N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-3

Pointing out an alleged violation of a coworker’s union contract, without more, is not protected whistleblowing under CEPA.

HELLER VS. MIDDLESEX COUNTY COLLEGE (L-7433-15, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-10-29(c)

Under the circumstances as alleged by plaintiff, pointing out such a violation of a union contract does not constitute whistleblower activity protected by CEPA.

An employee’s letter to a prosecutor questioning whether the employer’s conduct violates law or public policy can qualify as whistleblowing under § 34:19-3(a)(1).

ANTHONY P. FALCO, SR. VS. DAWN ZIMMER (L-0369-16, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-01-07(a)(1)

Falco's letter to the prosecutor was a whistleblowing activity under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a)(1).

Section 34:19-3(c) requires evidence that the employee engaged in protected whistleblowing activity; an unsupported claim of involvement in an audit does not establish a prima facie claim.

BRODOWSKI VS. HUDSON COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE (L-2418-16, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-01-08(c)

As such, we conclude plaintiff met the first two prongs of CEPA with regard to his activities regarding the custodial and MAST contracts, but he did not establish a prima facie case as to the audited contracts.

Section 34:19-3 does not protect an employee's report of a testing protocol breach when the protocols have no force of law.

STEINHAUER-KULA VS. MILLVILLE BOARD OF EDUCATION (L-0348-17, CUMBERLAND COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-02-23(a)(1)

She identified no law, rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law incorporating the PARCC testing protocols.

Section 34:19-3(c) requires whistle-blowing activity; protesting one’s own suspension for misconduct is insufficient.

TRIOLA v. AFSCME NEW JERSEY COUNCIL 63 · filed 2020-12-11(c)

Finally, Plaintiff has failed to plead whistle-blowing activity. ... Plaintiff simply alleges she protested her suspension for her misconduct. That is not enough.

Section 34:19-3(a) does not require specific words when an employee communicates a reasonable belief of illegal activity to a supervisor.

SERENA v. W.J. DEUTSCH & SONS, LTD. (L-1968-18, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-08-29(a)

CEPA does not require any magic words in communicating an employee’s reasonable belief of illegal activity.

Section 34:19-3 does not protect complaints about a contractor's work when the employee makes them as part of her job and does not tie them to alleged illegality or a violation of public policy.

MELODY N. VILLANUEVA-ARROYO VS. HOUSING A-3896-19 AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF PASSAIC (L-0974-15, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEW · filed 2021-06-03(a), (c)

Given this testimony, and from a review of the record, plaintiff's communications were for the purpose of doing her diligence, rather in objection to SAAR's continuation, which is insufficient under the case law. Young, 275 N.J. Super. at 236-37. Such claims were not expressly tied to any allegation of illegality or any violation of public policy.

Complaints limited to an employee's personal job disputes and perceived unfair discipline do not constitute protected whistle-blowing activity.

DOLINSKI v. BOROUGH OF WATCHUNG (L-1080-19, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-07-08(a)(1)

As noted above, plaintiff's complaints addressed his personal job disputes with Cina and the WPD. ... Because we conclude plaintiff did not engage in any whistle-blowing activity, we need not address whether he suffered any adverse employment action.

Section 34:19-3(b) applies when an employee provides information or testimony to a public body conducting an investigation into a violation of law, rule or regulation.

POULOS VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY (L-2263-18. MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-08-23(b)

Subsection "b" does not apply because plaintiff did not claim he provided "information to, or testifie[d] before, any public body conducting an investigation" about a violation of a law, rule or regulation.

Section 34:19-3(a) requires an employee to disclose suspected unlawful conduct to a supervisor or public body; an employee who makes no such disclosure cannot establish a claim under that provision.

SEPULVEDA v. TOWNSHIP OF NORTH BERGEN (L-3325-18, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-03-14(a)

As such, we agree with the court that Sepulveda's CEPA claims fail because she did not make the requisite disclosure under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a). As noted, however, plaintiff DeLeon formally reported the July 31, 2017 incident to his supervisor, Deputy Chief Prina, via WhenToWork, thereby satisfying N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a) and the second prong under Lippman.

Section 34:19-3 does not protect reports of misconduct by a third party unless the alleged facts establish that the third party acted on the employer’s behalf or in its interest.

ILLIANO v. WAYNE BOARD OF EDUCATION · filed 2022-09-30

It is well-established that CEPA’s protection does not extend to reports alleging the misconduct of non-employers.

Section 34:19-3(a) protects an employee who reports reasonably suspected unlawful conduct from retaliation; reassignment, removal of a duty weapon, a required psychological evaluation, and lost overtime can plausibly support a claim.

CAPPEL v. COUNTY OF ESSEX · filed 2023-12-21(a)

Plaintiff further alleges that after submitting the 151, he was reassigned, asked to surrender his duty weapon, required to attend a psychological evaluation, and could no longer work overtime. ... At this juncture, such allegations are sufficient to state a claim.

Section 34:19-3(a)(1) supports a retaliation claim when an employee reports a reasonably believed legal violation to a supervisor and is terminated a few weeks later.

BLOUNT v. TD BANK NA · filed 2023-07-19(a)(1)

Here, the Court finds little difficulty in concluding that Plaintiff has adequately stated a CEPA claim against Carroll and, by extension, TD. Plaintiff alleges that she reported to Carroll what she believed to be Lindner’s violation of Regulation Z of the Truth in Lending Act and Carroll terminated Plaintiff a few weeks later.

Section 34:19-3(c) does not protect an employee's refusal to follow a supervisor's instruction when the refusal is merely a workplace disagreement rather than whistle-blowing activity.

Lewitt v. Township of Gloucester · filed 2024-03-15(c)

Plaintiff has not satisfied CEPA's second prong. He fails to show he "blew the whistle" that O'Lano ordered him to violate the law. As the judge correctly determined, plaintiff's refusal to change his report is merely a labor disagreement with a superior, not whistle-blowing activity.

Section 34:19-3(c) requires a plaintiff to identify complaints with enough specificity to establish protected whistleblowing activity.

Azanedo v. Alaris Health at Castle Hill · filed 2024-04-23(c)

Plaintiff's lack of specificity is fatal to the requirement under prong two that she proffer a prima facie showing of a complaint falling within the CEPA statute.

Section 34:19-3(a)(1) permits a whistleblower claim based on an employee’s disclosure to a supervisor of an alleged misrepresentation to an investor; warnings that financial projections were inaccurate can sufficiently plead that activity.

FREEDMAN v. BAYADA HOME HEALTH CARE, INC. · filed 2024-05-07(a)(1)

Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to Relator, the PTAC demonstrates that Relator disclosed to his supervisor an alleged misrepresentation to the investor MUSC, advising in multiple emails that he believed the projections that were to be provided to the investor were inaccurate. Accepting these allegations as true, there is enough to establish whistleblower activity here to satisfy the Rule 12(b)(6) standard.

Section 34:19-3(a)(2) does not cover a report of alleged deception directed at a borrower’s reported employer, because that employer is outside the provision’s listed categories of potential fraud victims.

DAMIANI v. CMG MORTGAGE, INC. · filed 2024-05-28(a)(2)

The allegation that Connor misrepresented her identity to a borrower’s reported employer, even if accepted as true, does not constitute fraud to a shareholder, investor, client, patient, customer, employee, former employee, retiree or pensioner of the employer or any governmental entity as the borrower’s reported employer does not fall under any of these categories. As such, Plaintiff cannot establish a substantial nexus between the reported behavior and fraudulent conduct as contemplated by CEPA.

Section 34:19-3(c) does not protect an officer's enforcement of the law against third parties when the officer did not object to or refuse to participate in an employer activity, policy, or practice.

Cummis v. Township of Maplewood · filed 2024-10-18(c)

The record lacks evidence the township or its police department had a policy or other form of directive, requiring police to refrain from enforcing the law in circumstances like the July 2016 incident. Therefore, there could be no retaliation by defendants where protected activity did not occur.

Section 34:19-3(c) protects an employee who objects to or refuses to participate in activity the employee reasonably believes violates the law, is criminal, or violates a clear mandate of public policy; reporting the activity to someone is not required.

Caruso v. Borough of Haddonfield · filed 2024-12-11(c)

In its assessment of plaintiff's claims and evidence, the motion court applied the wrong standard under CEPA. The court analyzed the viability of plaintiff's claims based on whether plaintiff had "reported to somebody what he believed to be illegal or unethical workplace conduct." But that standard applies to a claim asserted under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a), and before the motion court plaintiff asserted his CEPA claims under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c), arguing that he had engaged in whistleblowing activity by objecting to and refusing to participate in activities he claimed he reasonably believed violated the law, were criminal, or violated a clear mandate of public policy.

Section 34:19-3(c) covers an employee's report to a supervisor of conduct the employee reasonably believes violates a law, rule, or regulation.

Jones v. the Mentor Network · filed 2025-04-08(c)

Here, plaintiff met the first and second prongs of CEPA because she performed whistleblowing activity by reporting the conduct she believed to be a violation of the law, rule or regulations to Delgado.

Section 34:19-3(a) does not protect a report of possible future staffing problems without a reasonable belief that the employer’s conduct violates a staffing mandate.

Nielsen v. County of Cape May · filed 2026-01-27(a)

However, Nielsen has failed to demonstrate a material fact supporting her reasonable belief that defendants' "conduct was violating" any staffing mandates.

A claim based on an objection under subsection (c) must plead enough detail about the objection and its substance to show protected whistle-blowing activity.

NORIEGA v. THE CITY OF JERSEY CITY · filed 2025-09-23(c)

Plaintiff, however, fails to plead a whistle-blowing activity under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3. ... Absent are the “date, time, or location” of Plaintiff’s objection, as well as the content of Plaintiff's communications to Metro.

Section 34:19-3(c) protects an employee’s report of alleged excessive force against an inmate as whistleblowing activity.

Nielsen v. County of Cape May · filed 2026-06-25(c)

We agree plaintiff's report concerning Officer McGonagle's alleged use of excessive force is protected conduct under CEPA.

Section 34:19-3(a) protects employees who disclose information to a supervisor or a public body.

Rost v. Pfizer, Inc. · filed 2010-11-17(a)

In fact, CEPA protects employees who disclose information “to a supervisor or to a public body.” N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a).

Section 34:19-3 protects employees who disclose or object to an employer practice they reasonably believe violates the law; complaints to a supervisor about unpaid overtime can qualify.

RUSSELL VS. THE GIFT GROUP, INC. (L-6264-19, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-12-06(a), (c)

Protected whistle-blowing activities include "disclos[ing] to a supervisor . . . an activity, policy or practice of the employer . . . the employee reasonably believes . . . is in violation of a law" and objecting to "any activity, policy or practice which the employee reasonably believes . . . is in violation of a law ." N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a) and (c). ... Plaintiff made a series ... of verbal complaints to her supervisor concerning defendants' purported wage law violation and was terminated shortly thereafter. Viewing plaintiff's proofs "indulgently" as we are required to do and limiting our inquiry to whether plaintiff presented a prima facie case satisfying all elements of the cause of action, Heimbach, 229 N.J. Super. at 20, we are satisfied the judge erred in dismissing plaintiff's CEPA claim.

Section 34:19-3(c) protects employees who object to or refuse to participate in conduct they reasonably believe violates a law, rule, or regulation.

CARMICHAEL v. THOMSON · filed 2023-02-10(c)

Relevantly, under CEPA an employer may not retaliate against an employee who objects or refuses to participate in an activity, policy, or practice that the employee reasonably believes violates a law, rule, or regulation. N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c).

Section 34:19-3(c) requires protected whistle-blowing to concern conduct with public ramifications, beyond a private employment dispute.

SPECHT v. COUNTY OF HUDSON · filed 2025-09-08(c)

To qualify as protected “whistle-blowing” under the section of CEPA the Plaintiff invokes, see Complaint ¶ 21 (citing N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c)), “the complained of activity must have public ramifications, and . . . the dispute between employer and employee must be more than a private disagreement.” Maw v. Adv. Clinical Comms., Inc., 179 N.J. 439, 445 (2004). ... In a nutshell: the September 24 letter does not count as “whistle-blowing” under CEPA.

Section 34:19-3 protects an employee who objects to suspected unsafe practices and refuses to participate in them; identifying hazards to the employer and taking action to stop the practices can plead protected whistleblowing.

KEATON v. ARGO TURBOSERVE CORPORATION · filed 2021-08-31(c)

However, here, Plaintiff alleges facts suggesting that he went beyond merely questioning or disagreeing with ATC’s conduct. He allegedly identified and explained the hazardous conditions at ATC’s subsidiary to the Board of Directors (TAC ¶ 37–38), advised them that a larger space was necessary (id.), and refused to participate in the allegedly unsafe practices by leasing a larger space for the ATC subsidiary (id. ¶ 39).

Section 34:19-3 does not treat a routine internal dispute over a religious exemption as protected whistleblowing activity.

SAQA v. FACTORY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY · filed 2024-03-05(a), (c)

Since subsection (b) is plainly inapplicable, Plaintiff must meet the conditions of subsection (a) or (c) in order to satisfy the statutory elements. However, Plaintiff cannot meet these conditions on the current allegations. As discussed, Plaintiff and counsel merely expressed a legal disagreement with Defendant as to whether a religious exemption was warranted under the law.

Section 34:19-3(c) protects an employee who objects to employer conduct the employee reasonably believes violates a law or a clear mandate of public policy.

ZEQO v. SELCO MANUFACTURING CORP. · filed 2024-05-13(c)

Rather, Plaintiff’s December 30, 2020 text was an objection to how Hutchinson allegedly failed to apply Executive Order 192 and the internal Selco COVID-19 policies to himself while Hutchinson was “exhibiting COVID-19 symptoms.” (ECF 65, Pl. Opp. at 6-7; see ECF 65-1, Pl. Opp. SOMF ¶¶ 159-63.)

Section 34:19-3 protects employees who object to coworkers’ illegal or fraudulent conduct, even without employer complicity or a separate showing that the conduct implicates the public interest.

Nettis v. Levitt · filed 2001-02-22(c)

Neither ground put forward by the district court supports dismissal of appellant’s CEPA claim. First, the New Jersey Supreme Court has now firmly established that CEPA permits claims for retaliation based on an employee’s objections to co-workers’ illegal or fraudulent conduct, even if his employer is not complied in that conduct. ... Second, New Jersey’s highest court has also recently held that, when an employee claims retaliation for objecting to illegal or fraudulent practices, the employee need make no separate showing that “the complained-about activities implicate the public interest.”

Section 34:19-3(c) can protect an employee who objects to a co-worker’s conduct reasonably believed to violate the law; the employer need not have committed the misconduct itself.

LEVERETT v. WILLIAMS-SONOMA DIRECT, INC. · filed 2023-12-30(c)

Contrary to Defendant’s arguments, however, Plaintiff need not allege that Defendant itself engaged in the conduct violating law or public policy. The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-3(c) the alleged misconduct of a co-worker may give rise to a CEPA claim.

Section 34:19-3(a) and (c)(1) require the reported activity to be attributable to the employer; conduct by employees that solely harms the employer does not qualify.

Roach v. TRW, INC. · filed 1999-05-04(a), (c)(1)

We are persuaded that an employee's activities in conflict solely with the employer's interests cannot constitute an activity, policy or practice of the employer within the meaning of section 3a. ... More importantly, our analysis regarding section 3a applies to 3c(1). The "activity policy or practice," section 3c(1), must be that of the employer.

Section 34:19-3(b) protects employees from employer retaliation for providing information or testimony to a public body about a co-employee’s misconduct.

DeLisa v. County of Bergen · filed 2000-07-25(b)

That language clearly reflects our belief that CEPA’s protection against employer retaliation extends to employees who communicate information either to employers or public bodies concerning co-employee misconduct encompassed by N.J.S.A. 34:19-3.

Section 34:19-3(c)(2) protects an employee who reports a co-worker’s criminal conduct to law enforcement.

Schlichtig v. Inacom Corp. · filed 2003-07-08(c)(2)

Accordingly, the Court has little difficulty concluding that Schlichtig engaged in conduct protected under subsection (c)(2) when he contacted law enforcement authorities to report that one of his co-workers had been found in possession of an illegal drug.

Section 34:19-3 treats a completed suspension as an adverse employment action; a CEPA claim based on it accrues when the suspension occurs.

Ivan v. County of Middlesex · filed 2009-01-21

CEPA prohibits retaliatory action in response to whistle-blowing. ... Ivan’s cause of action accrued on the date of the “adverse employment action.” With regard to the Smoking Incident, this occurred on May 12, 2003 when she was suspended.

An unpaid suspension is an adverse employment action for a claim under § 34:19-3.

Leone v. Township of Deptford · filed 2009-04-29

With regard to whether his four-day suspension was an adverse employment action, suspensions without pay are considered a adverse employment actions.

Section 34:19-3 requires an adverse employment action for a retaliation claim; attempts to solicit complaints that do not affect an employee’s terms and conditions of employment do not qualify.

Farneski v. County of Hunterdon · filed 2013-01-09

Hurley’s attempt to solicit complaints against Farneski do not constitute adverse employment actions within the meaning of CEPA.

Section 34:19-3 permits a retaliation claim when an illegitimate investigation amounts to an adverse employment action.

CHESLER v. CITY OF JERSEY CITY · filed 2020-09-29

Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, their allegations lead to a reasonable inference that Sjosward facilitated an illegitimate investigation that amounted to an adverse employment action.

Section 34:19-3 requires an adverse employment action for a CEPA retaliation claim; an Internal Affairs investigation alone does not qualify.

PATTI v. IBARRONDO · filed 2023-08-01

However, investigations by Internal Affairs do not qualify as adverse actions under CEPA.

When discharge is the alleged retaliation under § 34:19-3, the retaliatory act occurs at actual discharge, not when the employee receives advance notice.

Keelan v. Bell Communications · filed 1996-04-11

We therefore find no retaliatory action until plaintiff's actual discharge. ... This is particularly so in view of the language of N.J.S.A 34:19-3, which focuses upon discharge as a retaliatory act.

Section 34:19-3 requires a cognizable retaliatory employment injury; the alleged harassment did not support a CEPA claim where the employee alleged no lasting prejudice.

Kadetsky v. Egg Harbor Township Board of Education · filed 2000-01-20

I need not reach the question of what level of conduct less than “discharge, suspension or demotion” constitutes an “adverse employment action,” since, in this case, Kadetsky has failed to allege that he suffers any lasting prejudice. ... Neither the parties nor this Court have located any case law suggesting that, under the facts of this case, there is a cognizable injury within the CEPA context. Accordingly, I shall grant the Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count II of the Complaint, Kadetsky’s CEPA claim.

Section 34:19-3 can cover employer conduct equivalent to an adverse employment action even without discharge, suspension, demotion, transfer, or loss of income.

Cokus v. Bristol Myers Squibb Co. · filed 2002-04-22

It is true that plaintiff experienced no discharge, suspension, demotion, transfer, or loss of income. However, employer actions that fall short of such actions, may nonetheless be the equivalent of an adverse action.

Section 34:19-3 requires retaliatory employment action; harassment, attempted suspension, and emotional distress without an adverse effect on employment do not suffice.

Borawski v. Henderson · filed 2003-06-10

Allegations of harassment are insufficient to state a claim of retaliatory action. ... Moreover, emotional distress alone does not constitute a cognizable injury under CEPA. ... We conclude that Borawski fails to allege retaliatory conduct under CEPA. Therefore, we will dismiss Count Six for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

Section 34:19-3 permits a retaliation claim when relatively minor employment actions combine into a pattern of retaliatory conduct, even without discharge, suspension, or demotion.

Nardello v. Township of Voorhees · filed 2005-04-04

CEPA prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee under certain circumstances. N.J.S.A. 34:19-3. ... While defendant contests that these actions were taken in retaliation for plaintiff's conduct, and claims that plaintiff was unable to fully explain at his deposition exactly what retaliatory conduct was taken against him, we are satisfied that while many of the incidents are relatively minor, plaintiff has made a prima facie case and a jury could conclude that they combine to demonstrate a pattern of retaliatory conduct that is specifically prohibited.

Section 34:19-3(a) does not treat an employee’s resignation because of unlawful wage underpayment alone as a constructive discharge.

Zubrycky v. ASA Apple, Inc. · filed 2005-11-04(a)

For that reason, plaintiff's claim, that he resigned because he was being underpaid in violation of the Wage and Hour laws, does not state a claim for constructive discharge under CEPA.

A promotion does not establish the adverse employment action required for a CEPA retaliation claim when it does not materially worsen the employee’s terms and conditions of employment.

TROOPER JUSTINE POSER, ETC. VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DIVISION OF STATE POLICE (L-0069-14, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-06-22

Plaintiff's grievances do not rise to the level of an actionable adverse employment action because, by all accounts, her transfer was a promotion.

Section 34:19-3 does not treat every unwelcome change in an employee’s duties as retaliatory action.

RUSSELL VS. RUTGERS (L-2607-15, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-11-29

Not every action that makes an employee unhappy constitutes an actionable retaliatory action under CEPA.

Section 34:19-3 does not treat medical leave as retaliatory action when the employee's own doctors agree the employee is unfit to work.

KANE VS. PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS (L-1292-15, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-01-31

Plaintiff's own doctors, however, agreed he was not fit to work at that time and should be on medical leave. Accordingly, we do not see how PSE&G placing plaintiff on medical leave could possibly qualify as retaliatory under the statute.

Section 34:19-3 requires an adverse employment action; assigning a teacher classes she had not taught in years does not satisfy that requirement when the reassignment is not virtually equivalent to discharge.

L.M.P. VS. HIGH POINT REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL BOARD OF EDUCATION (L-0108-16, SUSSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-05-06

Plaintiff did not meet the third requirement, adverse employment action, despite her contention that defendants assigned her to teach classes she had not taught in a number of years, because such action is not "virtually equivalent to discharge."

Section 34:19-3 requires an adverse employment action; a complaint that has no significant negative effect on an employee's terms and conditions of employment is not actionable retaliation.

FROMOSKY VS. TOWNSHIP OF LITTLE EGG HARBOR (L-0723-17, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-11-14

Here, there is no evidence demonstrating that the September 1, 2016 complaint had any effect on the terms and conditions of Buzby's or Loesch's employment, let alone a significant, negative effect.

Section 34:19-3 prohibits retaliation against a whistleblowing employee, including a retaliatory failure to promote.

BONDA VS. CITY OF ELIZABETH (L-1979-13, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-06-21

In conclusion, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial for a jury to find that McNamara, or both McNamara and Vitullo, retaliated against plaintiff by failing to promote him to fire official in violation of N.J.S.A. 34:19-3.

Section 34:19-3 requires an adverse employment action for a CEPA retaliation claim; the office relocation and gift here did not qualify.

COMET MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC VS. NICOLE WOOTEN (L-0740-14, SUSSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-02-25

We agree with the motion judge's determination that Wooten's office relocation and the gifting of "Tennessee" whiskey did not constitute adverse employment action under the CEPA.

Section 34:19-3 allows a retaliation claim to proceed when changes to an employee's duties and working conditions could amount to an adverse employment action, even without termination or demotion.

ANN FOX VS. DGMB CASINO, LLC (L-1029-16, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-08-17

Here, although plaintiff was not terminated, transferred nor demoted from her position, arguably there were a number of actions by her employer from which a jury could infer she suffered retaliatory actions. ... On this record and at this stage of the proceeding, there was a genuine issue of fact that she was subjected to an adverse employment action.

Disciplinary charges arising from reasons unrelated to an employee's protected complaint do not establish retaliation under subsection (c).

GONZALEZ VS. CITY OF NEWARK (L-2777-17, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-08-19(c)

Regarding the third prong, the substantiated disciplinary charges that resulted in plaintiff's suspensions cannot establish retaliation for plaintiff engaging in protected activity by objecting to and reporting Spencer's conduct because the disciplinary charges arose from reasons unrelated to plaintiff's complaint.

Section 34:19-3 requires an adverse employment action for a CEPA retaliation claim; removal from a temporary acting position does not constitute a demotion.

RICK RUSSO VS. CITY OF ATLANTIC CITY (L-1135-16, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-03-04

Because plaintiff was never promoted to this position, he could not be demoted from it. We are satisfied that plaintiff's removal from the Acting Chief position did not constitute an adverse employment action .

An employee claiming retaliation for objections under § 34:19-3(c) must plead an adverse employment action; yelling, belligerence, and reprimands followed by a resignation based on expected continued mistreatment do not establish constructive discharge.

MCCARTHY v. MUSCLEPHARM CORPORATION · filed 2023-01-23(c)

Instead, Plaintiff broadly alleges yelling, belligerence, and reprimands which preceded Plaintiff quitting upon her assumption that the conduct would continue. Those actions, however, do not constitute a hostile work environment or constructive discharge.

Section 34:19-3 requires an adverse employment action affecting the employee’s terms and conditions of employment; an investigation into the employee’s children’s school residency does not qualify.

Gaviria v. Board of Education of the City of Elizabeth · filed 2024-07-19

First, a school residency investigation cannot be considered an "adverse employment action" within the meaning of CEPA because it in no way affected the terms and conditions of plaintiff's employment.

Section 34:19-3 requires an adverse employment action for a CEPA retaliation claim; a change in duties without demonstrated harm does not suffice.

Ford v. Edwards · filed 2025-01-29

Even assuming plaintiff could prove she sent the email, she failed to establish she suffered any adverse employment action as a result. As Judge Allende found, plaintiff's change to a role as an executive officer did not change her rank, status as a lieutenant, salary or working hours.

Section 34:19-3(a) protects disclosures or threatened disclosures of conduct reasonably believed unlawful; a retaliation claim requires evidence of an adverse employment action causally linked to protected activity.

Robinson v. Jersey City Board of Education · filed 2025-10-31(a)

Although she alleges violations concerning sick leave payments and vendor contracts, she does not point to any proofs that she disclosed or threatened to disclose unlawful conduct, nor does she identify any specific retaliatory action taken against her as a consequence. She was not terminated, demoted, or suspended following her complaints, and she continued to receive all contractual pay and benefits while on leave. Without competent evidence of adverse action or a causal link to any protected activity, her CEPA claim cannot survive summary judgment.

A rescinded reprimand does not establish the adverse employment action required for a CEPA retaliation claim.

Tesar v. Sayreville Borough · filed 2026-02-05

However, there was no adverse employment action associated with this incident because the reprimand was subsequently rescinded. ... Because he cannot demonstrate an adverse employment action in connection with this incident, plaintiff failed to demonstrates a prima facie case under CEPA.

Section 34:19-3 treats a resignation as an adverse employment action when the employer's conduct is so intolerable that a reasonable employee would be forced to resign.

Noah v. Sparta Township Board of Education · filed 2024-12-26

Even if we accept that plaintiff was effectively barred by the administration from the high school when Danzo so informed him, such action is not so intolerable that plaintiff had no other option but to resign.

A CEPA retaliation claim can rest on constructive discharge, but that theory requires evidence that the employee resigned because of intolerable working conditions.

Chapman v. Alaris Health, LLC · filed 2025-09-29(c)

There was no jury question as to whether plaintiff was constructively discharged because she consistently and unequivocally testified she was fired.

A reassignment at the employee's request and friction with management do not constitute an adverse employment action for a CEPA retaliation claim.

Cline v. City of Paterson · filed 2026-03-25

We are satisfied neither the reassignment nor the friction or "hard time" Cline encountered with management constitutes an adverse employment action under CEPA.

Section 34:19-3 permits a suspension without pay during a period when no indictment is pending to qualify as an adverse employment action under CEPA.

Uszenski v. Brick Township Board of Education · filed 2026-02-06

Therefore, the BOE's failure to pay Uszenski for the period from February 28 to June 13, 2017, appears to qualify under element three as an adverse employment action under CEPA.

Section 34:19-3(c)(3) requires a substantial connection between the employer’s conduct and an identifiable public policy standard; a general nurse staffing provision does not supply that standard for a complaint about the absence of a Patient Care Associate.

Tinio v. Saint Joseph Regional Medical Center · filed 2016-03-25(c)(3)

This policy does not bear a substantial nexus to St. Joseph’s failure to staff a PCA on the unit. The provision does not mention PCAs, much less require PCAs to be staffed on every nursing unit. Rather, this is a vague provision regarding the staffing of nurses that provides no standard by which a deficiency can be ascertained.

Section 34:19-3(c)(3) requires a clear mandate of public policy; the CDC and Governor’s screening-testing recommendations did not establish one.

Arterbridge v. Wayfair LLC · filed 2023-05-04(c)(3)

As relevant here, CEPA bars an employer from retaliating “against an employee” for “[o]bject[ing] to, or refus[ing] to” abide by a “policy” of his employer, “which the employee reasonably believes ... is incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy concerning the public health, safety or welfare[.]” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-3(c)(3). ... But the recommendations cited by Arterbridge simply do not fill the bill.

Section 34:19-3(c) requires a CEPA plaintiff to identify the law, rule, regulation, or public policy underlying the claim.

Parks v. Magedoff · filed 2018-07-11(c)

Plaintiff’s CEPA claim fails because she has not identified the law, rule, regulation, or public policy that supports her claim.

A CEPA retaliation claim requires the employee to identify a law, rule, regulation, or clear public policy mandate closely related to the complained-of conduct.

PIERRE v. OTSUKA AMERICA PHARMACEUTICALS · filed 2024-04-19(c)(1), (c)(3)

Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege the first element of her CEPA claim, i.e., that she has not identified a law, rule, regulation, or clear mandate of public policy that she believes was violated, the Court dismisses the Complaint on this basis alone and need not reach Defendant’s alternative arguments.

Section 34:19-3(c) requires a CEPA claimant to identify a statute, regulation, rule, or public policy closely related to the conduct she challenged.

PIERRE v. OTSUKA AMERICA PHARMACEUTICALS · filed 2024-12-23(c)

As it pertains to the regulations Plaintiff provides, the Court again finds that Plaintiff has failed to point to “a statute, regulation, rule, or public policy that closely relates to the complained-of conduct” to sustain a claim under the CEPA.

An employee invoking § 34:19-3(a), (c)(1), or (c)(2) need not identify the precise law allegedly violated.

Blackburn v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 1998-04-28(a), (c)(1), (c)(2)

The court disagrees. It is well established that CEPA does not require a plaintiff to “know, to a legal certitude, the precise contours and components” of the law that has purportedly been violated.

Section 34:19-3 does not support a retaliation claim based on a teacher’s failure to respond to a student’s suicide risk when there is no evidence the teacher knew of that risk.

Williams v. PEMBERTON TP. SCHOOLS · filed 1999-07-27(a), (c)

Even if we were to agree with the premise that failing to refer a suicidal student for counseling does violate a clear mandate of public policy, it is not supported by the record. There is no indication that Ms. D. ever advised her son's teacher, at any time before her meeting with plaintiff on November 2, that her son was contemplating suicide. Plaintiff provides no factual support that such occurred. There is therefore no support for plaintiff's allegations that the boy's teacher was aware of a risk of suicide and ignored it for several months.

Section 34:19-3(c)(3) requires the employee’s objection to concern an employer practice involving a clear mandate of public policy; a personal complaint about overtime distribution does not qualify.

Cosgrove v. Cranford Bd. of Educ. · filed 2003-01-14(c)(3)

In making the threshold determination under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c)(3) of whether a plaintiff has identified "a clear mandate of public policy concerning the public health, safety or welfare or protection of the environment," the focus is on the underlying employer "activity, policy, or practice" that triggers the employee's objection or refusal to participate. The focus is not on the method by which the employee chooses to assert a grievance or complaint, which here was resolved in favor of Cosgrove's argument by a settlement. See N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c). Cosgrove's complaint concerned a personal objection to the alleged unfair distribution of overtime, not the procedure for filing complaints through his union. The alleged unfair distribution of overtime is not a practice involving a clear mandate of public policy as contemplated by the statute.

Section 34:19-3 requires an employee to identify a law, regulation, or clear public policy mandate that the employer's challenged conduct would violate; disagreement over lawful enforcement priorities does not suffice.

Schechter v. NJ DEPT. OF LAW · filed 2000-01-21(a), (c)(1), (c)(3)

Therefore, the Division's decision to assign a lower degree of priority to exclusion cases than in prior years did not violate any "law, rule or regulation" or "clear mandate of public policy," as required to maintain a cause of action under CEPA, N.J.S.A. 34:19-3.

Section 34:19-3(c)(3) requires a clear mandate of public policy with public ramifications; a private dispute over the terms of a noncompete agreement does not qualify.

Maw v. Advanced Clinical Communications, Inc. · filed 2004-05-04(c)(3)

We conclude that plaintiff's private dispute over the terms of the do-not-compete provision in her employment agreement does not implicate violation of a clear mandate of public policy as contemplated by Section 3c(3) of CEPA.

Section 34:19-3(c)(3) protects an employee who reasonably believes that adopting out a dog with a biting history instead of euthanizing it is incompatible with a clear public policy of protecting people from dangerous dogs.

Turner v. ASSOC. HUMANE SOCIETIES, INC. · filed 2007-11-30(c)(3)

We are satisfied there is proof that plaintiff had an objectively reasonable belief that AHS's decision to allow deSwart to adopt a dog that had bitten its previous owner and was supposed to be euthanized was inherently "incompatible" with New Jersey's public policy of protecting its citizens from these animals.

Section 34:19-3(c)(3) requires a plaintiff to connect the employer’s conduct to a clear mandate of public policy concerning public health, safety, or welfare; unspecified flaws in hiring are insufficient.

SPENCE-PARKER v. Delaware River and Bay Authority · filed 2009-08-21(c)(3)

Plaintiff having failed to “furnish the trial court with enough by way of proof and legal basis,” ... to tie her perception of a flaw in the DRBA’s hiring process to a threat to “public health, safety or welfare,” N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c)(3), the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs CEPA claim.

Section 34:19-3(c) requires an employee claiming retaliation to identify a law, regulation, or other authority that sets a standard for the employer’s conduct; a belief that the conduct is plainly wrong is insufficient.

SERGEANT FIRST CLASS FRANK CHIOFALO, ETC. VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY (L-0049-13, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-06-21(c)

Plaintiff has identified the violation as self-evident, that official police records should not be destroyed, and that an employee should not be falsifying timesheets. However, plaintiff failed to articulate "an authority recognized by CEPA" that defendants have violated.

Section 34:19-3(c) requires an employee claiming retaliation for objecting to conduct contrary to public policy to identify a source of law or public policy that supplies a standard for assessing the employer's conduct.

GAUGHAN VS. DEPTFORD TOWNSHIP MUNICIPAL UTILITIES AUTHORITY (L-1368-15, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-12-28(c)

Nevertheless, a plaintiff also must identify a source of law or public policy that provides a governing standard for assessing the employer's conduct. ... Plaintiff's complaint did not identify the clear mandate of public policy allegedly violated by defendant.

Section 34:19-3(c)(1) covers objections based on a reasonable belief that an employer violated a school discipline policy or law enforcement memorandum adopted under state law.

COTTO VS. NEWARK PUBLIC SCHOOLS (L-3932-10, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-03-07(c)(1)

Contrary to defendant's argument, plaintiff clearly identified a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law (the discipline policy and USM), and set forth facts that would support his objectively reasonable belief that a violation had occurred.

An employee alleging retaliation for reporting a reasonably believed statutory violation need not also allege a violation of public policy.

COSTA VS. TOTAL REHAB & FITNESS (L-3548-14, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-06-05(a)(1)

Contrary to the trial court's apparent understanding, a plaintiff need not allege a violation of both a statute and a matter of public policy to state a CEPA cause of action.

For a claim based on reasonably believed criminal or fraudulent conduct, a plaintiff need not always pinpoint a statutory provision, but must provide the legal source if the defendant challenges it.

Sergeant First Class Frank Chiofalo v. State of New Jersey (081607)(Mercer County and Statewide) · filed 2019-07-16(c)(2)

That said, we acknowledge that there certainly are areas where conduct is so obviously criminal that one need not pinpoint a Title 2C provision to avoid dismissal of a CEPA claim. However, even in those areas, if a defendant questions the source of law relied on by the plaintiff, that source should be provided by the plaintiff.

An employee who reasonably believes public funds were misused need not identify a specific law prohibiting the conduct to claim protection for objecting to it.

MEG YATAURO VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY (L-1901-14, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-12-02(c)(3)

It was not necessary for plaintiff to cite an actual law that Bolden violated because reasonable persons would agree that public officials should not misuse public funds.

A claim under § 34:19-3(c) must plead facts showing a substantial nexus between the conduct the employee opposed and the law or public policy allegedly violated.

SAFONOF v. DIRECTSAT USA · filed 2020-03-31(c)

Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails because it lacks factual specificity to establish a substantial nexus between the alleged conduct and the supposed violations.

Section 34:19-3(a)(1) and (c)(1) require identification of a statute, regulation, or rule closely related to the conduct the employee challenged.

BERDZIK v. PHYSICIANS ENDOSCOPY, LLC · filed 2021-07-30(a)(1), (c)(1)

Plaintiff’s claim pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a)(1) and (c)(1) fails because he has not “identif[ied] [any] statute, regulation, [or] rule . . . that closely relates to the complained-of conduct.” Chiofalo, 238 N.J. at 541.

Section 34:19-3(c)(3) requires an identifiable public policy standard closely related to the conduct the employee challenges; broad goals of enforcing the law and protecting confrontation rights are insufficient.

KIRCHNER VS. CITY OF VINELAND (L-0318-17, CUMBERLAND COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-12-30(c)(3)

Applying those standards here makes plain the generalized public policies identified by the trial court of "enforcing the law for the protection of the public" and "upholding the rights of an accused to confront witnesses against them," were insufficiently specific to constitute a standard by which the Department's or Prosecutor's Office's conduct can be measured in this case.

Section 34:19-3 requires a plaintiff to identify the law, regulation, or clear mandate of public policy that the plaintiff reasonably believed the employer violated.

PASKAS v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC. · filed 2023-12-29(a)(1), (c)(1), (c)(3)

The first prong of a CEPA claim requires the plaintiff to identify a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy that the plaintiff reasonably believes the defendant violated.

Section 34:19-3(c)(3) permits a school safety policy to support a retaliation claim when the employee or the court identifies a law, rule, policy or regulation expressing that mandate.

Eisenstein v. Atlantic City Board of Education · filed 2024-10-22(c)(3)

In light of this clear mandate of public policy, either plaintiff or the court would need to identify the law, rule, policy or regulation containing the relevant mandate of public policy concerning school safety at issue. Therefore, we conclude the trial court erred in finding that, as a matter of law, plaintiff had not identified public policy "concerning the public health, safety or welfare or protection of the [school] environment" and dismissing plaintiff's complaint. N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c)(3).

Section 34:19-3(a)(1) requires a predicate law or rule that can be violated; a statute authorizing discretionary waivers cannot serve as that predicate.

Sloan v. Cape Regional Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2026-02-18(a)(1)

Although Section 1135 was clearly identified by plaintiff in his summary judgment brief, it is not a "law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law" that may be violated. See N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a)(1). It simply grants the Secretary discretion to relieve hospitals from the duty to comply with other regulations. Section 1135 cannot serve as the law or public policy to support plaintiff's CEPA claim.

A municipality may be liable under Section 34:19-3(a)(1) for an employee’s retaliation through respondeat superior, but that liability requires an employee to have retaliated.

Goldrich v. City of Jersey City · filed 2020-02-25(a)(1)

We come out differently, as the City could have been found liable for the acts of Shea under a theory of respondeat superior. ... Here, for the City to be liable under a theory of respondeat superior, its employee must have retaliated against Goldrich for reporting the alleged mishandling of funds.

Section 34:19-3(a) protects an employee who reports misconduct by another employer with which the employee’s employer has a business relationship, but liability for retaliation rests with the employee’s direct employer.

DaBronzo v. Roche Vitamins, Inc. · filed 2002-10-17(a)

Although CEPA was amended to protect against retaliation when an employee “blows the whistle” on “another employer” with whom the employee’s employer has a business relationship, this amendment renders only the employee’s direct employer liable. The amendment does not cast liability upon the other employer with whom the employees’ employer has a business relationship.

Section 34:19-3 permits individual liability for retaliation by an employee acting on behalf of an employer.

Maw v. Adv. Clinical Communications · filed 2003-04-16

Under CEPA, an "employer" is liable for retaliation against an employee. N.J.S.A. 34:19-3. ... A fair reading of the statute therefore makes both the employer and the employee subject to CEPA's prohibitions.

Section 34:19-3 prohibits retaliation by an employee’s employer; a union is not liable merely for failing to remedy the employer’s conduct.

Figueroa v. City of Camden · filed 2008-10-02

However, CEPA only prohibits retaliatory action against employees by their employers.

Under CEPA’s retaliation provision, a municipality may be held liable for retaliation by its supervisory employees.

PARSIPPANY-TROY HILLS POLICE CAPTAIN JAMES CARIFI VS. TOWNSHIP OF PARSIPPANY- TROY HILLS (L-2938-11, MORRIS COUNTY AND S · filed 2020-12-14

An appropriate response would have informed the jury that, in this case, the Township includes the supervisory employees within the Parsippany Police Department; from the trial testimony, the supervisory employees would include the police chief, the deputy chief, and the four captains underneath them.

Section 34:19-3 does not impose retaliation liability on retired former employees who lacked authority to take adverse employment action and were not authorized to act for the employer.

BEU v. CITY OF VINELAND · filed 2021-03-08

The New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”) prohibits employers from taking any retaliatory action against an employee who reports on suspected illegal activity. N.J.S.A. 34:19-3. ... Therefore, the Court is not inclined to hold that Maslanich and Donoflio can be liable under a statute that is intended to encompass employers’ actions. Finding otherwise would contravene the intent of CEPA, which is to protect employees from adverse actions by their employers. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants Maslanich and Donoflio cannot be subjected to CEPA liability.

Section 34:19-3(c) can support a retaliation claim against an indirect supervisor who personally participates in the retaliation.

CURLEY v. MERCURY INSURANCE SERVICES, LLC · filed 2022-02-10(c)

Importantly, relevant here, individual liability is not reserved solely for those who were direct supervisors or directly took the retaliatory action; CEPA liability can also be imposed on individuals, such as indirect supervisors and co-workers who allegedly participated in the retaliatory scheme.

Section 34:19-3 requires an individual defendant to take an adverse employment action because of the plaintiff’s whistleblowing for individual CEPA liability.

DO NOT FILE IN THIS CASE TRANSFERRED TO CAMDEN NEW CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:22-cv-2370 · filed 2022-08-09

Indeed, there is no liability under CEPA for any employee or supervisor unless the plaintiff can show that the individual defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff because of whistleblowing conduct.

Section 34:19-3 prohibits employer retaliation against an employee who reports suspected illegal activity; a union that does not employ the worker is not liable under that prohibition.

AUSTINO v. CITY OF VINELAND · filed 2020-09-02

The CEPA prohibits an employer from taking any retaliatory action2 against an employee who reports suspected illegal activity. See N.J.S.A. § 34:19–3. ... It is clear that plaintiff is not an employee of the PBA. ... The Court will grant the motion of defendant PBA to dismiss plaintiff’s claim under the CEPA.

Section 34:19-3 protects employees from retaliation, and whether a claimant is an employee under CEPA requires a factual analysis of multiple factors.

GREENMAN v. CITY OF HACKENSACK · filed 2020-09-12(a)

As these multiple factors make clear, the analysis for determining whether an individual is an employee for CEPA and NJLAD purposes is inherently factual.

Section 34:19-3 protects individual employees from retaliation; a corporation cannot bring a CEPA claim.

JD GLOBAL SALES, INC. v. JEM D INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS, LP · filed 2022-08-03

Because the statute defines an “employee” as “any individual,” JD Global lacks standing to pursue a CEPA claim.

Section 34:19-3 permits an individual employee or independent contractor to bring a CEPA claim against their employer; a corporation cannot bring the claim.

JD GLOBAL SALES, INC. v. JEM D INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS, LP · filed 2023-07-17

Because D’Amato is not an employee or independent contractor of Defendants, he cannot bring a CEPA cause of action against Defendants. The contractual relationship was between Red Sun Farms and JD Global, a corporation that, alone, also cannot bring a CEPA cause of action against Defendants.

Section 34:19-3 protects in-house attorneys from retaliation for covered conduct when they seek money damages and fees.

Parker v. M & T CHEMICALS, INC. · filed 1989-10-30

We conclude that our State's Conscientious Employee Protection Act does not, in this claim for money damages only, require an implied exception for in-house attorneys to survive a constitutional challenge.

Section 34:19-3 does not protect the Jersey City tax assessor, whose statutory job security gives him an independent position.

Casamasino v. City of Jersey City · filed 1997-09-02

Plaintiff enjoys a unique, independent status as tax assessor due to his statutorily created job security. ... Hence, we conclude that the Jersey City tax assessor is outside of CEPA’s scope.

Section 34:19-3 protects a municipal public defender who qualifies as an employee; professional independence does not prevent employee status, and courts may consider the relative nature of the work alongside the city's control.

Stomel v. City of Camden · filed 2006-03-10

N.J.S.A. 34:19-3 provides, in part, that "[a]n employer shall not take any retaliatory action against an employee" who undertakes certain protected conduct. ... Against this legal framework, we conclude that in addition to consideration of the degree of control the City exercised over plaintiff's work, the relative nature of the work test is also applicable. ... In doing so, we conclude that the character of the relationship between the City and plaintiff was that of employer-employee.

Section 34:19-3 protects covered employees from retaliation; a professional labeled an independent contractor may qualify based on employer control, economic dependence, and integration into the employer’s business.

D'Annunzio v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America · filed 2007-07-25

CEPA prohibits an employer from taking adverse employment action against any "employee" who exposes an employer's criminal, fraudulent, or corrupt activities. N.J.S.A. 34:19-3. ... When CEPA or other social legislation must be applied in the setting of a professional person or an individual otherwise providing specialized services allegedly as an independent contractor, we must look beyond the label attached to the relationship. The considerations that must come into play are three: (1) employer control; (2) the worker's economic dependence on the work relationship; and (3) the degree to which there has been a functional integration of the employer's business with that of the person doing the work at issue.

Section 34:19-3 requires a claimant to qualify as an employee; the court weighs the circumstances of the working relationship to determine whether that requirement is met.

Kelly v. County of Sussex · filed 2025-03-14

Weighing those factors qualitatively, we conclude plaintiff's factual allegations, even considering those made in his certification, are not sufficient to support a finding he was the County's employee.

Section 34:19-3 can protect an employee of a New Jersey company who lives and works in another state, subject to choice-of-law rules.

HALLIDAY v. BIOREFERENCE LABORATORIES, INC. (L-6043-17, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-08-03

Thus, subject to other choice-of-law factors, plaintiff may assert a CEPA claim even though she lived and worked for defendant in Texas.

An employee may pursue a Section 34:19-3 retaliation claim in court without first raising it in an administrative appeal.

Racanelli v. County of Passaic · filed 2010-11-10

We are therefore convinced that here, as in Hennessey, plaintiff is not barred from pursuing a CEPA claim because he elected not to raise this claim in his administrative appeal.

A claim based on improper quality of patient care requires a reasonable belief that the employer violated an applicable law, rule, regulation, declaratory ruling, or professional code of ethics governing its delivery of patient care.

Hitesman v. Bridgeway, Inc. (072466) · filed 2014-06-16(a)(1), (c)(1)

We hold that claims asserted under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a)(1) and (c)(1)’s “improper quality of patient care” provision must be premised upon a reasonable belief that the employer has violated a law, rule, regulation, declaratory ruling adopted pursuant to law, or a professional code of ethics that governs the employer and differentiates between acceptable and unacceptable conduct in the employer’s delivery of patient care.

Section 34:19-3(c) does not bar discipline for the manner, time, and place an employee expresses an objection when the discipline is unrelated to the objection’s content.

Davila v. City of Camden · filed 2014-12-11(c)

Even accepting as true that plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action as a result, plaintiffs CEPA claim fails for the same reasons as his First Amendment retaliation claims. As explained above, the evidence in the record shows that it was the manner, time, and place in which plaintiff expressed his concerns with the information gathering policy, and not for the content of his views, that subjected him to discipline.

Section 34:19-3 permits an affected coworker to bring a retaliation claim in appropriate circumstances even if the coworker did not personally engage in whistleblowing.

KELLY VS. J. CHRISTIAN BOLLWAGE (L-2647-16 AND L-3562-16, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-08-02

Coworkers of the complainant may bring their own retaliation claims against the employer in appropriate circumstances. ... This principle applies with equal force to retaliation claims under CEPA.

Section 34:19-3 does not cover a former employer’s interference with prospective employment opportunities after the employment relationship ends.

Noah Bank v. Marie Lee · filed 2025-04-01

Accordingly, interference with "prospective employment opportunities" following the end of employment does not violate CEPA.

A final judgment upholding a termination can foreclose a CEPA retaliation claim under either a pretext or mixed-motive theory when it resolves the legitimacy of that termination.

Hand v. Borough of New Providence · filed 2025-04-02

When we upheld plaintiff's termination, that extinguished any ability to assert defendants had acted for an illegitimate reason, which was fatal to the CEPA claim under the pretext and mixed-motive framework.

Section 34:19-3 does not provide relief against a person for aiding and abetting an employer’s retaliation.

RIVERS v. ULTIMATE TRANSPORTATION, LLC · filed 2025-09-30

The CEPA, however, does not include relief from those who aid and abet improper retaliatory employment actions.