N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3211

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, the pleading is liberally construed and the plaintiff receives every possible favorable inference.

Medical Assets v. Braveheart, Inc. · filed 2003-12-04

Bearing in mind that in the context of a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the pleading is to be liberally construed, and that the plaintiff is to be accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged causes of action against appellant for breach of contract, negligence and replevin.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion to dismiss can remedy deficiencies in the complaint.

Raquet v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. · filed 2003-12-31(a)(7)

We conclude that any alleged deficiencies in the complaint have been remedied by the affidavits submitted by plaintiffs in opposition to defendant’s motion (see id.).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court identifies the claim’s elements and determines whether the complaint states or reasonably implies them.

New York Civil Liberties Union v. State · filed 2004-01-29(a)(7)

In reviewing the amended complaint here, we begin by identifying the elements of the cause of action purporting to allege a violation of the guarantees of the Education Article and then examine the amended complaint to see if it states or reasonably implies those elements.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

Kevin Spence & Sons, Inc. v. Boar's Head Provisions Co. · filed 2004-03-01(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept as true the facts alleged in the pleading and submissions in opposition to the motion, and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144, 151-152 [2002]; Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Dev. Corp., 96 NY2d 409, 414 [2001]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, a plaintiff alleging fraud need only plead reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations; the reasonableness of that reliance generally presents a factual issue.

Knight Securities, L.P. v. Fiduciary Trust Co. · filed 2004-03-09(a)(7)

However, on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, “a plaintiff . . . need only plead that he relied on misrepresentations made by the defendant. . . since the reasonableness of his reliance [generally] implicates factual issues whose resolution would be inappropriate at this early stage” (Internet Law Lib., Inc. v Southridge Capital Mgt., LLC, 223 F Supp 2d 474, 485 [2002]; see also Duke v Touche Ross & Co., 765 F Supp 69, 74 [1991]).

Under § 3211(a)(7), a complaint survives dismissal when its alleged facts, accepted as true, fit a cognizable legal theory.

Ndiaye v. Cangelosi · filed 2004-03-22(a)(7)

In determining a motion pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(7), the court must also determine whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( Leon v. Martinez 84 N.Y.2d 83 at 88-89 [1994]), see also (Collins. v. Telcoa Intern. Corp . 283 A.D.2d 128 [2nd Dept. 2001]). ... The court further finds that the allegations of facts accepted as true support a tort claim of negligence against the defendant Congelosi based on his striking of the plaintiff with his vehicle. Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint is denied in its entirety.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept as true the facts alleged in the pleadings and evidentiary submissions opposing the motion.

Beverage Mktg. USA v. S. Beach Beverage Co. · filed 2004-04-05(a)(7)

When deciding a motion made pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept as true all of the facts alleged in the pleadings and any evidentiary submissions made in opposition to the motion.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the pleading’s assertions as true.

Utica First Insurance v. Floyd Holding, Inc. · filed 2004-03-29(a)(7)

Accepting the truth of the assertions in the third-party action, as we must on this motion to dismiss, RVI, as Floyd’s agent, breached its duty to Floyd to procure an effective insurance policy by negligently misrepresenting a material fact in the application for insurance.

On a preanswer motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Venditti v. Liberty Mutual Insurance · filed 2004-04-22(a)(7)

Addressing the legal sufficiency of the claim, we afford a liberal construction to the complaint at this preanswer stage, “accepting] as true the allegations contained therein, according] the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference and determining] only whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (1455 Washington Ave. Assoc, v Rose & Kiernan, 260 AD2d 770, 771 [1999]; see Virgem Enters, v City of New York, 290 AD2d 708, 708 [2002]; see also Cron v Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362, 366 [1998]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its allegations as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Skibinsky v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. · filed 2004-04-22(a)(7)

It is well settled, that on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court “must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept as true the allegations contained therein, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference and determine only whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (1455 Washington Ave. Assoc, v Rose & Kiernan, 260 AD2d 770, 771 [1999]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), an adequately pleaded claim survives when the movant’s evidentiary material does not conclusively refute it.

Brainstorms Internet Marketing, Inc. v. USA Networks, Inc. · filed 2004-04-27(a)(7)

The complaint adequately alleges that defendant USANI, by sending an e-mail to plaintiffs setting a closing date for its purchase of the remaining 84% of plaintiffs’ business, did, in fact, exercise the purchase option accorded it in the parties’ June 23, 2000 purchase agreement pursuant to the agreement’s terms (see Kaplan v Lippman, 75 NY2d 320 [1990]), and the evidentiary material submitted by USANI on the motion did not conclusively establish the contrary (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action must be denied when the complaint's factual allegations, taken together, state any cognizable claim.

Shanley v. Welch · filed 2004-04-30(a)(7)

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action “must be denied if from the pleadings’ four corners ‘factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law’ ” (511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144, 152 [2002], quoting Polonetsky v Better Homes Depot, 97 NY2d 46, 54 [2001]).

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court views the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Clark v. Elem Sand & Gravel, Inc. · filed 2004-05-19

Defendants in the above-captioned action move to dismiss the amended complaint herein pursuant to CPLR 3211 on the grounds that the amended complaint fails to state any causes of action as a matter of law. ... For the reasons set forth below, this court determines that there are no cognizable legal causes of action against either of the defendants in the instant action, even viewing the amended complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to determine whether the pleaded facts support a cause of action, even if the claim is imperfectly pleaded.

Bello v. New England Fin. · filed 2004-05-20(a)(7)

On a motion made pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must read the pleading to determine if the pleader has a cause of action and not whether the cause of action has been properly plead.

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference to determine whether they fit a cognizable legal theory.

Konidaris v. Aeneas Capital Management, LP · filed 2004-06-01(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, a court must accept as true the facts as alleged within the four corners of the complaint and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference to determine whether the allegations fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 634 [1976]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts and opposition submissions as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Maldonado v. Olympia Mechanical Piping & Heating Corp. · filed 2004-06-07(a)(7)

“[T]he court must accept as true the facts alleged in the pleading and submissions in opposition to the motion, and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference” (Kevin Spence & Sons, Inc. v Boar’s Head Provisions Co., 5 AD3d 352 [2004]; see 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., supra at 152).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether any reasonable view of the facts supports a claim.

Maranga v. McDonald & T. Corp. · filed 2004-06-07(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must determine, accepting as true the factual averments of the complaint and according the plaintiff the benefit of all favorable inferences, whether the plaintiff can succeed upon any reasonable view of the facts as stated” (see Schneider v Hand, 296 AD2d 454 [2002]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleading’s allegations as true, draws reasonable inferences for the pleader, and asks whether the alleged facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Sheppard-Mobley v. King · filed 2004-06-07(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss based upon failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must assume the truth of the allegations in the pleading, “resolve all inferences which reasonably flow therefrom in favor of the pleader” (Sanders v Winship, 57 NY2d 391, 394 [1982]), and “determine simply whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Morone v Morone, 50 NY2d 481, 484 [1980]).

CPLR 3211 does not permit dismissal merely because defendants dispute allegations about their relationship to the entity directly responsible for the alleged wrongdoing.

Franklin High Income Trust v. APP Global, Ltd. · filed 2004-05-18

Nor is the action as against AWSC and the other accounting defendant, Arthur Andersen, L.L.P, subject to dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211 merely because the accounting defendants ... dispute plaintiffs’ allegations respecting the assertedly close and controlling relationship between them and the Arthur Andersen entity that was purportedly immediately responsible for the complained-of audits and financial statements (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88 [1994]; Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court views the complaint favorably to the plaintiff and accepts its factual allegations as true.

Carter v. County of Nassau · filed 2004-06-28(a)(7)

Viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and accepting the factual allegations as true, the complaint states a cause of action to recover damages for a breach of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (see Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of New Rochelle v County of Westchester, 282 AD2d 561 [2001]; Rotanelli v Madden, 172 AD2d 815 [1991]; see also Matter of Andriola v Ortiz, 82 NY2d 320 [1993], cert denied sub nom. Andriola v Antinoro, 511 US 1031 [1994]; Matter of Civil Serv. Empls. Assn. Local 1000, AFSCME v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 2 AD3d 1197 [2003]; Jackson v Nassau County, 245 AD2d 264 [1997]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the alleged facts, accepted as true, conclusively establish that the plaintiff has no cause of action.

Noble v. Graham · filed 2004-06-28(a)(7)

Dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) is appropriate where the facts alleged, even if accepted as true, establish conclusively that the plaintiff has no cause of action (see Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633 [1976]; SRW Assoc. v Bellport Beach Prop. Owners, 129 AD2d 328 [1987]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is construed liberally and the plaintiff receives every possible favorable inference.

Humphrey v. Onondaga County Sheriff's Department · filed 2004-07-09(a)(7)

In lieu of answering, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint against it, alleging, inter alia, that the complaint failed to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). Construing the complaint liberally and giving plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see Harrison v Constantino, 2 AD3d 1315 [2003]), we conclude that Supreme Court properly granted defendant’s motion.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and determines whether they state a cognizable claim.

Itskov v. New York Fertility Institute, Inc. · filed 2004-07-29(a)(7)

The court’s inquiry on a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) is narrowly defined. ... Accepting the allegations of the complaint as true and construing the inferences that can be drawn therefrom in plaintiffs favor, the court finds that the plaintiff sufficiently stated a cause of action for breach of contract.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court determines whether the complaint states any cognizable cause of action, regardless of whether it was properly pleaded.

Prohealth Care Assoc., Llp v. April · filed 2004-08-18(a)(7)

When considering a motion made pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must read the complaint to determine if the plaintiff has any cognizable cause of action and not whether the cause of action has been properly plead.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court assumes the complaint’s allegations are true and determines whether they state a cause of action for which relief may be granted.

DeRosa v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. · filed 2004-08-26(a)(7)

On the merits of a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the IAS court must determine whether, assuming that the allegations in the complaint are true, they state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted (see Becker v Schwartz, 46 NY2d 401, 408 [1978]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every possible inference, and asks whether those facts fit any discernible legal theory.

Sheila C. v. Povich · filed 2004-08-26(a)(7)

It is well established that in determining whether to grant such a motion, the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction (CPLR 3026) and the court should accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint, accord plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and only determine whether the facts, as alleged, fit within any discernible legal theory (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; CBS Corp. v Dumsday, 268 AD2d 350, 352 [2000]).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts the alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Powers v. Carrols Corp. · filed 2004-06-14(a)(7)

“In reviewing the determination of a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, we must accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint and in the submissions in opposition to the motion, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (MetLife Auto & Home v Joe Basil Chevrolet, 303 AD2d 30, 31 [2002], affd 1 NY3d 478 [2004]).

On a CPLR 3211 motion, the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true and denies dismissal if they state any cognizable cause of action.

Paterno v. CYC, LLC · filed 2004-06-21

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, our task is to determine whether the complaint states a cause of action, and the motion must be denied if, from the four corners of the complaint, factual allegations are discerned which taken together and accepted as true manifest any cause of action cognizable at law (see 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144, 151 [2002]; Polonetsky v Better Homes Depot, 97 NY2d 46, 54 [2001]; Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint’s allegations in the plaintiff’s favor.

Beecher v. Feldstein · filed 2004-06-28(a)(7)

Liberally construing the allegations of the plaintiffs amended pleading in his favor (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88 [1994]), the defendant’s actions did not procure and were merely incidental to the dealership’s breach of the lease (see Fox News Network v N.S. Bienstock, 304 AD2d 498 [2003]; Blumenreich v North Shore Health Sys., 287 AD2d 529, 531 [2001]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, conflicting factual allegations cannot be resolved on the motion papers alone.

Matter of P.T. v. T.R. · filed 2004-08-25(a)(7)

Such controverted allegations cannot be resolved on the motion papers alone.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint and affidavit facts as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Lipton v. Unumprovident Co. · filed 2004-09-27(a)(7)

However, accepting the facts set forth in the complaint and the plaintiffs affidavit as true, and according him the benefit of every favorable inference, as we must on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) (see 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144, 151-152 [2002]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]), we find that the fifth cause of action, which seeks to recover damages for breach of fiduciary duty, states a cause of action against Spear Leeds.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the pleading is liberally construed, its alleged facts are accepted as true, and its allegations receive every favorable inference.

Klein v. Gutman · filed 2004-11-01(a)(7)

At this stage of the action, we find that the plaintiff adequately stated all of his causes of action. “[0]n a motion to dismiss a pleading for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is to be liberally construed, accepting all of the facts alleged therein to be true, and according the allegations the benefit of every possible favorable inference”

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court assumes the complaint’s allegations are true and determines whether they state a cognizable cause of action.

Carriafielio-Diehl & Associates, Inc. v. D&M Electrical Contracting, Inc. · filed 2004-11-15(a)(7)

Assuming the truth of the plaintiffs’ assertions, the complaint alleges a cognizable cause of action to recover damages for unjust enrichment (see 3105 Grand Corp. v City of New York, 288 NY 178 [1942]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true, draws favorable inferences for the plaintiff, and asks whether any reasonable view of the facts states a claim.

Pankin v. Cronin · filed 2004-11-15(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must determine, accepting as true the factual averments of the complaint and according the plaintiff the benefit of all favorable inferences, whether the plaintiff can succeed upon any reasonable view of the facts as stated (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Dye v Catholic Med. Ctr. of Brooklyn & Queens, 273 AD2d 193 [2000]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court may consider submitted evidentiary material in deciding whether the complaint states a cognizable cause of action.

Marino v. Pergolizzi · filed 2004-11-22(a)(7)

When read in conjunction with the evidentiary material submitted by the defendant and considered by the Supreme Court on the cross motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the complaint alleged material facts giving rise to a cog...nizable cause of action alleging legal malpractice ... [2001]).

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, draws every favorable inference for the plaintiff, and denies the motion if any reasonable view of the alleged facts permits recovery.

Alsol Enterprises, Ltd. v. Premier Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. · filed 2004-10-12

The defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 was properly denied. In assessing such a motion, the allegations in the complaint are accepted as true and the plaintiff is accorded every possible favorable inference to be drawn therefrom (see 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144, 152 [2002]). The motion must be denied if, upon any reasonable view of the facts alleged in the complaint, the plaintiff would be entitled to recovery (see 219 Broadway Corp. v Alexander’s, Inc., 46 NY2d 506 [1979]).

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, the court must credit the plaintiffs’ version of the events.

Payne v. County of Sullivan · filed 2004-11-10

When we credit plaintiffs’ version of the events, as we must in the context of their opposition to defendants’ CPLR 3211 motion, we conclude that plaintiff may have had a valid lien against Marlow’s boat (see Lien Law § 184).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court takes the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every reasonable inference.

State v. Grecco · filed 2004-12-06(a)(7)

Thus, our inquiry on this appeal is limited to determining whether, taking the allegations of the complaint as true and affording the Attorney General the benefit of every reasonable inference, the Attorney General has stated a cause of action against one or more of the defendants (see Leon v Martinez, supra at 87-88).

CPLR 3211 permits a cross motion to dismiss a claim that fails to state a cognizable cause of action.

Lewittes v. Blume · filed 2004-12-07

There was nothing improvident about the court’s decision in this regard, since defendant’s cross motion was based in part on CPLR 3211, which challenged plaintiffs statement of a cognizable cause of action (see Becker v Schwartz, 46 NY2d 401, 408 [1978]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court takes the complaint and supporting affidavit as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Cooney v. Cooney · filed 2004-12-13(a)(7)

The allegations in the complaint, and in any supporting affidavit, must be taken as true ... and the plaintiff must be accorded “the benefit of every possible favorable inference” ... Applying these principles, the Supreme Court also correctly denied that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the complaint favorably to the plaintiff and accepts its factual allegations as true.

Allianz Underwriters Insurance v. Landmark Insurance · filed 2004-12-16(a)(7)

It is well settled that on a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all factual allegations must be accepted as true (see 219 Broadway Corp. v Alexander’s, Inc., 46 NY2d 506, 509 [1979]; Great Atl. Ins. Co. v Weinstein, 125 AD2d 214 [1986]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires denial of a motion to dismiss when the complaint’s factual allegations, taken together, state a legally cognizable cause of action.

Dundes v. Fuersich · filed 2004-12-22(a)(7)

It bears repeating that, when presented with a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), it must be determined whether the complaint states a cause of action. “The motion must be denied if from the pleadings’ four corners ‘factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law.’ ”

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

City of Syracuse v. Comerford · filed 2004-12-30(a)(7)

We further note that, for purposes of this motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, “we must accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint and in the submissions in opposition to the motion, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (MetLife Auto & Home v Joe Basil Chevrolet, 303 AD2d 30, 31 [2002], affd 1 NY3d 478 [2004]; see Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Dev. Corp., 96 NY2d 409, 414 [2001]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true and gives the plaintiff all favorable inferences.

Dunleavy v. Hilton Hall Apartments Co. · filed 2005-01-10(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept as true the factual allegations of the complaint and accord the plaintiff all favorable inferences which may be drawn therefrom (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; Dye v Catholic Med. Ctr. of Brooklyn & Queens, 273 AD2d 193 [2000]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

Poliah v. Westchester County Country Club, Inc. · filed 2005-01-24(a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) which was to dismiss the cause of action alleging the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Accepting the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), we conclude the complaint fails to state such a cause of action (see Howell v New York Post Co., 81 NY2d 115, 121 [1993]; Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 NY2d 293, 303 [1983]), since the conduct complained of consisted of mere insults, indignities, and annoyances (see Harville v Lowville Cent. School Dist., 245 AD2d 1106, 1107 [1997]; Leibowitz v Bank Leumi Trust Co. of N.Y., 152 AD2d 169, 182 [1989]).

A complaint consisting only of bare legal conclusions and factual allegations contradicted by the record may be dismissed under CPLR 3211.

Negron v. JP Morgan Chase/Chase Manhattan Bank · filed 2005-01-31(a)(7)

Furthermore, the Supreme Court correctly granted that branch of the motion which was to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against the remaining defendants, since it consisted only of bare legal conclusions and factual allegations contradicted by the record (see Sesti v North Bellmore Union Free School Dist., 304 AD2d 551 [2003]; Palazzolo v Herrick, Feinstein, LLP, 298 AD2d 372 [2002]).

On a CPLR 3211 motion, the court accepts the alleged facts as true, construes them liberally, and asks whether they fit any cognizable legal theory of recovery.

Employee Network, Inc. v. Faircall Corp. · filed 2004-12-09

This Court’s scope of review on this CPLR 3211 motion is limited to a determination of whether plaintiffs alleged facts, when accepted as true and liberally construed, fit within any cognizable legal theory of recovery (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; New York Civ. Liberties Union v State of New York, 3 AD3d 811, 811-812 [2004]; Hopkinson v Redwing Constr. Co., 301 AD2d 837, 837-838 [2003]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court treats the alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences, and determines whether the claims are viable.

Salatino v. Salatino · filed 2004-12-20(a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly denied those branches of the defendant’s motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) and (7) to dismiss the first through sixth causes of action. Viewing the facts alleged in the complaint and the motion papers as true and giving the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences (see Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Dev. Corp., 96 NY2d 409 [2001]), we find that the plaintiff established viable causes of action based upon promissory estoppel arising out of the alleged oral conveyances (see Gurreri v Associates Ins. Co., 248 AD2d 356 [1998]), and for the imposition of a constructive trust as to both properties (see Bankers Sec. Life Ins. Socy. v Shakerdge, 49 NY2d 939 [1980]; Matter of Bayside Controls, 295 AD2d 343 [2002]).

Under CPLR 3211(a), a complaint may be dismissed when its allegations, accepted as true and given every favorable inference, fail to state a claim.

Mascola v. City University of New York · filed 2005-01-18(a)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Leland DeGrasse, J.), entered October 22, 2003, which granted defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs. ... Even assuming the truth of the facts pleaded, and ... granting plaintiff every favorable inference, the claim for hostile work environment was properly dismissed because the allegations did not rise to the level of being “severe or pervasive” (see Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v Vinson, 477 US 57, 67 [1986]).

On a CPLR 3211 motion, wholly conclusory allegations of negligence do not state a sustainable claim against an individual defendant.

Cruz v. Board of Managers of 140 West End Avenue Condominium · filed 2005-01-25

The complaint was also properly dismissed as against defendant Brown, an Insignia employee. The wholly conclusory allegations of negligence against Brown do not make out a sustainable claim against her individually.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts accept the complaint’s facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Elmore v. City of New York · filed 2005-02-07(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court should “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court treats the complaint’s factual allegations as true and gives the plaintiff the benefit of all favorable inferences.

Sirlin v. Town of New Castle · filed 2005-02-07(a)(7)

In reviewing a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the factual allegations of the complaint must be deemed to be true, and the court must afford the plaintiff the benefit of all favorable inferences that can be drawn from the complaint (see Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 86 NY2d 307, 318 [1995]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Johnson v Kings County Dist. Attorney’s Off. 308 AD2d 278 [2003]).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court assumes the complaint’s allegations are true and dismisses it if they fail to state a cause of action.

P.T. v. Children's Village · filed 2005-03-28(a)(7)

Assuming the allegations in the complaint to be true (see CPLR 3026; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), since the plaintiffs failed to allege the existence of a special relationship giving rise to a duty of care owed by WCHCC to PT., the complaint fails to state a cause of action against WCHCC (see Eiseman v State of New York, 70 NY2d 175, 185-189 [1987]; Santos v City of New York, 269 AD2d 585 [2000]; Cohen v Wales, 133 AD2d 94 [1987]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true, draw favorable inferences for the plaintiff, and deny dismissal if the plaintiff could succeed on any reasonable view of the allegations.

Montes Corp. v. Charles Freihofer Baking Co. · filed 2005-04-04(a)(7)

The allegations in the complaint, and in any supporting affidavit, must be taken as true (see Gingold v Beekman, 183 AD2d 870 [1992]), and if the plaintiff can succeed upon any reasonable view of the allegations, the complaint may not be dismissed (see Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of New Rochelle v County of Westchester, 282 AD2d 561, 562 [2001]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Martin v. Columbia Greene Humane Society, Inc. · filed 2005-04-14(a)(7)

When reviewing a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion, the court “ ‘must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept as true the allegations contained therein, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference and determine only whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory’ ” (Virgem Enters. v City of New York, 290 AD2d 708, 708 [2002], quoting 1455 Washington Ave. Assoc. v Rose & Kiernan, 260 AD2d 770, 770-771 [1999]).

On a motion to dismiss, section 3211 calls for liberal construction of the pleading and every favorable inference for the plaintiff.

Meyerson v. Prime Realty Services, LLC · filed 2005-02-28(a)(7)

The court determines the pleading is proper in form and sufficient under the statute. As stated in relation to another consumer fraud claim, Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. (98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]), on this motion to dismiss, “the pleadings are necessarily afforded a liberal construction” and a plaintiff accorded “the benefit of every possible favorable inference.” Accordingly, this branch of the motion is denied with leave to renew after amplification of the pleading or discovery.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, alleged facts are accepted as true, given every favorable inference, and assessed for whether they fit a cognizable legal theory.

Feinberg v. Boros · filed 2005-04-26(a)(7)

We agree that plaintiffs pleading of his legal malpractice cause of action was sufficient to survive defendants’ original CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion. From the alleged facts, accepting them as true, according them the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and evaluating them only as to whether they fit within any cognizable legal theory, one could infer that plaintiffs former partner would have been amenable to an agreement limiting the estoppel effect of the arbitration award.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal only when a liberally construed pleading fails to state a cause of action or submissions conclusively establish that the pleader has none.

Schwaner v. Collins · filed 2005-04-29(a)(7)

“A motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) should not be granted unless, within the four corners of the pleading, liberally construed, the pleader[s have] failed to state a cause of action, or unless documents and other submissions establish conclusively that [the pleaders have] no cause of action” (Grossman v Pharmhouse Corp., 234 AD2d 918, 919 [1996]; see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 635-636 [1976]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and grants dismissal only if they cannot establish a cause of action.

Asgahar v. Tringali Realty, Inc. · filed 2005-05-02(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the allegations in the complaint should be accepted as true (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). Such a motion should be granted only where, viewing the allegations as true, the plaintiff cannot establish a cause of action (see Cayuga Partners v 150 Grand, 305 AD2d 527 [2003]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and gives them every favorable inference.

Gaentner v. Benkovich · filed 2005-05-02(a)(7)

Here, even accepting the plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true and according them the benefit of every favorable inference, as we must on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Konidaris v Aeneas Capital Mgt., LP, 8 AD3d 244 [2004]), the plaintiffs failed to show any legally cognizable “transfer in reliance” or unjust enrichment enjoyed by the decedent (Satler v Merlis, supra; see Matter of Lefton, 160 AD2d 702 [1990]; Gargano v V.C.&J. Constr. Corp., 148 AD2d 417, 418-419 [1989]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts accept pleaded facts as true but need not accept legal conclusions or factual claims that are inherently incredible or flatly contradicted by documentary evidence.

Greene v. Doral Conference Center Associates · filed 2005-05-02(a)(7)

Upon a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), a court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true. However, this does not apply to legal conclusions or factual claims which were either inherently incredible or flatly contradicted by documentary evidence (see West Branch Conservation Assn. v County of Rockland, 227 AD2d 547 [1996]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court determines whether the complaint’s factual allegations state any legally cognizable cause of action.

Wohlgemuth v. Lang Construction, LLC · filed 2005-05-16(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must determine if the factual allegations of the complaint state any cause of action cognizable at law.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint survives a motion to dismiss if its allegations, liberally construed and taken as true, state a recognizable cause of action.

Schlackman v. Robin S. Weingast & Associates Inc. · filed 2005-05-23(a)(7)

A pleading attacked for insufficiency must be accorded a liberal construction, and “if it states, in some recognizable form, any cause of action known to our law,” it cannot be dismissed ... Applying these principles, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the motion of the Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company (hereinafter Mass Mutual) which was to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against it, based on a failure to state a cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss under § 3211, the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its alleged facts, and views them in the plaintiff’s favor.

Louis Capital Markets, L.P. v. REFCO Group Ltd. · filed 2005-06-06(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss, pursuant to CPLR 3211, the court should construe the pleadings in a liberal fashion by accepting the facts alleged in the complaint and interpreting them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Under CPLR 3211, a complaint survives dismissal when its allegations, accepted as true and liberally construed, state viable claims.

Retropolis, Inc. v. 14th Street Development LLC · filed 2005-04-19

The action was not subject to dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211 as against defendant 14th Street Development since the allegations of the complaint, when accepted as true and liberally construed (see CPLR 3026), sufficiently state viable claims that, among other things, this defendant interfered with plaintiffs use of the premises and violated the lease terms (see 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144, 152-153 [2002]).

Section 3211 requires courts to construe pleadings liberally when deciding a motion to dismiss.

Griffin v. Anslow · filed 2005-04-21

It is well established that “ ‘[o]n a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court assesses whether the allegations within the pleading state a cause of action cognizable at law.

Stucklen v. Kabro Associates · filed 2005-05-02(a)(7)

In determining whether a pleading is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must look within the four corners of the pleading to determine if the plaintiff has presented any cause of action cognizable at law (see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; Dye v Catholic Med. Ctr. *463 of Brooklyn & Queens, 273 AD2d 193 [2000]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

200 East 27th LLC v. Schiffmiller-Nachshen · filed 2005-05-05(a)(7)

In considering this issue the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction and “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), dismissal requires a showing that no significant dispute exists over the facts alleged in the complaint.

Dodge v. King · filed 2005-06-06(a)(7)

To succeed on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the evidence must demonstrate that no significant dispute exists as to the facts alleged by the plaintiff (see Mayerhoff v Timenides, 269 AD2d 369 [2000]). ... Furthermore, the defendant attorneys’ evidentiary submissions failed to establish that there was no dispute regarding the facts alleged by the plaintiff in his complaint (see Mayerhoff v Timenides, supra).

Section 3211(a)(1) permits dismissal only when documentary evidence conclusively establishes a defense as a matter of law; under (a)(7), the court accepts the pleaded facts and favorable inferences and asks whether the plaintiff has a cause of action.

Fast Track Funding Corp. v. Perrone · filed 2005-06-06(a)(1), (a)(7)

“Under CPLR 3211 (a) (1), a dismissal is warranted only if the documentary evidence submitted conclusively establishes a defense to the asserted claims as a matter of law” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88 [1994]). “[O]n a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must determine whether, accepting as true the factual averments of the complaint and according the plaintiff the benefits of all favorable inferences which may be drawn therefrom, the plaintiff can succeed upon any reasonable view of the facts stated” (Rochdale Vil. v Zimmerman, 2 AD3d 827 [2003], quoting Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of New Rochelle v County of Westchester, 282 AD2d 561, 562 [2001]). ... Applying these principles to the instant case, the Supreme Court properly granted the separate motions of the defendants James Perrone and Cynthia Harty and the defendant Ferrari Funding, Ltd., which were to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (7) insofar as asserted against them.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court liberally construes the complaint, draws favorable inferences, and asks whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, rather than whether it clearly stated one.

United States Fire Insurance v. American Home Assurance Co. · filed 2005-06-14(a)(7)

Giving the complaint a liberal construction and every favorable inference ... and accepting that the question under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) is not whether plaintiff has clearly stated a cause of action but whether it has one in the first place ... Defendant has not established as a matter of law, through documentary evidence or otherwise, that its policy with the insured did not cover the underlying claims.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court accepts the pleading’s allegations as true and gives them every favorable inference to determine whether they support a cognizable legal theory.

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Wise Metals Group, LLC · filed 2005-06-23(a)(7)

In deciding a motion to dismiss directed at the sufficiency of the pleadings (CPLR 3211 [a] [7]), a court must accept their allegations as true, according them the benefit of every favorable inference to determine whether they come within the ambit of any cognizable legal theory (see Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 634 [1976]; Hirschhorn v Hirschhorn, 194 AD2d 768 [1993]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), dismissal is proper only when the plaintiff cannot establish a cause of action even if the allegations are taken as true.

McGuire v. Sterling Doubleday Enterprises · filed 2005-06-27(a)(7)

Such a motion should be granted only when, even viewing the allegations as true, the plaintiff still cannot establish a cause of action.

On a pre-answer motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its allegations as true, and draws reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.

Gorelik v. Mount Sinai Hospital Center · filed 2005-06-30(a)(7)

It is settled that on a pre-answer motion to dismiss brought pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the complaint must be liberally construed, the allegations therein taken as true, and all reasonable inferences must be resolved in plaintiff’s favor (511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144, 151-152 [2002]; Cron v Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362, 366 [1998]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the plaintiffs’ allegations as true.

Izko Sportswear Co. v. Flaum · filed 2005-07-05(a)(7)

Since the defendants’ motion seeks dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the plaintiffs’ allegations must be accepted as true (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Stanchic v. Lim · filed 2005-07-05(a)(7)

Here, accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true and affording the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the motion of the defendant John Lim which was to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the petition's allegations as true and gives the petitioner every possible favorable inference.

Matter of Cocose v. Diane B. · filed 2005-07-22(a)(7)

The Court's inquiry on a motion to dismiss is limited to ascertaining whether the pleadings state a cause of action as opposed to whether there is evidentiary support for the petition. The Court is to give the petition a liberal construction, take the allegations of the pleadings as true and provide petitioner the benefit of every possible inference.

On a pre-answer motion to dismiss, a claim cannot survive when its allegations are contradicted by the agreement on which it relies, even if detailed pleading of its elements is ordinarily unnecessary.

Prospect Street Ventures I, LLC v. Eclipsys Solutions Corp. · filed 2005-08-04(a)(7)

Since the promissory estoppel claim is precluded by the terms of the letter, the rule that a detailed showing of the elements of promissory estoppel need not be shown to survive a pre-answer motion to dismiss (see Rogers v Town of Islip, 230 AD2d 727, 728 [1996]) is irrelevant here; the deficiency is not in the completeness of the allegations, but in their contradiction.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint survives dismissal when its allegations, accepted as true and read favorably to the plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of action.

Andre v. City of New York · filed 2005-08-18(a)(7)

Finally, viewing the amended complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs and accepting the factual allegations as true ... the court finds that it is ...sufficient to withstand the City’s motion and the MTA’s cross motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court assumes the pleaded allegations are true and asks whether they fit any cognizable legal theory.

Higgins v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc. · filed 2005-09-02(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court is necessarily assuming the truth of the allegations asserted in the pleadings in order to “determine simply whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory.” (Morone v Morone, 50 NY2d 481, 484 [1980].)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts and opposition submissions as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Operative Cake Corp. v. Nassour · filed 2005-09-19(a)(7)

The court must accept the facts alleged in the pleading and the submissions in opposition to the motion as true, and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see Maldonado v Olympia Mech. Piping & Heating Corp., 8 AD3d 348, 350 [2004]; Kevin Spence & Sons v Boar’s Head Provisions Co., 5 AD3d 352 [2004]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference.

Young v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 2005-09-26(a)(7)

However, accepting Young’s allegations as true and providing her the benefit of every possible inference ... she claims that attorneys at Epstein Grammatico were full-time employees of Nationwide and that, in her case, they did not exercise independent judgment on her behalf in the course of defending her in the Queens County action. We therefore conclude that dismissal of her complaint insofar as asserted against Nationwide at the complaint stage was premature.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, factual allegations are presumed true, the pleader receives every favorable inference, and supporting submissions may be considered to determine whether a cause of action exists.

Shisgal v. Brown · filed 2005-09-29(a)(7)

When properly reviewed, i.e., the factual allegations presumed to be true, the pleader given the benefit of every favorable inference which may be drawn from the pleading, and supporting affidavits and documentary evidence considered for the limited purpose of determining whether plaintiffs have a cause of action (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Wall St. Assoc. v Brodsky, 257 AD2d 526, 526-527 [1999]), it is clear that plaintiff stated claims on several theories.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, a court may consider the plaintiff’s affidavits to remedy defects in the complaint and must accept the allegations and opposing affidavits as true, giving them every favorable inference.

Chaikovska v. Ernst & Young, LLP · filed 2005-09-30(a)(7)

“ ‘In assessing a motion under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), ... a court may freely consider affidavits submitted by the plaintiff to remedy any defects in the complaint’ ” (Gibraltar Steel Corp. v Gibraltar Metal Processing, 19 AD3d 1141, 1142 [2005], quoting Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88 [1994]), and the allegations in the complaint and the affidavits submitted in opposition to the motion to dismiss must be accepted as true and given every favorable inference (see Leon, 84 NY2d at 87-88).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to allege a cognizable cause of action against a defendant.

Collymore v. Secretary of Housing & Urban Development · filed 2005-10-24(a)(7)

The Supreme Court also properly granted the motion of the defendant N.Y. City Finance Department to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). The complaint failed to allege any cognizable cause of action against that defendant (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Cayuga Partners v 150 Grand, 305 AD2d 527 [2003]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Fay Estates v. Toys "R" Us, Inc. · filed 2005-10-24(a)(7)

On the question of whether the complaint states a cause of action sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is to be liberally construed, the facts alleged in the complaint accepted as true, and the plaintiff accorded the benefit of every favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court reads the complaint liberally and gives the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference.

Zawahir v. Berkshire Life Insurance · filed 2005-10-31(a)(7)

However, reading that cause of action liberally, and giving the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference that may be drawn therefrom, as we must on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), we conclude that the third cause of action alleges either “bad faith” in the insurance context, deceptive business practices in violation of General Business Law § 349, or unfair claims settlement practices in violation of Insurance Law § 2601.

Section 3211(a)(7) requires denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action if the pleaded facts support recovery in any respect.

Friedman v. Anderson · filed 2005-11-01(a)(7)

On a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion, if in any aspect upon the facts stated the plaintiff is entitled to recovery, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action must be denied (see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]).

On a motion to dismiss, the court accepts pleaded facts as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Stafford v. Reiner · filed 2005-11-07(a)(7)

Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, even accepting as true the facts alleged in the complaint and affording him the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144, 151-152 [2002]), his claim that the defendants’ breach of fiduciary duty and/or negligence was a proximate cause of the dissolution of his marriage remains entirely speculative and finds no support in the record (see Turk v Angel, 293 AD2d 284 [2002]; Sherwood Group v Dornbush, Mensch, Mandelstam & Silverman, 191 AD2d 292, 294 [1993]; Weissman v Mertz, 128 AD2d 609, 610 [1987]).

On a pre-answer motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a promissory estoppel claim may be dismissed when the agreement contradicts its allegations, even though a detailed showing of the claim’s elements is generally unnecessary.

Prospect Street Ventures I, LLC v. Eclipsys Solutions Corp. · filed 2005-11-10(a)(7)

Since the promissory estoppel claim is precluded by the terms of the letter, the rule that a detailed showing of the elements of promissory estoppel need not be shown to survive a pre-answer motion to dismiss (see Rogers v Town of Islip, 230 AD2d 727, 728 [1996]) is irrelevant here; the deficiency is not in the completeness of the allegations, but in their contradiction.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court determines whether the counterclaim states a cause of action.

Jackal Holdings, LLC v. JSS Holding Corp. · filed 2005-11-14(a)(7)

The court’s role on this motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) was to determine whether the counterclaim stated a cause of action.

On a CPLR 3211(a) motion, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and denies dismissal if the complaint pleads a recognized cause of action.

Logan v. Salvation Army · filed 2005-11-16(a)

The proper branch of defendant’s motion is to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a). In deciding such a motion, the court is to accept as true all of the allegations of the complaint and give the plaintiff all favorable inferences that follow from the allegations (Cron v Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362, 366 [1998]). The court must determine whether the complaint pleads any cause of action recognized in our state, and, if so, the motion will be denied (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true facts asserted in the complaint and accompanying affidavits.

Scarfone v. Village of Ossining · filed 2005-11-21

Accepting as true the facts asserted in the amended complaint and the accompanying affidavits (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; McGuire v Sterling Doubleday Enters., L.P., 19 AD3d 660 [2005]), the plaintiff failed to allege that she was so affected by her mental condition as to be incapable of comprehending the nature of a settlement agreement and the surrounding proceedings, making a rational decision concerning entering into the agreement, or of controlling her conduct (see Ortelere v Teachers’ Retirement Bd. of City of N.Y., 25 NY2d 196, 202-205 [1969]; Whitehead v Town House Equities, Ltd., 8 AD3d 367, 369 [2004]; Lukaszuk v Lukaszuk, 304 AD2d 625 [2003]; see also Blatt v Manhattan Med. Group, 131 AD2d 48, 53 [1987]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the pleading is liberally construed, its alleged facts are accepted as true, and its allegations receive every possible favorable inference.

Panish v. Panish · filed 2005-12-19(a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). “[0]n a motion to dismiss a pleading for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is to be liberally construed, accepting all of the facts alleged therein to be true, and according the allegations the benefit of every possible favorable inference”

Under section 3211, a pleading may survive dismissal even when defendants seek further detail that can be obtained in discovery.

Serio v. Rhulen · filed 2005-12-22

Similarly, we are unpersuaded by defendants’ assertion that the sixth cause of action, alleging voidable transfers, is insufficient to withstand a CPLR 3211 motion. ... Under the liberal standard for assessing the sufficiency of a cause of action (see EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., supra at 19; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), plaintiffs sixth cause of action is adequate and defendants’ desire for more details can be pursued in discovery (see Pernet v Peabody Eng’g Corp., 20 AD2d 781, 782 [1964]; see generally Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3013:8, at 725-726).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211, the complaint is liberally construed.

Greenwich Excavating & Construction, Inc. v. Mark J. MacDonald Plumbing & Heating, Inc. · filed 2005-12-29

It is well settled that the complaint is to be liberally construed on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, whether pursuant to CPLR 3211 or 3212 (see CPLR 3026; Johnson City Cent. School Dist. v Fidelity & Deposit Co. ofMd., 263 AD2d 580, 581-582 [1999]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires courts to accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and draw all favorable inferences when deciding whether to dismiss a cause of action.

Hayes v. Wilson · filed 2006-01-17(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and accord the plaintiff all favorable inferences which may be drawn therefrom.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and decides whether the complaint states a cause of action.

Lester v. Braue · filed 2006-01-31(a)(7)

Accepting the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, and according the plaintiff Joseph Sadowski the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), we conclude that the complaint failed to state a cause of action against the defendant John Navaretta (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a complaint that fails to allege facts establishing a cause of action.

Anderson v. Jefferson-Utica Group, Inc. · filed 2006-02-03(a)(7)

Supreme Court erred in denying the cross motion of Kujawa seeking dismissal of the complaint against him for failure to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a cause of action.

Waltz v. Lynch · filed 2006-02-03(a)(7)

Thus, we agree with Casal that the complaint fails to state a cause of action against her and should have been dismissed on that ground (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires courts to liberally construe pleadings, accept the complaint's allegations as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and decide whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Brooks v. Key Trust Co. National Ass'n · filed 2006-02-09(a)(7)

Under well-established principles, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs claims under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action requires the court to “afford the pleadings a liberal construction, take the allegations of the complaint as true and provide plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference” (EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]; see AG Capital Funding Partners, L.P. v State St. Bank & Trust Co., 5 NY3d 582, 591 [2005]; Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal only when, even accepting the allegations as true, the plaintiff cannot establish a cause of action.

Guggenheimer v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP · filed 2006-02-24(a)(7)

A CPLR 3211 motion should be granted only when, even viewing the allegations as true, the plaintiff still cannot establish a cause of action.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a cause of action, with allegations accepted as true and favorable inferences given to the plaintiff.

Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty · filed 2006-03-07(a)(7)

Accepting the allegations in the complaint as true, and according the plaintiffs every possible favorable inference, as we must on this motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) (see 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144, 151-152 [2002]; Sokoloff Harriman Estates Dev. Corp., 96 NY2d 409, 414 [2001]), the complaint states a cause of action against the defendant Lauren Gazzola alleging tortious interference with the prospective business relationship between the plaintiff Huntingdon Live Sciences, Inc., and the plaintiff Mark L. Bibi, and alleging the creation of a private nuisance.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a cause of action, based on pleaded facts accepted as true and favorable inferences.

Levin v. Isayeu · filed 2006-03-07(a)(7)

Accepting the facts as alleged in the amended complaint as true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]), the amended complaint fails to state a cause of action against the defendant Sirik (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a pleading fails to state a cause of action and limits review to whether the pleading sufficiently alleges one.

New York City Housing Authority v. Grillasca · filed 2006-03-09(a)(7)

The four corners of the petition, with the petition’s attachments (see Wingate Hall Co. v Betances, NYLJ, Sept. 29, 1993, at 22, col 6 [Hous Part, Civ Ct, NY County]), limit the court’s consideration on a motion to dismiss. In assessing whether the petition is sufficient, the court may not consider the statements respondent made when she was arrested or her plea of guilty in the collateral criminal prosecution.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires the court to give the complaint a liberal construction, accept its allegations as true, and determine whether the alleged facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Shebar v. Metropolitan Life Insurance · filed 2006-01-05(a)(7)

“[0]n a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court ‘must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept as true the allegations contained therein, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference and determine only whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory’ ” (Skibinsky v State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 6 AD3d 975, 976 [2004], quoting 1455 Washington Ave. Assoc. v Rose & Kiernan, 260 AD2d 770, 771 [1999]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the plaintiff’s allegations must be accepted as true.

Izko Sportswear Co. v. Flaum · filed 2006-01-10(a)(7)

Since the defendants’ motion seeks dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the plaintiffs’ allegations must be accepted as true (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires factual allegations to be accepted as true when deciding whether a pleading states a cause of action on a motion to dismiss.

Kokot v. Barton · filed 2006-02-24(a)(7)

Although a factual issue does exist as to whether the lease renewal was accepted prior to, or after, the revocation, for purposes of a motion to dismiss the petitioner’s allegation that revocation occurred prior to acceptance must be accepted by this court as true.

A complaint that adequately alleges damages can state a cause of action and survive a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

Corrado v. Rubine · filed 2006-01-31(a)(7)

Contrary to the determination of the Supreme Court, the complaint adequately alleged the damages sought so as to state a cause of action, thus warranting the denial of that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) (see generally Tenzer, Greenblatt, Fallon & Kaplan v Ellenberg, 199 AD2d 45 [1993]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of claims that do not state valid claims for relief.

Soviero v. Carroll Group International, Inc. · filed 2006-03-14(a)(7)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Emily Jane Goodman, J.), entered January 13, 2005, which granted defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint to the extent of dismissing the second through sixth causes of action, unanimously affirmed, without costs. ... We agree that the causes of action for conversion and conspiracy, and for punitive damages, as well as those predicated on Labor Law §§ 190, 191 and 198, did not state valid claims for relief.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

Sterngass v. Town Board of Clarkstown · filed 2006-03-14(a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a pleading fails to state a cause of action.

Eskenazi v. Schapiro · filed 2006-03-21(a)(7)

We find, in any event, that plaintiffs breach of contract claim should have been dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a cause of action, based on whether its factual allegations establish a legally cognizable claim.

Morad v. Morad · filed 2006-03-21(a)(7)

“In determining whether a complaint is sufficient to withstand a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law a motion for dismissal will fail” (Morris v Morris, 306 AD2d 449, 451 [2003] [internal quotation marks.omitted]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept the complaint's alleged facts as true and give the plaintiff every favorable inference when deciding whether the complaint states a cause of action.

Fasano v. Colon · filed 2006-03-28(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]; Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633 [1976]; Roth v Goldman, 254 AD2d 405, 406 [1998]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a cause of action, viewing alleged facts as true and giving the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Mitchell v. TAM Equities, Inc. · filed 2006-03-28(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the facts alleged in the complaint must be accepted as true, and the plaintiff must be accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144, 151-152 [2002]; Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Dev. Corp., 96 NY2d 409, 414 [2001]; Wieder v Skala, 80 NY2d 628, 631 [1992]; Kenneth R. v Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 229 AD2d 159, 161-162 [1997], cert denied 522 US 967 [1997]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a pleading fails to state a cause of action.

Zorn v. Gilbert · filed 2006-03-28(a)(7)

The remaining causes of action were either duplicative of the legal malpractice claims and arose from the same facts ... or failed to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires dismissal when the pleading fails to state a cause of action, judged by accepting the allegations as true and drawing every reasonable favorable inference.

Kornfeld v. County of Nassau · filed 2006-03-28(a)(7)

Considering the facts in the light most favorable to the petitioner, accepting his proof as true and affording him every favorable inference that reasonably could be drawn therefrom, we conclude that the petitioner’s allegation that the compensatory time was a condition of employment, and could not be taken away from him without compensation, states a valid cause of action (see Gendalia v Gioffre, 191 AD2d 476 [1993]; Clift v City of Syracuse, 45 AD2d 596 [1974]; cf. Matter of Rubinstein v Simpson, supra; see generally Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the County’s motion which was to dismiss the proceeding pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a pleading fails to state a valid cause of action.

Brown v. Wyckoff Heights Medical Center · filed 2006-04-04(a)(7)

Contrary to the conclusion of the Supreme Court, construing the third-party complaint liberally and according Wyckoff the benefit of every possible inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]), it fails to state a valid cause of action independent of the previously-dismissed claims for contribution and indemnification.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a pleading fails to state a cause of action, and the court evaluates whether the challenged statements are reasonably susceptible of a defamatory connotation.

Equinox Management Group, Inc. v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America · filed 2006-04-11(a)(7)

“[T]he legal question for the court on a motion to dismiss is whether the contested statements are reasonably susceptible of a defamatory connotation” (Armstrong v Simon & Schuster, 85 NY2d 373, 380 [1995]). ... Since the third and fifth causes of action sufficiently allege defamatory statements, the CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion was properly denied.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action, with factual allegations accepted as true and given every favorable inference.

Doxey v. Glen Cove Community Development Agency · filed 2006-04-11(a)(7)

Accepting the plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true and according them the benefit of every favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), the plaintiffs failed to show a “legally cognizable transfer in reliance” on any promise by the Glen Cove Community Development Agency or the Glen Cove Industrial Development Agency (hereinafter the Glen Cove defendants) or unjust enrichment by the Glen Cove defendants (Gaentner v Benkovich, supra at 427; Sailer v Merlis, supra).

Section 3211(a)(7) tests whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory while accepting the complaint's factual allegations as true and giving the plaintiff favorable inferences.

Gem Services of New York, Inc. v. United General Title Insurance · filed 2006-04-11(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss an action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff all favorable inferences which may be drawn therefrom, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Hayes v Wilson, 25 AD3d 586 [2006]; Sinensky v Rokowsky, 22 AD3d 563 [2005]). ... Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the pleading fails to state a cause of action.

Oko v. Walsh · filed 2006-04-11(a)(7)

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, the motion is granted, the complaint is dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellant, and the action against the remaining defendants is severed. ... Accordingly, the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action to recover damages for fraud, and the appellant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it should have been granted.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a cause of action.

Resnick v. Lebovitz · filed 2006-04-11(a)(7)

In light of this rule, the third-party complaint, which contains no allegations of negligence, fails to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires a court to construe the complaint in the plaintiff's favor, accept factual allegations as true, and determine whether the plaintiff adequately pleaded a cause of action.

Ventresca Realty Corp. v. Houlihan · filed 2006-04-11(a)(7)

Construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accepting as true the factual allegations set forth therein (see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; LoPinto v J.W. Mays, Inc., 170 AD2d 582, 583 [1991]), the plaintiff adequately pleaded a cause of action to recover against the individual defendants for the alleged wrongs committed by the corporate defendant pursuant to a “[p]iercing [of] the corporate veil” theory (Weinstein v Willow Lake Corp., supra at 635; see Brooke Realty-Dupont v SBC Equip. Leasing Co., 248 AD2d 347 [1998]; Meachum v Outdoor World Corp., 235 AD2d 462 [1997]).

Section 3211(a) permits dismissal of a complaint when its allegations fail to state a viable cause of action.

Ascot Fund Ltd. v. Ubs Painewebber, Inc. · filed 2006-04-13(a)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Richard B. Lowe, III, J.), entered January 3, 2005, which granted defendant PaineWebber’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the amended complaint, unanimously affirmed, with costs. ... The aiding and abetting causes of action were also correctly dismissed because the amended complaint failed to allege any facts or conduct indicating that PaineWebber had actual knowledge that the investment/money manager’s transfer directions to PaineWebber contravened Marque Partners’ redemption procedures, or that the investment/money manager was secretly trying to defraud the other Marque Fund investors (see Kaufman v Cohen, 307 AD2d 113, 125-126 [2003]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a cause of action when the pleading is legally insufficient, and section 3211(e) governs leave to replead after dismissal.

Black Car & Livery Insurance v. H&W Brokerage, Inc. · filed 2006-04-18(a)(7), (e)

Accordingly, those causes of action were properly dismissed as to the respondent pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). The plaintiffs’ application for leave to replead, which consisted of a single sentence in an affidavit and provided no indication of what the new pleadings would be, was properly denied (see CPLR 3211 [e]; Hickey v National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 169 AD2d 685 [1991]; Moss v Moche, supra).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Stanton v. Carrara · filed 2006-04-18(a)(7)

Accepting the allegations of the complaint in the original action as true, and affording the plaintiffs the benefit of every favorable inference, the alleged conduct did not so transcend “the bounds of decency as to be regarded as atrocious and intolerable in a civilized society” (Freihofer v Hearst Corp., 65 NY2d 135, 143 [1985]; see Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 NY2d 293, 303 [1983]; Rohrlich v Consolidated Bus Tr., Inc., 15 AD3d 561, 562 [2005]; Poliah v Westchester County Country Club, Inc., 14 AD3d 601 [2005]).

On a motion to dismiss a counterclaim for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts its allegations as true and gives the nonmoving party every favorable inference.

Beneke v. Town of Santa Clara · filed 2006-04-20(a)(7)

Presented with a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211, we must accept the facts alleged in the counterclaim as true and accord the nonmoving party “the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Dev. Corp., 96 NY2d 409, 414 [2001]; see Griffin v Anslow, 17 AD3d 889, 891 [2005]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a cause of action.

Ka Foon Lo v. Curis · filed 2006-05-02(a)(7)

The cause of action to recover damages for fraud should have been dismissed. ... The plaintiff also failed to state a cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract. ... Since the remaining causes of action are based upon the fraud and breach of contract causes of action, those causes of action also should have been dismissed.

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true, give plaintiffs every favorable inference, and decide only whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Pellarin v. Moon Bay Development Corp. · filed 2006-05-02(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court should “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

Cruz v. McAneney · filed 2006-05-02(a)(7)

Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as we must, in the context of this motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) (see Rovello v Klein, 304 AD2d 638 [2003]), the following are the relevant facts: ... Therefore, that branch of the motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint was properly denied, and the order is affirmed.

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept the complaint's allegations as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and decide only whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Connolly v. Napoli, Kaiser & Bern, LLP · filed 2006-04-04(a)(7)

In evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept the allegations of the complaint as true, and accord plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within a cognizable legal theory.

Section 3211(a)(7) generally requires the court to assume the pleading’s factual allegations are true and decide whether they state any cognizable cause of action.

La Barbera v. Town of Woodstock · filed 2006-05-04(a)(7)

When a motion to dismiss is made pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), as a general rule we assume the truthfulness of the factual allegations of the pleading and determine simply whether the allegations make out any cognizable cause of action (see Griffin v Anslow, 17 AD3d 889, 891 [2005]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the pleadings fail to allege a cause of action.

Kirell v. Vytra Health Plans Long Island, Inc. · filed 2006-05-09(a)(7)

We need not decide whether private rights of action exist under 45 CFR 164.530 (g) (2) and Insurance Law § 3224-a (a), because even if they do, the pleadings fail to allege a cause of action (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]), so that the fourth and eighth causes of action were also properly dismissed.

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts to accept the complaint's factual allegations as true and give plaintiffs every favorable inference when deciding whether it states a legally cognizable cause of action.

Schenkman v. New York College of Health Professionals · filed 2006-05-09(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint and afford the plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference in determining whether the complaint states any legally cognizable cause of action (see Arnav Indus., Inc. Retirement Trust v Brown, Raysman, Millstein, Felder & Steiner, 96 NY2d 300, 303 [2001]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires allegations to be accepted as true and favorable inferences to be given to the plaintiff when deciding whether the complaint states a legally cognizable cause of action.

Gelfand v. Oliver · filed 2006-05-16(a)(7)

Taking these allegations as true and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Dodge v King, 19 AD3d 359, 360 [2005]), we find that they state a legally cognizable cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice (see Gamiel v Curtis & Riess-Curtis, P.C., 16 AD3d 140, 141 [2005]; see also Hayes v Wilson, 25 AD3d 586 [2006]). Under the circumstances, the defendant’s contention that any delay caused by his actions was de minimis cannot be resolved on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), and must await further development of the record (cf. Simons v Greenberg, 299 AD2d 265 [2002]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action, with the petition's allegations assumed true when deciding the motion.

McComb v. Reasoner · filed 2006-05-16(a)(7)

Because of the procedural posture in which this proceeding reaches us, the facts upon which we base our determination are derived from the allegations made in the petition, which we assume for purposes of this determination to be true (see Matter of Kornfeld v County of Nassau, 27 AD3d 743 [2006]). Because certain allegations in the petition stated causes of action, we modify and reinstate the petition in part.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the complaint fails to plead sufficiently factual allegations supporting a cause of action.

LaSalle Hotel Lessee, Inc. v. Marriott Hotel Services, Inc. · filed 2006-05-25(a)(7)

Plaintiff failed to plead sufficiently (see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]) factual allegations of breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to allege the elements necessary to state a claim.

Peters v. Accurate Building Inspectors Division of Ubell Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2006-05-30(a)(7)

Here, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 to dismiss the complaint.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires the allegations to be assumed true and the plaintiff to receive every favorable inference when deciding whether the complaint states a cause of action.

Zornberg v. North Shore University Hospital · filed 2006-05-30(a)(7)

Assuming the truth of the allegations in the complaint, and giving the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Pankin v Cronin, 12 AD3d 492, 493 [2004]), the complaint states a cause of action (see Yaz v Sipsas, 1 AD3d 503 [2003]).

Section 3211 permits dismissal when, even under a liberal construction and favorable inferences, the complaint fails to plead facts supporting a required element of the claim.

Fredriksen v. Fredriksen · filed 2006-06-06

Even affording the amended complaint a liberal construction, accepting the facts alleged therein as true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), the amended complaint fails to plead specific facts from which the existence of an attorney-client relationship, privity, or a relationship that otherwise closely resembles privity between the plaintiff and either Connors or Vanchieri may be inferred (see AG Capital Funding Partners, L.P. v State St. Bank & Trust Co., 5 NY3d 582, 595 [2005]; Goldfarb v Schwartz, 26 AD3d 462 [2006]; Rovello v Klein, 304 AD2d 638 [2003]; Conti v Polizzotto, 243 AD2d 672, 672-673 [1997]; Estate of Spivey v Pulley, 138 AD2d 563 [1988]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts to assess whether the pleadings state a cognizable cause of action, construing them liberally.

Gershon v. Goldberg · filed 2006-06-06(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]), the pleadings must be liberally construed (see, CPLR 3026).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires dismissal when the allegations, even accepted as true and given every favorable inference, fail to state a cause of action.

Castaldi v. 39 Winfield Associates · filed 2006-06-13(a)(7)

Accepting the facts alleged in the second amended complaint as true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, as we must on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]; Morales v Copy Right, Inc., 28 AD3d 440 [2006]; Fasano v Colon, 27 AD3d 691 [2006]), we find that the conversion claim fails to state a cause of action.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a cause of action, assessed by accepting alleged facts as true and giving the plaintiff every favorable inference.

LoPresti v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance · filed 2006-06-13(a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly granted the respondents’ respective motions, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them. Accepting the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]), the complaint fails to state a cause of action.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a tortious interference complaint can survive dismissal without details of when, how, and by whom negotiations were conducted when its allegations fairly support but-for causation.

Madison Third Building Companies, LLC v. Berkey · filed 2006-06-06(a)(7)

We reject defendants’ argument that the allegation of negotiations is conclusory, and that any inference of “but for” causation between the alleged negotiations and breach is speculative, in the absence of details showing when, how and by whom the negotiations were conducted.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a pleading fails to state a legally sufficient cause of action, with its allegations assumed true.

Reade v. Reva Holding Corp. · filed 2006-06-15(a)(7)

Since the complaint is not barred by the terms of the lease, we reach the question of whether the causes of action pleaded therein are legally sufficient, assuming the truth of the allegations on which such claims are based.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a pleading fails to state a cause of action, and CPLR 3211(a)(1) permits dismissal when documentary evidence flatly contradicts the claim.

North Fork Preserve, Inc. v. Kaplan · filed 2006-07-05(a)(7) and (a)(1)

In addition, the Supreme Court should have dismissed all of the causes of action to the extent that they are based on the allegations set forth in subparagraphs (f) and (g) on the ground that those allegations fail to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). ... Furthermore, the Supreme Court should have dismissed all of the causes of action to the extent that they are premised on the allegations of corporate misconduct set forth in subparagraphs (b) and (d) on the ground that they are flatly contradicted by the documentary evidence in the record (see CPLR 3211 [a] [1]).