N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1

A motion alleging that a consent judgment was entered without a party’s authorization should be considered under Rule 60(b)(4), even if it cites other Rule 60(b) grounds.

Lynch v. Lynch · filed 1985-05-07Rule 60(b)(4)

Although respondents filed their motion pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(1), (3) and (6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, for reasons which we later state, the clerk and trial court should have considered respondents’ motion under the provisions of Rule 60(b)(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which empowers the trial court to set aside void judgments.

Rule 60(b) provides a way to seek relief from a judgment in proceedings before the Industrial Commission when the Commission has no comparable rule.

Long v. Reeves · filed 1985-11-19Rule 60(b)

Since the North Carolina Industrial Commission has no rule comparable to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 60(b), and because the rules of civil procedure are applicable, we hold the Industrial Commission should have treated defendant’s motion on 15 November 1984 as ... one made pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 60(b) “to be relieved from a judgment.”

A motion to set aside an order for alleged fraud under Rule 60(b)(3) is addressed to the trial court’s discretion, and its denial is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Vuncannon v. Vuncannon · filed 1986-08-05(b)(3)

The rule is well-established that a motion for relief under Rule 60(b) is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and appellate review is limited to determining whether the court abused its discretion. ... Plaintiff advances no argument that the court abused its discretion in denying this motion, and our review of the record reveals no such abuse.

Rule 60(b)(1) requires a motion to set aside a judgment for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect to be made within one year.

Huggins v. Hallmark Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1987-01-20Rule 60(b)(1)

The requirement that the motion to set aside the judgment made pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) be made within one year is mandatory. Accordingly, we hold that the denial of the motion on the grounds delineated in subsection (b)(1) was proper as a matter of law.

Rule 60(b)(4) permits a motion to set aside a void judgment at any time, despite Rule 60(b)’s reasonable-time requirement.

Allred v. Tucci · filed 1987-04-07Rule 60(b)(4)

Although Rule 60(b) contains the requirement that all motions made pursuant thereto be made “within a reasonable time,” the requirement is not enforceable with respect to motions made pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), because a void judgment is a legal nullity which may be attacked at any time.

Rule 60(b)(6) does not allow a court to avoid a legal effect of a valid judgment while leaving the judgment intact.

Howell v. Howell · filed 1987-11-05Rule 60(b)(6)

Neither Rule 60(b)(6) nor any other provision of law authorizes a court to nullify or avoid one or more of the legal effects of a valid judgment while leaving the judgment itself intact.

Rule 60(b)(6) permits modification of a judgment’s prejudgment interest when a later settlement changes the amount covered by liability insurance and the issue could not have been raised on appeal earlier.

Petty v. Housing Authority of Charlotte · filed 1988-06-21(b)(6)

The issue only materialized after plaintiff settled her claim with the City of Charlotte which was insured to the full extent of the verdict. ... We find that the trial court properly modified the judgment as allowed by G.S. 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(6), and therefore affirm its ruling.

Rule 60(b) cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal to correct errors of law.

J. D. Dawson Co. v. Robertson Marketing, Inc. · filed 1989-02-21Rule 60(b)

It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that erroneous judgments may only be corrected by appeal “and that a motion under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 60(b) of the Rules of ... Civil Procedure cannot be used as a substitute for appellate review.”

Rule 60(b)(6) does not permit a trial court to reopen an affirmed judgment to consider compound interest when the appellate mandate did not remand that issue.

Lea Company v. Narth Carolina Bd. of Transportation · filed 1989-01-04Rule 60(b)(6)

The issue is whether the trial court properly denied plaintiff’s motion, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(6), to reopen a prior judgment for the purpose of making additional findings and conclusions as to whether plaintiff should be awarded compound interest as an element of just compensation for defendant’s taking of an interest in plaintiffs property by inverse condemnation. We hold that it did. ... As the trial court noted, our mandate did not include a remand for consideration of an award of compound interest; rather, it affirmed a judgment awarding simple interest, which was all the plaintiff had sought.

Rule 60(b)(6) cannot be used instead of an appeal to challenge an erroneous judgment.

Concrete Supply Co. v. Ramseur Baptist Church · filed 1989-09-19(b)(6)

“Motions under 60(b)(6), however, are not to be used as a substitute for appeal, and an erroneous judgment cannot be attacked under this clause.”

Rule 60(b)(6) relief requires extraordinary circumstances and a showing that justice demands setting aside the judgment.

Jorgensen v. Seeman · filed 1989-10-03Rule 60(b)(6)

In order for a judgment to be set aside, plaintiff must show that (1) extraordinary circumstances exist and that (2) justice demands it.

Rule 60(b)(6) cannot provide relief when the grounds for the motion fall under one of Rule 60(b)’s five preceding clauses.

Bruton v. Sea Captain Properties, Inc. · filed 1989-12-05(b)(6)

Rule 60(b)(6) cannot be the basis for a motion to set aside judgment if the facts supporting it are facts which more appropriately would support one of the five preceding clauses.

Rule 60 cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal to correct legal errors in an order.

Chicopee, Inc. v. Sims Metal Works, Inc. · filed 1990-05-15Rule 60

Since Rule 60 was not an appropriate vehicle by which to seek review of Judge Brewer’s orders on plaintiff’s motion to amend, as well as our decision to direct a reconsideration of that motion, we will not consider Judge Manning’s disposition of this aspect of plaintiff’s Rule 60 motion.

Rule 60(b)(4) does not provide relief for an alleged legal error when the court had jurisdiction and authority to enter the judgment.

Vaughn v. Vaughn · filed 1990-07-17Rule 60(b)(4)

Because the court had jurisdiction and authority to enter the contempt order, the order is not void. ... Therefore, a Rule 60(b)(4) motion is an inappropriate means to rectify the alleged error.

Rule 60(b) requires a party seeking relief from judgment to show both excusable neglect and a meritorious defense.

Gallbronner v. Mason · filed 1991-01-15Rule 60(b)

To obtain relief under Rule 60(b), a party must show both excusable neglect and a meritorious defense.

A trial court may consider a Rule 60(b) motion while an appeal is pending to indicate how it would rule if the appeal were not pending.

Pheasant v. McKibben · filed 1990-10-02Rule 60(b)

A trial court may consider a Rule 60(b) motion which is filed though an appeal is pending in order to indicate how it would rule on the motion were the appeal not pending.

Rule 60(b)(6) permits a request for relief from a consent judgment, but it cannot be used to amend the judgment.

State Ex Rel. Environmental Management Commission v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc. · filed 1991-02-05(b)(6)

However, it appears from defendants’ brief that their request for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) is in reality a motion to amend the Consent Judgment. That result cannot be achieved by a motion under Rule 60(b)(6).

Rule 60(b) permits relief from an inadvertent voluntary dismissal through a timely motion to amend that identifies the error and the correction sought.

Carter Ex Rel. Carter v. Clowers · filed 1991-03-19Rule 60(b)(1)

Based on the foregoing analysis, we construe the motion to amend the dismissal as a Rule 60(b) motion and grant plaintiff the relief he sought from the original dismissal.

Rule 60(b)(6) permits a court to grant relief from a judgment when extraordinary circumstances exist and justice demands it.

Dollar v. Tapp · filed 1991-06-04(b)(6)

This subsection serves as a “grand reservoir of equitable power” by which a court may grant relief from a judgment whenever extraordinary circumstances exist and there is a showing that justice demands it.

Rule 60(b)(1) requires a motion based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect to be filed within a reasonable time and no more than one year after entry of the judgment.

Brown v. Windhom · filed 1991-10-01(b)(1)

When a motion is made pursuant to subsection (b)(1), it “shall be made within a reasonable time, and . . . not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.” ... What constitutes a “reasonable time” under the rule is determined by examining the circumstances of the individual case.

Rule 60(b)(4) permits a party to seek relief from a void judgment at any time.

Matter of Finnican · filed 1991-10-01(b)(4)

Although section (b) of this rule states that all motions shall be made “within a reasonable time,” this requirement is not enforceable with respect to motions made pursuant to subsection (b)(4), “because a void judgment is a legal nullity which may be attacked at any time.”

Rule 60(b) permits relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for specified reasons, subject to time limits and judicial discretion.

Hoolapa v. Hoolapa · filed 1992-01-21(b)

N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b) (1990). As plaintiff’s motion was filed nineteen months after Judge Turner’s original order, it was filed later than the one year limit placed on 60(b)(1), (2) and (3). With respect to Rule 60(b)(4), a judgment is “void” only where the court that renders it did not have “jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter and [did not have] authority to render the judgment entered.” In re Brown, 23 N.C. App. 109, 110, 208 S.E.2d 282, 283 (1974). Here, the trial court clearly had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The order cannot then be “void” pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4).

Rule 60(b) motions for relief from judgment cannot substitute for an appeal, and erroneous judgments may be corrected only by appeal.

Loftis v. Reynolds · filed 1992-03-17(b)

As our appellate courts have consistently held, Rule 60(b) motions for relief from judgment cannot be used as a substitute for appeal and erroneous judgments may be corrected only by appeal.

Rule 60(b)(6) requires a movant to show extraordinary circumstances and that justice demands setting aside the judgment.

Partridge v. Associated Cleaning Consultants & Services, Inc. · filed 1993-01-19Rule 60(b)(6)

A judgment should be set aside under Rule 60(b)(6) only if the movant can show (1) that extraordinary circumstances exist and (2) justice demands that the judgment be set aside.

Rule 60(b)(4) permits relief only from a void judgment; an error of law, fact, or procedure alone does not make a judgment void.

Ottway Burton, PA v. Blanton · filed 1992-10-06(b)(4)

A Rule 60(b)(4) motion is only proper where a judgment is “void” as that term is defined by the law. A judgment will not be deemed void merely for an error in law, fact, or procedure. A judgment is void only when the issuing court has no jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter in question or has no authority to render the judgment entered.

A Rule 60(b)(4) motion to set aside a void judgment may be made at any time; the reasonable-time limit does not apply.

Nye, Mitchell, Jarvis & Bugg v. Oates · filed 1993-03-02(b)(4)

The requirement that the motion be made within a reasonable time is not enforceable with respect to motions made pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) to set aside a judgment as void, “because a void judgment is a legal nullity which may be attacked at any time.”

Rule 59 motions to amend a judgment are committed to the trial court’s discretion and are reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Spivey & Self, Inc. v. Highview Farms, Inc. · filed 1993-07-06

Motions to amend judgments pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 59 are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.

Rule 60(b)(6) allows relief from a final judgment for another reason justifying relief, subject to extraordinary circumstances, a demand for justice, and a meritorious defense.

Able Outdoor, Inc. v. Harrelson · filed 1994-02-01(b)(6)

Rule 60(b)(6) is equitable in nature and authorizes the trial court to exercise its discretion in granting or denying the relief sought. ... The setting aside of a judgment pursuant to . . . Rule 60(b)(6) should only take place where (i) extraordinary circumstances exist and (ii) there is a showing that justice demands it.

Rule 60(b)(4) lets a party seek relief from a judgment that is void.

Bell Atlantic Tricon Leasing Corp. v. Johnnie's Garbage Service, Inc. · filed 1994-02-01(b)(4)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(4) allows a party to petition for relief from judgment on the grounds that the judgment is void.

Rule 60(b)(1) permits relief from a final judgment when a counterclaim for equitable distribution constitutes a meritorious defense.

Baker v. Baker · filed 1994-06-21(b)(1)

The sole question presented by plaintiff’s remaining assignments of error is whether a counterclaim for equitable distribution can constitute a “meritorious defense” to a complaint for absolute divorce, necessary to the granting of relief from a judgment pursuant to G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b). We answer the question affirmatively and affirm the trial court’s order.

Rule 60(b)(6) allows an order to be set aside for any other reason justifying relief from its operation, but only when extraordinary circumstances exist and justice demands relief.

Jenkins v. Middleton · filed 1994-05-17(b)(6)

We must proceed under the premise that the order was set aside on the basis of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(6) (1990), which provides that an order may be set aside for “any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Relief from an order is appropriate under Rule 60(b)(6) only if there are (1) extraordinary circumstances and (2) there is a showing that justice demands it.

Rule 60(b)(6) permits relief from a final order for any other reason justifying relief, and Rule 60(c) permits the clerk to exercise that power over judgments the clerk rendered.

In re Ward · filed 1994-07-29(b)(6) and (c)

The lack of notice to Imperial of the original incompetency proceeding would clearly justify granting it relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6). If Imperial had made a motion expressly pursuant to that rule, the Clerk would have been authorized to reopen the incompetency proceeding thereunder.

Rule 60(b) applies only to final judgments.

Shamley v. Shamley · filed 1994-12-06Rule 60(b)

However, defendant’s motion was not authorized under Rule 60(b) because section (b) of the rule applies by its express terms only to final judgments.

Rule 60(b)(6) does not provide relief from errors of law or erroneous judgments.

Garrison Ex Rel. Chavis v. Barnes · filed 1994-12-06Rule 60(b)(6)

It is well settled, however, that Rule 60(b)(6) does not include relief from errors of law, Hagwood v. Odom, 88 N.C.App. 513, 519, 364 S.E.2d 190, 193 (1988), or erroneous judgments.

Rule 60(b)(6) permits relief from a final judgment when extraordinary circumstances exist and justice demands relief.

Lumsden v. Lawing · filed 1995-01-03(b)(6)

The trial court had the power, under Rule 60(b)(6), to grant plaintiffs relief from its original judgment. In light of the extraordinary circumstances of this case, we find that justice demands relief and that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant relief.

Rule 60(b)(4) permits relief from a void judgment, including an order entered without subject matter jurisdiction.

Vanburen County Department of Social Services v. Swearengin · filed 1995-03-21Rule 60(b)(4)

Rule 60(b)(4) provides that a court may relieve a party from a judgment if it is void. ... For this reason, we ... also hold that the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs Rule 60(b) motion and erred in dismissing plaintiffs action.

Motions under Rule 60(b)(5) and (6) must be made within a reasonable time.

Jenkins v. Richmond County · filed 1995-03-07(b)(5), (b)(6)

Under both Rule 60(b)(5) and (6), the motion for relief must be made within a reasonable time. We conclude that plaintiffs’ motion was not made within a reasonable time, and we reverse the order of the trial court granting plaintiffs relief.

Rule 60(b)(6) relief from a judgment is discretionary and is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

McNeil v. Hicks · filed 1995-07-18Rule 60(b)(6)

Thus, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted Allstate’s motion for relief in accordance with Rule 60(b)(6).

Rule 60(b) provides a way to seek relief from an Industrial Commission judgment after the 15-day period under § 97-85, if the motion is filed within a reasonable time.

Jones v. Yates Motor Co. · filed 1995-12-05(b)

Although plaintiff’s motion was made after the 15 days allowed under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-85, Rule 60(h) merely requires that a motion for relief from the judgment be filed within a reasonable time. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 60 (1990). In this case, we cannot conclude that the time period within which plaintiff filed his motion was unreasonable. In sum, the Commission should have considered the motion as a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from the judgment.

Rule 60(b)(4) permits a person subject to a void order to challenge it at any time.

Helbein v. Southern Metals Co. · filed 1995-07-05Rule 60(b)(4)

A party who is subject to an order by a trial court which is void, may attack that order at any time, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 60(b) permits a motion for relief based on intrinsic or extrinsic fraud, but an independent action attacking a judgment for fraud requires extrinsic fraud.

Caswell Realty Associates I, L.P. v. Andrews Co. · filed 1996-02-06Rule 60(b)

In this case, plaintiff had full opportunity to present its case to the court. The fraud of which plaintiff complains allegedly took place during settlement negotiations between the parties and is intrinsic. Plaintiff may not attack such alleged fraud through an independent action. Plaintiffs proper course of action would have been to pursue its 60(b) motion.

Rule 60(b)(2) permits relief from a final judgment for newly discovered evidence only when due diligence could not have uncovered it in time for a Rule 59(b) new trial motion.

Jacobsen v. McMillan · filed 1996-10-15(b)(2)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b) (1990). N.C.R. Civ. P. 59(b) establishes that a motion for new trial under subsection (a) must be made “not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 59(b). Thus, according to the plain language of Rule 60(b)(2), the moving party cannot seek relief from judgment where the movant had the opportunity, through the exercise of due diligence, to make a motion for new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(4).

Rule 60 relief is unavailable to a nonparty, who must bring an independent action to challenge a judgment affecting their rights.

Watson v. Ben Griffin Realty & Auction, Inc. · filed 1997-12-02Rule 60

In conclusion, this appeal is dismissed because N.C.Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 60 relief is not available to a non-party and Wilcox as a non-party is not permitted to appeal the trial court's ruling.

Rule 60(b)(3) does not warrant setting aside a judgment confirming an arbitration award when the alleged fraud lacks evidentiary support and a material connection to the award.

Trafalgar House Construction, Inc. v. MSL Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1998-01-06Rule 60(b)(3)

Moreover, even if the allegations regarding fraud were true, they were not materially related to an issue in the arbitration proceeding and no nexus was established between the fraud and the award because the arbitrators never received Milcarek’s affidavit into evidence. Therefore the trial court’s denials of the motion to vacate and Rule 60(b)(3) motion were proper on these grounds.

Rule 60(b) applies to Chapter 40A condemnation proceedings and permits relief from judgments or orders when necessary to promote justice.

City of Durham v. Woo · filed 1998-04-07(b)

Because “the exercise of the power of eminent domain is in derogation of property rights,” ... and because Chapter 40A does not specifically provide otherwise, we believe Rule 60 applies to proceedings under Chapter 40A in order to provide relief from judgments or orders when necessary to promote the interests of justice.

Rule 60(b) reconsideration factors include whether a party had an opportunity to present the claim and whether additional equities favor reconsideration.

Moore v. City of Raleigh · filed 1998-07-01Rule 60(b)

Further, under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1 , Rule 60(b) and IC Rule 703, factors to be considered by the trial judge, a Deputy Commissioner or the Full Commission, include whether Moore had an opportunity to present his claim and whether any additional equities urge reconsideration.

Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is within the trial court’s discretion and is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Tucker · filed 1998-10-06(b)(6)

Relief afforded under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b) “is within the discretion of the trial court, and such a decision will be disturbed only for an abuse of discretion.” ... Thus, no abuse of discretion has been shown on the facts of this case.

Rule 60(b)(5) permits relief when a judgment is no longer equitable prospectively, while Rule 60(b)(6) permits relief for any other reason justifying relief.

Condellone v. Condellone · filed 2000-04-18(b)(5), (b)(6)

Rule 60(b)(5) allows a court to rely upon changed circumstances as grounds for granting a motion for relief from a judgment or order, see, e.g., Poston v. Morgan, 83 N.C. App. 295, 350 S.E.2d 108 (1986), but there is no requirement of such a showing, see Buie v. Johnston, 313 N.C. 586, 589, 330 S.E.2d 197, 199 (1985) (“[A] court may relieve a party from a judgment if, among other reasons, it is no longer equitable that the judgment have prospective application.”).

Rule 60(b)(6) permits relief from a final judgment for any other reason justifying relief, including extraordinary circumstances that leave an incompetent person without a valid guardian ad litem.

Fox v. Health Force, Inc. · filed 2001-05-15(b)(6)

(6) Any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. ... For the reasons stated above, we find Rule 60(b)(6) the appropriate remedy for plaintiff and affirm the trial court.

Rule 60(b) lets a party seek relief from a final judgment for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.

Gibson v. Mena · filed 2001-06-05(b)

N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b) (1999) allows a party, on motion to the trial court, to seek relief from a final judgment on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.

Rule 60(b)(4) permits relief from a judgment that is void, and Rule 60(b)(6) permits relief for any reason justifying relief from the judgment.

Royal v. Hartle · filed 2001-07-17(b)(4), (b)(6)

Rule 60(b)(4) provides that a party or his legal representative may be relieved from a final judgment, order, or proceeding if the judgment is void. N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(4). ... Rule 60(b)(6) permits the trial court to set aside a judgment or order “for any reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” N.C.G.S. § 1A 1-1, Rule 60(b)(6). ... We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to vacate the consent judgment under either Rule 60(b)(4) or Rule 60(b)(6).

Rule 60(b)(4) lets the Commission set aside a judgment when the judgment is void.

Jenkins v. Piedmont Aviation Services · filed 2001-12-04(b)(4)

If in fact the deputy commissioner did not have authority to enter the judgment, the judgment is void and the Commission has the authority under N.C.G.S. § 1A-1 Rule 60(b)(4) to set aside the judgment.

Rule 60(b) permits a trial court to set aside a judgment on its own initiative when extraordinary circumstances justify relief.

Barnes v. Taylor · filed 2002-02-05(b)

Due to the extraordinary circumstances present here, we reject plaintiff’s contention that the trial court lacked authority to act on its own initiative in order to accomplish justice.

Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek relief from a paternity and support order; the court must address that motion before granting DNA testing to revisit paternity.

State Ex Rel. Bright v. Flaskrud · filed 2002-02-19Rule 60(b)

However, until the trial court addresses the defendant’s Rule 60(b) motion, it is error for the trial court to grant his motion to compel DNA testing.

Rule 60(b) relief requires prima facie evidence of a meritorious defense, even when the motion is timely and the neglect is excusable.

Sellers v. Rodriguez · filed 2002-04-02Rule 60(b)(1) and (6)

We hold it dispositive that even if we assume both of those contentions to be true, Mr. Sellers is still not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b) because he failed to demonstrate prima facie evidence of a meritorious defense.

Rule 60(b)(3) covers fraud by an adverse party, Rule 60(b)(6) permits relief for another reason justifying relief, and Rule 37(b)(2) permits default judgment when a party fails to obey a discovery order.

Henderson v. Wachovia Bank of North Carolina, N.A. · filed 2001-08-21(b)(3), (b)(6), and (b)(2)

Rule 60(b)(3), which provides for relief from a judgment upon a showing of fraud also affords defendant no relief because the rule governs “[f]raud . . . , misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party,” not fraud of a party’s attorney. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(3). ... Rule 37(b)(2) allows for “a judgment by default against the disobedient party” when “a party or an officer, director or managing agent of a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery.”

Rule 60(b)(6) permits a court to set aside a judgment for any reason justifying relief and gives the trial judge discretion to grant or deny that relief.

Piedmont Rebar, Inc. v. Sun Construction, Inc. · filed 2002-06-04(b)(6)

Under section 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(6) of our Rules of Civil Procedure, a judgment may be set aside for any reason "justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(6) (2001). A motion to set aside a judgment based on lack of personal service is proper under this section.

Rule 60(b)(4) permits relief from a final judgment, including a default judgment, when the judgment is void.

Barton v. Sutton · filed 2002-09-03Rule 60(b)(4)

Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(4) (2001), "[a] defendant may be relieved from a final judgment, including a default judgment, if the judgment is void."

Rule 60(b) permits relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding under specified circumstances, but does not authorize a motion seeking modification of the order.

White v. White · filed 2002-09-03Rule 60(b)

Rule 60(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 60(b)") allows a court to "relieve a party ... from a final judgment, order, or proceeding" under certain circumstances. ... Defendant's Motion Pursuant to Rule 60 does not seek relief from the 1998 Qualifying Order; rather, the motion expressly requests a modification or an amendment of the 1998 Qualifying Order. Thus, defendant's motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) was improper.

Rule 60(b) requires motions based on mistake or fraud to be made within a reasonable time and no more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding.

State Ex Rel. Richmond County Child Support Agency Ex Rel. Davis v. Adams · filed 2002-10-1560(b)

However, N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b) contains a time limitation. A motion based on Rule 60(b)(1) for “mistake” or Rule 60(b)(3) for “fraud” must be made within a “reasonable time, and . . . not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b). The one-year time limitation in N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b) is an explicit requirement which our Court cannot ignore.

Rule 60(b) does not impose a fifteen-day deadline for a motion to set aside a judgment.

Carroll v. Living Centers Southeast, Inc. · filed 2003-04-01(b)

Rule 60(b) does not require that a motion be made within a particular time period such' as fifteen (15) days, but only “within a reasonable time,” and “not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.”

Intrinsic fraud can be raised only through a Rule 60(b)(3) motion, not an independent action to set aside the judgment.

Hooks v. Eckman · filed 2003-08-05Rule 60(b)(3)

When the alleged fraud complained of is intrinsic then it can only be the subject of a motion under Rule 60(b)(3).

Rule 60(b)(6) permits a court to modify a QDRO whose inadvertent wording awards more than the parties intended in their consent judgment.

Harris v. Harris · filed 2004-02-03Rule 60(b)(6)

The facts of this case make relief under Rule 60(b)(6) appropriate. ... The trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the QDRO to reflect the true intent of the parties.

Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek relief from a voluntary dismissal with prejudice because the dismissal is a “proceeding” under the rule.

Estate of Barber Ex Rel. Barber v. Guilford County Sheriff's Department · filed 2003-12-16Rule 60(b)

A voluntary dismissal with prejudice is a “proceeding” under Rule 60(b).

Rule 60(b)(6) permits relief from judgment only when extraordinary circumstances exist and justice demands relief.

Godfrey v. Res-Care, Inc. · filed 2004-07-06Rule 60(b)(6)

Although Rule 60(b)(6) has been described as a “grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular place,” 7 Moore’s Federal Practice, para. 60.27[2] at 375 (2d ed 1979), a court may only set aside a judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) upon a showing that (1) extraordinary circumstances exist, and (2) justice demands relief. ... Thus, we conclude that defendant has failed to demonstrate that the extraordinary circumstances exist that require defendant be relieved from judgment in the instant case.

Rule 60(b) does not provide relief from judgment for an attorney's mere negligence or carelessness.

ESTATE OF CARLSEN v. Carlsen · filed 2004-08-03Rule 60(b)

Furthermore, while the trial court found that appellants established "mere negligence" on the part of their counsel, the trial court also found that appellants' counsel was not grossly negligent and did not engage in any intentional misconduct or any conduct that would merit relief under Rule 60(b). This finding and the trial court's resulting conclusion are consistent with case law, which holds that although attorney error may qualify as a reason for granting relief from judgment under certain conditions, neither ignorance nor carelessness on the part of an attorney will provide grounds for such relief.

Rule 60 cannot be used as a substitute for appellate review.

In re L.C. · filed 2005-11-15(b)(6)

However Rule 60 cannot be used as a substitute for appellate review.

Rule 60(b)(6) relief requires extraordinary circumstances and a showing that justice demands relief.

McKyer v. McKyer · filed 2007-04-03(b)(6)

“The test for whether a judgment, order or proceeding should be modified or set aside under Rule 60(b)(6) is two pronged: (1) extraordinary circumstances must exist, and (2) there must be a showing that justice demands that relief be granted.” ... The trial court’s order denying plaintiff’s motion for Rule 60(b) relief is affirmed.

Rule 60(b)(6) relief from a default judgment requires extraordinary circumstances and a showing that justice demands it; failure to maintain a registered office does not satisfy that standard.

Smith ex rel. Strickland v. Jones · filed 2007-06-05(b)(6)

Defendant's failure to attend to its obligations under Chapter 55D and properly maintain a registered office is the sole reason why substitute service on the Secretary of State was necessary. Accordingly, we find no grounds for the equitable relief sought by defendant. There has been no showing of "extraordinary circumstances" nor that the "demands of justice" require the default judgment to be set aside.

Rule 60(b)(6) permits relief from a judgment when extraordinary circumstances exist and justice demands it.

Milton M. Croom Charitable Remainder Unitrust v. Hedrick · filed 2008-01-15(b)(6)

However, “Rule 60(b)(6) is not a catchall rule . .. [and] [i]n order to be entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) the movant must show that (1) extraordinary circumstances exist and that (2) justice demands such relief.”

Rule 60(b)(6) relief requires extraordinary circumstances and a showing that justice demands relief; denial is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Lynch v. Parks · filed 2008-04-01(b)(6)

Appellants have not alleged any extraordinary circumstances and have failed to show how the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the order under Rule 60(b)(6).

Rule 60(b) allows an original party to seek relief from a judgment, but a stranger to the action lacks standing to seek that relief in her own right.

Edmunds v. Edmunds · filed 2008-12-16(b)

We hold that defendant, as the original party, had standing to bring her motion for relief from the default judgment under Rule 60(b). We affirm the trial court's ruling that Ms. High, as a stranger to the original action, lacked standing to bring a motion for relief from the default judgment in her own right.

Rule 60(b)(3) permits relief from a consent judgment for duress or undue influence, but the movant must establish grounds for relief.

Yurek v. Shaffer · filed 2009-07-07(b)(3)

The trial court did not act arbitrarily in determining that Shaffer failed to show she was under duress or undue influence when she executed the consent judgment. Because Shaffer has not met her burden of showing that the trial court’s denial of her Rule 60(b) motion was manifestly unsupported by reason, this assignment of error is overruled.

A Rule 60(b) motion filed eleven years after entry of a consent order is not brought within a reasonable time.

Hodges v. Hodges · filed 2009-11-03(b)(4), (b)(6)

We conclude as a matter of law that a delay of eleven years is not "a reasonable time" within which to seek relief from the consent order, and we overrule these assignments of error.

Rule 60(b)(6) permits the Industrial Commission to amend an award to clarify its intended benefits when necessary to do justice.

Ammons v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 2011-03-01(b)(6)

Because the amendment of the January Award was an appropriate exercise of the powers conferred upon the Industrial Commission by Rule 60(b), and not a “mere substitute” for an appeal, we find Ammons’ argument wholly meritless and conclude that the Industrial Commission did not err by amending the January Award and that the Full Commission did not err in affirming the July Award.

Rule 60(b)(3) does not provide relief from judgment for alleged fraud based on a default that the court has found occurred.

Epes v. B.E. Waterhouse, LLC · filed 2012-06-19(b)(3)

Plaintiff essentially argues that Defendants were fraudulent in asserting that Fuddruckers was in default under the contract. We ... have already concluded that Fuddrackers was in default, see Section I ... so this argument is without merit.

Rule 60(b) entitles a movant to a proper hearing on a motion for relief from judgment.

Novak v. Daigle, Inc. · filed 2013-04-02(b)

Whatever the reason, it is clear that “plaintiff[s] ha[ve] never had the proper hearing on [their] Rule 60(b) motion to which [they are] entitled.”

Rule 60(b)(6) does not permit a trial court to grant relief on an issue already decided on appeal and affirmed by the Supreme Court.

McLaughlin v. Bailey · filed 2019-02-05(b)(6)

But the trial court had no authority to do otherwise and should have simply denied plaintiff’s motion based on the law of the case since the issue raised by the Rule 60(b) motion was specifically addressed previously and affirmed by the Supreme Court.

Rule 60(b)(3) allows one year from the date of the order to seek relief for fraud.

Unger v. Unger · filed 2019-10-15(b)(3)

However, Rule 60(b) provides for a one-year statute of limitations for relief from fraud claims, which runs from the date of the order.

Rule 60(b) gives trial courts equitable discretion to grant or deny relief from a final judgment or order.

In re George · filed 2021-04-16(b)

The authority granted to a trial judge by N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b) “is equitable in nature and authorizes the trial court to exercise its discretion in granting or denying the relief sought.” Howell v. Howell, 321 N.C. 87, 91 (1987) (citing Kennedy v. Starr, 62 N.C. App. 182 (1983)).

Rule 60(b)(1) relief turns on whether the party intended the action taken, rather than its legal consequences.

T.H. v. SHL Health Two · filed 2024-04-16(b)(1)

The relevant intention, however, is not the intended outcome of an action; the relevant intention is the intended action.

Rule 60(b)(6) permits relief from a judgment when extraordinary circumstances exist and justice demands relief.

Sloan v. Sloan · filed 2002-07-16(b)(6)

A trial court cannot set aside a judgment or order pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) without a showing: (1) that extraordinary circumstances exist and (2) that justice demands relief. ... This evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that defendant’s silence as to the existence of the debt on the marital home “would serve as specific grounds to set aside the Order entered on September 1, 1998” and “serve as appropriate grounds to set aside the dismissal of Plaintiff’s permanent alimony claim” pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).

Rule 60(b)(6) permits a prior award to be set aside on equitable grounds to prevent injustice.

Bradshaw v. Southeastern Freight · filed 2007-05-24(b)(6)

Accordingly, the Full Commission concludes pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1 , Rule 60(b)(6), the portion of the Full Commission's November 15, 2001 Opinion and Award denying Plaintiff's claim for depression and denying Plaintiff's motion to allow Dr. Thomas English and Dr. Wayne Harper as additional treating physicians for Plaintiff should be set aside on equitable grounds to prevent an injustice.

Rule 15(c) permits a newly added plaintiff's virtually identical claim to relate back to the original complaint for determining venue when the plaintiffs are similarly situated.

Baldwin v. Wilkie · filed 2006-09-19Rule 15(c)

In this case, the substance of the claims of newly joined Plaintiffs, the Churches, are virtually identical to original Plaintiffs' claims. The Churches and original Plaintiffs are similarly situated as all Plaintiffs were allegedly injured during a one-week period at the same location. Accordingly, we hold that the Churches claim are deemed to have been interposed as of the time of the interposition by original Plaintiffs for purposes of determining venue.

Rule 15 does not allow supplemental pleadings to relate back when no actionable slander claim existed when suit was filed or arose within the limitations period.

Williams v. Rutherford Freight Lines, Inc. · filed 1971-02-24Rule 15(c), (d)

We express no opinion as to whether supplementary pleadings may, in some cases, relate back to the original pleading in order to prevent an action from being barred by the statute of limitations. However, we hold that in this case there can be no relation back because at the time the suits were instituted no actionable damages existed, nor did the claims alleged become actionable within the time provided by statute for the instituting of suits in slander actions.

Rule 15(c) permits an amended claim to relate back only if the original pleading gave the party named in the amendment notice of the transactions to be proved.

Teague v. Asheboro Motor Company · filed 1972-06-28Rule 15(c)

To whom must notice be given? The obvious answer is that the claim asserted in the amendment must be against one given notice in the original pleading of the transactions to be proved. Such notice was not given in this case and we believe that the clear words of the statute prevent the amended complaint from relating back to the original complaint.

An amended complaint correcting a policy number relates back when the original complaint gives the insurer notice of the same loss and claim.

Andrews v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance · filed 1975-06-04Rule 15(c)

When served with plaintiffs’ original complaint defendant knew that plaintiffs claimed a loss to the premises for which they contended defendant was liable. ... In no way could they have been prejudiced by plaintiffs’ mis-takingly pleading the number which defendant had affixed to the agreement to insure the premises. It was, therefore, error to dismiss the action and the judgment must be reversed.

Rule 15(a) permits leave to amend when justice so requires, and Rule 15(c) governs when an amended claim relates back to the original pleading.

Callicutt v. American Honda Motor Co. · filed 1978-07-11Rule 15(a), Rule 15(c)

Under Rule 15(a), “. . . leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” ... However, leave to amend is not to be granted automatically, but rather only “when justice so requires.” ... The trial court in this context was correct in viewing Rule 15(a) and (c) together in determining whether or not to grant plaintiff’s motion.

An amended claim relates back to the original complaint when that complaint gave the defendant notice of the transactions or occurrences to be proved by the amendment.

Quail Hollow East Condominium Association v. Donald J. Scholz Co. · filed 1980-07-15Rule 15(c)

Without deciding whether plaintiffs amendment to its complaint constitutes a new cause of action, it is our opinion that the amendment was properly allowed and that it relates back to the original complaint under Rule 15(c).

Rule 15(c) does not permit an agency claim to relate back when the earlier complaint gave the defendant no notice of the transactions or occurrences giving rise to that claim.

Cranford v. Helms · filed 1981-08-04Rule 15(c)

It did not put defendant on notice of the transactions or occurrences potentially giving rise to his liability. The second complaint, filed seven years after the accident in question, cannot, therefore, relate back to the first complaint.

Rule 15(c) allows an amended claim to relate back only if the original pleading gave notice of the transactions or occurrences supporting it.

Henry v. Deen · filed 1984-01-10Rule 15(c)

Since the original complaint did not give notice of a claim against Niazi for negligence or of the transactions or occurrences to be proved in support of any such claim, Rule 15(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure prevents the relation back of this amendment to the time the original complaint was filed.

Rule 15(c) permits an amended claim to relate back when the original complaint gave the defendant notice of the transactions or occurrences underlying the amendment.

Estrada v. Jaques · filed 1984-10-16Rule 15(c)

On these pleadings, we hold that the surgeons had “notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions” in the original complaint, and that, therefore the Amended Complaint related back.

Rule 15(c) does not make an amendment adding an individual partner after the limitations period relate back to a timely suit against the partnership merely because the partner knew of the suit.

Stevens v. Nimocks · filed 1986-08-05Rule 15(c)

Although Taylor had knowledge of the original action prior to the running of the three-year statute of limitations, this knowledge alone will not subject him to individual liability after the running of the statute of limitations. ... Thus, we hold that the plaintiffs amendment adding Taylor individually does not relate back to the filing of the original action and is thus barred by the statute of limitations.

Rule 15(c) relation back cannot revive liability extinguished by a statute of repose.

Pyco Supply Co. Inc. v. American Centennial Ins. Co. · filed 1987-04-07Rule 15(c)

While an ordinary statute of limitation limits a plaintiff's remedy, statutes of repose limit liability; accordingly, once defendant's liability terminated, plaintiff's amendment could not revive that liability, irrespective of any "relation back" under N.C.R.Civ.P. 15(c).

Rule 15(c) permits an amended claim to relate back when the original pleading gave notice of the transactions underlying it, whether the time restriction is a statute of limitation or repose.

Pyco Supply Co. v. American Centennial Insurance · filed 1988-02-03Rule 15(c)

We hold that the determination of whether a claim asserted in an amended pleading relates back does not hinge on whether a time restriction is deemed a statute of limitation or repose.

Rule 15(c) allows an amended complaint to relate back when the original complaint gave notice of the transaction or occurrence underlying the amended claim.

Kwan-Sa You v. Roe · filed 1990-01-16Rule 15(c)

Additionally, the allegations of the amended complaint are based on the same transaction or occurrence (i.e., defendants’ involuntary commitment of plaintiff) as the original complaint. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 15(c), plaintiff’s amended complaint should be deemed to relate back to the filing date of the original complaint.

Rule 15(c) permits an amended complaint to relate back when it corrects the accident year and the original complaint gives notice of the same collision.

Wooten v. Warren Ex Rel. Gilmer · filed 1994-12-20Rule 15(c)

Aside from the changes made by the first amended complaint, the only difference between the original and the second amended complaint of 26 October 1992 is the year in which the accident occurred and that is sufficient to give the notice called for by Rule 15(c).

Rule 15(c) does not permit a claim against a newly named defendant to relate back to the original pleading.

Crossman v. Moore · filed 1995-07-28Rule 15(c)

We hold that this rule does not apply to the naming of a new party-defendant to the action. It is not authority for the relation back of a claim against a new party.

Rule 15(c) does not allow claims against newly added defendants to relate back to the original complaint’s filing date.

Rogerson v. Fitzpatrick · filed 1996-03-05Rule 15(c)

Because Crossman prohibits the addition of new defendants under Rule 15(c), plaintiffs claims against the City and the officers in their official capacities may not take on the filing date of his original complaint and therefore are not saved under his first argument.

Rule 15(c) does not allow an amendment adding a new defendant to relate back, even when that defendant was already a third-party defendant with notice of the claim.

Wicker v. Holland · filed 1998-02-03Rule 15(c)

Wicker sought to add a party, and such action is not authorized by the rule. Accordingly, we must find no error in the trial court’s denial of her motion to amend.

Rule 15(c) does not permit an amendment to relate back when it adds a new defendant rather than correcting a misnomer.

Bob Killian Tire, Inc. v. Day Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1998-11-03Rule 15(c)

The notice requirement of Rulé 15(c) cannot be met where an amendment has the effect of adding a new party to the action, as opposed to correcting a misnomer.

Rule 15(c) allows an amended claim to relate back to the original pleading when the original pleading gave notice of the transactions or occurrences to be proved.

White v. Crisp · filed 2000-06-20(c)

(c) Relation back of amendments. — A claim asserted in an amended pleading is deemed to have been interposed at the time the claim in the original pleading was interposed, unless the original pleading does not give notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, to be proved pursuant to the amended pleading. ... Therefore, we conclude that the amended complaint, which named defendant Crisp in his individual capacity, had the effect of adding a new party and does not relate back to the filing of the original complaint.

Rule 15(c) does not permit an amended pleading to relate back when it adds a new party, though it may permit correction of a mere misnomer.

Piland v. Hertford County Board of Commissioners · filed 2000-12-29(c)

In subsequent cases, this Court has construed the Crossman decision to mean that Rule 15(c) is not authority for the relation back of claims against a new party, but may allow for the relation back of an amendment to correct a mere misnomer.

Rule 15(c) allows an amended claim to relate back to the original filing when the original pleading gave notice of the transactions or occurrences, including when the amendment corrects a misnomer for the same legal entity.

Liss v. Seamark Foods · filed 2001-11-20(c)

The relation back of amendments is the subject of Rule 15(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and provides: ... (c) Relation back of amendments. — A claim asserted in an amended pleading is deemed to have been interposed at the time the claim in the original pleading was interposed, unless the original pleading does not give notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, to be proved pursuant to the amended pleading. ... Here, plaintiff is not attempting to add a new party to the action. Plaintiff is correcting the name of defendant. ... Here, “we are concerned with only one legal entity which uses two names,” not an “attempt to substitute one legal entity for another as defendant.” ... Plaintiff did not add or substitute a new defendant to the action, he merely corrected a misnomer in the summons and complaint.

An amended fraud claim relates back only if the original pleading gives sufficient notice of the alleged fraudulent conduct.

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Darsie · filed 2003-12-16Rule 15(c)

We conclude these claims for relief do not sufficiently give notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, of the alleged fraudulent conduct in the amended counterclaim. Fraud in pleading requires particularity. The purpose of Rule 9(b), and its relation to Rule 15(c) in this instance, is because fraud embraces such a wide variety of potential conduct that the alleged fraudulent party needs particularity of allegations in order to meet the evidentiary remands of the charges.

Rule 13 does not make a counterclaim relate back to the date the plaintiff filed the original action.

Pharmaresearch Corp. v. Mash · filed 2004-04-06Rule 13

We conclude that the pertinent Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 13, does not support defendant’s assertion that his counterclaim should be deemed to “relate back” to the date that plaintiff filed its original action.

Rule 15(c) does not allow an amended complaint adding a defendant to relate back after the limitations period has expired as to that defendant.

State Ex Rel. Cooper v. Ridgeway Brands Manufacturing, LLC · filed 2007-07-17Rule 15(c)

When a plaintiff fails to amend his complaint to add a party defendant until after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations as to that defendant, the claim cannot relate back to circumvent the statute of limitations.

Rule 15(c) may allow an amendment correcting a defendant's name to relate back if the intended defendant was served and would not be prejudiced, but it does not allow a plaintiff to add a distinct new defendant after the limitations period.

Ludemann v. BRADFORD CLINIC, INC. · filed 2007-11-20Rule 15(c)

Rule 15(c) may allow for the relation back of an amendment to correct a misnomer if the intended defendant was properly served and would not be prejudiced by the amendment. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint was an attempt to add a new defendant to the action after the statute of limitations had expired.

Rule 15(c) does not allow an amendment adding or substituting a defendant to relate back, even if that defendant had notice of the proceedings.

Skislak v. Imperial Gourmet Buffet, LLC · filed 2007-08-21Rule 15(c)

However, Crossman clearly holds that Rule 15(c) does not allow plaintiff to add or substitute a party-defendant. Further, under Wicker, it is irrelevant whether plaintiff's claims relate back because Rule 15(c) does not allow the addition or substitution of party-defendants.

Rule 15(c) does not permit an amended complaint to relate back when the proper defendant had no notice of the suit before the limitations period expired.

Reece v. Smith · filed 2008-02-05Rule 15(c)

Key to the holding in Crossman for relation back to occur is notice to the defendant. ... Here, no one was served within the statute of limitations so it is evident that the proper individual was not put on notice of the lawsuit, as was the case in Pierce. ... The trial court properly granted Glenn’s motion to dismiss as the rule of relation back does not apply and the amended complaint was not filed until after the statute of limitations had expired.

Rule 15(c) does not permit an amendment to add a new defendant after the limitations period; substituting a separate corporation is not a correction of a misnomer.

Cline v. Owens · filed 2008-06-17Rule 15(c)

Further, North Carolina General Statute § 1A-1, Rule 15(c) does not allow plaintiff to amend an earlier summons to add a new defendant.

Rule 15(c)'s bar on relation back for a new defendant does not apply when a shareholder is the defendant corporation's alter ego.

State Ex Rel. Cooper v. Ridgeway Brands · filed 2008-08-27Rule 15(c)

Under the instrumentality test, if the plaintiff is able to pierce the corporate veil, the shareholder and the corporation are shown to be, to quote our holding in Henderson, "one and the same." Id. Consequently, the addition of the shareholder would not be the addition of a "new party." Therefore, the holding of Crossman, which the Court of Appeals majority found to be controlling, would not apply.

Suing a corporation tolls the statute of limitations as to its alter egos, so adding a shareholder shown to be an alter ego does not add a new party.

State v. Ridgeway Brands Manufacturing, LLC · filed 2008-08-27Rule 15(c)

We note that this holding merely clarifies that North Carolina follows the same rule as most other jurisdictions that have considered the issue: the principle that initiating a suit against a corporation tolls the statute of limitations with respect to its alter egos.

Rule 15(c) permits an amendment correcting a defendant’s misnomer to relate back when the defendant had notice of the original claim and was not prejudiced by the error.

Langley v. Baughman · filed 2009-01-20Rule 15(c)

Here, as in Seamark Foods, defendant received notice of the original claim despite the error in his name. The summons listed his correct address and was delivered to him. He appeared at the arbitration hearing despite the error, demonstrating that he had actual notice and was not prejudiced by the error.

Rule 15(c) permits an amendment correcting a defendant’s name when the intended defendant was served and had notice of the original claim.

Treadway v. Diez · filed 2011-01-04Rule 15(c)

Here, the various summonses were all served on Van Duncan, who was the sheriff, and thus the appropriate defendant for the suit, and who was himself later substituted in place of defendant Sheriff's Department as a defendant. As such, he did have notice that he was the target of a lawsuit dating back to the original claim. ... As such, we hold that the trial court did not err in allowing plaintiffs' motions to amend, nor in denying defendant's motions to dismiss.

Rule 15(c) does not allow an amendment adding entirely new parties to relate back to the original complaint.

Williams v. Owens · filed 2011-04-19Rule 15(c)

Furthermore, plaintiff’s amended complaint does not relate back to the date of the original complaint as it seeks to add entirely new parties.

Rule 15(c) cannot make an amended complaint relate back to an initial complaint filed by a plaintiff without standing, because the initial complaint is a nullity.

Coderre v. Futrell · filed 2012-12-18Rule 15(c)

Since Coderre lacked standing to file the initial complaint, it was a nullity. Without standing to bring the initial complaint, there was no valid complaint to which the amended complaint could relate back.

Rule 15(c) requires notice of both the events giving rise to a claim and the identity of the party bringing it for an amendment to relate back.

Revolutionary Concepts, Inc. v. Clements Walker PLLC · filed 2013-05-07Rule 15(c)

Critical to application of Rule 15(c) is not only notice of the events that led to the cause of action but also the identity of the party bringing those claims.

Rule 15(c)'s relation-back rule does not apply to an amendment adding a new party.

Philadelphus Presbyterian Found., Inc. v. Robeson Cnty. Bd. of Adjust. · filed 2014-01-07Rule 15(c)

Since the amendment which Petitioners sought to make effectively added a party to this proceeding and since amendments adding new parties do not relate back to the time of the original filing, any amendment of the nature sought by Petitioners would have been futile.

Rule 15(c) does not allow added plaintiffs’ claims to relate back when the claims are not virtually identical to the original claims and the plaintiffs are not closely related.

Charlot v. Ecolab, Inc. · filed 2015-03-27Rule 15(c)

In contrast, North Carolina law requires that the substance of the original and added claims be “virtually identical”; ... and that the original and proposed plaintiffs be “closely related.” ... For the foregoing reasons, relation back is not available under North Carolina law.

Rule 15(c) allows amended claims to relate back, but does not allow relation back to add a new party.

Williams v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc. · filed 2017-01-17Rule 15(c)

However, the plain language of Rule 15(c) makes clear the rule applies only to amendments to add claims, not parties.

Rule 15(c) does not allow an amendment naming a different corporate defendant to relate back when the originally named corporation exists, even if the intended defendant had notice of the claim.

Bradley v. Doe · filed 2014-07-01Rule 15(c)

However, as we stated in Wicker v. Holland, 128 N.C. App. 524, 527, 495 S.E.2d 398, 400 (1998), the fact that the proper defendant had notice of the action and would not be prejudiced by the amendment is “irrelevant under Crossman’s analysis of the limited reach of [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1,] Rule 15(c).” As a result, the fact that Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance may have had actual notice of the claim that Plaintiff intended to assert against it does not suffice to justify overturning the trial court’s decision to deny his amendment motion.

Rule 15(c) permits relation back for amended claims, but not for adding a new party after the statute of limitations expires.

Estate of Rivas by and Through Soto v. Fred Smith Construction, Inc. · filed 2018-02-20Rule 15(c)

Rule 15 allows for the relation-back doctrine to apply when amending a pleading to assert claims, but it does not apply to parties after the statute of limitations expires.

Rule 15 does not allow an amended petition to cure failure to serve the original petition within the deadline prescribed by § 150B-46.

Aetna Better Health of N.C. · filed 2021-09-21Rule 15(c)

To allow Rule 15 to control timeliness of service, when a party did not complete service pursuant to N.C. Gen. § 150B-46, would contravene our prior precedents and the legislative intent, and could lead to gamesmanship to overcome dilatory lapses.

Rule 15(c) allows an amendment correcting a defendant’s misnomer to relate back, but an amendment substituting a separate defendant cannot relate back.

Longmire v. Proof Hospitality 1, LLC · filed 2025-12-03Rule 15(c)

Accordingly, plaintiff’s amendment to the named party-defendant is not a correction of a misnomer but rather the substitution of a party-defendant. Therefore, her amendment may not relate back.

Under Rule 15(c), an amendment naming a defendant after the limitations period expires does not relate back unless the defendant knew or should have known of the identity mistake within that period.

Crossman v. Moore · filed 1994-06-21Rule 15(c)

The third factor, requiring that the party knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning identity, the action would have brought against him, all within the period prescribed by law, is not met. Moore was served in April of 1992, three and a half months after the expiration of the statute of limitations. Clearly, Moore II could not have notice prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations.

Rule 15(c) allows an amendment adding a defendant to relate back only if the new defendant had notice of the filed action before the limitations period expired.

Medford v. HAYWOOD COUNTY HOSP. FOUND. INC. · filed 1994-07-05Rule 15(c)

The amendment to add the Hospital as a party to the action does not relate back to the original complaint, because it does not fulfill the fourth element in the Ring Drug test. That element requires that, for an amended complaint to relate back to the original complaint, the party to be added must have notice of the institution of the civil action within the statute of limitations period.

Rule 15(c) permits an amendment naming a decedent’s estate in place of the decedent to relate back as a misnomer when the personal representative was served and the estate is not prejudiced.

Pierce v. Johnson · filed 2002-11-19Rule 15(c)

In our view, however, Ms. Pierce’s failure to plead the estate of John Daniel Johnson was a misnomer, and therefore, the trial court made an error in law by not permitting an amendment under Rule 15(c).

Rule 6 excludes intervening Saturdays and Sundays when calculating the ordinary five-day notice period for a child-custody hearing.

Brandon v. Brandon · filed 1971-02-24Rule 6(a)

Although the statutes indicate that ordinarily a parent is entitled to at least five days notice (an intervening Saturday or Sunday excluded) of a hearing involving the custody of a child, G.S. 50-13.5 (e) (1) and (2), G.S. 1A-1, Rule 6, this is not an absolute right and is subject to the rule relating to waiver of notice above mentioned.

Rule 6 requires a motion to be served at least five days before the hearing, excludes weekends and holidays when computing a period under seven days, and adds three days when notice is served by mail.

Howell v. Howell · filed 1974-08-07Rule 6(a), (d), (e)

Rule 6(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure further provides that when the period of time prescribed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, shall be excluded in the computation. Following this formula, the earliest that the hearing could have been conducted was 28 September. In addition, Rule 6(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that when service of notice is by mail, three days shall be added to the prescribed period. Consequently, the defendant did not receive adequate notice of the hearing, and the orders entered must be vacated.

Rule 6(a) excludes intermediate Saturdays and Sundays when a time period is less than seven days, and Rule 6(d)'s notice requirement may be waived unless prejudice results.

Jenkins v. Jenkins · filed 1975-10-15(a), (d)

Where the time period is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays and Sundays shall be excluded. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 6(a). Plaintiff committed error in computing the time. However, defendant does not have an absolute right to the notice requirement of Rule 6. Notice may be waived. Also, a new trial will not be granted for a mere technical error. It is incumbent on defendant to show he was prejudiced.

Rule 6(b) allows a trial court to enlarge the time for filing an answer and, after the deadline expires, requires excusable neglect.

Norris ex rel. Norris v. West · filed 1978-01-03(b)

G.S. 1A-1, Rule 6(b) gives the trial court the discretionary authority to enlarge the time period for filing an answer.

Rule 6(a) does not extend the ten-day period for an initial commitment hearing in this situation.

Matter of Jacobs · filed 1978-11-07(a)

We note that this is not a situation wherein the application of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 6(a) would extend the ten-day period.

Rule 6(e)’s three-day extension for notice served by mail does not apply to appeals from Employment Security Commission adjudicators because a statute prescribes a different procedure.

Smith v. Daniels International · filed 1983-10-04Rule 1; Rule 6(e)

The provision that the ten-day limit applies “whether the conclusion [is] delivered manually or mailed” clearly indicates legislative intent to establish “a differing procedure” from that prescribed by G.S. 1A-1, Rule 6(e). G.S. 1A-1, Rule 1 thus precludes application of the three-day grace period provided by G.S. 1A-1, Rule 6(e) and dictates that the express ten-day limit of G.S. 9645(b)(2) controls.

Rule 6(a) allows an action to be filed on Monday when the last day of the limitations period falls on a Saturday.

Adams v. Moore · filed 1989-11-21Rule 6(a)

Nor is the claim necessarily barred by the four-year statute of limitations, G.S. 75-16.2, since the complaint ... alleges that defendants’ unfair purchase was on 19 March 1984, and this action was filed on Monday, 21 March 1988. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 6(a), N.C. Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 6(a) excludes intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays when computing periods shorter than seven days.

Selph v. Post · filed 2001-07-03(a)

Rule 6(a) explicitly applies to “any period of time prescribed or allowed by [the Rules of Civil Procedure.]” We thus reject this argument, holding the cut-off date was met precisely, and plaintiffs’ action was timely commenced.

Rule 17(b) provides for a guardian or guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent party, whether plaintiff or defendant, rather than a next friend.

Rutledge v. Rutledge · filed 1971-02-24Rule 17(b)

Rule 17 (b) makes no reference to a “next friend,” but provides for the appointment of a guardian or guardian ad litem for infants and incompetents who are parties, whether plaintiff or defendant, in any civil action.

Rule 17(b)(1) permits a general guardian to be substituted as plaintiff when the guardian’s appointment is regular on its face.

Hearon ex rel. Willey v. Hearon · filed 1979-12-18Rule 17(b)(1)

The order appointing Sarah Bartlett Hearon Bondy as general guardian is regular on its face, and no reason appears why the general guardian should not be substituted as plaintiff. See G.S. 1A-1, Rule 17(b)(1).

Rule 17(b) permits a trustee to maintain an action for an incompetent person; a guardian ad litem may continue when the court deems that representation expedient.

Gaskins v. McCotter · filed 1981-06-02(b)(1), (b)(3)

As of 4 January 1978 Baxter, as trustee, became the proper person to maintain the action under G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 17(b)(1), and Archie Gaskins could maintain the action as guardian ad litem only as long as the court “deemed” it to be “expedient.” Since the court clearly had authority to determine whether it was expedient for the guardian ad litem to bring and maintain the action when the incompetent had a general guardian or trustee in this State, it manifestly had authority to substitute the general guardian or trustee as party plaintiff for the guardian ad litem.

Rule 17(c) requires appointment of a guardian ad litem for a minor parent and minor child in a parental rights termination proceeding.

In Re Clark · filed 1981-08-17Rule 17(c)

Whether or not the Act requires it, appointment of a guardian ad litem for both the minor respondent-mother and her minor child is mandated by G.S. 1A-1, Rule 17(c), Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 17(b)(2) permits a trial court to inquire into a litigant’s competency and decide whether to appoint a guardian ad litem.

In Re JAA · filed 2005-12-20Rule 17(b)(2)

The trial court conducted a hearing pursuant to Rule 17 regarding the issue of respondent's competency. After careful review of the record and transcript, we are unable to say that the trial judge abused her discretion by not appointing a guardian ad litem for respondent.

Rule 17 does not require appointment of a guardian ad litem for a parent when incompetence is neither alleged nor shown.

In Re DH · filed 2006-06-06Rule 17(b)(4)

No allegations were asserted, and no showing was made that respondent was incompetent. The trial court was not required to appoint a GAL to respondent under either N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B-1101 or N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 17.

Rule 17 permits a duly appointed guardian ad litem to bring an action on behalf of an incompetent person.

Granville v. YEDDO · filed 2009-08-18Rule 17

An action may also be brought on behalf of an incompetent by a duly appointed guardian ad litem.

Rule 11(c) permits an agent or attorney to verify a pleading founded on a written instrument for the payment of money, but does not require verification.

Hill v. Hill · filed 1971-04-28Rule 11(c)

G.S. 1A-1, Rule 11(c) sets forth the circumstances and the manner in which pleadings may be verified by an agent or attorney of a party when the action or defense is founded upon a written instrument for the payment of money only, but it does not specifically require verification.

Rule 11(b) requires a party's affidavit verifying a pleading to state that its contents are true to the party's knowledge, subject to matters stated on information and belief.

Skinner v. Skinner · filed 1976-02-04(b)

Nothing in plaintiff’s testimony suggests that the essential statement required by Rule 11 (b), the statement that “the contents of the pleading verified are true to the knowledge of the person making the verification” was in any way false.

A divorce complaint must be verified under Rule 11 when it is filed; verification before service is insufficient.

Boyd v. Boyd · filed 1983-03-15Rule 11

As a result, we hold that G.S. 50-8 requires that for a complaint for divorce to be valid, it must be verified in accordance with G.S. 1A-1, Rule 11 when it is filed. It is not sufficient to obtain verification before the complaint and summons are served on the defendant.