N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1

Rule 26(b) permits discovery of relevant investigation reports and witness statements despite a claimed privilege when the interests of justice outweigh that privilege.

Rutledge v. N.C. Dept. of Correction · filed 2010-02-11Rule 26(b)

More importantly, even if privileged, these records are discoverable because they are relevant and the interests of justice outweigh the protected privilege. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1 , Rule 26(b) (2009); Shellhorn v. Brad Ragan, Inc. 38 N.C.App. 310, 314, 248 S.E.2d 103 , 106 (1978).

Rule 26(b) permits discovery of relevant prison investigation records despite an asserted privilege when the interests of justice outweigh that privilege.

Rutledge v. N.C. Department of Corr. · filed 2010-02-17Rule 26(b)

More importantly, even if privileged, these records are discoverable because they are relevant and the interests of justice outweigh the protected privilege.

Rule 26 requires a defendant to use formal discovery procedures to obtain a plaintiff’s medical information from a nonparty provider after waiver of the physician-patient privilege, unless the patient authorizes disclosure.

Jones v. Asheville Radiological Group, P.A. · filed 1999-08-17

The confidential nature of the physician-patient relationship extends beyond the time of the waiver by the patient, Crist v. Moffatt, 326 N.C. 326, 334, 389 S.E.2d 41, 46 (1990), and a defendant "must utilize the statutorily recognized methods of discovery enumerated in N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 26" to obtain a plaintiff's medical information, id. at 336, 389 S.E.2d at 47; see also N.C.G.S. ch. 1A, art. 5 (1990). ... It follows that, even after plaintiff's waiver, the films only could be disclosed pursuant to statutorily authorized discovery procedures or pursuant to plaintiff's authorization.

Rule 6(c) permits a judge to sign an order out of term and out of district without the parties’ consent if the related hearing was held in term and in district.

Minton v. Lowe's Food Stores, Inc. · filed 1996-03-05Rule 6(c)

Pursuant to Rule 6(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, a judge may sign an order out of term and out of district without the consent of the parties so long as the hearing to which the order relates was held in term and in district.

Rule 6(c) permits a judge to determine costs after adjournment when that determination implements a costs decision announced in session.

Hockaday v. Lee · filed 1996-11-05Rule 6(c)

The determination of the amount of those costs, made after the adjournment of the session, was merely an implementation of the decision rendered in session and thus “relates” (within the meaning of Rule 6(c)) to that decision.

Rule 65(e) does not permit damages in a dissolution order when the temporary restraining order has already expired and cannot be dissolved.

Democratic Party of Guilford County v. Guilford County Board of Elections · filed 1996-03-08Rule 65(e)

Because there was no temporary restraining order in existence for Judge Freeman to vacate or dissolve, defendants could not recover damages in a dissolution order entered pursuant to Rule 65(e).

Rule 19(b) makes a third party who holds legal title to property claimed as marital property a necessary party to the equitable distribution proceeding, with participation limited to ownership of that property.

Upchurch v. Upchurch · filed 1996-04-02Rule 19(b)

It thus follows that when a third party holds legal title to property which is claimed to be marital property, that third party is a necessary party to the equitable distribution proceeding, with their participation limited to the issue of the ownership of that property.

Rule 19 requires all property owners subject to a restrictive covenant to be joined in an action to invalidate it.

Page v. Bald Head Ass'n · filed 2005-05-03Rule 19

In sum, we conclude the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ action to invalidate defendants’ revised assessment covenants for failure to join all property owners subject to the covenants as necessary parties.

Rule 19(a) requires joinder of lot owners whose recorded easements in condemned property give them interests directly affected by the compensation judgment.

North Carolina Department of Transportation v. Stagecoach Village · filed 2005-12-06Rule 19(a)

A suit as to the just compensation of the condemned land cannot be resolved without the joiner of each lot owner in the development who has an easement property right of record. Those owners of the easement have a material interest in the subject matter of the controversy, receiving just compensation for their individual easement, and their interest will be directly affected by the trial court’s decision.

Rule 19(a) does not require joining other property owners when invalidating a covenant would not deprive them of a property right.

Midsouth Golf, LLC v. Fairfield Harbourside Condominium Ass'n · filed 2007-11-06Rule 19(a)

... invalidation of the covenant would not deprive them of any property right, which is required under Earner to make them necessary parties.

Rule 12(b)(7) does not support dismissal when the allegedly missing parties are not necessary to resolve the controversy.

Beaufort County Board of Education v. Beaufort County Board of Commissioners · filed 2008-02-05Rule 12(b)(7)

As the State of North Carolina ... and the North Carolina Board of Education are not necessary parties to this action it was proper for the trial judge to deny defendant’s 12(b)(7) motion to dismiss.

Rule 19 requires joining the current property owner when a requested injunction could substantially alter the land.

Durham County v. Graham · filed 2008-08-05Rule 19

We therefore conclude that, the current property owner of the land in question is a necessary party.

Rule 19 requires joinder of the current property owner when a motion seeks to set aside the foreclosure sale through which that owner purchased the property.

In Re Foreclosure of a Lien by Hctha · filed 2009-10-06Rule 19(b)

Bartley, record owner of the property who purchased it without notice of infirmity of title at a judicial sale, is a necessary party in the Barbots’ motion to set aside the foreclosure sale.

Rule 19 requires a trial court to join necessary parties before deciding the merits; a judgment entered without them is void.

Apgar v. Crawford · filed 2010-03-16Rule 19(a)

Nevertheless, the trial court's failure to continue the action ex mero motu and to order that the owners of lots in Sections F and G be joined as parties to this action was in error. Therefore, the trial court's 4 June 2008 and 24 November 2008 orders granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denying defendant's motion for summary judgment are void.

Rule 19(b) requires joinder of trust beneficiaries whose interests will be affected by the adjudication.

Dunn v. Cook · filed 2010-06-01Rule 19(b)

Because the remainder beneficiaries’ interests will be affected by the adjudication of this action, they are necessary parties. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand this case to the Durham County Superior Court for entry of an order for the remainder beneficiaries to be “summoned to appear in the action.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 19(b).

Rule 19 requires joinder of a party needed for a complete determination of the claim; a judgment entered without that party is void.

McCraw v. Aux · filed 2010-07-20Rule 19(b)

As the Committee was not joined as a party, the trial court should not have addressed the merits of the case and its judgment is “null and void.”

Under Rule 19(a), lot owners are proper but not necessary parties to an action challenging covenant amendments when invalidation would not extinguish their property rights.

Wallach v. Linville Owners Ass'n, Inc. · filed 2014-07-01Rule 19(a)

Following the reasoning in Midsouth Golf, we hold the Staals were proper parties to the action seeking to declare the amendments to the Declaration invalid and unenforceable, but were not necessary parties. The amendments at issue in the present case did not extinguish any property rights of the Staals akin to those in Karner.

Rule 19(b)'s necessary-party requirement applies when a nonnatural entity holds legal title to property claimed as marital property.

Nicks v. Nicks · filed 2015-06-16Rule 19(b)

However, Sally's argument ignores the fact that this Court also based its holding in Upchurch on N.C.R. Civ. P. 19(b), which refers to "parties," rather than "persons." ... In short, Upchurch's application should not be limited to only natural persons holding legal title to property.

Rule 19(a) requires joinder of a party whose rights in disputed settlement funds would necessarily be affected by resolving the claims.

Window World of St. Louis, Inc. v. Window World, Inc. · filed 2015-08-10Rule 19(a)

Accordingly, here, where the Lomax/Gillette and Roland Plaintiffs appear to assert equal rights and interests in the Trust Deposit, the Court concludes the Roland Plaintiffs must be joined in the Lomax Action because the resolution of the Settlement Claims will necessarily affect their rights to the Trust Deposit.

Rule 19(a) requires owners to be joined when reformation would affect their property interests.

Conleys Creek Ltd. P'ship v. Smoky Mountain Country Club Prop. Owners Ass'n · filed 2017-09-05Rule 19(a)

Any reformation order would necessarily affect the ownership interests of these condo unit owners in certain common areas; and, therefore, they are necessary parties.

Rule 19(b) requires joinder of necessary parties before a court decides a claim that cannot be completely determined without them.

Smith v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co. · filed 2018-08-21Rule 19(b)

Although we have determined that Erie possesses standing to seek a declaratory judgment in this action, we nevertheless conclude that the trial court erred in ruling on Erie’s claim for declaratory relief because of the absence of necessary parties to the litigation.

Rule 19(d) does not require the Speaker of the House and President Pro Tempore of the Senate to be joined in a petition for judicial review that raises only an as-applied constitutional challenge.

Wilson Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Ret. Sys. Div. · filed 2023-08-15R. 19(d)

Although Petitioner asserted as-applied constitutional challenges in its petition for judicial review, this alone did not convert it into a “civil action challenging the validity of a North Carolina statute[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, R. 19(d); see also M.E. v. T.J., 380 N.C. 539, 564, 869 S.E.2d 624, 640 (2022). Because Petitioner did not challenge the facial validity of a North Carolina statute, Speaker Moore and President Pro Tempore Berger were not proper parties to the petition for judicial review and the superior court therefore erred by denying Respondents’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

Rule 19 requires a trial court to join a necessary party on its own motion when that party’s presence is needed to resolve an equitable distribution claim.

Wenninger v. Wenninger · filed 2024-05-07(b)

Nevertheless, despite the trial court’s apt recognition that the Trust was a necessary party, the trial court erred as a matter of law by failing to join the Trust ex mero motu as a necessary party to the equitable distribution action.

Rule 19 does not require joining other subdivision landowners when the existing parties represent the interests on both sides of a dispute over restrictive covenants.

Karner v. Roy White Flowers, Inc. · filed 1999-09-07Rule 19(a)

To the contrary, in the present case, the interest of landowners wishing to either oppose or support the assertion of changed conditions is fully represented by the present parties. Other landowners in Elizabeth Heights are not necessary parties for the court to determine whether or not the character of the neighborhood has changed to such an extent that the residential covenants should be annulled.

Rule 19(b) treats the mother’s husband as a necessary party in a custody action brought by a putative father or non-parent for a child born during the marriage, unless he has already been determined not to be the father.

Smith v. Barbour · filed 2002-12-03Rule 19(b)

In an action brought by a putative father or a non-parent claiming custody of a child bom during the mother’s marriage to her husband, the husband is thus a necessary party to the proceeding, unless he has previously been determined not to be the child’s father.

Rule 6(d)'s affidavit timing requirement does not apply to affidavits supporting a Rule 12(b) defense raised in an answer.

Ryals v. Hall-Lane Moving & Storage Co. · filed 1996-04-16Rule 6(d)

As such, affidavits filed in support of a 12(b) defense contained in an answer is not governed by the time constraints found in Rule 6(d).

Rule 62(d) directs an appellant seeking a stay of execution to follow the applicable statutory stay procedure.

Hieb v. HOWELL'S CHILD CARE CENTER, INC. · filed 1996-07-02(d)

Rule 62 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure governs stays of proceedings to enforce judgments and provides that when an appeal is taken, the appellant may obtain a stay of execution by acting in accordance with and subject to G.S. §§ 1-289, -290, -291, -292, -293, -294, and -295. ... Defendants did not pursue a stay under Rule 62(d) and G.S. § 1-289, instead improperly filing a motion with the Commission.

Rule 62(d) permits an appellant to seek a stay pending appeal, but satisfying § 1-291 does not compel a stay.

Meares v. Town of Beaufort · filed 2008-10-07Rule 62(d)

Under North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 62(d), “[w]hen an appeal is taken, the appellant may obtain a stay of execution ... by proceeding in accordance with and subject to the conditions of . . . G.S. 1-291 . . . .” N.C. R. Civ. 62(d) (2007) (emphasis added). ... We do not read N.C.G.S. § 1-291 to require that a stay is compelled upon satisfaction of the criteria under N.C.G.S. § 1-291.

Rule 62(d) allows a stay of execution when an appeal is taken, but does not authorize a stay of an SBM determination hearing.

State v. Blue · filed 2016-03-15Rule 62(d)

Per the plain language of Rule 62(d), “[w]hen an appeal is taken, the appellant may obtain a stay of execution.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 62 (2015). Accordingly, it would not have applied to stay defendant’s SBM hearing.

A request for a statement of monetary relief sought must be filed with the court before service or within five days afterward.

Cottle v. Thompson · filed 1996-07-02Rule 5(d)

Accordingly, we conclude that a request for a statement of monetary relief sought is not a discovery document excluded from the filing requirement of Rule 5 and is therefore a paper that must be filed with the court either before service or within five days thereafter.

Rule 6(b) gives trial judges broad discretion to enlarge the time allowed for a procedural act.

Sykes v. Keiltex Industries, Inc. · filed 1996-08-06Rule 6(b)

Additionally, Rule 6(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure vests a trial judge with great discretion to enlarge the time allowed for the performance of an act.

Rule 6(b) does not authorize a court to extend a statutory deadline for filing a petition to review an annexation ordinance, even for excusable neglect.

Chicora Country Club, Inc. v. Town of Erwin · filed 1997-12-16Rule 6(b)

Therefore, we hold that even if Chicora Country Club could demonstrate to the trial court’s satisfaction that the failure to timely file the petition for review of the 20 March 1996 annexation ordinance was a result of excusable neglect, the trial court in this case had no authority under Rule 6(b) to extend the time Chicora Country Club had to file that petition.

Rule 6(b) permits an extension after a court-ordered deadline expires only upon a showing of excusable neglect.

Summey v. Barker · filed 2003-10-02Rule 6(b)

A judge may allow enlargement of time after the expiration of a court-ordered deadline only upon a showing of excusable neglect. N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 6(b) (2001). Plaintiff made no such showing. Accordingly, the motion for extension of time was properly denied.

Rule 6(b) cannot extend an expired statute of limitations, even if it could extend the one-year period for refiling after a voluntary dismissal.

Warren v. Snowshoe LTC Grp. · filed 2024-03-19Rule 6(b)

In this case, like our Court in Osborne, even if we construed Rule 6(b) as providing authority to extend the one-year savings provision provided by N.C.R. Civ. P. 41(a), Rule 6(b) cannot apply to extend an otherwise expired statute of limitations.

Rule 59(e) permits a motion to alter or amend a judgment, but does not apply to motions to reconsider orders that are not judgments.

Curry v. FIRST FEDERAL SAV. AND LOAN · filed 1997-01-07Rule 59(e)

Thus, the motions denominated by appellants as motions for reconsideration were not motions to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e).

Rule 59(e) permits a motion to alter or amend a judgment, but does not apply to a motion to reconsider an order that is not a judgment.

Curry v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n · filed 1997-01-07(e)

Thus, the motions denominated by appellants as motions for reconsideration were not motions to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e).

Rule 59(e) allows a timely motion to modify an order for errors of law in the order, even without a prior objection or an express reference to the rule.

Elrod v. Elrod · filed 1997-02-18Rule 59(e)

Although Ms. Elrod had not prior to the filing of the motion entered any objection to the Order, because the motion was timely filed and because the issues raised in the motion relate to matters in the Order (as opposed to errors allegedly occurring during a trial), it is properly considered a Rule 59(e) request to modify the 14 August Order because of errors of law.

Rule 59(a)(8) permits a motion to alter or amend a judgment to raise an error of law by the trial court.

Scarvey v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Charlotte · filed 2001-09-04Rule 59(a)(8)

N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 59(a)(8) (1999) specifically permits such a motion to raise an error of law by the trial court.

Rule 59(e) motions to alter or amend a judgment are limited to the grounds listed in Rule 59(a).

Ncatr v. Ncdot · filed 2007-06-05Rule 59(e)

Rule 59(e) governs motions to alter or amend a judgment, and such motions are limited to the grounds listed in Rule 59(a).

A Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a judgment must reveal a ground listed in Rule 59(a); a motion that leaves the ground unclear is improper.

North Carolina Alliance for Transportation Reform, Inc. v. North Carolina Department of Transportation · filed 2007-06-05Rule 59(e)

In the present case, the basis of the motion was not apparent from the grounds listed, leaving the trial court and the opposing party to guess what the particular grounds might be. Although such deficiency would alone be adequate basis for dismissal of the motion, the trial court also found that petitioners simply sought to reargue matters from the earlier hearing, additionally supporting the court’s conclusions that the Motion to Alter or Amend was not a proper Rule 59(e) motion.

Rules 52(b) and 59(a), read together, require amendment of findings and judgment when equity and justice require allowing an answering defendant to defend on the merits.

Jackson v. Culbreth · filed 2009-09-01Rules 52(b) and 59(a)

Reading Rules 52 and 59 together, we hold that the trial court, upon defendant’s Motion to Reconsider, should have amended its findings, made additional findings, and amended its judgment because equity and justice required the court to allow defendant to defend its claim on the merits.

Rule 59 does not permit a party to seek reconsideration of an interlocutory decision or to add previously denied discovery or injunctive relief to an order dismissing the case.

Davis v. Rizzo · filed 2018-08-21Rule 59(e)

Rule 59 provides no grounds to request relief in the form of reconsidering an interlocutory decision a party alleges is collateral to the merits of a final judgment dismissing the case, or of amending an order dismissing a case by granting previously denied discovery requests or injunctive relief.

Rule 59(e) requires a motion to amend a judgment within ten days after entry; without a timely motion, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to amend under that rule.

Carcano v. JBSS · filed 2023-12-19Rule 59(e)

There is no Record evidence Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the Initial Judgment within ten days after its entry, and as such the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter its Amended Judgment under Rule 59(e).

Rule 59(e) permits denial of a motion to amend a judgment when the verdict sheet does not show whether the jury duplicated or apportioned damages.

B.C. v. Palmetto Wellness Grp. N.C. · filed 2025-06-04Rule 59(e)

We cannot tell from the face of the verdict sheet whether the jury awarded duplicative damages for the same injuries or instead apportioned the damages between the defendants. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiff’s motion.

Rule 37(b)(2)(c) permits default judgment as a discovery sanction without a separate assessment of the underlying claim’s merits.

Ivey v. Hall · filed 2025-10-01Rule 37(b)(2)(c)

Specifically, Rule 37(b)(2)(c) permits “rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party” without requiring the court to assess the substantive merits of the underlying claim. See N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 37(b)(2)(c) (2023).

Before striking an answer and entering default judgment under Rule 37, a trial court must consider lesser sanctions; findings explaining why lesser sanctions are inappropriate are sufficient.

State v. Om Shree Hemakash Corp. · filed 2024-08-20Rule 37(b)(2)(c)

These thorough findings of fact, in which the trial court explained that it “considered lesser sanctions” and explained why “all lesser sanctions are inappropriate[,]” are sufficient under our precedents.

Rule 37(b)(2) allows a judge to make just orders when a party fails to obey a discovery order, with sanctions reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Benton v. Hillcrest Foods, Inc. · filed 1999-12-21(b)(2)

“If a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery ... a judge . . . may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 37(b)(2) (1990). The choice of sanctions under Rule 37 is within the trial court’s discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.

Rule 26(f)(1) requires a discovery conference to set deadlines for designating experts and conducting discovery and permits sanctions when a party fails to identify an expert as ordered.

Coffman v. Roberson · filed 2002-11-05(f)(1)

In medical malpractice cases, North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure require a discovery conference to set deadlines for designating experts and conducting discovery. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 26(fl). Rule 26(fl) provides in part: If a party fails to identify an expert witness as ordered, the court shall, upon motion by the moving party, impose an appropriate sanction, which may include dismissal of the action, entry of default against the defendant, or exclusion of the testimony of the expert witness at trial. ... At bar, the purpose of the discovery rules was achieved and defendants were not prejudiced by any actions of plaintiffs in failing to timely notify defendants of experts in this action. All parties had the opportunity to depose both Drs. Tonn and Warren as experts before trial. Defendants cannot claim “surprise” by the expert testimony of either physician and have failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing into evidence the expert testimony of Drs. Tonn and Warren. This assignment of error is overruled.

Rule 26(f1) permits a court to impose sanctions, including exclusion of expert testimony, when a party fails to identify an expert witness as ordered.

Summey v. Barker · filed 2002-12-03Rule 26(f1)

The choice of sanctions lies within the court's discretion and will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion. ... Accordingly, we hold that the plaintiff has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for an extension of time to designate expert witnesses.

Rule 37 permits discovery sanctions for dilatory conduct even when the party ultimately produces the requested documents and permits inspection.

Essex Group, Inc. v. Express Wire Services, Inc. · filed 2003-04-15

It is no defense that defendants eventually produced the requested documents and allowed plaintiff to inspect its premises. Rule 37 sanctions are powers granted to the trial courts of our state to prevent or eliminate dilatory tactics on the part of unscrupulous attorneys or litigants.

Rule 37(d) permits sanctions for failure to respond to a Rule 34 document request, but leaves their imposition to the trial court’s discretion.

Messina v. Bell · filed 2003-05-20Rule 37(d)

Rule 37(d) permits a trial court to impose sanctions for failure to serve written responses to a request for inspection under Rule 34 of the rules of civil procedure. ... From this record, we conclude the trial court was within its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for sanctions.

Rule 37(d) does not permit failure-to-appear sanctions when an individual party physically attends a deposition but refuses to answer questions.

Board of Drainage Commissioners v. Dixon · filed 2003-06-17Rule 37(d)

Where an individual party physically appears at a deposition, the imposition of Rule 37(d) sanctions for failure to appear is not appropriate.

Rule 37(b)(2)b permits a court to bar a party from supporting its defenses when it disobeys a discovery order.

Joyner v. Mabrey Smith Motor Co. · filed 2003-11-04Rule 37(b)(2)b

Rule 37 expressly allows a court to sanction a party failing to comply with an order by “refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 37(b)(2)b (2001).

A trial court's choice of sanctions under Rule 37 for disobeying a discovery order is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Leder v. Leder · filed 2004-09-21Rule 37(b)(2)

A trial court's choice of sanctions under Rule 37 will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.

Rule 37(b)(2) allows a trial court to impose sanctions, including striking pleadings or entering judgment, when a party fails to comply with a discovery order.

Cunningham v. Sams · filed 2004-12-21(b)(2)

Rule 37(b)(2) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a trial court to sanction a party for failure to comply with a court order compelling discovery. The trial court is given broad discretion to "make such orders in regard to the failure as are just" and authorized to, among other things, prohibit the introduction of certain evidence, strike pleadings, dismiss the action, or render judgment against the disobedient party. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 37(b)(2) (2003).

Rule 37(b)(2) authorizes sanctions for failing to comply with a discovery order; a party that produces the documents the order requires has complied with it.

Becker v. Pierce · filed 2005-03-01Rule 37(b)(2)

Rule 37(b)(2) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a trial court to sanction a party for failure to comply with a court order compelling discovery. ... However, the trial court’s order required defendant to produce three letters, which he did. ... There is no evidence in the record to suggest defendant did not comply with the trial court’s order compelling production of the three letters.

Rule 37 requires a trial court to consider less severe sanctions before dismissing a claim with prejudice for discovery misconduct.

In Re Pedestrian Walkway Failure · filed 2005-09-20Rule 37(b)(2)(c)

Likewise, "`[b]efore dismissing a party's claim with prejudice pursuant to Rule 37, the trial court must consider less severe sanctions.'" ... We conclude that this sufficiently demonstrates that Judge Spainhour considered lesser sanctions before ordering a dismissal.

Rule 37(d) permits sanctions when a party fails to attend a properly noticed deposition without requiring a prior order compelling discovery.

Cole v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. · filed 2006-02-07Rule 37(d)

As an order directing compliance with discovery is not a prerequisite to sanctions under Rule 37(d), we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s imposition of sanctions for plaintiffs’ failure to appear for scheduled depositions.

Rule 37 requires a court to consider lesser sanctions before dismissing an action with prejudice for failure to respond to discovery, but the court need not list and reject each alternative.

Badillo v. Cunningham · filed 2006-06-06Rule 37(d)

Plaintiff is correct that a trial judge must consider less severe sanctions prior to dismissing an action with prejudice for failure to respond to discovery requests. ... We hold that the trial court is not required to list and specifically reject each possible lesser sanction prior to determining that dismissal is appropriate.

Rule 37(b)(2) permits a court to address a discovery violation without excluding an expert and to order the violating party to pay the opposing party’s attorney’s fees and expenses.

Kornegay v. Aspen Asset Group, L.L.C. · filed 2007-02-28Rule 37(b)(2)

After careful consideration, and in the exercise of my discretion, the Court declines to exclude Kornegay’s expert. Instead, the Court will fashion a sanction that punishes Kornegay, provides the Defendants with an adequate remedy for the discovery violation, and allows this case to proceed to trial. ... Pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, Kornegay shall reimburse the Defendants for their attorney’s fees and expenses in pursuing this Motion.

Rule 37 permits sanctions for failing to attend a deposition, but striking affirmative defenses is an abuse of discretion when the party promptly tries to cure an explained absence and the sanction is too severe.

Moore v. Mills · filed 2008-05-06Rule 37(d)

Given defendant's attempts to cure his failure to attend his deposition, his affidavit explaining the misunderstanding, which was presented to the trial court at hearing, and the severity of the sanctions imposed, we find that the trial court's sanctions were "manifestly unsupported by reason." Id. (quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly, we reverse and vacate that part of the trial court's order striking defendant's pleadings relating to the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and gross contributory negligence. The remaining sanction, payment of attorneys' fees and court reporter costs, is affirmed.

Rule 37(b)(2) does not permit a default judgment granting an annulment as a discovery sanction.

ESTATE OF HAWKINS v. Wiseman · filed 2008-07-01Rule 37(b)(2)

Unfortunately, the trial court entered a sanction under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 37(b)(2), that was unavailable in this particular case.

Rule 37(b)(2) permits a just default sanction for disobeying a discovery order, but it cannot dispense with the proof required to grant an annulment.

HAWKINS EX REL. THOMPSON v. Hawkins · filed 2008-08-19Rule 37(b)(2)

The trial court is empowered in its discretion to render a judgment of default for failure to comply with an order made pursuant to Rule 37 so long as that judgment is just. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 37(b)(2) (2005). However, the general rules of discovery found in Rule 37 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure do not trump the very specific rule concerning annulment and divorce found in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-10(a), which gives the court subject matter jurisdiction over the annulment action.

Rule 37 does not permit striking a party’s answer and entering default as a discovery sanction when that party did not disobey a discovery order.

Baker v. Rosner · filed 2009-06-16Rule 37(b)

There is no record evidence that Nova acted improperly or that Nova violated any discovery orders. We agree with Defendants that the trial court abused its discretion by striking Nova’s answer and entering default against it when it was not a disobedient party.

Rule 37(b)(2) permits a judge to sanction a party for disobeying a discovery order; inability to produce excuses noncompliance only when the party could not take reasonable measures to obtain the material.

Milks v. Mills · filed 2009-08-04(b)(2)

In regard to a failure to obey an order to produce discovery, a judge may make such orders as are just. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 37(b)(2) (2007). ... Failure to produce will be excused only for inability to produce.

Rule 37(d) does not require a finding that the party seeking discovery was prejudiced before a court dismisses a complaint for a discovery violation.

Sabates v. Sabates · filed 2009-08-04Rule 37(d)

Although the trial court could have appropriately considered the issue of prejudice in making a sanctions-related decision and appears to have done so in that part of its order detailing the expense incurred by Defendant in attempting to obtain the provision of discovery, it was not required to find prejudice as a precondition for dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint.

Rule 37 permits a discovery sanction short of dismissal, including precluding a claim for damages.

Stephens v. Hugo's · filed 2009-08-18Rule 37

Having considered all of the sanctions available under Rule 37, the most appropriate sanction is to require Plaintiff's obedience to the orders of the Industrial Commission and preclude Plaintiff from asserting any claim for psychological damages while permitting her to advance her claim for benefits related to her back injury.

Rule 37(b)(2) permits discovery sanctions against any party who disobeys a discovery order, including a propounder in a caveat proceeding.

In Re the Estate of Johnson · filed 2010-07-20(b)(2)

In fact, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 37(b)(2) states that sanctions may be imposed against any party who “fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery[.]” As the Court in Vestal issued Rule 37(b)(2) discovery sanctions against the caveator for “wilfully and blatantly-ignoring] and refusing] to comply” with the trial court’s order, 104 N.C. App. at 740, 411 S.E.2d at 167, the trial court here could also issue discovery sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) for propounder Jefferson’s “continued recalcitrance and repeated disobedience of the Orders of [the] Court.”

Rule 37 permits an order compelling discovery, and a court must consider less severe sanctions before dismissing a complaint for a discovery violation.

Bullock v. Bullock · filed 2010-05-18Rule 37(a)(2), (d)

However, entering an order directing Plaintiff to comply with discovery is a sanction enumerated in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 37(a)(2), and the trial court must consider less severe sanctions before dismissing a complaint.

Rule 37 permits dismissal and default for failure to permit discovery when the trial court considers lesser sanctions; the court need not list and reject each alternative.

Honeycutt Contractors, Inc. v. Otto · filed 2011-01-04Rule 37(b)(2)c

Rule 37(b)(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provides that the trial court may enter “[an] order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default” against any party that fails to permit discovery. ... The above finding was sufficient to show that the trial court considered lesser sanctions before dismissing Honeycutt’s action against defendants and entering default judgment against Honeycutt on defendants’ counterclaim. ... Honeycutt’s argument as to the entry of default is predicated entirely upon its contentions pertaining to the discovery sanctions order of 18 February 2009. For the reasons set forth in Section II of this opinion, this argument is without merit.

Rule 37 permits discovery sanctions for evasive or incomplete responses.

Ross v. Ross · filed 2011-09-20(a)(3)

Even though plaintiff did provide a response to the discovery-requests, under Rule 37, sanctions may be ordered for “evasive or incomplete” responses.

Rule 37 permits a court to exclude an expert witness when inadequate disclosure denies the opposing party a meaningful opportunity to depose the expert.

Williams v. United Community Bank · filed 2012-02-07Rule 37(b)(2)(b)

In light of Plaintiffs’ failure to afford the Andersons a meaningful opportunity to depose Capewell on his opinions of their appraisals, the trial court’s decision to exclude him as an expert witness does not reflect a lack of a reasoned decision.

Rule 37(b) permits sanctions for failure to obey an order compelling discovery; it does not apply to failure to provide medical care under an Industrial Commission award.

Powe v. Centerpoint Human Services · filed 2013-04-02Rule 37(b)(2)(b)

Rule 37(b) only applies when one party fails to obey a court order compelling discovery and, therefore, is not applicable here.

Rule 37(b)(2) does not authorize an attorneys’ fee award against an attorney who is not a party to the suit.

Ge Betz, Inc. v. Conrad · filed 2013-12-03Rule 37(b)(2)

Because the language of Rule 37(b)(2) is intelligible without adding anything further, ... we find that it was error for the court to award GE attorneys’ fees against Almy because he was not a “party” to the suit under the language of the Rule authorizing fees.

Rule 37(b)(2) permits sanctions for violations of protective orders entered under Rule 26(c).

Out of the Box Devs., LLC v. Logicbit Corp. · filed 2014-03-20Rule 37(b)(2)

The court concludes that both Rule 37(b)(2) and the inherent authority of a trial court to manage its docket and compel compliance with its orders permit imposing sanctions for violations of Rule 26(c) protective orders.

Discovery sanctions under Rule 37 are reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Khaja v. Husna · filed 2015-10-06Rule 37

“Our standard of review of an order imposing discovery sanctions under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 37 is abuse of discretion.”

Rule 37(b) permits a trial court to bar a party from offering documents it failed to produce by a discovery deadline.

Burns v. Kingdom Impact Global Ministries, Inc. · filed 2017-02-07Rule 37(b)

We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding Defendant from offering into evidence documents not produced before the aforementioned date.

Rule 37(d) requires a party who misses a deposition to pay the reasonable expenses caused by that failure, including attorney's fees, unless the failure was substantially justified or an award would be unjust.

Li v. Zhou · filed 2017-02-21Rule 37(d)

The trial court based its sanctions on North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 37(d), which provides when a party has failed to attend a deposition, "the court shall require the party failing to act to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 37(d) (2015). ... Consequently, we affirm the trial court's award of attorney's fees and costs to Plaintiff.

Rule 37(b) requires consideration of lesser sanctions before striking a party’s defenses, but does not always require formal findings that the court considered them.

Gea, Inc. v. Luxury Auctions Mktg., Inc. · filed 2018-05-15(b)(2)

A failure to consider lesser sanctions may constitute an abuse of discretion. However, formal findings of fact and conclusions of law stating that the trial court considered lesser sanctions are not required in order to sustain an order’s validity in every instance.

Rule 37(b)(2)b. permits a court to bar a party from raising a defense for disobeying a discovery order after considering lesser sanctions.

O'Buckley v. O'Buckley · filed 2019-03-19Rule 37(b)(2)b.

Where the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to enter an order imposing sanctions and properly considered lesser sanctions pursuant to our Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 37(b)(2) b., we affirm the trial court's entry of such an order.

A court may not impose discovery sanctions under Rule 26(e) without advance notice of that ground when the motion seeks sanctions under Rule 26(g).

Walsh v. Cornerstone Health Care, P.A. · filed 2019-06-04Rule 26(e)

Accordingly, in light of the lack of notice provided, we agree with Defendant that the trial court’s order imposing sanctions for a violation of Rule 26(e) must be vacated and remanded for entry of an order that is consistent with the grounds upon which Plaintiffs moved to strike Defendant’s answer.

Rule 37(d) permits a court to exclude evidence as a sanction for failing to disclose responsive information in discovery.

Miriam Equities, LLC v. Lb-Ubs 2007-C2 Millstream Rd., LLC · filed 2021-11-01Rule 37(d)

Therefore, under the circumstances presented here, the Court finds, in its discretion, that the prohibition of any evidence supporting Plaintiff’s alternative funding plan or, indeed, any funding plan other than a loan from Ameris Bank, is an appropriate sanction under Rule 37(d).

Rule 37(b)(2) allows a court to sanction a party for disobeying a discovery order, including by establishing facts, limiting evidence, striking pleadings, dismissing claims, or entering default judgment.

Dunhill Holdings v. Lindberg · filed 2022-03-01(b)(2)

North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) authorizes “sanctions by [a] court in which action is pending” when a party or certain representatives of a party, inter alia, “fail[] to obey an order to provide or permit discovery.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 37(b)(2) (2021) (capitalization altered).

Rule 37(b) permits sanctions when a party disobeys a discovery order entered after denial of a Rule 26(c) protective-order motion.

Kincheloe v. Kincheloe · filed 2025-11-05(b)(2)

Because the trial court denied Father’s motion for a discovery protective order made under Rule 26(c), ordered Father to respond to Mother’s first request for production of documents within sixty days of its 8 March 2022 Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, and Father “failed and refused” to comply with said order, the trial court was authorized to sanction Father under Rule 37.

Rule 37(d) permits default judgment for a discovery failure without a prior court order.

Haskin v. Lambert · filed 2026-05-06Rule 37(d)

However, under Rule 37(d), a court order is not a prerequisite to default judgment.

Rule 37 supports sanctions for failing to answer interrogatories and comply with orders to answer them.

Estate of Maske v. Lawhon · filed 1999-01-14

It is FURTHER ORDERED that the Deputy Commissioner's imposition of sanctions for defendants' failure to comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1 , Rule 37 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure shall stand and the sanctions are hereby due and payable as of the date of this order.

Rule 37 permits a court to strike a party’s answer and enter default for failure to obey discovery orders after considering less severe sanctions.

Atlantic Veneer Corp. v. Robbins · filed 1999-06-15Rule 37(b)(2)

Moreover, the trial court indicated in its order, as it must, that it considered less severe sanctions. ... The decision of the trial court to strike defendant’s answer and enter default is therefore affirmed.

A party must receive advance notice that Rule 37 sanctions may be imposed and of the grounds for them.

Osi Rest. Partners, LLC v. Oscoda Plastics, Inc. · filed 2019-07-16Rule 37(b)

However, “[n]otice and an opportunity to be heard prior to depriving a person of his property are essential elements of due process of law which is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution,” and these protections apply with equal force to a trial court’s authority to impose sanctions under Rule 37.

Rule 26 permits the Industrial Commission to deny discovery sanctions in its discretion when a party fails to move to compel and request sanctions before submitting its contentions.

Hubbard v. Freeman Center · filed 2010-12-15Rule 26(d), (f)

Having failed to file a motion to compel discovery and request sanctions prior to submitting their contentions in this action, and in the discretion of the undersigned, Defendants' motion for sanctions should be denied. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1 , Rule 26(d) (f); Dobson v. Harris , 134 N.C. App. 573 , 521 S.E.2d 710 (1999).

Rule 41(a)(1)(i) allows a plaintiff to dismiss an action without a court order by filing a notice before resting the case.

Schnitzlein v. Hardee's Food Systems, Inc. · filed 1999-07-06Rule 41(a)(1)(i)

Plaintiff filed a timely voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(l)(i). The trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter subsequent orders in the case. The orders of the trial court are vacated.

Rule 41(a)(1)(i) does not give a plaintiff an absolute right to voluntarily dismiss after the plaintiff has rested its case at a summary judgment hearing.

Allied Spectrum, LLC v. German Auto Ctr., Inc. · filed 2016-11-15Rule 41(a)(1)(i)

We hold that, because plaintiff had rested its case and lost its absolute right to voluntarily dismiss the case, the trial court did not err in entering an order on defendants’ summary judgment motion.

Rule 41(a)(1) does not revive a voluntarily dismissed action when the original complaint failed to state a valid claim against the proper defendant.

Sweet v. Boggs · filed 1999-07-06(a)(1)

In this case, there was no attempt made to amend the complaint; therefore, plaintiffs action never stated a valid claim against the executrix of Mr. Davidson’s estate, and the statute of limitations ran before a proper claim was instituted. As a result, Rule 41(a)(1) cannot be used to revive the action.

Rule 41(a)(1) allows a new action based on the same claim within one year after a voluntary dismissal, but cannot revive an action already barred by the statute of limitations.

Staley v. Lingerfelt · filed 1999-07-20(a)(1)

Rule 41 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure is unique and varies from its federal counterpart by the addition of the following: “If an action commenced within the time prescribed therefor, or any claim therein, is dismissed without prejudice under this subsec tion, a new action based on the same claim may be commenced within one year after such dismissal unless a stipulation filed under (ii) of this subsection shall specify a shorter time.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 41(a)(1) (1990). The effect of this provision is to extend the statute of limitations by one year after a voluntary dismissal.

Rule 41(a)(1) allows a new action within one year after a dismissal without prejudice when it is based on the same claim as the dismissed action.

Renegar v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. · filed 2001-07-17(a)(1)

In short, plaintiff’s state action thus was not “based on the same claims,” G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 41(a)(1), alleged in his federal action.

Rule 41(a)(1) permits a plaintiff to refile within one year after a stipulated voluntary dismissal, even if the original limitations period has expired.

Keyzer v. Amerlink, Ltd. · filed 2004-06-15Rule 41(a)(1)(ii)

Although plaintiff’s second action was filed outside of the period allowed by the statute of limitations, the action was filed within one year of the stipulation of dismissal entered pursuant to Rule 41(a). In such an instance, it is well established that the statute of limitations is tolled by the filing of a Rule 41(a) voluntary dismissal, and the plaintiff is not forbidden from subsequently refiling an action outside the statute of limitations period but within the period proscribed by Rule 41(a).

Rule 41(a)(1) limits the time to refile a claim after voluntary dismissal without prejudice.

Duval v. OM HOSPITALITY, LLC · filed 2007-10-16Rule 41(a)(1)

Time has expired for plaintiff to refile this claim against defendant Days Inn pursuant to North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1).

Rule 41(a)(1)'s one-year period for refiling after voluntary dismissal requires proper service in the original action before dismissal.

Camara v. Gbarbera · filed 2008-07-15Rule 41(a)(1)

However, a plaintiff must obtain proper service prior to dismissal in order to toll the statute of limitations for a year.

Rule 41(a)(1)’s one-year saving provision applies only to claims included in the voluntarily dismissed complaint.

Spoor v. Barth · filed 2018-02-06Rule 41(a)(1)

But Rule 41(a)(1)’s relation-back provision applies only to claims in a subsequent complaint that were included in the voluntarily dismissed complaint.

Rule 41(a)’s one-year refiling period does not toll the statute of limitations when the plaintiff did not serve the original complaint before voluntarily dismissing it.

N.C. Indian Cultural Ctr., Inc. v. Sanders · filed 2019-06-18Rule 41(a)

Therefore, on this Record, Brooks was never served with the 2013 Complaint, and Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal did not toll the statute of limitations.

Rule 41(a)(1) allows a timely filed claim to be refiled within one year of voluntary dismissal, even if that year extends beyond the applicable statute of repose.

Puma Biotechnology, Inc. v. Hedrick Gardner Kincheloe & Garofalo, L.L.P. · filed 2025-09-03(a)(1)

Because the savings provision of Rule 41(a)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure allows a timely-filed claim to be refiled within one year of its voluntary dismissal and this one year time period is not cut short by the four-year statute of repose contained in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-15(c), the trial court erred in granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Refiled Complaint.

Rule 4(j)(6)c requires service by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, addressed to an officer, director, or authorized agent of the corporation.

Fulton v. Mickle · filed 1999-08-17(j)(6)c

Under Rule 4(j)(6)c of the Rules of Civil Procedure, this method of service fails in two respects: First, the process was not sent certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, and second, the process was not addressed to an officer, director, or agent authorized to receive service of process.

Rule 4(j)(6) permits service on a corporation by delivering the summons and complaint to an officer or an authorized agent, even if the recipient’s capacity is not stated.

Bentley v. Watauga Building Supply, Inc. · filed 2001-08-07(j)(6)

We conclude that plaintiff sufficiently complied with the requirements of Rule 4(j)(6) by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to Ms. Koontz.

Rule 4(j)(6) requires a summons to a corporation to designate a person authorized to receive service on its behalf.

Lane v. Winn-Dixie Charlotte, Inc. · filed 2005-03-15Rule 4(j)(6)

A review of the summons demonstrates that plaintiffs failed to designate any person authorized by Rule 4Q)(6) to be served on behalf of the corporate defendant in violation of the clear requirements of the rule. Accordingly, the summons was defective on its face.

Rule 4(j)(6)(a) requires service on a domestic corporation through an officer, director, or managing agent, or by leaving copies at that person’s office with the person apparently in charge.

Woods v. Billy's Automotive · filed 2005-12-06Rule 4(j)(6)(a)

Thus, service on Billy’s Automotive must comply with North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j)(6). Summons was issued to Billy’s Automotive and served by delivering a copy to Mr. Ray on 26 June 2004. However, Mr. Ray is not an officer, director or managing agent of Billy’s Automotive. Thus, under the requirements for service of a domestic corporation under North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j)(6), Mr. Ray cannot accept service on behalf of Billy’s Automotive. We therefore find that Defendant was not properly served.

Rule 4(j)(6) permits service on a corporation by certified mail addressed to an officer, director, or managing agent at an address the corporation has used to receive property documents and other notices, even if it has a registered agent elsewhere.

In re: Garrett · filed 2016-11-15Rule 4(j)(6)

While Household may have had a registered agent in North Carolina that could have been served, that does not mean service was not proper to an officer, director, or managing agent, c/o HSBC Bank USA, to the New York address. ... Given the use of the New York address on the deed and to serve Household on other occasions, service on Household in the HOA Foreclosure was not improper.

Rule 4(j)(6)(c) permits service on a corporation by certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to an officer, director, or agent.

Harris v. Blue Ridge Health Servs., Inc. · filed 2019-06-21Rule 4(j)(6)(c)

The relevant North Carolina statute allows service on a corporation by, among other ways, "mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint, registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to the officer, director or agent to be served." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(6)(c). ... On this record, it appears that Plaintiffs have properly served Blue Ridge.

Rule 4(j)(6) requires a summons to a corporation to identify an officer, director, managing agent, or authorized agent to be served.

Gittens v. TransUnion · filed 2019-11-05Rule 4(j)(6)

Summons issued to a corporation without the identification of an officer, director, or managing or authorized agent is defective on its face.

Rule 4(j)(6) requires process mailed to a corporation to be directed to an officer, director, or managing or authorized agent.

Stewart v. GM Financial · filed 2019-11-07(j)(6)

Additionally, Plaintiff has not shown that she mailed or otherwise directed the summons for GM Financial to an officer, director, or managing or authorized agent as required by North Carolina law.

Rule 4(j)(6) requires service on a corporation to be directed or addressed to a person authorized to receive it; sending process to the corporation alone is insufficient.

Mitchell v. SunTrust Bank · filed 2019-11-22Rule 4(j)(6)

Here, Plaintiff did not properly serve Defendant. The Summons and Complaint were not directed or addressed to any of the above-identified individuals as required by Rule 4(j) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 4(j)(6) requires service on a corporation to be directed to an officer, director, managing agent, or other authorized agent.

WILSON v. PNC BANK, N.A. · filed 2020-03-09Rule 4(j)(6)

Thus, under either federal or state rules, service must be made upon “an officer, director, or managing agent,” or “any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(6). ... Plaintiffs failed to direct service to Brock & Scott’s registered agent, CT Corporation System; that information is publicly available on the Secretary of State’s website. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ service with regard to Brock & Scott is defective on its face.

Rule 4(j)(6)(c) permits service on a corporation by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to an officer, director, or agent.

ULTIMATE HOME PROTECTOR PANS, INC. v. CAMCO MANUFACTURING, INC. · filed 2020-08-24Rule 4(j)(6)(c)

The relevant North Carolina statute allows service on a corporation by, among other ways, “mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint, registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to the officer, director or agent to be served.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(6)(c). Defendants properly served Plaintiff with their counterclaims. ... The court is therefore satisfied that Plaintiff has been properly served.

Rule 4(j)(6)(d) requires certified mail used to serve a corporation to be addressed to an officer, director, managing agent, or authorized agent.

Smith v. Leon · filed 2020-08-25Rule 4(j)(6)(d)

But North Carolina law requires, however, that mail be addressed to certain persons to effect proper service.

Rule 4(j)(6) does not permit service on a corporation by certified mail to counsel who is not authorized to accept service.

Oliver v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2021-02-02Rule 4(j)(6)

Here, Plaintiff sent a copy of the Summons and Complaint directly to counsel for PHH Mortgage via certified mail. ... Defendant PHH Mortgage did not authorize counsel to accept service of the original Complaint and Summons, nor did counsel for PHH Mortgage indicate that the January 16, 2020, Certified Mail receipt indicated proper service. ... Plaintiff has clearly failed to uphold her burden of establishing that service of process was performed in accordance with the rules.

Rule 4(j)(6) requires service on a corporation to be directed to an officer, director, managing agent, or agent authorized to accept service.

JUUL Labs, Inc. v. LBC Ramsey, LLC · filed 2021-04-19Rule 4(j)(6)

Under North Carolina law, corporations may be served in various ways, all of which require service on either an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation, or service on an agent authorized by appointment or law to accept service of process.

Rule 4(j)(6) requires service on a corporation to be directed to an officer, director, managing agent, or agent authorized to accept service.

JUUL Labs, Inc. v. Smoke & Vape 1 LLC · filed 2021-04-19(j)(6)

Under North Carolina law, corporations may be served in various ways, all of which require service on either an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation, or service on an agent authorized by appointment or law to accept service of process.

Section 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(6) permits service on a corporation through specified officers, office personnel, or an authorized agent; a plaintiff relying on a front desk agent must show that the agent was authorized to accept service.

McNish v. Opal Hotels RDU Airport LLC · filed 2021-04-29Rule 4(j)(6)

Under North Carolina law, service on a foreign or domestic corporation may be effected by serving an officer, manager, or director, or leaving copies in the office of the officer, director, or managing agent with the person apparently in charge of the office, or by serving an agent authorized by appointment or by law to accept service of process. ... Not only has plaintiff failed to show that the front desk agent was authorized to accept service of process, but plaintiff's service is nevertheless deficient because she attempted to make service herself.

Rule 4(j)(6) permits service on a corporation through an officer, director, or registered agent, including by registered or certified mail.

WARREN v. PETERY · filed 2021-08-02Rule 4(j)(6)

North Carolina law allows for service on a corporation through an officer, director, or registered agent in the manner established in Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1), in addition to service by registered or certified mail through the officer, director, or registered agent. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(6).

Rule 4(j)(6)(c) requires mailed service on a corporation to be addressed to an officer, director, or agent.

May v. Martin Fein Interest Ltd. · filed 2022-05-19(j)(6)(c)

In this case, service fails under Rule 4(j)(6)(c) because service was not addressed to the officer, director, or agent to be served.

Rule 4(j)(6)(c) requires service on a corporate entity through an officer, director, or agent; a summons not directed to one of them is defective.

Wright v. EClerx, LLC · filed 2023-05-05(j)(6)(c)

Service on a corporate entity requires delivery to either an officer, managing or general agent, or another agent authorized to receive service of process, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(2), or an officer, director, or agent. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, N.C. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(6)(c); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1) (authorizing service on a corporate entity under applicable state rules). Plaintiff's summons directed to defendant eClerx is not directed to an officer, agent, or director. She has further not responded to show why her failure to comply with the rules should be excused. Accordingly, her summons is defective and dismissal of defendant eClerx is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(4) and Rule 12(b)(2).

Certified mail service on a corporation must identify an officer, director, or authorized agent to be served; a summons without that designation is defective.

Gean v. Charlotte Health and Rehabilitation Center · filed 2024-01-18Rule 4(j)(6)(c)

Here, the record shows Plaintiff failed to designate on the return certified mail card any individual to be served on Defendant’s behalf. Summons issued to a corporation without the identification of an officer, director, or managing or authorized agent is defective on its face.

Corporate service by certified mail requires the summons and complaint to be addressed to an officer, director, or agent to be served; a summons that identifies no such person is defective.

Mixon v. Apenbrinck · filed 2024-01-18Rule 4(j)(6)(c)

Summons issued to a corporation without the identification of an officer, director, or managing or authorized agent is defective on its face.

Rule 4(j)(6)(c) requires a summons served on a corporation to be directed to an officer, director, or agent.

Dublin v. UNC Rex Hospital · filed 2024-01-23(j)(6)(c)

Service on a corporate entity requires delivery to either an officer, managing or general agent, or another agent authorized to receive service of process, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(2), or an officer, director, or agent. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, N.C. R. Civ. P. 4G)(6)(c); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1) (authorizing service on a corporate entity under applicable state rules). Plaintiff's summons directed to UNC Rex Healthcare is not directed to an officer, agent, or director.

Rule 4(j)(6) requires process served on a corporation to be directed to an officer, director, or authorized agent; addressing it only to the corporation is insufficient.

JEFFERIES v. UPSTREAM PHARMACY · filed 2024-11-19(j)(6)

Jefferies’s process and service of process were insufficient. The summons was directed solely to the corporate defendants and did not contain any direction to an “officer, director or [managing] agent.”

A corporation served by certified mail must have the summons and complaint addressed to an officer, director, managing agent, or authorized agent.

Lucas v. Volt Workforce Solutions, Inc. · filed 2025-04-11Rule 4(j)(6)(c)

The affidavit does not indicate that the certified mail was addressed to, or delivered to, an officer, director, managing agent, or registered agent of defendant.

Rule 4(j)(6) requires service on a corporation through a person authorized to receive it; service accepted by an unauthorized person is insufficient.

PAYNE v. NATIONAL JEWELRY & PAWN, INC. · filed 2025-07-28Rule 4(j)(6)

In addition, as explained, because Mr. Kim accepted service on behalf of NJP but he was not authorized to do so under North Carolina law, there was insufficient service of process on NJP under Rule 12(b)(5).

Rule 4(j)(6)(c) requires certified mail used to serve a corporation to be addressed to an officer, director, or agent; mail addressed only to the corporation does not effect proper service.

Wray · filed 2026-05-26(j)(6)(c)

Similarly, the image of the envelope Plaintiff mailed to Twitter shows he addressed the envelope to “Twitter, Inc.”—not to an officer, director, or managing agent or an authorized agent for service of process. ... Therefore, proper service has not been made, and the Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over these Defendants.

Rule 4(j)(6) governs service of process on corporations; mailing process by regular mail to an out-of-state agent does not confer personal jurisdiction, even if the corporation receives actual notice.

Thomas & Howard Co. v. Trimark Catastrophe Services, Inc. · filed 2002-06-18(j)(6)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(6) provides the manner upon which service is to be made upon foreign corporations having registered offices and registered agents in the state of North Carolina. While service of process upon a registered agent in Texas may have given defendant actual notice of the lawsuit, it did not confer jurisdiction over defendant.

Rule 60(b)(4) permits relief from a void judgment or order.

Chance v. Henderson · filed 1999-09-07(b)(4)

Defendant appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(4) (1990) (Rule 60). We hold the trial court did not err.

Rule 60(b)(4) permits a judgment to be set aside when the parties’ consent was not subsisting when the judgment was entered.

Tevepaugh v. Tevepaugh · filed 1999-11-02Rule 60(b)(4)

The parties’ failure, however, to acknowledge their continuing consent to the proposed judgment, before the judge who is to sign the consent judgment, subjects the judgment to being set aside on the ground the consent of the parties was not subsisting at the time of its entry. ... N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(4) (1990).

Rule 60(b)(4) permits relief from a judgment that is void, including when the issuing court lacks jurisdiction or authority.

Chandak v. Electronic Interconnect Corp. · filed 2001-06-19(b)(4)

Accordingly, we hold that the district court had jurisdiction over the sanctions motion and that the judgment is not void under Rule 60(b)(4).

Rule 60(b) provides grounds for relief from a consent order; absent such relief, the order must be followed.

Nicholson v. EDWARDS WOOD PRODUCTS · filed 2006-02-07(b)

The order encompassed the bargained-for agreement of the parties and should have been followed in the absence of one of the grounds set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b) (2005).

Rule 60(b)(4) permits relief from a judgment that is void because the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

Macher v. Macher · filed 2008-02-05(b)(4)

A judgment against a defendant is void where the court was without personal jurisdiction.

Rule 60(b)(4) relief from a judgment void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not barred by delay, estoppel, or laches.

Caldon v. Caldon · filed 2008-11-18(b)(4)

Because we base our holding on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we must also reverse Judge Anderson's rulings in the alternative barring Defendant's motion for relief from the 1996 judgment based upon unreasonable delay, quasi-estoppel, judicial estoppel, and laches, as the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any time, and a void judgment may not be revived by the subsequent actions of any party.

Rule 60(b) relief from a foreign judgment is limited by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to specified grounds, including extrinsic fraud, a void judgment, and satisfaction or discharge.

DOCRX, Inc. v. EMI Services of NC, LLC · filed 2013-01-15(b)

We hold that postjudgment relief from foreign judgments under N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b) is limited to the following grounds: “(1) the judgment is based upon extrinsic fraud; (2) the judgment is void; or (3) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.” Craven, 117 P.3d at 14.

Rule 60(b)(4) permits relief from orders that are void because the defendant was never properly served.

The Cnty. of Jackson v. Moor · filed 2014-09-02Rule 60(b)(4)

Accordingly, because Vera was never properly served, all subsequent orders as to her are void.

Rule 60(b)(4) permits relief from a foreclosure order when statutory violations render the order void.

In re: Simmons · filed 2022-10-04(b)(4)

We hold that the trial court erred in denying Plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b) motion because the trustee failed to include proper notice of neutrality and acted as the foreclosure attorney for the noteholder.

Rule 15(a) allows pleadings to be amended after a response only with leave of court, which should be freely given when justice so requires.

PRAXAIR, INC. v. AIRGAS, INC. · filed 1999-10-20(a)

Amendment of pleadings after a response has been served is only by "leave of the court…and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 15(a).

Rule 15(a) permits one amendment without leave before a responsive pleading is served and thereafter requires leave or written consent, with leave freely given when justice so requires.

Brown v. North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles · filed 2002-12-31Rule 15(a)

Pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may amend its pleadings once without leave of the court if amended prior to the time a responsive pleading is served. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 15(a) (2001). Thereafter, “a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.”

Rule 15(a) requires a plaintiff to obtain leave of court or the adverse party’s written consent before amending an answered complaint to assert a claim against a third-party defendant.

Barnes v. Erie Insurance Exchange · filed 2003-03-04Rule 15(a)

Hence, when the defendant or third-party plaintiff has filed an answer to the plaintiffs original complaint, in order for the plaintiff to assert a claim against the third-party defendant, he must amend his complaint by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party.

An oral offer to add facts at a dismissal hearing is insufficient to request leave to amend a complaint.

Hunter v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America · filed 2004-02-03Rule 15(a)

Further, plaintiffs’ oral offer that they “would be willing to amend the petition and get more facts” at the Rule 12(b)(6) hearing is not a sufficient request for leave to amend. Accordingly, under these facts, it was not error for the trial court to deny plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend.

Rule 59 permits an order granting or denying a new trial to be reversed on appeal only in exceptional cases where abuse of discretion is clearly shown.

Marley v. Graper · filed 1999-11-02Rule 59

A “discretionary” order pursuant to [N.C.]G.S. 1A-1, Rule 59 for or against a new trial upon any ground may be reversed on appeal only in those exceptional cases where an abuse of discretion is clearly shown.

A ruling on a motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a)(7) is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Whaley v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc. · filed 2001-06-05Rule 59(a)(7)

Furthermore, in light of such evidence, we cannot say the trial court’s discretionary ruling denying defendant White’s alternative motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(7) on the issue of punitive damages amounted to a miscarriage of justice or an abuse of discretion.

A trial court’s denial of a Rule 59 motion for a new trial cannot be overturned absent an obvious substantial miscarriage of justice.

Hawley v. Cash · filed 2002-12-31(a)(5)-(7)

Absent an obvious “substantial miscarriage of justice,” this Court cannot overturn a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial.

A denial of a Rule 59(a)(7) motion for a new trial alleging an error of law is reviewed de novo.

Young v. Lica · filed 2003-03-04(a)(7)

As plaintiffs alleged errors of law in the trial court's underlying judgment, we review the trial court's denial of the motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a)(7) under a de novo standard. We hold the trial court erred on matters of law.

Rule 59(a) leaves new trial motions to the trial court’s discretion, but a ruling based on an error of law is reviewed de novo.

Cameron v. Canady · filed 2003-04-01Rule 59(a)

A motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a) is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. ... However, where the trial court commits an error of law, we review that decision de novo. ... Because defendant assigned as error the trial court's determination that as a matter of law there was insufficient evidence upon which to submit the issue of contributory negligence to the jury, we review that determination de novo.

A trial court’s discretionary ruling on a Rule 59 motion for a new trial is reversible only when an abuse of discretion is clearly shown.

WRI/Raleigh, L.P. v. Shaikh · filed 2007-05-15Rule 59

[I]t is plain that a trial judge’s discretionary order pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 59 for or against a new trial upon any ground may be reversed on appeal only in those exceptional cases where an abuse of discretion is clearly shown. ... We cannot say that this ruling is an “exceptional case” that rises to the level of a “manifest abuse of discretion” by the trial court.

A trial court’s denial of a new-trial motion based on insufficient evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Dogwood Development and Management Co. v. White Oak Transport Co., Inc. · filed 2008-08-19Rule 59(a)(7)

The standard of review for a trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial based upon insufficiency of the evidence is abuse of discretion.

A ruling on a motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a)(7) receives de novo appellate review.

Boileau v. Seagrave · filed 2008-10-21Rule 59(a)(7)

A trial court's ruling on a motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a)(7) is reviewed by this Court de novo.

Denial of a Rule 59(a)(8) motion for a new trial based on errors of law is reviewed de novo.

Franco v. Liposcience, Inc. · filed 2009-05-19Rule 59(a)(8)

First, we address the denial of Franco, Jr.'s motion for a new trial pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 59(a)(8) (2007), on the ground that the court committed various errors of law. We review denial of a Rule 59(a)(8) motion de novo.