custody motion as part of the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) analysis where the children are too young to express their wishes.’”

A juvenile court must consider every best-interest factor but need not discuss each one when the record otherwise indicates all necessary factors were considered.

In Re K.T.1 · filed 2018-10-24(D)

This court, however, has never held that the juvenile court must “discuss” each of the best-interest factors to meet the mandate that it “consider” all the elements of R.C. 2151.414(D) when making the best-interest determination. ... We strongly encourage the juvenile court’s discussion of each factor, but we cannot find error in the juvenile court’s failure to discuss each factor if the record otherwise indicates that all of the necessary factors were considered.

A court need not enumerate every best-interest factor, but the record must indicate that it considered all mandatory subsection (D)(1) factors.

In re K.T. · filed 2018-04-13(D)(1)

A trial court need not specifically enumerate each of the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factors in its decision, but “there must be some indication on the record that all of the necessary factors were considered.” ... Omitted from this list was a reference to the mandatory R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e) factors. And the opinion is devoid of any other indication that the court considered those factors referenced in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e).

Section 2151.414(D)(1) does not require a trial court to list the best-interest factors it found applicable before making its permanent-custody determination.

In re L.D. · filed 2017-03-23(D)(1)

The statute does not require the court to list those factors or conditions it found applicable before making its determination that the child cannot be placed with either parent or that the permanent custody is in that child’s best interest.

A juvenile court need not expressly list each Section 2151.414(E) factor when the record clearly and convincingly establishes at least one factor supporting the placement finding.

In re S. Children · filed 2024-02-14(E)

Where the court finds that just one of the R.C. 2151.414(E) factors exists by clear and convincing evidence, the first prong is satisfied. In re L Children at ¶ 16. While the juvenile court did not expressly list the R.C. 2151.414(E) factors, the record clearly and convincingly shows at least three factors supporting the juvenile court’s finding that the S. Children could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.

Section 2151.414(D)(1) does not require a juvenile court to expressly discuss each best-interest factor.

In re R.M. · filed 2024-05-16(D)(1)

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does not require a juvenile court to expressly discuss each of the best-interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e).

A juvenile court need not enumerate every best-interest factor, but the record must show that it considered all necessary factors or the judgment must be reversed.

In re J.R. · filed 2024-11-26(D)

Although “[a] trial court is not required to specifically enumerate each factor under R.C. 2151.414(D) in its decision * * * there must be some indication on the record that all of the necessary factors were considered.” (Citations omitted.) In re C.C., 10th Dist. No. 04AP-883, 2005-Ohio-5163, ¶ 53.

Even without express factor-by-factor findings, the judgment must allow a reviewing court to discern that the juvenile court considered the statutory best-interest factors.

In re Y.F. · filed 2024-11-27(D)(1)

But even if a juvenile court does not address the factors, a reviewing court “must be able to discern from the magistrate or juvenile court’s decision, and the court’s judgment entry,” that the court considered the listed factors. Id. at ¶ 31. The trial court’s summary determination that agency custody is not in Y.F.’s best interest, without more, does not allow us to find that it considered the best interest findings.

A juvenile court need not make specific findings or include a written discussion of every best-interest factor, but it must consider them.

In re N.J. · filed 2025-05-01(D)(1)

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does not require a juvenile court to make specific findings regarding each best-interest factor listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) or to include in its decision or judgment entry a written discussion of each of those factors.

A trial court need not explain how it weighed every subsection (D)(1) best-interest factor when the appellate record permits review of evidentiary support for its decision.

In re L.W. · filed 2025-06-26(D)(1)

V.P. argues the trial court erred in not explaining how it weighed the five best interest factors under R.C. 2141.414(D)(1). However, an appellate court can review the record to determine whether the evidence supports the trial court’s decision.

A juvenile court must consider every enumerated best-interest factor but need not expressly discuss each one; consideration alone satisfies the statute.

In re N.M. · filed 2025-07-31(D)(1)

Initially, we note that although a trial court is required to consider each of the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factors in making permanent-custody determinations, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does not require a juvenile court to expressly discuss each of the best-interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e). ... “Consideration is all the statute requires.”

The court must consider every subsection (D)(1) best-interest factor but need not make a written finding on each one.

In re Z.B. · filed 2025-10-02(D)(1)

The trial court is mandated to consider each factor. However, the court is not required to make written findings regarding each factor.

Subsection (D)(1) requires consideration, but not express discussion, of every enumerated best-interest factor.

In re J.H. · filed 2025-10-02(D)(1)

The Ohio Supreme Court has held that ‘R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does not require a juvenile court to expressly discuss each of the best interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e). Consideration is all the statute requires.’

A juvenile court must consider every subsection (D)(1) factor, but it need not expressly discuss each factor; consideration alone is required.

In re Y.G. · filed 2026-01-29(D)(1)

Although a trial court is required to consider each of the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factors in making its permanent-custody determination, “R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does not require a juvenile court to expressly discuss each of the best-interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e).” ... “Consideration is all the statute requires.”

A juvenile court must consider the best-interest factors but need not expressly discuss each one in its decision.

In re C.K. · filed 2026-02-05(D)(1)

Further, as held by the Supreme Court of Ohio, “R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does not require a juvenile court to expressly discuss each of the best-interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e). Consideration is all the statute requires.”

A court must consider every best-interest factor but need not expressly discuss or make written findings on each one.

In re A.T. · filed 2026-02-23(D)(1)

R.C. 2151.414(D) does not require the trial court to set forth a written analysis of each best interest factor, however. The trial court is required to “consider” each of the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D), but it need not explicitly discuss or make written findings on each factor.

A juvenile court must consider every best-interest factor and other relevant factors, but it need not list or discuss each factor if the record shows actual consideration.

In re M.L. · filed 2026-05-18(D)

A juvenile court does not need to specifically list or discuss each of the best-interest factors to meet the mandate that it “consider” the factors in R.C. 2151.414(D). ... However, it must appear from the record that the trial court did in fact consider the factors listed as well as any other relevant factor.

A juvenile court need not list or discuss every best-interest factor, but the record must show it actually considered all enumerated and other relevant factors.

In re C.W. · filed 2026-06-02(D)

A juvenile court does not need to specifically list or discuss each of the best-interest factors to meet the mandate that it “consider” the factors in R.C. 2151.414(D). ... However, it must appear from the record that the trial court did in fact consider the factors listed as well as any other relevant factor.

In deciding whether a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time, Section 2151.414(E) permits consideration of parental-care facts occurring both before and after the permanent-custody motion.

In re B.T. · filed 2017-09-05(E)

In determining whether the children cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the parents, a court must consider all relevant evidence including facts relating to the adequacy of parental care occurring before and after the motion for permanent custody is filed. In re Foust, 57 Ohio App.3d 149, 154, 567 N.E.2d 1042 (3d Dist.1989).

On remand, a trial court could not adequately assess a child's current best interest solely on a years-old record and was required to gather evidence covering the period since the original trial.

In re D.R. · filed 2025-08-12(D)(1)

Simply stated, given the incompleteness of the record related to D.R.’s and father’s circumstances since October 2021, coupled with the passage of time since the first trial, the trial court could not–and did not–adequately consider and determine D.R.’s best interest at the time of the remand proceedings. ... Given that even more time has now elapsed since the trial court’s November 20, 2023 decision and entry, we instruct the trial court to consider all the evidence in the record and gather new evidence to account for the entire period of time from October 2021 until it reaches its decision on remand.

A Section 2151.414(E)(3) finding based on parental abuse or neglect must rest on events occurring between the original complaint and the permanent-custody motion, not earlier events.

In re J.R. · filed 2018-06-29(E)(3)

R.C. 2151.414(E)(3) states that a finding … that a child cannot be returned to a parent’s home within a reasonable period of time shall be based on “all relevant evidence,” but that where such a finding is based on the parent’s abuse of the child or having caused the child to be neglected, the finding must be based on events “between the date that the original complaint alleging abuse or neglect was filed and the date of the filing of the motion for permanent custody.” Thus, the trial court appears to have improperly relied upon events predating the filing of the original complaint.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(e) requires one child in the parent's custody to have been adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent three separate times; it neither requires three adjudications for every child nor permits aggregation across multiple children.

In re L.C. · filed 2019-12-18(B)(1)(e)

Although this Court has held that the trial court cannot aggregate the adjudications of more than one child to reach the three adjudications required by R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(e), by it plain terms, this provision requires that one child, not all of them, has been adjudicated at least three times.

The three-adjudication ground requires that one child, whether the subject child or a sibling, was adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent on three separate occasions; adjudications of different children cannot be aggregated.

In re E.S. · filed 2018-09-28(B)(1)(e)

By its unambiguous terms, however, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(e) requires that at least one child, whether one of these children or a sibling, be adjudicated three separate times. ... In this case, although there had been numerous adjudications of many of Mother’s children, the agency failed to present evidence that any one of those children had been adjudicated three times. Consequently, the trial court’s conclusion that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(e) was satisfied was not supported by the record.

A parent's acknowledgment that the twelve-of-twenty-two-month condition in Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is satisfied is not a waiver of parental rights.

In re J.M.M. · filed 2019-07-15(B)(1)(d)

Mr. Mosier’s acknowledgement that the children had been in PCDJFS’ custody for 12 or more months in a 22 month period is not a waiver of parental rights.

A permanent-custody hearing under Section 2151.414 is distinct from a voluntary permanent surrender under Section 5103.15(B)(1), so the surrender statute's formalities do not apply.

In re J.M.M. · filed 2019-07-15

Secondly, R.C. 5103.15(B)(1) has no application in a permanent custody hearing pursuant to R.C. 2151.414.

A single Section 2151.414(D)(1) best-interest factor may support an award of permanent custody.

In re M.M. · filed 2019-12-19(D)(1)

“[O]nly one of the best-interest-of-the-child factors needs to be present to grant an award of permanent custody.”

A juvenile court must consider every statutory best-interest factor without giving any one factor greater weight, but only one factor must favor permanent custody to support termination of parental rights.

In re R.R. · filed 2023-06-22(D)(1)

Although the juvenile court is required to consider each statutory factor in determining what is in a child’s best interest under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), no one factor is required to be given greater weight than the others. In re T.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100852, 2014-Ohio-2985, ¶ 23, citing In re Schaefer, 111 Ohio St.3d 498, 2006-Ohio-5513, 857 N.E.2d 532, ¶ 56. Further, only one of the factors need be resolved in favor of permanent custody to terminate parental rights.

Although all best-interest factors must be considered, one factor resolved in favor of permanent custody may support the award.

In re K.C. · filed 2026-02-12(D)(1)

Although R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) requires the juvenile court to consider all of the factors, “only one of these enumerated factors needs to be resolved in favor of the award of permanent custody.” ... Therefore, the trial court did not err when it found that permanent custody is in K.C.’s best interests pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) and we need not address the remaining factors under that subsection.

A juvenile court must consider every best-interest factor, but one factor resolved in favor of permanent custody may support the award and no factor has greater weight.

In re A.H. · filed 2026-02-12(D)(1)

A juvenile court must consider each of the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factors when making a permanent custody determination, but no one factor is given greater weight than the others. ... Only one of the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) needs to be resolved in favor of permanent custody.

Although all best-interest factors must be considered, only one need be resolved in favor of permanent custody.

In re G.P. · filed 2026-05-21(D)(1)

Although R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) required the court to consider all of the factors, “only one of these enumerated factors needs to be resolved in favor of the award of permanent custody.”

Subsection (D)(1)(c) permits consideration of custodial-history facts beyond the 12-of-22-month circumstance but does not require the court to consider additional facts.

In re M.W. · filed 2020-11-05(D)(1)(c)

While the trial court may consider additional facts beyond the 12-out-of-22 circumstance in its analysis under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c), the court is under no obligation to do so.

The custodial-history factor is not fault-based and emphasizes whether the child has spent 12 of the preceding 22 months in agency custody.

In re R.S.J. · filed 2021-04-16(D)(1)(c)

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c), which requires courts to consider custodial history, is not a fault-based provision. It merely requires courts to consider the custodial history, with an emphasis on whether a child has been in custody for 12 of the last 22 months.

The custodial-history factor includes the child's custody before removal as well as time spent in agency custody.

In re J.L. · filed 2016-05-05(D)(1)(c)

This statement shows the trial court did consider the pre-removal history of the children and, specifically, that the children were in the custody of P.F. and M.L.

Under subsection (E)(5), a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent incarcerated for an offense committed against that child or a sibling.

In re J.A. · filed 2020-11-20(E)(5)

A child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with a parent when that parent is incarcerated for an offense committed against the child or a sibling of the child.

A finding that a parent abandoned the child under section 2151.414(B)(1)(b) independently satisfies the first prong of the permanent-custody test and permits the court to proceed to best interests.

In re A.C. · filed 2023-02-28(B)(1)(b)

A trial court's finding of abandonment under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b) satisfies the first prong of the permanent custody test, independent of a finding under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) [Parental Placement within a Reasonable Time], allowing the court to move on to the second prong of considering whether the grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child.

Only one section 2151.414(E) factor is needed to find that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent, and evidence supporting factors (E)(1), (2), (4), and (16) sustained that finding.

In re C.N. · filed 2023-03-01(E)

A court need only find one (E) factor present to support a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent. ... While the trial court was only required to make findings under one subsection of R.C. 2151.414(E) to support its decision, we find that competent, credible evidence supports the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (2), (4) and (16) as to father.