N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1

Rule 41(b) permits involuntary dismissal when the plaintiff’s evidence fails to show a right to relief.

Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Griffin · filed 1980-05-20Rule 41(b)

Defendant’s motion for involuntary dismissal under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 41(b) was denied by the trial court. We find that defendant was entitled to have this motion granted, since plaintiff’s evidence failed to show that it had a right to relief.

Under Rule 41(b), dismissal with prejudice for failing to obey an invalid order is an extreme sanction that requires a new discretionary ruling.

Thornburg v. Lancaster · filed 1980-06-03Rule 41(b)

While it is certainly true that one cannot take it upon himself to ignore an erroneous order or judgment, State v. Goff, 264 N.C. 563,142 S.E. 2d (1965), in light of the fact that a dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(b) is an extreme sanction, we find it appropriate in this case to vacate the trial court’s ruling on defendants’ Rule 41(b) motion and remand for a new ruling.

Rule 41(b) involuntary dismissal tests the legal sufficiency of all evidence admitted for the plaintiff in a non-jury case.

Harrell v. W. B. Lloyd Construction Co. · filed 1980-06-03Rule 41(b)

A motion for involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b) serves in part to test the legal sufficiency of all evidence admitted on behalf of the plaintiff in a non-jury case.

When a court dismisses a nonjury action after the plaintiff’s evidence under Rule 41(b), it must make findings of fact as required by Rule 52(a).

Memorial Hospital of Alamance County, Inc. v. Brown · filed 1981-02-03Rules 41(b), 52(a)(1)

The trial court having failed to make the necessary findings, we must vacate and remand for a new trial.

Rule 41(b) gives the trial court discretion to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute.

Jones v. Stone · filed 1981-06-16Rule 41(b)

Dismissal under Rule 41(b) is within the discretion of the trial court. The trial court heard the testimony of the original attorney and reviewed the affidavit of Ms. Jones, and upon that evidence it failed to find that petitioners were delaying this action or otherwise attempting to thwart its progress toward trial. The decision of the trial court, denying respondent’s motion, should therefore not be disturbed.

Rule 41(b) permits involuntary dismissal when a trial court sitting as factfinder makes findings supported by competent evidence that warrant dismissal.

Greensboro Housing Authority v. Kirkpatrick & Associates, Inc. · filed 1982-03-16(b)

The court, sitting as the trier of fact, found facts, based on competent evidence, which rendered proper allowance of the motion for involuntary dismissal pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 41(b).

Rule 41(b) requires a court granting involuntary dismissal on the merits in a nonjury trial to make findings of fact.

Young v. Kuehne Chemical Co. · filed 1981-09-15Rule 41(b)

Rule 41(b) provides that a court trying an action without a jury must, when rendering judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, make findings of fact as provided in G.S. 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(1).

Rule 41(b) permits a judge hearing a nonjury case to weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility when deciding a motion to dismiss after the plaintiff rests.

Dealers Specialties, Inc. v. Neighborhood Housing Services, Inc. · filed 1982-05-04(b)

When a motion to dismiss pursuant to 41(b) is made, the judge becomes both the judge and the jury and he must consider and weigh all competent evidence before him. He passes upon the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.

Rule 41(b) permits involuntary dismissal at the close of the plaintiff's evidence when the plaintiff has shown no right to relief, but the motion should be used sparingly.

Dubose Steel, Inc. v. Faircloth · filed 1982-12-07Rule 41(b)

G.S. 1A-1, Rule 41(b) allows a trial judge to involuntarily dismiss the case at the close of plaintiffs evidence because plaintiff has shown no right to relief. But this motion should be used sparingly.

Rule 41(b) permits a judge in a nonjury trial to weigh the evidence and dismiss the action after the plaintiff’s case, even if the plaintiff has made a prima facie case.

United Leasing Corp. v. Miller · filed 1982-12-21Rule 41(b)

Under Rule 41(b) the judge, as trier of the facts, may weigh the evidence, find the facts against plaintiff and sustain defendant’s motion at the conclusion of his evidence even though plaintiff has made out a prima facie case which would have precluded a directed verdict for defendant in a jury trial.

Rule 41(b) permits dismissal for violating Rule 8(a)(2)'s prohibition on stating a monetary demand in a professional malpractice complaint.

Jones v. Boyce · filed 1983-02-01Rule 8(a)(2); Rule 41(b)

The General Assembly thus must have intended application of the Rule 41(b) power of dismissal as a permissible sanction for violation of the Rule 8(a)(2) proscription.

Rule 41(b) permits a judge in a nonjury trial to weigh the plaintiff’s evidence and dismiss the action even if the plaintiff has made a prima facie case.

Thompson v. Wrenn · filed 1983-04-05Rule 41(b)

The judge may, as trier of facts, weigh the evidence, find the facts against plaintiff, and sustain defendant’s motion even though plaintiff has made a prima facie case.

A Rule 41(b) motion for involuntary dismissal may be denied when the plaintiff’s evidence, taken as true, supports findings on which judgment for the plaintiff could rest.

Matthews v. Brown · filed 1983-06-07Rule 41(b)

The first two assignments of error assert that the trial judge erred in failing to dismiss plaintiffs cause of action pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 41(b): first, because the evidence was insufficient to show a violation of the terms of the timber deed; and, second, because the evidence was insufficient to show negligence on the part of the Georgia-Pacific Corporation. We disagree. The trial judge’s findings of fact support his award. Adequate evidence was offered by plaintiff which, if taken as true, supports findings upon which the trier of fact could properly base a judgment for the plaintiff.

Rule 41(b) permits a judge in a nonjury case to weigh the evidence and enter judgment against the movant at the close of the movant’s evidence.

In re the Foreclosure of a Deed of Trust Executed by Taylor · filed 1983-09-06Rule 41(b)

At the close of the movant’s evidence, the judge may grant judgment against the movant on the basis of facts as he determines them to be. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 41(b).

Rule 41(b) makes an involuntary dismissal an adjudication on the merits unless the dismissal order specifies otherwise.

African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church v. Union Chapel A.M.E. Zion Church · filed 1983-10-18Rule 41(b)

Rule 41(b) provides that unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, [through the language “without prejudice”], dismissal under that section operates as an adjudication upon the merits.

A court may dismiss an action under Rule 41(b) for violating Rule 8(a)(2), and denying dismissal can be an abuse of discretion when the violation is flagrant and aggravated.

Schell v. Coleman · filed 1983-11-15Rule 8(a)(2)

The Rule 41(b) power of dismissal is only a permissible sanction, not a mandatory one. Allowance of a motion to dismiss on the basis of a Rule 8 violation is discretionary with the court. ... Given the flagrant and aggravated nature of plaintiffs violation of the rule, we are compelled to hold the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Rule 41(b) permits a judge in a nonjury trial to weigh the evidence and dismiss the action at the close of the plaintiff’s case, even if the plaintiff has made a prima facie case.

Lumbee River Electric Membership Corp. v. City of Fayetteville · filed 1983-12-06Rule 41(b)

The trial judge sits as a trier of the facts and may weigh the evidence, find the facts against the plaintiff and sustain the defendant’s motion under section (b) of this rule at the conclusion of the plaintiffs evidence, even though the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case which would have precluded a directed verdict for the defendant in a jury case.

Rule 41(b) controls review of a motion to dismiss in a nonjury case.

Davidson v. North Carolina Department of Administration · filed 1984-07-17Rule 41(b)

Since this was a nonjury case, our scope of review is controlled by G.S. 1A-1, Rule 41(b) instead of Rule 50(a) [the defendants referred to both Rules in their motion to the trial court].

In a nonjury civil trial, a defendant tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence through a motion for involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b).

Mayo v. Mayo · filed 1985-03-05Rule 41(b)

In nonjury civil cases the appropriate motion by which a defendant may test the sufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence to show a right to relief is a motion for involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b).

Rule 41(b) permits a judge in a nonjury trial to weigh the evidence and dismiss on the merits at the close of the plaintiff's evidence, even if the plaintiff has made a prima facie case.

McKnight v. Cagle · filed 1985-07-16(b)

A motion for dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b), made at the close of plaintiffs evidence in a non-jury trial, not only tests the sufficiency of plaintiffs proof to show a right to relief, but also provides a procedure whereby the judge may weigh the evidence, determine the facts, and render judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, even though the plaintiff may have made out a prima facie case.

Rule 41(b) permits a defendant in a non-jury case to move for dismissal after the plaintiff rests if the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.

Woodlief v. Johnson · filed 1985-06-04(b)

In a non-jury case, as here, after the plaintiff has rested his case, defendant may move pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 41(b) for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law plaintiff has shown no right to relief.

On a Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss in a non-jury trial, the judge weighs competent evidence and assesses witness credibility.

Matter of Hughes · filed 1985-06-04Rule 41(b)

In a non-jury trial when a motion to dismiss pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 41(b) is made, the judge becomes both judge and jury. He must consider and weigh all competent evidence before him. He passes on the credibility of the witnesses and determines the weight to be accorded their testimony.

Rule 41(b) permits a judge in a nonjury trial to weigh the evidence, find facts, and dismiss at the close of the plaintiff's evidence even if the plaintiff has made a prima facie case.

Childers v. Hayes · filed 1985-11-19Rule 41(b)

The trial judge may weigh the evidence, find the facts and sustain defendant’s Rule 41(b) motion at the conclusion of plaintiffs evidence even though plaintiff has made out a prima facie case which would have precluded a directed verdict for defendant in a jury trial.

Rule 41(b) governs a motion for involuntary dismissal after the plaintiff presents evidence in a trial before a judge.

Holthusen v. Holthusen · filed 1986-03-04Rule 41(b)

Defendant’s motion should be treated as a G.S. 1A-1, Rule 41(b) motion for involuntary dismissal.

Rule 41(b) permits a judge in a bench trial to defer ruling on a defendant’s motion for involuntary dismissal until all evidence has been presented.

Esteel Co. v. Goodman · filed 1986-09-16(b)

The permissive language of the rule itself makes clear that the court may decline to render judgment until all of the evidence has been presented.

Rule 41(b) permits lesser sanctions, including costs and attorney’s fees, for failure to comply with a court order, but the court must make findings about the effectiveness of alternatives and the plaintiff’s ability to comply.

Daniels v. Montgomery Mutual Insurance · filed 1986-07-01Rule 41(b)

With the foregoing, persuasive legal principles in mind, we hold that the trial court has the authority, pursuant to Rule 41(b), to impose lesser sanctions against a party or counsel for failure to comply with a court order. The lesser sanctions imposed may include costs plus attorney’s fees. In considering what sanctions to impose, the trial court must make findings concerning the effectiveness of alternative sanctions and must make findings that the plaintiff is capable of performing the alternative.

Rule 41(b) permits dismissal when a plaintiff fails to comply with a court order; dismissal is within the trial court’s discretion when intentional noncompliance makes a lesser sanction ineffective.

Daniels v. Montgomery Mutual Insurance · filed 1987-10-07Rule 41(b)

Rule 41(b) authorizes a trial court to dismiss an action for failure of a plaintiff to comply with a previous court order. ... Given the intentional noncompliance by the plaintiff and the ineffectiveness of the previously imposed sanctions, Judge Smith did not abuse his discretion in ordering the dismissal of plaintiff's action pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 41(b) requires the trial court to consider whether a less drastic sanction would secure compliance with a court order before dismissing a complaint with prejudice.

Rivenbark v. Southmark Corp. · filed 1989-04-18Rule 41(b)

We affirm the order finding plaintiff in contempt of court but hold that under Rule 41(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure the trial court erred in failing to consider whether a sanction less drastic than dismissal with prejudice would have assured plaintiff’s compliance with Judge Hobgood’s 12 June 1984 order.

Rule 41(b) permits dismissal with prejudice when a plaintiff intentionally delays service for tactical advantage, and the trial court does not abuse its discretion in finding lesser sanctions inadequate.

Sellers v. High Point Memorial Hospital, Inc. · filed 1990-02-06Rule 41(b)

The trial court in its discretion found “that no other lesser sanction would better serve the interests of justice in this case.” We find no basis for concluding that the trial court abused its discretion.

Rule 41(b) permits dismissal for failure to prosecute when plaintiffs refuse to proceed to trial after being ordered to do so.

Myers v. Barringer · filed 1990-12-18Rule 41(b)

... we find that the court properly exercised its jurisdiction in dismissing the remaining claims under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 41(b) (1983) for failure to prosecute and to comply with the trial judge’s order to prosecute.

Rules 41(b) and (c) govern involuntary dismissal of a counterclaim after the evidence, including judgment on the merits when the counterclaimant has shown no right to relief.

Carter v. Foster · filed 1991-06-04(b) and (c)

The provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim .... N.C.G.S. §§ 1A-1, Rules 41(b) and (c) (1990). ... An involuntary dismissal should be granted if the counter-claimant has shown no right to relief or if he has shown a right to relief but the trial court as trier of fact determines that the party moving for dismissal is entitled to a judgment on the merits. ... With respect to defendants’ counterclaim arising from sale of the collateral, we conclude the trial court’s findings support its conclusions, and the conclusions support the court’s judgment that the counterclaim be dismissed and forever barred. We, therefore, hold the trial court did not err in dismissing defendants’ counterclaim.

Rule 41(b) provides for an involuntary dismissal motion to test the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence in a nonjury trial.

Mashburn v. First Investors Corp. · filed 1991-04-16Rule 41(b)

When there is a trial by the court, sitting without a jury, the appropriate motion by which a defendant may test the sufficiency of plaintiff’s evidence to show a right to relief is a motion for involuntary dismissal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 41(b).

Under Rule 41(b), a judge deciding an involuntary dismissal motion in a nonjury case weighs the competent evidence as the factfinder.

C.F.R. Foods, Inc. v. Randolph Development Co. · filed 1992-10-06Rule 41(b)

“When a motion to dismiss pursuant to [N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule] 41(b) is made, the judge becomes both the judge and the jury and he must consider and weigh all competent evidence before him.”

Rule 41(b) does not permit involuntary dismissal when the plaintiff has shown a right to relief.

Riley v. Ken Wilson Ford, Inc. · filed 1993-03-02Rule 41(b)

Based on these facts and other evidence, it would have been improper for the trial court to find that plaintiffs had shown “no right to relief” for their breach of warranty claims. The trial court properly denied the motion.

Rule 41(b) permits a defendant in a nonjury trial to move for involuntary dismissal at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence when the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.

United Carolina Bank v. First Union National Bank · filed 1993-03-02Rule 41(b)

A defendant in an action being tried without a jury may test the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence by moving at the close of plaintiff’s evidence under N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 41(b) for involuntary dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.

Rule 41(b) requires a judge hearing a nonjury case to weigh all competent evidence when deciding a motion to dismiss.

In Re Becker · filed 1993-07-20Rule 41(b)

When a Rule 41(b) motion is made in a nonjury trial, the judge becomes both the judge and jury, and he must consider and weigh all competent evidence before him.

Rule 41(b) permits dismissal for failure to prosecute or comply with procedural rules or a court order, but a defendant may seek dismissal for failure to prove a right to relief only in a trial without a jury.

Beam v. Kerlee · filed 1995-09-19Rule 41(b)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 41(b) (1990) provides that a party may move for an involuntary dismissal for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or comply with the rules of civil procedure or any order of the court. Only in an action tried without a jury may the defendant move for an involuntary dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. ... Since this case was a jury trial, the defendant’s motion to dismiss was improper as was the court’s granting of the motion. We find this error harmless.

Rule 41(b) allows a judge in a nonjury trial to weigh the evidence and dismiss the case on the merits at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence, even if the plaintiff has made a prima facie case.

Matter of Oghenekevebe · filed 1996-08-06Rule 41(b)

A motion for dismissal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 41(b), made at the close of plaintiffs evidence in a nonjury trial, not only tests the sufficiency of plaintiffs proof to show a right to relief, but also provides a procedure whereby the judge may weigh the evidence, determine the facts, and render judgment on the merits against plaintiff, even though plaintiff may have made out a prima facie case.

Rule 41(b) permits dismissal within the trial court's sound discretion, subject to appellate review for abuse of discretion.

Kerik v. Davidson County · filed 2001-08-07(b)

"Dismissal under Rule 41(b) is left to the sound discretion of the trial court."

Rule 41(b) permits involuntary dismissal in a nonjury trial when the plaintiff's evidence is insufficient as a matter of law and allows the judge to weigh the evidence and determine the facts.

Vernon v. Lowe · filed 2002-02-19(b)

However, defendants’ motion is correctly treated as a motion for involuntary dismissal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 41(b) (1999).

Rule 41(b) treats an involuntary dismissal that does not specify it is without prejudice as a dismissal with prejudice.

Harvey v. Cedar Creek BP · filed 2002-04-16Rule 41(b)

In other words, an involuntary dismissal which fails to state that it is without prejudice will be construed as being with prejudice.

Rule 41(b) permits dismissal for insufficiency of the evidence after the trial judge weighs all competent evidence, within the court's sound discretion.

State Ex Rel. Pilard v. Berninger · filed 2002-11-19Rule 41(b)

When a party moves to dismiss pursuant Rule 41(b), the trial judge becomes both the judge and jury and must weigh all competent evidence before him.

Before dismissing a case for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b), the trial court must consider the plaintiff’s delay, prejudice to the defendant, and whether lesser sanctions would suffice.

Spencer v. Albemarle Hospital · filed 2003-03-18Rule 41(b)

Before a case may be dismissed under Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute, the trial judge must address the following three factors: “(1) whether the plaintiff acted in a manner which deliberately or unreasonably delayed the matter; (2) the amount of prejudice, if any, to the defendant; and (3) the reason, if one exists, that sanctions short of dismissal would not suffice.”

Rule 41(b)’s three-factor standard for dismissal with prejudice also applies when the Industrial Commission dismisses a workers’ compensation claim for failure to prosecute.

Lee v. Roses · filed 2004-01-06Rule 41(b)

(1) whether the plaintiff acted in a manner which deliberately or unreasonably delayed the matter; (2) the amount of prejudice, if any, to the defendant [caused by the plaintiff’s failure to prosecute]; and (3) the reason, if one exists, that sanctions short of dismissal would not suffice. ... We find this rule to be relevant to and consistent with the underlying public policy of the Worker’s Compensation Act, and thus apply these same standards to the dismissal of a workers’ compensation claim with prejudice at the Industrial Commission for failure to prosecute.

Rule 41(b) permits a trial court to defer ruling on a motion to dismiss until the close of all evidence.

In re J.A.G. · filed 2005-06-07Rule 41(b)

Moreover, under N.C.R. Civ. P. 41(b), the trial court has the discretion to decline to rule upon a motion to dismiss until the close of all evidence.

An involuntary dismissal under Rule 41 is reviewed for whether competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings and whether those findings support its conclusions of law and judgment.

Dean v. Hill · filed 2005-07-19Rule 41(b)

The proper standard of review for a motion for an involuntary dismissal under Rule 41 is (1) whether the findings of fact by the trial court are supported by competent evidence, and (2) whether the findings of fact support the trial court’s conclusions of law and its judgment.

Rule 41(b) allows a trial court to defer ruling on a motion to dismiss until the close of all evidence.

In Re JAG · filed 2005-08-16Rule 41(b)

Moreover, under Rule 41(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court has the discretion to decline to rule upon a motion to dismiss until the close of all evidence.

A defendant who presents evidence waives appellate review of the denial of a Rule 41(b) motion made at the close of the plaintiff's evidence.

Karger v. Wood · filed 2005-12-06Rule 41(b)

We note that by presenting evidence, defendant waived his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss made at the close of plaintiff's evidence.

An objection renewed after the petitioner closes its evidence is treated as a Rule 41(b) motion for involuntary dismissal and may be reviewed on appeal.

In Matter of Rj · filed 2006-02-07Rule 41(b)

We note initially that, ordinarily, a party may not seek review of a denial of a 12(b)(6) motion following a trial on the merits. However, as respondent renewed her motion following the close of petitioner's evidence, we treat this objection as a motion for involuntary dismissal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 41(b), and thus we address its merits on appeal.

Rule 41(b) governs a motion to dismiss in a trial before a judge without a jury.

Hammonds v. LUMBEE RIVER ELEC. M'SHIP CORP. · filed 2006-06-20Rule 41(b)

It is well settled that in actions tried before the judge without a jury, a motion to dismiss is made under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 41(b), not Rule 50(a).

Rule 41(b) governs motions to dismiss in trials before a judge without a jury.

Hammonds v. Lumbee River Electric Membership Corp. · filed 2006-06-20Rule 41(b)

It is well settled that in actions tried before the judge without a jury, a motion to dismiss is made under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 41(b), not Rule 50(a).

Rule 41(b) permits dismissal with prejudice in a nonjury trial when the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.

Hedingham Community Ass'n v. GLH Builders, Inc. · filed 2006-08-01Rule 41(b)

The court thus properly dismissed Plaintiff’s action with prejudice under Rule 41(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.

Appellate review of a Rule 41(b) involuntary dismissal asks whether competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings and whether those findings support its conclusions and judgment.

Hailey v. Auto-Owners Insurance · filed 2007-02-20(b)

“The proper standard of review for a motion for an involuntary dismissal under Rule 41 is (1) whether the findings of fact by the trial court are supported by competent evidence, and (2) whether the findings of fact support the trial court’s conclusions of law and its judgment.”

Rule 41(b) permits dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute when a plaintiff willfully delays adjudication and prejudices the defendant.

Bunch v. N.C. Dept. of Correction · filed 2007-03-23Rule 41(b)

In light of the foregoing, dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to prosecute is appropriate.

Rule 41(b) permits involuntary dismissal for failure to prosecute or comply with a rule or court order, or for failure to make out a prima facie case at a bench trial.

Floyd v. Allen · filed 2008-11-04Rule 41(b)

Rule 41, subsection (b) [4] provides two broad categories of involuntary dismissal: (1) failure to prosecute or comply with a court order or with procedural rules, and (2) failure to make out a prima facie case at a bench trial. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 41(b). The trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint fits neither category.

Rule 41(b) requires a trial court to consider lesser sanctions before dismissing an action with prejudice for failure to prosecute or comply with a court order.

All Carolina Crane & Equipment, LLC v. Dan's Relocators, Inc. · filed 2010-02-16Rule 41(b)

Before dismissing plaintiff's case with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b), the trial court is required to consider whether sanctions short of dismissal would not suffice.

An appellate court reviewing a Rule 41 involuntary dismissal determines whether competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings and whether those findings support its conclusions and judgment.

WOODRIDGE HOMES LTD. PARTNERSHIP v. Gregory · filed 2010-07-20(b)

“The proper standard of review for a motion for an involuntary dismissal under Rule 41 is (1) whether the findings of fact by the trial court are supported by competent evidence, and (2) whether the findings of fact support the trial court’s conclusions of law and its judgment.”

Rule 41(b) permits dismissal for failure to comply with a court order, but the trial court must consider lesser sanctions before dismissing the action.

Ray v. Greer · filed 2011-06-07Rule 41(b)

Rule 41(b) provides that a trial court may dismiss an action for failure to prosecute, failure to comply with an order of the court, or failure to comply with any of the rules of civil procedure. ... The trial court must consider lesser sanctions before imposing the “most severe sanction” available; after considering lesser sanctions, the trial court may determine the appropriate sanction in its discretion.

An involuntary dismissal under Rule 41 is reviewed for whether competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings and whether those findings support its conclusions and judgment.

In Re the Proposed Foreclosure of Claim of Lien Filed Against Johnson · filed 2011-06-21Rule 41(b)

"The proper standard of review for a motion for an involuntary dismissal under Rule 41 is (1) whether the findings of fact by the trial court are supported by competent evidence, and (2) whether the findings of fact support the trial court's conclusions of law and its judgment." Dean v. Hill, 171 N.C.App. 479, 483, 615 S.E.2d 699, 701 (2005) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

A dismissal under Rule 41(b) at the close of the claimant’s evidence receives the same appellate review as an order entered after a full trial.

Bodie v. Bodie · filed 2012-06-05Rule 41(b)

The same standard of review applies regardless of whether the trial court’s order was entered after a full trial on the merits or whether, as in this case, the trial court dismissed the relevant clam at the conclusion of the evidence presented by the party seeking relief pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 41(b).

Rule 41(b) permits a trial court to defer ruling on an involuntary dismissal motion until it has considered all the evidence.

Latak v. Latak · filed 2014-07-01Rule 41(b)

Since N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 41(b) allows the trial court to “decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence,” the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff's motion before the court had evaluated the submitted affidavits, evidence and briefs.

A Rule 41(b) dismissal operates as a final adjudication on the merits unless the order specifies otherwise or an exception applies.

Johnson v. Starboard Ass'n, Inc. · filed 2016-01-05Rule 41(b)

First, the dismissal of the foreclosure proceeding pursuant to Rule 41(b) operated as a final adjudication on the merits.

A defendant who presents evidence after denial of a Rule 41(b) motion waives the right to appeal that denial.

Jarrett v. Jarrett · filed 2016-09-06Rule 41(b)

Accordingly, we hold that because defendant presented evidence after his motion for involuntary dismissal was denied, he has waived his right to appeal from the denial of the motion.

A dismissal under Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Don'T Do It Empire, LLC v. Tenntex · filed 2016-03-01Rule 41(b)

The trial court’s decision to dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 41(b) is also reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Rule 41(b) allows a trial court to dismiss a claim at the close of all the evidence when it makes the required Rule 52 findings; the judgment is treated as one on the merits.

Estate of Johnson v. Johnsonów · filed 2016-12-30Rule 41(b)

Although Rule 41(b) does not specifically provide for involuntary dismissal at the close of all of the evidence, "where such a motion is made and ruled upon and the court has made findings as required by [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 1A-1, Rule 52, the judgment entered will be treated as a judgment on the merits."

Rule 41(b) requires dismissal of a civil satellite-based monitoring proceeding when the State fails to show a right to relief.

State v. Greene · filed 2017-10-03Rule 41(b)

Because “dismissal under Rule 41(b) is to be granted if the plaintiff has shown no right to relief[,]” having conceded the trial court’s error, the State must likewise concede that the proper outcome below would have been for the trial court to grant defendant’s motion and dismiss the satellite-based monitoring proceeding against him.

Rule 41(b) does not authorize an ALJ to convert a renewed summary judgment motion into an involuntary dismissal without giving the parties an opportunity to address the motion.

Environmentalee v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res. · filed 2018-04-03Rule 41(b)

Because of the stark differences in the motions, we hold it was improper for the ALJ to conflate the two motions and convert the renewed motion for summary judgment into a Rule 41(b) motion for an involuntary dismissal. There is no authority authorizing such conversion, especially where the ALJ acts sua sponte without providing the parties the opportunity to present additional arguments on Rule 41(b).

A Rule 41(b) dismissal is reviewed for competent evidence supporting the findings of fact and for whether those findings support the conclusions of law and judgment.

Musselwhite v. Cheshire · filed 2019-07-02Rule 41(b)

We review a trial court’s dismissal under Rule 41(b) to determine (1) whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, and (2) whether the findings of fact support the trial court’s conclusions of law and the judgment.

Rule 41(b) permits dismissal of a claim with prejudice on the defendant's motion.

Williams v. N.C. Dept. of Corr. · filed 2003-03-24Rule 41(b)

Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1 , Rule 41(b), defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim with prejudice is GRANTED.

Rule 41(b) permits dismissal with prejudice when a plaintiff fails to show a right to relief.

Pharr v. N.C. D.O.T. · filed 2003-05-27(b)

Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1 , Rule 41(b), defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim with prejudice, is hereby GRANTED.

Rule 41(b) permits dismissal with prejudice when the plaintiff fails to establish a claim.

Schubart v. N.C. D.O.T. · filed 2005-01-04Rule 41(b)

Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1 , Rule 41(b), Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's claim with prejudice is GRANTED.

Rule 41(b) permits dismissal of a claim with prejudice when the plaintiff fails to prove it.

Bullock v. N.C. Div. of Mental Health · filed 2005-05-20(b)

Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1 , Rule 41(b), Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's claim with prejudice is GRANTED.

Rule 41(b) permits dismissal with prejudice when a plaintiff fails to prove the claim.

Hall v. Pembroke · filed 2006-06-02(b)

Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1 , Rule 41(b), defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim with prejudice is GRANTED.

Rule 41(b) permits involuntary dismissal after the plaintiff presents evidence in a nonjury case if the plaintiff has shown no right to relief; the dismissal may be with prejudice.

Norman v. N.C. Dept. of Transportation · filed 2007-02-02(b)

Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1 , Rule 41(b), defendant's motion to involuntarily dismiss plaintiff's claim is GRANTED. This dismissal is an adjudication on the merits and is with prejudice.

Rule 41(b) permits dismissal when a plaintiff fails to prove negligence.

Evans v. North Carolina Central University · filed 2008-12-04Rule 41(b)

Since Plaintiff failed to prove negligence on the part of Defendant, her claim was properly dismissed. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1 , Rule 41(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 15(b) gives the trial court broad discretion to allow or deny amendments, and a denial that does not prejudicially affect a party’s rights is not error.

Helson's Premiums and Gifts, Inc. v. Duncan · filed 1970-11-18(b)

This contention is without merit as the trial court has broad discretion in permitting or denying amendments and the denial of the motion did not prejudicially affect defendant’s rights.

Rule 15(a) permits amendment of a pleading with the court’s leave, which should be freely given when justice requires.

Williams v. Nationwide Insurance Co. · filed 1971-08-04Rule 15(a)

Under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 15(a), ... a party may amend his pleading at any time by leave of court, “and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” In this case there was no error in allowing the amendments.

Rule 15(a) permits a court to allow a pleading amendment when justice requires, including an amendment that elaborates on an allegation already pleaded.

Southwire Co. v. Long Manufacturing Co. · filed 1971-09-15Rule 15(a)

G.S. 1A-1, Eule 15 (a), permits, among other things, a party to amend his pleading by leave of the court and provides that “leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” ... The amendment allowed was a further elaboration of what had already been pleaded. ... It was not error to allow the motion to amend.

Rule 15(b) allows issues tried by consent to be treated as pleaded, so denial of a formal amendment to conform the pleadings to the evidence does not itself prejudice a party.

Mangum v. Surles · filed 1971-12-07Rule 15(b)

Under this rule the plaintiff could not have been prejudiced by the court’s denial of the formal motion to amend the complaint.

Under Rule 15(a), an answer cannot be amended as of right after the time to answer expires; leave to amend rests in the court’s discretion.

Calloway v. Ford Motor Company · filed 1972-06-16(a)

This Court has consistently held that “after the time for answering a pleading has expired,” an answer may not be amended as of right. A motion to amend is addressed to the discretion of the court, and its decision thereon is not subject to review except in case of manifest abuse. ... Although these cases were decided prior to the adoption of the new Rules of Civil Procedure, G.S. 1A-1 (1969), the rule they enunciate remains applicable today.

Rule 15(a) leaves a motion for permission to amend a complaint to the trial court’s discretion.

Flores v. Caldwell · filed 1972-03-29Rule 15(a)

The motion for leave to file an amended complaint was addressed to the discretion of the trial court.

Rule 15 permits a court to allow an amendment to an answer during trial within its discretion.

Davis v. Connell · filed 1972-03-29Rule 15(b)

In our opinion the court was acting well within its discretionary powers in allowing the amendment under these circumstances.

Rule 15(b) treats an issue raised by evidence admitted without an objection that it falls outside the pleadings as before the trial court, even without a formal amendment.

Mangum v. Surles · filed 1972-04-12Rule 15(b)

The foregoing decisions establish that where no objection is made to evidence on the ground that it is outside the issues raised by the pleadings, the issue raised by the evidence is nevertheless before the trial court for determination. The pleadings are regarded as amended to conform to the proof even though the defaulting pleader made no formal motion to amend.

Rule 15(b) treats pleadings as amended by implied consent when evidence outside the pleaded issues is admitted without an objection on that specific ground.

Roberts v. William N. & Kate B. Reynolds Mem. Park · filed 1972-04-12Rule 15(b)

Under 15(b) the rule of "litigation by consent" is applied when no objection is made on the specific ground that the evidence offered is not within the issues raised by the pleadings. In such case the statutory rule, in effect, amends the pleadings to conform to the evidence and allows any issue raised by the evidence to go to the jury.

Rule 15(b) gives the trial court broad discretion to permit or deny an amendment to an answer to conform to evidence offered at trial.

Markham v. Johnson · filed 1972-06-28Rule 15(b)

The defendants next assign as error the trial judge’s denial of defendants’ motion to amend paragraph 3 of their answer in order to conform with the evidence as offered during the trial in accordance with G.S. 1A-1, Rule 15(b). This motion was not made until after defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied. The defendants’ motion was addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. The trial court has broad discretion in permitting or denying amendments.

Rule 15(b) does not require an amendment when the complaint already raises the issue under all provisions of the policy.

Rea v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Company · filed 1972-08-23Rule 15(b)

However, in our opinion the aid of the rule is not necessary. The complaint is sufficient to raise the question of the rights, duties and obligations of the parties under all provisions of the policy.

Rule 15 permits a defendant to amend an answer to conform to the evidence after both sides have presented their evidence and argued to the jury.

Reid v. Consolidated Bus Lines, Inc. · filed 1972-09-20Rule 15

The trial judge did not commit error, as plaintiff contends, In permitting the defendants to amend their answer to conform to the evidence after the evidence on both sides was in and after the parties had argued the case to the jury.

Rule 15(b) treats a statute-of-frauds defense as pleaded when the parties try the case as though it had been pleaded.

Bercegeay v. Surfside Realty Co. · filed 1972-12-20Rule 15(b)

While the cases at bar were tried without a jury and there were no formal issues, a review of the record discloses that the cases were tried as though the statute of frauds had been properly pleaded and the briefs addressed themselves to the question. We hold that Rule 15(b) applies here and this appeal is treated as though the statute of frauds had been specifically pleaded.

Rule 15 permits a plaintiff seeking payment for personal services to amend a claim based on an express contract and proceed on quantum meruit.

Forbes v. Pillmon · filed 1973-06-13Rule 15

Nevertheless,, this Court has said that “[i]t is permissible under our practice, in an action to recover for personal services, for the one rendering the services to abandon his allegations of special contract and proceed on the principle of quantum meruit.” Stout v. Smith, 4 N.C. App. 81, 84, 165 S.E. 2d 789 (1969). This assignment of error is overruled.

Rule 15 permits liberal amendment of pleadings, including after judgment to conform to the evidence, and denial of a motion to strike an amended answer can amount to permission to file it.

Performance Motors, Inc. v. Allen · filed 1974-01-09Rule 15(a), (b)

Assuming, arguendo, the Supreme Court did not authorize the parties to amend their pleadings without express permission of the trial court, we think the denial of plaintiff’s motion to strike defendant's amended answer was tantamount to permitting defendant to file the amended answer. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 15(a), authorizes the court to allow amendments to pleadings “when justice so requires.” Rule 15(b) authorizes the court to allow amendments to pleadings “as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence” and provides that amendments may be allowed at any time, even after judgment. The rule also contemplates liberality on the part of the court in allowing amendments to the pleadings. We find no merit in the assignment and the same is overruled.

Rule 15(a) requires leave to amend to be freely given when justice so requires.

Johnson v. Northwestern Bank · filed 1975-10-15(a)

Although G.S. 1A-1, Rule 15(a) admonishes that leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires,” we perceive no injustice in the court’s refusal in the present case to allow an amendment which would assert a claim completely different from that alleged in the original complaint, on behalf of persons not parties to the present litigation, which plaintiff as adminis-tratrix has no standing to assert.

Rule 15(a) governs when a party may amend a pleading as of course and when court leave or adverse party consent is required; leave is freely given when justice so requires, and a response to an amended pleading is due within 30 days unless otherwise ordered.

Northside Properties, Inc. v. Ko-Ko Mart, Inc. · filed 1976-02-18(a)

“A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 80 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within 30 days after service of the amended pleading, unless the court otherwise orders.” In this case, defendants were entitled to amend their answer only by leavé of court.

Rule 15 allows a pleading filed more than 30 days after service of the last responsive pleading only by leave of court or written consent of the adverse party.

Johnson v. Austin · filed 1976-05-05

Substantially more than 30 days after service of the last responsive pleading had elapsed. The pleading was not necessary to conform with the evidence because no evidence had been introduced. Thus, the pleading could only have been admitted by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 15. The adverse party did not give written consent and the trial judge, in his discretion, chose not to grant such motion.

Rule 15(a) gives trial courts broad discretion to allow amendments after the period for amending as a matter of course has expired.

Willow Mountain Corp. v. Parker · filed 1978-08-29(a)

G.S. 1A-1, Rule 15(a), gives trial courts extensive discretion in determining whether or not leave to amend will be granted after the time for amending as a matter of course has expired.

Rule 15(a) allows amendment with leave of court when justice so requires, and Rule 15(b) permits pleadings to be amended to conform to issues tried by the parties’ express or implied consent.

Munchak Corp. v. Caldwell · filed 1978-07-18Rule 15(a), Rule 15(b)

Under Rule 15(a), the ruling on such a motion is left to the discretion of the trial judge with the mandate, however, that where justice so requires, leave to amend shall be freely granted. ... Implied consent to the trial of an unpleaded issue is not established merely because evidence relevant to that issue was introduced without objection. At least it must appear that the parties understood the evidence to be aimed at the unpleaded issue. ... It is our conclusion that the motion to amend the pleadings was properly denied, and we find no error in the trial court’s failure to charge the jury on the issue of fraud.

Rule 15(a) requires leave to amend pleadings to be granted freely when justice so requires.

Gladstein v. South Square Associates · filed 1978-12-19

G.S. 1A-1, Rule 15(a) mandates that leave to amend shall be granted freely when justice so requires.

Rule 15(a) requires courts to freely allow amendments to pleadings when justice so requires.

Rogers v. Rogers · filed 1979-02-06(a)

G.S. 1A-1, Rule 15(a) provides that leave to amend shall be “freely given when justice so requires.” The trial judge has broad discretionary powers to permit amendments to any pleading.

Rule 15(a) permits amendment without leave of court before a responsive pleading is served.

Board of Transportation v. Royster · filed 1979-02-20(a)

The Board amended its complaint under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 15(a), which provides for amendment without leave of court before a responsive pleading is served. The defendants had not served a responsive pleading upon the Board of Transportation. In denying the motion of the defendants to strike the second amended complaint and declaration, the trial court properly ruled that the Board of Transportation had complied with the amendment provisions of Rule 15(a) and the condemnation statutes.

Rule 15(a) permits a trial court to allow an amendment to a complaint when its allegations concern facts admitted in the answer and an issue raised there.

Smith v. Staton · filed 1979-06-05Rule 15(a)

The trial court’s allowance of the amendment was proper pursuant to the discretionary power given it by G.S. 1A-1, Rule 15(a) because the allegations in the amendment concern the blocking of the road by defendants’ truck, which is admitted in the answer, and the adequacy of the warning given, which is an issue raised in the answer.

Rule 15(a) directs courts to freely grant a motion to amend filed more than 30 days after service when justice requires, subject to the trial court’s discretion.

Olive v. Williams · filed 1979-07-31Rule 15(a)

A motion to amend a pleading, made more than 30 days after the original pleading is served, shall be freely granted when justice so requires. ... However, the motion is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. ... We find no abuse of discretion.

Rule 15(a) permits denial of leave to amend when contradictory pleading or futility justifies it, despite its direction that leave be freely given when justice requires.

Rosenthal v. Perkins · filed 1979-07-31Rule 15(a)

Rule 15(a) requires that the leave to amend by the trial court “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Factors such as contradictory pleading and the futility of amendment are possible justification for denial of the amendment, and we find no abuse of discretion.

Rule 15(a) requires consent or leave of court to amend a pleading after the unrestricted amendment period, and denial of leave is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Edwards v. Edwards · filed 1979-10-16Rule 15(a)

Under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 15(a), after the time permitted for unrestricted unilateral amendment of pleadings has expired, a party “may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” ... Since the record before us fails to indicate the content of defendant’s proposed amendment and the circumstances surrounding the court’s denial of her motion, we cannot say that the trial court has abused its discretion.

Rule 15(a) allows a court to deny a motion to amend an answer when the proposed defense is unavailable; the denial is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Martin · filed 1979-12-18Rule 15(a)

Finally, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s action denying defendants’ motion under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 15(a) to amend their answer. We have already held that G.S. 45-21.36 was not available as a defense to these non-mortgagor defendants.

Rule 15(a) calls for leave to amend when justice requires, but denial of a motion to amend is reviewable only for abuse of discretion.

Helena Chemical Co. v. Rivenbark · filed 1980-03-04Rule 15(a)

As defendants contend, it is true that leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” G.S. 1A-1, 15(a). The motion, however, is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and is not reviewable in the absence of a showing that the judge abused his discretion. We have carefully considered all the matters of fact and law in this case and conclude that there is no showing that the judge erred when he denied the motion to amend.

Rule 15 leaves motions to amend pleadings to the trial judge’s broad discretion, subject to appellate review for abuse of discretion.

F. Industries, Inc. v. Cox · filed 1980-03-18

We think it suffices to say that the allowance or disallowance of motions to amend pleadings is a matter committed to the broad discretion of the trial judge whose ruling thereon is not reviewable on appeal in the absence of a showing of abuse of that discretion.

Rule 15(a) does not permit a court to allow an amendment that undermines a valid, jurisdictionally sound consent decree.

Tridyn Industries, Inc. v. American Mutual Liability Insurance · filed 1980-04-01Rule 15(a)

Although it is true that the allowance of amendments to pleadings “is an inherent and statutory power of superior courts which they may ordinarily exercise at their discretion”, ... G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 15(a), the power is not unlimited. We are of the opinion and so hold that the power may not be exercised so as to upset or to destroy the efficacy of a validly entered and jurisdictionally sound consent decree.

After the time to amend as of right expires, leave to amend should be freely given; denying it without a justifying reason or a showing of prejudice is an abuse of discretion.

Ledford v. Ledford · filed 1980-10-21Rule 15(a)

Rule 15(a), N.C. Rules Civ. Proc. mandates that after expiration of the time for amendment as of right, “a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court ... and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” ... We conclude that the denial of the motion to amend without a justifying reason and no showing of prejudice to defendant, and apparently based on a misapprehension of the law, was an abuse of discretion and reversible error.

A motion to amend a pleading is within the trial court’s discretion, and its denial is reviewable only for manifest abuse of discretion.

Moody v. Town of Carrboro · filed 1980-11-04Rule 15

The motion to amend was addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The denial of such motion is reviewable only for manifest abuse of discretion.

A motion to amend a complaint is within the trial court’s discretion, and its denial is reviewable on appeal only for abuse of discretion.

Jones v. City of Greensboro · filed 1981-05-05Rule 15(a)

A motion to amend is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s ruling thereon is not reviewable on appeal in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion.

Rule 15(a) permits leave to amend a complaint to remove requests for relief that belong initially before the clerk.

Ingle v. Allen · filed 1981-09-01Rule 15(a)

Their inclusion in the prayer for relief was not, however, grounds for dismissal, for want of subject matter jurisdiction, of the entire action. Upon remand, leave should be granted to amend the complaint to delete these portions. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 15(a).

Rule 15 requires leave of court to amend a pleading that requires no responsive pleading more than 30 days after it is filed.

Townsend v. Bentley · filed 1982-06-01Rule 15(a)

G.S. 1A-1, Rule 15, provides that 30 days after a pleading has been filed which does not require a responsive pleading, the pleading may be amended only by leave of the court. We hold the court did not abuse its discretion in this case.

Rule 15(a) allows a court to set a response period to an amended pleading of more or less than thirty days.

Saintsing v. Taylor · filed 1982-06-01Rule 15(a)

In addition N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 15(a) provides specifically that the court can order a response to an amended pleading in more or less than thirty days. We can find no prejudice suffered by defendant and no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in this case.

Rule 15(a) permits denial of leave to amend when the proposed amendment would be futile because it fails to state a claim.

Smith v. McRary · filed 1982-10-05Rule 15(a)

In the instant case the denial of plaintiffs motion to amend was not an abuse of discretion because the proposed amendment is no more than surplusage. The facts it attempts to add, as we have already demonstrated, are insufficient to state a second claim for relief; therefore plaintiffs proposed amendment could not withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Because to grant his motion to amend would be a futile gesture, the denial of his motion was not error.

Rule 15(b) permits amendment for an unpleaded issue tried by consent; the party opposing amendment must establish prejudice.

Evans v. Craddock · filed 1983-04-05Rule 15(b)

The burden is upon the party objecting to the amendment to set forth the grounds for objection and to establish that he will be prejudiced if the motion is allowed. ... It was error not to allow the amendment here. Any evidence offered by the plaintiff on her financial status was relevant to the attorney’s fee issue. The defendant has not shown any prejudice except that he did not know that a claim for the fees would be made.

Rule 15(a) gives the trial court discretion to allow an amended pleading; a party objecting to the amendment must show prejudice.

Swindell v. Overton · filed 1983-05-17Rule 15(a)

G.S. 1A-1, Rule 15(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that leave to amend pleadings shall “be freely given when justice so requires.” The ruling on such a motion is in the discretion of the trial court; and the objecting party must show that he will be prejudiced if the motion is allowed. ... Defendant Overton has not shown any prejudice by this action of the trial court, there was no abuse of discretion, and this cross-assignment is overruled.

After a responsive pleading is filed, Rule 15(a) requires leave of court to amend a complaint, and denial of leave is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Wright v. Commercial Union Insurance · filed 1983-08-02Rule 15(a)

It is clear from the facts of the present case that an amendment to plaintiffs’ complaint was possible only by leave of court. In such cases, the trial court has broad discretion in its rulings on motions to amend, and those rulings are subject to reversal only when there has been abuse of that discretion.

Rule 15(a) permits a court to deny a motion to amend a complaint when the amendment would cause undue trial delay.

Bryant v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance · filed 1984-04-03Rule 15(a)

In the case at bar, plaintiffs’ case had already been continued at least once, and the motion to amend was made just a few days before trial. It was clearly within the trial court’s discretion to deny the amendment to avoid further delays in the trial.

Rule 15(a) requires court approval to amend a complaint after an answer has been served; denial of leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Mauney v. Morris · filed 1985-03-19Rule 15(a)

Plaintiffs motion to amend was filed after the defendants had served their answer to the complaint, thus pursuant to Rule 15(a) plaintiff was required to seek court approval. It has repeatedly been held that a motion under Rule 15(a) for leave of court to amend a pleading is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and the denial of such a motion is not reviewable absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.

After the period for amendment as a matter of course expires, Rule 15(a) leaves a motion to amend to the trial judge's discretion; denial is reviewable only for a clear abuse of discretion.

Caldwell's Well Drilling, Inc. v. Moore · filed 1986-03-18Rule 15(a)

After the statutory time for amending pleadings as a matter of course has elapsed, a motion to amend a complaint pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 15(a) is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and the denial of such motion is not reviewable on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion.

Rule 15 gives a trial judge broad discretion to allow or deny an amendment to allege a counterclaim, whether the counterclaim is compulsory or permissive.

Grant & Hastings, P.A. v. Arlin · filed 1985-11-19Rule 15

Thus, under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 15, the trial judge had broad discretion to permit or deny the amendment, whether the counterclaim to be alleged was compulsory or permissive.

Leave to amend a pleading should be freely given unless the opposing party establishes material prejudice.

Boudreau v. Baughman · filed 1987-06-16Rule 15(a)

Such leave should be freely given unless the opposing party can establish it will be materially prejudiced by the amendment.

Rule 15 permits amendment of a wrongful death complaint to name the deceased's personal representative as plaintiff.

Ledford v. Martin · filed 1987-09-01Rule 15(a)

Plaintiffs are to be afforded an opportunity to amend their complaint, pursuant to Rule 15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, to bring the action for the wrongful death in the name of the personal representative of the estate.

A trial court has discretion to rule on a motion to amend an answer.

Hatfield v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. · filed 1987-05-05Rule 15(d)

The ruling on defendant’s motion to amend its answer is within the discretion of the trial court.

Rule 15(a) generally favors leave to amend, but a court may deny it for material prejudice to the opposing party; the denial is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Brown v. Lyons · filed 1989-04-18Rule 15(a)

Leave to amend pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 15(a) should be “freely given except where the party objecting can show material prejudice by the granting of a motion to amend.” ... Upon these facts, we cannot say the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the motion.

Rule 15(a) does not permit a trial court to grant leave to amend after final judgment, even on the court’s own motion.

Sentry Enterprises, Inc. v. Canal Wood Corp. · filed 1989-06-20Rule 15(a)

It is simply irrelevant who makes the motion. Once the trial court enters final judgment in the case, the trial court lacks the authority to grant leave to amend under Rule 15.

Rule 15(a) gives trial courts broad discretion over leave to amend after the time to amend as a matter of course expires; unexplained delay can support denial.

Stewart Office Suppliers, Inc. v. First Union National Bank · filed 1990-02-20Rule 15(a)

We note that “Rule 15(a) gives the trial court broad discretion in determining whether leave to amend will be granted after the time for amending as a matter of course has expired.” ... These allegations were not brought in the initial complaint and plaintiff made no showing of excuse for the delay in pleading them. We find no abuse of discretion.

Rule 15(b) permits amendment of pleadings at any point in trial, even after judgment, to conform them to the evidence and raise issues tried by the parties’ express or implied consent.

Marina Food Associates, Inc. v. Marina Restaurant, Inc. · filed 1990-08-21(b)

In order to conform the pleadings to the evidence and raise issues tried by the express or implied consent of the parties, G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 15(b) authorizes amendment of pleadings at any point in trial, even after judgment.

A complaint may be amended after judgment only if the judgment is set aside or vacated under Rule 59 or Rule 60.

Chrisalis Properties, Inc. v. Separate Quarters, Inc. · filed 1990-12-18Rule 15(a)

As a general rule, once judgment is entered amendment of the complaint is not allowed unless the judgment is set aside or vacated under Rule 59 or Rule 60.

Rule 15(a) allows a party to amend a pleading after the as of right period only with court permission or the opposing party’s written consent, with permission freely given when justice requires.

Patrick v. RONALD WILLIAMS, PA · filed 1991-04-02(a)

Rule 15(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, after the time for amendment as a matter of right expires, “a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 15(a) (1990). ... Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Rule 15(a) requires court leave to amend pleadings after responsive pleadings have been filed and directs that leave be freely given when justice so requires.

Madry v. Madry · filed 1992-04-07(a)

Under Rule 15(a), amendment of pleadings may be accomplished only by leave of court when the amendment is sought after responsive pleadings have been filed. That rule specifically provides, however, that “leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.”

Rule 15(a) requires a plaintiff seeking to amend a complaint after the defendant has answered to obtain the defendant’s written consent or leave of court.

Freese v. Smith · filed 1993-05-04Rule 15(a)

It is clear that plaintiff did not file his amended complaint before the defendant answered. Therefore the only way in which the plaintiff could have amended his complaint was with the written permission of the defendant which was not granted, or by leave of court.

Rule 15(a) permits denial of leave to amend for undue delay, bad faith, undue prejudice, futility, or repeated failure to cure defects.

Outer Banks Contractors, Inc. v. Daniels & Daniels Construction, Inc. · filed 1993-09-07Rule 15(a)

While the trial judge is not required to set forth specific reasons for denying a motion to amend a complaint, undue delay, bad faith, undue prejudice, futility of the amendment and repeated failure to cure defects by previous amendments have all been recognized as reasons justifying a denial of the motion.

Rule 15(a) permits a defendant to amend an answer as of right within thirty days after serving it if the case has not been placed on the trial calendar.

Coble Cranes & Equipment Co. v. B & W Utilities, Inc. · filed 1993-09-07Rule 15(a)

Indeed, we agree with plaintiff’s argument that, since defendant filed her motion within thirty days after serving the original answer and since the case had not been placed on the trial calendar, she had an absolute right to amend and thus did not need to file a motion.

Rule 13(f) permits an omitted counterclaim to be added by amendment for excusable reasons or when justice requires, and Rule 15(a) permits amendment when justice requires or the opposing party consents.

House Healers Restorations, Inc. v. Ball · filed 1993-12-0713(f); 15(a)

If a counterclaim is omitted through “oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect,” or if “justice requires,” leave of Court may be granted to add the counterclaim through amendment. § 1A-1, Rule 13(f). Leave to amend should be granted when “justice so requires,” or by written consent of the adverse party. § 1A-1, Rule 15(a) (1990).

Rule 15(a) generally requires leave to amend a complaint to be freely given unless the opposing party shows material prejudice.

Golden Rule Insurance v. Long · filed 1993-12-23(a)

Leave to amend pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 15(a) should be “freely given except where the party objecting can show material prejudice by the granting of a motion to amend.”

Rule 15(a) permits a court to deny leave to amend when the proposed amendment would state no claim for relief.

City of Winston-Salem v. Yarbrough · filed 1994-12-30Rule 15(a)

In this case, we believe that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion because the facts alleged in the proposed amendment would not state a claim for relief against any of the individual counterclaim defendants.

Rule 15(a) sets no time limit for moving to amend a pleading.

North River Insurance v. Young · filed 1995-02-07Rule 15(a)

Although the motions were allowed over two years after the lawsuit commenced and one week before defendants’ motions for summary judgment were heard, there is no time limit to move to amend under Rule 15.

Rule 15(a) permits a court to deny leave to amend a complaint when the proposed amendment would be futile in light of a proper summary judgment.

North Carolina Council of Churches v. State · filed 1995-09-05Rule 15(a)

When an amendment would be futile in light of the propriety of summary judgment on a plaintiff's claim, it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the amendment.

Rule 15(b) permits a trial court to allow an amendment to the pleadings so long as it does not permit judgment by ambush.

Johnson v. Friends of Weymouth, Inc. · filed 1995-09-19Rule 15(b)

Rule 15(b) authorizes the trial court to allow a party to amend its pleadings, so long as it does not permit judgment by ambush.

Rule 15(a) directs courts to freely allow pleading amendments when justice requires; the decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Qurneh v. Colie · filed 1996-06-04Rule 15(a)

Rule 15(a) provides that “leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Upon careful consideration, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing defendant to amend her pleadings.

Rule 15(a) permits denial of leave to amend an answer for undue delay and prejudice, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Isenhour v. Universal Underwriters Insurance · filed 1996-12-06Rule 15(a)

In the instant case, the trial court articulated clear reasons for denying Universal’s motion to amend its answer: undue delay and undue prejudice. ... Upon careful consideration, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Universal’s motion to amend its answer to interpose the two new defenses.

Rule 15(a) requires leave of court or the adverse party’s written consent to amend a pleading; filing an inconsistent summary judgment motion does not withdraw a judicial admission.

Webster Enterprises, Inc. v. Selective Insurance · filed 1997-01-07Rule 15(a)

To the contrary, we do not believe Barrett authorizes the withdrawal of a party’s solemn admission through the mere filing of an inconsistent motion for summary judgment. To hold otherwise would emasculate not only the conclusive nature of judicial admissions but also the plain language of N.C.R. Civ. R 15, which clearly provides that, under the present facts and circumstances, “a party may amend his pleadings only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 15(a) (1990) (emphasis added).

Rule 15(a) favors granting pleading amendments when justice requires, and the objecting party bears the burden of showing prejudice.

Paris v. Woolard · filed 1998-01-20Rule 15(a)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 15(a) (1990) provides that a party’s motion to amend its pleading should be freely granted when justice so requires. In addition, the objecting party has the burden of showing it would be prejudiced if the motion to amend was granted. ... Since liability arises from the conduct of ASI alone, there is no prejudice to ASI in allowing PMA’s pleadings to be amended. Thus, this assignment of error is overruled.

Rule 15(a) applies to a petition for writ of certiorari and permits amendment to show that jurisdiction exists.

Darnell v. Town of Franklin · filed 1998-12-29Rule 15(a)

Thus, although N.C.R. Prac. 19 provides a procedure for the issuance of a writ of certiorari upon the filing of a petition, we must turn to Rule 15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in addressing petitioner’s request to amend. ... Having determined that the petition was a “pleading” within the meaning of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court had the authority to grant the motion to amend the petition and was not required to dismiss due to lack of jurisdiction.

Rule 15 permits denial of a motion to amend pleadings for undue delay, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Delta Environmental Consultants of North Carolina, Inc. v. Wysong & Miles Co. · filed 1999-02-02Rule 15

Motions to amend are governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 15 (1990). ... We interpret this as the trial court’s determination that the timing of the motion was the result of undue delay. ... Because Wysong has failed to show an abuse of discretion, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of their second motion to amend.

Rule 15(b) treats evidence admitted at trial on an issue outside the pleadings as an amendment to the complaint.

Sidden v. Mailman · filed 2000-05-02Rule 15(b)

At trial, however, Defendant admitted he did not disclose to Plaintiff the existence of his State Retirement Account, and the admission of this evidence is tantamount to an amendment to the complaint that Defendant failed to disclose a material asset. N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 15(b) (1999).

Rule 20(a) permits joinder when claims arise from the same transaction and share a common question of law or fact, and Rule 15 permits pleadings to be amended to conform to evidence, including after judgment.

Fulk v. Piedmont Music Center · filed 2000-06-20Rule 20(a); Rule 15(a), (b)

Further, this Court has held that “[alternative claims may be joined under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 20(a) if two tests are met. First, each claim must arise out of the same transaction, the same occurrence, or a series of either.” ... “The second test is that each claim must contain a question of law or fact, which will arise, common to all parties.” ... we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the defendants to amend the judgment, allocating the damages among defendants. ... Furthermore, because defendants were put on notice before trial of plaintiff’s intent to show they had violated the Act, and because plaintiff’s evidence did, in fact, show that defendants violated the Act, we hold that it was proper for the trial court to apply N.C.R. Civ. R 15(b) and allow “[s]uch amendment of the pleadings as [was] necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence,” defendants having had the opportunity “to meet such evidence.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 15(b).

Rule 15 amendments and Rule 59(a)(6) motions for inadequate damages are reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Warren v. General Motors Corp. · filed 2001-02-20Rule 15; Rule 59(a)(6)

A motion to amend pleadings is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court; the trial court’s ruling is not reviewable absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. ... see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 15 (1999). ... The relevant statute provides that a new trial may be granted due to “[e]xcessive or inadequate damages appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice^]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 59(a)(6) (1999). “A motion for a new trial on the grounds of inadequate damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court[.]”

Rule 15(a) allows one amendment as of course before a responsive pleading and otherwise requires leave or written consent, with leave freely given when justice so requires.

Walker v. Walker · filed 2001-05-15(a)

N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 15(a) (1999) provides, in pertinent part: Amendments. A party may amend his pleadings once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served . . . Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. ... In the present case, defendant’s second amendment was allowable only by leave of court. A motion to amend the pleadings is addressed to the trial judge’s sound discretion. ... We hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying defendant’s second motion to amend his answer that was heard on the eve of trial.

Rule 15(a) permits a party to amend a pleading once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is filed.

Thigpen v. Ngo · filed 2001-05-01Rule 15(a)

All other issues presented in the present case are considered and resolved in companion case COA00-409. The trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s initial complaint and in granting summary judgment on plaintiff’s amended complaint.