N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1

Rule 56(e) requires a party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion to provide specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.

Willis v. City of New Bern · filed 2000-05-02Rule 56(e)

“may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.”

Rule 56(e) requires an adverse party responding to a supported summary judgment motion to set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial, or summary judgment may be entered if appropriate.

Jiggetts v. Lancaster · filed 2000-06-20(e)

Rule 56 of our Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part that [w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.

When a supported summary judgment motion is made, the opposing party must respond with specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial or summary judgment may be entered.

Campbell v. City of High Point · filed 2001-07-03(e)

"When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him."

Rule 56(c) permits summary judgment against the moving party when appropriate.

Trophy Tracks, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Insurance · filed 2009-03-17Rule 56(c)

Rule 56(c) provides that “[sjummary judgment, when appropriate, may be rendered against the moving party.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2007). We remand this case to the trial court with instructions to consider whether, based on our decision, summary judgment should be issued in favor of the insurance companies on the issue of insurance coverage.

Rule 56(c) permits summary judgment for a party who did not move for it when that party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Sullivan v. Pender County · filed 2009-05-05Rule 56(c)

Indeed, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2007), expressly authorizes the trial court to enter summary judgment if “any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (emphasis added).

A challenge to compliance with Rule 3’s summons procedure raises a question of process under Rule 12(b)(4), rather than personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2).

Berger v. Berger · filed 1984-04-03Rule 12(b)(4)

The basis for defendant’s appeal here concerns plaintiffs failure to strictly comply with Rule 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in commencing action by the issuance of a summons. ... After reviewing the facts in the instant case, we conclude that the substance of defendant’s appeal concerns a question of process under Rule 12(b)(4), not a question of jurisdiction, contemplated by appeals brought under Rule 12(b)(2).

Rule 8(a)(2)'s damages statement does not limit the damages recoverable in a medical malpractice action; recovery is governed by the evidence, except in cases of default.

Biggs v. Cumberland County Hospital System, Inc. · filed 1984-07-03(a)(2)

Manifestly, this part of Rule 8(a)(2) was enacted to reduce the believed impact of pre-trial publicity about medical malpractice cases, and for no other purpose. It has no bearing on the damages that a victim of medical negligence is entitled to recover, as the longstanding rule that damages in this state are governed by the evidence presented, rather than the claim made for relief, still abides except in cases of default.

Rule 6 leaves enlargement of time to file responsive pleadings to the trial judge’s discretion.

Miller v. Ruth's of North Carolina, Inc. · filed 1984-07-17Rule 6

Enlargement of time in which to file responsive pleadings is discretionary with the trial judge and we find no abuse of that discretion here. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 6.

Rule 6(b) permits a trial court to extend the time for serving process under Rule 4(c), including after the deadline upon a finding of excusable neglect.

Lemons v. Old Hickory Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc. · filed 1988-05-05Rule 6(b)

Therefore, we hold that pursuant to Rule 6(b) our trial courts may extend the time for service of process under Rule 4(c).

Rule 6(b) permits extensions for excusable neglect but does not authorize extending the 90-day period for issuing an alias or pluries summons after the action is discontinued under Rule 4(e).

Dozier v. Crandall · filed 1992-01-07(b)

While Rule 6 under the Lemons case gives the trial court discretion upon a showing of excusable neglect to permit an act to be done, we find no authority in the rule or in Lemons to overrule the express language of Rule 4(e) as to the effect of failing to have an endorsement or alias or pluries summons issued “within the time specified in Rule 4(d) . . . .”

Rule 6(b) does not permit a retroactive extension to prevent discontinuance when no alias summons or endorsement was obtained within Rule 4’s ninety-day period.

Locklear v. Scotland Memorial Hospital, Inc. · filed 1995-06-06Rule 6(b)

On appeal plaintiffs contend Rule 6(b) allows the trial court to exercise its discretion to retroactively extend the ninety day time period provided in Rule 4(d) for issuance of an alias and pluries summons or for an endorsement upon the original summons to effectuate service on defendant Wayment and to prevent a discontinuance of the action against him. We disagree. ... Because discontinuance of the action against defendant Wayment is mandated under this Court’s decision in Dozier, the trial court properly refused to set aside the order of dismissal.

Rule 6(b) does not authorize extending the statutory deadline to pay the filing fee for an appeal from small claims court.

Riverview Mobile Home Park v. Bradshaw · filed 1995-07-18Rule 6(b)

Accordingly, the magistrate did not have the authority under Rule 6(b) to extend the time for plaintiff to pay the filing fees, and the trial court did not err in so ruling.

Rule 23 permits individual taxpayers to represent corporations, estates, and trusts in a class action when they share a personal interest in challenging the same tax treatment.

Dunn v. State of North Carolina · filed 2006-10-17Rule 23

Accordingly, once the named Plaintiffs established standing to proceed on the individual claims, they were entitled, under Rule 23, to represent not only other individuals, but also non-individual taxpayers, specifically, estates and trusts, and corporations.

Rule 23 assesses predominance by whether individual issues will be the focus of the litigation over common issues.

Blitz v. Xpress Image, Inc. · filed 2006-08-25Rule 23(a)

Rather, the test is whether the individual issues are such that they will predominate over common ones in terms of being the focus of the litigants’ efforts.

Rule 23 leaves class action certification to the trial judge’s discretion; differences in class members’ damages can support denial of certification.

Perry v. Cullipher · filed 1984-08-07Rule 23

In this case, the damages consist largely of mental suffering by those who have had the graves of loved ones desecrated. The damages may vary a great deal among the parties. It is within the discretion of the trial judge as to whether an action should be certified as a class action and we hold the court did not abuse its discretion in this case.

Rule 23 gives trial judges broad discretion to consider factors beyond those it lists when deciding whether to certify a class action.

Maffei v. Alert Cable TV of North Carolina, Inc. · filed 1986-05-06Rule 23

In deciding whether to certify a class, a trial judge has broad discretion and may consider factors not expressly mentioned in N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 23, the class action statute.

Rule 23(a) requires a sufficient community of interest between named and unnamed plaintiffs for class certification.

Crow v. CITICORP ACCEPTANCE CO., INC. · filed 1986-02-18Rule 23(a)

We therefore hold that the trial court did not err in dismissing the class action. There is insufficient “community of interest” between the named plaintiffs and the unnamed plaintiffs to require the trial court to certify the action as a class action.

Rule 23(a) permits a class when named and unnamed members share an issue of law or fact that predominates over individual issues; they need not share a community of interest.

Crow v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., Inc. · filed 1987-04-07Rule 23(a)

Accordingly, we hold that a “class” exists under Rule 23 when the named and unnamed members each have an interest in either the same issue of law or of fact, and that issue predominates over issues affecting only individual class members. It is unnecessary for any member of the class to share a jural relationship or “community of interest” with any other member of the class.

Rule 23(a) permits a court to deny class certification when proposed members are not united in interest and lack a common issue that predominates over individual issues.

Perry v. Union Camp Corp. · filed 1990-08-21Rule 23(a)

Thus, it appears that the proposed class members are not united in interest from the outset and each do not share an interest in the same issue of law or fact which predominates over issues affecting only individual class members. ... We therefore hold that the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, properly refused to certify plaintiff’s action as a class action.

A trial court must make sufficiently specific findings of fact when granting or denying class certification to permit meaningful appellate review.

Nobles v. First Carolina Communications, Inc. · filed 1992-12-01Rule 23

Consequently, we now hold that findings of fact are required by the trial court when rendering a judgment granting or denying class certification in order for the appellate courts to afford meaningful review under the abuse of discretion standard.

Rule 23(a) allows a class when a common claim predominates over issues affecting individual members.

Faulkenbury v. TEACHERS'AND STATE EMP. RETIREMENT SYSTEM · filed 1997-04-11Rule 23(a)

Each of the parties had a claim based on what he or she contends is underpayment of retirement benefits. This claim predominates over issues affecting only individual class members in this case. This establishes a class.

Rule 23 permits a party with standing to sue on behalf of a class, but does not itself grant standing.

Laborers' International Union v. Case Farms, Inc. · filed 1997-08-19Rule 23(a)

This statute does not grant or deny standing to parties. Rather than providing a basis for standing, this statute allows a party who is entitled to sue to bring suit on behalf of itself and other parties in the form of a class action.

Rule 23(c) requires court approval to withdraw class claims, even before class certification, whether withdrawal is attempted by dismissal, amendment, or failure to pursue certification.

Alexander v. Daimlerchrysler Corp. · filed 2002-02-19Rule 23(c)

Accordingly, this Court holds that where a complaint is filed containing class action allegations and claims, those class claims may not be withdrawn, whether by voluntary dismissal, amendment to the complaint or simple failure to pursue class certification without court approval under Rule 23(c).

Rule 23(a) requires proposed class representatives to adequately represent the class; plaintiffs who did not own affected property when a county line was redrawn cannot represent owners who did.

Meadows v. Iredell County · filed 2007-12-18Rule 23(a)

In the case sub judice, plaintiffs did not own property along the Iredell-Rowan county line in 1992. Therefore, they cannot adequately represent the interests of potential class members who did own property along the county line in 1992 when the line was redrawn.

Rule 23 requires a proposed class to be subject to generalized proof that allows common questions to predominate over individual inquiries.

Blitz v. Agean, Inc. · filed 2013-06-04Rule 23

The trial court’s findings support its conclusion that plaintiff failed to provide a theory of generalized proof that allows for common questions to predominate over individual inquiries. Therefore, plaintiff failed to establish the existence of a class.

Rule 23(a) requires common issues of law or fact to predominate over issues affecting individual members for a class to exist.

Beroth Oil Co. v. North Carolina Department of Transportation · filed 2014-04-11Rule 23(a)

Here plaintiffs’ proposed bifurcated trial is unmanageable because the individual factual issues tied to each unique parcel of land far outnumber the common issues amongst all 800 property owners. Despite its premature determination of what takings test applies, the trial court correctly found that common issues of fact or of law would not predominate and therefore, plaintiffs have failed to establish the existence of a class.

Rule 23 permits denial of class certification based on findings about delay, efficiency, and superior methods of adjudication when those findings allow meaningful appellate review.

Elam v. William Douglas Mgmt., Inc. · filed 2015-05-19Rule 23

The trial court concluded a "test case" approach would yield a quicker and more efficient resolution of the issues of law and would be a superior method of adjudication. The findings of fact contained in the trial court's order are sufficient for us to conduct a meaningful review of its discretionary decision to deny class certification.

Rule 23 does not require a court deciding class certification to determine whether the proposed class claims are derivative in nature.

Fisher v. Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corp. · filed 2016-12-21(a)

In addition, neither Rule 23 nor this Court’s precedents require a court evaluating a motion for class certification to consider whether any claims raised by a putative class action are derivative in nature.

Rule 23 permits a court to certify a settlement class when its class action requirements are met.

Moss v. Towell · filed 2018-03-06Rule 23

Having thoroughly considered the matters of record, the Court finds and concludes that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met and that it should, in its discretion, certify a settlement class (“Settlement Class”).

Rule 23’s class certification requirements still apply when a named plaintiff’s claim relates back for mootness purposes.

Chambers v. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. · filed 2020-06-05(a)

To be sure, even applying the relation back doctrine, obtaining class certification still requires Chambers to meet the stringent requirements of Rule 23 of the North Carolina Rules ... of Civil Procedure.

Rule 23(a) leaves the trial court discretion to decide whether a class action is superior once the certification requirements are met.

McMillan v. Blue Ridge Cos., Inc. · filed 2021-12-17(a)

Once a party seeking class certification meets these requirements, “it is left to the trial court’s discretion whether a class action is superior to other available methods for the adjudication of the controversy.” Id. (cleaned up).

Rule 23(a) requires a proposed class to share a predominating issue that can be resolved for its members in one stroke.

Dewalt v. Hooks · filed 2022-11-04Rule 23(a)

A common issue predominates when plaintiffs demonstrate that the potential class members’ claims share a common issue capable of resolution “in one stroke.”

Rule 23(a) permits denial of class certification when the proposed class lacks a common predominating issue.

Dewalt v. Hooks · filed 2022-11-04(a)

However, because we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining there is no common predominating issue, we limit our review to that basis.

A class certification order must analyze the same class it certifies; a mismatch requires vacatur and remand.

Surgeon v. TKO Shelby, LLC · filed 2024-03-22Rule 23(a)

The mismatch between the class the trial court analyzed and the one it ultimately certified requires us to vacate the order and remand the matter for further proceedings.

Rule 23 permits certification of a class of fee payors despite differences in whether they later passed the fees on, when the asserted right to repayment turns on payment.

Wardson Constr., Inc. v. City of Raleigh · filed 2026-03-20(a)

Because entitlement under section 160D-106 turns on payment rather than ultimate economic burden, the alleged passing on of fees does not defeat certification under Rule 23.

Rule 23(a) places the burden on the party seeking class certification to show that the requirements for a class action are met.

Beroth Oil Co. v. North Carolina Department of Transportation · filed 2012-05-15Rule 23(a)

“The party seeking to bring a class action under Rule 23(a) has the burden of showing that the prerequisites to utilizing the class action procedure are present.”

A court may dismiss an action for violating Rule 8(a)(2) only when it determines that less drastic sanctions will not suffice.

Harris v. Maready · filed 1984-08-28Rule 8(a)(2)

Although an action may be dismissed under Rule 41(b) for a plaintiff's failure to comply with Rule 8(a)(2), this extreme sanction is to be applied only when the trial court determines that less drastic sanctions will not suffice.

A violation of Rule 8(a)(2)’s restriction on stating a damages amount does not warrant dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(b) when the violation is not egregious.

Stokes v. Wilson and Redding Law Firm · filed 1984-12-28Rule 8(a)(2); Rule 41(b)

Considering the fact that the Rule 8(a)(2) violation in this case was not as egregious even as the violation in Harris v. Maready, and considering further how distinguishable Schell v. Coleman is from this case, we hold that the Rule 41(b) dismissal with prejudice on the basis of a Rule 8(a)(2) violation was unwarranted, unjustified, and reversible error.

A Rule 8(a)(2) violation may be sanctioned by dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(b), but the court should use that sanction only when less drastic sanctions will not suffice.

Miller v. Ferree · filed 1987-01-20Rule 8(a)(2)

It is clear that a dismissal with prejudice, pursuant to Rule 41(b), is an available sanction for a plaintiffs violation of Rule 8(a)(2). ... It is not, however, the only available sanction and should be applied “only when the trial court determines that less drastic sanctions will not suffice.”

Rule 8(a)(2) requires claims for more than $10,000 in punitive damages to state only that the damages exceed $10,000 and permits sanctions for violating that requirement.

McLean v. Mechanic · filed 1994-09-06(a)(2)

One of the permissible sanctions for violating N.C.R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) is dismissal pursuant to N.C.R. Civ. P. 41(b). ... Although a dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) is available as a sanction for a violation of Rule 8(a)(2), it is not the only available sanction and should be imposed only where the trial court determines that less drastic sanctions are insufficient. ... In the present case, the trial court had the authority to dismiss the entire case, not just the award of punitive damages. As a result, we conclude the trial court did not err in striking the punitive damages award in the slander case as a sanction.

Rule 11(a) improper-purpose sanctions require objective evidence, viewed under the totality of the circumstances, supporting a strong inference that the filing’s principal purpose was improper.

COVENTRY WOODS NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION INC. v. City of Charlotte · filed 2011-07-05(a)

Therefore, based on the evidence in the record, when viewed objectively under the totality of the circumstances of the present case, we find appellants’ continued prosecution of its actions and the language concerning project delay in CWNA’s newsletter insufficient to create a strong inference that appellants’ principal purpose in filing their three actions was to harass Independence or to cause unnecessary delay and disruption to the Independence Woods development.

Rule 11 places the burden on the party seeking sanctions to prove that a motion was filed for an improper purpose.

Jonna v. Yaramada · filed 2020-08-18(a)

Defendant-Mother had the burden of proving that the motions were filed for an improper purpose in violation of Rule 11, which she failed to satisfy.

Under Rules 3 and 4, delayed service of a complaint is not a link in the chain of summonses, and serving a summons with a timely filed complaint after an extension order does not require serving the order again.

Childress v. Forsyth County Hospital Authority, Inc. · filed 1984-09-04Rule 3; Rule 4(d), (e)

To recapitulate, we hold: (1) that the “Delayed Service of Complaint” did not constitute a necessary link in the chain of summonses and that plaintiff properly kept his action alive; and (2) that the simultaneous service of the summons and the timely-filed complaint without an accompanying copy of the order extending time does not constitute grounds for dismissal.

Rules 3 and 4 do not require a specific time for serving the complaint in a civil action.

Lusk v. Crawford Paint Co. · filed 1992-05-19

Rules 3 and 4 do not contain a stated requirement as to the time within which a complaint must be served.

Rule 41 permits a defendant to take a voluntary dismissal only when the defendant’s pleading contains a counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim.

Department of Transportation v. Combs · filed 1984-11-20Rule 41(c)

Our research has failed to disclose any rule, statute, or case which grants a defendant the right to take a voluntary dismissal, whether with or without prejudice, unless the party-defendant taking the dismissal has a pleading which contains a “counterclaim, crossclaim, or third party claim.”

Rule 41(a)(1) permits a defendant’s consent to a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissals to be shown by the defendant’s failure to object.

Rhue v. Pace · filed 2004-07-20Rule 41(a)(1)

Therefore, we hold that where, as here, a defendant does not take exception to three voluntary dismissals filed by a plaintiff, the defendant has consented to the voluntary dismissal and the claims are thereby voluntarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(h).

Under Rule 53(g)(2), a referee’s factual findings are conclusive when no exceptions are filed, and the case is determined on those findings.

State Ex Rel. Gilchrist v. Cogdill · filed 1985-04-02Rule 53(g)(2)

Moreover, defendant did not object to the report and note exceptions as provided in G.S. 1A-1, Rule 53(g)(2). In the absence of exceptions to the factual findings of the referee, the findings are conclusive, and where no exceptions are filed the case is to be determined upon the referee’s findings.

Rule 12(e) permits a more definite statement when a complaint is too vague to assess its timeliness and sufficiency.

Smith v. City of Charlotte · filed 1986-03-04Rule 12(e)

We do not believe, however, that total dismissal of the complaint was the proper remedy. Defendant made a motion for a more definite statement. G.S. 1A-1, R. Civ. P. 12(e). Rather than dismissing the complaint altogether, the court should have required plaintiffs to come forward and plead the facts they possessed.

Rule 12(e) permits a party to seek a more definite statement before filing a responsive pleading; filing one without making the motion waives that request.

Westover Products, Inc. v. Gateway Roofing Co., Inc. · filed 1989-06-06Rule 12(e)

Rule 12(e) is a way a party may move for a more definite statement of the claim before interposing his responsive pleading. ... If a party pleads responsively without moving for a more definite statement, he waives his right to do so.

Rule 12(a)(1)(b)'s deadline for responding to a more definite statement controls over Rule 15(a)'s general deadline for amended pleadings.

Broughton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc. · filed 2003-11-04Rule 12(a)(1)(b)

Accordingly, we conclude that the specific requirements of Rule 12(a)(1)(b) control where in conflict with the general requirements of Rule 15(a).

Rule 12(e) permits a more definite statement when a pleading is too vague for the opposing party to frame a response, even if the pleading is sufficient to avoid dismissal.

Clue Prop. Dev., LLC v. Switzenbaum & Assocs., Inc. · filed 2022-10-14Rule 12(e)

In ruling on a motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e), the Court considers whether “a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading[.]” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 12(e). ... While the failure to do so was not sufficient to warrant dismissal of the Amended Complaint, it is sufficient to establish the need for a more definite statement because Defendants are unable to sufficiently respond to the allegations in the Complaint regarding damages to “Clue”.

Rule 12(e) permits a court to treat a motion to dismiss as a request for a more definite statement when the complaint lacks factual specificity, even if the defendant did not formally seek that relief.

Britcher v. Assurance Grp., LLC · filed 2025-11-04Rule 12(e)

Here, as in Baker, although TAG has not formally moved for relief under Rule 12(e), the Court—in the exercise of its discretion—believes that the interests of justice, efficiency, and judicial economy would be furthered by treating TAG’s Motion to Dismiss as a request for a more definite and factually specific statement of Plaintiffs’ claims under Rule 12(e).

Rule 8(b) permits a general denial to be treated as admitting facts that the defendant does not specifically dispute.

Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Bondurant · filed 1986-06-17Rule 8(b)

Likewise, defense counsel in this case did not by general denial raise any specific objection to the record of case 79CVD 2110 or to the case history alleged in the amendment. We therefore deem it abundantly clear that defendants admitted that the record so pleaded and filed was what it purported to be.

Rule 24(b)(2) leaves permissive intervention to the trial court’s discretion, and its decision stands absent an abuse of discretion.

Matter of Baby Boy Scearce · filed 1986-07-01Rule 24(b)(2)

It is in the court’s discretion whether to allow permissive intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b)(2); and, absent a showing of abuse, the court’s decision will not be overturned.

Rule 24(b)(2) permits intervention when the applicant's claim or defense shares a question of law or fact with the main action.

Bruggeman v. Meditrust Co., LLC · filed 2004-08-17Rule 24(b)(2)

Permissive intervention, on the other hand, only requires that "an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 24(b)(2) (2003).

In contested cases, Rule 24 governs the manner of filing a motion to intervene, but its substantive requirements do not govern intervention under § 150B-23(d).

Holly Ridge Associates, LLC v. North Carolina Department of Environment & Natural Resources · filed 2006-03-21Rule 24

Although the first sentence mentions Rule 24, it states only that parties must file "in the manner" of Rule 24, which plainly refers to procedural, not substantive, requirements.

Rule 24(b)(2) allows permissive intervention when the proposed claim or defense shares a question of law or fact with the pending action; standing is a separate issue.

Koenig v. Town of Kure Beach · filed 2006-07-18Rule 24(b)(2)

Therefore, the order allowing intervenors to intervene permissively constituted a determination only that they had a common question of law or fact that was being litigated between plaintiff and defendant.

Rule 24 permits intervention when the applicant’s claim or defense shares a question of law or fact with the main action.

Saunders v. ADP TotalSource Fi Xi, Inc. · filed 2016-09-06Rule 24(b)(2)

Rule 24 allows for permissive intervention when “an applicant’s claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 24(b)(2). For the reasons stated above, and as a proper party before the Commission, the trial court appropriately recognized Defendants’ interests in the purported action pending before it, and correctly allowed Defendants to intervene.

Rule 24(b)(2) permits a court to deny permissive intervention when the proposed intervener’s claims raise collateral issues.

Chambers v. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. · filed 2017-03-13Rule 24(b)(2)

These claims raise collateral issues not necessary to any declaratory judgment claim on behalf of a putative class and have all been previously dismissed from this action. For these reasons, the Court, in its discretion, denies Hayes’s Motion to Intervene under Rule 24(b)(2).

Rule 13(g) does not authorize a tort crossclaim against the State in superior court; the exception for third-party claims does not extend to crossclaims.

Selective Insurance Co. of the Southeast v. NCNB National Bank of North Carolina · filed 1988-10-18Rule 13(g)

The distinguishing feature between this case and Teachy is that in this case there is no express provision that allows tort-based crossclaims against the State to be heard in state court.

Rule 13(g) permits a codefendant to assert a crossclaim against the State for contribution and indemnification when the State is already a party.

Selective Insurance v. NCNB National Bank · filed 1989-06-27Rule 13(g)

We hold that the State may be held liable as a coparty under Rule 13(g) for purposes of contribution and indemnification to the same extent that the State may be held liable as a third-party defendant under Rule 14(c).

Rule 55(f) requires a claimant seeking default against the State to establish the claim by evidence and requires findings on that showing, but does not require a full evidentiary hearing.

Parker v. State Department of Transportation · filed 1996-04-16(f)

Accordingly, we hold that the Commission is not required by Rule 55(f) to conduct a full evidentiary hearing prior to entering default against the State. ... In turn, the fact finder must make findings of fact as to the claimant’s evidentiary showing.

The Rule 11 amendment permitting attorney’s fees applies to pleadings, motions, or papers filed on or after 1 January 1987; later legal work on an earlier claim does not make the amendment applicable.

Clark v. Williamson · filed 1988-11-01Rule 11

The amendment of Rule 11 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure was expressly made effective 1 January 1987 and is “applicable to pleadings, motions, or papers filed on or after that date.” ... While some of the time for which respondent’s attorney was to be reimbursed elapsed after the effective date of the amendment, the order directing payment of counsel fees was based on the claim that was filed before the effective date. Therefore, the trial judge erred in citing Rule 11 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure as a basis for his order.

Rule 11 does not authorize sanctions for a good-faith complaint that raises a justiciable issue.

Harris v. Harris · filed 1989-02-21Rule 11

In the present case it is clear that plaintiff’s complaint contained allegations which raised the existence of a justiciable issue as to her entitlement to the $15,000 she sought from defendant. Therefore, plaintiff’s complaint was not frivolous, was filed in good faith, and did not violate either G.S. § 6-21.5 or Rule 11.

Rule 11(a) requires sanctions when a party violates its restrictions on litigation conduct.

Turner v. Duke University · filed 1989-07-26Rule 11(a)

In short, our reading of the record in this case convinces us that several violations of Rule 11(a) occurred here. Since the sanctions clause of Rule 11(a) is mandatory, the trial court should have imposed sanctions on Duke and/or Duke’s counsel.

Rule 11(a) permits sanctions when repeated inflated allegations in a complaint remain uncorrected despite an opportunity to amend.

Shook v. Shook · filed 1989-09-19(a)

Under this new objective standard, we believe the consistent use of inflated figures in plaintiff’s complaint, after the opportunity to amend, was sufficient evidence for the trial court to support its findings of fact, make its conclusions of law and impose Rule 11 sanctions.

Rule 11(a) does not permit reducing an attorney’s fee sanction based on a factor unrelated to the reasonable expenses caused by the filing.

Central Carolina Nissan, Inc. v. Sturgis · filed 1990-05-01Rule 11(a)

Because we believe that the factor supporting the trial court’s decision to reduce sanctions was wholly unrelated to determining the “reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading,” as stated in Rule 11(a),'we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in basing its reduction on that factor.

Decisions on mandatory Rule 11 sanctions are reviewed de novo on appeal.

Lowry v. Lowry · filed 1990-07-03Rule 11

The trial court’s decision to impose or not to impose mandatory sanctions under Rule 11 is subject to de novo review.

A trial court must make findings of fact supporting its conclusion that Rule 11 sanctions are inappropriate.

McKinney v. Avery Journal, Inc. · filed 1990-07-17Rule 11

As to defendants’ cross-assignment of error that sanctions should have been imposed pursuant to G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 11, we remand this case to the trial court for findings of fact to support its conclusion of law that sanctions are inappropriate.

Rule 11 sanctions are unwarranted when the asserted defenses fall within the bounds of reasonableness.

First American Bank of Virginia v. Carley Capital Group · filed 1990-08-07Rule 11(a)

We cannot say that these defenses were so outside the bounds of reasonableness as to warrant sanctions under Rule 11.

Rule 11 is not violated merely because a party seeks custody after initially seeking visitation.

Kerns v. Southern · filed 1990-11-20Rule 11

There is no indication at trial that the grandparents in fact did not wish to obtain custody of the children or that their claim was made in bad faith. The fact that the grandparents had originally asked for visitation does not make their later claim for custody violative of Rule 11.

Rules 11 and 26 permit a court to strike an improperly noticed deposition, prohibit its later use, and grant a new trial as sanctions when those measures are within its discretion.

Turner v. Duke University · filed 1991-01-15Rule 11(a); Rule 26(g)

We therefore conclude that the sanctioning court’s order striking the notice of deposition and prohibiting its further use and the order of the new trial were authorized sanctions under Rules 11 and 26 and there is no evidence of an abuse of discretion.

Rule 11 may require sanctions if an attorney fails to dismiss a case after irrefutable evidence shows it is meritless.

Tittle v. Case · filed 1991-01-15Rule 11(a)

In some circumstances, then, the failure to dismiss a case when irrefutable evidence has come to an attorney’s attention that the case is meritless may require sanctions pursuant to Rule 11.

Rule 11(a) permits sanctions against counsel for signing a motion unwarranted by existing law without a good faith argument to change it.

Oglesby v. SE Nichols, Inc. by Noecker · filed 1991-02-19Rule 11(a)

The trial court found as a fact that there was no showing or good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law. Additional findings clearly show the motion was unwarranted and a violation of Rule 11(a). These findings support the trial court’s conclusions of law requiring plaintiff’s counsel to pay expenses incurred by defendant’s attorney in responding to this motion.

Rule 11 treats a nonlawyer litigant’s reliance on counsel as relevant, but not conclusive, when deciding whether the litigant made a reasonable inquiry into the law.

Bryson v. Sullivan · filed 1991-03-05Rule 11

Réliance on counsel by non-lawyers as to issues of law, is relevant, but not conclusive evidence on the issue of “reasonable inquiry.”

Under Rule 11, a facially plausible pleading does not warrant sanctions for lacking support in existing law.

DePasquale v. O'RAHILLY · filed 1991-03-19Rule 11

Our review of the complaint in conjunction with the answer, counterclaim, and reply reveals a complaint presenting facially plausible claims. Therefore, no inquiry into the attorneys’ conduct is required, and the defendant is not entitled to sanctions under Rule 11.

Rule 11 sanctions for filing a complaint for an improper purpose require the complaint to fail the legal or factual certification requirement.

Higgins v. Patton · filed 1991-03-19Rule 11(a)

Therefore, to impose sanctions against a party for filing a complaint for an improper purpose, the complaint must fail either the Rule 11 legal or factual certification requirements.

Rule 11(a) requires signed court papers to be factually grounded, legally warranted or supported by a good faith argument, and filed without an improper purpose; violations can result in sanctions.

Bryson v. Sullivan · filed 1992-01-27(a)

We therefore hold that in determining whether a pleading was warranted by existing law at the time it was signed the court must look at the face of the pleading and must not read it in conjunction with responsive pleadings, as the Court of Appeals erroneously held in this case and in other Rule 11 opinions.

Rule 11 imposes a continuing duty against pursuing litigation for an improper purpose and permits sanctions for violations.

Taylor v. Taylor Products Inc. · filed 1992-03-17Rule 11

Furthermore, in North Carolina, the duty imposed by the improper purpose prong of Rule 11 is a continuing one.

Rule 11 requires pleadings to be factually and legally supported and prohibits filing them for an improper purpose.

Parsons v. JEFFERSON-PILOT CORPORATION · filed 1992-06-02

A pleading violates Rule 11 if (1) it is not well grounded in fact, (2) it is not warranted by existing law or by “a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,” or (3) it is interposed for an improper purpose.

Rule 11 requires appropriate sanctions for signing a motion that is not well grounded in fact or law or is filed for an improper purpose.

Harwell v. Harwell · filed 1992-06-02Rule 11

G.S. 1A-1, Rule 11. This Court does not have authority to impose sanctions pursuant to this rule. Likewise, as Judge Harbinson actually granted the motion filed by defendant, we believe that it would not be proper for her to hear or decide any motion which may be made pursuant to Rule 11 following the remand of this cause.

Rule 11(a) requires a signer to certify that a pleading is factually supported, filed for a proper purpose, and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for changing it.

MacK v. Moore · filed 1992-07-21Rule 11(a)

Under Rule 11, in addition to certifying that the pleading or paper is well grounded in fact and “not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation,” the signer also certifies that the pleading or paper is “warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 11(a) (1990).

Rule 11(a) judges a pleading’s factual and legal sufficiency at the time it is signed under an objective reasonable inquiry standard.

Jerry Bayne, Inc. v. Skyland Industries, Inc. · filed 1992-12-15Rule 11(a)

At this early stage in the pleadings, Skyland was not required to undertake discovery to determine the merit of the owners’ claim and objections. We find that defendant’s actions comply with an objective standard of reasonable inquiry such that its answer satisfied the factual and legal sufficiency prongs of Rule 11 at the time it was signed.

Rule 11 sanctions are inappropriate when the evidence presents a valid factual dispute, even if the jury ultimately rejects the claim.

Keller v. Cochran · filed 1993-02-02Rule 11

While the jury found the construction of the retaining wall to be a reasonable approach to maintaining use of the right-of-way, the existence of other less obtrusive options established that a valid issue of fact existed and that the plaintiff was not in violation of Rule 11 when he pursued this case.

Rule 11(a) does not warrant sanctions when an attorney makes a reasonable inquiry into the factual basis for a complaint.

Pugh v. Pugh · filed 1993-07-20Rule 11(a)

We hold, based on the foregoing discussion, that Attorney Brown made a “reasonable inquiry” into the factual bases for the allegations contained in the Complaint and that, therefore, the sanctions imposed against him were not warranted.

Rule 11 sanctions do not apply to discovery responses; sanctions for those responses must be sought under the rule governing discovery.

Brooks v. Giesey · filed 1993-07-30Rule 11(a)

Therefore these discovery responses were not properly the subject of sanctions under Rule 11.

Rule 11(a) requires a party signing a pleading or motion to have read it and certify that it is factually and legally supported after reasonable inquiry.

Williams v. Liggett · filed 1994-03-01(a)

We are unable to review this assignment of error, because the trial court failed to make any findings of fact or conclusions of law in its 1 October 1992 order denying the motion for sanctions. We must therefore remand for entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the court’s decision to deny Rule 11 sanctions.

Rule 11(a) requires the signer to certify that a pleading is factually grounded, warranted by existing law, and not filed for an improper purpose.

Brown v. Brown · filed 1993-11-16(a)

Pursuant to Rule 11, the signer makes three certifications. ... In particular, the evidence supports a finding that Mr. Brown’s complaint failed the legal and factual certification demanded by Rule 11.

Rule 11(a) requires factual sufficiency, legal sufficiency, and proper purpose, and violating any one requirement mandates sanctions.

Dodd v. Steele · filed 1994-05-03(a)

There are three parts to a Rule 11 analysis: (1) factual sufficiency, (2) legal sufficiency, and (3) improper purpose. ... A violation of any one of these requirements mandates the imposition of sanctions under Rule 11.

Rule 11(a) requires an attorney’s signature to certify, after reasonable inquiry, that a pleading is factually and legally grounded and not filed for an improper purpose.

Logan v. Logan · filed 1994-09-06(a)

The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. ... Having reviewed Judge Cilley’s order, we find the conclusions of law support the judgment and the conclusions of law are supported by the findings of fact. However, we are unable to determine whether the findings of fact are supported by sufficient evidence because the judge failed to identify the motions and pleadings which were misleading or incorrect. ... The order imposing Rule 11 sanctions is reversed, and the cause is remanded for reconsideration, wherein the trial court is to make detailed findings of fact on plaintiff’s motion for sanctions.

An attorney’s Rule 11 signature certifies a complaint’s factual and legal basis after reasonable inquiry, but does not itself establish a genuine issue of material fact about whether the claim would have succeeded.

Byrd v. Arrowood · filed 1995-04-04Rule 11

The signature of an attorney under Rule 11 simply certifies upon reasonable inquiry that the complaint is well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law. § 1A-1, Rule 11. This signature does not demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact, in light of evidence gathered after the complaint is filed, as to whether a plaintiff would actually have prevailed on the underlying claim.

Rule 11 uses an objective standard to determine improper purpose, and the party seeking sanctions bears the burden of proving it.

McClerin v. R-M Industries, Inc. · filed 1995-05-02Rule 11

In determining whether a paper has been interposed for an improper purpose, an objective standard is used. The burden is on the movant to prove such improper purpose.

The Rules of Civil Procedure apply to a civil proceeding against the State when it has consented to suit, and the superior court has jurisdiction to decide whether Rule 11 sanctions are warranted.

Able Outdoor, Inc. v. Harrelson · filed 1995-07-28Rule 11

This is a proceeding of a civil nature. The State has consented to be sued by N.C.G.S. § 136-134.1. The Rules of Civil Procedure apply to this case. There is no reason why Rule 11 should be excluded from the rules to be applied. Again, we need not determine whether the action of Judge Cashwell was erroneous in basing his order on a violation of Rule 11. He had jurisdiction to interpret the rule, and the State did not appeal from the order.

Rule 11(a) permits sanctions for an improper purpose when the attorney’s objective behavior supports a strong inference of that purpose.

Bass v. Sides · filed 1995-10-17Rule 11(a)

There must be a strong inference of improper purpose to support imposition of sanctions.

The denial of summary judgment does not automatically bar Rule 11 sanctions.

Pleasant Valley Promenade v. Lechmere, Inc. · filed 1995-11-07Rule 11

After careful consideration of this question, we conclude the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not an automatic bar to imposition of Rule 11 sanctions.

Rule 11 sanctions require findings and conclusions explaining the violation and the appropriateness and amount of the sanction.

Davis v. Wrenn · filed 1995-12-19Rule 11(a)

Although the order recites that “[s]auctions are imposed against plaintiff for violation of the legal provision and improper purpose provision” of Rule 11, it contains no findings or conclusions explaining how plaintiff’s conduct violated these provisions. Moreover, there is nothing in the order to explain the appropriateness of the sanction imposed ($6,692 in attorney’s fees) or to indicate how the court arrived at that figure. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s imposition of sanctions against plaintiff and remand for additional findings consistent with this opinion.

Rule 11(a) sanctions are proper when a complaint disregards settled law and offers no good faith argument to change it.

Sharp v. Miller · filed 1996-02-20Rule 11(a)

Plaintiff’s brief in opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss ignores this well-established precedent regarding witness immunity and fails to argue for a reversal or modification of this existing and well-established law. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly imposed Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff.

Rule 11(a) sanctions are inappropriate under the factual certification requirement when the filer made a reasonable inquiry into the facts supporting the pleading.

Brown v. Hurley · filed 1996-11-05Rule 11(a)

We conclude that the evidence in this case supports the trial court’s ruling that sanctions were not appropriate under this prong of Rule 11 because plaintiff made a reasonable inquiry into the facts.

A court may consider a Rule 11(a) motion for attorney’s fees after the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action under Rule 41(a).

VSD Communications, Inc. v. Lone Wolf Publishing Group, Inc. · filed 1996-12-03Rule 11(a)

In the Rule 41(a) context, we recognize that a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to Rule 11(a) or G.S. 6-21.5 is not a continuation of adversary proceedings.

A Rule 11 sanctions motion may be filed after a voluntary dismissal, but it should be filed within a reasonable time after the alleged impropriety is discovered.

Renner v. Hawk · filed 1997-03-04Rule 11; Rule 41(a)(1)

Neither Rule 11 nor Rule 41 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure contains explicit time limits for filing Rule 11 sanctions motions. We find the reasoning in Cooter persuasive and decline to impose any time limits contrary to the plain language of the rules. We agree, though, that “a party should make a Rule 11 motion within a reasonable time” after he discovers an alleged impropriety.

Rule 11 sanctions depend on the totality of the circumstances, and the decision is reviewed de novo.

Carter v. Stanly County · filed 1997-03-18Rule 11

Whether an attorney’s conduct merits Rule 11 sanctions is determined by looking at the totality of the circumstances, Mack v. Moore, 107 N.C. App. 87, 94, 418 S.E.2d 685, 689 (1992), and is a matter reviewable de novo.

Rule 11 sanctions apply to signed pleadings, motions, or other papers, not attorney conduct unrelated to such a filing.

Williams v. Hinton · filed 1997-09-16Rule 11

As noted previously, it is improper for the trial court to impose Rule 11 sanctions based on appellant’s conduct, since it does not involve the filing of a pleading, motion, or other paper.

Rule 11 permits sanctions against an attorney who signs a complaint unsupported by fact or law, while a represented party who relies in good faith on counsel’s advice about legal sufficiency meets the reasonable inquiry requirement.

Taylor v. Collins · filed 1997-12-02Rule 11(a)

As such, we find this evidence supports the trial court’s findings and conclusions that the complaint signed by Hubbard was not well-grounded in fact or law. Thus, we uphold the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against Hubbard. ... In light of this evidence, we find that Taylor in good faith relied on Hubbard regarding the legal sufficiency of his claims and thus met his duty of making a “reasonable inquiry.” As such, the trial court’s imposition of sanctions against Taylor was improper.

Rule 11 is violated when a complaint names an LLC member as an individual defendant without a legal basis for doing so.

Page v. ROSCOE, LLC · filed 1998-03-03Rule 11(a)

As such, the naming of Bone as an individual defendant was not well-grounded in law and therefore a violation of Rule 11.

A corporate officer’s verification of a complaint in an official capacity does not, by itself, subject the officer to individual Rule 11 sanctions.

Polygenex International, Inc. v. Polyzen, Inc. · filed 1999-05-18Rule 11(a)

McGarry’s verification of the complaint was in his capacity as a corporate officer and was not in his individual capacity. This verification was not sufficient to subject McGarry to individual liability pursuant to Rule 11.

Rule 11 permits sanctions when a signed pleading, motion, or other paper is factually or legally insufficient or filed for an improper purpose.

Bryant v. Rogers (In Re Rogers) · filed 1999-09-22(a)

However, willful and malicious conduct is not a prerequisite of sanctions under Rule 11 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 11 requires a pleading, motion, or other paper to be factually and legally warranted after reasonable inquiry and not filed for an improper purpose.

Twaddell v. Anderson · filed 1999-12-21(a)

In the case at bar, we have held that plaintiff had grounds for seeking, to register the California order. Therefore, counsel for plaintiff did not violate Rule 11.

A Rule 11 sanctions motion must be filed within a reasonable time after the alleged impropriety is detected.

Griffin v. Sweet · filed 2000-03-07Rule 11

Therefore, based on the rationale of Rice v. Danas, Inc., supra, we conclude that by waiting over thirteen months after our Supreme Court denied defendants’ petition for discretionary-review, plaintiff failed to file his motion for Rule 11 sanctions within a reasonable time of detecting the alleged impropriety.

Rule 11(a) requires a signer to certify that a pleading is factually grounded, legally warranted or supported by a good faith argument, and not filed for an improper purpose.

Grover v. Norris · filed 2000-04-18(a)

Made plain, the three things the signer is certifying to be true are that the pleadings are: (1) well grounded in fact, (2) warranted by existing law, “or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,” and (3) not interposed for any improper purpose.

Rule 11 bars a party or attorney from filing a pleading that lacks factual or legal support or is filed for an improper purpose and permits sanctions for any such violation.

Hummer v. Pulley, Watson, King & Lischer, P.A. · filed 2000-10-17Rule 11

A party or his attorney may not file a pleading that is (1) not well grounded in fact, (2) not "warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law," or (3) filed for an improper purpose. Id. A violation of any one of these requirements may support sanctions under Rule 11.

Rule 11(a) requires an attorney to certify that a filing is factually and legally well grounded and authorizes sanctions for violations.

Sholar Business Associates, Inc. v. Davis · filed 2000-06-06(a)

As a general rule, remand is necessary where a trial court fails to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding a motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11.

Rule 11(a) requires sanctions for a pleading or other paper that is not well grounded after reasonable inquiry or is filed for an improper purpose.

DeMent v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 2001-04-03(a)

Having reviewed the record in its entirety, we find no evidence to support a conclusion that sanctions under Rule 11 are appropriate on either the “legal insufficiency” or “improper purpose” standard.

Rule 11(a) requires an attorney's signed paper to be legally warranted, factually grounded, and submitted for a proper purpose, and authorizes sanctions for violations.

Johnson v. Harris · filed 2002-05-07Rule 11(a)

In reviewing a trial court's determination to award Rule 11 sanctions, the appellate court conducts a de novo review. ... Examining the totality of the circumstances, and resolving all doubts in favor of plaintiffs, we hold that the trial court erred in awarding Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiffs.

Rule 11 requires sanctions for pleadings that lack factual or legal support or are filed for an improper purpose.

Static Control Components, Inc. v. Vogler · filed 2002-09-03(a)

There are three parts to a Rule 11 analysis: (1) factual sufficiency, (2) legal sufficiency, and (3) improper purpose. ... A violation of any one of these requirements mandates the imposition of sanctions under Rule 11.

Rule 11(a) sanctions are unwarranted when a renewed summary judgment motion raises an additional issue and the record shows no improper purpose.

Fox v. Green · filed 2003-12-02Rule 11(a)

As noted above, the second motion sought summary judgment on liability due in part to the defendants’ therapeutic justification argument, and on an additional issue, that of punitive damages. Even assuming that the second motion on liability was not well grounded, we see no evidence in the record that the motion was “interposed for any improper purpose.” Thus, plaintiffs motion for sanctions was properly denied.

Rule 11 sanctions require improper signing or filing of documents with the court.

Zaliagiris v. Zaliagiris · filed 2004-06-01Rule 11

We note that to the extent defendant was sanctioned under Rule 11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in the trial court's 11 September 2002 amended order, the trial court erred as a matter of law because the sanctions imposed upon defendant had nothing to do with the improper signing or filing of documents with the court.

Rule 11(a) allows a good faith argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law to avoid sanctions, even when the court has previously rejected the argument.

Vittitoe v. Vittitoe · filed 2004-07-06Rule 11(a)

Although it is true that Defendant's arguments regarding postseparation support had been previously rejected by this Court at the time he filed his motions, we have no evidence that Defendant did not present a "good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 11(a). After carefully reviewing the record and the trial court's findings, we cannot conclude the trial court erred in denying Plaintiff's motion for sanctions.

Rule 11 sanctions may include trial-level fees and costs, but not fees and costs incurred in defending an appeal.

Hill v. Hill · filed 2004-09-07Rule 11(a)

We instruct the trial court, after making these findings, to issue an order under Rule 11 awarding only those fees and costs incurred at the trial level.

A Rule 11 violation is determined by a preponderance of the evidence.

Adams v. Bank United of Texas, FSB · filed 2004-12-21Rule 11(a)

Thus, we conclude the preponderance of the evidence quantum of proof should be utilized in determining whether a Rule 11 violation has occurred.

Rule 11 requires sanctions when a filing lacks factual or legal sufficiency or was made for an improper purpose, while Rule 59(a) provides grounds for a new trial and Rule 60(b)(3) addresses relief for misconduct.

Krantz v. Owens · filed 2005-02-01Rule 11; Rule 59(a); Rule 60(b)(3)

When considering the appropriateness of sanctions under Rule 11, the trial court looks at the document in question, and then determines if it was well founded in both fact and law, and whether it was filed for an improper purpose. ... There are three parts to a Rule 11 analysis: (1) factual sufficiency, (2) legal sufficiency, and (3) improper purpose. ... A violation of any one of these requirements mandates the imposition of sanctions under Rule 11.”

Rule 11(a) does not permit a trial court to award attorney’s fees and costs incurred defending an appeal.

Hill v. Hill · filed 2005-09-20Rule 11(a)

Thus, the trial court abused its discretion under Rule 11 by improperly awarding to defendants attorney’s fees and costs incurred after plaintiff’s filing of notice of appeal and due directly to his appeal to this Court and petition to our Supreme Court.

Under Rule 11(a), a facially plausible complaint does not warrant sanctions for legal insufficiency.

Kohler Co., Inc. v. McIvor · filed 2006-05-02(a)

Because the complaint is facially plausible, the inquiry is complete, and sanctions are properly denied.

Rule 11(a) covers letters sent to a court to influence it to take particular action.

Dunn v. Canoy · filed 2006-11-07Rule 11(a)

We agree with these courts that the reference to "other papers" should, at least, encompass letters forwarded to a court that seek to influence the court to take particular action.

Rule 11(a) permits sanctions when counsel signs a complaint without a reasonable factual or legal basis; dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) alone does not automatically warrant sanctions.

Harris v. Daimler Chrysler Corp. · filed 2006-12-19Rule 11(a)

We hold that the trial court correctly concluded that plaintiffs counsel signed the amended complaint in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 11(a) (2005). The sanction imposed by the trial court was not an abuse of discretion and is supported by sufficient findings of fact regarding the attorneys’ fees awarded.

Rule 11 sanctions cannot rest on an attorney’s oral argument at a hearing when the challenged position appeared in no pleading, motion, or other paper filed with the court.

Watts v. North Carolina Department of Environment & Natural Resources · filed 2007-03-20Rule 11

Although the Commission cited the lack of facts and law to support the amount of damages for which NCDENR advocated, the amount of $8,000 did not appear in any pleading, motion, or other paper filed with the Commission, but was rather an argument made by defense counsel at the hearing. As such, "defendants' position" is not the proper subject of a Rule 11 sanction.

Rule 11(a) requires sanctions when a filing fails its legal sufficiency requirement.

Wilson v. Wilson · filed 2007-05-15Rule 11(a)

We conclude that Rule 11 sanctions were properly imposed for failing to meet the legal sufficiency requirement of the rule.

Rule 11(a) allows an omitted pleading signature to be supplied promptly after the omission is identified; the pleading is stricken only if it remains unsigned.

In Re DDF · filed 2007-12-04Rule 11(a)

Rule 11(a) contemplates the omission of a signature as a simple oversight, which can be easily corrected when pointed out, and then the case may proceed on its course, dealing with the substantive issues raised by the pleadings. Only if the pleading is not signed "promptly" even after omission is pointed out does Rule 11(a) provide for the pleading to be stricken.

Rule 11(a) does not permit sanctions for filing a complaint that raises a legal question no case had specifically resolved at the time.

Herring v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Board of Education · filed 2008-02-05Rule 11(a)

Although we reach that conclusion in the present case, it is not appropriate to sanction Plaintiffs attorneys for filing the complaint in the present case when no case had specifically held so at that time.

Rule 11(a) authorizes sanctions when a pleading is unwarranted by existing law and filed for an improper purpose.

Ward v. Jett Properties, LLC · filed 2008-08-05Rule 11(a)

As plaintiff’s complaints in the instant action were not warranted by existing law and were filed with an improper purpose, we affirm the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for sanctions.

Rule 11 sanctions may be imposed on a person who signs a complaint despite a separate attorney certification required by a gatekeeper order.

Dalenko v. Collier · filed 2008-08-05Rule 11

As noted above, we do not have Judge Cashwell’s order before us and cannot divine its terms, but clearly its purpose was not to insulate plaintiff from responsibility for her amended complaint under Rule 11. The trial courts cannot abdicate their duties and responsibilities under Rule 11 to a private attorney.

Rule 11(a) permits sanctions against represented parties even if they did not sign the pleading.

Egelhof Ex Rel. Red Hat, Inc. v. Szulik · filed 2008-11-18Rule 11(a)

Plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel contend that the trial court could not enter non-monetary sanctions pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 11 without their signatures on the amended complaint. We disagree. ... We hold that both plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel, as represented parties, were subject to sanctions pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 11.

Rule 11(a) requires a reasonable inquiry into the facts and a reasonable belief that the complaint is grounded in fact.

Persis Nova Construction, Inc. v. Edwards · filed 2009-01-20Rule 11(a)

This evidence supports the trial court’s findings that Plaintiff undertook a reasonable inquiry into the facts and that Plaintiff reasonably believed that the complaint was well grounded in fact.

Rule 11(a) does not warrant sanctions for asserting a contributory negligence defense when the defense has sufficient factual and legal bases.

McKoy v. Beasley · filed 2009-03-17Rule 11(a)

There were therefore sufficient factual and legal bases to raise contributory negligence as a defense in defendants' Answer, and the trial court properly denied plaintiff's motion.

Rule 11(a) permits sanctions when a complaint lacks factual sufficiency because the plaintiff could not reasonably believe the claim was grounded in fact.

Garner v. Smith · filed 2009-04-21Rule 11(a)

Therefore, the trial court properly concluded that plaintiff's complaint lacked factual sufficiency and that imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff were appropriate.

Rule 11(a) sanctions are inappropriate when a complaint raises a question of first impression.

Quets v. Needham · filed 2009-07-21Rule 11(a)

Plaintiff’s complaint, as we noted supra Part IV, raised a question of first impression. Even though we have upheld dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint on all the substantive issues raised therein, the trial court’s imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff was error.

Rule 11(a) requires findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficient to explain and support the amount of a sanction.

Ward v. JETT PROPERTIES, LLC · filed 2010-02-02Rule 11(a)

Although we uphold the trial court's conclusion that plaintiff filed his complaint for an improper purpose, we must nonetheless remand this case because the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to explain and support its particular sanction of $2,000.00 in attorneys' fees and costs.

Rule 11(a) permits reasonable attorney's fees to be imposed jointly and severally on a party and counsel who sign a pleading without a sufficient factual basis.

Nix v. SONY COMPUTER ENTERTAINMENT AMERICA, INC. · filed 2010-02-16Rule 11(a)

The trial court found that Plaintiff and her attorney signed the Amended Complaint in violation of the factual certification requirement of the Rule. Moreover, it is clear from the record and the trial court's order that sanctions were imposed because there was no basis in fact for any claim by Plaintiff against Defendant. Thus, the trial court was well within its discretion to impose reasonable attorney's fees on Plaintiff and Glover, jointly and severally.

Rule 11(a) sanctions for factual insufficiency require findings and conclusions addressing that insufficiency; an attorney's fee award also requires findings on the amount and its appropriateness.

In the Matter of Jp · filed 2010-05-18Rule 11(a)

On remand the trial court should make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to factual insufficiency. Moreover, additional findings and conclusions as to the amount of the attorney's fees and the appropriateness of the amount awarded are required.

Rule 11 sanctions are available in proceedings to revoke letters testamentary.

In Re the Will of Durham · filed 2010-08-03Rule 11

Thus, the weight of authority establishes that relief under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 11, is available in revocation proceedings conducted pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28A-9-1.

Rule 11(a)’s reference to “other papers” does not include the Town’s proposed site plan.

Barris v. Town of Long Beach · filed 2010-12-21Rule 11(a)

The Town’s second site plan does not constitute “other papers” pursuant to this statute.

Rule 11(a) requires the appellate court to uphold mandatory sanctions when the trial court’s conclusions, findings, and evidence support them.

Lamm v. Lamm · filed 2011-03-01Rule 11(a)

Having made the three Turner determinations in the affirmative, we must uphold the trial court’s decision to impose mandatory sanctions under N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 11(a).

Rule 11(a) requires sanctions when an attorney makes factual allegations without adequate inquiry or a reasonable belief that they are well grounded in fact.

Peters v. Pennington · filed 2011-03-01Rule 11(a)

In sum, we conclude Ms. Burns either failed to make an adequate inquiry in these factual allegations or did not reasonably believe the allegations were well-grounded in fact.

Rule 11 sanctions for factual or legal insufficiency are improper when the complaint’s allegations, taken as true, support claims warranted by existing law.

Johnson v. Antioch United Holy Church, Inc. · filed 2011-08-16Rule 11

In our discussion above, we have concluded Plaintiffs’ allegations are warranted by North Carolina statutes and common law. Accordingly, it was error for the trial court to grant Defendants’ Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions for the alleged factual and legal insufficiency of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

Rule 11(a) allows a party to cure an unsigned complaint promptly by filing a signed amendment, restoring the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

ESTATE OF LIVESAY EX REL. MORLEY v. Livesay · filed 2012-02-21Rule 11(a)

Applying the exception present in Rule 11, we hold Plaintiffs prompt remedial measures of filing an amended, signed complaint once Plaintiff discovered the mistake conferred subject matter jurisdiction on the trial court to enable it to deal with the substantive issues raised in the pleadings.

Rule 11(a) warrants sanctions when a motion is filed for the improper purpose of harassing an opposing party or needlessly increasing litigation costs.

Fatta v. M & M Properties Management, Inc. · filed 2012-12-04Rule 11(a)

Because the findings of fact are supported by sufficient evidence, and the findings of fact support the conclusion of law, we hold that the trial court did not err by concluding that plaintiff violated the improper purpose prong by the filing of his motion for sanctions, thereby warranting the imposition of Rule II sanctions against plaintiff.

Rule 11 permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees for motions that lack factual and legal support.

Adams Creek Associates v. Davis · filed 2013-06-04Rule 11(a)

Lastly, concerning the appropriateness of the Rule 11 sanctions awarded, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in awarding $11,000 to Adams Creek to cover fees incurred as a result of defendants’ meritless motions.

Rule 11(a) does not require sanctions for a counterclaim that is factually and legally sufficient and was not filed for an improper purpose.

McKinnon v. CV Industries, Inc. · filed 2013-07-02Rule 11(a)

We conclude that findings of fact 49-51 support the trial court’s conclusions that defendant’s counterclaim was (1) factually sufficient; (2) legally sufficient; and (3) not filed for an improper purpose. Moreover, these findings are based on competent evidence in the record. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees under Rule 11.

Rule 11(a) authorizes sanctions when a motion fails its factual sufficiency requirement.

O'Neal v. O'Neal · filed 2013-03-19(a)

Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court’s findings of fact are sufficient to conclude that Ms. Mills’ motion to recuse and amended motion did not meet the factual sufficiency requirement of Rule 11(a).

Rule 11 does not permit an improper-purpose sanction based solely on a party rearguing in a Rule 59(a)(8) motion an issue raised at trial.

Automotive Group, LLC v. A-1 Auto Charlotte, LLC · filed 2013-11-19Rule 11(a)

Furthermore, unlike the trial court, we cannot conclude that defendant’s motion pursuant to Rule 59(a)(8) was filed with an improper purpose only on the basis that defendant sought to re-argue the same issue elicited at trial.

Rule 11 sanctions are unwarranted when a complaint reflects a good faith belief in its allegations and the evidence provides some support for its theory of recovery.

Red Fox Future, LLC v. Holbrooks · filed 2014-09-09(a)

Accordingly, this is not a case in which the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions would further the Rule’s purpose of “prevent[ing] abuse of the legal system[,]” Grover v. Norris, 137 N.C. App. 487, 495, 529 S.E.2d 231, 235 (2000). The Holbrooks Defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees and costs under Rule 11 is, therefore, denied.