Mich. Comp. Laws § 500.3135

Section 500.3135(2)(c) bars damages for an uninsured owner only if the owner was operating the vehicle at the time of injury.

20221215_C360647_19_360647.Opn.Pdf · filed 2022-12-15(2)(c)

That leaves us with the plain language of MCL 500.3135(2)(c), which obligates defendants to show that plaintiff was operating his own vehicle at the time his injury occurred.

Section 500.3135(2)(c) does not bar third-party damages for an uninsured vehicle owner who was riding as a passenger rather than operating the vehicle when injured.

King v. Travelers Property Casualty Insurance Co · filed 2023-01-19(2)(c)

Therefore, we conclude that Tiffany King was not “operating” a vehicle when she was riding in the Pathfinder at the time her injury occurred, so the disqualification prescribed by MCL 500.3135(2)(c) does not apply to her.

Section 500.3135(2)(c) bars noneconomic damages only when the claimant failed to maintain no-fault insurance required by § 500.3101(1); a violation of § 500.3102(1) alone does not trigger the bar.

Alexander v. Kubacki · filed 2023-05-04(2)(c)

It unequivocally applies only if the party failed to maintain no-fault insurance as required by MCL 500.3101(1).

Section 500.3135(2)(c) bars noneconomic damages only when the vehicle owner failed to maintain insurance required by section 500.3101(1); a nonresident’s violation of section 500.3102(1) does not trigger that bar.

Goings Sr v. Giacomantonio-Snow · filed 2024-07-18(2)(c)

We agree with the Alexander Court that under the plain, unambiguous language of the statute, only a violation of MCL 500.3101(1) triggers MCL 500.3135(2)(c)’s bar on the recovery of noneconomic damages.

Section 500.3135(2)(c) does not bar third-party noneconomic damages when an insurer rescinds the injured motorist’s policy after the accident, if the policy was in effect when the injury occurred.

Wilmore-Moody v. Zakir · filed 2023-05-31(2)(c)

We hold that an insurer’s decision to rescind a policy postaccident does not trigger the exclusion in MCL 500.3135(2)(c).

Section 500.3135(2)(c) bars third-party damages for an uninsured vehicle only if the injured party was operating that vehicle when injured; standing outside and reaching into the vehicle is not operating it.

Finch Jr v. Gewin · filed 2023-10-05(2)(c)

Pertinently, plaintiff contends MCL 500.3135(2)(c) does not bar his claim for third-party damages from Gewin and Landstar even if his van was required to be properly insured and was not, so long as he was not operating it when he was injured. We agree with plaintiff’s reading of the statute.

Section 500.3135(2)(c) bars noneconomic damages when a person operates their own uninsured vehicle, and whether the driver constructively owned the vehicle may present a fact question.

Davis v. Baldini · filed 2026-03-10(2)(c)

However, under MCL 500.3135(1)(2)(c), “[d]amages must not be assessed in favor of a party who was operating his or her own vehicle at the time the injury occurred and did not have in effect for that motor vehicle the security required by section 3101(1) at the time the injury occurred.” ... Because there was a question of fact as to whether Davis was an owner of the vehicle under MCL 500.3101(3)(l)(i), summary disposition as to Davis’s claim for noneconomic damage was not appropriate.

Section 500.3135 permits a spouse to recover for loss of consortium when the injured spouse meets the statutory threshold of death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.

Warner v. Brigham · filed 1979-06-06(1)

However, we are of the opinion that claims for loss of consortium come within the statute, where the claimant's spouse has suffered death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement.

Section 500.3135(1) bars a loss-of-consortium claim arising from a motor vehicle injury unless the injured person suffered serious impairment of bodily function, permanent serious disfigurement, or death.

Gallagher v. Parshall · filed 1980-05-21(1)

In order to assert a claim in' tort under the common law for injuries arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, the injured plaintiff (or his representative) must first establish serious impairment of bodily function, permanent serious disfigurement, or death. ... Absent such a preliminary showing, any claim for loss of consortium under the statute will not lie.

Section 500.3135 preserves a spouse’s common-law claim for loss of consortium when the injured spouse meets the threshold for noneconomic tort recovery.

Rusinek v. Schultz, Snyder & Steele Lumber Co. · filed 1981-08-24

Applying these principles to the question presented in this case, we conclude that the no-fault act must be construed as retaining the common-law action for loss of consortium. The common-law action for loss of consortium in Michigan is not expressly abolished by the language of § 3135. If this section abolishes this common-law right it must be found to do so by implication. There is nothing, however, in the language of the act or its legislative purposes that requires such a construction. Since it is derived from the injured spouse’s action, a claim of loss of consortium does not create a new case nor does it contribute significantly to the problems the act was intended to alleviate.

Section 3135(1) bars a spouse's loss-of-consortium claim arising from an auto accident and precludes future noneconomic damages once the injured person no longer suffers a serious impairment of body function.

Rusinek v. S, S & S LUMBER CO. · filed 1980-07-01(1)

We agree with the reasoning of Judge BASHARA and hold that the spouse of a party injured in an auto accident may not recover for loss of consortium under the no-fault act. ... Since the spouse is not the party who has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement, he or she is not entitled to recover under the statute. ... Therefore, we believe that the requirement that the plaintiff show a serious impairment of body function not only presents a threshold requirement to recover in tort but also a limitation precluding recovery of future damages where plaintiff no longer suffers from a serious impairment of body function.

Section 500.3135 addresses tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle; dramshop liability falls outside that scope.

Schwark v. Lilly · filed 1979-07-09(2)

Section 3116 must be construed in light of and together with § 3135. In the latter section the Legislature discusses only "tort liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use * * * of a motor vehicle”. § 3135(2). The liability of the dramshop defendants did not arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of an automobile. Instead their liability arose from their alleged "unlawful selling, giving or furnishing * * * intoxicating liquor” to "a visibly intoxicated person”. MCL 436.22.

Section 500.3135 does not limit a railroad's or road commission's tort liability when that liability does not arise from its ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Soo Line Railroad · filed 1981-05-05

We agree with plaintiff that the foregoing section of the no-fault act does not limit the liability of the railroad company and the road commission since their liability is not caused by their ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle.

Section 3135 retains tort liability for qualifying losses caused by the use of a motor vehicle, whether that use is frequent or infrequent.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Ruuska · filed 1982-01-08

The Legislature chose to speak in broad language when it enunciated the circumstances under which a person remained subject to tort liability. It said simply, as here relevant, that the use of a motor vehicle, not either the infrequent or irregular use, or the frequent or regular use of a motor vehicle, could subject a person to tort liability under certain circumstances which would require a policy of insurance meeting certain standards.

Section 500.3135(2)(c) applies only to actions arising from negligent ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle and does not authorize deduction of prospective income taxes from damages in a highway maintenance action.

Gorelick v. Department of State Highways · filed 1983-07-19(2)(c)

Defendant’s assertions to the contrary, MCL 500.3135(2)(c); MSA 24.13135(2)(c) does not apply to authorize the deduction of prospective taxes here. Even if, as defendant contends, that section could in fact authorize the reduction of tort recoveries in certain cases, the section applies only to actions arising from the negligent ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle. The present action is not one based upon ownership, maintenance, or use of the defendant’s motor vehicle. Instead, the present action arises from defendant’s negligent maintenance of a highway, a breach of an entirely distinct statutory duty, MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102).

Section 500.3135 does not abrogate tort liability of a vehicle manufacturer or dealership whose liability does not arise from its ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle.

Ryan v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1985-04-02

These defendants were non-motorist tortfeasors whose liability did not arise from their ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle.

Section 3135’s abolition of tort liability applies to motorcyclists, including claims for damage to a motorcycle in a collision with an insured automobile.

Braden v. Spencer · filed 1980-10-07(2)

The exclusion of motorcycles from the act’s definition of motor vehicles does not illustrate a legislative intent to exempt motorcyclists from the effect of the abolition of tort liability by § 3135.

Section 500.3135(2) does not abolish tort liability for products liability claims because that liability does not arise from the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle.

Auto-Owners Insurance v. Employers Insurance of Wausau · filed 1981-02-17(2)

The wording of § 3135 makes it unlikely that the Legislature intended to extend the no-fault abolishment of tort liability to products-liability cases.

Section 500.3135(2) abolishes only tort liability arising from the defendant’s ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle, leaving non-motorist tortfeasors subject to liability for their other wrongful conduct.

Citizens Insurance Co. of America v. Tuttle · filed 1981-08-24(2)

We conclude that subsection (2) was intended to abolish only tort liability arising from a defendant’s ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. Tuttle thus remains subject to tort liability arising from his alleged lack of care in the keeping of his cow.

Section 500.3135(2) does not abolish the tort liability of motor vehicle repair facilities that are outside the no-fault insurance system.

Hengartner v. Chet Swanson Sales, Inc · filed 1984-03-20(2)

However, MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135 was not intended to abolish tort liability of motor vehicle repair facilities. ... Because motor vehicle repair facilities are not required to maintain no-fault insurance or other security, see MCL 500.3101; MSA 24.13101, such facilities are also outside the basic no-fault system of allocating the costs of accidents and, therefore, also remain subject to tort liability.

Section 500.3135(2) does not abolish tort liability for a garage owner or mechanic whose negligence while repairing a vehicle injures someone, because that conduct is not covered by their participation in the no-fault insurance system.

Coleman v. Franzon · filed 1985-02-20(2)

Neither the defendant garage owner nor his employee was required to purchase no-fault insurance to cover their conduct as garage owner and mechanic. Thus, permitting the defendant to avoid tort liability for actions for which he has not contributed premium payments will, in effect, cause motorist tortfeasors to pay for his asserted negligence. We do not believe that the no-fault insurance act was intended to bring about this result.

Section 3135 permits a noneconomic-loss tort claim arising from the unloading of a motor vehicle even when the vehicle is not being used for transportation.

Bialochowski v. CROSS CONCRETE PUMPING CO. · filed 1985-03-05(1)

Thus, plaintiff’s action against Cross Concrete, the third-party tortfeasor, must have been brought pursuant to § 3135 of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135. ... In the present case, plaintiff’s action is brought pursuant to § 3135, which does not contain the additional phrase "as a motor vehicle” that is contained in § 3105.

Section 3135(2)’s tort liability bar does not apply to a dramshop defendant whose liability arises from selling liquor to a visibly intoxicated person.

Tebo v. Havlik · filed 1984-02-06(2)

His liability, instead, arises out of his alleged sale of intoxicating liquors to a visibly intoxicated person. Just as the tort liability bar of § 3135 is inapplicable, so too is the remainder of the act inapplicable.

Section 500.3135 governs third-party tort claims for injuries involving a motor vehicle even when the injured worker received federal compensation benefits.

Gunsell v. Ryan · filed 1999-10-01

Because we find that plaintiffs should have brought this suit as a third-party claim under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135, we reverse.

Section 500.3135(1) sets an injury threshold for noneconomic motor vehicle tort liability; reaching the serious-impairment threshold does not delay accrual of an ordinary negligence claim.

Stephens v. Dixon · filed 1995-08-10(1)

Whereas the no-fault act in general and MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135 in particular were designed to reduce tort litigation and to promote promptness and certainty of outcome, a "fifth element” analysis would promote tort litigation as well as reduce promptness and certainty of outcome.

Section 500.3135’s noneconomic-loss threshold applies to claims against governmental agencies arising from negligent operation of their motor vehicles under the governmental-immunity vehicle exception.

Hardy v. Oakland County · filed 2000-03-28(1), (2)

For this reason, the circuit court was correct when it ruled that the plaintiff was required to meet the no-fault thresholds—in this instance that he was required to show serious impairment of body function—in order to prevail in his suit for noneconomic damages caused by the deputy’s negligence. This result accords with the intent of the Legislature as reflected in the plain language of the pertinent statutes.

Section 500.3135 does not bar a civil-liability action arising from the operation of an ORV because ORVs are exempt from the no-fault insurance act.

Van Guilder v. Collier · filed 2002-03-06

Further, in this case, an action under the civil liability act is not barred by the no-fault insurance act, MCL 500.3135, because ORVs are exempted from the no-fault insurance act.

Section 500.3135(3) permits a negligence action against an insured motor carrier to recover the financial security required for transporting hazardous materials under the Motor Carrier Safety Act, despite its general abolition of motor vehicle tort liability.

Department of Transportation v. North Central Cooperative LLC · filed 2008-01-24(3)

We fully recognize that such a negligence action would conflict with MCL 500.3135(3), which states: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use within this state of a motor vehicle with respect to which the security required by section 3101 was in effect is abolished. . . ." ... Following the binding precedent in Initial Transport and the basic rule of statutory construction that a specific statute trumps a contradictory general statute, see Baxter v. Gates Rubber Co., 171 Mich.App. 588, 590, 431 N.W.2d 81 (1988), we hold that to recover the security required under the MCSA for the transportation of hazardous materials, a plaintiff must proceed with a negligence action against the insured.

Section 500.3135 requires a claimant seeking noneconomic damages from a governmental motor vehicle operator to meet the serious impairment threshold as well as the governmental immunity exception’s bodily injury requirement.

Allen v. Bloomfield Hills School District · filed 2008-09-23(3)

The plain language of MCL 691.1405 and MCL 500.3135 may be read harmoniously to provide that a plaintiff may avoid governmental immunity if he suffers "bodily injury" under the motor vehicle exception of MCL 691.1405, but he must also satisfy the no-fault act threshold for bringing a third-party tort claim, i.e., a plaintiff must establish a serious impairment of a body function as stated in MCL 500.3135.

Section 500.3135(1) allows tort recovery only for injuries caused by the defendant’s motor vehicle use.

Aldape v. Baldwin · filed 2018-05-10(1)

A plaintiff is only entitled to recovery in tort for injuries caused by the allegedly tortious event. As there is no genuine issue of material fact on the lack of causation here, defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Section 500.3135(1) does not govern coverage under an optional underinsured motorist policy; the policy terms control.

Estate of Mm v. Foley · filed 2026-01-14(1)

Therefore, plaintiff’s arguments regarding MCL 500.3135(1) are inapplicable and we interpret the policy terms without reference to any statutes such as the no-fault act.

Section 500.3135(1) applies only to injuries caused by the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle.

Forbes v. Kindlund Construction Inc · filed 2026-01-15(1)

Because the statutory language plainly limits MCL 500.3135 to injuries caused by the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle, the trial court properly determined that it is inapplicable in this case.

Section 500.3135 requires more than an incidental or but-for connection between vehicle use and injury; the injury must be foreseeably identifiable with normal vehicle use.

Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange v. Higginbotham · filed 1980-02-05

In order for appellant to recover under either her own or her husband’s insurance policy, it is necessary that her injuries arose out of the use of a motor vehicle. MCL 500.3105, MCL 500.3135. ... Such causal connection must be more than incidental, fortuitous or but for. The injury must be foreseeably identifiable with the normal use of the vehicle. ... Applying this requirement to the present case leads to the conclusion that appellant’s injuries did not arise out of Mr. Higginbotham’s use of his motor vehicle.

Section 500.3135(1) does not support a claim against a medical provider when the alleged injury arose from treatment rather than the provider’s use of a motor vehicle.

Rahaman v. Spine Specialist of Michigan · filed 2024-08-13(1)

But Plaintiff does not allege that SSC or its employees injured her through the use of a motor vehicle. Instead, Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Bagley exacerbated her injuries from the 2016 accident. (See, e.g., ECF No. 1, PageID.33.) As such, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under § 500.3135.

Section 500.3135(2) abolishes tort liability for motor vehicle property damage arising from a plaintiff’s use of a vehicle, even when the defendant did not use a vehicle or cause the accident through one, unless a statutory exception applies.

Citizens Insurance Co. of America v. Tuttle · filed 1980-04-21(2)

The use of the broad term "arising from" indicates that the Legislature did not intend to limit § 3135(2) to accidents caused by a defendant's use of a motor vehicle. The trial judge's conclusion that § 3135(2) applies to actions arising out of a plaintiff's use of a motor vehicle is correct. Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the no-fault act.

Section 500.3135’s listed exceptions to abolished property-damage tort liability do not displace liability arising from a garage keeper’s bailment for hire.

Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Allied Truck Equipment Co. · filed 1981-01-21

We recognize that the Legislature provided three exceptions when it abolished tort liability for property damage in the no-fault insurance act and that none of these provisions involves a bailment situation. MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135. ... Here, where we do not find that the Legislature exhibited a clear intent to drastically alter the common law of bailments for hire, we are unwilling to find that the no-fault insurance act did so.

Section 500.3135 generally removes an insured driver's tort liability for economic property damage arising from motor vehicle use.

Matti Awdish, Inc v. Williams · filed 1982-06-22

Pursuant to MCL 500.3121(1); MSA 24.13121(1), an insurer is liable to pay benefits for property damage caused by its insureds. By MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135, an insured continues to have tort liability only for noneconomic losses where death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement has resulted.

Section 500.3135(2)'s property-damage protection did not bar motor-vehicle property-damage suits while the Court of Appeals' ruling that the protection was unconstitutional bound lower courts from November 5, 1975, to June 8, 1978.

Marshall v. Pech · filed 1980-02-20(2)

This Court held unconstitutional the no-fault act’s property damage protection scheme. That ruling was binding on lower courts from November 5, 1975, to June 8, 1978, when it was reversed by the Supreme Court.

Section 500.3135 immunizes a driver and vehicle owner from tort liability for damage to a tree caused by the vehicle.

Fisher v. Lowe · filed 1983-01-10

Defendants were immune from tort liability for damage to the tree pursuant to § 3135 of the no-fault insurance act. MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135.

Section 500.3135(2) abolishes tort liability for property damage arising from motor vehicle use unless the damage is intentionally caused.

National Ben Franklin Insurance v. Bakhaus Contractors, Inc. · filed 1983-04-05(2)

Tort liability for property damage arising from the use of a motor vehicle in this state has been abolished, unless the damage is intentionally caused.

Section 3135(2)(d) does not permit a suit for motorcycle damage because its exception for damage to motor vehicles excludes motorcycles.

Nerat v. Swacker · filed 1986-03-18(2)(d)

We find no ambiguity in the mini-tort provision. MCL 50Q.3135(2)(d); MSA 24.13135(2)(d). This statutory exception to the abolition of tort liability applies only to certain damages to motor vehicles. Since the relevant statutory definition of motor vehicle expressly excludes motorcycles, there is no right to sue for motorcycle damage under § 3135(2)(d). MCL 500.3101(2)(c); MSA 24.13101(2)(c).

Subsection (2)(d) preserves tort liability for up to $400 in damage to motor vehicles to the extent the damage is not covered by insurance.

Kanaziz v. Rounds · filed 1986-07-08(2)(d)

Under the statute, a person remains subject to tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, for damages up to $400 to motor vehicles, to the extent that damages are not covered by insurance.

Section 500.3135 bars tort claims for negligent property damage under the owner’s liability act when the no-fault act does not preserve tort liability.

Travelers Insurance v. U-Haul of Michigan, Inc · filed 1999-07-27(2)

We therefore conclude that the no-fault act barred plaintiff’s tort claims for property damage under the owner’s liability act.

A judgment on a small motor-vehicle property-damage claim under subsection (2)(d) does not bar a separate claim for other liability arising from the same accident.

Kaiser v. Smith · filed 1991-04-15(5)

From the plain meaning of the statute, it appears that the Legislature intended to create a separate cause of action for these small property damage claims, independent of any other claims arising out of the same motor vehicle accident and intended to provide an informal forum to resolve them. The reference to res judicata in subsection 5 also makes it apparent that the Legislature contemplated successive or even simultaneous actions.

Section 500.3135(4)(c) requires a mini-tort action to begin, whenever legally possible, in the small claims division of the district court or the municipal court.

Shield Global Partners - Gi LLC v. Progressive Casualty Ins Co · filed 2020-08-27(4)(c)

In turn, MCL 500.3135(4)(c) requires a mini-tort action to “be commenced, whenever legally possible, in the small claims division of the district court or the municipal court.”

Section 500.3135(3) abolishes trespass liability for property damage arising from the use of a motor vehicle unless the defendant intentionally caused the harm.

Pete's Auto and Truck Parts Inc v. Greg Hibbitts Transport Company · filed 2022-06-09(3)

As a tort, trespass is abolished by MCL 500.3135(3) absent evidence that the Hibbitts defendants intentionally caused harm to the property, and no such evidence has been presented.

Once an injured person meets the serious-impairment threshold, § 500.3135(1) permits recovery of all noneconomic loss, including loss suffered after the impairment ends.

Incarnati v. Savage · filed 1982-12-08(1)

Once this threshold has been crossed by a particular plaintiff, the defendant remains liable for all noneconomic loss suffered by the plaintiff.

Section 500.3135 permits summary disposition when claimed injuries, including a closed head injury or scar, do not satisfy its serious impairment or permanent serious disfigurement threshold.

Minter v. City of Grand Rapids · filed 2008-04-25(1)

In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals, for the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals dissenting opinion, and we REINSTATE the judgment of the Kent Circuit Court granting the defendants’ motion for summary disposition. Although the Court of Appeals majority correctly affirmed the Kent Circuit Court’s order granting the defendants’ motion for summary disposition regarding the plaintiff’s broken toe and cervical strain, the majority erred in reversing the circuit court’s order granting the defendants’ motion for summary disposition regarding the plaintiff’s closed head injury and scar.

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars noneconomic damages when a motor vehicle plaintiff is more than 50% at fault, but a genuine dispute over relative fault prevents deciding that threshold on summary judgment.

Biegas v. Quickway Carriers, Inc. · filed 2009-07-24(2)(b)

The statute further provides that "[d]amages shall be assessed on the basis of comparative fault, except that damages shall not be assessed in favor of a party who is more than 50% at fault." Id. § 500.3135(2)(b). ... We therefore believe that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the negligence of Biegas in parking close to the fog line and stepping into the traffic lane exceeded the negligence of Dailey in following the preceding truck too closely and allowing his tractor-trailer to cross the fog line. Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in granting Quickway's motion for partial summary judgment.

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars noneconomic damages when the injured party is more than 50 percent at fault; comparative fault is generally for the jury, but summary disposition is appropriate if no reasonable juror could find the party 50 percent or less at fault.

Fountaine Jr v. Hersey · filed 2014-10-23(2)(b)

Pursuant to MCL 500.3135(2)(b), “Damages shall be assessed on the basis of comparative fault, except that damages shall not be assessed in favor of a party who is more than 50% at fault.” Thus, if plaintiff is found to be more than 50 percent at fault for his injuries, he may not recover noneconomic damages. MCL 500.3135(2)(b). However, as a general matter, questions regarding comparative fault are for the jury to decide, and are not subject to summary disposition. Rodriguez v Solar of Mich, Inc, 191 Mich App 483, 488; 478 NW2d 914 (1991). But if a reasonable juror could only find the plaintiff more than 50 percent at fault for the accident, summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10).

Section 500.3135(1) permits noneconomic damages for a serious impairment of body function only when the defendant’s negligence caused the injury producing that impairment.

Gravel-Henkel v. Michigan · filed 2016-04-12(1)

To obtain noneconomic damages for such impairment, plaintiff was required to establish that the injury causing the impairment was caused by defendant’s negligence, i.e., the accident. MCL 500.3135(1). Since the evidence presented at trial could lead reasonable jurors to disagree as to whether plaintiff’s spinal injury was caused by the accident, the trial court did not err in denying her motion for JNOV on her claim for noneconomic damages. See Foreman, 266 Mich App at 136.

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars noneconomic damages for a party more than 50% at fault, which also defeats uninsured motorist benefits conditioned on legal entitlement to those damages.

Goodman v. Doe · filed 2016-06-21(2)(b)

MCL 500.3135(2)(b) provides that, in the context of tort liability for noneconomic loss, “[d]amages shall be assessed on the basis of comparative fault, except that damages shall not be assessed in favor of a party who is more than 50% at fault.” Thus, if plaintiff was more than 50% at fault for the accident, he would not be entitled to UM benefits under the policy.

Section 500.3135(2)(b) assesses noneconomic damages by comparative fault and bars them for a party who is more than 50% at fault.

Estate of Aaron Reid v. Walker · filed 2017-02-07(2)(b)

The same principles guide our holding that the circuit court erred by finding that Reid was more than 50% responsible for the crash. MCL 500.3135(2)(b) provides that noneconomic damages under the no-fault act “shall be assessed on the basis of comparative fault, except that damages shall not be assessed in favor of a party who is more than 50% at fault.”

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars noneconomic damages for a party more than 50% at fault, but does not bar recovery of economic damages under subsection (3)(c).

Stieve v. City of Dearborn · filed 2017-03-09(2)(b)

By the statute’s plain language, MCL 500.3135(2)(b)’s limitation of comparative negligence principles applies only to noneconomic damages. A later subsection, MCL 500.3135(3)(c), limits economic damages to “allowable expenses, work loss, and survivor’s loss as defined in [MCL 500.3107 to MCL 500.3110] in excess of the daily, monthly, and 3-year limitations contained in those sections.” But the Legislature did not make § (2)(b) applicable to § (3)(c). Accordingly, even if a jury ultimately concludes that Stieve was more than 50% at fault for his injuries, he would not be completely barred from recovery of all types of damages he requested.

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars damages for a party who is more than 50% at fault for an accident.

Estate of Ava Cameron Taylor v. Coole · filed 2017-04-13(2)(b)

However, MCL 500.3135(2)(b) provides that “damages shall not be assessed in favor of a party who is more than 50% at fault.” ... We conclude that the trial court did not err by granting summary disposition on the basis that that Taylor was more than 50% at fault for the accident because reasonable minds could not differ on the issue.

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars noneconomic damages when the injured party is more than 50% at fault, and a court may apply the bar on summary disposition if no reasonable jury could assign the defendant equal or greater fault.

O'Keefe v. Landgraff · filed 2016-08-23(2)(b)

Under the circumstances presented by the evidence in this case, the trial court did not err when it determined that no reasonable jury could assign Landgraff equal or greater fault for the accident. Consequently, it did not err when it determined that the O’Keefes’ claims were barred under MCL 500.3135(2)(b).

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars noneconomic damages when an injured party is more than 50 percent at fault, but disputed evidence of comparative fault can require a jury decision.

Chatfield v. Kenneth Newton Roupe · filed 2017-05-09(2)(b)

If a party is found for be more than 50 percent at fault for his or her injuries, he or she cannot recover non-economic damages. MCL 500.3135(2)(b). ... Thus, contrary to Roupe’s argument, it is not clear as a matter of law that Chatfield bore the majority of liability.

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars damages for a claimant more than 50% at fault, including on summary disposition when no reasonable juror could find the claimant 50% or less at fault.

Estate of Eric Johnson v. Jason Charles Ugljesa Hass · filed 2017-10-19(2)(b)

This is not a close question. No reasonable person could conclude that Johnson was less than 51- percent responsible for his injuries. MCL 500.3135(2)(b).

Section 500.3135(2)(b) assesses damages by comparative fault and bars damages for a party more than 50% at fault.

Estes v. Green · filed 2018-07-05(2)(b)

Under Michigan’s No-Fault Act at MCL 500.3135(2)(b), “Damages shall be assessed on the basis of comparative fault, except that damages shall not be assessed in favor of a party who is more than 50% at fault.” ... Given the admissible evidence provided regarding the location and circumstances surrounding he accident and the fact that plaintiff’s ability to function is presumed to be impaired due to his alcohol level, the trial court did not err in finding that plaintiff was 50% or more at fault for the accident.

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars damages in a motor vehicle accident when the claimant is more than 50% at fault.

Schaub v. Seyler · filed 2018-11-15(2)(b)

MCL 500.3135(2)(b) provides that in cases involving motor vehicle accidents, “damages shall not be assessed in favor of a party who is more than 50% at fault.” ... We only conclude that, even if Seyler was at all negligent, under the trial court’s analysis plaintiff still had to have been more than 50% at fault.

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars damages in an automobile negligence action when the claimant is more than 50% at fault; that bar may support summary disposition when no reasonable juror could find otherwise.

Cecile v. Wang · filed 2018-06-14(2)(b)

There is no claim that anyone other than plaintiff or defendant was negligent. Therefore, if defendant is less than 50% at fault, it follows that plaintiff was more than 50% at fault such that he is barred from recovering damages pursuant to MCL 500.3135(2)(b).

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars noneconomic damages for a claimant more than 50% at fault, but disputed evidence of comparative fault precludes applying that bar on summary disposition.

Estate of James Thomas Bush v. City of St Clair Shores · filed 2019-05-07(2)(b)

MCL 500.3135(2)(b) provides that, for noneconomic loss damages in an automobile accident, “damages shall be assessed on the basis of comparative fault, except that damages shall not be assessed in favor of a party who is more than 50% at fault.” ... Given the conflicting evidence regarding whether the decedent’s speed or presence of marijuana in his system contributed to the accident, the trial court properly declined to rule that Murphy could not be the proximate cause of the accident, or that the decedent was 50% or more at fault.

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars damages for a party more than 50% at fault, but a jury must apportion fault when both parties may have been negligent and reasonable minds could differ.

Estate of Evania Barbara Schobloher v. Cieslak · filed 2019-06-13(2)(b)

We do not believe under the circumstances presented that the fault for the accident can be so clearly attributed to one party or the other that reasonable minds could not differ. Laier, 266 Mich App at 496. In cases like this, where there is evidence that both parties may have acted negligently, it is for the jury to apportion fault. Id. Therefore, we decline to affirm the trial court’s order on the ground that Schobloher was precluded, as a matter of law, from recovery under MCL 500.3135(2)(b).

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars damages when a party is more than 50% at fault, but a jury question about that party’s share of fault prevents summary judgment on this ground.

Fields v. Ashford · filed 2020-04-08(2)(b)

Finally, Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because Fields was more than 50-percent at fault for the accident, and, under Michigan law, “damages shall not be assessed in favor of a party who is more than 50% at fault.” (Id., PageID.2636-2637, quoting Mich. Comp. Laws § 500.3135(2)(b).) However, as explained in detail above, if a jury were to accept Fields’ testimony about how the accident occurred, the jury could find that that she was not more than 50-percent at fault for the crash. Simply put, on this record, the Court cannot say that Fields’ version of events is so implausible that, as a matter of law, she is more than 50- percent at fault for the accident.

Section 500.3135(2)(b) precludes damages when a party is more than 50% at fault.

Estate of Bryan Lewis v. Messick · filed 2020-08-13(2)(b)

We note that this issue is moot in light of the jury’s determination that the decedent was more than 50% at fault, which precluded any recovery of damages, MCL 500.3135(2)(b).

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars damages for a party more than 50% at fault in an automobile negligence case, but a genuine dispute over the parties’ relative fault must be resolved by the fact-finder.

Estate of John Conforti v. Cornell · filed 2020-10-29(2)(b)

MCL 500.3135(2)(b) provides that, in automobile negligence cases, “[d]amages must be assessed on the basis of comparative fault, except that damages must not be assessed in favor of a party who is more than 50% at fault.” ... Accordingly, we conclude that the Estate presented sufficient evidence in response to defendants’ motion for summary disposition to create a genuine question of material fact regarding not only whether Conforti was more than 50% at fault for the collision, but also whether Cornell was negligently operating his vehicle at the time of the collision.

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars an assessment of damages in favor of a party who is more than 50% at fault in a motor vehicle accident.

Estate of William D Xerri v. Williams · filed 2019-07-25(2)(b)

The jury found that decedent was 60% at fault in the accident and thus did not address or award damages. As discussed, MCL 500.3135(2)(b) therefore precludes an assessment of damages in plaintiff’s favor.

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars damages to a party more than 50% at fault, but disputed evidence of both drivers’ negligence leaves the fault comparison for the factfinder.

Howard v. Wistinghausen · filed 2020-01-23(2)(b)

Our examination of the record evidence provided leads us to conclude that a question of fact exists as to whether plaintiff or defendant are barred under § 3135(2)(b) of the no-fault act.

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars recovery in a motor vehicle tort action when the injured person was more than 50% at fault for the collision.

Estate of Young Homrich v. Selective Insurance Company of America · filed 2020-09-24(2)(b)

Thus, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Young was more than 50% at fault for the collision, and trial court properly concluded that the estate is barred from recovery under MCL 500.3135(2)(b).

Section 500.3135(1) permits tort liability for noneconomic loss from motor vehicle use when the injured person has suffered a serious impairment of body function.

Harris v. Pawlitz · filed 2022-05-26(1)

Pursuant to the no-fault act, a “person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his or her ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered . . . serious impairment of body function . . . .” MCL 500.3135(1);4 see also McCormick, 487 Mich at 189-190.

Section 500.3135(1) permits third-party noneconomic damages only when the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.

Saddler v. Chevela · filed 2023-11-21(1)

Plaintiff also alleged a third-party claim for noneconomic damages under MCL 500.3135(1) which provides for such tort liability “only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.” ... And noneconomic damages are only permitted if that bodily injury is serious in nature.

Section 500.3135(2) abolishes certain tort liability arising from motor vehicle use but does not abolish liability under an enforceable contract, even when the loss arises from motor vehicle use.

Kinnunen v. Bohlinger · filed 1983-09-13(2)

We conclude that under a straightforward reading of the statutory language of § 3135 of the no-fault act, contractual liability is not abolished by said section even where said liability arises out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle.

Section 500.3135 abolishes much motor vehicle tort liability but does not bar a claim for breach of a bailment contract arising from use of a motor vehicle.

Universal Underwriters Insurance v. Vallejo · filed 1989-08-21

The no-fault act in large measure abolished tort liability for injuries or damages arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use in Michigan of a motor vehicle. MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135; ... However, the act did not abolish contractual liability for losses arising from the use of a motor vehicle. ... It follows, therefore, that plaintiffs contract claim was not barred by the no-fault act.

Section 500.3135 abolishes tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle but permits express contractual liability for collision damage to a rented vehicle.

Universal Underwriters Insurance v. Kneeland · filed 2001-07-03(2)

Additionally, § 3135 of our no-fault act, MCL 500.3135, expressly abolishes tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle (with some exceptions). The statutory language does not reflect an intent to abolish contractual liability for collision damages, an optional form of insurance not required by the no-fault act.

Section 500.3135 abolishes tort liability arising from motor vehicle use but does not abolish liability under an express contract to pay for vehicle damage.

Universal Underwriters Insurance v. Kneeland · filed 1999-08-30(3)

The no-fault act abrogated tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle, except with respect to certain circumstances that are inapplicable here, ... but did not abolish contractual ... liability.

Chipped teeth do not satisfy § 500.3135’s permanent serious disfigurement threshold for motor vehicle tort recovery.

Shortridge v. Bailey · filed 1985-09-04

We do not believe that chipped teeth is the type of injury for which the Legislature intended to allow recovery when it established the threshold of permanent serious disfigurement.

Section 500.3135 requires a permanent disfigurement to be serious based on its physical characteristics to satisfy the motor vehicle tort threshold.

Nelson v. Myers · filed 1985-10-21(1)

There is no doubt that the scar is a permanent disfigurement, according to the proofs presented. However, there is likewise no doubt that, in terms of its physical characteristics, it is not serious.

Section 500.3135(1) leaves permanent serious disfigurement to the jury when reasonable minds could differ, including where lost front teeth are replaced by a removable plate.

Owens v. City of Detroit · filed 1987-02-19(1)

However, considering the full spectrum of plaintiffs life, we believe that reasonable minds could differ as to whether plaintiffs injury constitutes permanent, serious disfigurement.

Section 500.3135’s permanent serious disfigurement threshold does not cover a hardly discernible scar below the lip.

Petaja v. Guck · filed 1989-07-18(1)

We do not believe that plaintiffs "hardly discernible” scar is the type of injury for which the Legislature intended to allow recovery when it established the threshold of permanent serious disfigurement.

Section 500.3135(1)'s permanent serious disfigurement threshold requires courts to assess the injury's effect on appearance without devices used to conceal it, such as dentures.

Fisher v. Blankenship · filed 2009-10-22(1)

For these reasons, we hold that courts must consider the effect of the disfigurement on the injured person's appearance without the use of devices designed to conceal the disfigurement, such as the dentures in this case.

Section 500.3135(1) requires evidence sufficient to show that a permanent scar is a serious disfigurement; photographs establishing the scar’s physical characteristics alone may be insufficient.

Scarber v. Issa · filed 2022-03-10(1)

We conclude that the photographs are sufficient to show that the scars have physical characteristics, contrary to the trial court’s holding, but they are insufficient to demonstrate a permanent serious disfigurement.

Permanent serious disfigurement under § 500.3135(1) does not require proof that the injury affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life.

Sgm v. James Robert David Whiteford · filed 2025-07-10(1)

There is no statutory language or caselaw indicating that the third element of “serious impairment of body function” also applies to “permanent serious disfigurement.”

Section 500.3135(2)(a) requires intent to cause harm to a person or property, rather than merely intent to perform the act that causes harm.

Hicks v. Vaught · filed 1987-02-04(2)(a)

We agree with defendant’s claim that this statute unambiguously requires a person to intend to cause harm to a person or property and not merely, as plaintiff contends, intend to do the act which causes the harm.

Section 500.3135(2)(a) preserves tort liability for intentionally caused property harm, including harm caused by wilful and wanton misconduct.

Citizens Insurance Co. of America v. Lowery · filed 1987-04-22(2)(a)

Intentionally caused harm to persons or property is an exception to the no-fault act’s abolition of tort liability. MCL 500.3135(2)(a); MSA 24.13135(2)(a). Because acts resulting from wilful ... and wanton misconduct fall within the class of intentional acts, defendant’s tort liability in the instant case is not abolished by the no-fault act.

Section 500.3135(3)(a)'s intentional-harm exception requires proof that the defendant intended the harm caused; reckless conduct alone does not suffice.

American Alternative Insurance Company, Inc v. York · filed 2002-09-24(3)(a)

As discussed above, the statute requires a showing that defendant intentionally caused the harm that occurred.

Section 500.3135(3)(a) removes motor vehicle tort immunity for intentionally caused harm only when the defendant intended to cause the resulting harm.

American Alternative Ins. Co., Inc. v. York · filed 2004-05-05(3)(a)

The statute makes no reference to “wilful and wanton.” Accordingly, in analyzing § 3135(3)(a), the courts are to review only whether the defendant intended to cause the harm that resulted.

Section 500.3135(3)(a) permits a property damage tort claim when the plaintiff plausibly alleges that the driver intended to cause the harm, rather than merely committed an intentional act.

CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Benore · filed 2015-12-30(3)(a)

Michigan -law is clear that to succeed on an intentional harm claim a plaintiff must show that the tortfeasor intended to cause the harm — not merely that his or her actions were intentional. ... Accordingly, where Plaintiff has set forth facts that, taken in a light most favorable to it, create a plausible claim of intentionally caused harm, Plaintiff has alleged a plausible claim that is an exception to the Act.

Section 500.3135(3)(a) requires evidence that the motorist intended the resulting property harm; intent to perform the act that caused the harm is insufficient.

330 S Cedar Street LLC v. Scholz · filed 2017-01-26(3)(a)

In sum, we hold that the trial court properly found that the evidence did not support the contention that defendant intentionally caused the harm that resulted to plaintiff’s car wash facility. Accordingly, because plaintiff’s claims were barred under MCL 500.3135(3)(a), the trial court did not err when it granted summary disposition in favor of defendants.

Section 3135 does not abolish tort liability for economic loss from an out-of-state motor vehicle accident, but its threshold for noneconomic damages still applies.

McLEAN v. WOLVERINE MOVING & STORAGE CO · filed 1991-02-13(1), (2)

Thus, by its plain terms the statute does not operate to abolish tort liability for economic loss arising from an out-of-state accident. ... Section 3135(1) contains no limitation that the injury must arise out of the use of the motor vehicle within this state.

Section 500.3135(1) limits recovery of noneconomic damages from an out-of-state motor vehicle accident when Michigan law governs, even if the defendants are not Michigan residents.

Marks v. West Side Unlimited Corp. · filed 1999-08-13(1)

Therefore, in this case, this court finds that plaintiffs right to recover noneconomic damages for tort injuries arising from the accident in Arizona is limited by the threshold requirement of § 3135(1).

Section 500.3135(1) retains tort liability for death caused by use of a motor vehicle, and a farm machinery exclusion cannot defeat required residual coverage if the vehicle played a causal role.

AMER. NAT. FIRE INS. CO. v. Frankenmuth Mutual Ins. Co. · filed 1993-04-05(1)

In this case, the exclusion seeks to deny the liability coverage required by the no-fault act because a farm implement, the combine, was also involved. However, whether the truck, as part of a unit carrying out the unloading operation, played a causal role as a motor vehicle in the accident is a disputed issue of fact. In view of the conflict between the exclusion and the language of the statute, we invalidate the attempted exclusion in order to read defendant's policy so as to provide the required coverage.

Section 500.3135(1)'s reference to “a motor vehicle,” read with the residual liability provisions, does not require coverage for every vehicle an insured drives, including a vehicle expressly excluded by the policy.

Husted v. Auto-Owners Insurance · filed 1999-04-27(1)

Plaintiff makes a specific textual argument, which the dissent adopts, regarding § 3135(1), as incorporated into § 3131(1), and § 3009(1). She notes that these provisions require residual liability coverage for use of "a" motor vehicle, rather than use of "the" or "such" motor vehicle. ... However, that the residual liability coverage requirement is not so limited does not indicate that it extends to "any" vehicle an insured drives, including vehicles specifically excluded from coverage in the insured's policy.

The discovery rule may delay accrual of a motor vehicle tort claim involving a latent injury if the plaintiff could not have discovered the injury’s connection to the accident through reasonable diligence.

Stephens v. Dixon · filed 1993-04-05

To gain the protection of the discovery doctrine, we now hold that the plaintiffs must be able to show that there was no reason, by way of medical advice or otherwise, to associate their conditions with the trauma caused by the automobile accident and that even with the exercise of reasonable diligence the causal connection would have remained unknown.

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars recovery of damages when a person injured in a motor vehicle accident was more than 50% at fault; a jury must resolve a genuine factual dispute over that allocation of fault.

DeLeo v. Modi · filed 2021-02-11(2)(b)

Under Michigan law, a plaintiff injured in a motor vehicle accident cannot recover damages from the alleged at-fault driver if the plaintiff was more than 50% at fault in causing the accident. MCL 500.3135(2)(b) (“Damages must be assessed on the basis of comparative fault, except that damages must not be assessed in favor of a party who is more than 50% at fault.”). ... Taking the facts in the light most favorable to DeLeo, this court cannot say that DeLeo’s negligence exceeded Modi’s as a matter of law.

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars damages for a party more than 50% at fault, but the fault threshold is for a jury when a reasonable juror could find that the party was not more than 50% at fault.

Henderson v. Lauderdale · filed 2021-03-18(2)(b)

Accordingly, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable juror could find that plaintiff was not more than 50% at fault for the accident, despite that he negligently pulled into Lauderdale’s lane.

Section 500.3135 permits a damages award when the injured person is less than 50% at fault, reduced by that person’s percentage of fault.

Fischer v. United States · filed 2021-06-01(2)(b)

That is to say, a fact-finder could reasonably determine that plaintiff was less than 50% at fault and that he is therefore entitled to a damages award (reduced, as the fact-finder may determine, by his percentage of fault, if any) under Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 500.3135.

Section 500.3135 bars damages when a party is more than 50% at fault, and disputed apportionment of fault is for the jury.

Farrar v. Lapan · filed 2021-11-19

Issues of fact regarding apportionment of fault and weighing of evidence are left to the determination of the jury. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, a genuine issue of material fact remains concerning whether Farrar was more than 50 percent at fault.

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars a damages award to a party who is more than fifty percent at fault.

Estate of Krystal Gayle Lawrence v. Schauf · filed 2022-02-10(2)(b)

In any event, a jury may not award damages in favor of a party who is more than fifty percent at fault.

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars motor vehicle tort damages for a claimant who is more than 50% at fault.

Montez Hill v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company · filed 2022-05-26(2)(b)

In sum, considering the undisputed evidence, no reasonable juror could find that Crisman was more at fault than Hill, a showing that is required by MCL 500.3135(2)(b) for Hill to prevail.

An alleged violation of a local ORV ordinance does not, by itself, establish the more than 50% fault needed to bar damages under § 500.3135(2)(b).

Parraghi v. Chodyniecki · filed 2022-11-03(2)(b)

Even assuming without deciding that the ORV ordinance was violated by the minor, we conclude that the ordinance violation terms were insufficient to conclude that the minor was more than 50% at fault for the accident.

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars damages for a party more than 50% at fault, and summary judgment is proper when reasonable minds could not differ that the party exceeds that threshold.

Zajdel v. Exel Inc., a Foreign Corp. d/b/a DHL Supply Chain (USA) · filed 2022-12-07(2)(b)

Under Michigan’s comparative negligence statute, “[d]amages must be assessed on the basis of comparative fault, except that damages must not be assessed in favor of a party who is more than 50% at fault.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 500.3135(2)(b). ... Taken together, the evidence supports the finding that reasonable minds could not differ on whether Zajdel was more than 50% at fault for the accident. Mich. Comp. Laws § 500.3135(2)(b). The Court will therefore grant Defendants’ summary judgment motion and dismiss the case.

Section 500.3135(2)(b) allows comparative fault to be resolved without a jury when no reasonable juror could find the defendant more at fault than the plaintiff.

Maya v. Omega Freight Systems Inc · filed 2022-12-22(2)(b)

Questions of fact regarding comparative negligence are generally reserved for the jury, Poch v Anderson, 229 Mich App 40, 51; 580 NW2d 456 (1998), unless “no reasonable juror could find that defendant was more at fault that the [plaintiff] in the accident as required by MCL 500.3135(2)(b),” Huggins v Scripter, 469 Mich 898, 899; 669 NW2d 813 (2003). ... Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, her statement to police did not rebut the witness’s testimony that she was stopped in the intersection, and there was no evidence presented to substantiate her claim that she was not comparatively negligent.

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars damages for a party who is more than 50% at fault.

Odisho v. Yacouba · filed 2023-02-01(2)(b)

As this Court explained in its summary judgment decision, under Michigan law, damages may not be assessed in favor of a party who is more than 50% at fault.

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars damages for a party who is more than 50% at fault for the collision.

Almaswari v. Great American Insurance Company · filed 2023-04-27(2)(b)

Given these facts, there is no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff was more than 50% at fault in causing the collision. Under MCL 500.3135(2)(b), plaintiff cannot prevail against Lychuk, and the trial court erred by not granting Lychuk summary disposition.

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars a plaintiff who is more than 50% at fault for a motor vehicle accident from recovering damages, and the bar may be applied on summary disposition when no reasonable jury could find otherwise.

Ong v. Lewis · filed 2023-06-08(2)(b)

Plaintiff clearly was more than 50% at fault for the accident. The trial court, therefore, erred by not granting defendants summary disposition under MCL 500.3135(2)(b).

Section 500.3135(2)(b) requires comparative fault to determine damages and precludes damages for a party more than 50% at fault; disputed relative fault cannot be resolved by summary disposition when reasonable minds could differ.

Estate of India D Sullivan v. Stiles · filed 2023-11-21(2)(b)

Based on this record, reasonable minds could differ on the question whether Stiles or Sullivan was more at fault in causing this accident, and the trial court therefore erred by granting summary disposition in favor of the City.

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars damages when a party is more than 50% at fault, but a genuine dispute over comparative fault precludes summary disposition on that ground.

20231207_C364223_36_364223.Opn.Pdf · filed 2023-12-07(2)(b)

The trial court further erred by finding that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Murphy was more than 50% at fault or the accident, barring him from recovery pursuant to MCL 500.3135(2)(b), which provides: “Damages must be assessed on the basis of comparative fault, except that damages must not be assessed in favor of a party who is more than 50% at fault.”

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars damages when a party is more than 50% at fault for a motor vehicle accident; comparative fault may be resolved on summary disposition only when no reasonable juror could find the defendant more at fault.

Batton v. Auto Owners Insurance · filed 2023-08-03(2)(b)

In the context of a motor vehicle accident, “a party who is more than 50% at fault” may not recover any damages. MCL 500.3135(2)(b). Comparative negligence may be decided on a motion for summary disposition if no reasonable juror could find that the defendant was more at fault than the plaintiff.

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars damages when the injured party is more than 50% at fault.

Tw v. Amber Quinn · filed 2023-10-19(2)(b)

But, even when a party breaches their standard of care, the comparative negligence doctrine holds that “a party who is more than 50% at fault” may not recover damages. MCL 500.3135(2)(b).

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars noneconomic damages when the plaintiff is more than 50% at fault; a jury must decide the fault allocation when reasonable jurors could find the plaintiff 50% or less at fault.

Zajdel v. Exel, Inc. · filed 2023-11-17(2)(b)

A plaintiff may not recover noneconomic damages if the plaintiff is more than 50% at fault.

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars damages for a party more than 50% at fault, but disputed evidence of the plaintiff’s fault leaves that determination to the trier of fact.

Choice v. Richards · filed 2025-03-13(2)(b)

Under MCL 500.3135(2)(b), “Damages must be assessed on the basis of comparative fault, except that damages must not be assessed in favor of a party who is more than 50% at fault.” ... The facts on which defendants rely—plaintiff was driving an unfamiliar vehicle in snowy conditions and without a driver’s license—do not demonstrate as a matter of law that plaintiff was more than 50% at fault for the accident. ... Therefore, the trial court did not err when it left the determination of comparative negligence to the trier of fact.

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars damages in a motor vehicle tort action when the plaintiff is more than 50% at fault.

Sayegh v. Citizens Insurance Company of the Midwest · filed 2025-04-28(2)(b)

The trial court also did not state that it had determined that plaintiff was more than 50% at fault in the parties’ collision, which would mean that damages could not be assessed in plaintiff’s favor. See MCL 500.3135(b)(2).

Section 500.3135(1) requires causation, and subsection (2) limits recovery when a plaintiff is more than 50% at fault; disputed testimony about either issue can preclude summary disposition.

Derose v. Rodgers · filed 2025-07-09(1), (2)

Defendants insist that plaintiffs cannot recover from defendants because (1) plaintiffs cannot establish that Rodgers “caused” their injuries as required by MCL 500.3135(1) and (2) plaintiffs were more than 50% at fault for the collision, so their recovery was barred by MCL 500.3135(2). We reject both arguments because, in making the arguments, defendants fail to view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. Defendants contend that, on the basis of the bystanders’ testimonies, White caused the collision by driving in front of the bus. But White’s testimony supports that Rodgers caused the collision, so there is a question of fact as to this issue. Likewise, if a jury believes White’s testimony, it could readily conclude that plaintiffs were not more than 50% at fault for the collision.

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars noneconomic damages when the injured party is more than 50% at fault, and a court may dispose of the claim when undisputed evidence leaves no reasonable basis to find otherwise.

Rowland v. City of Detroit · filed 2025-09-12(2)(b)

Here, the “other proofs” defendants submitted—most notably, the multi-angle video recording—demonstrate that no reasonable factfinder could conclude plaintiff was less negligent than defendants. As in Huggins, plaintiff’s own conduct so plainly exceeded any arguable negligence by defendants that the case cannot proceed to a jury under MCL 500.3135(2)(b).

Section 500.3135(2)(b) leaves comparative fault to the jury when the evidence permits reasonable jurors to differ over whether the injured person was more than 50% at fault.

Estate of Valinda Pudelek v. Boriboon · filed 2025-09-17(2)(b)

However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we disagree with defendant that the evidence conclusively establishes that Valinda was more than 50% at fault. There is evidence from which a jury could determine that both defendant and Valinda shared fault for the accident. Considering this conflicting evidence, the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition because there were genuine issues of material fact for the jury to determine.

Section 500.3135(2)(b) bars damages for a party more than 50% at fault, but a genuine factual dispute over that party’s fault precludes summary disposition on that basis.

Estate of Michael Schlicker v. Kanicki · filed 2025-12-05(2)(b)

The trial court further erred by finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the decedent was more than 50% at fault for the accident and concluding that the estate was barred from recovery under MCL 500.3135(2)(b), which provides: “Damages must be assessed on the basis of comparative fault, except that damages must not be assessed in favor of a party who is more than 50% at fault.”

Section 500.3135(2)(b) does not bar recovery when reasonable minds could differ about which driver was more at fault for the crash.

Christiansen v. Armbrustmacher · filed 2025-12-15(2)(b)

With this evidence, together with Armbrustmacher’s deposition testimony reflecting uncertainty as to whether he inspected the hi-lo’s lights before traveling, “reasonable minds could differ on which driver was more at fault for the crash, [and thus] MCL 500.3135(2)(b) does not bar recovery for plaintiff.” McDuffie, 21 NW3d at 208.

Under § 500.3135(2)(b), possible comparative fault does not warrant summary disposition of a motor vehicle tort claim if a reasonable jury could find the plaintiff no more than 50 percent at fault.

Gamarra v. Oakland County · filed 2026-03-06(2)(b)

For tort claims arising from motor vehicle accidents, summary disposition is inappropriate unless no reasonable jury could fail to find that the plaintiff is more than 50 percent at fault. See Poch v Anderson, 229 Mich App 40, 51; 580 NW2d 456 (1998); MCL 500.3135(2)(b).

Section 500.3135(4)(a) requires comparative fault to be assessed in auto-negligence claims for noneconomic damages and bars damages to a party more than 50% at fault.

Katrina White v. Domenico Pace · filed 2025-11-03(4)(a)

In an auto-negligence action for noneconomic damages, “[d]amages must be assessed on the basis of comparative fault, except that damages must not be assessed in favor of a party who is more than 50% at fault.” MCL 500.3135(4)(a).

Section 500.3135(2)(b) requires damages to be assessed by comparative fault and bars recovery by a party more than 50% at fault.

Harper v. Reed · filed 2025-12-22(2)(b)

However, a plaintiff may not recover noneconomic damages when a plaintiff’s fault is greater than the aggregate fault of the others involved. MCL 600.2959; see also MCL 500.3135(2)(b) (“Damages must be assessed on the basis of comparative fault, except that damages must not be assessed in favor of a party who is more than 50% at fault.”).

Section 500.3135(3)(c) expands tort liability for allowable expenses only in connection with policies issued or renewed after July 1, 2020.

Progressive Marathon Insurance Company v. Pena · filed 2023-01-26(3)(c)

Because applicants or named insureds were only permitted to limit or exclude PIP coverage under MCL 500.3107c and 3107d in policies issued or renewed after July 1, 2020, their direct reference in MCL 500.3135 indicates that the changes in tort liability cannot affect policies issued prior to July 2, 2020.