Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11

Section 11-46-11(2) requires a notice of claim to provide information in each of its seven required categories; omitting a category fails the notice requirement.

Harden v. Field Memorial Community Hospital · filed 2008-02-19(2)

Because Harden provided no facts as to two of the seven categories of information, Harden has failed to satisfy the MTCA’s notice requirement.

Section 11-46-11(1) requires notice of claim ninety days before suit; failure to give notice bars the claim.

1704 21ST AVENUE, LTD. v. City of Gulfport · filed 2008-07-29(1)

1704 21st Avenue, however, did not provide a notice of claim to the City as required pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-46-11(1); therefore, its actions are barred.

Section 11-46-11(2) requires a written notice of claim to provide information in all seven statutory categories; a letter omitting required categories does not qualify as notice.

Parker v. HARRISON COUNTY BD. OF SUP'RS · filed 2008-07-31(2)

Furthermore, the August 2003 letter and the January 2004 letter clearly do not comply with the requirements of Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11-46-11(2). Without even addressing the scant information contained in the letter of August 12, 2003, there was absolutely no information in that letter, as required by the statute, concerning the extent of the plaintiffs' injuries; the names of all persons known to be involved; the amount of money damages sought; the residence of the persons making the claim at the time of the injury; and the plaintiffs' residence at the time of filing the notice.

Section 11-46-11(2) does not require a notice of claim to give every claimant’s residence when it gives the residence of a person making the claim.

Saul v. South Central Regional Medical Center · filed 2008-08-20(2)

Finally, the letter gave the residence address of Dale Cook, one of the persons making the claim and the person who sent the notice. Therefore, we find that the notice-of-claim letter complied fully with the requirements of Section 11-46-11(2).

Section 11-46-11(3) tolls the limitations period for ninety-five days from a state agency's receipt of a notice of claim.

Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v. McGee · filed 2008-12-11(3)

Pursuant to Section 11-46-11(3), the statute of limitations is tolled for ninety-five days "from the date the chief executive of the state agency receives the notice of the claim." Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3) (Rev.2002) (emphasis added). Therefore, the statute of limitations for the wrongful-death claims was tolled on November 28, 2005, and did not expire until March 3, 2006.

A notice of claim need not specifically mention every claim later raised in the complaint if it gives notice of the claims known when the letter was sent.

Briere v. South Central Regional Medical Center · filed 2009-02-26(2)

Thus, we hold that the first notice letter was not statutorily insufficient simply because it did not specifically mention all of the claims ultimately raised in the complaint.

Section 11-46-11 requires notice of a tort claim to the governmental entity’s chief executive officer ninety days before suit; failure to give notice bars the claim.

Gentry v. Jackson State University · filed 2009-04-17

Plaintiff does not deny that she failed to provide the required notice and therefore, summary judgment will be granted on this claim.

Section 11-46-11(3) does not toll the one-year limitations period when the claimant gives no notice to the defendant’s government employer.

Sidney Carlton Gorton, M.D. v. Rance · filed 2009-06-22(3)

Although the statute provides for tolling during the notice period, because Rance provided no notice to Dr. Gorton’s employer, Greenwood Leflore Hospital, the tolling provision is inapplicable in this case. Therefore, Rance’s claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations under the MTCA.

Section 11-46-11(1) requires notice of a claim against a governmental entity ninety days before filing suit; failure to give any notice bars a state law tort claim.

Montgomery v. Mississippi · filed 2007-07-06(1)

Because Montgomery failed to provide any notice whatsoever, the Court finds that all state law tort claims for “wrongful demotion” are procedurally barred due to his failure to comply with the notice provisions of the MTCA.

A notice of claim satisfies subsection (2)’s residence requirement when it gives the address of one person making the claim, even if it omits another claimant’s address.

Saul Ex Rel. Heirs of Cook v. South Central Regional Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2010-01-07(2)

Finally, the letter gave the residence address of Dale Cook, one of the persons making the claim and the person who sent the notice. Therefore, we find that the notice-of-claim letter complied fully with the requirements of Section 11-46-11(2).

Section 11-46-11(1) requires notice to the governmental entity’s chief executive officer ninety days before suit, and failure to give notice bars the state law claims.

Chestang v. ALCORN STATE UNIVERSITY · filed 2011-05-17(1)

Simpson next argues that Chestang’s state law claims should be dismissed for failure to comply with the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”), Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1), which requires that plaintiffs file a notice with the chief executive officer of the governmental entity to be sued ninety days prior to filing suit. Chestang did not respond to Simpson’s argument in this regard and thus apparently concedes that he failed to comply with the MTCA’s notice requirement. ... Accordingly, Chestang’s claims under Mississippi state law are procedurally barred and must be dismissed.

Section 11-46-11(1) requires notice before a McAm wrongful termination claim may proceed against a governmental entity or its officials in their official capacities.

Papagolos v. Lafayette County School District · filed 2013-09-16(1)

The law is clear that McAm wrongful termination claims are governed by the MTCA, and thus, notice pursuant to the MTCA is required to sustain such a claim. ... Because Plaintiff offers no proof that she complied with the statutorily required notice for her McAm wrongful termination claim and does not challenge Defendants’ contention that she did not comply with the statutorily required notice, her wrongful termination claim fails against LCSD and Defendants McPhail and Nelson in their official capacities.

Section 11-46-11(1) requires a claimant to file a notice of claim on a political subdivision; failure to do so supports dismissal.

Barnes v. City of Canton, Mississippi · filed 2016-05-03(1)

Since we find the Bureau is a political subdivision, Barnes was required to file a notice of claim on the Bureau. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1). This did not occur; thus, we affirm the trial court’s decision to grant the Bureau’s motion to dismiss.

Section 11-46-11(2) requires a notice of claim to substantially comply with its information requirements, including the damages sought and the claimant’s residence; a deficient notice warrants dismissal, but a timely filed complaint can toll the limitations period and make dismissal without prejudice appropriate.

Keever v. Mississippi Institutions of Higher Learning · filed 2019-04-30(2)

Although Keever did not comply with the notice requirements of section 11-46-11(2), warranting the dismissal of her claim, because her March 7, 2014 complaint was properly filed within one year and tolled the statute of limitations, we find that the circuit court erred in dismissing the case with prejudice.

Section 11-46-11(2)(a) requires strict compliance with municipal notice-of-claim service; serving the city’s chief operations officer is insufficient.

Dobbs v. City of Columbus, Mississippi and Dalton T. Conwill, in his official capacity as a City of Columbus · filed 2019-12-10(2)(a)

Accordingly, service of the notice of claim upon the city clerk is a mandatory requirement, and substantial compliance is not enough.

A notice of claim must include information in all seven categories required by § 11-46-11(2); omitting six does not substantially comply.

Newton v. Lincoln County · filed 2012-03-27(2)

Here, the September 23rd letter failed to include the information required in the seven categories. The letter failed to state: (1) any facts regarding the extent of the injury, (2) the place the injury occurred, (3) the names of all persons known to be involved, (4) the amount of money damages sought, (5) Newton’s residence at the time of the injury, and (6) Newton’s residence at the time of the filing. Newton has failed to provide any information for six of the seven required categories.

Section 11-46-11(1) requires an adequate notice of claim at least ninety days before suit; failure to substantially comply bars the state law claim.

Easter v. Itawamba County, Mississippi · filed 2022-03-23(1)

The MTCA states that an adequate notice of claim must be served on the subject defendant(s) at least ninety days before the filing of a suit. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to substantially comply with the MTCA and his state law claims are therefore barred.

Section 11-46-11(1) requires notice of claim for state law claims against municipalities under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Bradley v. State of Mississippi · filed 2022-08-03(1)

Plaintiff’s state law claims fare no better, since both municipal defendants assert that plaintiff provided them with no notice of claim under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, as required by Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1). This court has no reason to doubt the representations of the municipal defendants in this regard, and, once again, plaintiff has failed to respond to their arguments at all.

Section 11-46-11(1) requires a claimant to file notice with the governmental entity’s chief executive officer at least 90 days before suing; failure to comply can warrant dismissal with prejudice.

Moore RESTRICTED FILER v. Monroe County Detention Facility · filed 2024-11-12(1)

Under Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1), “[a]fter all procedures within a governmental entity have been exhausted, any person having a claim under this chapter shall proceed as he might in any action at law or in equity, except that at least ninety (90) days before instituting suit, the person must file a notice of claim with the chief executive officer of the governmental entity.” ... Moore’s state law claims will be dismissed with prejudice due to his failure to comply with the MTCA’s procedural requirements.

Section 11-46-11 requires notice to a governmental entity’s chief executive officer at least 90 days before suit and tolls the one-year limitations period for 95 days when notice is filed.

Nowlin · filed 2026-04-13

Additionally, when suing a governmental entity, including a municipality, “at least ninety (90) days before instituting the suit, the person must file a notice of claim with the chief executive officer of the governmental entity.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11. While filing this notice “will toll the [one-year] statute of limitations for ninety-five (95) days,” id. § 11-46-11(3)(a), Rankin County says Nowlin never gave that notice, Def.’s Mem. [27] at 4; see Anderson v. Hinds Cnty., No. 25-60083, 2025 WL 2542170, at *2 (5th Cir. Sept. 4, 2025) (affirming dismissal of state-law claims for failure to comply with notice requirement). Nowlin never filed a reply and thus concedes the issue. For these reasons, adding any state-law claims against Rankin County would be futile.

Section 11-46-11(1) requires substantial compliance with notice to the governmental entity before filing suit.

Bracey · filed 2026-05-12(1)

The MTCA requires that “before a claimant files suit against a governmental entity, a notice of claim must first be filed with that entity.” ... Therefore, any state law claims asserted against the Drew Defendants, in their official capacities, are also dismissed.

Section 11-46-11 requires a pre-suit notice of claim that includes the names of all persons known to be involved and the claimant’s residence at the time of injury.

Butler v. Jim Ray and East Webster High School · filed 2020-06-30(2)(b)

Butler sent a copy of her lawsuit by registered mail to Ray, but the content of the complaint is insufficient to serve as notice as by section 11-46-11(1). For example, Butler did not include the names of all persons known to be involved or the residence of the person making the claim at the time of the injury.

A notice of claim must state the amount of damages sought; omitting that critical information makes the notice insufficient.

Ellis v. Clarksdale Public Utilities · filed 2020-11-13(2)(b)(iii)

Thus, the notice provides insufficient information required by § 11-46-11(2). Significantly, the amount of damages sought is a critical issue.

Section 11-46-11 requires a notice of claim to name all persons known to be involved; omitting them fails substantial compliance and can require dismissal without prejudice.

Gordon v. Holly Springs School District · filed 2021-09-27(2)(b)

Here, the Plaintiff's Notice of Claim fails to identify or even mention any of the Individual Defendants as persons known to be involved [Plaintiff's Notice of Claim, Doc. No. 19-1]. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Plaintiff's Notice, insofar as it relates to the Individual Defendants, fails to substantially comply with the MTCA.

Section 11-46-11(1) requires a claimant to exhaust the governmental entity’s procedures and file a notice of claim with its chief executive officer at least ninety days before suing; failure to file the notice requires dismissal of the claim.

Ward v. Lowndes County, Mississippi · filed 2022-07-25(1)

To bring a claim under this Act, a person must exhaust all procedures within a governmental entity and file a notice of claim ... with the chief executive officer of the government entity at least ninety days before instituting a lawsuit. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1) (2013). ... However, the Plaintiff fails to state his claim under this statute, and even to the extent that it can be read into the Complaint, the Plaintiff has failed to follow the terms of this statute by appropriately filing a notice of claim with the Defendants. Therefore, in so far as this argument is present in the case sub judice, it must be dismissed.

Section 11-46-11(2)(b)(iii) requires a notice of claim to state a numerical amount of damages sought; listing types of damages without an amount does not substantially comply.

Branson v. Jackson Municipal Airport Authority · filed 2024-08-06(2)(b)(iii)

The statute requires MTCA claimants to provide “a short and plain statement of the facts upon which the claim is based, including . . . the amount of money damages sought . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(2)(b)(iii). ... But the cases reveal that notices of claim must provide a number. ... Branson’s notice did not do this.

Section 11-46-11(1) requires a claimant to file notice with the governmental entity’s chief executive officer at least 90 days before suing under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

C.W.P. v. Brown · filed 2014-09-26(1)

The MTCA requires that “any person having a claim under this chapter shall proceed as he might in any action at law or in equity, except that at least ninety (90) days before instituting suit, the person must file a notice of claim with the chief executive officer of the governmental entity.” Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1).

Section 11-46-11(1) requires a claimant to wait ninety days after filing a notice of claim before suing a governmental entity; filing suit after eleven days is not substantial compliance.

Wright v. Quesnel · filed 2002-02-28(1)

Wright filed a notice of claim but did not wait the statutorily-prescribed ninety day period before filing suit. Allowing a plaintiff to file suit before ninety days have passed since noticing the claim is tantamount to reading out the notice provisions of the MTCA.

Section 11-46-11(1) requires a claimant to give notice and wait ninety days before filing suit; a suit filed prematurely must be dismissed.

University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Easterling · filed 2004-11-03(1)

We hold the responsibility to comply with the ninety-day notice requirement under Section 11-46-11(1) lies with the plaintiff. After the plaintiff gives notice, he must wait the requisite ninety days before filing suit.

Section 11-46-11 requires written notice containing information in all seven required categories and a ninety-day wait after notice before filing suit against a governmental entity.

South Central Regional Medical Center v. Guffy · filed 2005-03-15(1), (2)

We find that Guffy did not comply with the notice provisions of Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(2). Furthermore, Guffy did not strictly comply with the statutory ninety-day requirement under Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1).

Section 11-46-11(1) requires a plaintiff to give notice and wait ninety days before filing suit; a prematurely filed suit must be dismissed.

University Medical Center v. Easterling · filed 2006-04-06(1)

¶ 24. We hold the responsibility to comply with the ninety-day notice requirement under Section 11-46-11(1) lies with the plaintiff. After the plaintiff gives notice, he must wait the requisite ninety days before filing suit. Because Easterling failed to comply with the ninety-day waiting period, her case must be dismissed.

Section 11-46-11(1) requires a claimant to wait ninety days after filing a notice of claim before filing suit; failure to wait requires dismissal.

Brown v. SOUTHWEST MISS. REGIONAL MED. CTR. · filed 2008-01-29(1)

Therefore, we only look to whether Brown strictly complied with the provisions of section 11-46-11(1). Because Brown failed to comply with the ninety-day waiting period, his case must be dismissed.

Section 11-46-11(1) requires a claimant to wait ninety days after giving notice before filing suit against a governmental entity; a complaint filed early is subject to dismissal.

Jones v. Laurel Family Clinic, P.A. · filed 2010-01-05(1)

Here, Barbara was obligated to wait the full ninety days before filing her complaint against the Hospital. Because she failed to do so, her complaint was properly dismissed by the circuit court; therefore, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Section 11-46-11(1) gives a governmental entity ninety days after notice of a claim to consider it before a lawsuit can be maintained.

Long v. MEMORIAL HOSP. AT GULFPORT · filed 2007-10-11(1)

The Mississippi Tort Claims Act gives a governmental entity defendant ninety days from the filing of a notice of claim to consider the claim before a lawsuit can be maintained. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1) (Rev.2002).

Section 11-46-11(1) requires notice of a claim at least ninety days before suit; failure to meet that deadline requires dismissal of claims subject to the MTCA.

Mathews v. City of Booneville, Mississippi · filed 2020-05-22(1)

The MTCA requires that ninety days prior to filing suit, a plaintiff must file a “notice of claim with the chief executive officer of the governmental entity.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1). ... Because it is undisputed Mathews failed to comply with the ninety-day notice requirement, his state law claims, which are indisputably subject to the MTCA, must be dismissed.

Section 11-46-11(1) makes compliance with its ninety-day presuit notice requirement a condition precedent to filing a state-law claim covered by the MTCA.

Beacham v. City of Brookhaven, Mississippi · filed 2023-08-01(1)

Plaintiff’s state law claim in Count II is subject to the MTCA and must be dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to satisfy the condition precedent to filing in Section 11-46-11(1) of the MTCA.

Section 11-46-11(1) requires a claimant to file notice of an MTCA claim with the governmental entity’s chief executive officer 90 days before maintaining an action; compliance is a condition precedent.

Johansen v. Myers · filed 2023-08-24(1)

As noted above, under Mississippi law, compliance with the notice requirement is a condition precedent to maintaining such an action. Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff alleges state law cause of action covered by the MTCA against Singing River, the Motion to Dismiss such claims is granted.

Section 11-46-11’s ninety-day notice requirement satisfies equal protection because it rationally serves the state’s interests in conserving resources and protecting public welfare.

Vortice v. Fordice · filed 1997-02-26

Since these reasons serve a valid state purpose, the Tort Claims Act, including the notice provision, meets the rational basis test, and is therefore, Constitutional.

Section 11-46-11’s ninety-day notice requirement for suits against governmental entities satisfies equal protection under rational basis review.

Vortice v. Fordice · filed 1998-05-14

This means that the state must show that the ninety day mandatory notice required by Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11 is rationally related to a proper legislative purpose. ... Since these reasons serve a valid state purpose, the Tort Claims Act, including the notice provision, meets the rational basis test, and is therefore, Constitutional.

Section 11-46-11(3)'s one-year limitations period is subject to the discovery rule for latent injuries, and when the period began to run may present a question of fact.

Smith v. Braden · filed 1997-08-26(3)

The well-established discovery rule states that the statute of limitations is tolled until the actual discovery of the injury to be redressed. In Barnes this Court held that the discovery rule would be incorporated into actions involving latent injuries brought under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Id. at 203-06. We noted that to do so was particularly important given the relatively short one-year statute of limitations provided by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Id. at 205. In the case at hand, a question of fact exists regarding when the statute of limitations began to run. Because of Barnes, which arose after the completion of proceedings in the trial court, the trial court should consider this issue on remand.

Section 11-46-11(3)’s one-year limitations period includes a discovery rule for latent injuries.

Barnes v. Singing River Hospital Systems · filed 1997-11-13(3)

Following the same line of reasoning as in the above cases, we choose to incorporate a discovery rule in actions brought under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act involving latent injuries. Particularly considering the short, one-year statute of limitations period in § 11-46-11(3), we find that justice is best served by applying a discovery standard to such cases.

Section 11-46-11(3)'s one-year limitations period begins when a claimant reasonably discovers a latent injury and its negligent cause.

Barnes v. Singing River Hosp. Systems · filed 1999-01-21(3)

Despite the absence of specific discovery language in the statute, we find that the discovery rule applies to § 11-46-11(3).

Section 11-46-11(3)'s one-year limitations period incorporates the discovery rule for latent injuries, and a factual dispute about when the period began must be considered.

SMITH EX REL. SELMON v. Braden · filed 2000-08-24(3)

The well-established discovery rule states that the statute of limitations is tolled until the actual discovery of the injury to be redressed. In Barnes this Court held that the discovery rule would be incorporated into actions involving latent injuries brought under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Id. at 203-06. We noted that to do so was particularly important given the relatively short one-year statute of limitations provided by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Id. at 205. In the case at hand, a question of fact exists regarding when the statute of limitations began to run. Because of Barnes, which arose after the completion of proceedings in the trial court, the trial court should consider this issue on remand.

Section 11-46-11(3)’s one-year limitations period is tolled by the discovery rule for latent injuries when the claimant could not reasonably discover the cause of the injury earlier.

Punzo v. Jackson County, Mississippi · filed 2002-06-29(3)

Within one year of his discovery of the potential cause of the floods, he instigated proceedings against the County in compliance with § 11-46-11. ... We find the trial court erred in dismissing the money damage claims because the discovery of a latent injury rule applied to toll the statute of limitations.

Section 11-46-11(3)'s one-year limitations period is subject to the discovery rule for latent injuries.

Punzo v. Jackson County · filed 2003-12-04(3)

We find that six months is a reasonable time period to discover the alleged cause of the harm. ¶ 21. Within one year of his discovery of the potential cause of the floods, he instigated proceedings against the County in compliance with § 11-46-11. ... ¶ 30. We find the trial court erred in dismissing the money damage claims because the discovery of a latent injury rule applied to toll the statute of limitations.

Section 11-46-11(3)’s one-year limitations period is subject to the discovery rule, which requires reasonable diligence in investigating a possible injury.

Wayne General Hosp. v. Hayes · filed 2004-03-25(3)

In addition, the MTCA provides a one-year statute of limitations that begins to run from the date of the "tortious, wrongful or otherwise actionable conduct on which the liability phase of the action is based." Id. § 11-46-11(3). ... Assuming without deciding that the injuries alleged here were latent, we find that the discovery rule did not operate to toll the statute of limitations. First, the plaintiffs were not reasonably diligent in investigating the cause of Wa'Landra's injuries.

Section 11-46-11(3)’s one-year limitations period is subject to the discovery rule when a claimant diligently investigates but cannot reasonably discover the alleged wrongdoing.

Forrest County General Hosp. v. Kelley · filed 2005-06-28(3)

The MTCA provides for a one-year statute of limitations. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3) (Rev.2002). The statute begins to run from the date of the "tortious, wrongful or otherwise actionable conduct on which the liability phase of the action is based." Id. The discovery rule applies to the one-year statute of limitations. ... Mr. Kelley provided sufficient evidence to support a finding that he was diligent in his pursuit to obtain all of Mrs. Kelley's medical records and could not have known of the alleged wrongdoing until he had access to the necessary medical records. Accordingly, we find that the circuit court properly denied the Hospital's motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment.

Section 11-46-11(3)’s one-year period begins when all elements of a tort exist and the claimant knows, or reasonably should know, both the injury and the act or omission that caused it.

Caves v. Yarbrough · filed 2006-10-13(3)

Thus, we hold today that the limitations period for MTCA claims does not begin to run until all the elements of a tort exist, and the claimant knows or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should know of both the injury and the act or omission which caused it.

Section 11-46-11(3)’s one-year limitations period is subject to a discovery rule and begins when the claimant knows or reasonably should know both the injury and the act or omission that caused it.

McDonald v. Memorial Hospital at Gulfport · filed 2007-08-29(3)

McDonald submitted the statutory notice to MHG on March 22, 2004; so, even assuming arguendo that she discovered an actionable injury on March 24, 2003, McDonald complied with the one-year statute of limitations imposed by Section 11-46-11(3). Thus, the trial court erred in ruling that McDonald’s claims were barred based on the statute of limitations.

Section 11-46-11(3)’s one-year limitation period begins when all elements of a tort exist and the claimant knows or reasonably should know of both the injury and the act or omission that caused it.

Caves v. Yarbrough · filed 2008-09-25(3)

Thus, we hold today that the limitations period for MTCA claims does not begin to run until all the elements of a tort exist, and the claimant knows or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should know of both the injury and the act or omission which caused it.

Section 11-46-11(3)’s one-year limitations period begins when a claimant knows or reasonably should know of both the injury and the act or omission that caused it.

McDonald v. Memorial Hospital at Gulfport · filed 2009-04-30(3)

McDonald submitted the statutory notice to MHG on March 22, 2004; so, even assuming arguendo that she discovered an actionable injury on March 24, 2003, McDonald complied with the one-year statute of limitations imposed by Section 11-46-11(3). Thus, the trial court erred in ruling that McDonald’s claims were barred based on the statute of limitations.

Section 11-46-11’s one-year notice deadline is not delayed when a claimant could identify the governmental defendant through due diligence.

Davis v. Forrest Royale Apartments · filed 2006-03-14(3)

The warranty deed, which listed Forrest County as the owner of the property, was available to Davis during this entire period, had she chosen to exercise due diligence by examining it. Her own failure to exercise due diligence does not excuse her duty to comply with the procedural requirements of the MTCA.

Section 11-46-11(3)(a)’s one-year limitations period for medical malpractice claims is subject to the discovery rule, which requires reasonable diligence in investigating a possible injury.

Lyas v. Forrest General Hospital · filed 2015-10-29(3)(a)

The Mississippi Tort Claims Act’s (MTCA) one-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice cases is subject to the discovery rule. ... In sum, an issue of fact remains regarding whether Madra engaged in the “reasonable diligence” necessary to toll the statute of limitations in this case under the discovery rule.

Section 11-46-11’s one-year limitations period does not begin when a claimant receives a generic letter that fails to put her on notice of her injury and its negligent cause.

Lula McLeod and John Eric McLeod v. Terrence J. Millette, M.D. and Singing River Health System · filed 2020-07-02(3)(a)

The November 15, 2016 letter was insufficient to put her on notice that she was injured and that Dr. Millette’s negligent conduct caused the injury.

Section 11-46-11(3)(a)’s one-year limitations period begins when the claimant knew or should have known of both the injury and the wrongful act that caused it.

Prystupa v. Rankin County Board of Supervisors and Pearl River Valley Water Supply District · filed 2022-05-10(3)(a)

The statute of limitations begins to run on MTCA actions when a plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury and the wrongful act(s) that caused it.

Section 11-46-11’s notice-of-claim requirement and one-year limitations period do not apply to claims that accrued before its April 1, 1993 enactment.

Jones v. Baptist Memorial Hospital-Golden Triangle, Inc. · filed 1998-03-04

The cause of action in this case accrued prior to the enactment of § 11-46-3 (providing immunity to the state and its political subdivisions, approved April 1, 1993) and 11-46-11 (providing for notice of claim requirement and one year statute of limitations, approved April 1, 1993). ... Thus, since § 11-46-11 does not apply, Jones was not required to file a "notice of claim" with Lowndes County prior to filing suit. ... Likewise, Jones is not restricted by the one year statute of limitations contained in § 11-46-11.

Section 11-46-11’s notice-of-claim requirement and one-year limitations period do not apply to claims that accrued before the section took effect.

Jones v. BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL-GOLDEN · filed 1999-03-18

Thus, since § 11-46-11 does not apply, Jones was not required to file a "notice of claim" with Lowndes County prior to filing suit. ¶ 13. Likewise, Jones is not restricted by the one year statute of limitations contained in § 11-46-11.

Section 11-46-11(3)’s one-year limitation does not apply to claims arising from conduct before the MTCA took effect.

Bailey v. Ossama Al-Mefty · filed 1999-09-13(3)

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on the one-year statute of limitations under Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11 (Supp. 2001). The MTCA is not applicable to claims arising from events occurring before its passage, and a plain reading of the statute dictates such a holding.

Section 11-46-11(3)'s one-year limitations period does not apply to claims arising from conduct before the MTCA took effect, even when the injury was discovered later.

Bailey v. Al-Mefty · filed 2001-09-13(3)

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on the one-year statute of limitations under Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11 (Supp.2001). The MTCA is not applicable to claims arising from events occurring before its passage, and a plain reading of the statute dictates such a holding.

Section 11-46-11(1)'s notice defense is waived if raised for the first time on appeal.

Gale v. Thomas · filed 1998-06-30(1)

This Court has not addressed the issue of whether the question of compliance with the notice provisions of the MTCA may be raised for the first time on appeal. Despite this Court's statements that compliance with the notice requirements is a jurisdictional issue, and in light of this Court's statements in Thornburg, it is the conclusion of this Court that the City and Thomas are precluded from raising this issue for the first time on appeal.

A defendant waives the section's notice defense by failing to raise it in the trial court and cannot raise it for the first time on appeal.

Gale v. Thomas · filed 1999-12-09(1)

Despite this Court's statements that compliance with the notice requirements is a jurisdictional issue, and in light of this Court's statements in Thornburg, it is the conclusion of this Court that the City and Thomas are precluded from raising this issue for the first time on appeal.

Section 11-46-11(1)'s ninety-day notice requirement is nonjurisdictional and can be waived when a defendant delays enforcing it while participating in the lawsuit.

Stuart v. University of Mississippi Medical Center · filed 2006-09-25(1)

We find that UMMC’s participation in this lawsuit and its failure to raise Stuart’s noncompliance with the ninety-day-notice requirement until two-and-a-half years later constitute waiver of that defense. ... The notice requirements in the MTCA are not jurisdictional, and we now hold them to be nonjurisdictional and, therefore, waivable.

Section 11-46-11(1)’s ninety-day notice requirement is nonjurisdictional, and a governmental defendant may waive an objection to noncompliance by delaying its enforcement while participating in litigation.

Stuart v. University of Mississippi Medical Center · filed 2009-08-20(1)

We find that UMMC’s participation in this lawsuit and its failure to raise Stuart’s noncompliance with the ninety-day-notice requirement until two-and-a-half years later constitute waiver of that defense. ... The notice requirements in the MTCA are not jurisdictional, and we now hold them to be nonjurisdictional and, therefore, waivable.

The requirement to serve a notice of claim on a governmental entity’s chief executive officer is mandatory but subject to waiver and estoppel.

University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Jackie Aycock and Debra Aycock · filed 2023-08-17(2)(a)(ii)

We hold, therefore, that the Section 11-46-11(2)(a)(ii) requirement that “service of notice of claim shall be had only upon that entity’s or political subdivision’s chief executive officer[,]” is a mandatory requirement, but it is also subject to waiver and estoppel.

For a negligent-supervision claim, the one-year period under § 11-46-11(3) begins when the claimant is injured by the alleged negligence.

Doe v. State of Mississippi · filed 2001-12-26(3)

We hold that the one-year window to file a notice of claim did not begin to run until January 26, 1999, the day Doe was raped.

Section 11-46-11(3) requires an action under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act to begin within one year of the actionable conduct.

Conrod v. Holder · filed 2002-08-15(3)

¶ 11. Another grounds for upholding the grant of summary judgment is that Deputy Little was not named as a defendant in this case until well after the statute of limitations had run. Section 11-46-11(3) of the MTCA maintains that "all actions brought under the provisions of this chapter shall be commenced within one (1) year next after the date of the tortious, wrongful or otherwise actionable conduct on which the liability phase of the action is based." Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3). ¶ 12. In this case, Deputy Stevie Little was not named in the action filed in federal district court within the statute of limitations. Further, no notice of an action was given to Stevie Little until a full two years after the alleged conduct. Therefore, the action in this case was not only barred by the plaintiffs failing to meet the requirements of naming a governmental entity as a defendant; as to Stevie Little, the action was barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 11-46-11(3) requires an action under the Tort Claims Act to be filed within one year of the actionable conduct, subject to applicable tolling provisions.

Southern v. Jones · filed 2003-07-15(3)

As one can clearly see, the complaint was filed well after the one year statutory limit and any appropriate tolling provisions set out in Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3).

Section 11-46-11(3) requires actions under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act to be filed within one year of the actionable conduct, subject to tolling for a notice of claim.

Southern v. Mississippi State Hospital · filed 2003-09-11(3)

The record does not reflect that Southern complied with the notice of claim requirements of Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3). Furthermore, Southern waited until approximately two and a half years to file suit, well in excess of the one year statute of limitations. We find that the trial court properly dismissed Southern's complaint as being time barred.

Section 11-46-11(3) makes the MTCA’s one-year limitations period controlling; the general savings statute in § 15-1-69 does not extend it.

Stockstill v. State · filed 2003-09-18(3)

Because we find that pursuant to §§ 11-46-11 and 15-1-1, § 15-1-69 does not apply to the MTCA, it is also worthy to note that non-tort claims act cases, e.g., Boston v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 822 So.2d 239 (Miss.2002), and Norman v. Bucklew, 684 So.2d 1246 (Miss.1996), are not controlling as to the applicability of § 15-1-69.

Section 11-46-11(3) imposes a one-year limit on tort claims against governmental entities; filing a notice of claim after that year does not make the claim timely.

Black v. Ansah · filed 2003-10-14(3)

Applying this rule to the present case, Dr. Black filed two notice letters, one on April 6, 2001, and another on May 8, 2001. Since we have held that any tortious misconduct causing Dr. Black’s injury must have occurred by May 28, 1999, the two notices were well beyond the one-year time limit. Therefore, the trial court correctly ruled that Dr. Black did not bring her suit within one year of any “actionable conduct,” and her claims are time-barred.

The one-year limitations period for flood damage began when the plaintiffs experienced the flooding or discovered its cause, rather than when the subdivision map was approved.

Scheinblum v. Lauderdale County Board of Supervisors · filed 2004-12-10(3)

Based on the holding in Punzo, this court is of the opinion that the one- *747 year statute of limitations began to run, not when the subdivision map was approved by the defendants in 1997, but either when plaintiffs experienced flooding in April 2003, or alternatively, when plaintiffs discovered that the flooding resulted from the design of the subdivision, presumably sometime after April 2003.

Section 11-46-11(3) imposes a one-year statute of limitations on actions under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Jackson v. Hodge · filed 2005-09-13(3)

It *628is undisputed that the Jacksons did not comply with the one year statute of limitations that accompanies actions under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3) (Rev.2002). As such, the circuit court correctly granted Hodge’s motion for summary judgment.

Section 11-46-11(3)’s one-year period for a negligent supervision claim begins when the claimant suffers injury from the alleged negligence.

Connell v. State ex rel. Mississippi Department of Corrections · filed 2003-04-03(3)

We hold that the one-year window to file a notice of claim did not begin to run until January 26, 1999, the day Connell was raped. Connell’s notice of claim and complaint, insofar as the negligent supervision claim is concerned, were filed timely.

Section 11-46-11(3)’s one-year limitations period for a negligent supervision claim begins when the plaintiff sustains injury from the alleged negligence.

Doe v. State Ex Rel. Mississippi Dept. of Corrections · filed 2003-11-06(3)

She could not have possibly filed suit on her negligent supervision claim within one year of MDOC's acceptance of Adams or his actual reporting for supervision since she did not sustain damages as the result of any "tortious, wrongful or otherwise actionable conduct" until she was raped on January 26, 1999. We hold that the one-year window to file a notice of claim did not begin to run until January 26, 1999, the day Doe was raped.

The MTCA’s one-year limitations period begins when a claimant knows or reasonably should know of both the injury and the act or omission that caused it; a factual dispute about when the claim accrued precludes summary judgment.

Kelly v. Corinth Public Utilities Commission · filed 2016-01-19(3)(a)

Actions under the MTCA must be commenced within one year of “the date of the tortious, wrongful or otherwise actionable conduct on which the liability phase of the action is based.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3)(a). Thus, “the MTCA’s one-year statute of limitations begins to run when the claimant knows, or by exercise of reasonable diligence should know, of both the damage or injury, and the act or omission which proximately caused it.”

The one-year limitations period does not begin when a letter fails to put the claimant on notice of an actionable injury.

Davis v. Singing River Health System; · filed 2020-03-03(3)(a)

Upon review, we find that Singing River’s letter was insufficient to put Davis on notice of an actionable claim in November 2016. The judge prematurely and erroneously found that Davis’s statute of limitations had expired and granted Singing River’s motion to ... dismiss.

Section 11-46-11(4)’s minor savings clause does not revive a claim whose limitation period expired before the clause was adopted.

Blailock v. Hubbs · filed 2003-01-06(4)

Since the discovery rule did not toll the statute of limitations in the case sub judice, Tayler’s cause of action lapsed on March 10, 1998. The minor savings clause, adopted over two years later, cannot alter that fact. Therefore, the trial court did not err in holding that it would be improper to apply the minor savings clause to this cause of action.

Section 11-46-11(4)'s savings clause applies to claims still in existence on May 15, 2000, but its 2002 amendment cannot revive claims already barred by the limitations period.

University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Robinson · filed 2003-01-08(4)

The March 2002 amendment to § 11-46-11(4) is unconstitutional to the extent that it makes the savings clause applicable to all claims since April 1, 1993. However, the savings clause as first enacted in April of 2000 is valid and enforceable. Those claims in existence on May 15, 2000, are subject to the savings clause.

Section 11-46-11(4)'s savings clause applies to claims still existing on May 15, 2000, but its 2002 amendment cannot revive claims already barred.

UNIVERSITY OF MISS. MED. CENTER v. Robinson · filed 2004-07-01(4)

The March 2002 amendment to § 11-46-11(4) is unconstitutional to the extent that it makes the savings clause applicable to all claims since April 1, 1993. However, the savings clause as first enacted in April of 2000 is valid and enforceable. Those claims in existence on May 15, 2000, are subject to the savings clause.

The minor savings clause does not revive a claim that expired before the clause was adopted.

Blailock ex rel. Blailock v. Hubbs · filed 2005-05-26(4)

Since the discovery rule did not toll the statute of limitations in the case sub judice, Tayler’s cause of action lapsed on March 10, 1998. The minor savings clause, adopted over two years later, cannot alter that fact.

Section 11-46-11(4) tolls a minor’s MTCA claim until the minor reaches the age of majority or an interested party files a complaint on the minor’s behalf.

Doe v. Holmes County School District · filed 2018-05-08(4)

As a result, Jane’s claim is tolled under section 11-46-11(4) until she reaches the age of majority or an interested party actually files a complaint on her behalf.

Section 11-46-11 requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before notice of a claim is given under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Whiting v. University of Southern Mississippi · filed 2008-09-17

The MTCA further provides that notice of a claim must be brought only after all administrative remedies have been exhausted. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11 (Rev. 2002). ... Her claims based on tortious conduct in general, tortious breach of contract in particular, and breach of an implied contractual term or warranty are foreclosed by her failure to adhere to the requirement of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act that all administrative remedies be exhausted prior to filing suit.

Section 11-46-11(1) requires a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit under the MTCA.

Evans v. Mississippi Department of Human Services · filed 2010-06-01(1)

In addition, the MTCA requires a plaintiff to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing suit. ... From the record before us, it appears Evans also failed to comply with this mandate. Accordingly, we find summary judgment proper on each of the sanction-based allegations.

Section 11-46-11 requires a claimant to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Whiting v. University of Southern Mississippi · filed 2011-03-31

The MTCA further provides that notice of a claim must be brought only after all administrative remedies have been exhausted. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11 (Rev.2002). ... Her claims based on tortious conduct in general, tortious breach of contract in particular, and breach of an implied contractual term or warranty are foreclosed by her failure to adhere to the requirement of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act that all administrative remedies be exhausted prior to filing suit.

Section 11-46-11 does not require notice before a tortious interference claim because that claim falls outside the MTCA.

Zumwalt v. Jones County Board of Supervisors · filed 2009-09-10

To the extent the chancellor determined that notice was required before pursuing claims of tortious interference with either business relations or contracts, this was error.

Section 11-46-11 does not require pre-suit notice for claims of tortious interference with business relations or contracts because those claims fall outside the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Zumwalt v. Jones County Board of Supervisors · filed 2008-04-16

To the extent the chancellor determined that notice was required before pursuing claims of tortious interference with either business relations or contracts, this was error.

Section 11-46-11(1) does not require presuit notice for a tortious interference with contract claim against a government employee individually for acts allegedly outside the scope of employment.

Springer v. Ausbern Construction Co., Inc. · filed 2017-10-19(1)

As a result, Ausbern’s claim for tortious interference with the road-construction contract against Springer in his individual capacity was not subject to the Tort Claims Act’s presuit notice requirements.

Section 11-46-11’s pre-suit notice requirement does not apply to inverse condemnation claims.

Rogers v. City of Lumberton · filed 2025-04-01

We find that the circuit court erred by dismissing Rogers’ inverse condemnation claim because it was not subject to the pre-suit notice provisions of the MTCA.

A defendant may assert the MTCA’s one-year limitations period despite another entity’s misrepresentation when the defendant did not induce the claimant’s delay.

Kimball Glassco Residential Center, Inc. v. Terrance Shanks · filed 2009-09-15(3)

There was no showing of inequitable conduct on behalf of Kimball Glassco or Richardson. We find that no action by Kimball Glassco or Richardson reasonably could have induced Shanks to believe Kimball Glassco and Richardson were not entitled to the privileges and immunities of the MTCA. The trial court erred by finding that the doctrine of equitable estoppel prevented Kimball Glassco and Richardson from asserting the MTCA statute of limitations.

Section 11-46-11(1) requires pre-suit notice for claims alleging breach of an implied contract term, but not for claims alleging breach of an express contract term.

Simpson v. Alcorn State University · filed 2014-06-13(1)

While a claim for breach of an implied contract provision is covered by the MTCA and thus would be subject to the MTCA’s pre-suit notice provision, ... this requirement does not apply to actions for breach of the express terms of a contract, see id. (recognizing that state and its political subdivisions may not invoke sovereign immunity to escape their written contractual obligations).

Section 11-46-11(1) requires pre-suit notice for a tortious-interference claim against a governmental employee; without that notice, sovereign immunity is not waived.

Springer v. Ausbern Construction Co., Inc. · filed 2016-08-02(1)

The pre-suit notice requirements of Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-46-11(1) therefore apply to the claim against Springer.

A claimant must substantially comply with section 11-46-11’s pre-suit notice requirements; failure to give proper notice before filing suit calls for dismissal without prejudice.

O'Hara v. City of Hattiesburg, Mississippi · filed 2017-03-21(2)(b)

Here, the trial court reviewed O’Hara’s handwritten notice of claim and found that it was insufficient to satisfy section 11-46-11. O’Hara challenges that finding on appeal, but we are unable to consider his argument because he failed to see that the record included a copy of the notice for this Court to review. Accordingly, the circuit court’s ruling that O’Hara failed to substantially comply with the MTCA’s pre-suit notice requirement “will be considered correct.” Pennington, 858 So. 2d at 903 (¶5). If a plaintiff in an MTCA case fails to provide proper notice prior to filing suit, the complaint should be dismissed without prejudice.

Section 11-46-11 requires notice to the governmental entity at least ninety days before suit; a claim filed without that notice must be dismissed without prejudice.

Jones v. Mississippi Institutions of Higher Learning · filed 2018-08-14

Accordingly, on remand, Jones’s good faith and fair dealing claim should be dismissed without prejudice to his ability to refile the claim after he complies with the MTCA’s pre-suit notice requirements.

Section 11-46-11(1) requires notice of claim 90 days before suit; failure to give notice bars claims covered by the MTCA.

Hughes v. City Of Southaven, Mississippi · filed 2019-06-17(1)

The MTCA requires that a plaintiff first provide a notice of claim 90 days before filing suit. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1). ... Hughes did not provide notice to any defend- ants, at all, before bringing suit. Thus, any action covered by the MTCA is barred.

Section 11-46-11 requires pre-suit notice for a breach-of-implied-contract claim covered by the MTCA.

Williams v. Mississippi Department of Public Safety · filed 2025-07-07(1), (3)(b)

So to the extent that MDPS is not immune, and Williams is asserting breach of an implied term of her employment contract, that claim is barred for failure to provide required pre-suit notice.

Section 11-46-11 requires notice of an MTCA claim at least ninety days before suit, and failure to comply with the mandatory notice requirement requires dismissal.

Taylor v. Preciado · filed 2025-09-30

A plaintiff must submit notice of her claims under the MTCA at least ninety days prior to instituting suit. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11.

Section 11-46-11’s tolling provisions for MTCA claims do not extend the federal deadline to file a Title VII claim.

Pittman v. Mississippi Department of Human Services · filed 2023-02-14(3)

To the extent that plaintiff may be suggesting in her response that MTCA’s tolling provisions apply to her Title VII claim, she is mistaken.

Section 11-46-11’s filing deadline is satisfied when the clerk receives the complaint, required civil cover sheet, and filing fee; immediate submission of a summons is not required.

Thomas v. Bolivar County, Mississippi · filed 2023-09-07(3)(a)

Thus, an action is commenced with the clerk’s receipt of the original complaint, required civil cover sheet, and filing fee, and the immediate submission of summons to be issued is not required.

A claimant suing a municipality must serve the pre-suit notice of claim on the city clerk; a deputy city clerk’s receipt does not satisfy the strict compliance requirement.

Stephanie Barnes, Individually and on Behalf of All The Wrongful Death Beneficiaries, and Heirs of Law of Demarcus Brown · filed 2026-03-17(2)(a)(i)

Thus, the notice was not served upon the city clerk, and Barnes did not “strictly comply” with the MTCA’s service of process requirements.

Section 11-46-11(2)(a)(i) requires pre-suit notice of a claim against a county to be served on the county’s chancery clerk.

Esco v. Madison County, Mississippi · filed 2021-11-09(2)(a)(i)

Because Esco failed to provide the statutorily required pre-suit notice to the chancery clerk of Madison County and because Esco’s proposed amended complaint could not cure this fundamental failure, the circuit court did not err in refusing to grant Esco’s motion to amend her complaint, in dismissing her complaint, and in denying Esco’s Rule 59 motion.

Section 11-46-11 requires written notice of a municipal tort claim to the city clerk, including a short and plain statement of the claim.

Linares v. City of Southaven · filed 2022-09-28(2)

Under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, the individual bringing a claim against a municipality must provide notice to the city clerk in writing, containing a short and plain statement of the claim. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(2)(a)(i)(2), § 11-46-11(2)(b)(i)-(iii). The Plaintiffs have not provided evidence of such notice as required by the Act. Therefore, these claims are DISMISSED.

Section 11-46-11(2) requires a claimant suing a municipality to serve presuit notice on the city clerk; failure to do so requires dismissal.

The City of Jackson, Mississippi v. Jones · filed 2024-08-08(2)

Because Jones did not comply with Section 11-46-11(2)’s mandate to send notice to the city clerk, his lawsuit against the City must be dismissed.

Section 11-46-11 requires a claimant suing a municipality to give presuit notice at least ninety days before filing suit and to serve that notice on the city clerk.

Russell v. Booneville Police Department · filed 2025-09-16(1), (2)

According to the record before us, Russell neither provided presuit notice ninety days before filing her complaint, as required by section 11-46-11(1), nor provided presuit notice of her claims to the proper official (the Booneville city clerk), as required by 11-46-11(2). We therefore affirm the circuit court’s order dismissing Russell’s amended complaint for failing to comply with the mandatory requirements of the MTCA.