N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2

The two-year limitations period ordinarily runs from discovery of a medical malpractice claim, but a claim may be dismissed if the defendant proves unusual prejudice from the delay and the plaintiff had reasonable time to sue within two years of the actionable event.

Fox v. Passaic General Hospital · filed 1976-07-09

In principle, he should ordinarily have the full statutory two years after accrual, just as he does when discovery is contemporaneous with the actionable conduct. ... We therefore are of the view, and hold, that if a defendant can establish (a) that the lapse of time between the expiration of two years after the actionable event and the date of institution of the suit "peculiarly or unusually prejudiced the defendant", id. at 276; and (b) that there was a reasonable time for plaintiff to institute his action between discovery of the cause of action and expiration of said two years after the actionable event, the cause of action may be dismissed on limitations grounds.

Section 2A:14-2's two-year limitations period is subject to the discovery rule, but a claim accrues when reasonable diligence would reveal a possible basis for it.

Drazin v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation · filed 1977-01-21

The problem here is the statute of limitations. Plaintiff seeks to add new parties defendant more than two years after her injury. See N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. ... The court concludes that in April 1974 plaintiff's cause of action if any, against the proposed defendants was not "unknowable" nor was it undiscoverable "by the exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence."

Section 2A:14-2 gives a claimant two years to file a personal injury action, and the discovery rule does not delay accrual when the claimant should have known of a possible claim at the time of injury.

Burd v. New Jersey Telephone Company · filed 1977-03-17

Consequently, we are of the view that under the circumstances of this case the trial judge erred in permitting plaintiff to invoke the discovery rule in contravention of the basic policy of repose embodied in the statute of limitations.

Section 2A:14-2 gives a plaintiff two years from accrual to bring a personal injury action; an auto accident claim accrues when the plaintiff knows of the injury, even if its permanence or the amount of medical expenses becomes known later.

Rescigno v. Picinich · filed 1977-06-30

As the No Fault Law does not contain a limitations provision in respect to tort liability, reference must be made to the general statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, as that statute has been interpreted and applied by the courts of New Jersey. ... The extent or quantum of damages may not be fully known as of the date of the occurrence, but the No Fault Law does not make such knowledge a prerequisite of the maintainability of the action itself. ... The court concludes that neither the discovery rule nor any modification of that rule should apply to preserve the actionability of the claim here in suit.

Section 2A:14-2 applies to a husband's per quod claim, and the discovery date for that claim is determined separately from his wife's.

Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Company · filed 1976-04-02

But it does not follow that its application to him, and in particular the application of the discovery rule to him, depends on the date of his wife's discovery rather than the date of his own. ... Since his action is independent, the courts of New Jersey would, we are convinced, require a separate determination of the date of his discovery of a claim against Mead Johnson.

The two-year period for a personal injury claim begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know the facts that may support a claim, without waiting for legal advice.

Burd v. New Jersey Telephone Company · filed 1978-05-23

The discovery principle modifies the conventional limitations rule only to the extent of postponing the commencement of accrual of the cause of action until plaintiff learns, or reasonably should learn, the existence of that state of facts which may equate in law with a cause of action.

Section 2A:14-2's two-year period is not delayed until an injured person receives legal or expert advice about the merits of a claim.

Silverman v. Lathrop · filed 1979-05-04

Plaintiff here essentially contends that the statute does not start to run on a relatively sophisticated claim, e.g. malpractice or products liability, until the plaintiff receives sound legal or other expert advice about the merits of the claim. This thesis was rejected by the Supreme Court in Burd and must be rejected in this case. For the foregoing reasons the survivor's tort claim is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 2A:14-2 gives a claimant who invokes the discovery rule a full two years after the claim accrues to file a personal injury suit.

Lynch v. Rubacky · filed 1981-01-27

An injured party, who is compelled though no fault of his own to invoke the discovery rule, should not lose his statutory entitlement under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 to a two-year period within which to initiate a personal injury suit.

The two-year period for personal injury actions is not extended under the discovery rule when the plaintiff knew of the injury and could have identified a potential defendant through reasonable diligence.

Townsend v. Great Adventure · filed 1981-03-25

We see no basis to extend the statute of limitations with respect to appellant's claim against Mona Goldfine on the basis of the "discovery rule." As we have noted, if appellant had been at all diligent he could have ascertained Mona Goldfine's involvement in the accident. Appellant knew he had been injured. He had such a knowledge of the material facts relating to the origin and existence of his injury that he should have realized the potential for a liability claim. His lack of diligence forecloses extension of the statute of limitations beyond two years after the accident.

Section 2A:14-2's limitations period for a personal injury claim does not begin until the plaintiff becomes aware of the injury or that another's fault caused it.

Ayers v. Jackson Tp. · filed 1983-04-05

Our "discovery" rule provides that the statute of limitations applicable to a personal injury claim will not begin to run until a plaintiff becomes aware that he has sustained injury or until he becomes aware that his damage was caused by the fault of another. Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267 (1973); Lynch v. Rubacky, 85 N.J. 65 (1982). If and when a plaintiff manifests a physical condition which could be medically attributed to the ingestion of the alleged contaminants, his cause of action will have survived the statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.

The two-year period for personal injury actions begins when the claim accrues, and the discovery rule can defer accrual for an automobile injury in appropriate circumstances.

Mancuso v. Mancuso · filed 1986-03-11

Since injuries sustained in automobile accidents are subject to the accrual principle of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, we see no conceptual impediment to their eligibility, in appropriate circumstances, for the benefit of the discovery rule.

Section 2A:14-2 does not bar a timely claim for a later-discovered injury; under the discovery rule, the claim accrues when the person learns of the injury and facts suggesting a third party may be responsible.

Ayers v. Township of Jackson · filed 1987-05-07

Nevertheless, it is appropriate that all of the parties in interest understand that neither the single controversy doctrine nor the statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, will preclude a timely-filed cause of action for damages prompted by the future "discovery" of a disease or injury related to the tortious conduct at issue in this litigation. The bar of the statute of limitations is avoided because, under New Jersey's discovery rule, the cause of action does not accrue until the victim is aware of the injury or disease and of the facts indicating that a third party is or may be responsible.

The two-year period for a personal injury action runs from accrual, which the discovery rule delays until the injured person discovers or reasonably should discover a possible actionable claim.

Vispisiano v. Ashland Chemical Co. · filed 1987-06-29

The "discovery rule" is an equitable principle by which the accrual of a cause of action is delayed "until the injured party discovers, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered[,] that he may have a basis for an actionable claim." ... The issue is whether by application of the "discovery rule" it may be said that the date on which plaintiff filed his complaint falls within the two-year period next after plaintiff's cause of action accrued, as required by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions.

The discovery rule can apply to a personal injury claim even when the injury was sudden and traumatic.

Graves v. Church & Dwight Co., Inc. · filed 1989-06-01

Nor is the shattering impact of the injury, the traumatic nature of which defendants emphasize here, a bar to the application of the discovery rule.

The two-year period for a personal injury claim can begin when the plaintiff knows the injury may be attributable to another's fault; it does not wait for a physician's proof of malpractice.

Brizak v. Needle · filed 1990-03-16

The threshold issue is whether, applying the "discovery rule," the two-year limitations period for personal injury actions ( N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2) began to run June 17, 1987, as defendant contends. ... Although we sustain the trial judge's finding that plaintiff's claim against the doctor accrued on December 5, 1983, it does not necessarily follow that defendant was unreasonable in believing that the claim would not accrue until a physician furnished proof of medical malpractice. We conclude, however, that from the state of the law when defendant made his judgment, there was no reasonable basis for his belief, and that even if there were such a basis, he was obliged to warn plaintiff that her claim could be time-barred sooner in the event his belief was wrong.

Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year period for personal injury suits; under the discovery rule, that period begins when the cause of action accrues.

Graham v. Gielchinsky · filed 1990-05-08

Turning to the cross-appeal, we conclude that the suit, which was begun on April 8, 1985, was not barred by the statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. ... In our view, the cause of action did not accrue until at least October 4, 1983, when Dr. Sarkarias removed the three wires which defendant had left within plaintiff's chest.

Section 2A:14-2 gives a plaintiff two years to bring a product liability claim, beginning when the plaintiff knows or should know of an injury that may be attributable to another’s fault.

Wade v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. · filed 1990-09-17

The two year statute of limitations of N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-2 applies to a product liability action, such as the instant case. ... The statute of limitations begins to run once an individual has knowledge or should have knowledge that he has sustained an injury which is or may be attributable to the fault of another. ... It therefore remains a question of fact whether Wade’s doctors told him of his condition before 1986 or whether Wade should have known of his condition prior to the 1987 diagnosis. Hence, summary judgment is inappropriate.

The two-year limit for personal injury actions begins when the claimant knows or should know that an injury may be attributable to another’s fault, even without knowing who is responsible.

Colarossi v. Schmid Laboratories, Inc. · filed 1993-07-15

Having been alerted to the Daikon Shield litigation, Susman’s failure to review her own medical records or make inquiry of her doctors as to the brand of IUD she used will not prevent the statute of limitations from running. Accordingly, the two-year statute of limitations in New Jersey commenced, at the latest, in 1986 when Susman learned of the Daikon Shield litigation and the wrongdoing associated with the manufacture of IUD’s.

Section 2A:14-2 gives a plaintiff two years from accrual to bring a personal injury negligence claim; expert confirmation of malpractice does not postpone accrual.

Carter v. University of Medicine & Dentistry · filed 1993-12-06

But any contention that the cause of action did not accrue until plaintiffs received confirmation from medical experts that the care rendered to Neal- was below acceptable standards is contrary to New Jersey law.

Section 2A:14-2 allows two years from accrual to file a personal injury claim; a factual dispute about when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known the facts supporting the claim precludes summary judgment on timeliness.

Diaz v. Johnson Matthey, Inc. · filed 1994-11-18

Defendants also argue that plaintiffs failed to file their claims within the statutory time limit of two years from accrual of the cause of action. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. ... There is a clear factual dispute as to when Diaz knew or reasonably should have known the facts on which his cause of action is based, and summary judgment is therefore inappropriate.

The two-year limitations period is not delayed when a plaintiff knows of the injury and another person’s fault but does not know the person’s exact identity.

Cruz v. City of Camden · filed 1995-08-04

The discovery rule is inapplicable since the plaintiff knew at the time of the arrest that there was .a problem with the warrant. Indeed, this is the basis of his cause of action. Moreover, he knew or believed that his “injury”, i.e. his arrest and incarceration, was attributable to the fault of others. He simply did not know, at that time, the exact identities of all allegedly responsible parties.

Section 2A:14-2 bars an informed consent claim when the patient knew or reasonably should have known of the injury and its connection to the physician's conduct more than two years before filing.

Bennett v. Surgidev Corp. · filed 1998-05-15

Although plaintiff may not have learned until December 1989 or January 1990 that defendant implanted a defective lens, she certainly was aware as early as September 1982 that her cataract surgery which implanted a lens which was "not perfected" was the cause of her continuous ophthalmological difficulties. Therefore, plaintiff's complaint, filed July 15, 1991, was time-barred, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, and was properly dismissed.

The two-year period for personal-injury claims begins when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know facts suggesting that another's fault caused her injury, even if she does not yet know the legal theory.

Baird v. American Medical Optics · filed 1998-07-15

Thus, the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff is aware, or reasonably should be aware, of facts indicating that she has been injured through the fault of another, not when a lawyer advises her that the facts give rise to a legal cause of action.

The two-year limit for personal injury actions runs once a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know facts suggesting an actionable claim; an exact medical diagnosis is unnecessary.

Lapka v. Porter Hayden Co. · filed 2000-02-24

We hold that plaintiffs' suit is time-barred by the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 and that the discovery rule does not operate on these facts to delay the accrual of the cause of action.

Section 2A:14-2 gives a plaintiff two years from accrual to file a malpractice action; under the discovery rule, a claim does not accrue until the plaintiff knows of the injury and that another was at fault.

Caravaggio v. D'AGOSTINI · filed 2001-01-22

N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 gives a plaintiff a two year period from the accrual of his or her claim in which to file a malpractice action. ... When a plaintiff's claim falls within the latter class her cause of action does not accrue until she has knowledge of the injury and that such injury is the fault of another.

Section 2A:14-2 gives a plaintiff two years to bring a medical malpractice action, with accrual postponed while the plaintiff reasonably remains unaware of the injury or another's fault.

Troum v. Newark Beth Israel Med. Ctr. · filed 2001-03-05

Medical malpractice actions must be commenced within two years of the alleged negligence. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. However, the discovery doctrine "postpone[s] the accrual of a cause of action" so long as a party reasonably is unaware either that he has been injured, or that the injury is due to the fault or neglect of an identifiable individual or entity.

Section 2A:14-2 requires personal injury claims to be filed within two years of accrual; under the discovery rule, accrual may be delayed until the injured person discovers or reasonably should discover a possible claim.

Yarchak v. Trek Bicycle Corp. · filed 2002-06-25

Under the discovery rule, the accrual of a cause of action is delayed, in appropriate circumstances, until the injured party actually discovers, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence reasonably should have discovered, that he may have a basis for an actionable claim.

The discovery rule tolls Section 2A:14-2's two-year medical malpractice limitations period when a plaintiff reasonably remains unaware of a provider's possible fault despite diligent investigation and tolling does not unfairly prejudice the provider.

Guichardo v. Rubinfeld · filed 2003-07-16

We must decide whether the discovery rule tolls the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, to preserve plaintiff's action against Dr. DeLisi. ... In view of plaintiff's reasonable reliance on the expert advice she received prior to consulting with Dr. Hetherington, as well as the absence of undue prejudice to Dr. DeLisi, we conclude that the discovery rule applies to preserve plaintiff's claim.

Section 2A:14-2 gives plaintiffs two years to bring a personal injury products liability claim, measured from when they knew or reasonably should have known of an injury potentially caused by another.

Ward v. Arm & Hammer · filed 2004-10-21

In addition to Plaintiffs failure to state a claim, the complaint must be dismissed as untimely under the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury products liability claims. ... Therefore, Plaintiffs actual time of discovery of his alleged basis for this action is immaterial, and the lawsuit was therefore time-barred.

Personal injury claims must be filed within two years of accrual; when the discovery rule may delay accrual of an emotional distress claim, a hearing is required to determine the accrual date.

Maldonado v. Leeds · filed 2005-02-03

With respect to the statute of limitations, we are persuaded that a Lopez [2] hearing is mandated to determine when plaintiff discovered that she suffered a compensable injury. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 requires that a personal injury claim be brought within two years of the accrual of the cause of action.

Section 2A:14-2’s two-year limit bars medical malpractice claims when available records gave the plaintiff reason to investigate a provider’s possible liability before the period expired.

Love v. Rancocas Hospital · filed 2005-06-27

The information in the emergency department records possessed by Plaintiff prior to the depositions, however, clearly “impose[d] on plaintiff a ‘duty to act,’ that is, to investigate whether there might be a cause of action against” the nurses. ... For the reasons set for above, the Court grants the Motions to Dismiss of Benn and Slimm, on the ground that the claims against them in the Third Amended Complaint are barred by the two-year statute of limitations contained in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.

Section 2A:14-2 requires a medical malpractice action to be brought within two years after the claim accrues.

Miller v. Estate of Sperling · filed 1999-12-23

The grounds for a malpractice action were discovered in 1985; Mrs. Miller died in 1996. Since a malpractice action must be brought within two years of its accrual, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, principles of repose would be severely compromised and the defendant in this case would be prejudiced by permitting the medical malpractice action to proceed. Therefore, plaintiff's individual claims are not timely.

Section 2A:14-2 imposes a two-year limitations period on medical malpractice claims and bars a claim against a doctor added after that period when the amendment does not relate back.

Love v. Rancocas Hospital · filed 2003-07-16

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has not provided an “appropriate description sufficient for identification” of Levin, she cannot now avail herself of the discovery rule. Because her claims against Dr. Levin are therefore barred under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, the Court shall grant Dr. Levin’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 56.

Section 2A:14-2(a)’s two-year period is not delayed by the discovery rule when the injured person already knows that another’s conduct may have caused the injury.

Fahey v. Hollywood Bicycle Center, Inc. · filed 2010-07-07(a)

Here, plaintiffs were aware that another’s conduct may have caused or contributed to their injuries on July 11, 2006 – the date of the accident. Indeed, Fahey consulted a lawyer soon thereafter, indicating that he was aware of the possibility that his injuries were caused by another’s wrongdoing, rather than by happenstance or misfortune, and that he could have then filed a complaint. Accordingly, the District Court appropriately concluded that the discovery rule does not apply.

A plaintiff who plausibly alleges repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse may seek a preliminary hearing on discovery-rule tolling of Section 2A:14-2’s two-year limitations period.

Bryson v. Diocese of Camden · filed 2012-11-14

Plaintiff and Defendant agree that the causes of'actions are subject to a two-year statute of limitations under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2. ... Based on the flexible, equitable nature of the New Jersey discovery rule, as well as language in the River Dell case, the Court holds that Plaintiff should be allowed to make an argument for equitable tolling at a preliminary hearing.

The discovery rule delays accrual of a personal injury claim until a reasonable person exercising ordinary diligence could discover a basis for the claim.

J.P. v. Smith · filed 2016-03-07

Affording plaintiff the benefit of the discovery rule, we conclude that, no later than July 2013, a reasonable person, possessing plaintiff's knowledge, could have discovered a basis for a cause of action with the exercise of ordinary diligence.

Section 2A:14-2 imposes a two-year limitations period on intrusion into seclusion claims; under the discovery rule, the period begins when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have discovered the claim.

Piscopo v. Public Service Electric and Ga · filed 2016-05-25

Therefore, the district court was correct in holding that, at the latest, the limitations period on his claim began to ... run in July 2010. Because Piscopo filed more than two years after that date, his claim is time-barred.

Learning from a lawyer that one can sue does not by itself delay the two-year medical negligence limitations period under subsection (a).

Worthy v. Kennedy Health System · filed 2016-06-22(a)

She maintains a material factual dispute exists whether the two-year statute of limitations for medical negligence cases, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a), was tolled because she did not discover the right to legal recourse until she spoke to counsel on August 6, 2008. We disagree. ... As a result, we conclude the discovery rule does not apply.

A negligent infliction of emotional distress claim accrues when the plaintiff knows of the injury and knows or should know of an actionable claim; the discovery rule does not postpone accrual in those circumstances.

JOSEPH D. MILLS VS. DR. RICHARD J. MILLS (L-5549-15, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-06-01(a)

The motion judge correctly determined that, in light of the facts as alleged, the discovery rule did not apply to plaintiff's claims.

Section 2A:14-2(a) bars negligence claims filed more than two years after discovery of the basis for the claim, even when the discovery rule applies.

CCM PROPERTIES, LLC VS. THOMAS C. PIEPER (L-1690-16, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-06-20(a)

Plaintiffs' negligence claims against both defendants, subject to a two-year statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a), are barred regardless of the discovery rule's application. Plaintiffs filed their complaint on May 9, 2016 – well over two years after the phase I report was issued in August 2013.

Section 2A:14-2(a) gives a medical malpractice plaintiff two years from accrual to file suit; under the discovery rule, accrual begins when a reasonable person would know of the injury and possible fault.

GRINDLINGER VS. JONATHAN M. ABENAIM, D.M.D. (L-5697-15, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-07-13(a)

Medical malpractice actions must be commenced within two years after the cause of action has accrued. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a). ... As such, we conclude that the statute of limitations for commencing the action accrued as of August 22, 2013.

The two-year period for a medical malpractice action is subject to the discovery rule when reasonable diligence would not reveal a potential defendant's possible fault.

RAHEIM SMITH VS. ST. JOSEPH'S HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL CENTER (L-1489-16, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-03-19

Medical malpractice actions must be instituted within two years from the date of the alleged negligence. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. ... We are satisfied that the discovery rule applies because a reasonable person exercising ordinary diligence would not have been aware that Dr. Sinha and Nurse Abucay's conduct "may have caused or contributed to the cause of the injury and that conduct itself might possibly have been unreasonable or lacking in due care." Savage, 134 N.J. at 248.

Section 2A:14-2(a) gives plaintiffs two years to file personal injury claims; under the discovery rule, these claims accrued when Tabor had reasonable information connecting his injuries to the mesh.

TABOR VS. JOHNSON & JOHNSON (L-0830-14, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-12-24(a)

Although the court did not make a finding as to a specific date of accrual, we conclude the causes of action accrued no later than July 20, 2011. ... The court correctly determined they were filed outside of the limitations period.

The common law discovery rule may toll Section 2A:14-2’s two-year limitations period for tort claims outside the Child Sexual Abuse Act.

A.Z. VS. A.R.P. AND R.T.P. (L-4011-17, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) · filed 2020-02-24

That is, simply because plaintiff could not rely on the CSAA accrual and tolling provision did not preclude plaintiff from asserting, and the court from considering whether, the discovery rule tolled the running of the two-year limitations period under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 for tort claims not encompassed by the CSAA.

Section 2A:14-2 requires an action for injury to the person to be filed within two years after the claim accrues; accrual may depend on when the injured person knew or reasonably should have known of the claim.

HALL M. WHITE, JR. VS. KIMBERLY M. WILSON, ESQUIRE (L-2527-17, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-05-28

We reject plaintiff's argument that his claims began to accrue when he received a copy of the allegedly forged transcript on October 27, 2015. ... Therefore, the filing of his Law Division complaint over six years later, in October 2017, was clearly barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 2A:14-2 requires a personal injury action to be filed within two years of accrual; under the discovery rule, accrual may be delayed until the plaintiff knows or should know of a possible claim.

PAGUREK VS. BETH J. DORFMAN, D.D.S. (L-8065-18, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-05-05

Thus, Judge Happas correctly determined that a Lopez hearing was not required because there were no genuine issues of material facts as to when plaintiffs' claims accrued. Further, the record supports the judge's determination that plaintiffs did not assert their claims based on the alleged negligent placement of the implant within the time required by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.

Section 2A:14-2(a) gives negligence claims a two-year limitations period, which the discovery rule may toll when a plaintiff reasonably could not discover the claim in time.

SHELLEY v. CHRISTOPHER ACADEMY · filed 2021-07-27(a)

The Court also notes that Plaintiff’s claim is considered timely at this stage. While negligence actions ordinarily fall under the two-year statute of limitations period of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14–2(a), a plaintiff may still toll the statute of limitations by explaining why he “reasonably could not have discovered [his] cause of action in time to comply with the limitation period.” Phillips v. Gelpke, 190 N.J. 580, 595–96 (2007) (describing New Jersey’s “discovery rule”). Here, as in other childhood sexual assault cases, Plaintiff’s argument as to timeliness, which “consists of ‘I forgot, and then I remembered,’” is sufficient as the credibility of Plaintiff’s memory is “an issue for the jury to decide.” Doe v. R.J.L., No. 4640-16, 2018 WL 1955063, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 26, 2018) (citations omitted).

Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limit for emotional distress and loss of services claims, and the discovery rule does not delay accrual when plaintiffs fail to diligently identify a potential defendant.

YANEZ v. PEDRO CORDERO, M.D. (L-3459-18, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-04-04

Plaintiffs' remaining claims for emotional distress and loss of decedent's services are governed by the two-year statute of limitations in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. ... The discovery rule is also applicable to plaintiffs' tort claims under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. ... For those reasons, we are convinced the motion court correctly concluded that in the absence of any evidence of a diligent effort to identify Stirling, the discovery rule did not delay the accrual of plaintiffs' survivorship and tort claims such as to render the August 2019 complaint against Stirling timely.

Section 2A:14-2(a) gives a plaintiff two years to bring product liability and negligence claims, with the period running from accrual as affected by the discovery rule.

DIAZ v. C.R. BARD INC. · filed 2023-05-15(a)

Under New Jersey law, product liability and negligence claims are subject to a two-year statue of limitations, which begins to run when the cause of action accrues. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2(a). The effect of that relatively short limitations period is tempered by New Jersey’s “discovery rule,” which tolls the running of the statute “until the injured party discovers, or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered” the basis for the claim. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2.

Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limit for personal injury and product liability claims; New Jersey’s discovery rule delays accrual until the injured person discovers or reasonably should discover a possible claim.

Crowe v. Johnson & Johnson · filed 2022-06-15

Under New Jersey’s statute of limitations, Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred and due to be dismissed because in New Jersey a claim accrues when the injured party discovers, or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered that she may have a basis for an actionable claim.

Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limit for personal injury claims; New Jersey’s discovery rule can toll that limit when a plaintiff reasonably lacks facts connecting the injury to a defendant.

REEVES v. HEMSLEY · filed 2023-12-08

Under New Jersey law, negligence claims are also subject to a two-year statute of limitations, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2 (“Every action at law for an injury to the person caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of any person within this State shall be commenced within two years next after the cause of action shall have accrued.”), which generally starts to run at the time of the alleged injury. ... Considering Plaintiff’s initial pro se status and the fact that Plaintiff filed his counseled fifth amended complaint within a month of being notified of the existence of Defendant Morse by Defendant County of Bergen, the Court applies the New Jersey discovery rule to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Morse and finds those claims timely under that rule.

Section 2A:14-2(a) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a personal injury claim, with accrual delayed under the discovery rule until the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of a possible claim.

NORTON v. MYLAN INC. · filed 2024-04-02(a)

WHEREAS Counts I and II of Plaintiff’s TAC are hereby dismissed with prejudice as the two-year statute of limitations began running at the time of Plaintiff’s alleged injury in 2016, and Plaintiff did not file her suit until January 2, 2022.

A medical malpractice claim must be filed within two years of accrual; the discovery rule does not delay accrual once the plaintiff knows enough to recognize the injury and possible fault.

Judy Woody v. Horatio Daub, Md · filed 2024-11-14(a)

As the statutes of limitations accrued, at the very latest, on May 8, 2016, the limitations periods therefore expired on May 8, 2018.

The two-year period for a medical malpractice claim does not begin until the patient knows of the injury and has reason to believe a provider was at fault.

Galayda v. Imani Jackson Rosario, M.D. · filed 2025-05-27(a)

Because plaintiff filed her complaint within two years of the November 7, 2018 date, her complaint is timely under the discovery rule.

A personal injury claim asserted as recoupment remains timely under the two-year limitation if it was not barred when the plaintiff commenced the action, even if the counterclaim is filed later.

Atlantic City Hospital v. Finkle · filed 1970-05-21

I need only to hold, as I do, that prevailing authority supports the proposition that where the counterclaim asserts a recoupment which is not barred by the appropriate statute of limitations as of the time when the principal action was commenced, it will not be considered as untimely even though it is filed in said action at a time when if it were the subject of an independent action it could not be maintained by reason of the statute of limitations. Since defendant's counterclaim in the case at bar was filed in an action commenced by plaintiff within two years of the accrual of defendant's cause of action, it is timely.

Section 2A:14-2 bars a personal injury counterclaim first asserted after its two-year limitations period expires, even when the original complaint and answer were timely filed.

Giambuttista v. Bradlees, Inc. · filed 1974-10-03

This court holds that the counterclaim sought to be asserted is barred by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.

An amended personal-injury claim may relate back to a timely third-party complaint for purposes of the section's two-year limit when that complaint gave the defendants notice of the same negligence charges.

Lawlor v. Cloverleaf Memorial Park, Inc. · filed 1970-06-22

The answers to the amended complaint by the Hospital and the Doctor were similar to the answers filed earlier by them to the third-party complaint, although the Doctor's answer additionally set forth specific defenses of contributory negligence and the applicable statute of limitations ( N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2). We reject the Hospital's and the Doctor's limitation defense for we are convinced that, under the compelling circumstances presented here, the amendment to the complaint must be deemed to relate back, as in De Sisto and Greco, at least to the time of the filing of the third-party complaint.

Section 2A:14-2’s two-year limit does not bar a later direct personal injury claim against a third-party defendant when the motion for leave to serve the third-party complaint was filed within that period, even if service occurred afterward.

Ioannou v. Ivy Hill Pk. Section Four, Inc. · filed 1970-10-21

It is the court's opinion that neither actual service nor such filing within the statutory period are necessary and that, in the circumstances, the making of the motion to serve the third-party complaint within the two-year period renders the Lawlor doctrine applicable and avoids the bar of the statute of limitations, even though the third-party defendants may have actually been unaware of the plaintiffs' action during the statutory period.

Section 2A:14-2’s two-year period does not automatically bar substitution of the proper defendant after a complaint is timely filed; courts consider good faith, diligence, and prejudice.

Aruta v. Keller · filed 1975-06-11

As noted in Farrell, supra, interpreting the statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, is a judicial responsibility. Once an action is commenced by the filing of a complaint within time, judicial interpretation is essential to determine whether joinder of a properly named party may be considered timely thereafter. ... The criteria to be considered include good faith and reasonableness in the course pursued, diligence in seeking to substitute the proper party, and an evaluation of prejudice to the defendant by reason of the late notice additional to the normal period of limitations.

Section 2A:14-2 gives a plaintiff two years from the injury to commence a personal injury action; filing the complaint within that period suffices even if service occurs later.

Raskulinecz v. Raskulinecz · filed 1976-03-26

N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 provides that an action for "an injury to the person caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of any person within this state shall be commenced within 2 years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued." The cause of action here involved accrued when the injury was suffered. ... The action was commenced by the filing of the complaint with the court. ... Neither service of process nor attempted service is required to constitute commencement of the action, although delay in so doing may result in dismissal. ... If the New Jersey statute of limitations governs, then the action was instituted in time. ... The New Jersey statute of limitations applies.

Section 2A:14-2 requires a personal injury action to be commenced within two years of accrual; receipt of the complaint by a county clerk acting as deputy clerk of the Superior Court can satisfy that deadline.

Grubb v. JC Penney Co., Inc. · filed 1978-01-04

We disagree with the trial judge's conclusion that the November 4, 1976 filing was ineffective for limitations purposes. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 requires a personal injury action to be "commenced" within two years after its accrual. ... Following the command of R. 1:1-2 that rules of court be construed so as to secure substantial justice, we are satisfied that the deputy clerk status of the Middlesex County Clerk resulted, in these circumstances, in an adequate filing pursuant to R. 4:2-2.

Section 2A:14-2 bars a new, affirmative personal injury crossclaim filed after its two-year limitations period, even if the crossclaim is filed within the court rule's 90-day period.

Biddle v. Biddle · filed 1978-10-20

Although the statute had obviously run, the 90-day period provided for filing crossclaims had not. ... On the other hand, there is no justification, either under the above doctrines or elsewhere, for permitting a defendant to plead a crossclaim, otherwise barred, when that claim constitutes a new cause of action which is clearly affirmative in nature.

Section 2A:14-2 requires a personal injury action to be filed within two years of accrual; filing in a federal court without jurisdiction does not toll that period.

Galligan v. Westfield Centre Service, Inc. · filed 1979-02-20

This argument, unfortunately, must be rejected. The state filing was late, and the federal court lacked both jurisdiction and the power to transfer the case to our court.

Section 2A:14-2’s two-year limit can be tolled by a timely federal complaint filed in a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction when the filing satisfies the purposes of the limitation period.

Galligan v. Westfield Centre Service, Inc. · filed 1980-03-13

None of the purposes of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 would be served by dismissing plaintiff's survival cause of action. We therefore hold that in the circumstances of this case, the filing of a complaint in federal court suspended the running of the statutory period of limitations.

A personal injury action is commenced within the two-year period when the plaintiff presents the complaint to the clerk before the deadline, then obtains a filing-fee waiver and returns the complaint within ten days.

Novack v. Chait · filed 1990-06-20

The complaint is therefore deemed to have been filed on October 30, 1987. ... We hold that the personal injury cause of action was "commenced" within two years of its accrual within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 and R. 4:2-2.

A personal injury action must be commenced within two years of accrual; a complaint received by the clerk before that deadline is timely even if the clerk later loses it.

Waite v. Doe · filed 1985-10-28

N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 requires a personal injury action to be "commenced" within two years after its accrual. ... We are therefore satisfied that if the complaint here had reached the Clerk's Office prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, it would have to be deemed to have been timely filed.

Section 2A:14-2's two-year limit bars a personal injury complaint filed after the deadline when the plaintiff cannot prove timely mailing or reasonable diligence in confirming filing.

Cwiklinski v. Burton · filed 1987-05-20

Since plaintiffs cannot establish that the complaint was mailed, they cannot rely upon the presumption of its delivery to the Clerk's Office within a reasonable period of time. Moreover, even if plaintiffs were accorded the benefit of the presumption of delivery, plaintiffs could not continue to rely upon it for the more than five weeks between the time that the complaint was allegedly mailed and the running of the statute of limitations.

Section 2A:14-2's two-year limit does not bar claims against defendants substituted for fictitious defendants when the amendments relate back to a timely complaint.

Hernandez v. St. James Hosp. · filed 1986-12-29

The effect of our holding respecting R. 4:26-4 is that all counts of the complaint as against these two defendants are timely as measured by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.

Reinstating an original complaint does not create a limitations defense that was unavailable before its dismissal.

Mason v. Nabisco Brands, Inc. · filed 1989-05-19

Thus, if a defendant could not raise the statute of limitations defense prior to the dismissal of the complaint, it cannot do so at the time it is restored.

Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limit for personal injury actions; a plaintiff who fails to diligently identify a defendant cannot substitute that defendant after the limit expires.

Younger v. Kracke · filed 1989-08-31

Every action at law for an injury to the person "shall be commenced within two years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued". N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. ... Since the plaintiffs failed to use diligent efforts to ascertain the true identities of Marion S. Daniels and Joseph T. Daniels, their motion to amend the original complaint to substitute the Daniels as direct defendants is denied.

Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limit for personal injury claims, but a counterclaim arising from the same transaction can avoid that limit while the plaintiff's action remains pending.

Molnar v. Hedden · filed 1992-10-27

We are therefore satisfied that if plaintiff's action against defendant had been entirely disposed of on the record and was consequently no longer pending on November 12, 1991, the cause of action defendant sought to assert by his late counterclaim would be barred both by the two-year statute of limitations prescribed by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 and by the entire controversy doctrine incorporated by R. 4:30A. ... Our conclusion that the counterclaim is not barred by the statute of limitations does not, of course, mean that it is automatically entitled to be pursued.

Section 2A:14-2 gives a plaintiff two years to file a personal injury action; a late amendment naming defendants cannot avoid that deadline through fictitious-name pleading when their identities were discoverable with due diligence.

Cardona v. Data Systems Computer · filed 1992-12-23

Plaintiff concedes that his amended complaint, in which the Vizcainos were first named as defendants, was not filed within the two year period provided by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 for filing a personal injury action. ... This failure constituted a lack of due diligence and foreclosed plaintiff from invoking the fictitious name practice.

Section 2A:14-2 gives a plaintiff two years to bring a personal injury action; the fictitious party rule does not suspend that period when the plaintiff knew or should have discovered the defendant’s identity.

Mears v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 1997-05-21

We are satisfied from our study of the record and the arguments presented that the trial court properly held that plaintiffs personal injury tort action against Walsh and Daurio was barred by the two year statute of limitations of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 and that the fictitious party rule did not apply to suspend the running of the statute of limitations.

Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions; a related amendment adding parties with timely notice does not introduce a time-barred new cause of action.

Kernan v. One Washington Park Urban Renewal Associates · filed 1998-06-12

Therefore, it appears that the party that may ultimately be responsible for plaintiff's claim received notice of these proceedings within the two-year statute of limitations applicable to plaintiff's action, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. ... We conclude that an amendment by plaintiff to her complaint to add McCormick and the Trustee does not introduce a new cause of action barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 2A:14-2 applies to breach of implied or express warranty claims based on personal injuries rather than mere property damage.

BOND v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON · filed 2021-12-21

Similar to Michigan, New Jersey applies the statute of limitations applicable to personal injury claims, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, where a plaintiff asserts a claim for breach of implied or express warranty based on personal injuries rather than mere property damage.

Section 2A:14-2's two-year limit governs personal injury claims arising from product sales, even when framed as breach of contract or misrepresentation.

Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc. · filed 1972-01-27

We agree that actions of this kind, even though they may arise out of the consequences of sales, are essentially personal injury actions and as such are controlled by the two-year statute of limitation provision. Denominating them as actions arising out of a breach of contract or misrepresentation does not change their inherent character. Furthermore, as a matter of legislative interpretation, we perceive no intention on the part of the Legislature, in adopting N.J.S.A. 12A:2-725 as a part of the Uniform Commercial Code, to change the two-year statute of limitation period normally applicable to personal injury actions under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.

Section 2A:14-2’s two-year limit applies to personal injury claims for breach of warranty, even though those claims sound in contract.

Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Company · filed 1974-12-30

The two-year limitation of N.J. S.A. 2A:14-2 is also applicable to plaintiff’s claim of breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. Although breach of warranty claims sound in contract, the New Jersey courts have not applied the limitation of actions provision, N.J.S.A. 12A:2-725, which relates to breach of any contract for sale whenever damages are sought for personal injury. Instead, the New Jersey courts have construed the time limitations of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 to apply to all personal injury claims irrespective of whether they fall within the traditional classifications of tort or contract.

Section 2A:14-2 gives a plaintiff two years to bring a false imprisonment claim; in this case, the claim accrued no later than the superseding indictment.

TONY MITCHNER VS. TROOPER MARK MARCHATERRE (L-8715-17, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-06-04

Here, plaintiff's false imprisonment claim accrued, at the latest, upon the issuance of the superseding indictment. Since plaintiff's complaint was filed more than two years after plaintiff's superseding indictment, his false imprisonment claim was untimely.

Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year limitations period for common law false imprisonment claims.

HAMZA v. UNITED CONTINENTAL HOLDINGS, LLC · filed 2021-07-29

Here, Plaintiff’s alleged false imprisonment ended in April 2018, and the two-year statute of limitations had expired when Plaintiff first raised a claim for false imprisonment in the SAC, which he filed on October 28, 2020.

Section 2A:14-2 starts the limitations period for a negligence action when the claimant knows or reasonably should know of both a breach of duty and resulting injury.

Gleason v. United States of America · filed 1972-04-20

We conclude that a negligence action accrues for purposes of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 at the time when the claimant knows or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of a breach of a duty owed him by the defendant and he knows or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that he has suffered injury as a result of that breach.

The two-year period for a personal injury claim begins when the injured person knows of the injury and who caused it; knowledge of negligence is unnecessary.

Rankin v. Sowinski · filed 1972-06-03

It is not necessary for him to know that the driver was negligent in order for his cause of action to accrue. The same standard should apply here. The statute began to run against Mrs. Rankin in February or March 1964, when she knew she was injured and by whom.

For a nonpermanent soft tissue injury subject to the No-Fault Law, Section 2A:14-2’s two-year period begins when the plaintiff incurs or reasonably should know they will incur enough eligible medical expenses to meet the threshold.

Montag v. Bergen Bluestone Company · filed 1976-10-29

Since the No-Fault Law itself contains no limitations provision in respect of liability actions, [1] it is clear that the accrual question here posed can be resolved only by resort to N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, the general statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions, construed in light of the conceptual foundations and underlying policy considerations of that provision, and by an analysis of the extent to which, if at all, the tort liability exemption of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8 purports to or was intended to modify the common law of tort liability. ... It cannot, therefore, be until the injured person does incur or is reasonably chargeable with the knowledge that he will incur eligible expenses that his right to maintain his suit for common law tort liability arises, and it is that date on which, by definition, his cause of action accrues.

The two-year limitations period for a personal injury action begins when the right to institute and maintain the suit arises.

Tevis v. Tevis · filed 1978-01-17

We are further satisfied that under these circumstances December 17, 1974 is the date upon which this action accrued. It is, of course, clear that an action cannot be deemed to have accrued until the right to institute and maintain the suit arises.

Section 2A:14-2’s two-year period begins when the claimant learns that a defect caused the injury, even if the claimant does not yet know the defendant’s name.

Britt v. Arvanitis · filed 1978-11-24

This is precisely the situation envisioned by the Court in Lawrence, supra, and we therefore hold that appellants' cause of action accrued, and the limitations period began to run, in January, 1975 when it was first established that the wire sutures used in the 1970 operation were causative factors in appellants' damages.

Section 2A:14-2 gives a person two years from accrual to bring an injury action; a cause of action accrues when the person first knows or has reason to know of it.

Whitehead v. St. Joe Lead Co. · filed 1984-02-28

Under New Jersey law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff first knows or has reason to know of its existence. ... A reasonable jury might infer that Whitehead did not and should not have known of the cause of action until that date. If the jury so finds, the action would be within the two-year limit of section 2A:14-2. Thus, we need not address the constitutionality of the tolling provision of section 2A:14-22.

Section 2A:14-2 requires a false arrest claim to be filed within two years of the unlawful detention; pending criminal proceedings do not toll that period.

Fleming v. UPS · filed 1992-01-22

A claim for false arrest must be brought within two years of the unlawful detention. Earl v. Winne, 14 N.J. 119, 132, 101 A. 2d 535 (1953); N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. Fleming was arrested on March 3, 1986 but did not file suit until December 27, 1989. ... Finally, it has been held that the pendency of criminal proceedings does not toll the statute of limitations on a false arrest claim.

Section 2A:14-2’s two-year limitations period for an increased-risk-of-harm claim does not begin until that claim accrues when the harm occurs.

Karol v. Berkow · filed 1992-03-06

Our reading of the case law persuades us that Karol's increased-risk-of-future-harm cause of action did not accrue until that harm occurred in 1989, less than two years before this action was filed.

Section 2A:14-2(a) sets a limitations period for personal injury actions and does not create a private cause of action.

ALLEN · filed 2026-02-09(a)

As both provisions are statutes of limitations, they do not provide Ms. Allen with a private cause of action but rather govern the timeliness of her alluded to breach of contract claim.

Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims. New Jersey applies that period when its interest in compensating an injured domiciliary takes the claim outside its narrow rule for borrowing another state’s limitations period.

Dent v. Cunningham · filed 1986-03-19

We hold that the district court erred in applying California’s one year statute of limitations to this action instead of New Jersey’s two year statute.

For a wrongful-termination claim under the Law Against Discrimination, the two-year limitations period begins the day after the employee's last day of regular pay.

TURNER-BARNES VS. CAMDEN COUNTY COLLEGE (L-2623-17, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-01-31(a)

Here, since plaintiff was paid until June 30, 2015, for computation purposes, the first day to be included in the limitations period is the day after the date of discharge, or July 1, 2015. Thus, her June 29, 2017 complaint was timely.

Section 2A:14-2(a) gives a plaintiff two years to sue for each discriminatory wage payment under the Law Against Discrimination, limiting recovery to timely payments.

Alexander v. Seton Hall University · filed 2010-11-23(a)

Each payment of such discriminatory wages thus constitutes a renewed separable and actionable wrong that is remediable under the LAD. The two-year statute of limitations applies to such violations, cutting off the untimely portion and, as a result, operating as a limit on the back period for which a plaintiff may seek recovery under the LAD.

Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year limitations period for LAD claims, including claims arising before July 27, 1993.

Poveromo-Spring v. Exxon Corp. · filed 1997-06-26

The two-year statute of limitations applies equally to claims arising after July 27, 1993, as well as to those claims arising before July 27, 1993. Thus, the two-year statute of limitations is applicable to Poveromo-Spring’s LAD claim.

The two-year limitations period may be tolled when a continuing pattern of harassment ends within two years before the complaint is filed.

Wilson v. Wal-Mart Stores · filed 1999-05-03

Her complaint filed on March 4, 1996 may have been timely because it was filed within two years of the last act of continuous harassment.

Section 2A:14-2 supplies the two-year limitations period for LAD claims accruing after November 30, 2000; for claims accruing after Montells but before that date with operative facts predating July 27, 1993, the deadline is the earlier of six years from accrual or two years from November 30, 2000.

Ali v. Rutgers · filed 2000-11-30

In Montells v. Haynes, 133 N.J. 282, 627 A. 2d 654 (1993), this Court held that claims arising under the Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49 (LAD), are subject to the two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries found at N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, rather than the general six-year limitations period established under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1. ... Accordingly, we hold that for LAD actions accruing after the date of the Montells decision but before the date of this opinion, in which plaintiffs allege operative facts arising prior to July 27, 1993, the limitations period is the earlier of six years from the date of accrual or two years from the date of this opinion. For LAD actions accruing after the date of this opinion, the limitations period is two years from the accrual date.

Section 2A:14-2 provides the two-year limitations period applied to § 1983 claims brought in New Jersey.

Simone v. Narducci · filed 2003-05-07

Section 1983 claims brought in New Jersey are thus subject to N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

The two-year limitations period for a continuing hostile work environment claim begins when the last act in the series occurs.

Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Center · filed 2002-08-07

Accordingly, plaintiffs' cause of action accrued on the date of the last act in the pattern or series of acts that comprise the continuing violation claim.

Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to NJLAD claims and is borrowed for Rehabilitation Act claims; a continuing violation may keep those claims timely.

D.G. v. Somerset Hills School District · filed 2008-04-18

The Rehabilitation Act and the NJLAD are governed by the two-year statute of limitations generally applicable to personal injury actions. ... As noted in footnote 3, supra, the continuing violations doctrine applies here. Therefore, because the conduct forming the basis of the Rehabilitation Act claim and NJLAD claim constituted a continuing practice that did not cease until D.G. left Bernards High School in 2006, and this action was commenced on September 25, 2007, Plaintiffs brought these claims within the applicable two-year statute of limitations period.

Section 2A:14-2's two-year period for an LAD hostile work environment claim begins when the last act of harassment could have occurred, even if the employee is formally terminated later.

Toto v. PRINCETON TP. · filed 2009-01-15

A claim under the LAD is governed by a two year statute of limitations. Montells v. Haynes, 133 N.J. 282, 291-95, 627 A. 2d 654 (1993) (holding that the two year statute of limitations for personal injury claims set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 applies to claims under the LAD since those claims primarily address injuries to the person). ... As a result, the last day on which plaintiff's cause of action accrued was the day he left the workplace, namely January 11, 2002, the date on which the last act of harassment could have occurred. The statute of limitations began to run from that point. Plaintiff's complaint was filed on March 25, 2004, more than two years after his last day of work on January 11, 2002. As a result, plaintiff's claim for a hostile work environment is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 2A:14-2 gives Superior Court LAD claims a two-year filing period measured from when the claim accrues.

Henry v. New Jersey Department of Human Services · filed 2010-12-10

The complaint must be filed within two years of the date on which the cause of action “accrued.”

Section 2A:14-2 supplies a two-year limitations period for civil rights claims governed by New Jersey’s personal injury limitations period.

Budzash v. 1-20 Jane and John Does · filed 2011-11-17

Accordingly, the limitations period is two years. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2.

Section 2A:14-2 supplies the two-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims arising in New Jersey.

Kaminski v. Township of Toms River · filed 2014-12-23

They had two years from that date of accrual to bring their claims. See id.; see also N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2; Dique, 603 F.3d at 185 (“[A] section 1983 claim arising in New Jersey has a two-year statute of limitations.”). Kaminski I was filed in 2010, making their claim untimely.

Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims in New Jersey.

Jevon Green v. State of New Jersey · filed 2015-08-20

In New Jersey, § 1983 claims are subject to New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations on personal injury actions. See Dique, 603 F.3d at 185; see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2.

Section 2A:14-2 gives personal injury tort claims a two-year limitations period; a plaintiff who already knew the basis for a claim cannot avoid that deadline through the discovery rule or equitable tolling.

Jonas v. Gold · filed 2015-09-23

Under New Jersey law, the statute of limitations for personal injury tort claims is two years. ... The injuries alleged in Edwin’s Complaint arose, at the latest, from the judgment in May 2006. This suit was filed in May 2013. Therefore, unless some basis for tolling applies, Edwin’s claims are untimely. ... Edwin’s claims are all time-barred.

A minor’s personal injury claim may be filed within two years after the minor turns eighteen, unless it involves injuries sustained at birth.

Kranz v. Steven Schuss, M.D. · filed 2016-08-31

Although this case was not prosecuted concurrently with the New York case, as a minor, Rachel's cause of action did not have to be commenced in New Jersey until two years after she turned eighteen years of age, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.

Section 2A:14-2 supplies a two-year limitations period for Bivens claims arising in New Jersey.

Torruella-Torres v. Fort Dix FCI · filed 2017-03-09

Bivens actions are subject to a two-year limitations period in both Delaware and New Jersey.

Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, including § 1983 claims brought in New Jersey.

McCargo v. Camden County Jail · filed 2017-05-22

McCargo’s complaint is barred by the statute of limitations. A claim raised under § 1983 is “characterized as a personal-injury claim and thus is governed by the applicable state’s statute of limitations for personal-injury claims,” which in New Jersey is two years. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2; Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Cito v. Bridgewater Twp. Police Dep’t, 892 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1989)).

Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year limitations period for claims under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.

LAVERN SANDERS VS. DIVISION OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES (L-1146-13, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-07-26

The statute of limitations for NJLAD claims is two years.

Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which applies to § 1983 claims arising in New Jersey.

Williams v. Borough of Highland Park · filed 2017-09-11

A two-year statute of limitations applies to personal injury claims in New Jersey.

Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions that applies to § 1983 claims in New Jersey.

Camick v. Smith · filed 2017-09-29

In New Jersey, § 1983 claims are subject to New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations on personal injury actions.

Section 2A:14-2(a) sets a two-year limitations period for claims under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act.

JOHN FALAT, JR. VS. THE COUNTY OF HUNTERDON (L-0188-15, SUSSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-07-25(a)

"The statute of limitations for claims under the NJCRA is two years[,]" Lapolla v. Cty. of Union, 449 N.J. Super. 288, 298 (App. Div. 2017) (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a)), the same statute of limitations that applied to plaintiffs' federal civil rights claims.

Section 2A:14-2(a) sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions that applies to § 1983 claims in New Jersey.

Parness v. Christie · filed 2018-09-11(a)

The District Court properly determined that the amended complaint was time-barred as to the first RICO conspiracy, see Mathews, 260 F.3d at 244-45; that certain of Parness’s § 1983 claims either were time-barred because they are subject to New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2(a); Cito v. Bridgewater Township Police Dep’t, 892 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1989), or failed to state a claim for relief; and that Parness could not proceed under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims filed in New Jersey.

Ong v. Hudson County Superior Court · filed 2018-10-02

In New Jersey, § 1983 claims are subject to New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations on personal injury actions. See Dique, 603 F.3d at 185; see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2.

For birth injuries governed by the earlier version of § 2A:14-2, a minor had two years after turning eighteen to bring a medical malpractice action.

BONET VS. DR. HARRY MONDESTEN, M.D. (L-0019-16, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-01-02

Thus, plaintiff had the right to bring a malpractice action against defendants for the injuries he allegedly sustained at the time of his birth until January 4, 2015, which was two years after he reached age eighteen on January 4, 2013.

Section 2A:14-2(a) gives intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims a two-year limitations period.

KACHUR v. WMC MORTGAGE CORPORATION · filed 2019-08-14(a)

Both causes of action have a two-year statute of limitations. N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-2(a); Agcaoili v. Thayer, 365 F. App’x 372, 375 (3d Cir. 2010); Fraser v. Bovino, 721 A.2d 20, 25 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).

Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which applies to § 1983 claims brought in New Jersey.

BARTLEY v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY · filed 2019-08-30

Under New Jersey law, there is a two-year statute of limitations period for personal-injury torts. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14–2. Therefore, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are governed by a two-year statute of limitations.

Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal-injury tort claims.

PAGLIAROLI v. AHSAN · filed 2020-02-26

Under New Jersey law, there is a two-year statute of limitations period for personal-injury torts. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2.

Section 2A:14-2 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 actions in New Jersey.

BRADY v. TOWNSHIP OF WOODBRIDGE · filed 2020-04-17

The statute of limitations for § 1983 actions in New Jersey is two years. See Backof v. N.J. State Police, 92 F. App’x 852, 855 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2). ... As Plaintiff was aware of her injury at the time of her arrest, the two-year limitations period began to run on June 11, 2013, and expired in June 2015, absent some basis for a later accrual date or equitable tolling.

Section 2A:14-2 supplies the two-year limitations period for claims under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.

Rosa v. WELLS FARGO · filed 2020-04-23

The LAD is subject to the two-year statute of limitations established under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.

Section 2A:14-2 imposes a two-year limitations period on LAD claims.

CURT BRICKELL VS. CABLEVISION (L-0971-15, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-06-22

Finally, the trial judge concluded plaintiff is barred from bringing this cause of action by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to LAD claims. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. All of the evidence plaintiff produced to support his claims of bullying and other hostile acts in the workplace based on his alleged intellectual disabilities and/or cognitive limitations occurred in 2000 and 2001. Plaintiff filed this LAD complaint against Cablevision and his two supervisors on January 23, 2015. ... We thus end our analysis by incorporating by reference the trial judge's statement of reasons attached to his June 29, 2017 order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment.

Personal injury actions have a two-year limitations period.

HERRON v. GURALNICK · filed 2020-06-30

Additionally, New Jersey’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. See Alexis v. Sessions, 2018 WL 5077899, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 18, 2018)(citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14–2). Given that Plaintiff was last represented by Defendant Guralnick in 2012 and the train accident occurred in 2008, Plaintiff, who did not file this case until September 2019, missed the statute of limitations for all of his potential claims.

Section 2A:14-2 supplies a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which the court applied to the plaintiff’s civil rights claims.

COELLO v. DILEO · filed 2020-10-21

“In New Jersey that statute is N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, which provides that an action for an injury to the person caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or default, must be convened within two years of accrual of the cause of action.” ... As a result, Plaintiff’s claims against the City Defendants are time-barred and will be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 2A:14-2(a) supplies the two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in New Jersey.

BALDEO v. CITY OF PATERSON · filed 2020-12-31(a)

For a § 1983 claim, the statute of limitations comes from “the underlying state’s statute of limitations for personal-injury torts.” Randall v. City of Phila. Law Dep’t, 919 F.3d 196, 198 (3d Cir. 2019). In New Jersey, that period is two years. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2(a).

Section 2A:14-2(a) provides New Jersey’s general two-year personal-injury limitations period, which applies to federal civil rights claims even when a longer state period covers sexual assault claims.

GAVIN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, SOUTH ORANGE-MAPLEWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT · filed 2021-03-18(a)

That “general or residual statute,” in New Jersey is N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2(a), the two-year statute.

New Jersey’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions applies to § 1983 claims.

BAKER v. WITTEVRONGEL · filed 2021-05-07

As the Third Circuit explained, New Jersey's two-year limitations period on personal injury actions, N.J.S.A. 2A:14–2, applies to civil rights claims under § 1983. ... Baker’s false arrest claims are barred by the statute of limitations, and the Third Circuit has already ruled on this issue.

New Jersey’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions governs § 1983 claims brought in New Jersey.

CARATINI v. POWELL · filed 2021-05-14

A claim under § 1983 is governed by the applicable state’s statute of limitations period for personal injury torts; in New Jersey it is two years. Id. (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14–2; Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 126 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1998)).

Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for New Jersey personal injury claims, including § 1983 claims that accrue there.

LOVE v. JOHN DOES 1-9 · filed 2021-06-29

A two-year statute of limitations period applies to personal injury claims in New Jersey. N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:14-2. Thus, claims brought pursuant to § 1983 that accrued in New Jersey are subject to a two-year statute of limitations period.

New Jersey’s two-year personal injury limitations period applies to § 1983 claims brought in New Jersey.

MANNING v. ST. PAUL · filed 2021-06-29

Accordingly, New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions governs Plaintiff’s claim under Section 1983. See N.J. Stat. § 2A:14-2.

Section 2A:14-2 supplies the two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, including claims brought under § 1983 in New Jersey.

RAMOS v. MAIN · filed 2021-09-22

Accordingly, New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions governs Plaintiff’s claim under Section 1983.

Section 2A:14-2(a) requires a plaintiff to bring an NJLAD claim within two years of the alleged adverse employment action.

MILANO v. IKEA HOLDING US, INC. · filed 2021-09-27(a)

A plaintiff must bring a claim under the NJLAD within two years of the alleged adverse employment action. See N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a); Montells v. Haynes, 133 N.J. 282, 298 (1993).

Section 2A:14-2 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims that accrue in New Jersey.

SEBSO v. BERGEN COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE · filed 2021-10-14

The statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions that accrue in New Jersey is two years. ... Because Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that equitable tolling applies, his § 1983 claims against the BCPO are time-barred.

Section 2A:14-2 provides the two-year limitations period that applies to § 1983 claims arising in New Jersey.

Demby v. County of Camden · filed 2021-10-26

As the District Court recognized, New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims applies to Demby’s § 1983 claims, see Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2, and the limitations period began to run when Demby “knew or should have known of the injury upon which [the] action is based,” Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998).

Section 2A:14-2 supplies the two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in New Jersey.

JEFFERSON v. WARDEN OF HUDSON COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY · filed 2022-01-13

There is a two-year statute of limitations for claims brought under § 1983. See O'Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 126-27 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[f]or section 1983 actions in New Jersey, ‘[the governing personal injury] statute is N.J.S.A. 2A:14–2, which provides that an action for injury to the person caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default, must be convened within two years of accrual of the cause of action”) (quoting Brown v. Foley, 810 F.2d 55, 56 (3d Cir. 1987)). The limitations period for Plaintiff’s claims is therefore two years.

Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims.

COUSAR v. MORGAN · filed 2022-03-08

Under New Jersey law, there is a two-year statute of limitations period for personal-injury torts. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14–2. Therefore, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are governed by a two-year statute of limitations.

Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.

MICHAEL J. WEST v. TOWN OF SECAUCUS (L-3634-20, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) · filed 2022-06-24

There is a two-year statute of limitations for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Section 2A:14-2 provides the two-year personal-injury limitations period that applies to Section 1983 claims in New Jersey.

Doe v. MORRIS COUNTY · filed 2022-07-13

Under New Jersey’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2, Plaintiff had two years, or until some point in 2015, to assert her federal claim.

Section 2A:14-2 supplies the two-year limitations period for Bivens claims in New Jersey, including claims arising from sexual assault.

FISHER v. HOLLINGSWORTH · filed 2022-08-18

New Jersey’s exception to the general tort statute of limitations is thus inapplicable to Bivens claims, even where they relate to sexual assault, and Plaintiff's Bivens claims remain time barred for the reasons expressed by Judge McNulty in his screening opinion quoted above.

Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which applies to § 1983 and Bivens claims in New Jersey.

BYRD v. FINLEY · filed 2023-01-31

Under New Jersey law, there is a two-year statute of limitations period for personal-injury torts. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2. Because a § 1983 claim is characterized as a personal-injury claim, such claims are governed by the applicable state’s statute of limitations for personal-injury claims.

Section 2A:14-2(a) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising from detention and search.

ELLIS v. LEBRON · filed 2023-06-07(a)

Under New Jersey law, there is a two-year statute of limitations for a “wrongful act, neglect, or default.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2(a) (West 2019). Claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are considered torts and, therefore, are subject to New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations.

Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which the court applied to the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.

STALLINGS v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY · filed 2023-06-20

Under New Jersey law, there is a two-year statute of limitations period for personal-injury torts. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14–2. Therefore, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are governed by a two-year statute of limitations.

Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims, including Bivens excessive force claims brought in New Jersey.

CHURUK v. HAMPTON · filed 2024-03-15

New Jersey’s statute of limitations for personal injury causes of action is two years. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2.

Section 2A:14-2 provides the two-year limitations period that applies to § 1983 claims in New Jersey.

SHAIKH v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY - DEPARTMENT OF BANKING & INSURANCE, DIVISION OF INSURANCE · filed 2024-04-30

First, a two-year statute of limitations applies to Shaikh’s § 1983 claims related to alleged violations of due process, equal protection, and the First Amendment.

The two-year limit for personal injury actions was not extended where the plaintiff failed to diligently identify a potentially liable contractor and did not establish grounds for tolling or delayed accrual.

Suriel v. Marbella Tower Urban Renewal Association · filed 2024-05-16(a)

N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a) provides in relevant part: "Except as otherwise provided by law, every action at law for an injury to the person caused by the ... wrongful act, neglect or default of any person within this State shall be commenced within two years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued." ... On appeal, plaintiff reprises the arguments she raised before the trial court: she was diligent in prosecuting and investigating her claims and was therefore entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations under the fictitious pleading, equitable tolling and relation back doctrines, and the discovery rule; and Marbella had constructive notice of the condition of the grate. ... Having considered plaintiff's arguments in light of the record and these well-established principles, we affirm the court's decisions substantially for the reasons detailed at length in its thorough and comprehensive opinions.

Section 2A:14-2 supplies a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, including § 1983 claims brought in New Jersey.

Kim v. Ali · filed 2024-12-17

In New Jersey, § 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations on personal injury actions. See Dique, 603 F.3d at 185; see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2.

Section 2A:14-2(a) gives LAD claims a two-year limitations period, subject to the continuing violation doctrine.

Wheeler v. New Jersey State Police · filed 2025-03-24(a)

"The statute of limitations for LAD claims is two years."

Section 2A:14-2(a) gives NJCRA claims a two-year limitations period, subject to the discovery rule when a claimant is unaware of the injury or who caused it.

Pa Builders, LLC v. Township of Toms River · filed 2025-05-07(a)

N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a) states that "[e]very action at law for an injury to the person caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of any person within this State shall be commenced within two years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued . . . ." ... Applying the NJCRA two-year statute of limitations, plaintiffs were required to file their NJCRA claims no later than July 25, 2019. As such, plaintiffs' November 3, 2022 complaint was untimely.

Section 2A:14-2 supplies a two-year limitations period for civil rights and constitutional tort claims in New Jersey.

SHAIKH v. KIRSCH · filed 2025-05-12

Shaikh’s claims appear to be mostly “[c]ivil rights or constitutional torts claims,” which have a statute of limitations of two years in New Jersey. Germadnig, 2023 WL 4534127, at *26 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2).

Section 2A:14-2 provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims arising in New Jersey.

HOBBS v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR OF LABOR · filed 2025-05-30

But any criminal statutes of limitations are inapplicable here, as the Court must apply New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions in this civil case.

Section 2A:14-2 sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions in New Jersey.

Petrossian v. Borough of Rutherford · filed 2025-07-09

In New Jersey, personal injury actions are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.

Section 2A:14-2 supplies the two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in New Jersey.

Green v. Irvington Police Department · filed 2025-08-08

In New Jersey, § 1983 claims are subject to the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Id.; see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2.