Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805

Section 600.5805(10) provides a three-year statute of limitations for civil-rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 filed in Michigan.

Fairley 297836 v. Fidler · filed 2021-11-01(10)

In this case, Plaintiff brings causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under Section 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(10); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999).

Section 600.5805(10) provides a three-year statute of limitations for civil-rights suits filed in Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Caldwell 805842 v. Cummings · filed 2022-02-16(10)

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(10); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999).

Section 600.5805(2) supplies a three-year statute of limitations for § 1983 civil-rights suits filed in Michigan.

Coleman 379771 v. Ringeutte · filed 2022-08-16(2)

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999).

Section 600.5805(2) supplies a three-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims brought in Michigan.

Partee v. Trobridge · filed 2022-09-19(2)

Section 1983 claims in Michigan are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); see also Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2).

Subsections (10) and (2) provide three-year limitation periods for the specified claims, including fiduciary-duty claims and actions seeking damages for injury to persons or property.

Stone v. Mrozek · filed 2022-12-01(10), (2)

Plaintiff’s remaining claims follow a similar pattern. Plaintiff’s Count II, breach of fiduciary duty, is subject to a three-year statute of limitations, and the claim accrues “when the beneficiary knew or should have known of the breach.” Prentis Family Foundation v Karmanos Cancer Institute, 266 Mich App 39, 47; 698 NW2d 900 (2005), citing MCL 600.5805(10). ... Tortious interference with a business opportunity (Count V) is governed by the general three-year limitations period for actions involving injury to persons or property. Blazer Foods, Inc v Restaurant Props, Inc, 259 Mich App 241, 253-254; 673 NW2d 805 (2003); MCL 600.5805(2). ... Claims for conversion (Counts IX and X) are claims for recovery of damages for injury to property, and are therefore also subject to the three-year limitations period in MCL 600.5805(2). The general three-year limitations period for actions for injury to property would appear to apply to plaintiff’s claim for an accounting. MCL 600.5805(2).

Subsection (10) imposes a three-year limitations period on tort claims, including intentional infliction of emotional distress, running from accrual.

Stone v. Wolf · filed 2023-03-23(10)

Intentional infliction of emotional distress is governed by the three-year statute of limitations that applies to tort claims, MCL 600.5805(10). “Claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress must be brought within three years after they accrue in order to avoid the limitation bar.” Nelson v Ho, 222 Mich App 74, 85; 564 NW2d 482 (1997). The majority of Stone’s factual allegations involve wrongs committed in 2017. The statute of limitations for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim based on those allegations expired in 2020. Accordingly, summary disposition was properly granted under MCR 2.116(C)(7) with respect to those claims.

Section 600.5805(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on trespass and nuisance claims, while temporary or continuous violations generate new causes of action for injuries accruing within the three years before suit.

Moore Family Trust v. Bingham · filed 2023-08-17(2)

Trespass and nuisance claims are subject to a 3-year statute of limitations, Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2), but where “the nuisance or trespass is ‘temporary’ or ‘continuous,’ a new cause of action arises day by day or injury by injury, with the result that the plaintiff in such a case can always recover for such damages as have accrued within the statutory period immediately prior to the suit,” Township of Fraser v. Haney, 983 N.W.2d 309, 312 n.13 (Mich. 2022) (quoting Russo Farms, Inc. v. Vineland Bd. of Ed., 675 A.2d 1077, 1086 (N.J. 1996)).

Section 600.5805(2) provides a three-year statute of limitations for § 1983 civil-rights suits filed in Michigan.

Burley 502426 v. Weller · filed 2023-01-03(2)

Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999).

Subsection (2) sets a three-year statute of limitations applicable here to § 1983 takings claims and statutory and common-law conversion claims.

Fakhreddine v. Eric R. Sabree, Wayne County Treasurer · filed 2024-09-04(2)

The statute of limitations for a § 1983 takings claim arising out of conduct in Michigan is three years. Wolfe, 412 F.3d at 714; Estate of Majors v. Gerlach, 821 F. App’x 533, 537 (6th Cir. 2020); Hall v. Oakland Cnty., No. 20-12230, 2024 WL 209702, at *16 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 19, 2024); Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2). But Plaintiffs did not file their complaint until August 2021—five months after the limitations period expired. Plaintiffs’ federal takings claims are therefore time barred. Similarly, Plaintiffs’ conversion claims are time barred because limitations period for both statutory and common law conversion in Michigan is three years. See Tillman v. Great Lakes Truck Ctr., Inc., 277 Mich. App. 47, 49 (2007); Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2).

Section 600.5805(2) provides a three-year limitations period for civil-rights suits filed in Michigan.

Dykes 201541 v. Brown · filed 2024-10-01(2)

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under Section 1983, the statute of limitations is three years.

Section 600.5805(8) supplies a three-year statute of limitations for Michigan civil-rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

McMillan v. Michigan, State of · filed 2025-03-18(8)

Federal courts apply state personal injury statutes of limitations to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983. ... For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(8); ... Accordingly, any claims that McMillan asserts that accrued prior to February 19, 2022, are barred.

Section 600.5805(2) gives civil-rights suits filed in Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a three-year statute of limitations.

Parks 865693 v. Rewerts · filed 2025-06-20(2)

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999).

Section 600.5805(2) provides a three-year statute of limitations for civil-rights suits filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Michigan.

Joyce 251901 v. Sprango · filed 2025-10-07(2)

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years.

Section 600.5805(2) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on civil-rights suits filed in Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Grahn · filed 2025-10-23(2)

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999).

Actions for injury to a person or property must be filed within three years after the injury, with the limitation period running from when the claim first accrues.

Arabbo v. Estate of Robert West · filed 2025-03-10(1) (2)

MCL 600.5805(1) provides that “[a] person shall not bring or maintain an action to recover damages for injuries to persons or property unless, after the claim first accrued to the plaintiff or to someone through whom the plaintiff claims, the action is commenced within the periods of time prescribed by this section.” Under MCL 600.5805(2), “the period of limitations is 3 years after the time of the . . . injury for all actions to recover damages for . . . injury to a person or property.”

Section 600.5805(1) provides a three-year statute of limitations for the applicable claim.

Wardlaw v. City of Detroit · filed 1991-10-01(1)

Wardlaw exceeded the three year statute of limitations period contained in Mich.Comp.Laws § 600.5805(1) by approximately three years.

Section 600.5805(1) provides the three-year personal-injury limitations period applicable to a § 1983 cause of action.

Crawford v. Schlappi · filed 1993-05-05(1)

Michigan's three-year personal injury statute of limitations applies to a cause of action under § 1983. ... Crawford did not file his complaint until September 25, 1989, long after the statute of limitations had expired.

Subsection (1) provides the three-year limitations period used for § 1983 claims arising in Michigan.

Reid v. The City of Flint Flint Firefighters Iaff Union, Local 352 · filed 1993-10-06(1)

Because this case arises out of Michigan, that state's three-year statute of limitations contained in Mich.Comp.Laws § 600.5805(1) is the uniform limitations period to be applied to this § 1983 case.

Subsection (8) ordinarily supplies a three-year limitations period for claims under the Elliott-Larsen Act and § 1981 civil-rights actions.

Gomez v. Great Lakes Steel Division National Steel Corp. · filed 1986-10-10(8)

Pursuant to Mich.Comp. Laws § 600.5805(8) a three-year statute of limitations ordinarily applies to claims under the Elliott-Larsen Act, Mair v. Consumers Power Co., 419 Mich. 74, 77-78, 348 N.W.2d 256, 257-58 (1984), as well as to § 1981 civil rights actions, Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057, 1063 (6th Cir. 1973). In this case Gomez’s claims of discrimination which occurred prior to July 6, 1978, would thus be barred.

The two-year period in subsection (4) does not govern a claim that sounds in negligence rather than malpractice, including where the parties had no contractual relationship.

Law Offices of Lawrence J Stockler, PC v. Rose · filed 1989-01-03(4)

“Malpractice” is not defined in the Revised Judicature Act and, thus, the definition is determined by resort to the common law. Dennis v Robbins Funeral Home, 428 Mich 698, 702; 411 NW2d 156 (1987). Malpracticé denotes a breach of duty owed by one in rendering professional services to a person who has contracted for such services. Rogers v Horvath, 65 Mich App 644, 646-647; 237 NW2d 595 (1975), lv den 396 Mich 845 (1976), and see Becker v Meyer Rexall Drug Co, 141 Mich App 481, 484-485; 367 NW2d 424 (1985), lv den 423 Mich 852 (1986). Since there was no contractual relationship between the Roses and Touche Ross in the instant case, we conclude that the Roses’ lawsuit sounded in negligence and not malpractice. Accordingly, the two-year limitation period of MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4) was inapplicable and the Roses’ lawsuit against Touche Ross was not barred by it.

For claims essentially sounding in professional malpractice, subsection (6)'s two-year limitations period applies instead of the longer periods in subsections (8) or (10).

Poly-Flex Construction, Inc. v. Neyer, Tiseo & Hindo, Ltd. · filed 2008-10-06(6)

For the reasons previously discussed, PFC’s claims are all essentially in the nature of professional-malpractice claims, so “the applicable period prescribed in section 5805” is the malpractice period specified in § 600.5805(6), not the longer period which § 600.5805(8) would allow for contract claims or § 600.5805(10) would allow for “actions to recover damages for ... injury to a person or property.”

Section 600.5805(10) provides a three-year limitations period for ordinary-negligence claims seeking damages for injury to a person or property, with a negligent insurance-procurement claim accruing when the insurer denies coverage.

Stephens v. Worden Insurance Agency, LLC · filed 2014-10-16(10)

The MCL 600.5805(10) describes that the limitations period expires “3 years after the time of the death or injury for all actions to recover damages for the death of a person, or for injury to a person or property.” ... Today we hold that a negligent procurement or advice claim accrues when the insurer denies the insured’s claim. On that date any speculative injury becomes certain, and the elements of the negligence action are complete.

Section 600.5805(6) provides a two-year statute of limitations for malpractice claims.

Collins v. Citimortgage, Inc. · filed 2013-09-25(6)

Under Michigan law, the limitations period for a claim of malpractice is two years. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(6).

Subsection 600.5805(8) provides a two-year limitations period for medical-malpractice claims, applied here from each surgery date.

Ottgen v. Md · filed 2021-05-20(8)

In this case, Candi’s first surgery was on May 1, 2017. Therefore, she had until May 1, 2019, to properly file her cause of action. See MCL 600.5805(8). ... Consequently, plaintiffs’ claims arising from the May 1, 2017 surgery are barred by the two-year period of limitations enumerated under MCL 600.5805(8). Therefore, dismissal with prejudice with regard to the May 1, 2017 surgery is appropriate.

Subsection 600.5805(10) provides a three-year limitations period for gross-negligence claims.

Nosse v. City of Ann Arbor · filed 2023-02-27(10)

A three-year limitations period applies to Plaintiff’s gross negligence claim. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(10). As such, Plaintiff’s claim must be premised on conduct within the three-year period before the filing of his Complaint on June 9, 2022.

Section 600.5805 establishes a three-year limitations period for negligence claims in Michigan.

Wade v. Michigan, State of · filed 2024-09-11

And the statute of limitations for a negligence claim in Michigan is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805. As with the civil rights claim, the negligence claim needed to be filed on or before February 3, 2022, which it was not.

Section 600.5805 imposes a two-year period for attorney-malpractice claims and a three-year period for conversion claims.

Duchene v. Spicer Sr · filed 2025-07-21(1), (2), and (6)

“A plaintiff must bring a malpractice action within two years of accrual of the claim, MCL 600.5805(1) and (6), or within six months of when he or she discovered or should have discovered the claim, MCL 600.5838(2), whichever is later,” subject to a six-year period of repose. ... The period of limitations for conversion is three years under MCL 600.5805(2). ... Consequently, this claim is barred by MCL 600.5805(2).

Section 600.5805 gives a plaintiff three years to bring a negligence claim.

Coyer v. HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc. · filed 2012-11-30

Even if the Coyers had stated a negligence claim, that claim is barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805.

Section 600.5805(8) provides a three-year limitations period for claims based on intentional nuisance, including when the defendant is a governmental agency and the conduct also involves highway maintenance.

Palomba v. City of East Detroit · filed 1982-01-05(8)

The period of limitations for claims based upon intentional nuisance is three years. MCL 600.5805(8); MSA 27A.5805(8).

Section 600.5805(8) provides a three-year limitations period for claims based on intentional nuisance.

Pacini v. City of Detroit · filed 1983-05-18(8)

The period of limitations for claims based upon intentional nuisance is three years. MCL 600.5805(8); MSA 27A.5805(8). ... Accordingly, plaintiffs cause of action is subject to the three-year, rather than the two-year, statute of limitations, provided she has sufficiently pleaded a claim based upon intentional nuisance.

Subsection (9) bars a loss-of-consortium claim when the applicable limitations period has run and no tolling rule applies.

Wold v. Jeep Corp. · filed 1985-03-18(9)

Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s decision to hold plaintiff’s claim for loss of consortium as being barred by the statute of limitations, and affirm the grant of accelerated judgment as to Gratiot County.

Section 600.5805(10) provides a three-year limitations period for property-damage claims arising from negligence and nuisance, running here once the plaintiffs suffered actual property damage.

Henry v. Dow Chemical Company · filed 2017-06-01(10)

The parties do not dispute that the applicable limitations period is three years for property damage claims arising in negligence and nuisance. MCL 600.5805(10). ... Plaintiffs’ claims did not accrue until the 2002 MDEQ notice was released and plaintiffs first suffered damages as a result of dioxin contamination. The circuit court therefore did not err when it found that plaintiffs’ March 2003 complaint was filed within the three-year limitations period and denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8).

When a statute has barred a cause of action and the limitations period had not expired before the statute was held unconstitutional, the three-year limitations period runs from the decisional date removing the statutory impediment.

Herrick v. Taylor · filed 1982-02-18(8)

The parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations is three years. MCL 600.5805(8); MSA 27A.5805(8). ... Where the statute of limitations has not run prior to the decisional date of the opinion finding the statute prohibiting the cause of action unconstitutional, plaintiffs should have the statutory period from the decisional date within which to bring their action.

Section 600.5805(7), and effective September 13, 1978, § 600.5805(8), imposes a three-year limitation period on wrongful-death actions running from the decedent's death.

Hebert v. Cole · filed 1982-04-22(7), (8)

Wrongful death actions must be brought within three years of the death of the deceased. ... Here, as the action was not instituted within the three-year period of limitation, it is barred. ... At the deceased’s death, the three-year limit was expressed in the general statute, MCL 600.5805(7); MSA 27A.5805(7). Effective September 13, 1978, a specific statute of limitations for wrongful death actions sets the same three-year limit. MCL 600.5805(8); MSA 27A.5805(8).

Section 600.5805(8) applies a three-year period of limitations to both wrongful-death actions and survival actions.

Warren v. Howlett · filed 1986-01-21(8)

The distinction between the two types of actions becomes particularly important when considering the statute of limitations. In either action, the three-year period of limitations is applicable under MCL 600.5805(8); MSA 27A.5805(8).

Subsection (8) gives all other actions for damages for death or injury to a person or property a three-year limitation period beginning on the date of death or injury and ending on the same calendar date three years later.

Dunlap v. Sheffield · filed 1993-05-25(8)

The provision clearly indicates that the limitation period begins on the date of the injury. ... The claim here is covered by a section other than §§ 5829 to 5838; therefore, the claim accrues at the time the wrong occurred, March 22, 1987, which is also the day the period begins to run. Subsection 5805(8) states that the period ends three years from that date. ... Consequently, pursuant to §§ 5805 and 5827, the first day was the day of the accident, March 22, 1987, which makes the last day the same day, three years later, March 22, 1990.

Subsection (10) sets a three-year limitations period for wrongful-death and other actions seeking damages for death or personal or property injury, measured from the death or injury.

Trentadue v. Buckler Automatic Lawn Sprinkler Company · filed 2007-07-25(10)

The applicable statute of limitations in a wrongful death case is MCL 600.5805(10),7 which states: “The period of limitations is 3 years after the time of the *387death or injury for all other actions to recover damages for the death of a person, or for injury to a person or property.”

Section 600.5805 generally requires actions seeking damages for death or personal or property injury to be commenced within three years after the death or injury.

20241218_C368509_55_368509.Opn.Pdf · filed 2024-12-18(1), (2)

MCL 600.5805 states: (1) A person shall not bring or maintain an action to recover damages for injuries to persons or property unless, after the claim first accrued to the plaintiff or to someone through whom the plaintiff claims, the action is commenced within the periods of time prescribed by this section. (2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the period of limitations is 3 years after the time of the death or injury for all actions to recover damages for the death of a person or for injury to a person or property.

Subsection (8) imposes a three-year limitations period on tort claims, including mental-anguish damages claims characterized as tort rather than contract.

MacDonald v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1982-06-16(8)

We find that June E. MacDonald’s individual claim for damages based upon mental anguish she allegedly sustained is a tort claim rather than a contract claim and thus is barred by the three-year statute of limitations contained in MCL 600.5805(8); MSA 27A.5805(8).

Section 600.5805(8) keeps the general three-year limitation period for injury claims even when § 600.5839 applies; § 600.5839 does not extend that period to six years.

Witherspoon v. Guilford · filed 1994-01-18(8)

What is less clear is whether the six-year period applicable to ordinary negligence under § 5839 precludes application of § 5805(8) where the cause of action arises within six years after use or acceptance of the improvement. In other words, recognizing that § 5839 is a specific statute of limitations, which normally controls over a general statute of limitations, ... the question is whether § 5839, in tandem with § 5805(10), renders § 5805(8) inapplicable. We hold that it does not. ... We do not understand those provisions to expand the general three-year period of viability for injury claims under § 5805(8) to a six-year period insofar as the claims apply to those protected by § 5839.

Section 600.5805(10) imposes a three-year limitation period on negligence and intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims.

Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Detroit · filed 2005-02-16(10)

Intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence are subject to a three-year statute of limitation. MCL 600.5805(10); Lemmerman v Fealk, 449 Mich 56, 63-64; 534 NW2d 695 (1995).

Section 600.5805(10) provides a three-year limitations period for a negligence claim, including negligence arising from an alleged statutory violation when no civil claim exists for violating the underlying criminal statute.

Gates v. Brubaker · filed 2015-01-15(10)

Thus, the proper period of limitations is the three-year period provided under MCL 600.5805(10). ... Assuming that Brubaker’s refusal could constitute negligence, Gates had to sue him within three years of that date. Lemmerman v Fealk, 449 Mich 56, 63-64; 534 NW2d 695 (1995); MCL 600.5805(10). Gates, however, did not sue until April 2013. Therefore, his negligence claim was untimely.

Subsection (10) imposes a three-year limitations period on a private individual's public-nuisance claim involving a distinct injury to person or property.

David a Mills v. Lerner · filed 2015-04-14(10)

The three-year limitations period in MCL 600.5805(10) applies to a private individual’s public nuisance claim because the individual must show a distinct injury, and MCL 600.5805(10) provides the time limitation for initiating a claim related to injury to a person or property.

Section 600.5805(1) and (10) sets a three-year limitations period for tort actions, running from accrual regardless of when the damage occurs.

Polytorx LLC v. Regents of University of Michigan · filed 2015-05-07(1) and (10)

MCL 600.5805(1) and (10) and MCL 600.5827 provide that the period of limitations for an action in tort runs three years from the time the claim accrues, regardless of the time when damage results.

Section 600.5805(2) bars a tort claim after its three-year limitations period expires.

Estate of Yacoub Audisho v. Everest National Insurance Company · filed 2021-06-24(2)

Second, no tort claim could be brought against Yacoub as the limitations period of three years has expired.

Section 600.5805(2) sets a three-year limitations period for gross negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.

Dixon-Brown v. Covenant Cemetery Services · filed 2022-02-10(2)

Plaintiffs do not dispute that, under the facts of this case, the general three-year statutory limitation period applied to their claims of gross negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. ... Thus, in 2001, plaintiffs’ claims accrued when they were harmed, long before 2016.

Section 600.5805(2) provides a three-year limitations period for tort damages claims involving death or injury to a person or property.

Dixon-Brown v. Covenant Cemetery Services · filed 2022-02-10(2)

MCL 600.5805(2) provides a three-year period of limitations “after the time of the death or injury for all actions to recover damages for the death of ... a person or for injury to a person or property.”

Section 600.5805(4) governs claims alleging professional negligence as medical malpractice.

Dorlin v. Providence Hospital · filed 1982-08-25(4)

The claim sounds in professional negligence and is governed by the medical malpractice statute, MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4).

Section 600.5805(8) imposes a two-year limitations period on medical-malpractice claims, so claims classified as medical malpractice are time-barred when filed later than two years after accrual.

Trowell v. Providence Hospital and Medical Centers Inc · filed 2018-07-23(8)

At issue in this case is whether plaintiff’s claims sound in medical malpractice or ordinary negligence. If her claims sound in medical malpractice, then they are barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice actions and defendant is entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7). ... As stated in the complaint, the other claims sound in medical malpractice, and thus those other claims are time-barred.

Section 600.5805(3) provides a two-year limitations period for attorney malpractice claims; the court could not find the claim barred on this record because the timing of the alleged malpractice remained a factual question.

Biberstine v. Woodworth · filed 1978-03-07(3)

Both parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations is two years, MCLA 600.5805(3); MSA 27A.5805(3), and that the accrual of the claim is governed by MCLA 600.5838; MSA 27A.5838 before its amendment by 1975 PA 142. ... The trial court erred in ruling that plaintiff’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations on the basis of the present record.

Section 600.5805(6) gives a plaintiff two years after accrual to file a professional malpractice claim.

Papa's Pizza Inc v. Globe Midwest Corporation · filed 2018-03-08(6)

Regardless, plaintiff’s accrual claim is without merit. A professional malpractice claim must be filed within two years of its accrual, MCL 600.5805(1) and (6), or within six months of when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered its claim, MCL 600.5838(2), whichever is later.

The three-year limitations period for actions to recover damages for injuries to persons and property does not apply to inverse condemnation actions.

Hart v. City of Detroit · filed 1982-12-23(7) (renumbered as (8))

Accordingly, we find that the three-year statute of limitations for "injuries to persons and property” is not applicable to inverse condemnation actions.

Section 600.5805(10)'s three-year period for injury to property does not govern an inverse condemnation claim seeking compensation for a taking.

Lakeside Resort LLC v. Township · filed 2016-04-05(10)

The Hart Court also rejected application of the three-year limitations period currently found in MCL 600.5805(10), because, although it applies, in part, to the recovery of damages for an injury to property, a plaintiff in an inverse condemnation action “must prove that a taking in the sense of conversion has occurred, not merely that he has suffered injury to his property.” Id. at 502.

Section 600.5805(2) supplies a two-year limitations period for false imprisonment, § 600.5805(7) supplies a one-year period for defamation, and the general-negligence period in § 600.5805(8) does not govern a § 1983 false-arrest claim.

Granet v. Wallich Lumber · filed 1983-04-26(8), (2), (7)

Plaintiff, however, contends that the catchall MCLA § 600.5805(8) three-year limitation applies. ... After Kilgore, this Court is not authorized to apply the general negligence statute of limitations. Like Kilgore, this case involves a false arrest. And like Kilgore, the appropriate statute of limitations with respect to the false imprisonment portion of plaintiff’s section 1983 claim is the false imprisonment statute of limitations. This statute of limitations, found at MCLA § 600.5805(2) is two years. Since the false arrest at issue occurred more than two years before this lawsuit was filed, the false imprisonment portion of plaintiff’s claim must be dismissed. ... The applicable statute of limitations is the Michigan defamation statute of limitations — MCLA § 600.5805(7) — which is one year. But since the defamation allegedly is continuing, the defamation portion of the complaint is not time barred.

Subsection (2) imposes a two-year limitations period on claims for assault, battery, false arrest, and false imprisonment.

Roberson v. Macnicol · filed 2017-06-19(2)

Roberson’s state-law claims for assault and battery, false arrest, and false imprisonment are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Michigan defamation claims are subject to a one-year limitations period, so claims based on statements made more than one year before the action began are barred.

House of Providence v. Meyers · filed 2020-05-05(9)

must also keep in mind, as defendants point out, that defamation claims in Michigan are subject to a one-year limitations period, see Mitan v. Campbell, 706 N.W.2d 420, 422 (2005) (citing Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(1), (9)), and therefore plaintiffs may not base any of their defamation claims on statements allegedly made more than one year before this action was commenced.

Section 600.5805(1) imposes a one-year limitations period on libel and defamation claims.

PMP - Romulus, Inc. v. Valyrian Machine, LLC · filed 2024-08-02(1)

However, “[t]he statute of limitations in Michigan for claims of libel or defamation is one year.” Nichols v. Moore, 334 F. Supp. 2d 944, 948 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (alteration added) (citing Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 600.5805(1), (11)), aff’d by, 477 F.3d 396 (6th Cir. 2007). ... Thus, the statutory period for defamation claims would be from February 15, 2023, to February 15, 2024. Tony Konopka’s alleged act of defamation in November 2022 is the only alleged act of defamation that does not fall within Michigan’s one-year statute of limitations period. ... Therefore, Tony Konopka’s alleged statement, made in November 2022, is outside of the statutory period and must be dismissed.

Section 600.5805(9) requires libel and slander actions to be filed within one year after the claim accrues.

Bassett v. Wayne County · filed 2018-07-17(9)

A one-year limitations period for defamation claims is found in MCL 600.5805(1), (9), which provides: ... (9) The period of limitations is 1 year for an action charging libel or slander. Therefore, defamation claims must be filed within one year from the date the claim first accrued. ... Plaintiff filed her complaint in this matter on May 23, 2016, nearly two years after DPS received the background check information and terminated plaintiff’s employment. The trial court properly determined that plaintiff’s defamation and slander claims were subject to dismissal because both claims are barred by operation of the relevant period of limitations.

Section 600.5805(1) requires a defamation action to be filed within the prescribed period after first accrual, and subsection (9) sets that period at one year for libel or slander; republication does not extend the period for the original statement.

Mitan v. Campbell · filed 2005-12-06(1), (9)

MCL 600.5805(1) and (9) are clear and unambiguous. Our Legislature has clearly provided that a defamation claim must be filed within one year from the date the claim first accrued. The claim first accrued when the defamatory statement was made on February 22, 2000. The statute does not contemplate extending the accrual of the claim on the basis of republication, regardless of whether the republication was intended by the speaker.

Subsection (7)'s one-year period governs defamation, while subsection (8)'s three-year period governs an injurious-falsehood theory seeking special pecuniary damages, not general reputation damages.

Kollenberg v. Ramirez · filed 1983-07-19(7), (8)

Defendant argues in this appeal, as he did in the lower court, that Count I of plaintiffs first amended complaint was actually a reiteration of the defamation claim, or slander per se, that plaintiff alleged in his original complaint. As such, defendant argues that that claim should have been dismissed as barred by the running of the one-year period of limitation for defamation actions. MCL 600.5805(7); MSA 27A.5805(7). We disagree and affirm the trial court’s ruling on that claim. ... The more difficult question presented in this case is whether a properly asserted action for an injurious falsehood arising from a statement that is also defamatory in nature is subject to the one-year period of limitation for a defamation action. ... We find the Horstein approach the better one, the one that comports best with analogous Michigan case law. ... Plaintiff argued, as plaintiff does in this case, that the three-year period of limitation for damages to person or property applied. MCL 600.5805(8); MSA 27A.5805(8). ... The Wilkerson Court held that plaintiff had alleged the necessary elements of a tortious interference with an economic relationship even though that interference was allegedly caused by a defamatory statement. The plaintiff was correct in arguing that the three-year period of limitation applied to that tort. ... We find the reasoning of Wilkerson applicable here where plaintiffs allegations could support either an action for defamation or for an injurious falsehood. Plaintiff has pled all the elements of an injurious falsehood including special pecuniary damages. ... However, we limit the three-year limitations period to an action for only those special pecuniary damages alleged. General personal damages for injury to plaintiff’s professional reputation are not recoverable in the injurious falsehood action. Thus, we modify the trial court’s order to the extent that plaintiff is precluded from seeking such general damages.

Subsections (1) and (9) require a defamation claim to be brought within one year after accrual.

Andrew Rocky Raczkowski v. Knollenberg · filed 2017-12-26(1), (9)

A defamation claim must be brought within one year of accrual. MCL 600.5805(1) and (9); Mitan, 474 Mich at 23.

Section 600.5805(1) and (9) imposes a one-year limitations period for defamation claims, running from the first publication and not restarting on republication, including by a third party.

Lynk v. Chase Home Finance, LLC · filed 2009-08-14(1), (9)

Under the applicable statute of limitations, the plaintiff had one year from the time the claim first accrued to bring a defamation action. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(1), (9). A defamation claim accrues when the defamatory statement is first made, and “[t]he statute does not contemplate extending the accrual of the claim on the basis of republication, regardless of whether the republication was intended by the speaker.” ... This rule includes republication by a third party.

Section 600.5805(11) imposes a one-year limitations period on reputational damages from defamation, while § 600.5805(2) provides a three-year period for special pecuniary damages from injurious falsehood.

Geomatrix, LLC v. Int'l · filed 2023-09-12(11), (2)

Further, when, as here, there is a limitations question, these damages are also subject to separate limitations periods—reputational damages resulting from defamation are subject to a one-year limitations period, Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(11), but “special pecuniary damages” are subject to a three-year limitations period, id. § 600.5805(2). ... With this background, we consider the business defamation claim. We agree with the district court that the one-year limitations period, Mich. Comp. Laws. § 600.5805(11), applies, but only in part. ... The analysis is slightly different for the injurious falsehood claim. ... Moreover, these are governed by a three-year limitations period, see id.; Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2), so any statement in the complaint after December 18, 2017, may suffice.

The three-year limitations period for a products liability action in § 600.5805(9) did not apply to a claim accruing before December 13, 1978; the claim remained governed by the unamended three-year period in § 600.5805(7).

Bonney v. the Upjohn Company · filed 1983-09-26(7), (8), (9)

The special products liability period of limitations provision is, therefore, not applicable to the plaintiffs’ claim. Instead, MCL 600.5805(7); MSA 27A.5805(7), unamended, governs their claim. Under that provision the period of limitations is three years.

Subsection (9) imposes a three-year limitation period for products-liability claims, and a John Doe complaint does not toll or satisfy that period for defendants who are not specifically named.

Thomas v. Process Equipment Corp. · filed 1986-08-18(9)

In a products liability claim, as in this case, there is a period of limitation of three years from the accrual of such claim. MCL 600.5805(9); MSA 27A.5805(9). ... More importantly, plaintiffs’ position conflicts with the previous holdings of this Court that the filing of a "John Doe” complaint does not toll or satisfy the period of limitation; for all practical purposes all defendants specifically unnamed are not yet parties to a suit. ... Therefore, amendments to a complaint that add new parties do not relate back.

Subsection (9) sets a three-year period of limitations for products liability actions.

Grimm v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1986-12-30(9)

The applicable statute of limitation for products liability actions is three years. MCL 600.5805(9); MSA 27A.5805(9). ... Therefore, plaintiffs decedent had three years from that date to file a claim.

Section 600.5805(9) gives a products liability action three years to be brought.

SS Aircraft Co. v. Piper Aircraft Corp. · filed 1987-04-20(9)

Piper filed a motion for summary disposition alleging that plaintiff’s products liability cause of action was barred by MCL 600.5805(9); MSA 27A.58O50), which allows three years for a products liability action to be brought. ... In the instant case, S.S. Aircraft’s products liability claim accrued on the date of the crash — February 19, 1981. This claim became forever barred by the running of the statutory period on February 19, 1984. Thus, the complaint filed in the instant suit on February 13, 1985, is untimely. Therefore, the trial court correctly granted Piper summary disposition on the basis that S.S. Aircraft’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 600.5805(9) gives a products-liability plaintiff three years from accrual to sue, and accrual occurs when all necessary claim elements have occurred and can be alleged in a proper complaint.

Mascarenas v. Union Carbide Corp. · filed 1992-10-05(9)

The three-year limitation period for a products liability action runs from the time the claim accrues. MCL 600.5805(9), 600.5827; MSA 27A.5805(9), 27A.5827. A claim accrues when all the necessary elements have occurred and can be alleged in a proper complaint.

Section 600.5805 requires injury actions to be commenced within the applicable limitations period after accrual and sets a three-year period for products-liability actions; for a products-liability claim involving a sudden injury, accrual occurs when the injury occurs rather than when a defect is later discovered.

Wendel v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2024-09-05(1), (12)

MCL 600.5805(1) provides that “[a] person shall not bring or maintain an action to recover damages for injuries to persons or property unless, after the claim first accrued . . . , the action is commenced within the periods of time prescribed by this section.” (Emphasis added.) ... MCL 600.5805(12) states, “The period of limitations is 3 years for a products liability action.” ... In contrast, when a product causes sudden injury, as occurred here, the harm is much more apparent and thus indicative of a potential cause of action. ... For the foregoing reasons, Wendel’s claim was properly construed as sounding generally in products liability and not subject to the discovery rule for the subset of breach of warranty claims under MCL 600.5833.

Section 600.5805(9)'s three-year limitation period for product-liability actions does not govern a commercial purchaser's claim for purely economic loss caused by defective goods; the UCC's limitation period controls.

Neibarger v. Universal Coopertives, Inc. · filed 1992-05-20(9)

In the cases before us, plaintiffs argue that their claims fall within the class of products liability actions defined in MCL 600.2945; MSA 27A.2945,25 and that the proper statutes of limitation and accrual are those provided by the Revised Judicature Act, MCL 600.5805(9); MSA 27A.5805(9) and MCL 600.5833; MSA 27A.5833. We disagree for the reasons stated above. Application of the rja to the cases before us would effectively negate Article 2 of the ucc; application of the economic loss doctrine ensures that the ucc will remain effective in governing commercial disputes, while the rja serves to govern noncommercial products liability actions.

Section 600.5805(10) supplies a three-year limitations period for false-light invasion-of-privacy claims because the Legislature did not expressly assign them the one-year period in § 600.5805(9).

Derderian v. Genesys Health Care Systems · filed 2004-10-28(9) (10)

Although defendants assert, without citation of supporting authority, that the statute of limitations for plaintiffs’ claim is the one-year period applicable to the somewhat similar claim of defamation, MCL 600.5805(9), this Court has previously applied the general “injury to person” limitation period, three years, see MCL 600.5805(10), to this cause of action. Arent v Hatch, 133 Mich App 700, 705; 349 NW2d 536 (1984). Because the Legislature did not expressly impose a one-year limitations period on claims of false light invasion of privacy, we will not assume that it intended to do so.

For an invasion-of-privacy claim, the three-year limitation period under § 600.5805(8) begins when all elements of the claim have occurred; here, the claim accrued when the criminal nature of the defendant’s conduct was exposed in March 1979.

Arent v. Hatch · filed 1984-04-16(8)

The trial court ruled that plaintiff’s claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations, MCL 600.5805(8); MSA 27A.5805(8), because plaintiff’s cause of action accrued in 1974, when plaintiff was first placed in a false light. ... Defendant contends that the wrong was done in the instant case when the checks were first disclosed to third persons. We disagree. At the time the checks were negotiated in 1974, the signatures were not known to be forgeries, nor had the criminal nature of defendant’s action been exposed. Therefore, in 1974, not all of the elements of the cause of action had occurred. Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued in March, 1979. Since plaintiff’s complaint was filed in April, 1981, plaintiff’s suit for invasion of privacy was not barred by the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 600.5805's limitations period is not governed by a constitutionally required discovery rule; the period may run from accrual even before the claimant discovers the cause of action.

Lumber Village, Inc v. Siegler · filed 1984-06-28

Initially, plaintiff presents the constitutional argument that due process requires that the statutory period of limitation starts running from the day of discovery by plaintiff of the cause of action, rather than from the date that the cause of action accrued. ... Since a review of relevant federal and state law discloses that neither the federal nor state constitution mandates that a "discovery” rule be utilized when applying a statutory period of limitation, we find Issue I to be without merit.

Subsection 5805(8) imposes a three-year limitations period, which begins when the discriminatory act occurs rather than when its later effects occur or the employer refuses to undo it.

Robson v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1984-09-18(8)

Ricks and Chardon show that the limitations period begins to run with the discriminatory act, not with the employer’s subsequent failure to change its mind. Requests for relief from a prior discriminatory act will not start the limitations period running anew.

Section 600.5805(8) imposes a three-year limitations period that bars a discriminatory-discharge action filed more than three years after discharge, measured from the employee’s last day worked.

Parker v. Cadillac Gage Textron, Inc · filed 1995-11-14(8)

A claim of discriminatory discharge accrues on the date the plaintiff is discharged. ... The last day worked is the date of discharge. Subsequent severance or vacation pay does not affect the date of discharge. ... In this case, plaintiffs filed their case more than three years after the date they were discharged. ... Even if we accept the mistaken notation in defendant’s records that January 4, 1991, was the last day worked, the three-year statute of limitations bars plaintiffs’ suit.

Section 600.5805(10)’s three-year period for a discriminatory termination claim begins when the employee is discharged, even if the employee was suspended earlier.

Collins v. Comerica Bank · filed 2003-07-02(10)

Accordingly, plaintiff’s causes of action for discriminatory termination had yet to arise on the date of her suspension, September 5, 1996, and the limitation period does not begin to run before a cause of action accrues.

Section 600.5805(8)'s three-year limitations period does not bar an appeal from a Civil Rights Commission refusal to issue a charge, but it bars any independent cause of action introduced in the circuit-court proceeding.

Anderson v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1984-11-05(8)

The trial court also erred in applying the three-year statute of limitations against plaintiffs claim of appeal from the CRC decision. If, however, on remand, the trial court determines that any part of plaintiffs circuit court petition or brief introduces an independent cause of action, that action will be barred by the limitations period.

Section 600.5805(9) imposes a three-year period of limitations on products-liability actions, which the court applied to bar wrongful-death claims based on time-barred asbestosis injuries.

Larson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. · filed 1985-01-23(9)

In the instant case, as we have stated, the plaintiffs allege a wrongful death cause of action sounding in products liability. All four plaintiffs concede that the three-year period of limitation for products liability contained in MCL 600.5805(9); MSA 27A.5805(9) had run prior to commencement of their respective asbestosis claims. Applying the authorities referred to above, we conclude that the trial court was correct in awarding summary judgment in the four cases on these claims.

Subsection (4) imposes a two-year limitation period on malpractice actions, including a pharmacist’s negligent dispensing of the wrong drug; subsection (9)’s three-year products-liability period does not apply when the claim is based on negligent dispensing rather than a defective product.

Simmons v. Apex Drug Stores, Inc · filed 1993-08-16(4), (9)

The limitation period of MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4) applies to an action where it is alleged that a licensed pharmacist mistakenly dispensed the wrong drug, thus harming the plaintiff. ... Plaintiff also attempts to characterize his action as one alleging products liability, to which a three-year period of limitation would apply. MCL 600.5805(9); MSA 27A.5805(9). Plaintiffs analysis is incorrect. This is not an action alleging the sale of a defective product.

Section 600.5805(13) sets a three-year statute of limitations for products liability claims.

Peter v. STRYKER ORTHOPAEDICS, INC. · filed 2008-10-06(13)

The statute of limitations for a products liability claim is three years.

Section 600.5805(10) gives products-liability claims a three-year statute of limitations.

Stults v. Symrise, Inc. · filed 2013-12-24(10)

The Michigan statute of limitations for products liability claims is three years. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(10).

Section 600.5805(13) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on all products liability claims.

Stephenson v. C. R. Bard, Inc. · filed 2018-01-31(13)

Under Michigan law, all products liability claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(13).

For products-liability claims based on breach of implied warranty, § 600.5805(9) is construed together with the discovery rule in § 600.5833 to determine when the claim accrues.

Cullender v. BASF Wyandotte Corp. · filed 1985-10-11(9)

We further find that the "discovery rule” contained in MCL 600.5833; MSA 27A.5833 should be construed together with MCL 600.5805(9); MSA 27A.5805(9) to determine the accrual date of causes of action for products liability based on breach of implied warranty.

Section 600.5805(9)'s discovery period does not apply to a product-liability claim for an HVAC system that is an improvement to real property covered by the architects-and-engineers statute of repose.

Fennell v. John J. Nesbitt, Inc · filed 1986-09-09(9)

Accordingly, we conclude that the term "improvement to real property” should be construed to include the design of the hvac system and to preclude maintaining a cause of action under MCL 600.5805(9); MSA 27A.5805(9).

Section 600.5805(4)'s general malpractice limitation period applies when a special statute of limitations does not govern the claim.

City of Marysville v. Pate, Hirn & Bogue, Inc · filed 1986-09-15(4)

A special statute of limitation addressing a specific claim always controls over a general statute of limitations. ... However, where a special statute of limitation does not apply to a claim, the general statute of limitation should be used. Because the special statute of limitation for architects and engineers did not apply as discussed above, the trial court correctly applied the general malpractice statutes of limitation to plaintiffs claim.

Section 600.5805(6) gives malpractice actions a two-year limitations period, while § 600.5805(10) gives most tort actions a three-year period; the applicable period depends on the nature of the interest harmed rather than the claim's label.

Bishop & Heintz Pc v. Finch · filed 2016-07-12(6), (10)

Here, the two-year statute of limitations, not the six-year statute of repose, applies. ... Again, we agree with defendant in that the statute of limitations for most tort claims, including a general negligent-infliction-of-emotional distress counterclaim, is three years. ... Thus, because the “type of interest harmed, rather that the label given the claim, determines what limitations period controls,” Seebacher, 181 Mich App at 646, the circuit court was correct in concluding that the two-year legal-malpractice statute of limitations applied to each of defendant’s counterclaims.

Subsection (6) provides a two-year limitations period for medical malpractice actions, while subsection (10) provides a three-year limitations period for ordinary negligence actions.

Kuznar v. Raksha Corp. · filed 2006-11-22(6), (10)

The statutory period of limitations for a medical malpractice action is two years, whereas the statutory period of limitations for an ordinary negligence action is three years. See MCL 600.5805(6) and MCL 600.5805(10). ... Plaintiffs timely commenced their negligence action on October 7, 2003, within three years of the alleged acts of negligence that occurred in November 2000. MCL 600.5805(10).

Section 600.5805(6) supplies the two-year limitations period for medical-malpractice claims, while § 600.5805(10) supplies the three-year period for ordinary-negligence claims.

Kuznar v. Raksha Corp. · filed 2008-06-11(6), (10)

Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claims of direct liability against Randall and Crown Pharmacy and their claims for vicarious liability against Crown Pharmacy sound in ordinary negligence. Because plaintiffs have stated valid claims of ordinary negligence, the trial court properly denied defendants’ motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8). The claims are not barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations, and so the court also properly denied defendants’ motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7).

Section 600.5805(4)'s two-year malpractice limitation does not cover claims against funeral homes or funeral directors, while section 600.5805(8)'s three-year limitation applies to traditional and primarily common-law tort claims for injury to a person or property.

Dennis v. Robbins Funeral Home · filed 1987-08-24(4) and (8)

Since there was no common-law cause of action for funeral director or funeral home malpractice, we find no indication that the Legislature intended to include such actions within the meaning of malpractice as it is used in MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4). ... Therefore, we find that a person engaged in mortuary science is practicing a profession, but that that profession is not among those which the Legislature intended to be included within the malpractice statute of limitations, MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4). ... In determining that the three-year limitation period controls, we find that this case involves an alleged injury to person or property within the meaning of § 5805(8). The provisions of this statute apply to traditional and primarily common-law torts. We find that the three-year period of limitations applies in this case and is the proper limitation period for this action.

Section 600.5805(6) provides a two-year limitations period for medical-malpractice claims, while subsection (10) provides a three-year period for ordinary-negligence claims; the court classified these claims as malpractice.

Estate of Brian P Turner v. Christopher M Mohler Md · filed 2016-11-08(6), (10)

An ordinary negligence action is subject to a three-year limitations period, MCL 600.5805(10), whereas the limitations period for a medical malpractice claim is two years, MCL 600.5805(6). ... Accordingly, the trial court properly determined that plaintiff’s claim was one for medical malpractice, and not ordinary negligence.

Sections 600.5805(1) and (6) require professional-malpractice claims, including accounting-malpractice claims, to be brought within two years after the claim accrues.

Jgm Transportation Inc v. Lewis & Knopf Cpas Pc · filed 2015-02-24(1) and (6)

Claims of professional malpractice, including accounting malpractice, must be brought within two years of the date that the claim first accrued. MCL 600.5805(1) and (6); see Local 1064, RWDSU AFL-CIO v Ernst & Young, 449 Mich 322, 333; 535 NW2d 187 (1995).

Section 600.5805(8) provides a three-year limitation period for property-damage claims, but a continuing trespass or nuisance is not barred while the interference continues; whether the injury is temporary or permanent, and thus whether the claim is time-barred, is for the jury.

Traver Lakes Community Maintenance Ass'n v. Douglas Co. · filed 1997-10-01(8)

Finally, defendants argue that plaintiff’s trespass claim and proposed nuisance claim were time-barred under the applicable three-year period of limitation for damage to property, MCL 600.5805(8); MSA 27A.5805(8). Plaintiff counters that its claim is not time-barred because the excess silt flowing into the pond system constitutes a continuing trespass/ nuisance. ... Where a trespass or nuisance is alleged to have continued during the limitation period, recovery is not barred. ... Here, a question of fact exists whether the alleged trespass/nuisance involving plaintiffs pond system was temporary, and therefore abatable by reasonable curative or remedial action, or whether it was permanent in nature, and therefore nonabatable. Where, as here, a question of fact exists regarding the temporary or permanent nature of the nuisance and whether, as a consequence, the claim is time-barred under MCL 600.5805(8); MSA 27A.5805(8), these issues should be submitted to a jury. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings regarding plaintiff’s trespass and proposed nuisance claims.

For a nuisance claim, the three-year limitations period does not begin with the first act when the nuisance is continuing.

Difronzo v. Village of Port Sanilac · filed 1988-02-01(8)

If a nuisance is of a continuing nature the period of limitations does not begin to run from the date of the first act. ... Plaintiff has pled that the intrusion in this case is ongoing. We therefore reverse the trial court holding that the period of limitations has run.

Section 600.5805(8) provides a three-year statute of limitations for wrongful-death actions, subject to tolling while a prior action is pending and not adjudicated on the merits.

Roberts v. City of Troy · filed 1988-08-15(8)

The statute of limitations for a wrongful death action is three years. MCL 600.5805(8); MSA 27A.5805(8). ... Accordingly, plaintiff’s state law claims against defendants were not adjudicated on the merits and were dismissed without prejudice. Thus, the statute of limitations was tolled throughout the period that the prior suit was pending in the federal courts.

For medical-malpractice claims, the limitations period uses a discovery rule, and when reasonable minds could differ about when the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the malpractice, the discovery issue is for the jury.

Wakefield v. Hills · filed 1988-11-22(3), (4)

The applicable statute of limitations is set forth by the former provisions of MCL 600.5805(3); MSA 27A.5805(3) and MCL 600.5838; MSA 27A.5838. These sections must be read together. ... Reasonable minds could differ as to when Peggy Wakefield discovered or should have discovered defendants’ alleged malpractice. The discovery issue is a question of fact for the jury. The lower court erred by granting summary disposition in favor of defendants based on the statute of limitations.

The limitations period is tolled when the complaint is filed, even if service occurs later.

Goniwicha v. Harkai · filed 1974-12-23(7)

The statute of limitations was tolled from and after November 23, 1970, the date that this action was commenced.

Section 600.5805(4)'s two-year medical-malpractice limitations period is tolled during the 182-day statutory notice period.

Morrison v. Dickinson · filed 1996-08-12(4)

Reading the notice provision and the tolling provision together, it is clear that the Legislature intended to toll the limitation period set forth in MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4) during the pendency of the notice period.

Section 600.5805 requires a negligence action to be brought within three years after the injury and does not toll that period until the plaintiff learns that the injury is serious enough to exceed the no-fault tort threshold.

Gagliardi v. Flack · filed 1989-09-05(1) and (8)

The indefinite tolling of the statute of limitations until the plaintiff knows or should have known of his or her likelihood of prevailing before a jury on the threshold issue is a standard too indefinite and uncertain to be administered. The purposes of the no-fault act would be thwarted by the unpredictable application of a tolling doctrine to nearly all automobile accident injuries. The security against stale and fraudulent claims would vanish as memories fade, witnesses die, records are destroyed, and scenes are changed. The worthy policy objectives of the statute of limitations would be voided as the judicially created exception consumes the rule.

Section 600.5805's malpractice limitation period is tolled until the malpractice is discovered or reasonably could have been discovered; for a claim accruing before the 1975 amendment, the older two-year discovery tolling period applies.

City of Marysville v. Pate, Hirn & Bogue, Inc · filed 1992-09-09

Under Dyke, supra, the limitation period embodied in MCL 600.5805; MSA 27A.5805 is tolled until the malpractice is discovered or reasonably could be discovered. ... We hold that, because plaintiff’s cause of action accrued before the amendment of MCL 600.5838; MSA 27A.5838, the old tolling period from Dyke is applicable.

Section 600.5805(1) requires an action to be commenced within the prescribed limitations period, but filing the complaint alone does not toll that period; tolling requires compliance with § 600.5856.

Gladych v. New Family Homes, Inc · filed 2003-07-01(1)

Focusing solely on the statutory language, § 5805 simply provides a threshold requirement before the filing of a complaint. In other words, § 5805 provides that one cannot commence an action unless the complaint is filed within the periods prescribed by that section. Section 5805 does not provide, however, that the statute of limitations somehow becomes irrelevant once the complaint is filed. In fact, the plain language of the statute extends no further than the filing of the complaint. ... It is precisely because § 5805 pertains only to the filing of the complaint that one must then turn to § 5856 to determine the effect of the statute of limitations once the complaint has been filed.

Section 600.5805(1) provides a three-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, and days covered by AO 2020-3 are excluded when computing that period.

20230126_C360772_36_360772.Opn.Pdf · filed 2023-01-26(1)

MCR 1.108(1) clearly applies to computations involving statutes of limitations, i.e., “a period of time prescribed or allowed by . . . statute[.]” Accordingly, under AO 2020-3 and MCR 1.108(1), any day falling during the state of emergency does not count toward determining the last day of a statutory limitations period.

Section 600.5805’s three-year period for conversion claims does not apply to a claim seeking to invalidate a trust because the settlor lacked mental capacity.

Sparling v. Sparling · filed 2022-06-16(10)

If John’s argument were correct, most, if not all claims to invalidate a trust would be a claim for conversion, rendering MCL 700.7604 nugatory, because all claims would be properly addressed under MCL 600.5805. We reject such an interpretation of the complaint.

Section 600.5805(4) sets the time for filing a malpractice action in court and does not directly bar an arbitration demand.

Nielsen v. Butterworth Hospital · filed 1990-03-05(4)

However, our review of this provision indicates that it refers only to the requisite time frame within which an action alleging malpractice must be filed. The statute specifically uses the term action which we believe does not encompass demands for arbitration, but, rather, refers only to suits filed in a court of law.

Subsection 5805(8)'s three-year personal-injury limitation does not apply to contractual maintenance-and-cure claims.

Oliver v. National Gypsum Co. · filed 1991-03-05(8)

The trial court found the claim time-barred by the three-year statutory limitation period for personal injury actions. MCL 600.5805(8); MSA 27A.5805(8). However, a claim for maintenance and cure is not predicated on the fault or negligence of the shipowner, or the unseaworthiness of the vessel. It is contractual in nature, arising out of the employment relationship, and seeks damages in the form of subsistence payments, reimbursement for medical expenses, and unearned wages. ... Consequently, limitation periods for tort actions, under § 763a or state statutes, are inapplicable.

The statute's one-year limitation period for libel or slander applies to actions for slander of title, rather than the three-year residual period.

Bonner v. Chicago Title Insurance · filed 1992-06-01(7)

MCL 600.5805; MSA 27A.5805 provides, in pertinent part: ... (7) The period of limitations is 1 year for an action charging libel or slander. ... (8) The period of limitations is 3 years after the time of the death or injury for all other actions to recover damages for the death of a person, or for injury to a person or property. ... We agree with the view adopted by the jurisdictions mentioned above and hold that the one-year period of limitation for an action charging libel or slander applies to an action for slander of title.

Section 600.5805(1) requires an action to be brought within the applicable limitations period, and subsection (11) gives libel or slander actions a one-year period; each defamatory publication may support a separate claim, but recovery is limited to publications within one year of suit.

Redmond v. Heller · filed 2020-05-28(1), (11)

The Legislature has prohibited a person from bringing “an action to recover damages for injuries to persons or property unless, after the claim first accrued to the plaintiff or to someone ... through whom the plaintiff claims, the action is commenced within” the applicable period of limitations. MCL 600.5805(1). “The period of limitations is 1 year for an action charging libel or slander.” MCL 600.5805(11). ... Since Leonard, Michigan courts have continued to recognize that each act amounting to libel or slander could serve as a separate claim subject to a separate period of limitations, or could be joined in one action. ... But in either case, a plaintiff’s proofs and recovery would be limited to those libels or slanders that occurred within one year of the suit. See Grist, 1 Mich App at 85 (stating that each slanderous act is a basis for an action, and the statute of limitations runs from the date of each such act).

Section 600.5805 imposes a one-year limitations period on an action charging libel or slander, and that period applies to a slander-of-title action.

Equity Funding Inc v. Village of Milford · filed 2022-07-21

An action for slander of title has a one-year statute of limitations. See Bonner v Chicago Title Ins Co, 194 Mich App 462, 471; 487 NW2d 807 (1992) (“[T]he statute of limitations applicable to actions for libel and slander applies to actions for slander of title”); MCL 600.5805 (providing that “[t]he period of limitations is 1 year for an action charging libel or slander”); see also MCL 565.107 (indicating that “[n]othing contained in this act shall be construed to extend the periods for the bringing of an action or for the doing of any other required act under any existing statutes of limitation . . . .”).

Subsection (2) provides a two-year limitation period for assault-and-battery claims, while subsection (8) provides a three-year limitation period for negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims.

Guerra v. Garratt · filed 1997-05-22(2) and (8)

The period of limitation is two years for an assault and battery claim and three years for a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. MCL 600.5805(2) and (8); MSA 27A.5805(2) and (8). In the absence of a device to extend the limitation periods, plaintiff’s claims here are untimely and therefore barred.

Section 600.5805(10) ordinarily provides a three-year limitations period for a sexual-harassment claim, but a shorter contractual period may replace it if reasonable and knowingly waived.

Hicks v. Epi Printers, Inc · filed 2005-09-02(10)

Typically, the applicable period of limitations for her sexual harassment claim is three years. MCL 600.5805(10). Parties may contract for a period of limitations shorter than the default statutory period as long as the shorter period is reasonable. ... A one-year period of limitations for plaintiffs sexual harassment claim is reasonable. ... For these reasons, we find, on review de novo, that plaintiff knowingly, intelligently, and voluntary waived the statutory three-year period of limitations in which to file a claim.

Section 600.5805(8) imposes a three-year limitations period on breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims.

Moross Ltd. Partnership v. Fleckenstein Capital, Inc. · filed 2006-10-24(8)

Even if Moross had sought to amend its complaint, the claims would have been barred by Michigan’s three-year statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty and six-year statute of limitations for fraud.

Section 600.5805(6) gives legal-malpractice claims a two-year limitations period, while § 600.5805(10) gives breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims a three-year limitations period.

Fuqua v. Goldstein · filed 2018-07-12(6), (10)

A claim alleging legal malpractice must be brought either within two years after the claim first accrued or within six months after the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the existence of the claim. MCL 600.5805(6); MCL 600.5838(1) and (2); Kloian v Schwartz, 272 Mich App 232, 235; 725 NW2d 671 (2006). ... We note the statute of limitations provides for a three-year limitations period for a claim of breach of fiduciary duty, id., citing MCL 600.5805(10), instead of a two-year limitations period for a malpractice claim.

Subsection (2) provides a three-year limitations period for conversion claims, and subsection (10) provides a three-year limitations period for breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims.

Main Street Lofts Condominium Association v. Parodi · filed 2023-11-21(2), (10)

Conversion is subject to the three-year limitations period in MCL 600.5805(2). ... Breach of fiduciary duty is subject to a three-year limitations period, and the claim accrues “when the beneficiary knew or should have known of the breach.” Prentis Family Foundation v Karmanos Cancer Institute, 266 Mich App 39, 47; 698 NW2d 900 (2005), citing MCL 600.5805(10).

Section 600.5805(10) supplies a three-year limitations period for an aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claim against a party who is not an officer or director.

Kravitz v. Summersett (In re Great Lakes Comnet, Inc.) · filed 2018-06-15(10)

Because the aiding and abetting claim is not asserted against the Debtor's officers or directors, the court concludes that the more appropriate statute of limitations for the claim against LEC-MI is the three-year period in Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(10).

Section 600.5805(10) bars recovery for injuries caused by discriminatory acts outside the three-year limitations period, but does not categorically bar using those acts as background evidence for a timely discrimination claim when the trial court finds them admissible.

Campbell v. Department of Human Services · filed 2009-11-24(10)

We instead choose to adopt the reasoning in Ramanathan I and hold that acts occurring outside the limitations period, although not actionable, may, in appropriate cases, be used as background evidence to establish a pattern of discrimination. This evidence is subject to the rules of evidence and applicable governing law, and may be admitted under the sound discretion of the trial court. We note that our decision to adopt this rule of law does not resurrect the continuing-violations doctrine. Unlike under the continuing-violations doctrine, a plaintiff cannot recover for any injury suffered as a result of a prior act occurring outside the limitations period.

Conduct outside Section 600.5805’s limitations period cannot support a claim, but may be considered as background evidence for a timely sexual harassment claim.

Marotta v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2015-08-11

The court will therefore consider all of plaintiffs allegations — including those that predate March 11, 2011, and March 11, 2013 — as background to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact showing a pattern of discrimination or harassment. As it relates to the remainder of plaintiffs claims, however, defendants are correct that the time-barred events cannot be considered.

For negligent construction of an improvement, the applicable three-year limitations period under former § 600.5805(10) (now § 600.5805(2)) applies in addition to § 600.5839’s six-year period of repose.

Hinderer v. Snyder · filed 2019-01-29(10), currently (2); former (1) and (10); former (15), currently (14)

Since the decisions in Ostroth II and Citizens Ins, the Legislature amended MCL 600.5805 to no longer state that the claims against contractors shall be “as provided” by MCL 600.5839. Instead, MCL 600.5805, as amended by 2011 PA 162, stated under MCL 600.5805(15), currently MCL 600.5805(14), that the “periods of limitation under this section are subject to any applicable period of repose established in section [MCL 600.]5838a, [MCL 600.]5838b, or [MCL 600.]5839.” With this amendment, the Legislature modified the statutory scheme to preclude MCL 600.5839 from being applied as a statute of limitations, clarifying that it was a statute of repose that should be applied in addition to any applicable period of limitations. ... Because the periods of limitations are now subject to the period of repose stated under MCL 600.5839, see former MCL 600.5805(15), courts must apply both the applicable period of limitations and the applicable period of repose. As such, the Hinderers could not bring a claim involving negligent construction of an improvement against a contractor unless they brought the claim within three years after the claim first accrued, see former MCL 600.5805(1) and (10), and within six years “after the time of occupancy of the completed improvement, use, or acceptance of the improvement,” MCL 600.5839(1)(a).

Subsection 5805(10) imposes a three-year limitations period on procedural due process claims involving injury to person or property.

Brown v. Police Officers Labor Council · filed 2015-04-23(10)

Procedural due process claims are subject to a three-year period of limitations. MCL 600.5805(10). Brown contends that Almont violated his procedural due process rights by failing to give him adequate pre-termination notice and process. Almont fired him on July 11, 2003. Thus, at the latest, Brown’s claim accrued on that date and, absent tolling, the three-year period expired on July 11, 2006.

Subsection (6) provides a two-year malpractice limitations period, while subsection (15) makes that period subject to applicable statutory repose periods.

Estate of Loren Alex Gallivan v. Dbmj Rehabilitation Services Pllc · filed 2017-11-02(6), (15)

The general period of limitations in which to file an action charging malpractice is two years. MCL 600.5805(6). However, “[t]he periods of limitation under [MCL 600.5805] are subject to any applicable period of repose established in section 5838a, 5838b, or 5839.” MCL 600.5805(15). ... Plaintiffs contend that in accord with Kincaid, they were able to surmount summary disposition upon showing that a question of fact existed as to whether defendants’ continued reliance on the NECC was unreasonable. We agree. ... Accordingly, plaintiffs’ failure to vet claim was not barred by the statute of repose.

Section 600.5805(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in Michigan.

Grainger v. Ottawa, County of · filed 2021-03-02(2)

Second, the Court concludes that the three-year statute of limitations applies to Plaintiff’s federal claims brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 600.5805 sets a three-year limitations period for Michigan § 1983 civil-rights suits.

Gardner 287557 v. Fronsczak · filed 2020-01-17(10), (2)

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(10); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999).

Section 600.5805(2) provides a three-year statute of limitations for civil-rights suits filed in Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Gardner 287557 v. Millette · filed 2020-05-05(2)

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999).

Subsection (10) provides a three-year limitations period for civil-rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Michigan.

Nelson 630619 v. Macauley · filed 2020-05-18(10)

In this case, Plaintiff brings causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(10); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999).

Section 600.5805(2) provides a three-year limitations period for civil-rights suits filed in Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Harris 292201 v. Nader · filed 2020-06-25(2)

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999).

Section 600.5805(2) provides a three-year limitations period for civil-rights actions arising from personal injury.

Briggs v. Harris · filed 2020-07-02(2)

Michigan’s statute of limitations for civil rights actions is three years.

Section 600.5805(2) provides a three-year limitations period for § 1983 civil-rights suits filed in Michigan.

Schwab v. Wyoming Police Department · filed 2020-07-02(2)

In this case, Plaintiff brings his causes of action against the improperly joined defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999).

Section 600.5805(10) gives civil-rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Michigan a three-year statute of limitations.

Johnson 343032 v. Hoover · filed 2020-09-04(10)

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(10); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999).

Section 600.5805(10) gives Michigan civil-rights suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a three-year statute of limitations.

Snider 834248 v. Corizon Medical · filed 2020-09-11(10)

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(10); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999). ... All of the actions about which Plaintiff complains occurred in 2019 and 2020, well within the three-year period of limitations.

Section 600.5805(2) provides a three-year statute of limitations for civil-rights suits filed in Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Johnson 561762 v. Miller · filed 2020-09-24(2)

State statutes of limitations and tolling principles apply to determine the timeliness of claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268-69 (1985). For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999).

Section 600.5805(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for civil-rights claims filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Michigan.

Spearman 320836 v. Whitmer · filed 2020-10-15(2)

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999). ... Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims against AMF Defendants Lanala and Harju regarding the initial placement in CMHP and the concurrent prescription for Haldol are barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 600.5805(10) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on § 1983 civil-rights suits filed in Michigan.

Evans 367619 v. Frias · filed 2020-10-23(10)

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years.

Section 600.5805(2) provides a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in Michigan.

Luft v. Midland County · filed 2020-11-04(2)

There is a three-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Michigan. Estate of Majors v. Gerlach, 821 F. App’x 533, 537 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2)). Luft’s complaint is signed and dated September 22, 2020, far more than three years after he claims that Haskell-Wise sexually abused him. So the sexual-abuse allegations and any related claims that the defendants at the time failed to protect Luft, will be dismissed, with prejudice, as barred by the applicable limitation period.

Section 600.5805(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for civil-rights suits filed in Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Edwards 203782 v. Washington · filed 2020-11-19(2)

For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999).