N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3211

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, a court gives the plaintiff every favorable inference and dismisses a cause of action that states no cognizable ground for relief.

Dreifus v. Heimeshe Bakery Corp. · filed 2008-03-11(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 [(a) (7)], the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction (see CPLR 3026). We accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord [the] plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). Here, even after according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, we conclude that the sixth cause of action fails to state any cognizable legal ground for the recovery of damages against the defendants Heimeshe Cof, Inc., doing business as Ostrovitsky Bakery, Yair Ostrovitsky, and Jacob Ostrovitsky (see Widman v Rosenthal, 40 AD3d 749 [2007]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Velazquez v. Decaudin · filed 2008-03-18(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court should accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, affording the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determining only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Goldfarb v Schwartz, 26 AD3d 462, 463 [2006]; Fast Track Funding Corp. v Perrone, 19 AD3d 362, 362-363 [2005]). Applying that standard here, the complaint insofar as asserted against Streisfeld and UGT should not have been dismissed.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, courts construe the complaint liberally, accept its allegations as true, and give the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

Kumar v. American Transit Insurance · filed 2008-03-21(a)(7)

“When assessing the adequacy of a complaint in light of a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion to dismiss, the court must afford the pleadings a liberal construction, accept the allegations of the complaint as true and provide plaintiff (here third-party plaintiff) ‘the benefit of every possible favorable inference’ ”

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court presumes pleaded facts true, gives the allegations every favorable inference, and asks whether they fit a cognizable legal theory.

Sitar v. Sitar · filed 2008-04-01(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CFLR 3211 (a) (7), the facts pleaded are presumed to be true, and the court must afford those allegations every favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Shaya B. Pac., LLC v Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, 38 AD3d 34, 38 [2006]; Gershon v Goldberg, 30 AD3d 372, 373 [2006]; Goldfarb v Schwartz, 26 AD3d 462, 463 [2006]; Fast Track Funding Corp. v Perrone, 19 AD3d 362, 362-363 [2005]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to view a complaint’s allegations liberally in the plaintiff’s favor when deciding whether they state a cause of action.

North Salem Psychiatric Services, P.C. v. Medco Health Solutions, Inc. · filed 2008-04-22(a)(7)

Viewing the pertinent allegations of the amended verified complaint most liberally in favor of the plaintiffs (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), we find that they do not state a cause of action (see Doria v Masucci, 230 AD2d 764, 765 [1996]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires a hearing before dismissal when a material factual dispute over service of a notice of claim must be resolved.

Stewart v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2008-04-22(a)(7)

Here, there is a question of fact regarding when the notice of claim was served. Accordingly, the motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action should not have been decided without a hearing first being held to resolve that issue.

A complaint that states a cause of action survives a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion to dismiss.

Villani v. Holton · filed 2008-04-25(a)(7)

Supreme Court erred in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the question is whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, not merely whether the pleading states one.

Allen v. City of New York · filed 2008-03-27(a)(7)

It is now well established that the criterion in considering a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) “is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he has stated one” (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; see Griffin v Anslow, 17 AD3d 889, 891 [2005]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to assess whether the complaint states a claim on its face; a defense does not warrant dismissal on that basis.

Good Samaritan Housing & Land Corp. v. City of Hudson · filed 2008-04-24(a)(7)

Defendant’s assertion is relevant to its defense of the action and not whether plaintiffs have, in fact, stated a claim on the face of their pleadings.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court treats the complaint’s factual allegations as true.

Adames v. Velasquez · filed 2008-04-01(a)(7)

Even aside from his sworn affidavit in opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, Adames’s recitals in the complaint are deemed to be true for purposes of this motion to dismiss (Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825 [2007]; Wieder v Skala, 80 NY2d 628, 631 [1992]; Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633 [1976]; see Operative Cake Corp. v Nassour, 21 AD3d 1020 [2d Dept 2005]).

Under subsection (a)(7), an affidavit opposing dismissal may amplify a complaint sufficiently to state a cause of action.

Sheroff v. Dreyfus Corp. · filed 2008-04-15(a)(7)

The plaintiff’s complaint, as amplified by the affidavit she submitted in opposition to the defendant’s motion, inter alia, to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), adequately stated causes of action alleging aiding and abetting the breach of a fiduciary duty (second cause of action) and aiding and abetting conversion (fourth cause of action) (see Kaufman v Cohen, 307 AD2d 113, 125 [2003]; Dangerfield v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 2006 WL 335357 [SD NY 2006]; cf. Norwest Mtge. v Dime Sav. Bank of N.Y., 280 AD2d 653 [2001]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action even when the complaint’s allegations are accepted as true.

Benyo v. Sikorjak · filed 2008-04-29(a)(7)

In the case at bar, even accepting the allegations of the complaint as true, the plaintiffs only showed that the defendants attempted to terminate the long-term lease either through legal proceedings or through a failure to provide some building services. ... Accordingly, the court should have granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the cause of action alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

Under subsection (a)(7), allegations that a priest undertook secular marriage counseling and breached a fiduciary duty through sexual misconduct state a cause of action sufficient to survive dismissal.

Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester · filed 2008-05-02(a)(7)

Supreme Court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), for failure to state a cause of action. We conclude that the court erred in granting that part of the motion of defendant Peter M. DeBellis, the priest, seeking dismissal of the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action of plaintiff against him.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, pleaded facts and submissions opposing the motion are accepted as true and given every favorable inference.

Danna v. Malco Realty, Inc. · filed 2008-05-06(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleaded facts, and any submissions in opposition to the motion, are accepted as true and given every favorable inference (see 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144, 151-152 [2002]; Gershon v Goldberg, 30 AD3d 372, 373 [2006]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the pleadings liberally, accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

DeAngelis v. Timberpeg East, Inc. · filed 2008-05-08(a)(7)

On such motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), we “must afford the pleadings a liberal construction, take the allegations of the complaint as true and provide [the] plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference” (EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]; see Team Mktg. USA Corp. v Power Pact, LLC, 41 AD3d 939, 940 [2007]).

A fraud complaint fails to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211(a)(7) if it does not plead justifiable reliance on the alleged misrepresentation.

Sareen v. Sareen · filed 2008-05-13(a)(7)

The plaintiffs complaint failed to state a cause of action, since he failed to plead that he justifiably relied upon these alleged misrepresentations in determining whether to enter into the marriage (see Valassis Communications v Weimer, 304 AD2d 448 [2003]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every possible inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Chaudhry v. Vital Holding Co. · filed 2008-05-20(a)(7)

As to that branch of the motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), we accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint, afford the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (id. at 87-88; DePasquale v Estate of DePasquale, 44 AD3d 606, 607 [2007]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court does not decide whether the plaintiff can ultimately prove the allegations.

Paolino v. Paolino · filed 2008-05-20(a)(7)

Whether the plaintiff can ultimately establish the allegations is not part of the analysis (see EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]).

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action may be denied when the movant fails to address the complaint’s allegations.

Garfinkle Ltd. Partnership II v. 11 Mecox Bay Inn, Inc. · filed 2008-06-03(a)(7)

Here, the Supreme Court properly determined that the defendant failed to address the allegations in the complaint, and therefore properly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

A factual dispute about whether the defendants made the alleged statement cannot be resolved on a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion on this record.

Ingber v. Mallilo · filed 2008-06-10(a)(7)

Finally, whether or not the defendants were in fact the source of Lezcano’s statement is a factual issue not subject to summary resolution on the record presented. Thus, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference when deciding whether it states a legally cognizable cause of action.

Curry v. Dollard · filed 2008-06-17(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint and afford the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference in determining whether the complaint states any legally cognizable cause of action (see Schenkman v New York Coll. of Health Professionals, 29 AD3d 671, 672 [2006]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiffs every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

DelBene v. Estes · filed 2008-06-17(a)(7)

In reviewing a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, grant the plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144, 151-152 [2002]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the pleading liberally, accepts its factual allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference when deciding whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Smith v. Meridian Technologies, Inc. · filed 2008-06-17(a)(7)

In deciding a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must give the pleading a liberal construction, accept all of the facts alleged in the pleading to be true, and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference in determining whether the allegations fit under any cognizable legal theory (see 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144 [2002]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court assumes the allegations are true and gives the claimant every favorable inference.

Bolin v. Nassau County Board of Cooperative Educational Services · filed 2008-06-17

Accordingly, even assuming the truth of the allegations set forth in the petition/complaint and according the petitioner every favorable inference, as we must at this stage of the proceedings (see Matter of Town of Riverhead v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 50 AD3d 811 [2008]; Matter of Alabi v Community Bd. No. 2 of Brooklyn, 17 AD3d 459 [2005]), the petitioner failed to state a claim that BOCES is required to pay her the cash value of her 34-day “vested bank” vacation balance.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, and asks whether they fit a cognizable legal theory.

Fishberger v. Voss · filed 2008-05-06(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the complaint to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Rosenfeld v. Sayers · filed 2008-05-27(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court should “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). Applying these principles, the Supreme Court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs first cause of action, which sufficiently pleaded a cause of action to recover damages for tortious interference with contract (see White Plains Coat & Apron Co., Inc. v Cintas Corp., 8 NY3d 422, 426 [2007]; Kronos, Inc. v AVX Corp., 81 NY2d 90, 94 [1993]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), sufficiently pleaded claims for assault, battery, and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision survive a motion to dismiss.

Blanco v. County of Suffolk · filed 2008-05-13(a)(7)

Furthermore, those causes of action were sufficiently pleaded (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true.

Pomerance v. McTiernan · filed 2008-05-20(a)(7)

On this CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion to dismiss, we necessarily accept plaintiffs factual allegations as true.

A breach of contract complaint that alleges a violation only in vague and conclusory terms may be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

Clifden Futures, LLC v. Man Financial, Inc. · filed 2008-05-20(a)(7)

Here, the plaintiff has done nothing more than plead generally that defendant has breached the contract by violating various rules of the CME. Such vague and conclusory allegations are insufficient to support a cause of action for breach of contract, and the motion to dismiss may be granted on this ground.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, pleaded facts receive favorable inferences, but bare legal conclusions and claims contradicted by documentary evidence do not.

Santora v. Silver · filed 2008-07-14(a)(7)

“On a motion addressed to the sufficiency of a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the facts pleaded are presumed to be true and accorded every favorable inference. However, allegations consisting of bare legal conclusions, as well as factual claims either inherently incredible or flatly contradicted by documentary evidence, are not entitled to such consideration.”

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives plaintiffs every possible favorable inference, and determines whether the complaint states a cause of action.

Caboara v. Babylon Cove Development, LLC · filed 2008-07-15(a)(7)

Here, taking the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, and according the plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the complaint was sufficient to state causes of action to recover damages for common-law fraud and breach of ... contract (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; Lama Holding Co. v Smith Barney, 88 NY2d 413 [1996]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]; Eagle Tenants Corp. v Fishbein, 182 AD2d 610 [1992]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, courts accept the petition’s allegations as true, give petitioners favorable inferences, and ask whether the facts fit a recognized legal theory.

Abele v. Dimitriadis · filed 2008-07-24(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must liberally construe the petition, accept all of its allegations as true, accord petitioners every favorable inference and decide only whether the alleged facts fit within any recognized legal theory (see Bailey v Chernoff, 45 AD3d 1113, 1116 [2007]; Skibinsky v State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 6 AD3d 975, 976 [2004]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint fails to state a cause of action when its discrimination claim rests on a conclusory assertion unsupported by factual allegations.

Goldin v. Engineers Country Club · filed 2008-09-02(a)(7)

Nevertheless, the complaint should have been dismissed because it failed to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, courts accept the pleaded facts as true and give the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

Breytman v. Olinville Realty, LLC · filed 2008-09-09(a)(7)

When accepting all the facts as alleged in the amended complaint to be true and allowing the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, the facts as alleged fit within a cognizable legal theory.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept the alleged facts as true and give the plaintiff every favorable inference when deciding whether the complaint states a recognizable cause of action.

Fisher v. DiPietro · filed 2008-09-23(a)(7)

“[A] motion to dismiss made pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) ... will fail if, taking all facts alleged as true and according them every possible inference favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint states in some recognizable form any cause of action known to our law”

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference when deciding whether they state a claim.

Malik v. Beal · filed 2008-09-23(a)(7)

Taking these allegations as true and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, we find they state a legally cognizable cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice (see Gelfand v Oliver, 29 AD3d 736 [2006]).

On a motion to dismiss under § 3211(a), the complaint must be construed liberally and given every inference that a cause of action exists.

Campaniello v. Board of Managers · filed 2008-07-28(a)

On a motion to dismiss, the complaint must be construed liberally and given the benefit of every inference that a cause of action exists.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts pleaded facts as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference when deciding whether the allegations state a legally cognizable claim.

Flax v. Lincoln National Life Insurance · filed 2008-09-30(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept all of the facts alleged in the pleading to be true, and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference in determining whether the allegations fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]; Smith v Meridian Tech., Inc., 52 AD3d 685 [2008]; Mancuso v Rubin, 52 AD3d 580 [2008]).

Section 3211(a)(7) addresses dismissal for failure to state a cause of action; dismissal based on proof that essential elements cannot be established proceeds under CPLR 3212.

Song v. Woods Oviatt Gilman LLP · filed 2008-10-03(a)(7)

We conclude that defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3212 rather than dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, and asks whether they fit any cognizable legal theory.

Abdul v. Hirschfield · filed 2008-10-06(a)(7)

With respect to ruling on that branch of Chu’s order to show cause to dismiss plaintiffs case against her, for plaintiffs failure to state a cause of action, the court must liberally construe the pleadings and accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true in determining if the alleged facts fit into any cognizable legal theory.

CPLR 3211 (a) (7) permits dismissal when a complaint, liberally construed with its allegations accepted as true, states no cognizable legal claim.

Dinerman v. Jewish Board of Family & Children's Services, Inc. · filed 2008-10-07(a)(7)

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of Counterforce’s motion which was to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

Section 3211(a)(7) allows a breach of contract claim to proceed when the complaint alleges specific facts sufficient to state that claim.

Ideal Steel Supply Corp. v. Beil · filed 2008-10-07(a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly upheld the sufficiency, for the purposes of pleading, of so much of the breach of contract cause of action as alleged an unwarranted increase in hourly fees and a failure to provide promised adjustments to the billing.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court accepts the complaint’s facts as true and resolves inferences in the plaintiff’s favor when deciding whether the complaint states a cause of action.

Kadymir v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2008-10-07(a)(7)

Turning to whether immunity attaches to the facts at bar, accepting as true the facts alleged in the complaint and resolving all inferences in the parties’ submissions in the plaintiffs favor (see Cron v Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362, 366 [1998]; Arrington v New York Times Co., 55 NY2d 433, 442 [1982], cert denied 459 US 1146 [1983]), we find that the plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action against the NYCTA.

A motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7) must be denied when the challenged claims state legally cognizable causes of action.

Out of Box Promotions, LLC v. Koschitzki · filed 2008-10-07(a)(7)

The Supreme Court also properly denied those branches of the motion which were to dismiss the fifth, sixth, and eighth causes of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Katz v. Katz · filed 2008-10-14(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court should accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and afford the proponent of the complaint the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Goldfarb v Schwartz, 26 AD3d 462, 463 [2006]; Fast Track Funding Corp. v Perrone, 19 AD3d 362, 362-363 [2005]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Lonner v. Simon Property Group, Inc. · filed 2008-10-14(a)(7)

Accepting the facts as alleged in the amended complaint as true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), the plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts to support causes of action to recover damages for breach of contract based upon a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violation of General Business Law § 349 (see Sims v First Consumers Natl. Bank, 303 AD2d 288 [2003]).

A libel complaint alleging malice sufficiently states a cause of action to withstand dismissal under CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

Singh v. Sukhram · filed 2008-10-21(a)(7)

The complaint contains sufficient allegations of malice to withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) (see Kotowski v Hadley, 38 AD3d 499 [2007]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept the complaint’s facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and ask whether the facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Kass v. Zaslav · filed 2008-10-28(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), a court “should ‘accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory’ ” (Parsippany Constr. Co., Inc. v Clark Patterson Assoc., P.C., 41 AD3d 805, 806 [2007], quoting Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true.

Schwartz v. Schwartz · filed 2008-10-28(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the allegations in the complaint should be accepted as true (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts view the complaint and cross claims in the light most favorable to the claimant when deciding whether they state a cause of action.

Sirius America Insurance v. Joline Estates, LLC · filed 2008-10-28(a)(7)

Further, viewing the complaint and cross claims in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and the defendant Joline Estates, LLC, the cross claimant, respectively (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), the complaint and cross claims adequately state a cause of action (see Lanza v Wagner, 11 NY2d 317, 334, appeal dismissed 371 US 74 [1962], cert denied 371 US 901 [1962]; Law Research Serv. v Honeywell, Inc., 31 AD2d 900, 901 [1969]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Bonney v. 5pg, LLC · filed 2008-10-14(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court should “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

Under subsection (a)(7), courts accept pleaded facts as true and give the plaintiff every favorable inference; under subsection (a)(1), the moving party must submit documentary evidence that conclusively resolves all factual issues and disposes of the claim.

Uzzle v. Nunzie Court Homeowners Association, Inc. · filed 2008-10-14(a)(1), (a)(7)

When determining a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading must be afforded a liberal construction (see CPLR 3026; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]), the facts as alleged in the complaint are accepted as true, the plaintiff is accorded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court must determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d at 87-88; Cayuga Partners v 150 Grand, 305 AD2d 527 [2003]). ... “A party seeking dismissal on the ground that its defense is founded on documentary evidence under CPLR 3211 (a) (1) has the burden of submitting documentary evidence that ‘resolves all factual issues as a matter of law, and conclusively disposes of the plaintiffs claim’ ” (Sullivan v State of New York, 34 AD3d 443, 445 [2006], quoting Nevin v Laclede Professional Prods., 273 AD2d 453 [2000]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d at 88).

On a CPLR 3211 motion, courts construe the complaint liberally and accept its allegations as true except where documentary evidence flatly contradicts them.

Rowley v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. · filed 2008-10-16

...“the complaint liberally in plaintiff’s favor [and] accepting] the facts alleged as true” (Quail Ridge Assoc. v Chemical Bank, 162 AD2d 917, 918 [1990], lv dismissed 76 NY2d 936 [1990]; see CPLR 3211; Morone v Morone, 50 NY2d 481, 484 [1980]; Carp v Marcus, 112 AD2d 546, 546 [1985]), except as to those facts which are “flatly contradicted by documentary evidence” (Quail Ridge Assoc, v Chemical Bank, 162 AD2d at 918), we conclude that Supreme Court correctly found a lack of privity between the parties and dismissed the action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Rivera v. Lutheran Medical Center · filed 2008-10-16(a)(7)

In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept the allegations of the complaint as true and accord plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within a cognizable legal theory (Polonetsky v Better Homes Depot, 97 NY2d 46, 54 [2001] [motion must be denied if “from (the) four corners (of the pleadings) factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law”]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true and does not resolve factual disputes.

State v. Samaritan Asset Management Services, Inc. · filed 2008-10-29(a)(7)

As to this last contention, for purposes of a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept all of the facts alleged in the complaint as true (Smith v Meridian Tech., Inc., 52 AD3d 685 [2d Dept 2008]). Factual issues, such as whether the mutual funds traded by the defendants prohibited market timing, are not determined on a motion to dismiss.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint survives if its factual allegations, taken together, state a legally cognizable cause of action.

Heffez v. L & G General Construction, Inc. · filed 2008-11-12(a)(7)

In determining a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “the sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law a motion for dismissal will fail” (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the complaint’s allegations are insufficient to sustain its claims.

Wachovia Securities v. Joseph · filed 2008-11-13(a)(7)

The record establishes that the court applied the appropriate standards on the motions to dismiss and properly determined that the allegations in the complaint were insufficient to defeat said motions (see e.g. Matter of Sud v Sud, 211 AD2d 423, 424 [1995]).

Section 3211(e) permits a defendant to raise failure to state a cause of action in an answer.

Butler v. Catinella · filed 2008-11-18(e)

That section expressly permits a defendant to assert or raise, in a “pleading,” the defense that a complaint does not state a cause of action.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and dismisses a claim if those allegations do not state a cause of action.

Pat a. Tartaro v. Allstate Indemnity Co. · filed 2008-11-25(a)(7)

The Supreme Court also erred in denying that branch of the defendant’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the third cause of action, alleging negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, for failure to state a cause of action. ... Here, accepting the allegations of the complaint as true, they do not allege conduct so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to state a cause of action for negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress (see Curry v Dollard, 52 AD3d 642 [2008]).

On a pre-answer motion to dismiss, a complaint that adequately alleges fraud states a cause of action under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

Ito v. Suzuki · filed 2008-12-02(a)(7)

The complaint adequately pleads a cause of action for fraud, alleging that Sam Suzuki used plaintiffs funds to obtain property with a cloud on its title (because of the injunction against transfer and the filing of a lis pendens), for an inflated price and under financing terms onerous to plaintiff.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the pleadings in the plaintiff’s favor and accepts the factual allegations as true.

Kaplon-Belo Associates, Inc. v. D'Angelo · filed 2008-12-30(a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) and (8). Construing the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accepting as true all its factual allegations (see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; Schlackman v Robin S. Weingast & Assoc., Inc., 18 AD3d 729, 729-730 [2005]; Montes Corp. v Charles Freihofer Baking Co., Inc., 17 AD3d 330 [2005]), the plaintiffs complaint sufficiently states a cause of action against the defendants to recover a brokerage commission (see Greene v Hellman, 51 NY2d 197, 206 [1980]; Lane — Real Estate Dept. Store v Lawlet Corp., 28 NY2d 36, 42 [1971]; Stanzoni Realty Corp. v Landmark Props. of Suffolk, Ltd., 19 AD3d 582 [2005]; Buck v Cimino, 243 AD2d 681, 684 [1997]).

On a pre-answer motion under CPLR 3211, a complaint survives dismissal if it sufficiently states a cause of action.

Horgan v. Whitaker · filed 2008-12-31

Given this, we are satisfied that the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action to survive dismissal under CPLR 3211.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the alleged facts as true and dismisses if they provide no basis for relief.

Amazon.com LLC v. New York State Department of Taxation & Finance · filed 2009-01-12(a)(7)

Amazon’s complaint must be dismissed in its entirety for failure to state a cause of action (CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). Even accepting all the facts alleged to be true, there is no basis upon which Amazon can prevail.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the alleged facts as true and asks whether they fit a cognizable legal theory.

Connor v. Pier Sixty, LLC · filed 2009-01-12(a)(7)

However, in determining whether a complaint is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept all of the facts alleged as true and determine only whether the facts alleged fit into any cognizable legal theory.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must construe the complaint liberally, accept its alleged facts as true, and give the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Elow v. Svenningsen · filed 2009-01-20(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the complaint must be accorded a liberal construction, the facts as alleged therein must be accepted as true, and the plaintiff must be accorded the benefit of every favorable inference.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) does not permit dismissal when facts the plaintiff could prove would establish a right to relief.

City of New York v. 330 Continental · filed 2009-01-29(a)(7)

Finally, we affirm the order appealed from insofar as it denied defendants’ pre-answer cross motion, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (7), to dismiss the City’s first, second and fourth causes of action. ... While the City failed to establish an entitlement to a preliminary injunction against such use of the buildings, it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that there is no state of facts the City could prove that would establish a right to ultimate relief based on the challenged causes of action.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, draws favorable inferences for the plaintiff, and denies dismissal if the allegations state a cause of action.

Dunn v. Gelardi · filed 2009-02-03(a)(7)

Viewing the allegations of the complaint as true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, the allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action to recover damages for defamation ... Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a cause of action may be dismissed for failure to state a claim, but dismissal is unwarranted for causes of action that do not fail on that ground.

Reynolds v. Haiduk · filed 2009-02-03(a)(7)

We agree with the Supreme Court that the first cause of action should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. However, we disagree with the Supreme Court that the second and third causes of action should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Daley v. County of Erie · filed 2009-02-06(a)(7)

Contrary to the contention of defendant, Supreme Court properly denied its motion seeking to dismiss the complaint for, inter alia, failure to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). In determining whether a complaint fails to state a cause of action, a court is required to “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffl ] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, *1088 87-88 [1994]; see Morone v Morone, 50 NY2d 481, 484 [1980]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court reads the pleadings liberally, accepts their allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

Clearmont Property, LLC v. Eisner · filed 2009-01-22(a)(7)

Initially, we are mindful that, on a motion to dismiss, “a court should construe the pleadings liberally, accept the allegations as true and afford [plaintiff] the benefit of every possible inference to determine whether the facts alleged fit within a cognizable legal theory” (T. Lemme Mech., Inc. v Schalmont Cent. School Dist., 52 AD3d 1006, 1008 [2008]; see Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]). ... However, we agree with Supreme Court that plaintiffs causes of action sounding in fraud fail to state a claim (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every possible inference when deciding whether it states a cause of action.

Dank v. Sears Holding Management Corp. · filed 2009-02-17(a)(7)

“Affording the complaint a liberal construction, accepting as true all facts alleged therein, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference” ... Therefore, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, courts accept the pleaded facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

East Suffolk Development Corp. v. Town Board of Riverhead · filed 2009-02-24(a)(7)

Contrary to the defendants’ contention, “accepting] the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, according] [the] plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determining] only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see Kass v Zaslav, 55 AD3d 877 [2008]), the plaintiff presented a viable cause of action for declaratory relief (see XJnanue v Town of Gardiner, 105 AD2d 1025 [1984]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Jason v. Krey · filed 2009-03-10(a)(7)

“In reviewing a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the facts as alleged in the complaint must be accepted as true, the plaintiff is accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and the court’s function is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Martin v New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens, 34 AD3d 650, 650-651 [2006]). Under this standard, the complaint fails to state a cause of action.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint that adequately states a cause of action should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Zorn v. Gilbert · filed 2009-03-17(a)(7)

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should not have dismissed the first cause of action contained in the original complaint (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires a court deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action to construe the complaint liberally and determine whether its alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Gateway I Group, Inc. v. Park Avenue Physicians, P.C. · filed 2009-03-17(a)(7)

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Supreme Court properly denied the appellants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against them for failure to state a cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true and gives the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

Lowenbraun v. Garvey · filed 2009-03-24(a)(7)

Here, accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and affording the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference to be drawn therefrom, the complaint fails to allege that Raab engaged in such wrongful conduct (see Baron Assoc., P.C. v RSKCO, 16 AD3d 362 [2005]; Koeppel v Schroder, 122 AD2d 780 [1986]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, draws favorable inferences for the plaintiff, and asks whether those facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Hauff v. Listemann · filed 2009-03-31(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the complaint must be afforded a liberal construction, the facts therein must be accepted as true, and the plaintiff must be accorded the benefit of every favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). The court’s function on such a motion is only to determine whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d at 87-88).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the pleaded facts as true and gives the plaintiff every possible inference when deciding whether the complaint states a cause of action.

McGovern v. Nassau County Department of Social Services · filed 2009-03-31(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept all of the facts alleged in the pleading as true, and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference in determining whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Kass v Zaslav, 55 AD3d 877 [2008]; Dinerman v Jewish Bd. of Family & Children’s Servs., Inc., 55 AD3d 530, 531 [2008]; Flax v Lincoln Natl. Life Ins. Co., 54 AD3d 992, 994 [2008]).

Under § 3211(a)(7), a court reviewing a motion to dismiss must accept the complaint’s allegations as true.

Global Reinsurance Corporation-U.S. Branch v. Equitas Ltd. · filed 2009-03-03(a)(7)

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), I must accept the pleading’s allegations as true.

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, the court must accept all allegations in the complaint as true.

Brinkerhoff v. County of St. Lawrence · filed 2009-03-30

Brought as a CPLR 3211 dismissal motion, all allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, pleaded facts are presumed true and receive every favorable inference, except factual claims flatly contradicted by the record.

Younis v. Martin · filed 2009-03-20(a)(7)

We add only that, contrary to the contention of Charles Farrell (defendant), the court applied the appropriate standard of review in denying that part of the motion to dismiss the claim for legal malpractice against him pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). In determining such a motion, “[t]he facts pleaded are to be presumed to be true and are to be accorded every favorable inference, although . . . factual claims flatly contradicted by the record are not entitled to any such consideration” (Gershon v Goldberg, 30 AD3d 372, 373 [2006]; see Parola, Gross & Marino, P.C. v Susskind, 43 AD3d 1020, 1021-1022 [2007]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court determines whether the petitioner has a legally cognizable claim.

Carver v. State · filed 2009-04-17(a)(7)

The court, when deciding a motion to dismiss the petition pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, must determine whether the petitioner has a legally cognizable cause of action and not whether the action has been properly pleaded.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must construe the complaint liberally, accept its allegations as true, and give the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Halliwell v. Gordon · filed 2009-04-28(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must afford the pleadings a liberal construction, accept the allegations of the complaint as true, and provide the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see AG Capital Funding Partners, L.P. v State St. Bank & Trust Co., 5 NY3d 582, 591 [2005]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]). Doing so here, the Supreme Court correctly granted those branches of the defendant’s motion which were to dismiss the second, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action, but erred in granting those branches of the motion which were to dismiss the first, third, and seventh causes of action.

On a motion to dismiss under subsection (a)(7), the complaint is construed liberally in the plaintiff’s favor and its allegations are accepted as true.

Pacific Carlton Development Corp. v. 752 Pacific, LLC · filed 2009-05-05(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the complaint must be liberally construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all allegations must be accepted as true (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Prince Seating Corp. v. QBE Insurance · filed 2009-05-12(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the facts as alleged in the complaint must be accepted as true, the plaintiff is accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and the court’s function is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]).

On a motion to dismiss under subsection (a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether any reasonable view of those facts supports a claim.

Wald v. Berwitz · filed 2009-05-12(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must determine, “accepting as true the factual averments of the complaint and according the plaintiff every benefit of all favorable inferences, whether the plaintiff can succeed upon any reasonable view of the facts stated” (Malik v Beal, 54 AD3d 910, 911 [2008]; see Simmons v Edelstein, 32 AD3d 464, 465 [2006] ; Manfro v McGivney, 11 AD3d 662, 663 [2004]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its allegations and opposing submissions as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Battistello v. East 51st Street Development Co. · filed 2009-05-12(a)(7)

In deciding a motion brought pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint should be liberally construed and the facts alleged in the complaint and any submissions in opposition to the dismissal motion accepted as true, according plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a fraud counterclaim when its allegations, accepted as true with favorable inferences, do not support justifiable reliance.

Glezelis v. Halkiopoulos · filed 2009-04-07(a)(7)

However, even when accepting the facts alleged in support of the counterclaims as true, and according the defendants the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]), the counterclaims are not supported by sufficient allegations from which it could reasonably be found that the defendants justifiably relied on the alleged misrepresentations (see Sareen v Sareen, 51 AD 3d 765 [2008]). ... Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the plaintiffs motion which was to dismiss the counterclaims (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; see also CPLR 3016 [b]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives plaintiffs every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Monex Financial Services, Ltd. v. Dynamic Currency Conversion, Inc. · filed 2009-05-05(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court should “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see Schwartz v Schwartz, 55 AD3d 897 [2008]).

On a CPLR 3211 motion, the court must accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true when deciding whether dismissal is warranted as a matter of law.

Hoffman v. Parade Publications · filed 2009-05-07

Since for purposes of this motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 we must accept as true the allegations that the decision to terminate plaintiffs employment was made in New York City and that the economic reasons given by the employer for the decision to terminate him were a pretext for discrimination on the basis of his age (see Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Dev. Corp., 96 NY2d 409, 414 [2001]), we cannot reject as a matter of law at this juncture plaintiffs claim that a New York City and New York State employer made a discriminatory decision here.

On a motion to dismiss under subsection (a)(7), the court accepts the pleading’s factual allegations as true.

Children's Corner Learning Center v. A. Miranda Contracting Corp. · filed 2009-05-21(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) we accept all factual allegations in the pleading as true.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court determines whether the alleged facts fit within any cognizable legal theory.

Micro Technology International, Inc. v. Artech Information Systems, LLC · filed 2009-05-12(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court should, among other things, “determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the pleadings receive a liberal construction.

L.K. Station Group, LLC v. Quantek Media, LLC · filed 2009-05-14(a)(7)

Even according, as we must on a motion to dismiss, a liberal construction to the pleadings (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), we, nevertheless, conclude that the allegations of the complaint fail to state a cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether any reasonable view of the facts supports a claim.

Hill v. Murphy · filed 2009-06-02(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must determine, accepting as true the factual averments of the complaint and according the plaintiff the benefit of all favorable inferences, whether the plaintiff can succeed upon any reasonable view of the facts as stated” (Schneider v Hand, 296 AD2d 454 [2002]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether the plaintiff could succeed on any reasonable view of those facts.

Meadow Lane Equities Corp. v. Hill · filed 2009-06-02(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must determine, accepting as true the factual averments of the complaint and according the plaintiff the benefit of all favorable inferences, whether the plaintiff can succeed upon any reasonable view of the facts as stated” (Schneider v Hand, 296 AD2d 454 [2002]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court views the complaint in the plaintiff’s favor and assumes its factual allegations are true.

Zaffarese v. Iona College · filed 2009-06-02(a)(7)

Viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and assuming that the factual allegations contained therein are true for the purposes of this motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action ... we conclude that the complaint states a cause of action to this limited extent only, and modify the order accordingly.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court accepts pleaded facts as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, but dismisses a complaint that fails to allege the required elements of a cause of action.

Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP v. Carucci · filed 2009-06-09(a)(7)

Accepting as true the facts pleaded by plaintiff and according plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference to be drawn from those facts, plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for quantum meruit. ... For these reasons, that aspect of Carucci’s motion seeking dismissal of the complaint under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) should have been granted.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Spector v. Wendy · filed 2009-06-09(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Kass v Zaslav, 55 AD3d 877 [2008]).

A dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action has limited preclusive effect and may be treated as a dismissal that was not on the merits.

Sullivan v. Nimmagadda · filed 2009-06-16(a)(7)

That limited preclusive effect is not relevant to the facts herein, as the dismissal of the prior action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) was not on the merits (see Viafax Corp. v Citicorp Leasing, Inc., 54 AD3d 846, 849-850 [2008]; Tortura v Sullivan Papain Block McGrath & Cannavo, P.C., 41 AD3d 584, 585 [2007]; Asgahar v Tringali Realty, Inc., 18 AD3d 408, 409 [2005]).

On a CPLR 3211 motion for failure to state a cause of action, the court treats the allegations as true and gives the claimant every favorable inference.

Strathmore Ridge Homeowners Ass'n v. Mendicino · filed 2009-06-23

Further, viewing the defendants’ allegations as true, and according the defendants the benefit of every favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), the allegations made in support of the first counterclaim are sufficient to state a cause of action to set aside the amendments, inter alia, on the ground that they were improperly enacted without a prior amendment of the Association’s declaration of covenants, restrictions, easements, charges and liens (hereinafter the Declaration).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a legal malpractice complaint that fails to state a cause of action.

Analisa Salon, Ltd. v. Elide Properties, LLC · filed 2009-06-30(a)(7)

Under the circumstances of this case, we agree with the Supreme Court that the third-party complaint failed to state a cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the pleading liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

Zane v. Minion · filed 2009-06-30(a)(7)

In deciding a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must give the pleading a liberal construction, accept all of the facts alleged in the pleading to be true, and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference in determining whether the allegations fit under any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits allegations sufficient to state a claim to survive a motion to dismiss even when the record evidence does not support the claim.

Aiardo v. Town of East Greenbush · filed 2009-07-02(a)(7)

While these allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, the record evidence does not support the allegations.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Niagara Falls Water Board v. City of Niagara Falls · filed 2009-07-02(a)(7)

“In determining whether a complaint fails to state a cause of action, a court is required to ‘accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffl ] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory’ ” (Daley v County of Erie, 59 AD3d 1087, 1087 [2009], quoting Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see generally CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its factual allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Hurrell-Harring v. State · filed 2009-07-16

Of course, where a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action is made pursuant to CPLR 3211, “the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]), and the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (id. at 87-88; accord Matter of Maron v Silver, 58 AD3d 102, 109 [2008]; see Rubinstein v Salomon, 46 AD3d 536, 538 [2007]; Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v State of New York, 300 AD2d 949, 952 [2002]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and gives them every favorable inference.

Pinkava v. Yurkiw · filed 2009-07-21(a)(7)

Moreover, accepting the plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true, and according them the benefit of every favorable inference, as we must on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), the plaintiffs’ allegations of payments to the Yurkiws of $51,000 and their contribution of time managing the property was sufficient to establish the transfer in reliance and unjust enrichment elements of a cause of action for a constructive trust (see Salatino v Salatino, 13 AD3d 512 [2004]; Matter of Bayside Controls, 295 AD2d 343, 346 [2002]; Gottlieb v Gottlieb, 166 AD2d 413, 414 [1990]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Reichenbaum v. Cilmi · filed 2009-07-21(a)(7)

Affording the complaint a liberal construction, accepting all facts as alleged in the amended complaint to be true, and according the plaintiffs the benefit of every favorable inference as required on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the amended complaint fails to state a cause of action (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]; see also Fishberger v Voss, 51 AD3d 627 [2008]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the facts state a cognizable claim.

Lebhar v. National City Bank · filed 2009-07-29(a)(7)

It is well settled that, on a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court should accept the facts pleaded in the complaint as true and, affording the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, should determine whether such facts state a cognizable cause of action (see e.g. Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Dev. Corp., 96 NY2d 409, 414 [2001]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88 [1994]).

On a motion under section 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and give the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference.

Maiorino v. Galindo · filed 2009-08-04(a)(7)

Inasmuch as the motion was made pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept all facts as alleged in the complaint to be true and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 AD3d 703, 703-704 [2008]; Smith v Meridian Tech., Inc., 52 AD3d 685, 686 [2008]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every possible inference.

Kurtz v. Foy · filed 2009-08-06(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), a court “must afford the pleadings a liberal construction, take the allegations of the complaint as true and provide [a] plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference” (EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]; see Skibinsky v State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 6 AD3d 975, 976 [2004]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint survives dismissal if its allegations, taken as true with every favorable inference, state a recognizable cause of action.

Daly v. Kochanowicz · filed 2009-08-18(a)(7)

“Moreover, a motion to dismiss made pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) will fail if, taking all facts alleged as true and according them every possible inference favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint states in some recognizable form any cause of action known to our law”

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint must be liberally construed and the plaintiff given every favorable inference.

Daub v. Future Tech Enterprise, Inc. · filed 2009-09-08(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the complaint must be liberally construed, giving the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Mitchell v TAM Equities, Inc., 27 AD3d 703, 704 [2006]).

On a motion to dismiss, the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but it must still allege facts sufficient to state a claim.

DeNatale v. Santangelo · filed 2009-09-08(a)

In addition, viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), it failed to set forth allegations sufficient to state a claim that the negligence of the law firm and its two members was a proximate cause of his failure to obtain a more favorable result in the underlying civil action (see Barnett v Schwartz, 47 AD3d at 203-204).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

McClain v. City of New York · filed 2009-09-08(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss a complaint, the facts alleged in the complaint must be accepted as true, the plaintiff is accorded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court’s function is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court treats the complaint’s allegations as true and resolves all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.

Goldson v. Walker · filed 2009-09-15(a)(7)

Viewing the allegations in the complaint as true and resolving all inferences in favor of the plaintiff ... the complaint adequately states a cause of action against the appellant to recover damages for aiding and abetting fraud.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Vig v. New York Hairspray Co. · filed 2009-09-15(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action (CPLR 3211 [a] [7]), the court is required to accept as true the facts as alleged in the complaint, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference and strive to determine only whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Dev. Corp., 96 NY2d 409, 414 [2001]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint fails to state a cause of action when it offers only conclusory allegations without supporting facts.

Caplan v. Tofel · filed 2009-09-22(a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). The complaint failed to state a cause of action because it did not set forth facts to support the plaintiffs conclusory allegation that the defendants’ lawful issuance of a restraining notice constituted an abuse of process or tortious interference with prospective economic advantage (see Curiano v Suozzi, 63 NY2d 113, 116 [1984]; Reisman v Kerry Lutz, P.C., 6 AD3d 418, 419 [2004]; Aluminum Mill Supply Corp. v Larkin, 129 AD2d 542 [1987]; see also Carvel Corp. v Noonan, 3 NY3d 182, 190-191 [2004]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court treats the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff favorable inferences; when the movant offers evidentiary material, the court determines whether the plaintiff has a cause of action.

Hashmi v. Messiha · filed 2009-09-22(a)(7)

“[A] motion to dismiss made pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) will fail if, taking all facts alleged as true and according them every possible inference favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint states in some recognizable form any cause of action known to our law” (Shaya B. Pac., LLC v Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, 38 AD3d 34, 38 [2006]; see AG Capital Funding Partners, L.P. v State St. Bank & Trust Co., 5 NY3d 582, 591 [2005]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). However, when, as here, the moving party offers evidentiary material, “the court is required to determine whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not [just] whether [they have] stated one” (Hartman v Morganstern, 28 AD3d 423, 424 [2006] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint sufficiently pleads damages when they may reasonably be inferred from its allegations.

Fielding v. Kupferman · filed 2009-08-11(a)(7)

To survive a pre-answer motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “a pleading need only state allegations from which damages attributable to the defendant’s conduct may reasonably be inferred” (Lappin v Greenberg, 34 AD3d 277, 279 [2006]).

A plaintiff opposing a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7) need not establish a prima facie case by proving the alleged easement.

Shapiro v. Jackel · filed 2009-08-11(a)(7)

To the extent that the defendant argues that, in opposing his CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion, the plaintiffs were required to establish their prima facie case by demonstrating the existence of the alleged easement, that contention is without merit.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory, regardless of whether they can ultimately be proved.

Union State Bank v. Weiss · filed 2009-08-11(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court’s function is to determine whether the plaintiffs factual allegations fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007]), without regard to whether those allegations ultimately can be established (see EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]; Aberbach v Biomedical Tissue Servs., Ltd., 48 AD3d 716, 717-718 [2008]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires the court to construe the complaint liberally.

O'Gara v. Alacci · filed 2009-09-22(a)(7)

Affording the third-party complaint a liberal construction, as we must in light of the procedural posture of this case (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]), it is clear the appellants were seeking contribution from the third-party defendants based on an alleged violation of the Dram Shop Act.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a recognizable cause of action, even after its allegations receive every favorable inference.

Sonne v. Board of Trustees of Village of Suffern · filed 2009-09-29(a)(7)

Accordingly, the plaintiff does not state a cause of action sounding in the deprivation of property rights in violation of 42 USC § 1983 as alleged in her first cause of action, and that cause of action should have been dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the allegations in the complaint and opposition submissions as true and gives the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

McHenry v. Lawrence · filed 2009-10-06(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint and submissions in opposition to the motion, and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144, 151-152 [2002]; Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Dev. Corp., 96 NY2d 409, 414 [2001]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the opposing papers and pleadings as true and give them every favorable inference.

Levine v. New York State United Teachers · filed 2009-10-08(a)(7)

For purposes of deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the papers and pleadings submitted in opposition to the motion must be accepted as true, and given every favorable inference (511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144, 152 [2002]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

De Paulis Holding Corp. v. Vitale · filed 2009-10-20(a)(7)

In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “we must accept as true the facts as alleged in the complaint and submissions in opposition to the motion, accord [the plaintiff] the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Dev. Corp., 96 NY2d 409, 414 [2001]; Richmond Shop Smart, Inc. v Kenbar Dev. Ctr., LLC, 32 AD3d 423 [2006]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Gotlin v. City of New York · filed 2009-10-30(a)(7)

The court notes that this is a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion made prior to taking of any discovery by the parties. At this stage of the litigation, the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory.”

Under § 3211(a)(7), a complaint fails to state a cause of action when, even liberally construed with every favorable inference, it alleges no facts against the defendants.

Feder v. Polkes · filed 2009-11-10(a)(7)

Even liberally construed and affording the appellants every favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), the complaint fails to state a cause of action against the defendants (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Regina v. Marotta · filed 2009-11-10(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true.

Empire One Telecommunications, Inc. v. Verizon New York, Inc. · filed 2009-10-22(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must read the complaint liberally, accept its allegations as true, and give the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Pekler v. Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York · filed 2009-11-10(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must afford the pleadings a liberal construction, accept the allegations of the complaint as true, and provide the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see CPLR 3026; ... [1994]). Doing so here, the Supreme Court should have dismissed the fifth cause of action.

When a court considers evidentiary material on a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), it asks whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, rather than whether the complaint states one.

Davis v. Davis · filed 2009-11-17(a)(7)

Where a court considers evidentiary material in deciding the motion, the standard is not whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of action, but whether the plaintiff has a cause of action (see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; Fischer v Sadov Realty Corp., 34 AD3d at 631; Hartman v Morganstern, 28 AD3d at 424; McGuire v Sterling Doubleday Enters., L.P., 19 AD3d at 661).

When evidentiary material is considered on a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court determines whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, rather than whether the complaint states one.

Gianis v. Gianis · filed 2009-11-24(a)(7)

“Where evidentiary material is submitted and considered on a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must determine whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, not whether the plaintiff has stated one”

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the pleading and gives the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference.

Colasacco v. Robert E. Lawrence Real Estate · filed 2009-12-01(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction and the plaintiff accorded the benefit of every possible inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must liberally construe the pleading, treat its alleged facts as true, and give the petitioner every favorable inference.

In re Doman · filed 2009-12-08(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a petition pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must liberally construe the pleading, with the facts alleged deemed to be true, and accord the petitioner the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]; Katz v Katz, 55 AD3d 680, 682 [2008]; Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 AD3d 703, 703-704 [2008]).

On a motion to dismiss under subsection (a)(7), courts liberally construe the complaint, accept its allegations as true, and give the plaintiff every possible inference.

Schmidt & Schmidt, Inc. v. Town of Charlton · filed 2009-12-10(a)(7)

As this case comes to us in the posture of a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), we “must afford the pleadings a liberal construction, take the allegations of the complaint as true and provide [the] plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference” (EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]; see Alaimo v Town of Fort Ann, 63 AD3d 1481, 1482 [2009]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff every possible inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Sinclair · filed 2009-12-15(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the pleading as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; Etzion v Etzion, 62 AD3d 646, 650 [2009]; McGovern v Nassau County Dept. of Social Servs., 60 AD3d 1016, 1017 [2009]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Roth v. R & P Restaurant Corp. · filed 2009-12-15(a)(7)

In determining a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court should “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Fragrancenet.com, Inc. v. Fragrancex.com, Inc. · filed 2009-12-22(a)(7)

Affording the complaint a liberal construction, accepting all facts as alleged in the complaint to be true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference ... in effect, upon renewal, the Supreme Court properly, inter alia, granted that branch of the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) which was to dismiss the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the pleading liberally and asks whether the alleged facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Lucia v. Goldman · filed 2009-12-22(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint, the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction. The court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint’s allegations are accepted as true, and dismissal is proper only if the alleged facts fit no cognizable legal theory.

Peterec-Tolino v. Harap · filed 2009-12-22(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the allegations in the complaint should be accepted as true, and the motion should be granted only if the facts as alleged do not fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a cause of action against a defendant.

Jacobs v. Mostow · filed 2010-01-05(a)(7)

The complaint was properly dismissed insofar as asserted against NCS Pearson, Inc., inasmuch as the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action against that defendant (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

DiBuono v. Abbey, LLC · filed 2010-01-12(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court should “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

A motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7) fails if the alleged facts, taken as true with every favorable inference, state a recognizable cause of action.

Fisher v. Giuca · filed 2010-01-12(a)(7)

“ ‘[A] motion to dismiss made pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) will fail if, taking all facts alleged as true and according them every possible inference favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint states in some recognizable form any cause of action known to our law’ ” (Fisher v DiPietro, 54 AD3d at 893-894, quoting Shaya B. Pac., LLC v Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, 38 AD3d 34, 38 [2006]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a pleading survives if its factual allegations together state any cognizable cause of action.

Wilner v. Allstate Insurance · filed 2010-01-12(a)(7)

In determining a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “the sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law a motion for dismissal will fail” (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; see Pacific Carlton Dev. Corp. v 752 Pac., LLC, 62 AD3d 677, 679 [2009]).

Section 3211(a)(7) does not require dismissal of a complaint alleging undisclosed marital assets when the parties’ stipulation expressly allows further court proceedings on that issue.

Kingsley v. Kingsley · filed 2010-01-14(a)(7)

Notably, the parties’ stipulation specifically contemplated further court proceedings when, as here, one party alleges that the other party failed to disclose marital assets. Accordingly, defendant’s assertion that the complaint herein fails to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) is unpersuasive.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference when deciding whether it states a cause of action.

Marcantonio v. Picozzi · filed 2010-02-02(a)(7)

Affording the complaint a liberal construction, accepting all facts as alleged in the complaint to be true, and according the plaintiffs the benefit of every favorable inference as required on ... a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the complaint fails to state a cause of action against the defendants Michael Picozzi III, and Viola, Benedetti, Azzolini & Morano, LLC (hereinafter the law firm) (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Reichenbaum v Cilmi, 64 AD3d 693, 694 [2009]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the pleaded facts and opposition submissions as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Chiu v. Man Choi Chiu · filed 2010-03-02(a)(7)

The court must accept the facts alleged in the pleading and the submissions in opposition to the motion as true, and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference’ ”

A complaint seeking to recover an unsatisfied judgment from an insurer can withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.

Jimenez v. New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance · filed 2010-03-02(a)(7)

NYCM’s contention that the Supreme Court improperly denied its motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]) is without merit.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference when deciding whether it states a cause of action.

Roslyn Union Free School District v. Barkan · filed 2010-03-02(a)(7)

The District’s accounting, unjust enrichment, and constructive trust causes of action must be dismissed insofar as asserted against Margaritis for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). ... Accepting the allegations in the complaint as true, and according the District the benefit of every favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), the District failed to state a cause of action for an accounting, unjust enrichment, or a constructive trust, as the complaint is bereft of any allegation that Margaritis possessed any property or asset of the District.