N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1

Rule 43(e) allows a trial court, in its discretion, to hear live oral testimony at a summary judgment hearing.

D.V. Shah Corp. v. VroomBrands, LLC · filed 2023-12-15Rule 43(e)

Turning to the specific rule of civil procedure at issue in this case, Rule 43(e) plainly allows for the introduction of live oral testimony at a summary judgment hearing in the trial court’s discretion: “When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 43(e) (2021) (emphasis added).

Under Rule 3(a), filing a compulsory counterclaim in an answer does not commence a civil action, so the counterclaim relates back to the filing of the complaint for limitations purposes.

Upchurch v. Harp Builders, Inc. · filed 2024-03-22Rule 3(a)

The Rules of Civil Procedure do not treat the filing of compulsory counterclaims as procedurally equivalent to the commencement of civil actions. Consequently, the Rules do not preclude the relation back of such counterclaims.

Rule 14 requires a third-party claim to derive from the plaintiff’s claim; a party cannot be impleaded if the plaintiff cannot maintain a civil suit against that party.

Hernandez v. Hajoca Corp. · filed 2024-04-16Rule 14

Third-Party Defendants can only be hailed into superior court as third-party defendants, by Hajoca and Weymouth, if Plaintiff can maintain a civil suit against them.

Rule 37(a)(4) ordinarily calls for attorneys’ fees when a motion to compel is granted, but permits denial when the opposition was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award unjust.

Hoaglin v. Duke Univ. Health Sys. · filed 2024-05-07Rule 37(a)(4)

Normally when a motion to compel is granted under Rule 37, the trial court should award attorneys’ fees to the moving party. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 37(a)(4) (2023). But a trial court need not award attorneys’ fees if “the court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Id.

Rule 41(b) dismissals for failure to comply with a court order are reviewed for abuse of discretion.

In re: Howell · filed 2024-06-04Rule 41(b)

Because the trial court dismissed Caveators’ case for failure to “comply with . . . an[] order of court,” see N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1A-1, Rule 41(b), we will review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, see In re Pedestrian Walkway Failure, 173 N.C. App. at 247, 618 S.E.2d at 826.

Rule 58 requires an order to be written, signed by the judge, and filed with the clerk before it is entered.

Sapia v. Sapia · filed 2024-06-18Rule 58

“[A]n order is entered when it is reduced to writing, signed by the judge, and filed with the clerk of court.” Abels v. Renfro Corp., 126 N.C. App. 800, 803, 486 S.E.2d 735, 737-38 (1997); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 58 (2023). To the extent Wife’s arguments on appeal rely upon any notations upon “Exhibit A,” we cannot address these arguments because we must confine our review to the filed, signed Order from which Wife appealed.

Rule 58 deems an order entered only when the judge has signed it and it has been filed with the clerk.

In re: Z.G. · filed 2025-07-02Rule 58

It is true that an order is not deemed entered until it is signed by the judge and filed with the clerk. See N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 58 (2023).

Rule 58 requires an order to be written, signed by the judge, and filed with the clerk before it is entered.

In re: J.G., S.G., J.C. · filed 2025-10-15Rule 58

Granted, an order is not “entered” until it is “reduced to writing, signed by the judge, and filed with the clerk of court pursuant to Rule 5.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 58 (2023). So Respondent-Mother is correct that the Guardianship Order was “entered” before Permanency-Planning Order #6. Nevertheless, the timing of entry of the orders is inconsequential.

Rule 58 provides that an order is entered after it has been signed and filed.

Roybal v. Raulli · filed 2026-02-04Rule 58

An order is “entered” under Rule 58 of our North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure after it has been signed and filed.

Rule 6(e) does not extend the deadline to file a petition initiating an administrative contested case.

Bradley Home, Caring for Wake Cmty. & the Carolinas · filed 2024-07-16Rule 6(e)

Because the “timely filing of a petition is necessary to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the agenc[y][,]” Gray, 149 N.C. App. at 378, 560 S.E.2d at 397, Rule 6 is inapplicable to time limitations effective prior to the commencement of the proceeding.

When a termination order is served after entry, Rule 58 tolls the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal until service.

In re: K.B.C., A.G.S.C. · filed 2024-09-17Rule 58

Thus, because the Orders were not served on Respondent-Father for fourteen days after their filing, the thirty- day window for Respondent-Father to file notice of appeal was tolled until the Orders were served.

Rule 45(c) provides a procedure for subpoenaed nonparties to seek court protection when they have a legal basis to object.

Crenshaw v. Crenshaw · filed 2024-10-01Rule 45(c)(3)

This rule sets out the procedure for a non-party who has been subpoenaed to seek protection from the court if they believe there is a legal basis for objection to the subpoena.

Rule 12(b) permits a court to review a document attached to and explicitly incorporated in a complaint without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.

Cato Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. · filed 2024-12-13Rule 12(b)

Such a review is appropriate at the motion to dismiss stage without converting the motion to one for summary judgment, because the policy was attached as an exhibit to Cato’s initial complaint and explicitly incorporated therein.

Rule 12(b)(1) dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are reviewed de novo, and courts may consider matters outside the pleadings.

Fifth Ave. United Methodist Church of Wilmington v. The N.C. Conf. · filed 2024-12-31Rule 12(b)(1)

“We review Rule 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo and may consider matters outside the pleadings.”

An appellate court reviews a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo and treats the complaint’s factual allegations as true.

Sanders v. N.C. Dep't of Transp. · filed 2025-12-12Rule 12(b)(6)

A trial court’s order disposing of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss receives de novo review on appeal.

Rule 41(b) treats a dismissal with prejudice as an adjudication on the merits.

Doe v. Roman Cath. Diocese · filed 2025-01-31Rule 41(b)

This type of dismissal with prejudice “operates as an adjudication upon the merits” under our Rules of Civil Procedure. See N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 41(b) (2023).

Rule 41(b) provides for dismissal with prejudice of claims barred by the statute of limitations.

Ballard v. North Carolina Department of Trans. · filed 1998-06-15Rule 41(b)

Plaintiffs' claims, which are barred by the statute of limitations, must be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1 , Rule 41(b) and further the North Carolina Industrial Commission is without jurisdiction to hear this matter.

Rule 4(j)(5)(a) permits service on a city by delivering or mailing the summons and complaint to its mayor, city manager, or clerk in the prescribed manner.

Atkinson v. Duke Raleigh Hospital · filed 2025-02-24Rule 4(j)(5)(a)

Under North Carolina law, a plaintiff may serve a city by personally delivering or mailing a copy of the summons and complaint, registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to the city’s mayor, city manager, or clerk. See N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(5)(a). ... Plaintiff presents no other evidence that she served defendant Raleigh’s chief executive officer in accordance with Rule 4(j)(2)(A) or that she served Raleigh’s mayor, city manager, or clerk under N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(5)(a).

Rule 63 does not apply to criminal cases and cannot authorize a substitute judge to enter an order in one.

State v. Fearns · filed 2025-03-05Rule 63

Rule 63 of the Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to criminal cases, so the trial court did not have authority to enter the order based on Rule 63.

Rule 50(b) permits a judgment notwithstanding the verdict argument only if the movant timely raised the same specific issue in a motion for directed verdict.

Vanguard Pai Lung, LLC v. Moody · filed 2025-03-21Rule 50(b)(1)

We hold that, to preserve an issue for use in a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 50(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the movant first must timely move for a directed verdict on that same issue. In a case involving multiple claims or defenses, an issue is raised at the directed verdict stage only if the movant expressly articulates that specific argument or theory to the trial court.

Rule 50(b) permits a party to raise an issue in a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict only if the party timely sought a directed verdict on that same issue.

Vanguard Pai Lung, LLC v. Moody · filed 2025-03-21Rule 50(b)(1)

We adopt the reasoning of this line of Court of Appeals cases and hold that to preserve an issue for use in a motion for JNOV under Rule 50(b), the movant first must have timely moved for a direct verdict based on that same issue.

Rules 15(c) and 17(a) do not permit amendment of a complaint filed by a plaintiff who lacked standing, because that complaint is a nullity.

Intrepid Direct Ins. Agency v. Amerex Corp. · filed 2025-04-02Rule 15(c); Rule 17(a)

Because Intrepid Agency lacked standing to bring these claims, the complaint was a nullity; consequently, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the motion to amend under either Rule 15(c) or 17(a), and was therefore required to grant Defendants’ motions to dismiss.

Rule 6(d) permits a trial court to admit a late opposing affidavit when it supplements the record in response to a newly raised argument.

Bilfinger Inc. v. Cargill · filed 2025-04-02Rule 6(d)

Therefore, Defendant has not demonstrated any abuse of discretion by the trial court in admitting and considering the Second Affidavit.

Rule 4(i) allows correction of a party’s name but does not allow an amendment that substitutes a different party.

Russell v. Taylor · filed 2025-06-04Rule 4(i)

By his Rule 60 amended motion, Plaintiff did not seek to merely correct a misnomer or mistake in NSW, Inc.’s name. Instead, Plaintiff’s attempt to amend the Order for Entry of Default Judgment against NSW, Inc. to name Taylor in his individual capacity as the judgment defendant “amounts to a substitution or entire change of parties” and “will not be allowed.” Id. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by granting Plaintiff’s amended Rule 60 motion.

Rule 4(j)(1) permits service on an individual by personal delivery, by leaving process at the person’s dwelling with a suitable resident, or by delivery to an authorized agent.

MINUTELLO v. AT&T SERVICES, INC. · filed 2025-06-20Rule 4(j)(1)

But to properly serve Dewitt, Minutello had to either personally deliver process to him, leave process at his home or “usual abode” with a person of suitable age and discretion, or deliver process to an agent Dewitt had authorized to accept service on his behalf.

Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint, so a court ordinarily should not consider testimony at the dismissal hearing.

White v. Boatwright · filed 2025-07-02(b)(6)

Normally, it is not appropriate to consider testimony at a hearing on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), because a motion to dismiss is based only on the sufficiency of the complaint.

Rule 63 permits the chief district court judge to enter an order after the hearing judge’s term expires when that judge made the findings and conclusions and only ministerial entry remains.

Cunningham v. Bravo 4 Autoworks LLC · filed 2025-07-16

Chief Judge Wiggins’ order was prepared and entered in conformity with Rule 63.

Rule 4(j)(8) requires service on an unincorporated association to be directed to an authorized recipient; addressing process only to the association does not suffice.

VAUGHN v. DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC · filed 2025-07-18Rule 4(j)(8)

It was not addressed to any proper recipient permitted by North Carolina’s rules. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(8).

Rule 56(e) requires a party opposing summary judgment to present evidence beyond the pleadings that establishes a genuine issue of material fact.

Eberhardt v. Meletich · filed 2025-08-06Rule 56(e)

Therefore, to survive a summary judgment motion, the burden is on the party opposing the motion to present some evidence beyond the mere allegations in the pleadings establishing a genuine issue of material fact.

After the movant shows an absence of evidence on an essential element, Rule 56(e) requires the opposing party to forecast evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact.

Wyer v. Alamance Reg'l Med. Ctr. · filed 2026-02-18Rule 56(e)

As a result of this showing, plaintiffs were required to present evidence in the form of affidavits to forecast a genuine issue of material fact with respect to causation. Rorrer, 313 N.C. at 360; N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 56(e) (2013).

Rule 56(e) requires a party opposing a supported summary judgment motion to set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial; allegations in a complaint are insufficient.

Towne v. Cope · filed 1977-04-06Rule 56(e)

In the present case defendant supported his motion for summary judgment by establishing the affirmative defense of qualified privilege. Even though plaintiff, thereafter, had the burden of setting forth specific facts “by affidavits or otherwise” showing a genuine issue exists as to whether defendant made the alleged statements with actual malice, he relied simply on the allegations in his complaint to show malice. Therefore summary judgment was appropriately entered against him.

Rule 12(b)(3) provides a basis for dismissal when a civil action is filed in the improper trial division; filing in that division does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction.

Boone v. Green · filed 2025-08-06Rule 12(b)(3)

Accordingly, even if this action was filed improper division, this did not deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. Furthermore, Rule 12(b)(3) is the applicable basis for the dismissal of cases for improper division. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, R. 12(b)(3) (“Improper venue or division”). A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(3) does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction.

Rule 56(c) does not include unsworn expert reports among the evidence considered on summary judgment.

Cutter v. Vojnovic · filed 2025-08-22Rule 56(c)

The plain language of Rule 56 does not include unsworn “expert witness reports” or “reports” as evidence to be considered on a motion for summary judgment. Therefore, it was proper for the Business Court to disregard the Molony report.

Rule 56(e) requires a party opposing a supported summary judgment motion to present specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.

Johnson v. Scott · filed 2000-04-18Rule 56(e)

Plaintiffs having presented no evidence aliunde their responses to defendant’s interrogatories tendered to the trial court by defendant, the court did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Rule 60(b) does not treat a party’s mistaken belief that counsel is handling a served lawsuit as excusable neglect for setting aside a default judgment.

Builders Mut. Ins. Co. v. EMPWR Solar LLC · filed 2025-10-01Rule 60(b)

We cannot find excusable neglect in ignoring a lawsuit on the mistaken belief that counsel has it handled. ... For the reasons stated herein, we hold the trial court did not err by denying Defendants’ Rule 60(b) motion to vacate the default judgment as Defendants’ failure to respond to the complaint was not excusable neglect.

Rule 60(b)(1) requires a party seeking to set aside a default judgment for excusable neglect to show a meritorious defense as well.

Hickory White Trucks, Inc. v. Greene · filed 1977-10-19Rule 60(b)(1)

G.S. 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(1) replaces former G.S. 1-220, but is still governed by case law developed under G.S. 1-220. ... Case law under former G.S. 1-220 required that a party moving to set aside a judgment on ground of excusable neglect also show that he had a meritorious defense to the plaintiff’s cause of action.

Rule 63 gives a substitute chief district court judge discretion to grant a new hearing instead of signing an unavailable judge’s order; that choice is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

In re: K.S.,T.S. · filed 2025-10-15Rule 63

In considering whether it was proper for the Chief Judge to decline to sign the 2018 Orders on behalf of the disabled judge, we apply an abuse of discretion standard of review. The permissive language of Rule 63 indicates it is the Chief Judge’s prerogative whether he or she, as the substitute judge, will perform the duties of the disabled judge or “choose to grant a new trial or hearing for the parties.” Lange v. Lange, 357 N.C. 645, 648, 588 S.E.2d 877, 879 (2003); see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 63 (providing that “the judge may, in the judge’s discretion, grant a new trial or hearing”) (emphasis added).

Rules 52 and 63 require a new hearing when the original judge retires and a substitute judge would otherwise have to make findings of fact and conclusions of law for a hearing the substitute did not preside over.

Strickland v. McLachlan · filed 2025-11-19Rule 63

Accordingly, Rules 52 and 63 prevent us from remanding without ordering a new hearing.

Rule 8(a)’s general notice pleading standard does not suffice for a Corum claim; the complaint must allege facts supporting the claim.

Simuel v. N.C. Admin. Off. Of The Courts · filed 2025-12-03Rule 8(a)

Plaintiff contends the standard for alleging a proper Corum claim is “notice pleading.” See N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 8(a). Plaintiff is incorrect. ... Therefore, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support a Corum claim, not just state there is a claim.

A Rule 17 guardian ad litem should preserve a represented minor parent’s opportunity to exercise rights within her understanding; the court may allow the parent to invoke her Fifth Amendment right.

In re: A.H-G. · filed 2025-12-17Rule 17(b)(2)

Once appointed, as our General Statutes prescribe for guardianships, the Rule 17 GAL “should seek to preserve for the incompetent person the opportunity to exercise those rights that are within his comprehension and judgment, allowing for the possibility of error to the same degree as is allowed to persons who are not incompetent.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35A-1201(a)(5) (2023). ... Because the trial court did not err by allowing Mother to invoke her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, we affirm the trial court’s adjudication and disposition orders as to Mother.

Rule 4 requires service on a municipality through an authorized official; service through its attorney is insufficient.

Hankins · filed 2026-01-05Rule 4(j)(5)

As explained above, Plaintiff has attempted to serve the three municipal defendants impermissibly through their attorneys rather than executive officers.

Rule 42(b)(3) requires separate liability and damages trials in a tort action seeking more than $150,000 unless the court finds good cause for a single trial.

Moore v. Richmen Enters., LLC · filed 2026-01-07Rule 42(b)(3)

While Rule 42(b)(3) states “the court shall order separate trials,” id., “a motion to bifurcate may be denied ‘for good cause shown.’” Clarke, 243 N.C. App. at 694, 779 S.E.2d at 163 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b)(3)). ... We therefore hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Midwest’s motion to bifurcate.

Rule 4(j)(1) requires service of the actual summons and complaint on a natural person; without that service, the court lacks personal jurisdiction.

Plyler v. Meade · filed 2026-02-04Rule 4(j)(1)

Because Plaintiff never served Defendant with the summons and complaint, the trial court never obtained personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim was properly dismissed under Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(5).

Rule 36(a) treats unanswered requests for admission as admitted.

Advisor Law, LLC v. Holland · filed 2026-02-04Rule 36(a)

By failing to respond to Plaintiff’s requests for admission, Defendant admitted the elements of breach of contract.

Rule 68.1(e) gives a confessed judgment the effect of other judgments but does not make its factual statements binding in a later civil action, except an action on the judgment.

Eastwood Construction Partners, LLC v. Bryant · filed 2026-02-18Rule 68.1(e)

Therefore, factual statements contained within a confession of judgment do not constitute admissions that a defendant is estopped from disputing in a subsequent civil action.

Rule 52(a)(1) does not require a trial court to make a finding on a defense the party did not raise in its pleadings or at trial.

Wheeler v. Wheeler · filed 2026-03-04Rule 52(a)(1)

Thus, because Plaintiff did not raise the alleged Separation Agreement as a defense to Defendant’s equitable distribution claim in his pleadings or his arguments and evidence at trial, the document did not raise an issue of ultimate fact “required to establish [his] defense” about which the trial court was required to make a finding.

Rule 52(a) requires findings of fact in a DVPO entered after trial; an order that merely says “See Complaint” is insufficient.

Cook v. Montgomery · filed 2026-03-04Rule 52(a)

Indeed, the DVPO being appealed does not contain findings, as required by Rule 52(a) of our Rules of Civil Procedure, but merely states “See Complaint.”

Rule 52(a)(2) does not require a trial court to make findings of fact unless requested.

Creech v. City of Raleigh · filed 2026-05-20Rule 52(a)(2)

Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(2), the trial court need not make findings of fact unless requested.

Rule 52 requires findings of fact to reflect the trial court’s own factual determinations; a recitation of witness testimony does not suffice.

In re D.T.H. · filed 2021-09-24Rule 52

As a result, given our inability to determine whether the contents of Finding of Fact No. 9, taken in its entirety, represent a factual determination by the trial court rather than the mere recitation of the maternal grandfather’s testimony, we are compelled to disregard Finding of Fact No. ... 9 in determining whether the trial court’s findings of fact adequately support its determination that respondent-father’s parental rights in David were subject to termination.

Rule 15(b) treats an issue tried by the parties’ implied consent as though it had been raised in the pleadings.

Israel v. Zachary · filed 2026-03-04Rule 15(b)

Thus, pursuant to Rule 15(b), loss of use is, by implied consent, “treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 15(b).

Rule 15(b) treats issues tried by the parties’ implied consent as though they were raised in the pleadings.

Keith v. Health-Pro Home Care Servs., Inc. · filed 2022-06-17Rule 15(b)

Thus, even if evidence addressed issues beyond the scope of the pleadings, we must treat them as if raised in the pleadings pursuant to Rule 15(b) on account of the Keiths’ and Health-Pro’s implied consent.

Rule 52(a)(1) permits a trial court to incorporate a party’s written statement into its findings when the court assesses its credibility and makes the ultimate findings needed to support its conclusions.

Jay v. Jay · filed 2026-03-20Rule 52(a)(1)

Because the record reflects that the trial court considered Mrs. Jay’s written statement in conjunction with her testimony from the DVPO hearing to evaluate the statement’s credibility and meaningfully altered the statement to reflect the trial court’s thinking, the trial court’s findings and its issuance of the DVPO were not improper. We hold that the trial court sufficiently engaged with the factfinding process and did not violate Rule 52.

Rule 56(f) does not require a continuance for discovery when the opposing party offers only speculation and gives little explanation of how further discovery would reveal a genuine issue of material fact.

In re: Alford · filed 2026-04-01Rule 56(f)

Based on Caveators’ conclusory speculation in their verified caveat and their negligible effort in supplementing that material, paired with limited explanation as to how additional discovery would support a genuine issue of a material fact, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying their Rule 56(f) motion.

Rule 15(a) permits denial of leave to amend for undue delay when a party waits over a year and seeks amendment on the day of trial.

EWC Raleigh CV, LLC v. EWC of Cameron Vill., Inc. · filed 2026-04-01Rule 15(a)

We do not discern, however, an abuse of discretion by the trial court in finding Defendants showed undue delay where Plaintiff waited over a year to amend its complaint as to the breach of contract claim, had already moved to amend its complaint for other reasons, and then argued the Second Motion to Amend on the day of trial.

Rule 15(a) gives trial judges broad discretion to grant or deny leave to amend a pleading.

Hudspeth v. Bunzey · filed 1978-02-07Rule 15(a)

It is clear from the facts of the present case that defendants’ amendment is possible only by leave of court. Our courts have consistently held that, in a motion to amend addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, the trial court has broad discretion in permitting or denying amendments.

Rule 8(a) requires a claim for relief to be pleaded; a court cannot adjudicate a claim that no pleading raises.

Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State · filed 2026-04-02Rule 8(a)

If a litigant does not use a pleading to activate the court’s subject matter jurisdiction over a claim, the trial court cannot render a decision as to that claim.

A trial court may deny a motion to compel discovery when the requested materials are irrelevant to the claims.

RestorePro Reconstruction, Inc. v. Simpson · filed 2026-04-15Rule 37

Our review leads us to hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s motion to compel discovery from State Farm since the materials sought are irrelevant to Defendant’s counterclaims.

Rule 26(b)(1) permits a court to limit discovery when the requesting party had ample opportunity to obtain the information earlier.

Lindsey v. Boddie-Noell Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2001-11-20Rule 26(b)(1)

Although the record does not indicate that the evidence sought by plaintiff would have been unreasonably cumulative or unduly burdensome for defendant to produce, the record does indicate that plaintiff had "ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought." Id. ... Presuming, as we must, that plaintiff first requested production of these documents one month prior to trial, and failed to make such a request during the previous twenty months, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to compel.

Rule 4(j1) requires a plaintiff to use reasonably available information to locate and serve a defendant before resorting to service by publication.

Farmer v. Cumberland Cnty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. · filed 2026-04-15Rule 4(j1)

We therefore conclude Plaintiff failed to exercise due diligence prior to attempting service by publication.

Rule 6(e) adds three days when service by mail starts the time to act, but does not extend a deadline measured from entry of an order.

Blackmon v. Blackmon · filed 2026-04-15Rule 6(e)

Here, while the April order was served by mail, it was not the service of that order which triggered the 30-day period for payment.

Rule 6(e)'s three-day extension for service by mail does not apply to the statutory period for commencing a contested case.

Bradley Home v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs. · filed 2026-05-22(e)

In sum, we hold that the provisions of Rule 6(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to the statutory limitation period to commence a contested case.

Rule 8(e)(2) permits hypothetical affirmative defenses before discovery when later evidence could make them relevant.

Cadieu Tree Experts, Inc. v. Wiedner · filed 2026-04-15Rule 8(e)(2)

If discovery reveals a failure by Plaintiffs to mitigate their damages or a third-party who committed the conduct that Wiedner Defendants are accused of, these affirmative defenses become relevant. Wiedner Defendants are correct that this is why Rule 8 explicitly allows hypothetical pleadings, especially at the 12(b)(6) stage prior to discovery.

Rule 6(d)’s hearing-notice provision did not require a continuance when counsel had actual notice weeks before the hearing, despite the notice’s later formal filing.

In re: Z.N.D. · filed 2026-05-06Rule 6(d)

Though the notice of hearing was not formally filed until 11 December 2023, respondent’s counsel acknowledged at the 14 December hearing that the trial court had previously provided the new hearing date when the original motion to continue was heard. ... Given that the trial court provided actual notice of the 14 December 2023 hearing on 31 October 2023, the trial court’s decision to deny the continuance based on respondent’s absence was not arbitrary or unsupported by reason.

Under Rule 15(b), an unpleaded claim for special damages may be resolved when the defendant addressed it at trial and failed to show prejudice from the pleading omission.

Woollens v. Hamad · filed 2026-05-20Rule 15(b)

While Seller objected at trial to this issue, Seller has failed to establish he was prejudiced at trial by Buyers’ failure to specifically plead damages from the increased interest rate and, as the evidence below shows, he was clearly able to present evidence at trial to defend against the issue of future interest rate damages.

An initial pretrial order can bind the parties as stipulations even when no final pretrial order was entered.

Kimball v. Kimball · filed 2026-05-20Rule 16

Although no final pretrial order was entered, an initial pretrial order was entered by the parties, and the trial court did not err by treating the contents of the initial pretrial order as binding stipulations.

Before imposing a Rule 37 sanction that treats a complaint’s allegations as admitted, a court must consider less severe sanctions.

Hogan v. Thayer · filed 2026-05-20Rule 37(b)(2)

Defendants are correct that, before imposing sanctions amounting to the admission of a complaint’s allegations, the court “must consider less severe sanctions.”

Rule 37(b) requires a court to consider lesser discovery sanctions before imposing severe sanctions, but does not require it to impose lesser sanctions first.

Delene v. Kean · filed 2026-05-20Rule 37(b)

Evidently, not only does the record permit us to infer the trial court considered lesser sanctions, but the trial court clearly states that it considered whether lesser sanctions were warranted and concluded otherwise. It was not required to actually impose lesser sanctions.

Rule 6(a) extends a filing deadline to the following Monday when the tenth day falls on a Saturday.

Ahdi v. Ahdi · filed 2026-05-20Rule 6(a)

Because the tenth day fell on a Saturday, the deadline was automatically extended to the following Monday, making the post-trial motion timely.

Rule 52 does not require the judge who presides over a termination of parental rights adjudication hearing to preside over the separate dispositional hearing when no judge is substituted under Rule 63.

In re: N.L.A. · filed 2026-06-03Rule 52(a)(1)

We discern nothing in Rule 52 of the Rules of Civil Procedure nor in the Juvenile Code, which requires the trial judge, who presides over the adjudication hearing, to also preside over the separate and distinct dispositional hearing in the absence of a substitution of judge under Rule 63.

Rule 50(a) requires a directed verdict motion to state specific grounds, except when the grounds are apparent in an uncomplicated, single-issue case; failure to do so also prevents preservation of those grounds for JNOV.

108 Grace, LLC v. Riverbend 1, LLC · filed 2026-06-03Rule 50(a)

The party moving for directed verdict must state specific grounds for directed verdict; the only exception is in “uncomplicated, single-issue cases where the basis for the motion is the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the elements of the claim.”

Rule 54(a) does not treat a dismissal without prejudice as final when the trial court retains jurisdiction and the motion may be refiled.

In re: A.S., III · filed 2026-06-17Rule 54(a)

In sum, because the trial court maintains jurisdiction over this matter and DSS may refile its motion to terminate parental rights, the order dismissing the motion without prejudice is not “final” as contemplated by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 54(a), or § 7B-1001(a)(2).

Rule 63 authorizes a successor superior court judge to perform a retired judge’s duties, including reconsidering and amending an order.

In re Expungement for Kearney · filed 2005-10-18

Therefore, notwithstanding Judge Freeman's absence from the bench due to retirement, Judge Wood erred in denying the motion to reconsider Judge Freeman's expungement order for lack of jurisdiction because he is statutorily authorized to address the motion to reconsider the order for expungement and, in accordance with the dictates of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A-146(a), to amend Judge Freeman's 15 March 1994 order.