N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3211

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, pleaded facts receive every favorable inference, but bare legal conclusions and claims that are inherently incredible or flatly contradicted by documentary evidence do not.

Sud v. Sud · filed 1995-01-05(a)(7)

Although on a motion addressed to the sufficiency of a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the facts pleaded are presumed to be true and accorded every favorable inference, nevertheless, allegations consisting of bare legal conclusions, as well as factual claims either inherently incredible or flatly contradicted by documentary evidence, are not entitled to such consideration (Mark Hampton, Inc. v Bergreen, 173 AD2d 220, lv denied 80 NY2d 788).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), conclusory allegations that fail to establish an agreement do not state a breach of contract claim.

Nathan v. J & I Enterprises, Ltd. · filed 1995-02-21(a)(7)

In addition, the plaintiff’s breach of contract claims were properly dismissed since the plaintiff’s conclusory allegations failed to establish the existence of an agreement.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court determines whether the pleading states a claim rather than resolving the facts.

Hinrichs v. Youssef · filed 1995-04-10(a)(7)

Moreover, on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the proper concern is whether the pleading states a cause of action rather than the ultimate determination of the facts (see, Stukuls v State of New York, 42 NY2d 272, 275).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court treats the complaint’s factual allegations as true.

Covino v. Hagemann · filed 1995-04-21(a)(7)

Thus, the question at bar upon defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) is a legal one, not a factual one (see, Matter of New York State AFL-CIO v Stimmel, 105 Misc 2d 545, 546), and the facts alleged in the complaint are considered as if they are true (Marone v Marone, 50 NY2d 481).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court construes the complaint liberally in the plaintiff’s favor; when evidentiary materials are submitted, it determines whether the plaintiff has a cause of action.

MacFawn v. Kresler · filed 1995-04-27(a)(7)

Noting our limited scope of review on a motion to dismiss made pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) and that we must construe the complaint liberally in the plaintiff’s favor (see, Quail Ridge Assocs. v Chemical Bank, 162 AD2d 917, 918, lv dismissed 76 NY2d 936), where, as here, evidentiary materials have been submitted, our role is to determine as a matter of law "whether plaintiff has a cause of action, not whether he has properly stated one” (supra, at 918 [emphasis supplied]; see, New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. v Aasen, 157 AD2d 965, 966; Brown v State of New York, 125 AD2d 750, 751, lv dismissed 70 NY2d 747).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

One Acre, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead · filed 1995-05-01(a)(7)

It is well settled that on a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the complaint is to be liberally construed, accepting all the facts alleged in the complaint as true and affording the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87; Rotanelli v Madden, 172 AD2d 815, 816).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the question is whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail.

Scott v. Cooper · filed 1995-05-01(a)(7)

The criterion is whether the plaintiff has a cause of action and not whether he may ultimately be successful on the merits (see, Stukuls v State of New York, 42 NY2d 272, 275; Detmer v Acampora, 207 AD2d 475; Greenview Trading Co. v Hershman & Leicher, 108 AD2d 468, 470).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the plaintiffs’ allegations as true.

Lake Claire Homeowners Ass'n v. Rosenberg · filed 1995-05-08(a)(7)

For purposes of this appeal, the plaintiffs’ allegations are accepted as true. ... While the plaintiffs clearly have established their littoral rights with respect to Lake Claire, the complaint fails to set forth any viable cause of action upon which to predicate a duty on behalf of the defendants to repair or maintain the dam for the plaintiffs’ benefit.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is construed in the plaintiff’s favor and its factual allegations are accepted as true.

Bovino v. Village of Wappingers Falls · filed 1995-05-22(a)(7)

It is well settled that, as a general rule, on a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all factual allegations must be accepted as true (see, Gruen v County of Suffolk, 187 AD2d 560, 562).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court considers what can reasonably be implied from the complaint’s allegations.

Ambassador Factors v. Kandel & Co. · filed 1995-05-25(a)(7)

The test on a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the pleadings is not whether the plaintiff has artfully drafted the complaint but whether, deeming the complaint to allege whatever can be reasonably implied from its statements, a cause of action can be sustained (Feinberg v Bache Halsey Stuart, 61 AD2d 135, 137-138; Edwards v Codd, 59 AD2d 148, 149).”

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court asks whether the complaint states a cognizable cause of action and treats its allegations and supporting affidavit statements as true.

Cherry v. Joseph S. Herbert & Co. · filed 1995-06-13(a)(7)

The present case comes to this Court in the procedural context of a denial of a motion to renew the trial court’s denial of defendant’s CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion. The inquiry on the initial motion to dismiss, therefore, was limited to whether the plaintiffs’ complaint stated cognizable causes of action with the allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint and statements in the affidavits relied upon to sustain those allegations deemed to be true (Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633; Becker v Schwartz, 46 NY2d 401).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint is sufficient if its factual allegations, taken as true, could entitle the plaintiff to relief on any reasonable view of the facts.

Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State · filed 1995-06-15(a)(7)

In considering the sufficiency of a pleading subject to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), our well-settled task is to determine whether, "accepting as true the factual averments of the complaint, plaintiff can succeed upon any reasonable view of the facts stated” (People v New York City Tr. Auth., 59 NY2d 343, 348; see, Jiggetts v Grinker, 75 NY2d 411, 414-415; 219 Broadway Corp. v Alexander’s, Inc., 46 NY2d 506, 509).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true and gives the plaintiffs all favorable inferences from their pleading.

Weinbaum v. Cuomo · filed 1995-09-28(a)(7)

Upon a careful review of the complaint, and having accepted as true the factual averments of the complaint and accorded the "plaintiffs the benefit of all favorable inferences which may be drawn from their pleading, without expressing our opinion as to whether they can ultimately establish the truth of their allegations before the trier of fact” (Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 86 NY2d 307, 318), we conclude that the IAS Court erred in rejecting defendants’ claim that the complaint does not state a cause of action under the State Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection, the Civil Rights Law and the Education Law.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s material allegations and reasonable inferences from them.

Rojas v. Debevoise & Plimpton · filed 1995-10-27(a)(7)

Defendants move pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. ... For purposes of this motion, the court will assume the truth of the complaint’s material allegations and whatever can be reasonably inferred therefrom (McGill v Parker, 179 AD2d 98, 105).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the test is whether the plaintiff has alleged a cognizable cause of action.

Carlson v. City of Tonawanda · filed 1995-11-15(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the test is whether plaintiff has alleged a cognizable cause of action (Collision Plan Unlimited v Bankers Trust Co., 63 NY2d 827, 830, rearg denied 64 NY2d 755; Siegel, NY Prac § 265, at 395 [2d ed]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) provides the motion for testing whether a complaint states a cause of action.

Guglielmo v. Roosevelt Hospital Staff Housing, Co. · filed 1995-12-04(a)(7)

If the appellants seek to test the sufficiency of the amended complaint, they must do so by an appropriate motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) (see, Platt v Portnoy, supra; Singh v Kalish, 153 AD2d 621, 625).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court assumes the truth of the pleading’s material allegations and reasonable inferences from them.

KSL Recreation Corp. v. Boca Raton Hotel & Club Ltd. Partnership · filed 1995-12-08(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, brought pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court "assumes the truth of the complaint’s material allegations and whatever can be reasonably inferred therefrom.”

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference when deciding whether it states a cause of action.

Szpicek v. Szpicek · filed 1995-12-18(a)(7)

However, even taking all of the plaintiff’s allegations to be true and granting her every favorable inference arising therefrom, the plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a cause of action (see, Sanders v Winship, 57 NY2d 391; Morone v Morone, 50 NY2d 481; Green v Leibowitz, 118 AD2d 756).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s allegations and the plaintiff’s supporting affidavits.

Perfect Fit Glove Co. v. Post · filed 1995-12-22(a)(7)

Assuming, as we must, the truth of the allegations in the complaint and statements in the affidavits submitted by plaintiff (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88), we conclude that plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that its customer information, pricing policies, and manufacturing processes are not publicly known nor ascertainable from sources outside the company; that Post acquired knowledge of those confidences while employed with plaintiff; and that, while employed with plaintiff, Post misappropriated that information and used it to the benefit of a competitor of plaintiff in violation of the non-disclosure provision of his contract of employment (see, Ward v Arcade Bldg. Maintenance, 191 AD2d 368; Rochester Tel. Mobile Communications v Auto Sound Sys., 182 AD2d 1119).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the complaint liberally and accepts its factual allegations as true.

Wilson v. South Buffalo Railway Co. · filed 1995-12-22(a)(7)

Construing the complaint liberally in the light most favorable to plaintiff and accepting all factual allegations as true (see, e.g., Morone v Morone, 50 NY2d 481, 484; Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275), we conclude that the complaint fails to state a cause of action against South Buffalo because it owed no duty to plaintiff under the circumstances of this case (see, O’Britis v Peninsula Golf Course, 143 AD2d 123).

CPLR 3211(a) does not permit dismissal on the pleadings when the complaint states a cause of action after the plaintiff receives every possible favorable inference.

National Union Fire Insurance v. Williams · filed 1996-01-16(a)

It will certainly not suffice to support dismissal of a pleading (CPLR 3211 [a]), "the operative criterion being that 'a complaint should not be dismissed on a pleading motion so long as, when the plaintiff is given the benefit of every possible favorable inference, a cause of action exists’ ” (Harris v City of New York, 147 AD2d 186, 189, quoting Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 634; see also, Arrington v New York Times Co., 55 NY2d 433, 442).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Farooqui v. Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority · filed 1996-02-02(a)(7)

Pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), Supreme Court properly dismissed all causes of action against defendants Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority, Gerald Chiarmonte, John Doe, Richard Roe and William Woe. Accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and according plaintiff every favorable inference ... we conclude that the complaint fails to state a cause of action against those defendants.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Bell v. Slepakoff · filed 1996-02-20(a)(7)

It is well settled that on a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is to be liberally construed, accepting all the facts alleged in the complaint to be true and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Banco Nacional Ultramarino, S. A. v. Chan · filed 1996-03-14(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and afford plaintiff every favorable inference which may be drawn from those allegations.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is liberally construed, the plaintiff receives every possible inference, and an affidavit may remedy pleading defects.

Silberman v. Flaum · filed 1996-03-21(a)(7)

Recognizing, as we must, that the complaint should be liberally construed with plaintiff being afforded every possible inference to determine whether a cause of action exists (see, Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633), and in so doing reviewing the affidavit submitted for the purpose of remedying any perceived defects, we find that Supreme Court properly dismissed the underlying complaint.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is viewed liberally and in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

9 East 38th Street Associates v. George Feher Associates, Inc. · filed 1996-04-09(a)(7)

Viewing the complaint liberally and in the light most favor...able to plaintiff, we find it sufficiently particularized to sustain the first cause of action for piercing the corporate veil and assigning personal liability to defendant.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court assumes the complaint’s allegations are true and asks whether they state a cause of action.

S.A.E. Motor Parts Co. v. Tenenbaum · filed 1996-04-15(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the question "is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail in the litigation, but whether the complaint states a cause of action (see, Becker v Schwartz, 46 NY2d 401, 408). For the purposes of this review the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint must be assumed to be true (see, Becker v Schwartz, supra, at 408)” (Reliance Ins. Co. v Morris Assocs., 200 AD2d 728, 729).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Citron v. Allstate Insurance · filed 1996-04-22(a)(7)

It is well settled that, on a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is to be liberally construed, accepting all the facts alleged in the complaint to be true and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true when deciding whether it states a claim.

Guilderland Reinsurance Co. v. Gold · filed 1996-05-09(a)(7)

Accepting the allegations of the third-party complaint as true for the purposes of this motion addressed only to the sufficiency of the pleading, defendant has stated a claim based upon the alleged existence of a fiduciary relationship between defendant and third-party defendants and upon third-party defendants’ alleged breach of the fiduciary duty owed to defendant as a result of that relationship.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint that states no cognizable cause of action may be dismissed even after its pleadings receive every favorable inference.

Malphrus v. Carrk · filed 1996-05-16(a)(7)

In our view, Supreme Court properly granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). Even giving plaintiff’s pro se pleadings the benefit of every favorable inference, as is appropriate on such a motion, we fail to discern any cognizable cause of action upon which relief could be granted (see, Di Nezza v Credit Data of Hudson Val., 166 AD2d 768, 768-769, lv dismissed, lv denied 77 NY2d 935).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its allegations as true, gives plaintiffs every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Corvetti v. Town of Lake Pleasant · filed 1996-05-16(a)(7)

We begin by reiterating the principles governing a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion. In deciding this type of motion, the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction, its allegations are accepted as true, plaintiffs are accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference and we determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, a court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true, but need not accept legal conclusions or factual claims that are inherently incredible or flatly contradicted by documentary evidence.

West Branch Conservation Ass'n v. County of Rockland · filed 1996-05-20(a)(7)

Although, upon a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), a court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, this does not apply to legal conclusions or to factual claims which are either inherently incredible or flatly contradicted by documentary evidence (see, Quail Ridge Assocs. v Chemical Bank, 162 AD2d 917, 918; SRW Assocs. v Bellport Beach Prop. Owners, 129 AD2d 328, 331).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is liberally construed, its allegations are accepted as true with favorable inferences, and plaintiffs’ affidavits may remedy pleading defects.

Diehl v. First Congregational Church of Antwerp, Inc. · filed 1996-07-12(a)(7)

Supreme Court erred in granting defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). On such a motion, the complaint must be liberally construed and the facts alleged therein accepted as true and accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Quail Ridge Assocs. v Chemical Bank, 162 AD2d 917, 918, lv dismissed 76 NY2d 936). Affidavits submitted by plaintiffs may also be considered to remedy any pleading defects (see, Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 635).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint must allege facts sufficient to state a cognizable cause of action; vague and conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Washington Avenue Associates, Inc. v. Euclid Equipment, Inc. · filed 1996-07-15(a)(7)

Although on a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) "the [narrow] question presented for review is not whether [the] plaintiff * * * should ultimately prevail in this litigation, but * * * whether [the complaint] state[s] cognizable causes of action” (Becker v Schwartz, 46 NY2d 401, 408), the allegations in the complaint cannot be vague and conclusory (see, O'Riordan v Suffolk Ch., Local No. 852, Civ. Serv. Empls. Assn., 95 AD2d 800).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and determines whether they are sufficient to withstand dismissal.

Spector v. Hebrew Hospital Home, Inc. · filed 1996-07-29(a)(7)

Accepting these allegations as true (see, Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 86 NY2d 307; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83), we find that the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to withstand the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) (see, Daniels v Empire-Orr, Inc., 151 AD2d 370).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, pleadings are liberally construed and pleaded facts receive every favorable inference, but bare legal conclusions and facts flatly contradicted by the record do not.

Doria v. Masucci · filed 1996-08-12(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]), the pleadings must be liberally construed (see, CPLR 3026). ... The facts pleaded are to be presumed to be true and are to be accorded every favorable inference, although bare legal conclusions as well as factual claims flatly contradicted by the record are not entitled to any such consideration (see, Morone v Morone, 50 NY2d 481; Gertler v Goodgold, 107 AD2d 481, affd 66 NY2d 946).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint is construed in the plaintiff’s favor and its factual allegations are accepted as true.

Marple v. Sorg · filed 1996-08-19(a)(7)

It is well settled that on a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the complaint must be construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and all the factual allegations must be accepted as true (see, Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268; One Acre v Town of Hempstead, 215 AD2d 359).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, pleaded facts receive every favorable inference, but bare legal conclusions and claims that are inherently incredible or flatly contradicted by documentary evidence do not.

Perl v. Smith Barney Inc. · filed 1996-08-22(a)(7)

"Although on a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the facts pleaded are presumed to be true and are accorded every favorable inference, where as here, the allegations consist of bare legal conclusions, as well as factual claims either inherently incredible or flatly contradicted by documentary evidence, they are not entitled to such consideration.”

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court may consider affidavits and documentary proof to determine whether they cure deficiencies in the complaint.

Vanscoy v. Namic USA Corp. · filed 1996-12-05(a)(7)

Even after viewing plaintiff’s affidavits and documentary ... proof to determine whether they could cure these blatant deficiencies (see, Marraccini v Bertelsmann Music Group, 221 AD2d 95), we conclude that Supreme Court appropriately dismissed the complaint.

On a motion to dismiss under subsection (a)(7), the court asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory, not whether the defendant has a defense.

Unadilla Silo Co. v. Ernst & Young · filed 1996-12-12(a)(7)

On a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion, a court’s sole inquiry is whether the facts alleged in the complaint fit within any cognizable legal theory, not whether the defendant has a defense (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Beltrone v General Schuyler & Co., 223 AD2d 938, 939).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the pleading liberally, accepts its allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

La Barge v. Haven of Schenectady, Inc. · filed 1996-12-12(a)(7)

The pertinent principles which the court must apply in deciding a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion seeking the dismissal of an action before issue is joined are (1) that the pleading under challenge be afforded a liberal construction; (2) that its allegations be accepted as true; (3) that the plaintiff be accorded the benefit of every favorable inference; and (4) that the only determination to be made is whether or not the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Corvetti v Town of Lake Pleasant, 227 AD2d 821).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a liberally construed pleading fails to state a cause of action or submissions conclusively establish that the plaintiff has none.

Grossman v. Pharmhouse Corp. · filed 1996-12-30(a)(7)

A motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) should not be granted unless, within the four corners of the pleading, liberally construed, the pleader has failed to state a cause of action, or unless documents and other submissions establish conclusively that plaintiff has no cause of action (see, Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275; Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 635-636).

A complaint survives a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action if its factual allegations, read together, disclose any legally recognized claim.

Esposito-Hilder v. SFX Broadcasting, Inc. · filed 1996-12-31(a)(7)

If from the four corners of the pleading, regardless of its form and draftsmanship, factual allegations are discernable which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law, the pleading states a cause of action and the motion will fail.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court assumes the complaint’s allegations are true and gives them every favorable inference.

Meachum v. Outdoor World Corp. · filed 1997-01-21(a)(7)

Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 which was to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendants Resorts USA, Inc., Rank Ahnert, Inc., and Rank America, Inc., for failure to state a cause of action. ... Therefore, assuming the truth of the allegations and according them every favorable inference (see, Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v Lindner, 59 NY2d 314; Jacobs v Haber, 133 AD2d 739), we find that at this preliminary stage of the proceedings it was appropriate for the Supreme Court to deny the motion to dismiss (see, e.g., Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268; Ackerman v 305 E. 40th Owners Corp., 189 AD2d 665).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires denial of a motion to dismiss when the pleading’s factual allegations, taken together, state a cognizable cause of action.

Fourth Branch Associates Mechanicville v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. · filed 1997-01-30(a)(7)

A motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) should be denied where the pleading states a cause of action and where "from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law” (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275; see, Weiner v Lenox Hill Hosp., 193 AD2d 380, 381).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court asks whether the complaint states a cause of action, assuming its allegations are true.

Benerofe v. Avnet, Inc. · filed 1997-02-18(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the narrow question presented for review is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail in the litigation, but whether the complaint states a cause of action (see, Becker v Schwartz, 46 NY2d 401, 408).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the question is whether the plaintiff has a cause of action.

Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese · filed 1997-03-03(a)(7)

When considering an application to dismiss a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), "the criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he has stated one” (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275; see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83; Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 636).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court asks whether the alleged facts fit any cognizable legal theory, without requiring evidentiary support for the complaint.

Hejna v. Reilly · filed 1997-03-13(a)(7)

We affirm Supreme Court’s denial of defendant’s CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint in this divorce action based upon cruel and inhuman treatment. On such a motion, the court’s sole inquiry is whether the facts alleged in the complaint fit within any cognizable legal theory, not whether there is evidentiary support for the complaint (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Pietrosanto v NYNEX Corp., 195 AD2d 843, 844).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, a complaint is read by fair and reasonable intendment to determine what its allegations imply.

Vitale v. Dean Fowler Oil Co. · filed 1997-04-17(a)(7)

Hence, by fair and reasonable intendment (see, Korenman v Zaydelman, supra, at 713), we find that plaintiffs have properly alleged a wrongful use of its property without consent, thereby constituting a trespass (see, Sporn v MCA Records, 58 NY2d 482, 487; see also, Trustco Bank v S/N Precision Enters., 234 AD2d 665; Granchelli v Johnson Bldg. Co., 85 AD2d 891).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts to construe the pleading liberally, accept its allegations as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and ask whether the alleged facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Sand v. Chapin · filed 1997-04-24(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), we are to afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept as true the allegations contained therein, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Shulman & Son v Jorling, 189 AD2d 1012, 1013).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, pleadings are viewed liberally and deemed true, but a claim that still fails to state a cause of action must be dismissed.

Schulman v. Continental Insurance · filed 1997-05-05(a)(7)

While we perceive no error in the Supreme Court’s failure to dismiss the plaintiffs causes of action against the defendant company sounding in intentional interference with prospective business or economic advantage (the first cause of action), conversion (the second cause of action), defamation (the third cause of action), gender discrimination (part of the sixth cause of action) and disability discrimination (seventh cause of action), the pleadings, even when viewed liberally and deemed true (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83; Becker v Schwartz, 46 NY2d 401; Reliance Ins. Co. v Morris Assocs., 200 AD2d 728), fail to state a cause of action based upon religious discrimination (part of the sixth cause of action) (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; 3013; Fisher v Maxwell Communications Corp., 205 AD2d 356; Yusuf v Vassar Coll., 35 F3d 709).

On a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion, the court treats the complaint’s allegations as true and dismisses it if they fail to state a cognizable claim.

Funderburke v. Uniondale Union Free School District No. 15 · filed 1997-05-21(a)(7)

Even viewing the allegations of the complaint as true as the court must on a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) ... the complaint must be dismissed for failure to set forth a cognizable claim under either the New York City or New York State Human Rights Law.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiffs every possible inference.

U.S. Ice Cream Corp. v. Bizar · filed 1997-06-23(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleadings are to be liberally construed, accepting all the facts alleged in the complaint to be true and according the plaintiffs the benefit of every possible inference (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court determines whether the complaint states a cause of action, construes it liberally for the plaintiff, and accepts its factual allegations as true.

Bernstein v. Kelso & Co. · filed 1997-07-01(a)(7)

Our role in a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) is limited to determining whether the complaint states a cause of action, not whether there is evidentiary support for the complaint (LoPinto v J. W. Mays, Inc., 170 AD2d 582, 583). We must liberally construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff and accept as true all factual allegations (supra).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court treats allegations in the complaint and opposing affidavits as true and draws reasonable inferences for the plaintiff.

Schooley v. Mannion · filed 1997-07-10(a)(7)

When deciding whether plaintiffs have stated a cause of action the court must consider plaintiffs’ allegations, asserted in both the complaint and any accompanying affidavits submitted in opposition to the motion, “ ‘as true and resolve all inferences which reasonably flow therefrom in favor of the [plaintiffs]’ ” (Joel v Weber, 166 AD2d 130, 135-136).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable theory.

Ferran v. Belawa · filed 1997-07-31(a)(7)

It is well settled that “[o]n a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), we are to afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept as true the allegations contained therein, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable theory” (Sand v Chapin, 238 AD2d 862, 863).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true.

Leviton Manufacturing Co. v. Blumberg · filed 1997-08-07(a)(7)

On a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion for dismissal for failure to state a cause of action, the court is required to accept factual allegations as true (see, McGill v Parker, 179 AD2d 98, 105).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint survives dismissal if its allegations state a cognizable cause of action.

Cooper v. 620 Properties Associates · filed 1997-08-25(a)(7)

In determining whether a complaint is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action (see, Weiss v Cuddy & Feder, 200 AD2d 665).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, pleadings receive a liberal construction, allegations are accepted as true, and the claimant receives every possible favorable inference.

Parker v. State · filed 1997-09-11(a)(7)

In any event, even affording the pleadings a liberal construction, accepting claimant’s' allegations as true and according him the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88), claimant has failed to demonstrate that he has a cause of action. ... Accordingly, in our view, the pleadings were clearly deficient and the amended claim was properly dismissed on this ground (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

An objection that a complaint fails to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211(a)(7) may be raised by motion at any time, even if it was not raised in the answer.

Schel v. Roth · filed 1997-09-29(e)

A defendant’s objection that a complaint fails to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) may be raised in a motion “at any time even if such objection was not raised in the answer” ... There was thus no procedural impediment to the consideration of the merits of the defendants’ motion and cross motion.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the complaint and the plaintiff’s affidavit in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Conti v. Polizzotto · filed 1997-10-27(a)(7)

Construing the allegations of the complaint and the affidavit of the plaintiff Giovanni Conti in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, as we must on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action ... we agree with the Supreme Court that the ... plaintiffs have failed to allege specific facts upon which the existence of an attorney-client relationship or privity between the parties could be inferred.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), bare legal conclusions and factual claims that are inherently incredible or flatly contradicted by documentary evidence are not presumed true or given favorable inferences.

Beattie v. Brown & Wood · filed 1997-10-28(a)(7)

“Although on a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the facts pleaded are presumed to be true and are accorded every favorable inference, where, as here, the allegations consist of bare legal conclusions, as well as factual claims either inherently incredible or flatly contradicted by documentary evidence, they are not entitled to such consideration”

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its factual allegations as true, draws every favorable inference, and asks whether it alleges any cognizable cause of action.

Esposito-Hilder v. SFX Broadcasting, Inc. · filed 1997-11-26(a)(7)

We begin our discussion by noting that upon a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), we accord the complaint a liberal ... construction, assume its factual allegations to be true, draw every possible favorable inference therefrom and determine only whether any cognizable cause of action has been alleged (see, CPLR 3026; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts factual allegations as true and construes the complaint liberally, but may dismiss a claim unsupported by facts showing a viable cause of action.

L. Magarian & Co. v. Timberland Co. · filed 1997-12-09(a)(7)

Despite the strong presumptions favoring the complaint on a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion, such as that the court must accept each factual allegation as true and make no effort to evaluate the ultimate merits of the case ... the motion court erred in refusing to dismiss this complaint, which sounded in breach of a fiduciary relationship.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court views the complaint and submitted affidavits in the plaintiff’s favor and dismisses claims that fail to state a cause of action.

Hampton Navigation, Inc. v. Pinpoint System International · filed 1997-12-22(a)(7)

Viewing the amended complaint and affidavits submitted on the motion in a light most favorable to the plaintiff (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87), we find that the first, second, and ...fourth causes of action fail to state causes of action.

Section 3211(a)(7) tests whether a pleading states a cause of action, rather than whether the pleading party will ultimately prevail.

Williams v. Allano · filed 1998-01-20(a)(7)

It is well settled that on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the question is not whether the party pleading the claim will ultimately prevail, but whether the claim states a cause of action (see, S.A.E. Motor Parts Co. v Tenenbaum, 226 AD2d 518).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires the court to construe the complaint liberally, accept its alleged facts as true, and give the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Ferrandino v. Alvin J. Bart & Sons, Inc. · filed 1998-02-09(a)(7)

It is well settled that on a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the pleading is to be liberally construed, accepting all the facts alleged in the complaint to be true and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87; Rotanelli v Madden, 172 AD2d 815, 816).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives them every reasonable inference, and may consider affidavits to remedy pleading defects.

M. M. v. E. M. · filed 1998-03-03(a)(7)

Where a motion to dismiss is directed at the sufficiency of the pleadings, the question is not whether the complaint is artfully drafted. “The court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and then determine whether those facts fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Hirschhom v Hirschhorn, 194 AD2d 768). The complaint is accorded every reasonable inference (Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 634), and affidavits may be considered for the purpose of remedying defects in the pleading (supra, at 636).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the complaint’s allegations as true and give them every possible favorable inference.

Melnik v. Saks & Co. · filed 1998-03-09(a)(7)

It is well settled that on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the allegations set forth in the complaint must be accepted as true and given the benefit of every possible favorable inference (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275; Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 634; Russo Sec. v Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein, Wolf, Schlissel & Sazaer, 243 AD2d 552; Bovino v Village of Wappingers Falls, 215 AD2d 619).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court asks whether the complaint states a cognizable cause of action; vague and conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Stoianoff v. Gahona · filed 1998-03-16(a)(7)

Although on a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) the narrow question is whether the complaint states a cognizable cause of action (see, Washington Ave. Assocs. v Euclid Equip., 229 AD2d 486), the allegations in the complaint cannot be vague and conclusory (see, Washington Ave. Assocs. v Euclid Equip., supra; Schuckman Realty v Marine Midland Bank, 244 AD2d 400).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, pleadings are liberally construed and pleaded facts receive every favorable inference.

Mastrocola v. County of Nassau · filed 1998-03-30(a)(7)

The pleadings must be liberally construed, and the facts pleaded are presumed to be true and are accorded every favorable inference (see, Doria v Masucci, 230 AD2d 764, 765).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true.

Steinberger v. Steinberger · filed 1998-03-30(a)(7)

In determining a motion to dismiss an action for failure to state a cause of action, the allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true (Wanser v Wanser, 214 AD2d 611; Horvath v Horvath, 177 AD2d 617).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court reads the pleading liberally and accepts its allegations as true, but vague, conclusory allegations and a hope that discovery will supply support are insufficient.

Weimer v. City of Johnstown · filed 1998-04-02(a)(7)

We acknowledge that on a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction, its allegations are accepted as true, plaintiffs are accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference and [the court] determine [s] only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Corvetti v Town of Lake Pleasant, 227 AD2d 821, 822; see, Bryant Ave. Tenants’ Assn. v Koch, 127 AD2d 470, 472-473, affd 71 NY2d 856). Nevertheless, we find that plaintiffs vague and conclusory allegations and expression of hope that discovery, if and when conducted, might provide some factual support for his cause of action under 42 USC § 1983 provide an insufficient basis for failing to dismiss a patently defective cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Edmond v. International Business MacHines Corp. · filed 1998-04-07(a)(7)

Accepting these allegations as true and according plaintiffs the benefit of every favorable inference as we must in a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Arrington v New York Times Co., 55 NY2d 433, 442), plaintiffs’ complaint sufficiently states a cause of action (see, Matter of Tobin v Steisel, 64 NY2d 254, 259; Hill v St. Clare’s Hosp., 67 NY2d 72, 82-83).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, bare legal conclusions or factual claims contradicted by evidence do not suffice.

Manno v. Mione · filed 1998-04-13(a)(7)

Our review of the complaint reveals that the appellant’s fifth cause of action sounding in negligent supervision contains “little more than bare legal conclusions” or factual claims that are contradicted by evidence (Corporate Natl. Realty v Philson Ltd., 232 AD2d 518, 519). Thus, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the fifth cause of action (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

A complaint withstands a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action if a cause of action can be reasonably implied from its allegations, even if it is inartfully drafted.

Jones Lang Wootton USA v. LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae · filed 1998-04-16(a)(7)

However, as this Court has had occasion to note, “The test on a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the pleadings is not whether the plaintiff has artfully drafted the complaint but whether, deeming the complaint to allege whatever can be reasonably implied from its statements, a cause of action can be sustained” ... In this respect, the complaint is sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court may consider a complaint as amplified by a bill of particulars.

Rodgers v. Earl · filed 1998-04-29(a)(7)

Supreme Court properly denied that part of defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). The complaint, as amplified by the bill of particulars, states a cause of action for negligence based upon the actions of defendants in removing snow from the public sidewalk abutting their property (see generally, Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true and asks whether the plaintiff could succeed on any reasonable view of those facts.

Culverhouse v. Cooke Center for Learning & Development, Inc. · filed 1998-05-06(a)(7)

When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts as true the factual averments of the complaint and determines whether the plaintiff can succeed upon any reasonable view of the facts stated.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the complaint’s allegations as true and draw all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.

Cavanaugh v. Doherty · filed 1998-06-04(a)(7)

Moreover, “[i]t is axiomatic that on a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court is required to view every allegation of the complaint as true and resolve all inferences in favor of the plaintiff regardless of whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail on the merits” (Grand Realty Co. v City of White Plains, 125 AD2d 639; see, Sanders v Winship, 57 NY2d 391, 394).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true and gives them every possible favorable inference.

Frankel v. American Film Technologies, Inc. · filed 1998-06-12

This is a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211. The generally accepted principle of law in New York on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is that the factual allegations in the pleading must be accepted as true and be given every possible favorable inference.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the test is whether the plaintiff can succeed on any reasonable view of the facts stated.

Antonoff v. Maimonides Medical Center · filed 1998-06-22(a)(7)

It is well settled that in determining a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the test is whether the plaintiff can succeed upon any reasonable view of the facts stated (see, Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 86 NY2d 307; Jiggetts v Grinker, 75 NY2d 411, 414-415; 219 Broadway Corp. v Alexander’s, Inc., 46 NY2d 506).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court presumes the pleading’s allegations are true when deciding whether it states a cause of action.

Moss v. Moss · filed 1998-06-25(a)(7)

Where, as here, the counterclaim states facts occurring within the five-year Statute of Limitations period (see, Domestic Relations Law § 210) and presuming the allegations as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss on CPLR 3211 (a) (7) grounds, as we are required to do, we hold that the pleading states a cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court takes the complaint’s factual allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference when assessing its sufficiency.

Geiger v. American Tobacco Co. · filed 1998-07-06(a)(7)

Finally, contrary to the appellants’ arguments on appeal, taking the factual averments of the complaint as true and giving the plaintiffs the benefit of every favorable inference, the complaint is otherwise sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) (see, Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 86 NY2d 307; SRW Assocs. v Bellport Beach Prop. Owners, 129 AD2d 328; see also, City of New York v Lead Indus. Assn., 190 AD2d 173) and is sufficiently detailed to withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3016 (b) (see, Lanzi v Brooks, 43 NY2d 778; Marcus v Jewish Natl. Fund [Keren Kayemeth Leisrael], 158 AD2d 101).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), pleaded facts receive every favorable inference, but bare legal conclusions and factual claims flatly contradicted by the record do not.

Sotomayor v. Kaufman, Malchman, Kirby & Squire, L. L. P. · filed 1998-07-20(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]), the pleadings must be liberally construed (see, CPLR 3026). The sole criteria is whether “from [the complaint’s] four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law” (Guggenheimer v Ginsburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275; see also, Bovino v Village of Wappingers Falls, 215 AD2d 619). The facts pleaded are presumed to be true and are to be accorded every favorable inference, although bare legal conclusions as well as factual claims flatly contradicted by the record are not entitled to such consideration (see, Morone v Morone, 50 NY2d 481; Gertler v Goodgold, 107 AD2d 481, affd 66 NY2d 946).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint is legally sufficient if any reasonable view of its stated facts permits recovery.

Hoag v. Chancellor, Inc. · filed 1998-08-20(a)(7)

If a “plaintiff is entitled to a recovery upon any reasonable view of the stated facts”, the complaint is legally sufficient and the motion must be denied.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true and asks whether the plaintiff can succeed on any reasonable view of those facts.

Farmer v. Green Bus Lines, Inc. · filed 1998-10-19(a)(7)

At issue on the instant appeal is whether the plaintiffs complaint states a cause of action (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). It is well settled that on such a motion, the court’s “task is to determine whether, ‘accepting as true the factual averments of the complaint, plaintiff can succeed upon any reasonable view of the facts stated’ ” (Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 86 NY2d 307, 318, quoting People v New York City Tr. Auth., 59 NY2d 343, 348).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the pleading is liberally construed, its alleged facts are accepted as true, and the plaintiff receives every possible favorable inference.

HBP Associates v. State · filed 1998-10-26(a)(7)

...failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is to be liberally construed, accepting all the facts alleged in the complaint to be true and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87; Rotanelli v Madden, 172 AD2d 815, 816).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the alleged facts are accepted as true and the plaintiff receives every favorable inference.

Oja v. Grand Chapter of Theta Chi Fraternity, Inc. · filed 1998-11-19(a)(7)

In our view, when the facts alleged are accepted as true, and plaintiffs are afforded the benefit of every favorable inference that may be drawn therefrom, plaintiffs’ allegations fit within a cognizable theory of negligence on the part of defendant (see, CPLR 3211 [7]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

A conclusory assertion that the plaintiff will never prove damages is insufficient to dismiss a complaint at the pleading stage.

Home Insurance v. Liebman, Adolf & Charme · filed 1999-01-12(a)(7)

Further, defendants’ conclusory assertion that Home will never be able to prove damages does not provide a sufficient basis for dismissal at this stage of the proceedings (see, e.g., VDR Realty Corp. v Mintz, 167 AD2d 986).

A trespass claim survives a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7) when the complaint alleges intentional, unlawful interference with the plaintiff’s right to possess property and resulting damages.

Ain v. Glazer · filed 1999-01-12(a)(7)

The denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs cause of action for trespass was proper since the complaint adequately alleged defendant’s intentional and unlawful interference with plaintiffs right to possession of certain real property and resultant damages (see, Annutto v Town of Herkimer, 56 Misc 2d 186, 190, affd in relevant part 31 AD2d 733, appeal dismissed 24 NY2d 820).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Oja v. Grand Chapter of Theta Chi Fraternity, Inc. · filed 1999-01-28(a)(7)

Accepting the allegations of the complaint as true, ...and according plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference that may be drawn therefrom (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; Weimer v City of Johnstown, 249 AD2d 608, 610, lv denied 92 NY2d 806), plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action, asserting common-law negligence, does not, as Supreme Court found, necessarily come within the ambit of the rule that precludes recovery, from a provider of alcoholic beverages, by one who has been injured as a result of his or her own voluntary intoxication (see, e.g., Sheehy v Big Flats Community Day, 73 NY2d 629, 636; Dodge v Victory Mkts., 199 AD2d 917, 919).

A complaint’s sufficiency for failure to state a cause of action must be tested by a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

Providian National Bank v. McGowan · filed 1999-02-19(a)(7)

The sufficiency of a complaint may only be tested by a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

A complaint can withstand a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss even when the plaintiff later loses on summary judgment.

Badillo v. Tower Insurance · filed 1999-02-23

While we agree with the courts below that the complaint was sufficient to withstand a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, we otherwise reverse.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a), the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, and draws all possible inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.

B-S Industrial Contractors, Inc. v. Burns Bros. Contractors, Inc. · filed 1998-12-24(a)

The sole issue before us is whether the complaint, as originally proposed or amended, can survive a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) where such pleading must be afforded a liberal construction, the facts as alleged must be accepted as true and all possible inferences deferred to plaintiff (see, Ferran v Belawa, 241 AD2d 841; Esposito-Hilder v SFX Broadcasting, 236 AD2d 186, 187-188; Butler v Delaware Otsego Corp., 218 AD2d 357).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the complaint’s allegations as true.

Berkshire Fashions, Inc. v. F.W. Woolworth Co. · filed 1998-12-29(a)(7)

Plaintiffs allegations in the verified complaint, which must be accepted as true on a motion to dismiss (Khan v Newsweek, Inc., 160 AD2d 425, 426), make out a valid cause of action in tort for fraudulent concealment.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court takes the complaint’s factual allegations as true and considers affidavits only to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim.

Wall Street Associates v. Brodsky · filed 1999-01-28(a)(7)

In the context of a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, where we must take the factual allegations of the complaint as true, consider the affidavits submitted on the motion only for the limited purpose of determining whether the plaintiff has stated a claim, not whether he has one and, in the absence of proof ... that an alleged material fact is untrue or beyond significant dispute, must not dismiss the complaint ... we find that plaintiffs allegations are sufficient to support its contentions that its fraudulent conveyance claims were viable and potentially successful when brought to defendants’ attention in 1986, that as a consequence, its claims for legal malpractice and breach of contract to perform legal services were sufficiently alleged, and that the motion court erred in granting dismissal of the complaint.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), pleadings must be considered liberally.

Masi Management, Inc. v. Town of Ogden · filed 1999-02-25(a)(7)

The pleadings at this stage must be considered liberally.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference.

Lightman v. Flaum · filed 1999-03-04(a)(7)

Upon a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court is required to construe the complaint liberally, accepting all of the facts alleged as true and affording plaintiff the benefit of any possible inference.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the allegations as true, construes the pleading liberally, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Coleman v. Seldin · filed 1999-03-08(a)(7)

In deciding a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion the pleadings are afforded a liberal construction, the allegations are accepted as true and the plaintiff is accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference in determining whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must liberally construe the complaint, accept its material allegations and reasonable inferences as true, and deny dismissal if the alleged facts state any cognizable cause of action.

Mulvey v. Cuviello · filed 1999-03-15(a)(7)

The court, in considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for the failure to state a cause of action, must liberally construe the challenged pleading (see, Mastrocola v County of Nassau, 248 AD2d 684), assume the truth of its material allegations, together with whatever can be reasonably inferred therefrom, and deny the application if, from its four corners, factual allegations are discerned which, taken together, manifest any cause of action cognizable at law (see, Sotomayor v Kaufman, Malchman, Kirby & Squire, 252 AD2d 555).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court need not accept legal conclusions or allegations that are inherently incredible or contradicted by documentary evidence.

1455 Washington Avenue Associates v. Rose & Kiernan, Inc. · filed 1999-04-08(a)(7)

We need not, however, “accept as true legal conclusions or factual allegations that ‘are either inherently incredible or flatly-contradicted by documentary evidence’ ” (Ferran v Belawa, 241 AD2d 841, 843, quoting Quail Ridge Assocs. v Chemical Bank, 162 AD2d 917, 918, Iv dismissed 76 NY2d 936; see, Doria v Masucci, 230 AD2d 764, 765, Iv denied 89 NY2d 811).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, CPLR 3211 requires the court to accept pleaded facts as true and construe the complaint liberally in the plaintiff’s favor.

Unotti v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. · filed 1999-04-20(a)(7)

On a motion made pursuant to CPLR 3211, to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, it is well settled that the factual averments in a pleading must be accepted as true and the complaint liberally construed in the pleader’s favor (Anguita v Koch, 179 AD2d 454 [1st Dept 1992]).

A motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7) is properly denied when the amended complaint states a cause of action for breach of contract.

Esposito v. Alcamo Supply & Contracting Corp. · filed 1999-05-10(a)(7)

The Supreme Court correctly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The plaintiff’s amended complaint states a cause of action for breach of contract (see, Merritt v Hooshang Constr., 216 AD2d 542).

A motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 should be denied when the complaint alleges facts sufficient to support the claims.

Internationale Nederlanden (U.S.) Capital Corporation v. Bankers Trust Co. · filed 1999-05-04

The motion court erred in granting defendants’ motions, since plaintiffs’ complaint contains factual allegations sufficient to support claims against Bankers Trust Company and Donlin.

A motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) succeeds only when the complaint fails to state a claim on its face.

McEntee v. Cappucci · filed 1999-04-30(a)(7)

A motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) is successful only when the complaint fails to state a claim on its face.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), vague and conclusory allegations without a factual basis are insufficient to state a cause of action.

Rose v. Gelco Corp. · filed 1999-05-03(a)(7)

The plaintiffs are also not entitled to recovery under a theory of strict products liability or breach of implied warranty as the allegations in support of these causes of action are devoid of a factual basis and are vague and conclusory (see, Schuckman Realty v Marine Midland Bank, 244 AD2d 400).

A complaint fails to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211(a)(7) when it alleges no facts permitting an inference of actual, ascertainable damages.

Argyle Capital Management Corp. v. Lowenthal, Landau, Fischer & Bring, P. C. · filed 1999-05-20(a)(7)

Plaintiff Argyle’s causes of action were properly dismissed since the complaint fails to state any facts permitting the inference that Argyle suffered any actual, ascertainable damages as a result of defendants’ conduct (see, Franklin v Winard, 199 AD2d 220).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the pleadings, accepts the allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every possible inference.

Barnes v. Dungan · filed 1999-05-20(a)(7)

Our review, on a motion of this kind, requires that we liberally construe the pleadings and accept the allegations as true, yielding every possible inference in plaintiffs favor (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83; Parker v State of New York, 242 AD2d 785; MacFawn v Kresler, 214 AD2d 925, affd 88 NY2d 859).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action.

North Shore Associates v. Knox · filed 1999-05-20(a)(7)

A claim may be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action (CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a defamation counterclaim that fails to state a valid cause of action.

Nyack Hospital v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield · filed 1999-05-24(a)(7)

The Supreme Court correctly found that the appellant did not validly state a cause of action to recover damages for defamation and thus properly dismissed that counterclaim (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; Springer v Club Med, 240 AD2d 395; Doherty v New York Tel. Co., 202 AD2d 627).

Section 3211(a)(7) asks whether the pleadings state a cause of action, without testing their evidentiary support.

Wells v. Bank of New York Co. · filed 1999-05-24(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court is limited to ascertaining whether the pleadings state any cause of action, and may not consider whether there is evidentiary support for the complaint.

A legal malpractice complaint fails to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211(a)(7) if it alleges only speculative damages rather than actual ascertainable damages.

Perkins v. Norwick · filed 1999-05-25(a)(7)

Accordingly, since the complaint fails to contain the requisite allegation of “actual ascertainable damages,” it fails to state a cause of action.

A legal malpractice complaint that alleges only speculative damages fails to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

Perkins v. Norwich · filed 1999-05-25(a)(7)

Accordingly, since the complaint fails to contain the requisite allegation of “actual ascertainable damages,” it fails to state a cause of action.

On a motion attacking the sufficiency of a complaint under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the facts are construed in the opposing party’s favor, with all reasonable inferences drawn for that party.

Ansonia Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Public Service Mutual Insurance · filed 1999-05-25(a)(7)

On a motion for summary judgment attacking the sufficiency of the complaint (CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; Sanders v Winship, 57 NY2d 391, 394), the facts are construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, which is entitled to all reasonable inferences that can be derived therefrom (Arrington v New York Times Co., 55 NY2d 433, 442, cert denied 459 US 1146; Dulberg v Mock, 1 NY2d 54, 56).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, courts accept factual allegations as true and draw favorable inferences, but conclusory allegations without factual support do not suffice.

Rau v. Borenkoff · filed 1999-06-07(a)(7)

While a court must deem all factual allegations to be true and afford a plaintiff every favorable inference on a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion to dismiss (see, Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268), the plaintiff failed to allege any facts in his complaint which could be deemed true, and there are no inferences to be drawn.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, bare legal conclusions and factual claims flatly contradicted by evidence are not presumed true.

Meyer v. Guinta · filed 1999-06-14(a)(7)

It is well settled that bare legal conclusions and factual claims which are flatly contradicted by the evidence are not presumed to be true on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a fraud claim stated with sufficient specificity survives a motion to dismiss.

Romanoff Restaurant & Cabaret, Inc. v. Ougoulava · filed 1999-06-14(a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the third cause of action seeking to recover damages for fraud, as the complaint stated a cause of action sounding in fraud with sufficient specificity (see, Knox v Sprague, 255 AD2d 428).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Jacobs v. Macy's East, Inc. · filed 1999-06-28(a)(7)

It is well settled that on a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is to be liberally construed, accepting all the facts alleged in the complaint to be true and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87; Rotanelli v Madden, 172 AD2d 815, 816).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint survives dismissal for failure to state a cause of action when the plaintiff’s affidavits or documentary evidence show that a cause of action may exist.

Johnson City Central School District v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland · filed 1999-07-01(a)(7)

A complaint will not be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) where affidavits or other documentary evidence submitted by the plaintiff demonstrate that a cause of action may exist (see, Leon v Martinez, supra, at 88; Silberman v Flaum, 225 AD2d 985, 986).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court assumes the complaint’s factual allegations are true and determines whether they state a claim.

Contractors Casualty & Surety Co. v. I.E.A. Electric Group, Inc. · filed 1999-07-07(a)(7)

In considering a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion, the court must determine whether the pleader would be entitled to judgment, assuming that all of the facts alleged in the complaint are true.

Section 3211(a)(7) does not permit dismissal of a reformation claim when the plaintiff’s alleged facts, accepted as true, support the conclusion that the written lease does not reflect the parties’ agreement.

Clifford v. Montana Mills Bread Co. · filed 1999-07-09(a)(7)

Supreme Court erred in granting defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). ... The facts alleged in plaintiff’s submissions, if accepted as true, support the conclusion that the rent provisions of the lease agreement do not reflect the agreement of the parties.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint supplemented by a plaintiff’s affidavit can sufficiently plead fraud and negligence.

SS&J Morris, Inc. v. Mahoney Cohen & Co. · filed 1999-08-19(a)(7)

Initially, we note that the allegations of the complaint, as supplemented by plaintiffs’ affidavit, did sufficiently allege a cause of action against Mahoney Cohen for fraud. Contrary to the motion court’s view, the element of justifiable reliance necessary to state a cause of action for fraud was adequately pleaded. ... In addition, the complaint’s allegations, as supplemented by plaintiffs’ affidavit, also stated a cause of action in negligence against Mahoney Cohen.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a petition may be dismissed when its allegations, accepted as true, do not state a cause of action under any reasonable view of the facts.

Roxborough Apartment Corp. v. Becker · filed 1999-09-03(a)(7)

Accepting petitioner’s allegations as true, no reasonable view of those facts states a cause of action under the lease interpreted according to the applicable statutory provisions. Therefore the court grants respondent’s motion to dismiss on this ground.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the pleadings must be liberally construed.

Mayer v. Sanders · filed 1999-09-27(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]), the pleadings must be liberally construed (see, CPLR 3026).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint states a cause of action when it alleges all the required elements on its face.

Slazak v. Capozzi · filed 1999-10-01(a)(7)

Although defendant did not specify the ground upon which he sought dismissal under CPLR 3211, we construe the motion to be made pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), failure to state a cause of action. Viewing the motion in that light, we conclude that the complaint is sufficient on its face because it includes all of the elements of a cause of action to recover damages for wrongful death (see, Chong v New York City Tr. Auth., 83 AD2d 546, 547; see generally, 21A Carmody-Wait 2d, NY Prac § 130.43, at 525-526).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the complaint states no cause of action against the defendant.

Moas v. Empire Insurance Group · filed 1999-10-04(a)(7)

The Supreme Court did not err in dismissing the complaint since no cause of action was stated against the defendant.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, allegations in a complaint may be amplified by an affidavit submitted in opposition to show that the complaint states a cause of action.

Waldman v. NYNEX Corp. · filed 1999-10-05(a)(7)

... we agree with the LAS Court that, in the context of this pre-joinder motion, the allegations of plaintiff’s complaint, as amplified by the affidavit submitted in opposition to the motion, allege sufficient facts to make out causes of action within the narrowly drawn exceptions to the at-will doctrine outlined in Weiner v McGraw-Hill, Inc. (57 NY2d 458; see, Mulder v Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, 208 AD2d 301) and Wieder v Skala (80 NY2d 628).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the pleading is liberally construed, its alleged facts are accepted as true, and its allegations receive every possible favorable inference.

EECP Centers of America, Inc. v. Vasomedical, Inc. · filed 1999-10-12(a)(7)

It is well settled that on a motion to dismiss a pleading for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is to be liberally construed, accepting all the facts alleged in the pleading to be true and according the allegation the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87).

A failure-to-state-a-cause-of-action argument may be raised at any time.

DeStefano v. Kopelman · filed 1999-10-18(e)

The contention of the defendant in this case is that the plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). An argument of ... that nature may be raised at any time (see, CPLR 3211 [e]; Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3211:13, 1999 Pocket Part, at 6).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true and draws favorable inferences for the plaintiff.

Barham v. Suffolk County Community College · filed 1999-11-01(a)(7)

Accepting as true the factual averments of the complaint and affording the plaintiff the benefit of all favorable inferences which may be drawn therefrom (see, Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 86 NY2d 307, 318; CPLR 3211 [a] [7]), the complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract.

Section 3211(a)(7) does not warrant dismissal of a breach of contract claim that sufficiently alleges an oral contract.

Rab Contractors, Inc. v. Stillman · filed 1999-11-16(a)(7)

Plaintiff-appellant sufficiently alleged an oral contract between him and the individual defendants and, accordingly, his second cause of action for breach of the alleged oral contract should not have been dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

CPLR 3211 permits dismissal of a counterclaim whose allegations on essential elements are unsubstantiated and conclusory.

Vail-Ballou Press, Inc. v. Tomasky · filed 1999-11-10

We find defendant’s allegations concerning malice and the lack of probable cause to be unsubstantiated and conclusory such that the claim should have been dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (see, id.; Mondello v Mondello, 161 AD2d 690, 691; see generally, Ferrara v Guardino, 164 AD2d 932).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion to dismiss, the court must assume the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations.

Negrin v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc. · filed 1999-11-15(a)(7)

Assuming the truth of the plaintiffs allegations, as we must in opposition to a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion to dismiss (see, Edmond v International Bus. Machs. Corp., 91 NY2d 949), the plaintiff has stated a cause of action based on consumer fraud (see also, B.S.L. One Owners Corp. v Key Intl. Mfg., 225 AD2d 643; Wegman’s Food Mkts. v Scrimpsher, 17 Bankr 999), and thus the defendant’s motion to dismiss the second cause of action should not have been granted.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a fraud claim can survive dismissal when the alleged wrongdoing is peculiarly within the defendants’ knowledge and the complaint and supporting affidavit sufficiently state a cause of action.

Krusch v. Affordable Housing L. L. C. · filed 1999-11-23(a)(7)

Under the circumstances at bar, where the particulars of the alleged wrongdoing are peculiarly within defendants’ knowledge, plaintiffs’ complaint and supporting affidavit sufficiently stated a cause of action against defendants for fraud (see, Federal Ins. Co. v Specialty Paper Box Co., 222 AD2d 254).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court takes the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every reasonable inference.

Energy Brands, Inc. v. County of Nassau · filed 1999-11-29(a)(7)

Thus, even taking the allegations of the complaint as true and giving every reasonable inference to the plaintiff, dismissal of the complaint was warranted (see, Sanders v Winship, 57 NY2d 391; Morone v Morone, 50 NY2d 481).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a cognizable cause of action.

Maloney v. King Kullen Grocery Co. · filed 1999-11-29(a)(7)

...failed to state any cognizable cause of action and was properly dismissed by the Supreme Court (see, Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275; Sotomayor v Kaufman, Malchman, Kirby & Squire, 252 AD2d 554; CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

A breach of contract complaint that fails to identify the contractual provisions allegedly breached fails to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

Gordon & Breach Science Publishers, Inc. v. New York Systems Exchange, Inc. · filed 1999-12-07(a)(7)

Although defendant IBM moved pursuant to both CPLR 3211 (a) (7) and 3212 (c) to dismiss the complaint against it, the complaint was ultimately dismissed as to IBM by the motion court pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), for plaintiffs failure to state a cause of action for breach of contract. This disposition was correct since plaintiff failed in its pleading to identify the contractual provisions IBM breached (see, Bomser v Moyle, 89 AD2d 202, 203) and, as plaintiff concedes, the license agreements between the parties do not require IBM to provide plaintiff with the upgrades it seeks free of charge.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a cause of action stated by the complaint should not be dismissed.

Kayson Communications v. NYNEX Corp. · filed 1999-12-20(a)(7)

The complaint stated a cause of action to recover damages for intentional interference with contract (see, Lama Holding Co. v Smith Barney, 88 NY2d 413; Foster v Churchill, 87 NY2d 744; WMW Mach. Co. v Koerber AG., 240 AD2d 400). Therefore, the Supreme Court erred when it dismissed that cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must liberally construe the pleading.

D'Angelo v. Schlem · filed 1999-12-27(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a pleading for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is to be liberally construed.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the allegations every favorable inference.

Fred Tuck & Co. v. Bronxville Properties, Inc. · filed 1999-12-27(a)(7)

It is well settled that on a motion to dismiss a pleading for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is to be liberally construed, accepting all the facts alleged therein to be true, and according the allegations the benefit of every possible favorable inference to determine whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83; EECP Ctrs. v Vasomedical, Inc., 265 AD2d 372).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff; solid, nonconclusory allegations can sustain the claim.

Renzler v. D. F. White, Inc. · filed 1999-12-27(a)(7)

When viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, “it cannot be said that the complaint ‘is totally devoid of solid, nonconclusory allegations’ ” regarding the individual appellants’ use of the corporation to evade the corporation’s obligations (Sequa Corp. v Christopher, 176 AD2d 498, quoting Perez v One Clark St. Hous. Corp., 108 AD2d 844, 845).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Rhode v. Port Washington Cinema Corp. · filed 1999-12-27(a)(7)

Accepting the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the court must determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Morone v Morone, 50 NY2d 481, 484; Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 634).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the pleading is construed liberally, its alleged facts are accepted as true, and its allegations receive every favorable inference.

Taverna v. Microchip Technology, Inc. · filed 2000-01-24(a)(7)

It is well settled that on a motion to dismiss a pleading for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is to be liberally construed, accepting all the facts alleged therein to be true and according the allegations the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see, Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

CBS Corp. v. Dumsday · filed 2000-01-25(a)(7)

In evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court is required to accept the allegations of the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court assumes the pleaded facts are true and asks whether they fit a cognizable legal theory.

Wilt v. Brunswick Plaza L. L. C. · filed 2000-01-26(a)(7)

However, motions to dismiss are ill-suited to inquiring into factual and legal questions such as whether the movant has a defense (Unadilla Silo Co. v Ernst & Young, 234 AD2d 754) because the court’s sole inquiry on such motions is whether the facts as alleged in the complaint fit within a cognizable legal theory (Cron v Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362, 366).

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, the court accepts the nonmovant’s alleged facts as true.

Missionary Sisters of the Sacred Heart, Inc. v. Dowling · filed 1999-11-29

The standard of review on a motion to dismiss requires this court to accept the facts as alleged by petitioner to be true.

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, the pleading is liberally construed.

IHC Services, Inc. v. Product Safety Management, Inc. · filed 2000-01-31

It is well settled that on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the pleading is to be liberally construed.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits a petition that states a cause of action on its face to survive a preanswer motion to dismiss.

Nowlin v. Schriver · filed 2000-02-03(a)(7)

Contrary to Supreme Court’s ruling, we find that the petition on its face states a cause of action sufficient to survive respondents’ preanswer motion to dismiss (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).