Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.414

A child's interest in permanency may outweigh the detriment of severing a parent-child bond when the parent has not shown an ability to meet the child's special needs.

In re J.B.C. · filed 2016-04-18(D)(1)(d)

The trial court recognized that Appellant and J.B.C. shared a bond. However, the court found that the child’s interest in permanency outweighed the detriment of severing this bond.

The benefits of permanence may outweigh the harm of severing a weak parental bond.

In re D.G. · filed 2016-07-18(D)(1)(a), (D)(1)(d)

The trial court found that any harm of severing the parental bond was outweighed by the benefits of permanency. We agree.

A parent's bond with the children is only one subsection (D)(1) factor in the best-interest analysis.

In re K.G. · filed 2021-04-07(D)(1)(a)

The bond between Mother and the children is only one of the factors the juvenile court must take into consideration when making its best interest determination.

A parent-child bond is relevant to subsection (D)(1)(a), but it is not controlling and the factor is not limited to that bond.

In re H.S. · filed 2022-02-22(D)(1)(a)

{¶ 52} Upon review, it is clear there is a bond between the parents and children. The testimony at trial indicated that both parents consistently visited the children. Vangeloff testified that H.S. is the most attached and initially requested to return to the care of her parents but has since changed her mind through the course of the proceeding. While the bond and relationship of the children to the parents is a factor, it is not controlling. " '[The] resolution of [R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)] is not limited to merely the bond between child and parent.' " B.B. at ¶ 60, quoting In re K.R., 10th Dist. No. 18AP-633, 2019-Ohio-2192, ¶ 81.

A good parent-child relationship alone is insufficient under subsection (D)(1)(a), because the controlling concern is the child’s best interest rather than the mere existence of a relationship.

In re T.J. · filed 2022-06-09(D)(1)(a)

This court has previously noted, ‘“[T]he mere existence of a good relationship is insufficient. Overall, we are concerned with the best interest of the child, not the mere existence of a relationship.’” In re K.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95374, 2011-Ohio-349, ¶ 23, quoting In re R.N., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83121, 2004-Ohio-2560.

A child's bond and regular visitation with the parents do not by themselves make permanent custody contrary to the child's best interest under section 2151.414(D)(1)(a).

In re R.B. · filed 2023-09-07(D)(1)(a)

However, simply because a child is bonded with his parents and has engaged in regular visitation with them does not render an award of permanent custody to a children's services agency against the child's best interest.

A parent-child bond is only one factor in the best-interest analysis under Section 2151.414(D)(1).

In re H.G. · filed 2023-11-13(D)(1)(a)

Though evidence was presented that Mother and the children are bonded and that the children appear to have a relationship with Grandfather, this is but one factor in the best interest test.

Under section 2151.414(D)(1), the benefits of a permanent placement may outweigh the detriment caused by severing a child's bond with a parent.

In re O.G. · filed 2023-12-08(D)(1)

The juvenile court found that any detriment that could occur by severing any bond between Mother and O.G. would be outweighed by the benefits of permanency for this child. We agree.

A strong parent-child bond is only one best-interest factor and does not make permanent custody contrary to the child's best interest, especially when the relationship involves unhealthy role reversal.

In re B.S. · filed 2024-02-12(D)(1)(a)

As to the first best interest factor—that is, the interaction and interrelationship of the child with her parents, foster caregivers, and others, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)—the evidence demonstrates that Mother and Beth have a close bond, albeit a very unhealthy one. "It is well established that permanent custody is not contrary to a child's best interest simply because a parent loves their child and the two share a strong bond." In re G.A., 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2022-11-079, 2023-Ohio-643, ¶ 27.

Under section 2151.414(D)(1), children's bond with and desire to be with a parent may be outweighed by the parent's inability to provide a secure and stable home and the children's need for permanency.

In re C.G.V. · filed 2024-03-04(D)(1)

The trial court acknowledged the children’s bond and desire to be with Mother were outweighed by the lack of Mother’s ability to provide a secure and stable home for the children and their need for permanency. Sufficient evidence was produced to support the trial court’s decision, and giving deference to the trier of fact, we cannot say that the trial court clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice.

Under section 2151.414(D)(1), the benefits of permanency in an adoptive home able to meet a child's special needs may outweigh any detriment from severing a parental bond.

In re A.N. · filed 2024-02-14(D)(1)

However, the evidence demonstrates that any detriment which may occur by severing any bond is outweighed by the benefits of permanency for A.N. ... The clear and convincing evidence here supports the trial court’s finding that A.N.’s best interests are served by awarding SCDJFS permanent custody thus making her eligible for a permanent adoptive home that can serve her special needs.

Under section 2151.414(D)(1), the benefits of permanency and stability may outweigh any detriment from severing a parent's bond with the children.

In re C.R.M. · filed 2024-06-13(D)(1)

M.M. also claims that he had a bond with his children. However, the evidence demonstrates that any detriment which may occur by severing any bond is outweighed by the benefits of permanency and stability for the children.

A biological relationship or even a good parent-child bond is not controlling under section 2151.414(D)(1); the child's need for permanency and a safe, secure environment remains paramount.

In re M.T. · filed 2024-08-15(D)(1)

However, in determining what is in a child’s best interest, the existence of a biological relationship or even a “good relationship” or bond with a parent is not controlling in and of itself. ... “A child’s best interests require permanency and a safe and secure environment.” ... Although “[f]amily unity and blood relationship are vital factors to carefully and fully consider,” the “paramount consideration” is always the best interest of the child.

A bond between a parent and children may weigh toward permanent custody when it is unhealthy and excludes one child.

In re J.S. · filed 2024-08-29(D)(1)(a)

With regard to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a), Golich acknowledged that Mother bonded with the children, but it was not a healthy bond. During visitation, Mother would focus her attention on J.S. and S.P. to the exclusion of N.M., who was left to herself.

When Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d)'s twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground applies, a minor parent's request for extra reunification time is moot because the remaining question is the child's best interest, without considering the effect on the parent.

In re K.J. · filed 2020-09-10(B)(1)(d), (C)

Because T.J. does not challenge the finding that K.J. had been in the custody of FCCS for 12 or more months of the consecutive 22-month period, and because the trial court was justified in concluding that permanent placement with the County was in her best interest, this assignment of error is moot. ... The trial court underscored that "while [T.J.], herself a minor and the victim of great trauma, is owed great sympathy and the protection of the community, the focus of 'best interest' must be upon [K.J.], * * * as required by R.C. 2151.414(C)."

The best-interest inquiry focuses on the child, and Section 2151.414(C) bars consideration of the effect permanent custody would have on the parents; each parent's rights require a separate best-interest determination.

In re N.C.P. · filed 2014-08-25(C)

The focus of the “best interest” determination is upon the child, not the parent, as R.C. 2151.414(C) specifically prohibits the court from considering the effect a grant of permanent custody would have upon the parents. In re: Awkal, 95 Ohio App.3d 309, 315, 642 N.E.2d 424(8th Dist.1994). A finding that it is in the best interest of a child to terminate the parental rights of one parent is not dependent upon the court making a similar finding with respect to the other parent. The trial court would necessarily make a separate determination concerning the best interest of the child with respect to the rights of the mother and the rights of the father.

The best-interest determination focuses on the child rather than the parent, and each parent's rights require a separate best-interest determination.

In re C. Children · filed 2015-11-09(C)

The focus of the “best interest” determination is upon the child, not the parent, as R.C. 2151.414(C) specifically prohibits the court from considering the effect a grant of permanent custody would have upon the parents. In re: Awkal, 95 Ohio App.3d 309, 315, 642 N.E.2d 424(8th Dist.1994). A finding that it is in the best interest of a child to terminate the parental rights of one parent is not dependent upon the court making a similar finding with respect to the other parent. The trial court would necessarily make a separate determination concerning the best interest of the child with respect to the rights of the mother and the rights of the father.

A parent's love for the children is not alone sufficient to defeat permanent custody because the court may not consider the effect termination will have on the parent.

In re N.P. · filed 2015-11-30(C)

Although Crystal may love her children, as is argued in her brief, this alone is not sufficient. The effect of the trial court’s decision on the parent is not to be considered. R.C. 2151.414(C).

Section 2151.414(C) focuses the best-interest determination on the child and prohibits considering the effect of permanent custody on the parents.

In re S.D. · filed 2016-09-26(C)

The focus of the “best interest” determination is upon the child, not the parent, as R.C. 2151.414(C) specifically prohibits the court from considering the effect a grant of permanent custody would have upon the parents.

Section 2151.414(C) focuses the best-interest determination on the child, prohibits considering permanent custody's effect on a parent, and requires a separate determination as to each parent's rights.

In re L.J. · filed 2019-12-13(C)

The focus of the “best interest” determination is upon the child, not the parent, as R.C. 2151.414(C) specifically prohibits the court from considering the effect a grant of permanent custody would have upon the parents. ... The trial court would necessarily make a separate determination concerning the best interest of the child with respect to the rights of the mother and the rights of the father.

Division (C) requires the best-interest determination to focus on the child and prohibits considering the effect of permanent custody on the parents.

In re A.E. · filed 2021-02-23(C)

[T]he focus of the best interest determination is upon the child, not the parent, as R.C. 2151.414(C) specifically prohibits the court from considering the effect a grant of permanent custody would have upon the parents.

The permanent-custody best-interest determination focuses on the child rather than the parent, and subsection (C) prohibits considering the effect of permanent custody on the parents.

In re B.T. · filed 2022-11-17(C)

the best interest determination is upon the child, not the parent, as R.C. 2151.414(C) specifically prohibits the court from considering the effect a grant of permanent custody would have upon the parents.

Section 2151.414(C) prohibits considering the effect of permanent custody on a parent, so the parents' wishes are not a best-interest factor in a permanent-custody appeal.

In re H.P. · filed 2023-10-11(C)

For example, one of Mother’s primary arguments is that the trial court erred by failing to honor the parents’ wishes, a best interest factor set forth in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(a), which this Court may consider when reviewing an appeal from a legal custody judgment, but not an appeal from a permanent custody judgment. ... In fact, R.C. 2151.414(C) provides that, in making its permanent custody decision, the trial court “shall not consider the effect the granting of permanent custody to the agency would have upon any parent of the child.”

Section 2151.414(C) makes the child's best interest the focus and prohibits considering the effect that granting permanent custody would have on the parents.

In re A.M. · filed 2024-03-28(C)

It is axiomatic that the best interest determination focuses on the child, not the parent. ... Indeed, R.C. 2151.414(C) expressly prohibits the court from considering the effect the granting of permanent custody to a children services agency would have upon the parents.

Section 2151.414(C) makes the child, rather than the parent, the focus of the best-interest determination.

In re Z.F. · filed 2024-08-08(C)

The “best interest determination” focuses on the child, not the parent. R.C. 2151.414(C).

Section 2151.414(C) prohibits the juvenile court from considering the effect that granting permanent custody to the agency would have on the parents.

In re R.H. · filed 2024-10-17(C)

Indeed, R.C. 2151.414(C) expressly prohibits the juvenile court from considering the effect the granting of permanent custody to the agency would have upon the parents.

The best-interest determination focuses on the child, and subsection (C) bars consideration of how permanent custody would affect the parents.

In re A.W. · filed 2025-03-12(C)

The focus of the “best interest” determination is upon the child, not the parent. R.C. 2151.414(C) expressly prohibits the court from considering the effect a grant of permanent custody would have upon the ... parents.

The best-interest inquiry focuses on the child, and the court may not consider the effect of permanent custody on the parents.

In re S.L. · filed 2026-05-18(C)

Importantly, the focus of the “best interest” determination is upon the child, not the parent. Indeed, R.C. 2151.414(C) expressly prohibits the court from considering the effect a grant of permanent custody would have upon the Parents.

The best-interest determination focuses on the child, and the court may not consider the effect of permanent custody on the parent.

In re M.E.W. · filed 2026-06-02(C)

Importantly, the focus of the “best interest” determination is upon the child, not the parent. Indeed, R.C. 2151.414(C) expressly prohibits the court from considering the effect a grant of permanent custody would have upon the parent.

The effect of a permanent-custody decision on the parent is not a factor the trial court may consider.

In re A.M. · filed 2026-06-22(C)

Although Father wished for more time because he wanted a relationship with A.M., the effect of the decision on the parent is not a factor to be considered by the trial court.

At the permanent-custody stage, the agency need not establish a direct nexus between a parent's untreated mental-health or substance-abuse issues during reunification and adverse effects on the children.

In re L.W.J. · filed 2014-09-24(D)(1)

But HCJFS was not required to show that the mother’s mental-health and substance-abuse issues during the reunification process adversely affected the children.

A child's extraordinary medical needs may support a cannot-or-should-not-be-placed finding when the parent cannot reliably provide the care necessary for the child's survival.

In re R.S. · filed 2015-01-15(E)

All children require care to maintain their health and happiness; however, the care R.S. requires to ensure his survival beyond two-years-old ... goes far beyond the care needed by a healthy child. The evidence demonstrates that despite the efforts of TCDJFS, R.S. could not and should not be placed with Mother within a reasonable time.

A child's significant mental-health needs, a parent's inability to manage them, and the child's need for a single-child home may weigh in favor of permanent custody under the best-interest analysis.

In re S.H. · filed 2015-01-20(D)

With respect to the best interest finding, the evidence revealed S.H. has significant mental health issues, which Father is not capable of handling. S.H. needs to be in a single child home. Father’s living arrangement is not such a situation.

Permanent custody was supported where the statutory best-interest factors showed that the children urgently needed permanence despite the parents' occasional progress.

In re C.Z. · filed 2025-05-12(D)(1)

Although the parents at times made progress, the children are in dire need of permanency. Therefore, after reviewing all of the evidence, we find that the trial court’s determination is supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Permanent custody was supported where neither parent could provide an appropriate home and the mother lacked insight into the child's serious needs despite the child's wish to live with her.

In re A.H. · filed 2025-08-06(D)(1)

The evidence established that neither Father B., by his own admission, nor Mother was in a position to provide an appropriate home for A.H. Although A.H. wished to live with Mother, Mother lacked insight regarding the significance and severity of the child’s mental health and cognitive issues. ... Under the circumstances, the juvenile court did not err by finding that permanent custody is in the best interest of A.H.

Limited cognitive abilities cannot alone support termination, but they may be considered when evidence links them to a parent’s inability to remedy the causes of removal and provide an adequate permanent home.

In re T.A.H. · filed 2017-08-04(D), (E)(1), and (E)(2)

In the present case, the trial court did not rely solely on Parents' cognitive abilities in granting permanent custody to RCCS. Rather, the evidence in this case illustrates a link between Parents’ limited cognitive abilities and their abilities to remedy the problems identified by RCCS and to provide an adequate permanent home for the child.

Severe cognitive limitations support a finding that a parent cannot provide a suitable home when years of reunification services have not enabled the parent to care for any child even during supervised visits.

In re H.W. · filed 2015-07-29(E)(2)

There was ample evidence before the trial court to demonstrate that Mother’s cognitive limitations were so severe that she was unable to provide H.W. with a suitable home. Although Mother had given birth to four children, she had never cared for any of them in her own home, as each had been placed in CSB custody shortly after birth. After more than five years of working reunification case plans in three separate dependency cases, focusing on the same parenting obstacles, Mother had been unable to demonstrate that she could care for any of her children, even during supervised visits.

A parent's limited cognitive abilities do not alone justify permanent custody, but the court may rely on the totality of evidence showing the parent's inability to safely and consistently parent despite services.

In re Howland Children · filed 2015-09-21(E)(1)

Despite appellant's lack of cognitive skills, the main concern was her ability to parent correctly and give the children a stable, safe, and consistent environment. ... Based upon the totality of the evidence that addressed issues beyond appellant's cognitive skills, we find sufficient clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's decision to grant appellee permanent custody of the children.

A trial court may not base a best-interest decision solely on a parent's limited cognitive abilities, but may consider those limitations with objective evidence of unresolved parenting, domestic-violence, and safety problems.

In re N.M. · filed 2016-01-26(D)

The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “[w[hen determining the best interest of a child under R.C. 2151.414(D) at a permanent-custody hearing, a trial court may not base its decision solely on the limited cognitive abilities of the parents.”

A best-interest decision may not rest solely on a parent's limited cognitive abilities.

In re A.B. · filed 2022-11-28(D)

“When determining the best interest of a child under R.C. 2151.414(D) at a permanent-custody hearing, a trial court may not base its decision solely on the limited cognitive abilities of the parents.”

A best-interest determination cannot rest solely on a parent's limited cognitive abilities.

In re K.D. · filed 2024-11-27(D)

Importantly, the juvenile court may not base its best-interest determination under former R.C. 2151.414(D) “solely on the limited cognitive abilities of the parents.” In re D.A., 2007-Ohio-1105, ¶ 36.

A child's serious medical needs are part of the best-interest analysis, and permanent custody is warranted when the child requires a stable home with caregivers who vigilantly monitor health and the foster family provides that environment.

In re C.B. · filed 2015-09-14(D)(1)(d)

The evidence established that C.B.'s well-being depends on being in a loving stable home with caregivers who vigilantly monitor his health and that C.B.'s foster family provides C.B. with this environment. The juvenile court properly considered the appropriate factors under R.C. 2151.414(D) and acted in C.B.'s best interest by granting permanent custody to the agency.

R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) encompasses both the conditions that caused the initial removal and home-environment problems identified after removal that caused the court to continue the child's out-of-home placement.

In re L.P. · filed 2015-10-07(E)(1)

Father argues that the initial reasons for the children’s removal did not include substantiated domestic violence or inappropriate discipline by Father, but this Court has previously emphasized that Revised Code Section 2151.414(E)(1) will “encompass not only the conditions that led to the initial removal of the children from the home, but also problems with the home environment that the agency identified after the children’s removal, which caused the juvenile court to continue its placement of the children outside the home.”

Clear and convincing evidence supported failure to remedy where parents could not obtain and maintain a clean, hazard-free home.

In re K.W. · filed 2026-03-02(E)(1)

Critically, the parents failed to remedy the conditions that caused the children to be removed from the home. The parents were unable to obtain and maintain a clean, hazard-free home for a minimum of six months.

R.C. 2151.414(B) requires the trial court expressly to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that granting permanent custody to the agency is in the child's best interest; omission of that finding is reversible error.

In re M.F. · filed 2015-10-13(B)

We hold that the trial court must find that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody. R.C. 2151.414(B). That finding must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. See id.; In re H.M.K., 2013-Ohio-4317, at ¶ 40-43. In this case, the trial court failed to make this required finding. That failure amounts to reversible error.

Establishing the twelve-of-twenty-two-month threshold does not compel permanent custody when the agency fails to prove by clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the children's best interest.

In re F.G. · filed 2024-12-05(B)(1)(d), (D)(1)

Here, the juvenile court clearly considered all of the evidence and arguments of counsel and determined that the agency did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody was in the best interest of the children. And after reviewing the entire record, we cannot say the juvenile court lost its way when it denied the agency’s motion for permanent custody under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).

A juvenile court deciding permanent custody must consider all relevant best-interest factors, including the five listed in subsection (D)(1)(a) through (e).

In re L.B. · filed 2025-06-23(D)(1)

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) requires that a juvenile court, in determining whether a grant of permanent custody is in the best interest of the child, ‘consider’ all relevant factors, including the five factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e).

Subsection (D)(1) broadly requires consideration of all factors relevant to the child's best interest so the permanent-custody decision is fully informed.

In re L.B. · filed 2025-06-26(D)(1)

R.C. 2151(D) is written broadly and requires the juvenile court judge to consider all factors that are relevant to the best interests of the child. The purpose of a far-reaching inquiry is to allow the judge to make a fully informed decision on an issue as important as whether to terminate parental rights, privileges and responsibilities.

The subsection (D)(1) list of best-interest considerations is nonexhaustive, and the court must consider all relevant factors.

In re D.K. · filed 2025-07-11(D)(1)

R.C. 2151.414 provides that a juvenile court may grant an agency permanent custody of a child only when clear and convincing evidence shows (1) one or more conditions exist under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e), and (2) the juvenile court considered all relevant factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), which is not exhaustive, in determining the best interest of the child.

A juvenile court must consider all relevant best-interest factors, and subsection (D)(1)'s enumerated factors are nonexhaustive.

In re D.J. · filed 2025-07-22(D)(1)

A juvenile court must consider all relevant factors, including the non- exhaustive list of R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) best-interest factors.

Satisfying the twelve-of-twenty-two-month threshold does not itself establish best interest, and permanent custody may be denied when the agency fails to prove best interest by clear and convincing evidence.

In re N.R. · filed 2025-08-15(D)(1)

The trial court’s judgment clearly reflects that it considered each factor in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) and found that MCCS did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the best interest of N.R. to grant permanent custody to the agency.

A best-interest decision requires balancing all relevant and enumerated statutory factors, with no factor receiving greater weight or heightened significance.

In re M.G. · filed 2025-09-25(D)(1)

Determining whether granting permanent custody to a children services agency will promote a child’s best interest involves a balancing of “all relevant [best interest] factors,” as well as the “five enumerated statutory factors.” ... However, none of the best interest factors requires a court to give it “greater weight or heightened significance.”

A permanent-custody court must consider all relevant best-interest factors, including the nonexclusive factors enumerated in subsection (D)(1).

In re L.L.-B. · filed 2025-10-06(D)(1)

In determining the best interest of the child at a permanent custody hearing, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) mandates the trial court must consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following: (a) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (b) the wishes of the child as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; (c) the custodial history of the child; (d) the child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody; and (e) whether any of the factors in division (E)(7) to (11) of R.C. 2151.414 apply in relation to the parents and child.

No single subsection (D)(1) best-interest factor is dispositive; the court must weigh the totality of the circumstances.

In re D.L. · filed 2026-01-30(D)(1)

When determining whether permanent custody is in a child’s best interest, a juvenile court must consider all relevant factors, including those set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). No single factor is dispositive; rather, the court must weigh the totality of the circumstances.

A permanent-custody best-interest inquiry must consider all relevant factors, including but not limited to the factors enumerated in subsection (D)(1).

In re L.G. · filed 2026-02-03(D)(1)

In determining whether granting permanent custody of a child to an agency is in that child’s best interest, the trial court must consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the ones listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).

The subsection (D)(1) best-interest inquiry considers the totality of the circumstances, with no single factor receiving more weight than another.

In re J.H. · filed 2026-04-13(D)(1)

Under this test, the trial court considers the totality of the circumstances when making its best interest determinations. No single factor is given more weight than others.

The enumerated subsection (D)(1) best-interest factors are nonexclusive, and a juvenile court may consider any other factor it deems relevant.

In re S.F. · filed 2026-04-27(D)(1)

They are not the only factors that the court may consider, however. "A juvenile court may also consider any other factors it deems relevant to the child's best interest."

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(a) independently supports permanent custody even when the child's young age makes the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground mathematically impossible.

In re N.S. · filed 2015-10-19(B)(1)(a)

It is well established that (B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(d) are independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant an agency's motion for permanent custody. See In re M.R., 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4–12–18, 2013–Ohio–1302, ¶ 80. However, our review of the pertinent trial court documents reveals no reliance on the "twelve of twenty-two" option, which would have nonetheless been mathematically impossible given the very young age of N.S. at the time of the agency's request for permanent custody.

An unchallenged abandonment finding independently supports the statutory threshold for permanent custody, regardless of a challenge to the alternative reasonable-time finding.

In re W.H. · filed 2015-10-19(B)(1)(b)

Appellant has not challenged the finding that she abandoned the child, which is an independent basis for upholding the decision of the trial court.

When the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground applies, a cannot-or-should-not-be-placed finding is unnecessary, and including that superfluous finding does not invalidate the decision.

In re S.D. · filed 2016-08-19(B)(1)(d)

Thus, we need not address the issue of whether the juvenile court erred by finding that the children could not be placed with R.D. within a reasonable time, or should not be placed with her; the trial court was not required to make that finding. Nor does including that superfluous finding in its findings render the decision invalid.

When the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground applies, the trial court need not also find that the children cannot or should not be placed with the parents within a reasonable time.

In re K.M.S. · filed 2017-01-17(B)(1)(d)

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court was not required to find that the children could not or should not be placed with the parents within a reasonable period of time.

An unchallenged cannot-or-should-not-be-placed finding independently supports the permanent-custody threshold and makes a challenge to abandonment moot.

In re L.M.R. · filed 2017-01-17(B)(1)(a)

Specifically, the trial court held that the children cannot be placed with their parents at this time or within a reasonable time consistent with R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a). Appellant does not challenge this determination, which is supported by the court’s findings.

An independently supported cannot-or-should-not-be-placed finding sustains permanent custody even if another threshold ground is disputed.

In re B.O.C. · filed 2017-01-26(B)(1)(a)

The trial court had an alternate, independent ground for terminating parental rights, finding the children cannot and/or should not be placed with any parent at this time or in the foreseeable future as ... they failed continuously and repeatedly to remedy the problems which caused the children to be removed from the home.

A fully supported subsection (E)(11) finding remains sufficient when the parent challenges only other alternative subsection (E) findings.

In re R.R. · filed 2019-06-05(E)(11)

Although Mother challenges two of the trial court’s alternative findings under R.C. 2151.414(E), she raises no challenge to the trial court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), which was fully supported by the record.

Only one of subsection (B)(1)(a) through (e)'s alternative findings is needed to satisfy the threshold prong of the permanent-custody test.

In re S.K. · filed 2019-06-10(B)(1)(a)-(e)

Only one of these findings must be met to satisfy the second prong of the two-part permanent custody test.

The subsection (B)(1) first-prong grounds are alternatives, so the agency need prove only one of them.

In re P.B. · filed 2019-06-17(B)(1)

The five first-prong grounds are alternative findings; the agency must prove only one to satisfy the first part of the permanent custody test.

Subsections (B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(d) are alternative grounds, and either independently supports permanent custody.

In re C.B. · filed 2019-07-08(B)(1)(a), (d)

As findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) are alternative findings, each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant the motion for permanent custody.

Only one of subsection (B)(1)(a) through (e)'s five circumstances must be found to satisfy the threshold prong of the permanent-custody test.

In re C.D. · filed 2019-12-02(B)(1)(a)-(e)

Only one of these findings must be met to satisfy the second prong of the two-part permanent custody test.

One supported subsection (B)(1) threshold finding, together with a best-interest finding, is sufficient to support permanent custody.

In re T.C. · filed 2020-03-09(B)(1)

This finding alone, in conjunction with a best interest finding, is sufficient to support the grant of permanent custody.

Subsections (B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(d) are mutually exclusive because the reasonable-time inquiry matters only when the 12-of-22-month threshold is not met.

In re C.W. · filed 2020-03-31(B)(1)(a), (d)

The question of whether the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) becomes relevant only where the child has not been in agency custody for the requisite time under subsection (d). Subsections (a) and (d) of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) are, accordingly, mutually exclusive.

Only one of subsection (B)(1)(a) through (e)'s alternative findings is needed to satisfy the threshold prong of the permanent-custody test.

In re K.M. · filed 2020-07-06(B)(1)(a)-(e)

Only one of these findings must be met to satisfy the second prong of the two-part permanent custody test.

Appellate review of remaining permanent-custody grounds is unnecessary once clear and convincing evidence supports one subsection (B)(1) basis.

In re C.K. · filed 2020-11-24(B)(1)

Once we conclude the record contains clear and convincing evidence supporting one basis for granting permanent custody, review of the balance of the findings is unnecessary.

Only one of subsection (B)(1)(a) through (e)'s alternative findings is needed to satisfy the threshold prong of the permanent-custody test.

In re D.P. · filed 2020-12-14(B)(1)(a)-(e)

Only one of these findings must be met to satisfy the second prong of the two-part permanent custody test.

Subsection (B)(1) requires clear and convincing evidence of at least one listed threshold factor.

In re M.C. · filed 2020-12-15(B)(1)

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the following factors applies: (a) the child is not abandoned or orphaned, but the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents; (b) the child is abandoned; (c) the child is orphaned, and there are no relatives who are able to take permanent custody; (d) the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period; or (e) the child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents from whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated an abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions by any court in this state or another state.

When subsection (B)(1)(d)'s 12-of-22-month finding is uncontested, a court need not consider alternative subsection (B)(1) grounds.

In re R.G.S. · filed 2020-12-15(B)(1)(d)

However, as A.D. acknowledges, because there is no contest regarding the R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) factor, we need not consider the juvenile court's alternative holdings under the remaining R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) factors.

Only one of subsection (B)(1)(a) through (e)'s alternative findings is needed to satisfy the threshold prong of the permanent-custody test.

In re M.G. · filed 2021-03-29(B)(1)(a)-(e)

Only one of these findings must be met to satisfy the second prong of the two-part permanent custody test.

The five threshold grounds in Section 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) are alternatives, so the agency need prove only one to satisfy the first prong of the permanent-custody test.

In re A.B. · filed 2023-10-23(B)(1)(a)-(e)

The juvenile court found that the agency had met its first prong burden by presenting clear and convincing evidence of the sole alleged first prong ground which is sufficient to meet that portion of the permanent custody test. See In re J.B., 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 28752 and 28753, 2018-Ohio-244, ¶ 9 (“The five first-prong factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) are alternative findings; accordingly, CSB must only prove one of those grounds in order to satisfy the first-prong requirement of the permanent custody test.”).

Permanent-custody eligibility requires only one of the alternative grounds in Section 2151.414(B)(1).

In re Z.F. · filed 2024-05-03(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d)

To support a permanent-custody disposition following a dependency adjudication, the trial court need only find that one of the eligibility requirements in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) has been satisfied.

Only one of the alternative circumstances in Section 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) must apply to satisfy the threshold prong for permanent custody.

In re L.W. · filed 2024-08-26(B)(1)(a)-(e)

Only one of these circumstances need apply to satisfy the second prong of the two-part permanent custody test. In re C.S., 2020-Ohio-4414, ¶ 16 (12th Dist.).

An established twelve-of-twenty-two-month finding makes a challenge to an alternative inability-to-place finding moot.

In re M.B. · filed 2024-08-26(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d)

Because the juvenile court's "12 of 22" finding satisfies the second prong of permanent custody test, we need not consider Mother's arguments relating to the court's alternative finding that the children could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time. The issue is moot.

An established twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground satisfies the threshold prong, making review of an alternative inability-to-place finding unnecessary.

In re J.F. · filed 2024-09-05(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d)

Because only one factor is needed, the first prong of the two-part analysis is satisfied and we need not consider the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a).

Each alternative finding in subsection (B)(1)(a) through (d) independently satisfies the threshold prong for permanent custody.

In re S.S. · filed 2025-03-13(B)(1)

We note that because the findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(d) are alternative findings, each is independently sufficient to establish one prong of the two-part test to grant a motion for permanent custody.

A supported twelve-of-twenty-two-month finding makes review of an alternate reasonable-time placement finding unnecessary.

In re J. Children · filed 2025-04-23(B)(1)(d)

Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in determining that the children could not be placed with her within a reasonable time or should not be placed with her under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a); however, because the juvenile court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is supported by clear and convincing evidence, we need not review the alternate finding by the juvenile court under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a).

When the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground is established, a court need not review the other threshold grounds for permanent custody.

In re E.R. · filed 2025-04-29(B)(1)(d)

Based on this circumstance, it is unnecessary for this court to review the applicability of the other factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1).

A satisfied twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground makes consideration of an abandonment threshold ground moot.

In re C/S Children · filed 2025-05-07(B)(1)(d)

First, the children have been in the temporary custody of HCJFS since 2019, well beyond the 12-of-22 month minimum required under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). This finding renders consideration of the (B)(1)(b) factor moot.

Each subsection (B)(1) threshold ground is independently sufficient when accompanied by a best-interest finding.

In re K.B. · filed 2025-08-21(B)(1)

As findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b), and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) are alternative findings, each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant the motion for permanent custody. ... This finding alone in conjunction with a best interest finding is sufficient to support the grant of permanent custody.

The subsection (B)(1) threshold grounds are alternatives, so an agency need prove only one to satisfy the first prong.

In re V.N. · filed 2025-11-06(B)(1)

The five first-prong factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) are alternative findings; accordingly, [an agency] must only prove one of those grounds in order to satisfy the first-prong requirement of the permanent custody test.

When the twelve-of-twenty-two-month threshold applies, subsection (E) placement findings are unnecessary but their underlying facts may still be relevant to best interest.

In re B.M.H. · filed 2025-11-17(B)(1)(d) and (D)(1)

Initially, because the trial court made the “12 in 22” finding under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), which Father does not dispute, any findings made pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(2) and (4) are statutorily superfluous. ... Even though these “factors” were unnecessary to the court’s legal determination, the trial court’s factual findings entered under these subsections serve as additional, relevant bases to support the court’s conclusion.

Only one subsection (B)(1)(a) through (e) circumstance must apply to satisfy the threshold prong of the permanent-custody test.

In re E.D.L. · filed 2026-01-07(B)(1)

Only one of these circumstances need to apply to satisfy the second prong of the two-part permanent custody test.

Only one subsection (B)(1) threshold finding is required before the court proceeds to the best-interest inquiry.

1-25-15, 16, 20 · filed 2026-02-09(B)(1)

Any finding related to the “12 of 22” standard is redundant in this case, as only one finding needs to be present under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) before the trial court must proceed to the best interests of the children.

Once the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground is satisfied, a reasonable-time placement finding is unnecessary.

In re C.M. · filed 2026-03-02(B)(1)(a) and (d)

We need not review this issue. ... Only one of the R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) findings must be met to satisfy the second prong of the permanent custody test. ... Because the juvenile court found that the "12 of 22 provision" had been satisfied under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), its "could not/should not be placed" finding under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) was unnecessary to grant permanent custody.

Only one subsection (B)(1) legal circumstance is needed to satisfy the threshold prong of the permanent-custody test.

In re J.L.S. · filed 2026-04-13(B)(1)

Only one of the Legal Circumstances needs to be found under the second prong of the two-part permanent custody test.

The subsection (B)(1)(a) through (e) threshold factors are alternatives, so the agency need prove only one before the court proceeds to best interest.

In re C.C. · filed 2026-05-04(B)(1)

the five factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) are alternative findings, and that the agency need only prove one in order to satisfy the first prong of the permanent custody test”

Any error involving one subsection (B)(1) threshold ground is harmless when an alternative threshold ground independently supports permanent custody.

In re D.T. · filed 2026-05-07(B)(1)

Notwithstanding the R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) finding, the trial court also found mother failed continuously and repeatedly to comply with her case plan. If any error occurred, we find it to be harmless given the trial court's alternative determination on R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), "reasonable time."

The reasonable-time and twelve-of-twenty-two-month grounds are independently sufficient when coupled with a best-interest determination.

In re P.S · filed 2026-05-14(B)(1)

Either finding—when coupled with a best-interest determination—is independently sufficient to support an award of permanent custody.

Unchallenged subsection (B)(1) grounds are independently sufficient to satisfy the first permanent-custody prong when only one ground is required.

In re Z.P. · filed 2026-05-19(B)(1)

Because only one R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) factor must be established, the unchallenged findings are independently sufficient to satisfy the first prong, and Mother’s failure to address them is dispositive.

The reasonable-time and twelve-of-twenty-two-month grounds are alternatives, and either independently satisfies the first permanent-custody requirement.

In re M.Y. · filed 2026-05-22(B)(1)(a) and (d)

‘[T]he findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) are alternative findings, [and] each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant the Agency’s motion for permanent custody.’

A challenge to the reasonable-time placement ground is immaterial when the parent concedes the child was in agency custody for the time required by subsection (B)(1)(d).

In re H.M. · filed 2026-06-26(B)(1)(a) and (d)

Accordingly, Mother’s challenge to the juvenile court’s R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) finding– that H.M.’s toileting issues were not properly diagnosed as a medical, rather than a behavioral, condition and the agency failed to get H.M. the ... necessary treatment– is belied by her concession that H.M. has been in WCDJFS’ temporary custody since February 2024.

A parent’s incarceration and mental-health hospitalization do not defeat abandonment when the parent made no positive effort to care for or become involved with the child and never requested visitation.

In re H.J. · filed 2018-01-22(B)(1)(b)

Javis’ legal and mental health issues do not negate his failure to make any positive effort to care for or otherwise be involved in H.J.’s life. ... Javis cannot claim to have been denied visitation if he never sought visitation in the first place.

A parent's lack of contact for more than ninety days supports the abandonment ground even when the no-contact period occurred during incarceration.

In re W.H. · filed 2015-10-19(B)(1)(b)

Appellant had no contact with the child from December 11, 2014, through the date of the hearing in the instant case, June 8, 2015, a period of longer than ninety days. Despite appellant's argument that the period of his incarceration should not be included in the ninety day period leading to a presumption of abandonment, this Court has previously held that lack of contact for ninety days during a period of incarceration supports a presumption of abandonment.

Incarceration does not rebut the statutory presumption of abandonment arising from more than ninety days without visiting or contacting the child.

In re A.S. · filed 2025-07-29(E)(10)

Father argues that he rebutted the abandonment presumption because his incarceration prevented him from having any contact with A.S. “Incarceration, however, does not rebut the presumption of abandonment.”

Subsection (B)(2) permits permanent custody when a child should not be placed with either parent because the parent did not comply with the reunification plan.

In re J.S. · filed 2022-12-16(B)(2), (E)(1)

But HCJFS established the first prong of the two-prong test with respect to S.S. through R.C. 2151.414(B)(2). R.C. 2151.414(B)(2) allows a court to grant permanent custody if it determines that the child should not be placed with either parent because the parent does not comply with the reunification plan.

A parent relying on alternative treatment instead of recommended case-plan services must verify that the alternative treatment was effective rather than merely claim self-healing.

In re J.C. · filed 2018-04-30(D)(1)

However, when dealing with the life of a young child, such as the case here, the juvenile court cannot, and should not, blindly accept one's claims of self-healing without some type of verification. In other words, if alternative treatment is used in lieu of the recommended case plan services, such treatment must be proven to have been effective through, at the very least, a comprehensive psychological evaluation.

A failure-to-remedy finding under Section 2151.414(E)(1) must be based on the written requirements of the journalized case plan, not additional restrictions a caseworker or guardian believes were imposed.

In re M.P. · filed 2015-10-26(E)(1)

Despite repeated suggestions throughout the hearing to the contrary, Mother was only required to comply with the written requirements of the journalized case plans, not additional requirements that the caseworker or guardian ad litem seemed to believe had been imposed upon her.

An agency's failure to implement one particular part of a case plan, standing alone, is not a basis for denying permanent custody or finding the agency's overall efforts unreasonable.

In re L.C. · filed 2024-01-24(C)

However, under R.C. 2151.414(C), the fact that “the agency failed to implement any particular aspect of * * *” the case plan, standing alone, is not a basis for denying a motion for permanent custody, and does not show that the agency’s efforts were unreasonable.

A parent’s unresolved substance abuse and domestic violence, lack of insight, and inability to remain consistent outside a highly structured setting may support a finding that permanent custody is in the children’s best interest.

In re A.S. · filed 2017-12-13(D)(1)

There is an abundance of clear and convincing evidence to demonstrate that Father had not only failed to address and overcome his substance abuse issues, but he continued to deny that amphetamine abuse was even an issue for him. Moreover, he denied any issues involving domestic violence despite three convictions. The only time that Father managed to demonstrate any consistency in either addressing various issues or visiting the children was when he was in a highly structured setting like a halfway house. Without structured supervision and forced accountability, Father lost motivation and failed to appear for probation and treatment appointments, required classes, and visitations. As a result, Father was never able to demonstrate that he had attained any insight to address the issues which prevented him from providing for the basic needs of the children. Under these circumstances, the children would be exposed to insecurity, instability, and potential harm were they to be returned to Father’s care.

A parent who repeatedly fails treatment programs, refuses recommended inpatient treatment, and would recreate drug-related removal conditions satisfies Section 2151.414(E)(9).

In re K.M. · filed 2015-11-12(E)(9)

The caseworker testified that mother had not complied with any of the four treatment programs she had entered, and stated that mother refused to enter an inpatient treatment program even after her counselors recommended that she enter an inpatient program. Mother also refused to attend the Franklin County Drug Court program when the GAL offered to place her in that treatment program. ... We find that mother's conduct in this case satisfies R.C. 2151.414(E)(9).

Extensive missed and positive drug screens support finding that a parent failed to remedy removal conditions and that permanent custody serves the children's best interest.

In re K.C. · filed 2024-05-07(D)(1)

Mother failed to remedy the conditions which led to the removal of the Children from her care. Mother missed over 100 drug screens. Between February 3, 2022, and January 12, 2023, Mother tested positive for THC 29 times, amphetamines twice, and missed 66 tests.

Parental love and appropriate supervised interaction do not overcome the legally secure placement factor when the parents cannot provide for the children's special needs.

In re A.B. · filed 2015-08-14(D)(1)(d)

The court found that the parents loved the children and interacted with them appropriately during visitation, but that the evidence also demonstrated that the parents were unable to provide for the children’s special needs.

Clear and convincing evidence supported permanent custody where the parent completed case-plan requirements but did not remedy the concerns or show an ability to care for the child's special medical needs.

In re R.M. · filed 2025-04-18(D)(1)

Mother participated in the Family Case Plan and completed the requirements that were set out for her. However, the concerns which lead to R.M.’s removal were not remedied. Mother and R.M. did not progress past supervised visits and Mother could not show she could care for R.M. Mother was unable to articulate that she understood R.M.’s specific medical needs. ... This Court has reviewed the record and finds that the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to decide that there was clear and convincing evidence that R.M. should be placed into the permanent custody of Appellee.

The factors in R.C. 2151.414(E) apply to permanent-custody hearings under R.C. 2151.414(A) and R.C. 2151.353(A)(4), not legal-custody dispositions under R.C. 2151.353(A)(3).

In re D.S. · filed 2016-01-11(E)

However, our reading of the relevant statutory sections reveals the General Assembly put the R.C. 2151.414(E) factors in place for purposes of permanent custody hearings held pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(A) and R.C. 2151.353(A)(4).

The factors in R.C. 2151.414(E) govern permanent-custody hearings, not legal-custody dispositions under R.C. 2151.353(A)(3).

In re A.S. · filed 2016-01-11(E)

As such, consideration of subsection (E)(1), supra, is outside the scope of the present R.C. 2151.353(A)(3) legal custody issues.

Findings under Section 2151.414(E)(1) and (E)(4) bear on the threshold parental-placement inquiry, not the best-interest inquiry under Section 2151.414(D)(1)(e).

In re M.P. · filed 2023-05-23(D)(1)(e)

Mother’s arguments pertain to the court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) and (4), respectively, which are not factors to be considered under a best interest analysis. Instead, they are factors to be considered in evaluating whether the children “cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should be placed with either parent” under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), i.e. the first element in a permanent custody analysis.

An agency was not entitled to permanent custody where it failed to show error in the juvenile court's finding that none of the subsection (E) placement factors applied.

In re D. Children · filed 2025-04-30(E)

We must first determine whether the juvenile court’s finding that none of the factors in division (E) of R.C. 2151.414 apply in this case was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. ... Based on the foregoing analysis and the evidence discussed, HCJFS failed to show how the juvenile court erred in its decision under the first prong of R.C. 2151.353(A)(4).

The enumerated best-interest inquiry incorporates only subsection (E)(7) through (11), not subsection (E)(1), though a court may consider other relevant factors.

In re A.M. · filed 2025-08-21(D)(1)(e)

Accordingly, the trial court was not required to consider R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) when determining whether permanent placement with FCCS was in A.M.’s best interest. ... Notwithstanding the fact that R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) is not a required part of a trial court’s best-interest analysis, a trial court is not precluded from considering other relevant factors.

The subsection (E)(1) failure-to-remedy factor applies to the cannot-or-should-not-place ground, not to the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground.

In re M. Children · filed 2025-10-15(B)(1)(a), (E)(1)

To the extent a parent’s inability to overcome previous struggles is relevant to the parental termination calculus, it may come into play, if at all, in determining whether a parent remedied the conditions that necessitated removal under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1). But that factor only applies to cannot-or-should-not-place cases under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), not 12-in-22 cases under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). As this case is of the latter variety, the factor simply does not apply.

Subsection (E)'s cannot-or-should-not-be-placed factors are necessary only when applying subsection (B)(1)(a), not when another threshold circumstance independently applies.

In re J.E. · filed 2026-01-16(B)(1)(a), (E)

Determining whether a child can be placed with a parent within a reasonable time is only necessary when applying the circumstance set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)—where the child has been in the temporary custody of the Agency for less than 12 of 22 consecutive months. Here, the juvenile court did not apply that circumstance, therefore its findings under R.C. 2151.414(E)(5), (6), and (12) were unnecessary.

When the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground is satisfied, the agency need not establish and the court need not find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent under subsection (E).

In re A.S. · filed 2026-01-30(B)(1)(d), (E)

As a result, MCCS was not required to establish that A.S. could not or should not be placed with either parent, and no judicial finding was required on the issue. ... Permanent custody was authorized based on A.S.’s placement in MCCS’s temporary custody for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period. Therefore, the trial court had no need to address R.C. 2151.414(E).

Subsection (E)(1) is not required in the best-interest analysis, although its underlying facts may be considered as other relevant factors.

In re B.N. · filed 2026-02-10(D)(1)(e)

However, these arguments fall under the factor contained in R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), which the trial court is not required to consider during its best-interest analysis. ... Nevertheless, in considering these arguments as other relevant factors in the best-interest analysis, appellant’s contentions are belied by the record.

The absence of a current foster-to-adopt placement or a plan to preserve sibling contact does not preclude a permanent-custody best-interest finding, although those facts remain relevant.

In re L.T. · filed 2016-02-19(D)(1)

It also is true that the older child is not in a foster-to-adopt placement and that MCCS did not present any testimony about a plan to keep the children in touch with each other. Although these are relevant facts, they certainly did not preclude awarding permanent custody to MCCS.

At a permanent-custody hearing, division (A)(1) bars readjudication of a dispositional order previously issued under section 2151.353.

In re E.A. · filed 2020-05-15(A)(1)

Upon review, it is clear from a reading of the plain language of R.C. 2151.414, that during the hearing on a motion for permanent custody, the juvenile court shall not readjudicate a dispositional order previously issued under R.C. 2151.353.

A permanent-custody hearing may not readjudicate the prior abuse, neglect, or dependency adjudication or the dispositional order issued from it.

In re S.C. · filed 2015-11-19(A)(1)

However, “[t]he adjudication that the child is an abused, neglected, or dependent child and any dispositional order that has been issued in the case under section 2151.353 of the Revised Code pursuant to the adjudication shall not be readjudicated at the hearing.” R.C. 2151.414(A)(1). Thus, the neglect finding was not subject to readjudication at the time of the permanent custody hearing.

Section 2151.414(A)(1)'s bar on readjudicating abuse, neglect, or dependency does not prevent consideration of evidence from the adjudicatory hearing at the permanent-custody hearing; it preserves the prior adjudication regardless of the custody ruling.

In re J.H. · filed 2016-02-22(A)(1)

The prohibition in R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) against the readjudication of neglect and dependency does not preclude the court from considering evidence elicited in the dependency hearing at a permanent custody hearing. In re Cavender, 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2000-06-037, 2001 WL 277245, *9 (Mar. 19, 2001). Instead, "the prohibition is merely an attempt to emphasize that the outcome of the permanent custody hearing has no effect on the prior adjudication of neglect or the prior order of temporary custody, meaning that the parent cannot 'erase' past findings of neglect by defeating the agency's motion for permanent custody."

A dependency adjudication and its resulting dispositional order cannot be readjudicated at a later permanent-custody hearing.

In re E.R. · filed 2017-08-10(A)(1)

This court is without the power to reexamine the trial court's dependency adjudication. The statute is clear: "The adjudication that the child is an abused, neglected, or dependent child and any dispositional order that has been issued in the case under section 2151.353 of the Revised Code pursuant to the adjudication shall not be readjudicated at the hearing" on a motion for permanent custody. (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2151.414(A)(1).

Subsection (A)(1) bars readjudication of the child's abuse, neglect, or dependency adjudication and resulting dispositional order at the permanent-custody hearing.

In re A.N.F. · filed 2018-09-13(A)(1)

The statute is clear: "The adjudication that the child is an abused, neglected, or dependent child and any dispositional order that has been issued in the case under section 2151.353 of the Revised Code pursuant to the adjudication shall not be readjudicated at the hearing" on a motion for permanent custody.

The conditions relevant to whether a parent substantially remedied the causes of removal are those established in the adjudicatory decision and need not be relitigated at the permanent-custody stage.

In re J.P. · filed 2025-06-25(E)(1)

The “conditions” that caused J.P. to remain placed outside Mother’s home were those set forth in the adjudicatory decision. ... Relying on In re Burrell, 58 Ohio St.2d 37, 39 (1979), Mother asserts that CSB failed to prove that her substance abuse or mental illnesses had a negative impact on J.P., but that determination was already made when the child was adjudicated dependent and need not be relitigated at the permanent custody stage of the proceedings.

Unappealed adjudicatory findings of abuse or neglect are established in the case and need not be relitigated at the permanent-custody hearing.

In re A.S. · filed 2025-07-28(A)(1), (E)(15)

Neither parent objected to or appealed the adjudications of abuse and neglect, so those findings were established in this case and there was no need to relitigate them at the permanent custody stage of the proceedings.

A parent’s continued abusive relationship may weigh heavily in the best-interest analysis despite progress in therapy and other services.

In re A.J.O. · filed 2019-03-22(D)(1)

Despite this progress, she repeatedly failed to substantially remedy the concerns which caused the children to be removed from the home. ... Considering all of the relevant factors under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), particularly mother’s abusive relationship with Kidd, the trial court correctly applied the best-interest test.

A parent who knows children are being sexually abused in the home and does nothing to protect them may satisfy Section 2151.414(E)(15), even if the parent did not personally perpetrate the abuse.

In re J.H. · filed 2016-02-23(E)(15)

Under (E)(15), according to the children, father was a perpetrator of sexual abuse against them. Even assuming he was not, he admitted that he was aware of sexual abuse in the home yet he did nothing to protect his children.

A parent’s refusal to acknowledge overwhelming evidence that a household member abused the child can show failure to remedy the cause of removal and unwillingness to provide an adequate home or prevent further abuse.

In re Z.P. · filed 2017-07-28(E)(1), (4), and (14)

We agree with the GAL that the evidence supported a finding by clear and convincing evidence that mother failed to remedy the underlying problem that initially caused her children to be removed from their home because she failed to acknowledge the overwhelming evidence that stepfather had sexually abused her child. See former R.C. 2151.414(E)(1). Mother’s conduct demonstrated her unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for the children or to prevent them from suffering abuse. See former R.C. 2151.414(E)(4) and (14).

A parent's repeated choice to allow people who harmed the children into the home supports finding a lack of protective capacity and commitment to providing for the children's safety.

In re D.B. · filed 2024-01-24(E)(4)

In the case before us, appellant repeatedly allowed individuals into her home who harmed her children. This behavior supports a finding that appellant lacks adequate protective capacities or a commitment to providing for her children’s safety.

When Section 2151.414(D)(2) applies, the court must find the child's best interest and all four listed conditions before permanent custody is mandatory.

In re B.Z.D. · filed 2016-03-07(D)(2)

Therefore, the trial court is required to make a best interest finding and a determination that all four factors have been met.

When all four subsection (D)(2) findings are made, permanent custody is conclusively in the child's best interest and the court must commit the child to the agency.

In re G.A. · filed 2020-03-23(D)(2)

Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2), if the juvenile court makes the four enumerated findings, permanent custody is per se in the child’s best interest and the court “shall” commit the child to the permanent custody of the agency.

When every condition in Section 2151.414(D)(2) is present, the juvenile court has no discretion and must commit the child to permanent agency custody.

In re N.S. · filed 2023-11-02(D)(2)

While the court’s determination under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard, the juvenile court has no discretion if it finds that all the factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) are present. The standard of review when a court has no discretion is whether the court’s decision was erroneous as a matter of law.

When every factor under Section 2151.414(D)(2) applies, permanent custody is in the child's best interest and the court must commit the child to the agency.

In re H.G. · filed 2024-09-05(D)(2)

Additionally, the trial court made findings establishing each of the factors under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) applied, in which case the statute instructs that “permanent custody is in the best interest of the child, and the court shall commit the child to the permanent custody of a public children services agency or private child placing agency.”

When all four subsection (D)(2) conditions are met, permanent custody is in the child's best interest and the court must grant permanent custody to the agency.

In re C.L. · filed 2025-06-12(D)(2)

Under that subsection, permanent custody is in the child’s best interest and the trial court must grant permanent custody to the agency if four factors are met.

If the juvenile court makes all four subsection (D)(2) findings, permanent custody is necessarily in the child's best interest and the court must commit the child to the agency.

In re B.L. · filed 2025-09-15(D)(2)

“By contrast, ‘under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2), if the juvenile court makes [each of] the four enumerated findings, permanent custody is per se in the child’s best interest and the court “shall” commit the child to the permanent custody of the agency.’”

A supported finding under subsection (D)(2) mandates a finding that permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In re C.H. · filed 2025-11-26(D)(2)

“A finding under section (D)(2) of R.C. 2151.414 mandates that the trial court find it is in a child’s best interest to be placed in the agency’s permanent custody.”

A parent's statement that permanent placement elsewhere serves the child's best interest is only testimonial evidence that the court may credit or discredit, not a conclusive admission requiring adjudicatory-plea protections.

In re A.D.C.L. · filed 2016-04-01(D)

The admission is but one more article of testimonial evidence for the court to consider in resolving the best-interest question. The court is entitled to credit the admission or discredit it, on the merits.

Parents may stipulate generally that statutory grounds for permanent custody exist without stipulating to each individual factor under Section 2151.414(B).

In re E.G. · filed 2024-05-23(B)

We perceive Parents’ argument to be that they should have stipulated to specific individual factors pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B). We are unaware of any such requirement, and Parents do not point us to any case law or statute in support of their premise.

Section 2151.414(A) does not require the court to revisit the child's prior adjudication or hear evidence supporting the initial removal at the permanent custody dispositional hearing.

In Re R.H., Unpublished Decision (10-28-2004) · filed 2004-10-28(A)

Father complains first that the state failed to present evidence to support the need to remove the children from the home. This evidence is not necessary at a dispositional hearing; "The adjudication that the child is an abused, neglected, or dependent child * * * shall not be readjudicated at [dispositional] the hearing * * *." R.C. 2151.414 (A).

A child's occasional or inconsistent wish to reunify does not create a conflict with a guardian ad litem's permanent-custody recommendation requiring appointment of separate counsel.

In re C.E. · filed 2016-04-08(D)(1)(b)

Based on the record before this Court, the evidence does not reflect a conflict of interest between C.E. and the guardian ad litem. C.E. did not consistently and repeatedly express a desire for reunification such that the appointment of independent counsel was required.

A conflict requiring independent counsel exists only when the child repeatedly and consistently expresses an affirmative desire to return to the parent's home, not merely opposition to adoption or missing family.

In re S.D. · filed 2016-04-11(D)(1)(b)

The record in this case fails to reveal that K.S. had expressed a consistent desire to return to Mother’s home.

Section 2151.414 does not apply to a case limiting a parent's visitation where no termination of parental rights is involved.

In re K.Z.-P. · filed 2016-05-20

Thus, R.C. 2151.414 does not apply, and appellant’s argument is without merit.

Children need secure and permanent homes in the near term and need not endure likely harm to give a parent additional time to prove suitability.

In re P.S. · filed 2016-06-16(D)(1)(d)

The law does not require the court to experiment with the child’s welfare to see if he will suffer great detriment or harm.”

A legally secure placement may require permanent custody when the children have spent a lengthy period in agency custody and the parent has repeatedly failed to achieve stability or remedy the removal conditions.

In re P.Z.A. · filed 2023-06-16(D)(1)(d)

Given the length of the children’s history in MCCS’s custody and Mother’s repeated failure to maintain stability in her life and to rectify the conditions causing the children’s removal, there is no doubt that a legally secure placement for the children could not have been achieved without granting permanent custody to MCCS.

A legally secure permanent placement means more than housing; it requires a safe, stable, consistent environment with dependable adults who will meet the child's needs.

In re S.K. · filed 2023-11-08(D)(1)(d)

The Ohio Revised Code does not define the phrase “legally secure permanent placement,” but “this court and others have generally interpreted the phrase to mean a safe, stable, consistent environment where a child’s needs will be met.” In re M.B., 4th Dist. Highland No. 15CA19, 2016-Ohio-793, ¶ 56. “A legally secure permanent placement is more than a house with four walls. Rather, it generally encompasses a stable environment where a child will live in safety with one or more dependable adults who will provide for the child’s needs.” Id.

A parent who has not demonstrated the ability to care for the children or achieve verified mental-health, sobriety, and housing stability cannot provide a legally secure permanent placement.

In re D.P. · filed 2024-02-09(D)(1)(d)

Mother’s “struggles with providing and caring for the children, notably the inability to have a home or job when paired with the opinions of the majority of the professionals involved in the children’s lives, gives rise to great concern with Mother being granted return custody of the children.”

A legally secure permanent placement requires more than housing; it generally means a stable, safe environment with dependable adults who provide for the child's needs.

In re S.H. · filed 2025-07-02(D)(1)(d)

This court has stated, “a legally secure permanent placement ‘is more than a house with four walls. Rather, it generally encompasses a stable environment where a child will live in safety with one or more dependable adults who will provide for the child’s needs.’”

Additional time is unwarranted when a parent has failed to undertake even the basic service prerequisite to other case-plan objectives and the record shows further time would be ineffective.

In re N.E. · filed 2016-08-01(E)(1)

There is nothing in the record to prove that any further time to develop the case plan would be effective.