N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3211

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action when the governing agreements refute the complaint’s allegations.

B&R Management & Leasing Corp. v. Triarc Restaurant Group, Arby's, Inc. · filed 2000-02-16(a)(7)

Thus, the complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; ...).

A complaint alleging adverse employment action based on an arrest that did not result in a conviction states a cause of action sufficient to defeat a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion.

Annabi v. Cassino · filed 2000-02-28(a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). The complaint alleged that the defendant took adverse employment actions against the plaintiff, based on the fact that the plaintiff, a police officer, was arrested, although the arrest had not resulted in a conviction. Accordingly, it properly stated a cause of action for a violation of Executive Law § 296 (16) (see, Matter of Wallick v Barrios-Paoli, 248 AD2d 332; Matter of Lebensbaum v Adelphi Univ., 111 AD2d 393).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff all favorable inferences, and asks whether any reasonable view of those facts permits recovery.

Santos v. City of New York · filed 2000-02-28(a)(7)

Additionally, the Supreme Court properly granted the Hospital’s motion to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it for failure to state a cause of action (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). On such a motion, the court must determine whether, accepting as true the factual averments of the complaint and according the plaintiff the benefit of all favorable inferences which may be drawn therefrom, the plaintiff can succeed upon any reasonable view of the facts stated (see, Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 86 NY2d 307, 318).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court asks whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, even if the pleading has not stated one.

Eastern States Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc. · filed 2000-03-03(a)(7)

This test is so liberal that the standard is simply whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, not even whether one has been stated.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court assumes the complaint’s allegations are true and resolves reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.

Tepper v. Botein, Hays & Sklar · filed 2000-03-09(a)(7)

Assuming the truth of the complaint’s allegations and resolving all inferences which reasonably flow therefrom in plaintiffs favor (see, Sanders v Winship, 57 NY2d 391), the court properly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action since the complaint fails sufficiently to allege that the legal fees incurred by plaintiff resulted from the ordinary and proper conduct of the partnership’s business or from the preservation of the partnership’s business or property (Partnership Law § 40 [2]; see, Gramercy Equities Corp. v Dumont, 72 NY2d 560).

A failure-to-state-a-cause-of-action objection may be raised by motion at any time.

Rainbow Hospitality Management, Inc. v. Mesch Engineering, P. C. · filed 2000-03-29(e)

That objection “runs to the sufficiency of the complaint as failing to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action” (Wells v Merrill, 204 App Div 696, 698; see, Truly v Federal Bakers Supply Corp., 217 AD2d 951, 951-952; Sterritt v Heins Equip. Co., 114 AD2d 616, 617), which may be raised by motion at any time (see, CPLR 3211 [e]; Schel v Roth, 242 AD2d 697; Herman v Greenberg, 221 AD2d 251).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint that pleads a prima facie cause of action survives a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.

Chase Manhattan Bank v. Beckerman · filed 2000-04-03(a)(7)

Here, the appellants agreed to pay annual interest at a rate of 16.9% and then defaulted in making those payments. Thus, the plaintiff pleaded a prima facie case in its complaint and the motion to dismiss was properly denied.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the allegations every possible favorable inference.

Maric Piping, Inc. v. Maric · filed 2000-04-10(a)(7)

It is well settled that on a motion to dismiss a pleading for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is to be liberally construed, accepting all of the facts alleged therein to be true, and according the allegations the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87).

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, the court liberally construes the plaintiff’s allegations to determine whether they may establish a cause of action.

Di Stefano v. Rosetti-Falvey Real Estate, Inc. · filed 2000-03-09

Affording plaintiff’s allegations a liberal construction as we do in a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, they establish that plaintiff may have a cause of action against Rosetti for breach of the listing agreement.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true.

Shahzad v. American Lung Ass'n · filed 2000-04-07(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss the complaint, the facts alleged therein must be accepted by the court as true (Morone v Morone, 50 NY2d 481, 484 [1980]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court assumes the truth of allegations in the complaint and opposition affidavits and denies dismissal when they sufficiently plead a cause of action.

Grammer v. Turits · filed 2000-04-24(a)(7)

Assuming the truth of the allegations in the complaint and in the affidavits submitted in opposition to the brokers’ motion (see, Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268), the plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded the existence of a special relationship with the brokers (see, Houlihan / Lawrence, Inc. v Duval, supra) and the other elements necessary to state a cause of action to recover damages for negligent misrepresentation. Consequently, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the brokers’ motion which was to dismiss the complaint against them pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must assume the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations.

1414 Realty Corp. v. G & G Realty Co. · filed 2000-05-01(a)(7)

It is well settled that a court is required to assume the truth of a plaintiff’s allegations when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) (see, Edmond v International Bus. Machs. Corp., 91 NY2d 949).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a cause of action that fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted.

Liberty Co. v. Boyle · filed 2000-05-08(a)(7)

The court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s sixth and eighth causes of action as they failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; 8302 [b]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the pleader; proof submitted on the motion may show that no cognizable claim can be stated.

Tucker v. City of New York · filed 2000-05-11(a)(7)

The complaint, even if viewed in a light most favorable to the pleader, fails to state a viable claim against the District Attorney. Indeed, when examined together with other proof on this motion, it is clear that no cognizable claim can be stated.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when, even accepting the complaint’s factual allegations as true, no reasonable view of the facts supports the cause of action.

Breen v. Breen · filed 2000-05-15(a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was, in effect, to dismiss the first cause of action for failure to state a cause of action (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). ... Accepting as true the factual allegations of the complaint (see, Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 86 NY2d 307, 318; Farmer v Green Bus Lines, 254 AD2d 389), there is no reasonable view of the facts which supports such a cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the pleadings must be liberally construed.

Dye v. Catholic Medical Center of Brooklyn & Queens, Inc. · filed 2000-06-05(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleadings must be liberally construed (see, CPLR 3026; Mayer v Sanders, 264 AD2d 827).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the complaint fails to allege all elements of a cause of action.

Ramautar v. Wainfeld · filed 2000-06-05(a)(7)

Upon a review of the factual allegations of the complaint (see, Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268) as well as the documentary evidence submitted on the motion to dismiss (see, Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633; Adams v O’Connor, 245 AD2d 537), the plaintiff Ruby Ramautar failed to allege all of the elements necessary to support a cause of action to recover damages for battery (see, Romatowski v Hitzig, 227 AD2d 870; Laskowitz v CIBA Vision Corp., 215 AD2d 25, 27; Spinosa v Weinstein, 168 AD2d 32, 41; Rigie v Goldman, 148 AD2d 23, 28-29; Oates v New York Hosp., 131 AD2d 368; Murriello v Crapotta, 51 AD2d 381).

A motion to dismiss a counterclaim based solely on legal insufficiency is treated as a motion for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

Lamica v. Pecore · filed 2000-06-22(a)(7)

Inasmuch as plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss was not supported by any factual allegations and argued solely that such a parental duty would conflict with controlling legal principles, we view the motion as one to dismiss the counterclaim for failure to state a cause of action (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

Section 3211 requires courts deciding a motion to dismiss to construe pleadings liberally, accept alleged facts as true, and view them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

626 East 9 Street Housing Development Fund Corp. v. Collins · filed 2000-05-19(b)

It is well settled that in determining a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the courts must liberally construe the pleadings, accept the facts as alleged to be true and interpret them in light most favorable to the nonmovant.

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, the pleading is liberally construed.

Vestal v. Vestal · filed 2000-06-26

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of his motion which was to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211. It is well settled that on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 the pleading is to be liberally construed.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

532 Madison Avenue Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Center, Inc. · filed 2000-07-06(a)(7)

When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the trial court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiff[ ] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88). Reviewing the complaint in this action with that standard in mind, and combining its allegations with the undisputed facts, we conclude that plaintiff has made out prima facie claims of public nuisance and negligence, and we reinstate those causes of action.

A complaint should not be dismissed under CPLR 3211(a)(7) when the defendants’ documentary evidence does not conclusively establish a defense to the claims as a matter of law.

Winston Resources, Inc. v. Glehan · filed 2000-07-17(a)(7)

Contrary to the determination reached by the Supreme Court, the Glehans did not submit documentary evidence which conclusively established a defense to the asserted claims as a matter of law (see, Held v Kaufman, 91 NY2d 425, 430-431; Wall St. Assocs. v Brodsky, 257 AD2d 526; Grumman Aerospace Corp. v Rice, 199 AD2d 365). Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in dismissing the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

A defendant’s denials and contrary factual allegations do not warrant dismissal of a sufficiently pleaded claim under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

Brand v. Lipton · filed 2000-07-31(a)(7)

Donnenfeld’s denials and allegations to the contrary merely create issues of fact and are insufficient to warrant dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court treats the petition’s alleged facts as true and gives them every favorable inference.

Anderson v. Town of Clarence · filed 2000-09-29(a)(7)

Supreme Court erred in granting respondents’ motion to dismiss the petition for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). On such a motion, the facts alleged in the petition are deemed true and petitioners are “benefitted by the rule that every favorable inference must be afforded the facts alleged” in the petition (Held v Kaufman, 91 NY2d 425, 432; see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Matter of Ostrowski v County of Erie, 245 AD2d 1091, 1092).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the complaint’s allegations as true and give them every favorable inference.

Villarin v. Onobanjo · filed 2000-10-02(a)(7)

The Supreme Court erred in granting the respondents’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them. To determine a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the allegations therein as true, and must give them the benefit of every favorable inference (see, Cron v Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362; Schulman v Chase Manhattan Bank, 268 AD2d 174; Veraldi v American Analytical Labs., 271 AD2d 599).

A complaint that sufficiently states a cause of action is not subject to dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

Kapsalis v. Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North & South America · filed 2000-10-16(a)(7)

Also, the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action (see, Dye v Catholic Med. Ctr., 273 AD2d 193).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the complaint attributes the complained-of acts solely to a third party rather than to any act or omission by the defendants.

Padro v. Visiting Nurses Service · filed 2000-10-17(a)(7)

These allegations state no cognizable claim against defendants since the complained of acts are properly attributable solely to the patient and not to any act or omission by defendants (see, Ventricelli v Kinney Sys. Rent A Car, 45 NY2d 950).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must assume the allegations are true.

Darby & Darby, P. C. v. VSI International, Inc. · filed 2000-10-24(a)(7)

Assuming defendants’ allegations to be true, as we must, we conclude that plaintiff here owed defendants no such duty.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court views the petition in the light most favorable to the pleader.

Iwachiw v. New York State Board of Elections · filed 2000-10-24(a)(7)

Even when viewed in a light most favorable to the pleader on this CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion, the petition fails to state a cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every possible inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Kovach v. Hinchey · filed 2000-10-26(a)(7)

In sum, even viewing the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we do not find the allegations support any cognizable legal theory warranting relief.

A complaint that fails to identify specific actionable conduct by a defendant is subject to dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

Knox v. New York City Bureau of Franchises · filed 2000-11-06(a)(7)

The plaintiffs pleadings failed to identify any specific actionable conduct on the part of the appellants. Accordingly, their respective motions should have been granted.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court may read the complaint together with the plaintiff’s affidavits to assess whether a cause of action is sufficiently alleged.

Page v. City of Niagara Falls · filed 2000-11-13(a)(7)

Defendants sought dismissal for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). Contrary to defendants’ contention, we conclude that the complaint, read together with the affidavits submitted by plaintiff (see, Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275), sufficiently alleges the existence of a special relationship between plaintiff and defendants.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of claims against defendants when the complaint contains no allegations against them.

Paynter v. State · filed 2000-11-14(a)(7)

With no allegations against them, the RCSC and suburban school districts’ motions to dismiss the case against them are granted (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; 3013; Kramer v Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 20 AD2d 634).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court asks whether the complaint’s factual allegations, taken together, state any cognizable claim.

Davis v. CCF Capital Corp. · filed 2000-11-20(a)(7)

The sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action and if, from its four corners, factual allegations are discerned which, taken together, manifest any cause of action cognizable at law (see, Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275; Gruen v County of Suffolk, supra).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court assumes the complaint’s allegations are true and determines whether they allege facts sufficient to support the claim.

Korn v. First UNUM Life Insurance · filed 2000-11-20(a)(7)

The plaintiffs sixth cause of action, alleging a violation of General Business Law § 349, was properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). Viewing the complaint with the assumption that all the allegations contained therein are true (see, Becker v Schwartz, 46 NY2d 401, 408; Sotomayor v Kaufman, Malchman, Kirby & Squire, 252 AD2d 554; S.A.E. Motor Parts Co. v Tenenbaum, 226 AD2d 518), the plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to support his contention that the defendant First UNUM Life Insurance Company violated General Business Law § 349.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, courts liberally construe the complaint, accept its allegations as true, and give the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Murray v. Breski · filed 2000-11-28(a)(7)

In any event, if as required, we afford the complaint liberal construction, deem the allegations against defendant to be true and accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see, e.g., Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 634-635), the preamendment complaint clearly stated a legally cognizable cause of action and dismissal was by no means warranted under CPLR 3211 (7).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court views the complaint’s allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Trans International Corp. v. Clear View Technologies, Ltd. · filed 2000-12-05(a)(7)

The motion court properly dismissed plaintiffs seventh cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). The factual allegations of that cause, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, do not state a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty (see, Conn v Chambers, 123 App Div 298, 302-303, affd 195 NY 538).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the complaint’s allegations as true and give them every favorable inference.

Tiffany General Holding Corp. v. Speno, Goldberg, Steingart & Penn, P. C. · filed 2000-12-11(a)(7)

It is well settled that in considering a motion to dismiss a claim for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept the allegations set forth in the complaint as true, and give them the benefit of every favorable inference (see, Cron v Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362; Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268). Viewed from this perspective, we find that the first cause of action set forth in the complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice on behalf of Melnic (see, Mecca v Shang, 258 AD2d 569; Scheller v Martabano, 177 AD2d 690).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court assumes the plaintiff’s allegations are true and affords her every favorable inference.

Cirillo v. Muss Development Co. · filed 2000-12-18(a)(7)

Assuming the truth of the allegations in the plaintiffs complaint and in her affidavit submitted in opposition to the defendants’ motion, and affording her every favorable inference (see, Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268), she has sufficiently alleged that Markowitz had the authority to make personnel decisions and salary and benefit determinations.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives them every favorable inference.

First Bank Richmond v. Blue Chip Capital Corp. · filed 2000-12-18(a)(7)

To determine a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the allegations of the complaint as true, and must give them the benefit of every favorable inference (see, Cron v Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362; Schulman v Chase Manhattan Bank, 268 AD2d 174). Contrary to the appellant’s contention, the facts as alleged did not state a viable cause of action (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88; CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court takes the complaint’s allegations as true, draws reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, and dismisses claims that fail to state a cause of action.

Fox Court Realty, Inc. v. Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York, Inc. · filed 2000-12-26(a)(7)

Taking the allegations of the complaint as true and resolving all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, we agree that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of contract or fraud (see, Gaidon v Guardian Life Ins. Co., 94 NY2d 330; Lama Holding Co. v Smith Barney, 88 NY2d 413, 421; New York Univ. v Continental Ins. Co., 87 NY2d 308; Aventine Inv. Mgt. v Canadian Imperial Bank, 265 AD2d 513).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is read favorably to the plaintiff and its factual allegations are accepted as true.

New York County Lawyers' Ass'n v. Pataki · filed 2001-01-16(a)(7)

A motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all factual allegations accepted as true.

A claim survives a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) if, liberally construing the pleading, it is viable under any cognizable legal theory.

Dellith v. Oneonta City School District · filed 2001-02-08(a)(7)

The test for determining if a cause of action should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) is whether, affording the pleading a liberal construction, the party has a claim under any cognizable legal theory (see, Kovach v Hinchey, 276 AD2d 942, 943; 1455 Washington Ave. Assocs. v Rose & Kiernan, 260 AD2d 770, 771).

CPLR 3211 (a) (7) permits dismissal of a cause of action for failure to state a cause of action.

Laing v. Cantor · filed 2001-02-13(a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly dismissed the plaintiffs first three causes of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action.

A complaint survives a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action when it seeks relief directly affecting the defendant’s claimed interest in the property.

Seevers v. Tang · filed 2001-02-20(a)(7)

However, the motion court correctly determined that the complaint does indeed seek relief necessarily and directly affecting Georgette Tang’s claims to the accounts.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court asks whether the complaint’s factual allegations fit any cognizable legal theory and accepts those allegations as true.

Wilt v. Brunswick Plaza, L. L. C. · filed 2001-03-22(a)(7)

It is well settled that on a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court’s focus is to determine whether the factual averments of the complaint fit within any cognizable legal theory and, if so, the motion must be denied (see, Unadilla Silo Co. v Ernst & Young, 234 AD2d 754).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, pleadings are liberally construed, alleged facts are accepted as true, and plaintiffs receive every possible favorable inference.

Hudes v. Vytra Health Plans Long Island, Inc. · filed 2001-03-29(a)(7)

With respect to the law applicable to a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss a complaint, pleadings shall be liberally construed, the facts as alleged accepted as true, and every possible favorable inference given to plaintiffs (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87).

On a motion to dismiss under subsection (a)(7), the court determines whether the pleadings state a cause of action without weighing evidentiary support.

Fiorenti v. Central Emergency Physicians, P. L. L. C. · filed 2001-03-30(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court is limited to ascertaining whether the pleadings state a cause of action, and may not consider whether there is evidentiary support for the complaint.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court treats factual allegations as true, construes the pleadings favorably to the plaintiff, and may use an opposing affidavit to remedy defects in the complaint.

Auguston v. Spry · filed 2001-04-09(a)(7)

Construing the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, deeming all factual allegations therein to:be true (see, Held v Kaufman, 91 NY2d 425; Cron v Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362), and using the affidavit submitted by the.plaintiff in opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, to remedy defects in the complaint (see, Cron v Hargro Fabrics, supra; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83; Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633), it is clear that the plaintiff has pleaded, several viable causes of action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true, draws favorable inferences for the plaintiff, and asks whether the plaintiff can succeed on any reasonable view of the facts.

Board of Education of City School District v. County of Westchester · filed 2001-04-16(a)(7)

It is well settled that on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must determine whether, accepting as true the factual averments of the complaint and according the plaintiff the benefits of all favorable inferences which may be drawn therefrom, the plaintiff can succeed upon any reasonable view of the facts stated (see, Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 86 NY2d 307, 318).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the complaint’s allegations as true and give them every favorable inference.

Lifshitz v. BMW Financial Services NA, Inc. · filed 2001-04-23(a)(7)

To determine a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the allegations of the complaint as true, and must give them the benefit of every favorable inference (see, Cron v Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362, 366; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87; CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when, accepting the complaint’s factual allegations as true, no reasonable view of the facts supports the cause of action.

Stroke v. Stroke · filed 2001-05-02(a)(7)

Supreme Court erred in denying defendant’s motion seeking dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action for divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; Domestic Relations Law § 170 [1]). “Accepting as true the factual allegations of the complaint * * * there is no reasonable view of the facts which supports such a cause of action” (Breen v Breen, 272 AD2d 425, 426; cf., Vestal v Vestal, 273 AD2d 461, 462).

A complaint that clearly states a cause of action is not subject to dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7) when the defendant’s answer has been stricken.

Gordon v. City of New York · filed 2001-05-22(a)(7)

However, in the instant case, there is no CPLR 3211 (a) (7) problem with plaintiffs’ complaint as it clearly states a cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Collins v. Telcoa International Corp. · filed 2001-06-11(a)(7)

It is axiomatic that on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; see, Lakeville Pace Mech. v Elmar Realty Corp., 276 AD2d 673; U.S. Ice Cream Corp. v Bizar, 240 AD2d 654).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts pleaded facts as true and gives them favorable inferences, but disregards bare legal conclusions and facts that are inherently incredible or flatly contradicted by documentary evidence.

Gelbman v. Valleycrest Productions, Ltd. · filed 2001-06-21(a)(7)

In deciding whether to dismiss a complaint under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), if the facts as stated in the complaint are sufficient to infer a cause of action, the court may not dismiss for failure of the complainant to state it (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88 [1994]). The court must accept the facts as alleged by the plaintiff as true (Morone v Morone, 50 NY2d 481, 484 [1980]). However, even though the pleaded facts are presumed true and accorded the most favorable inference, allegations consisting of bare legal conclusions, as well as facts that are inherently incredible or flatly contradicted by documentary evidence, will not be given such consideration (Marraccini v Bertelsmann, 221 AD2d 95, 98 [3d Dept 1996]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint and opposing submissions as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Sokoloff v. Harriman Estates Development Corp. · filed 2001-07-10(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, we must accept as true the facts as alleged in the complaint and submissions in opposition to the motion, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see, Tenuto v Lederle Labs., 90 NY2d 606, 609-610; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

CPLR 3211 (a) (7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action when a complaint is unintelligible and lacks a legally cognizable claim.

Kung v. Pan · filed 2001-07-16(a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ cross motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action. The complaint is unintelligible, and lacks specificity and any legally cognizable claim.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every possible inference when deciding whether a cause of action is stated.

Ford v. Snashall · filed 2001-07-19(a)(7)

Accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and according every possible inference to the benefit of plaintiff (see, Barnes v Dungan, 261 AD2d 797), we agree with Supreme Court that the three disputed causes of action failed to state a claim pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

On a motion to dismiss under § 3211(a)(7), the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its allegations as true, and asks whether they fit a cognizable legal theory.

Ground To Air Catering, Inc. v. Dobbs International Services, Inc. · filed 2001-07-26(a)(7)

To that end, “[t]he rules governing our review of a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) are both simple and straightforward — we must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept as true the allegations contained therein, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference and determine only whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (1455 Washington Ave. Assocs. v Rose & Kiernan, 260 AD2d 770, 770-771; see, Murray v Breski, 277 AD2d 867, 869).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, courts liberally construe the pleadings, accept alleged facts as true, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

McNeary v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. · filed 2001-08-02(a)(7)

When examining such a motion, a court must liberally construe the pleadings in plaintiffs favor, accept the facts alleged as true, and determine whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see, id., at 366; Kovach v Hinchey, 276 AD2d 942, 944).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, draws favorable inferences for the plaintiff, and asks whether the plaintiff could succeed on any reasonable view of the stated facts.

TKO Fleet Enterprises, Inc. v. Elite Limousine Plus, Inc. · filed 2001-08-20(a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint. “[0]n a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must determine whether, accepting as true the factual averments of the complaint and according the plaintiff the benefits of all favorable inferences which may be drawn therefrom, the plaintiff can succeed upon any reasonable view of the facts stated” (Board of Educ. v County of Westchester, 282 AD2d 561, 562; see, Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 86 NY2d 307, 318).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference when deciding whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Ark Bryant Park Corp. v. Bryant Park Restoration Corp. · filed 2001-08-23(a)(7)

Generally, on a motion to dismiss made pursuant to CPLR 3211, the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction (see, CPLR 3026), and the court should accept as true the facts as alleged in the complaint, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Morone v Morone, 50 NY2d 481, 484; Sotomayor v Kaufman, Malchman, Kirby & Squire, 252 AD2d 554; Fischbach & Moore v Howell Co., 240 AD2d 157).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the movant’s papers must conclusively establish a fact relied on to defeat the claim.

Gerson v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. · filed 2001-08-27(a)(7)

The appellant’s motion papers failed to conclusively establish that it was not the owner of the offending vehicle ... Therefore, the appellant’s motion to dismiss was properly denied.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true, draws favorable inferences for the plaintiff, and asks whether the plaintiff can succeed on any reasonable view of the stated facts.

Blumenreich v. North Shore Health System, Inc. · filed 2001-10-15(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must determine whether, accepting as true the factual averments of the complaint and according the plaintiff the benefits of all favorable inferences which may be drawn therefrom, the plaintiff can succeed upon any reasonable view of the facts stated (see, Board of Educ. v County of Westchester, 282 AD2d 561).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true, gives the plaintiff all favorable inferences, and asks whether the plaintiff could succeed on a reasonable view of the facts stated.

Schlecter v. Abbondandello · filed 2001-10-15(a)(7)

The Supreme Court improperly granted that branch of the school’s motion which was to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it for failure to state a cause of action (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). Contrary to the school’s contention, accepting as true the factual averments of the complaint and according the plaintiffs the benefits of all favorable inferences which may be drawn therefrom, the plaintiffs could succeed upon a reasonable view of the facts stated (see, Farmer v Green Bus Lines, 254 AD2d 389).

A complaint to foreclose a mechanic’s lien withstands dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7) when its allegations sufficiently state a cause of action.

Innovative Construction Concepts, Inc. v. 842 Manhattan Avenue Corp. · filed 2001-11-05(a)(7)

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the plaintiffs allegations were sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; Cron v Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83; Kantrowitz & Goldhamer v Geller, 265 AD2d 529; Lien Law § 3; CPLR 3013).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court assumes the allegations are true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Coppola v. Applied Electric Corp. · filed 2001-11-08(a)(7)

Assuming the truth of plaintiffs allegations and according him every possible favorable inference to determine only whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Batas v Prudential Ins. Co., 281 AD2d 260), it is clear that the claimed fraud was not collateral or extraneous to the contract (see, Glanzer v Keilin & Bloom, 281 AD2d 371; First Bank v Motor Car Funding, 257 AD2d 287, 291-292; Morgan Knitting Mills v Reeves Bros., 243 AD2d 422), did not allege any damages, including those for foregone opportunities, that would not be recoverable under a contract measure of damages (see, Makastchian v Oxford Health Plans, 270 AD2d 25, 27; Morgan Knitting Mills v Reeves Bros., supra) and failed to plead a breach of duty separate from a breach of the contract (see, New York Univ. v Continental Ins. Co., 87 NY2d 308, 316; First Bank v Motor Car Funding, supra; Non-Linear Trading Co. v Braddis Assocs., 243 AD2d 107, 118-119).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires a court to construe the complaint liberally, assume its factual allegations are true, draw every favorable inference, and decide whether it alleges a cognizable cause of action.

Bergler v. Bergler · filed 2001-11-09(a)(7)

“In determining a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion, the court must ‘accord the complaint a liberal construction, assume its factual allegations to be true, draw every possible favorable inference therefrom and determine only whether any cognizable cause of action has been alleged’ ” (Dorety Constr. v Joseph Francese, Inc., 252 AD2d 656, 656-657, quoting Esposito-Hilder v SFX Broadcasting, 236 AD2d 186, 187-188).

A claim based on the State’s regulation of traffic may be dismissed under CPLR 3211(a)(7) when it fails to allege the special relationship required for tort liability.

Rogers v. State · filed 2001-11-09(a)(7)

The Court of Claims erred in denying the motions of defendant, State of New York (State), seeking dismissal of the claims for failure to state a cause of action (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; cf, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88). ... We conclude that claimants have failed to allege that they had the necessary special relationship with the State to “provide a proper predicate for tort liability against the [State]” premised on its regulation of traffic (Balsam v Delma Eng’g Corp., 90 NY2d 966, 968; see also, Cuffy v City of New York, 69 NY2d 255, 260).

A petition alleging a bona fide justiciable controversy should not be dismissed under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

Zaidins v. Hashmall · filed 2001-11-13(a)(7)

Furthermore, the allegations asserted in the petition demonstrate the existence of a bona fide justiciable controversy which should be addressed (see, Sysco Corp. v Town of Hempstead, 133 AD2d 751). Thus, the Supreme Court improperly granted that branch of the respondents’ motion which was to dismiss the petition pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) and 7804 (f).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the allegations as true and asks whether the pleading’s facts together state a cognizable claim.

Polonetsky v. Better Homes Depot, Inc. · filed 2001-11-19(a)(7)

We note that the case comes to us in the posture of a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss. Accepting the allegations as true, our “sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law a motion for dismissal will fail” (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]).

When evidentiary material is considered on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the question is whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, not merely whether the pleading states one.

Capotosto v. City of New York · filed 2001-11-26(a)(7)

Where, as here, evidentiary material is considered, the criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he or she has stated one (see, Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268; Steiner v Lazzaro & Gregory, 271 AD2d 596).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a cognizable claim without converting the motion to one for summary judgment.

Carniol v. Carniol · filed 2001-11-26(a)(7)

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) ...; there was no need to convert the motion to one for summary judgment.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a constructive trust complaint that fails to plead a promise to reconvey the property and a transfer in reliance on that promise.

Mantia v. Squire · filed 2001-12-10(a)(7)

The Supreme Court correctly concluded that the complaint failed to state a cause of action to impose a constructive trust on certain realty and stocks in the defendant’s name. The plaintiff failed to plead two of the four essential elements of a constructive trust, i.e., that the defendant promised to reconvey the property in dispute, and that the plaintiff transferred the property in reliance on that promise (see, Simonds v Simonds, 45 NY2d 233; Sharp v Kosmalski, 40 NY2d 119; CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a cause of action.

Waldman v. Bobover Yeshiva Bnei Zion · filed 2001-12-17(a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly granted the defendant’s cross motion to dismiss the complaint because it failed to state a cause of action (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the complaint’s allegations as true and give the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Marec v. Lynch · filed 2001-12-31(a)(7)

To determine a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept the allegations of the complaint as true, and must give the plaintiffs the benefit of every favorable inference (see, Cron v Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83; CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its allegations as true, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Virgem Enterprises, Inc. v. City of New York · filed 2002-01-10(a)(7)

“The rules governing our review of a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) are both simple and straightforward — we must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept as true the allegations contained therein, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference and determine only whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory * * *”

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court assumes the plaintiff’s allegations are true and gives them every favorable inference.

Sangermano v. Board of Cooperative Educational Services · filed 2002-01-22(a)(7)

However, assuming the truth of the plaintiffs allegations, and giving them the benefit of every favorable inference as we are required to do on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) (see, Edmond v International Bus. Mach. Corp., 91 NY2d 949, 951; Negrin v Norwest Mtge., 263 AD2d 39, 51), we conclude that the second cause of action is sufficient to withstand dismissal (see, Vitale v Rosina Food Prods., 283 AD2d 141; 1414 Realty Corp. v G&G Realty Co., 272 AD2d 309).

A motion made before joinder of issue that addresses only the complaint’s facial sufficiency is a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

207 Second Avenue Realty Corp. v. Salzman & Salzman · filed 2002-02-07(a)(7)

—Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Jane Solomon, J.), entered November 30, 2000, dismissing the complaint, unanimously modified, on the facts, to delete any references therein to CPLR 3212 and summary judgment, to insert therein a recital that the complaint is dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, and otherwise affirmed; judgment, same court and Justice, entered on or about August 23, 2001, awarding defendants sanctions of $500 for plaintiffs’ frivolous conduct, unanimously affirmed; appeal from order, same court and Justice, entered March 30, 2001, which denied plaintiffs’ motion to reargue the dismissal of the complaint, and, upon finding such motion to be frivolous, granted defendants’ cross motion for sanctions to the extent of awarding $500, unanimously dismissed; all of the above with one bill of costs payable by plaintiffs to defendants.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court takes the allegations as true and draws inferences in the pleader’s favor.

Glassman v. Zoref · filed 2002-02-11(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), a court must take the allegations as true and resolve all inferences in favor of the pleader (see, Cron v Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362, 366).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court takes the complaint’s allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.

Terranova v. Liberty Lines Transit, Inc. · filed 2002-03-11(a)(7)

Taking all of the allegations in the complaint as true, and resolving all inferences which reasonably flow therefrom in favor of the plaintiffs, as we must on a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) ... we conclude that the complaint in the instant case sufficiently alleged a cause of action to recover damages for age discrimination under Executive Law § 296 (1) (a) (see, Vorel v NBA Props., supra; Fern v International Bus. Machs. Corp., 204 AD2d 907, 909).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court determines whether the complaint states a claim on its face, without requiring evidentiary support.

Frank v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. · filed 2002-03-28(a)(7)

Stated another way, the court’s role in a motion to dismiss is limited to determining whether a cause of action is stated within the four corners of the complaint, and not whether there is evidentiary support for the complaint (Bernstein v Kelso & Co., 231 AD2d 314, 318; LoPinto v J.W. Mays, Inc., 170 AD2d 582, 583).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

Smith v. Scott · filed 2002-04-08(a)(7)

The appeal involves a motion, inter alia, to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211 (a) (7). Accordingly, the Court must accept the allegations of the complaint as true and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see Cron v Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362, 366; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true and asks whether the plaintiff could recover under any reasonable view of those facts.

Credit Index, L.L.C. v. RiskWise Intl. L.L.C. · filed 2002-04-10(a)(7)

In considering the sufficiency of a pleading subject to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must determine whether, “ ‘accepting as true the factual averments of the complaint, plaintiff can succeed upon any reasonable view of the facts stated’ ” (Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 86 NY2d 307, 318 [1995] [citation omitted]; see also, Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268 [1977]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts to construe pleadings liberally and accept alleged facts as true, but courts need not accept legal conclusions or inherently incredible allegations.

Fernicola v. New York State Insurance Fund · filed 2002-04-11(a)(7)

In determining a motion of this type, a court must “liberally construe the pleadings in plaintiffs favor, accept the facts alleged as true, and determine whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable theory * * *. However, [even with this broad standard,] a court need not accept as true legal conclusions or factual allegations that are either inherently incredible or flatly contradicted by documentary evidence * * *” (Ozdemir v Caithness Corp., 285 AD2d 961, 963, lv denied 97 NY2d 605 [citations omitted]; see, McNeary v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 286 AD2d 522, 523-524).

A CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion tests whether a petition states a cause of action or whether one nonetheless exists.

Benderson Development Co. v. Town of Niskayuna · filed 2002-04-11(a)(7)

As a starting point, it is of critical moment to note that this is a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) challenging the facial sufficiency of the petition. The question is whether petitioner has stated a cause of action and, if not, whether such cause of action nonetheless exists.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, section 3211 requires courts to construe the pleading liberally, accept its alleged facts as true, and ask whether they fit a cognizable legal theory.

Hoch v. New York State Department of Health · filed 2002-05-10(a)(7)

On such a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts as alleged are accepted as true for evaluation purposes and a court needs to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83; CPLR 3026).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Storch v. Town of Cornwall · filed 2002-05-13(a)(7)

Accepting the facts as alleged in the complaint as true and affording the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87; Farmer v Green Bus Lines, 254 AD2d 389, 390), the first cause of action, which seeks to recover for property damage the plaintiff allegedly suffered when certain real property owned by him was flooded, sufficiently alleges that the Town was negligent in failing to properly maintain and repair a certain drainage system near the property (see, Colgan v Town of Hillsdale, 68 NY2d 788, 789; Pet Prods, v City of Yonkers, 290 AD2d 546; Zeltmann v Town of Islip, 265 AD2d 407, 408; cf. Biernacki v Village of Ravena, 245 AD2d 656, 657).

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, courts accept the complaint’s allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.

McGarvey v. Foley · filed 2002-05-21

Accepting plaintiffs allegations as true and resolving all reasonable inferences from those allegations in plaintiffs favor, as we must in the present procedural context (see, Cron v Hargro, 91 NY2d 362, 366), the complaint sufficiently pleads a claim for sexual harassment based on a hostile work environment.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts material allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every reasonable inference when deciding whether the complaint states a cognizable claim.

Kralic v. Helmsley · filed 2002-05-23(a)(7)

When accorded its proper treatment on a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion to dismiss, that is, accepting the material allegations as true and giving plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference (see, McGill v Parker, 179 AD2d 98, 105), the complaint sets forth sufficient facts such that a cognizable claim for tortious interference with contract can be discerned (see, Foster v Churchill, 87 NY2d 744, 749-750).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court assumes the alleged facts are true and construes the complaint liberally in the plaintiff’s favor.

Added Extras, Inc. v. Party City Corp. · filed 2002-06-11(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, every fact alleged must be assumed to be true and the complaint liberally construed in plaintiffs favor.

A motion to dismiss alleging failure to serve a required termination notice may be treated as a challenge to whether the complaint states a cause of action.

Hsiu v. Trujillo · filed 2002-06-12(a)(7)

Although the defect in the proceeding (if it is a defect) may or may not be termed a defect going to the “jurisdiction” of the court, it would appear to be logical to assume that if the proceeding is defective for want of a requisite notice to terminate, then the complaint fails to state a cause of action. Consequently, so as not to exalt form over substance, the court will consider the motion as addressed to the sufficiency of the complaint.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true, draws favorable inferences for the plaintiff, and asks whether the plaintiff could succeed on any reasonable view of the stated facts.

Lewis v. Drake · filed 2002-06-17(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the Supreme Court must determine whether, accepting as true the factual averments in the complaint and according the plaintiff the benefit of all favorable inferences which may be drawn therefrom, the plaintiff “can succeed upon any reasonable view of the facts stated” (People v New York City Tr. Auth., 59 NY2d 343, 348; Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 86 NY2d 307, 318; see also Blumenreich v North Shore Health Sys., 287 AD2d 529; TKO Fleet Enters, v Elite Limousine Plus, 286 AD2d 436).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court presumes the complaint’s allegations true and gives them every possible favorable inference.

Shaw v. Baldowski · filed 2002-06-25(a)(7)

In addition, the court finds that plaintiffs allegations, which the court must presume to be true and accord the benefit of every possible favorable inference, do not assert sufficient minor incidents that occurred often and over a long period of time in order to attain the necessary critical mass of unreasonable inferiority which would be actionable.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether the plaintiff could succeed on any reasonable view of the stated facts.

Schneider v. Hand · filed 2002-07-08(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must determine, accepting as true the factual averments of the complaint and according the plaintiff the benefit of all favorable inferences, whether the plaintiff can succeed upon any reasonable view of the facts as stated (see Board of Educ. v County of Westchester, 282 AD2d 561).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Bettan v. Geico General Insurance · filed 2002-07-15(a)(7)

Accepting the allegations of the complaint as true and giving the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, as we must on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88), we agree with the Supreme Court that causes of action two through seven in the complaint failed to state a cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the petitioner need not lay bare its proofs.

Baptist Temple Church, Inc. v. Mann · filed 2002-07-17(a)(7)

Moreover, because this motion was styled as one brought pursuant to CPLR 3211 based on the inadequacy of the pleadings, rather than a summary judgment motion pursuant to CPLR 3212, the petitioner has no burden to lay bare its proofs on this motion.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its factual allegations as true, and asks whether they fit any cognizable legal theory.

Sutton Park Development Corp. Trading Co. v. Guerin & Guerin Agency Inc. · filed 2002-08-01(a)(7)

A complaint states a cause of action if the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see, Wilt v Brunswick Plaza, 281 AD2d 840, 841; Unadilla Silo Co. v Ernst & Young, 234 AD2d 754). A reviewing court affords the pleading a liberal construction and accepts as true the factual allegations therein (see, Wilt v Brunswick Plaza, supra at 841; Dellith v Oneonta City School Dist., 280 AD2d 864, 865).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, courts liberally construe the pleading, accept its alleged facts as true, and give them every favorable inference to determine whether they fit a cognizable legal theory.

Molina v. Phoenix Sound Inc. · filed 2002-09-26(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), it is well settled that courts must liberally construe a pleading, accept all the facts alleged therein to be true, and accord those allegations the benefit of every possible favorable inference in order to determine whether those facts fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88). Accordingly, we find that the motion court properly denied that branch of defendant’s cross motion to dismiss the first cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court treats the pleaded allegations as true and gives the pleader every reasonable favorable inference.

Milillo v. Milillo · filed 2002-09-27(a)(7)

On any motion to dismiss for the failure to state a cause of action, “the allegations of the pleading are deemed to be true. More than that the pleading will be deemed to allege whatever may be implied from its statements by reasonable intendment; the pleader is entitled to every favorable inference that might be drawn.”

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, pleaded facts are presumed true and receive every favorable inference.

Palazzolo v. Herrick, Feinstein, LLP · filed 2002-10-07(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the facts pleaded are presumed to be true and accorded every favorable inference (see CPLR 3026; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Baker v. Thompson · filed 2002-11-08(a)(7)

The Association’s last argument for dismissal is that the plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action (CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). The court’s inquiry is limited to deciding whether the facts as alleged in the complaint fit within a cognizable legal theory (Maas v Cornell Univ., 94 NY2d 87, 91; Cron v Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362, 366).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires a court deciding whether a pleading states a cause of action to accept its allegations as true and give the petitioner every possible inference.

Hutt v. Retirement Board of New York State Teachers' Retirement System · filed 2002-11-14(a)(7)

Therefore, even accepting the allegations in the petition as true and according the benefit of every possible inference to petitioner (see Ford v Snashall, 285 AD2d 881), we find nothing in the pleadings or arguments that would allow respondents to change the benefit option that decedent selected at the time of his retirement once benefits became due. Accordingly, we agree with Supreme Court that petitioner failed to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the complaint and supporting affidavit in the plaintiff’s favor and treats factual allegations as true.

Retina Associates of Long Island, P.C. v. Rosberger · filed 2002-11-25(a)(7)

Construing the complaint and the affidavit submitted by the plaintiffs in the light most favorable to them and deeming all factual allegations to be true (see Cron v Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362, 366), the plaintiffs did not state a causé of action to recover damages for the defendant Daniel Rosberger’s alleged subornation of perjury in an arbitration proceeding.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court construes the complaint in the plaintiffs’ favor and dismisses a claim that fails to allege a cause of action.

Ahmad v. Nassau Health Care Corp. · filed 2002-12-09(a)(7)

Construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs (see generally Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83; Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268; Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633), the Supreme Court correctly determined that the plaintiffs failed to allege a cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract for violating section 14 of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (see Public Authorities Law § 3403; Civil Service Law § 75 [1] [c]; § 80-a; Leon v Lukash, 178 AD2d 583).

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court treats the relevant allegations in the pleading and opposing affidavits as true.

Parlato v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States · filed 2002-10-17(a)(7)

The relevant allegations, which we are required to treat as true on this appeal from a judgment dismissing the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211, are set forth in the proposed amended complaint, and in plaintiffs’ respective affidavits submitted in opposition to Equitable’s motion to dismiss.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court presumes the pleaded facts are true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Peisinger Creative Branding Systems v. CBS Cable Networks, Inc. · filed 2002-11-12(a)(7)

Presuming the facts as pleaded in the complaint to be true and according plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference therefrom, as we must in adjudicating a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) ... we conclude that plaintiff sufficiently alleged that defendants, by determining to bring all licensing transactions “in-house,” breached their agreements with plaintiff entitling it, for a specified term, to act as defendants’ exclusive third-party representative to develop licensing proposals.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), allegations showing a potentially actionable bad-faith rejection withstand dismissal, while factual issues raised by a contrary affidavit are considered after joinder of issue.

Louise Laskin Trust — 1991 v. 775 Park Avenue, Inc. · filed 2002-11-21(a)(7)

Defendant’s president’s affidavit denying that defendant rejected the transfer because of plaintiffs initial reluctance to pay a flip tax, as evidenced by defendant’s adherence to its rejection even after plaintiff offered to pay a flip tax, raises issues of fact bearing upon defendant’s directors’ states of mind to be considered after joinder of issue (see id. at 666-667, citing, inter alia, Bryan v West 81 St. Owners Corp., 186 AD2d 514).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court views the complaint’s allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Trocom Construction Corp. v. Consolidated Edison Co. · filed 2002-12-19(a)(7)

Viewing the allegations of the third-party complaint, as we must in the present procedural context, in the light most favorable to Con Edison (see Peisinger Creative Branding Sys. v CBS Cable Networks, 299 AD2d 184), we conclude that the third-party complaint should be sustained as against the City’s motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

A defendant moving to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7) must establish entitlement to dismissal.

Aprea v. Savage · filed 2002-12-23(a)(7)

The defendant Eloise Savage did not establish entitlement to dismissal of the complaint insofar as asserted against her pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) (see Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 86 NY2d 307, 318; 219 Broadway Corp. v Alexander’s, Inc., 46 NY2d 506, 509).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is construed liberally in the plaintiff’s favor and its allegations are accepted as true.

Well v. Rambam · filed 2002-12-23(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the complaint must be liberally construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all allegations must be accepted as true (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87; LoPinto v J.W. Mays, Inc., 170 AD2d 582; Cohn v Rothman-Goodman Mgt. Corp., 155 AD2d 579).

Allegations that a defendant aided and encouraged a sexual assault can state a cause of action under concerted action liability.

Weldon v. Rivera · filed 2003-01-23(a)(7)

Because we find that plaintiffs pleadings set forth a cause of action for rape and assault against Touma ... Supreme Court properly denied Touma’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs first cause of action.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives plaintiffs every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Old Salem Development Group, Ltd. v. Town of Fishkill · filed 2003-01-27(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit into any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Collins v Telcoa Intl. Corp., 283 AD2d 128, 131).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Vekiarellis v. Pall Corp. · filed 2003-02-03(a)(7)

Accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and according the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, the first cause of action sufficiently alleges hostile work environment sexual harassment and retaliatory firing in violation of Executive Law § 296 (see San Juan v Leach, 278 AD2d 299; Walsh v Covenant House, 244 AD2d 214).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a defamation claim when the complaint does not allege that the defendant committed a defamatory act.

Armele v. Moose International, Inc. · filed 2003-02-07(a)(7)

Memorandum: Contrary to plaintiffs contention with respect to the order in appeal No. 1, Supreme Court properly granted those parts of the motions of defendants Moose International, Inc. (Moose International) and Joseph Genco seeking dismissal of the eighth and ninth causes of action of the second amended verified complaint for failure to state a cause of action for defamation against them (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). With respect to Genco, the eighth cause of action is asserted against him in his individual capacity and there is no allegation in that cause of action that he committed a defamatory act.

A complaint survives a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action if a cause of action exists when the plaintiff receives every favorable inference.

A.O. Fox Memorial Hospital v. American Tobacco Co. · filed 2003-02-10(a)(7)

“[A] complaint should not be dismissed on a pleading motion so long as, when the plaintiff is given the benefit of every favorable inference, a cause of action exists” (Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 634; see West Branch Conservation Assn. v County of Rockland, 227 AD2d 547).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true and resolves all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.

Spitzer v. All-Pro Telemarketing Associates Corp. · filed 2003-02-21(a)(7)

Because this court must accept all of the plaintiffs allegations as true and all inferences resolved in plaintiffs favor (Cron v Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362, 366 [1998]), defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action against defendant Gelvan is denied.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every possible inference.

Avgush v. Town of Yorktown · filed 2003-03-03(a)(7)

It is well settled that on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is to be liberally construed, accepting all the facts as alleged in the pleading to be true and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to read the pleading liberally, accept its alleged facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Bernberg v. Health Management Systems, Inc. · filed 2003-03-03(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the challenged pleading is to be construed liberally (see CPLR 3026; Mayer v Sanders, 264 AD2d 827 [1999]). Accepting the facts alleged as true, and according the plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the court must determine only whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Morone. v Morone, 50 NY2d 481 [1980]; Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633 [1976]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court presumes pleaded facts true and gives them every favorable inference.

Mohan v. Hollander · filed 2003-03-10(a)(7)

When considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court must presume the facts pleaded to be true and accord them every favorable inference (see Rattenni v Cerreta, 285 AD2d 636 [2001]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the pleading is liberally construed, its factual allegations are accepted as true, and the plaintiff receives every possible favorable inference.

Dann v. King Associates, LLC · filed 2003-03-17(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is to be liberally construed, accepting all the facts as alleged in the pleading to be true and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; Roth v Goldman, 254 AD2d 405 [1998]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

365 West End LLC v. New York City Department of Environmental Protection · filed 2003-03-18(a)(7)

When deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court will liberally construe the pleading, “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory.”

When a defendant submits evidentiary material on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court determines whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, not merely whether the pleading states one.

Olszewski v. Waters of Orchard Park · filed 2003-03-21(a)(7)

“It is well settled that bare legal conclusions and factual claims which are flatly contradicted by the evidence are not presumed to be true on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. When the moving party offers evidentiary material, the court is required to determine whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether [he or] she has stated one”

On a preanswer motion to dismiss, the court accepts the complaint’s material allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every reasonable inference, and asks whether the facts support a cognizable claim.

Sims v. First Consumers National Bank · filed 2003-03-25(a)(7)

The standard against which defendants’ preanswer motion should have been decided is whether or not, “accepting the material allegations as true and giving plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference [citation omitted], the complaint sets forth sufficient facts such that a cognizable claim * * * can be discerned” (see Kralic v Helmsley, 294 AD2d 234, 235 [2002]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the claimant every favorable inference in deciding whether a claim is adequately pleaded.

Heffner v. Star Farm Associates · filed 2003-04-07(a)(7)

Accepting the allegations of the third-party complaint as true and according the respondents the benefit of every favorable inference to be drawn therefrom, the complaint adequately pleads a claim for indemnity (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]; 17 Vista Fee Assoc. v Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assn. of Am., 259 AD2d 75 [1999]; County of Westchester v Welton Becket Assoc., 102 AD2d 34 [1984], affd 66 NY2d 642 [1985]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, bare legal conclusions and factual allegations contradicted by the record are not presumed true.

Sesti v. North Bellmore Union Free School District · filed 2003-04-07(a)(7)

Bare legal conclusions and factual allegations which are contradicted by the record are not presumed to be true on a motion made pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211, the court must construe the complaint’s allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Rovello v. Klein · filed 2003-04-14

Construing the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, as we must on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]), we agree with the Supreme Court that the plaintiffs failed to allege specific facts from which the existence of privity between the parties could be inferred.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint must be construed most favorably to the plaintiff.

Tesser v. Allboro Equipment Co. · filed 2003-02-24(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the complaint must be construed most favorably to the plaintiff (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court takes the plaintiff’s allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.

Maratea v. Greater Metropolitan Abstract Corp. · filed 2003-05-05(a)(7)

Taking the plaintiff’s allegations as true, and resolving all inferences which reasonably flow therefrom in his favor, he has stated a cause of action alleging breach of the agreement (see Cron v Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362 [1998]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]; Miller v J.A. Keeffe, P.C., 276 AD2d 757 [2000]; Grinblat v Taubenblat, 107 AD2d 735 [1985]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a legal malpractice complaint survives dismissal when its alleged facts, accepted as true and given every favorable inference, state a cognizable claim.

InKine Pharmaceutical Co. v. Coleman · filed 2003-05-06(a)(7)

Plaintiffs pleading of its legal malpractice cause of action was sufficient to survive the CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion. The alleged facts, if accepted as true, accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and evaluated only as to whether they fit within any cognizable legal theory, sufficiently state plaintiffs claim that defendants’ negligence in failing to timely file the Asian patent on the pharmaceutical product at issue caused the substantial diminution of the value of its worldwide license to manufacture, sell and sublicense the product (see Arnav Indus., Inc. Retirement Trust v Brown, Raysman, Millstein, Felder & Steiner, 96 NY2d 300, 303 [2001]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), an attached exhibit can supply enough detail to state a cause of action when the petition itself alleges a denial of due process only generally.

McEachin v. McGinnis · filed 2003-05-15(a)(7)

Contrary to Supreme Court’s ruling, we find that the papers presented by petitioner sufficiently set forth a cause of action to avoid a dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). While it is true that the verified petition contains a bare allegation that petitioner was denied due process (see generally Matter of Reynoso v LeFevre, 199 AD2d 886 [1993], lv denied 83 NY2d 754 [1994]), the petition nevertheless specifically refers to a copy of petitioner’s administrative appeal, attached to the petition as an exhibit, as providing grounds for the requested relief. Since our review of that exhibit discloses a sufficient articulation of the arguments petitioner wishes to raise, we conclude that dismissal of the proceeding was not appropriate at this juncture (see Matter of Nowlin v Schriver, 269 AD2d 630 [2000]).

A defense that a counterclaim fails to state a valid cause of action must be raised by a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

Petracca v. Petracca · filed 2003-05-19(a)(7)

A defense that a counterclaim does not state a valid cause of action must be raised by appropriate motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) (cf. Propoco, Inc. v Birnbaum, 157 AD2d 774, 775 [1990]).

On a motion to dismiss, the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true.

Mars v. Diocese of Rochester · filed 2003-05-07(a)(7)

Here, plaintiffs have alleged in their complaint, and which for purposes of this motion must be accepted as true, that defendant Diocese (a) had knowledge of O’Neill’s prior history of alcohol abuse, alcohol abuse with minors and sexual abuse of boys, and (b) concealed this knowledge from plaintiffs by moving O’Neill from parish to parish, changing his work responsibilities and continuing to allow him to administer sacraments.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7), the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its alleged facts as true, and asks whether they fit a cognizable legal theory.

Cayuga Partners, LLC v. 150 Grand, LLC · filed 2003-05-19(a)(1), (a)(7)

It is well established that on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (7), “the pleadings must be liberally construed and the facts alleged accepted as true; the court must determine ‘only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory’ ” (Wiener v Lazard Freres & Co., 241 AD2d 114, 120 [1998], quoting Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint fails to state a cause of action when it contains only bare legal conclusions and factual claims flatly contradicted by documentary evidence.

Giustino v. County of Nassau · filed 2003-06-16(a)(7)

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly determined that the complaint fails to state a cause of action since the complaint contains only bare legal conclusions and factual claims which are flatly contradicted by the documentary evidence (see Kenneth R. v Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 229 AD2d 159, 162 [1997]; Gertler v Goodgold, 107 AD2d 481, 485 [1985], affd 66 NY2d 946 [1985]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Becker v. University Physicians of Brooklyn, Inc. · filed 2003-07-07(a)(7)

Accepting the facts as alleged in the amended complaint as true, and according the plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference ... the amended complaint fails to state a cause of action against UPB and Zabel (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court treats the complaint’s allegations as true.

Johnson v. Kings County District Attorney's Office · filed 2003-08-11(a)(7)

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the allegations of the complaint are deemed to be true.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every possible inference.

Gjonlekaj v. Sot · filed 2003-09-15(a)(7)

It is well settled that on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the pleading is to be liberally construed, accepting all the facts as alleged in the pleading to be true and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court accepts the complaint’s alleged facts as true and dismisses it if they fail to state a cause of action.

Estate of Morgan v. Whitestown American Legion Post No. 1113 · filed 2003-10-02(a)(7)

Even accepting the facts as alleged in the complaint as true (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]), we conclude that the complaint fails to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

Section 3211(a)(7) governs a motion addressed solely to the sufficiency of the pleadings, even when the motion was brought under CPLR 3212 after issue was joined.

Paynter v. State of NY · filed 2003-06-26(a)(7)

Defendants brought their motion after joining issue, and therefore moved under CPLR 3212. The motion is addressed, however, solely to the sufficiency of the pleadings and has been treated accordingly (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, CPLR 3211 requires the court to give the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference.

Madison Equities v. MZ Management Corp. · filed 2003-08-11(a)(7)

According the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference (see CPLR 3211; see also Meliso v Pinter, 289 AD2d 462 [2001]), the complaint sufficiently states the causes of action alleged.

A motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action is inadequate when it attacks an earlier complaint instead of the amended complaint alleging causation.

Nonnon v. City of New York · filed 2003-10-14(a)(7)

Defendant further based its dismissal motion on the original complaint filed in the actions and not the third amended verified complaint ... which plaintiffs aver is the correct complaint and which asserts that the landfill caused plaintiffs’ injuries. Thus, defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is inadequate and is, therefore, denied.

On a CPLR 3211(a) motion, a complaint viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff may be dismissed if it states no cognizable claim for relief.

Youkelsone v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n · filed 2003-10-23(a)

Moreover, the complaint, even when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff (see Four Seasons Hotels v Vinnik, 127 AD2d 310, 318 [1987]), states no cognizable claim for relief.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its allegations and reasonable inferences as true, and asks whether they fit any cognizable legal theory.

New York State Ass'n of Tobacco & Candy Distributors, Inc. v. City of New York · filed 2003-11-06(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint must be liberally construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff (see CPLR 3026; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]). The court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint, and reasonable inferences therefrom, as true, and determine whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (id. at 87-88).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint's factual allegations and reasonable inferences as true and asks whether they fit a cognizable legal theory.

New York State Assn. of Tobacco & Candy Distribs., Inc. v. City of New York · filed 2003-11-06(a)(7)

The court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint, and reasonable inferences therefrom, as true, and determine whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( id. at 87-88).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court assumes the allegations are true and gives the plaintiffs every favorable inference.

Vaz v. Sipsas · filed 2003-11-17(a)(7)

Assuming the truth of the allegations in the complaint and in an affidavit submitted by Mr. Vaz, and giving the plaintiffs the benefit of every favorable inference (see Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633 [1976]), the complaint states a cause of action.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court must deny a motion to dismiss if the allegations in the pleadings, taken together, show any legally cognizable cause of action.

State v. Justin · filed 2003-11-19(a)(7)

The court must deny the motion if from the pleadings’ “four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law” (Polonetsky v Better Homes Depot, 97 NY2d 46, 54 [2001] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a complaint that is unintelligible and lacks specificity and any legally cognizable claim.

Coleman v. Nassau County · filed 2003-12-15(a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The complaint was unintelligible, and lacked specificity and any legally cognizable claim (see Kung v Pan, 285 AD2d 532 [2001]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the complaint is construed in the plaintiff’s favor and its factual allegations are accepted as true.

Rosen v. Watermill Development Corp. · filed 2003-11-10(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss, “the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all factual allegations must be accepted as true” (Gruen v County of Suffolk, 187 AD2d 560, 562 [1992]).