Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9

Section 9(4) entitles consumers who prevail on a Chapter 93A claim to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

Burnham v. Mark IV Homes, Inc. · filed 1982-11-05(4)

The plaintiffs’ right to recover under G. L. c. 93A, § 2, entitles them to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred in asserting their rights. G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (4).

Section 9(4) permits an attorney’s fee award in a consumer action even when the plaintiff receives only minimal damages, with the amount assessed under the usual fee factors.

Geraci v. Crown Chevrolet, Inc. · filed 1983-02-04(4)

The award of attorney’s fees to plaintiff’s counsel is supportable under the factors discussed in such cases as Heller v. Silverbranch Corp., 376 Mass. 621, 629-630 (1978), Linthicum v. Archambault, supra at 388, and Hanner v. Classic Auto Body Inc., 10 Mass. App. Ct. 121, 123 (1980).

Section 9(4) entitles a plaintiff to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs when the court finds an unfair act or practice in violation of Section 2.

George A. Pickering, Inc. v. Blue Hill Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. · filed 1984-05-31(4)

In any case brought under G.L.c. 93A, where the court makes a finding that acts complained of constituted an unfair act or practice in violation of §2, the plaintiff shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

Section 9(4) requires a finding of a violation of Chapter 93A, § 2 before attorney’s fees may be awarded.

Talbot v. Horace Mann Insurance · filed 1984-12-12(4)

Before attorney’s fees are awarded, the court must find that there has been a violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 2. See G. L. c. 93A, § 9(4). Such a finding was totally lacking on this record.

Section 9(4) does not authorize a trial court to award appellate attorney’s fees unless the appellate court directs it to do so.

Patry v. Liberty Mobilehome Sales, Inc. · filed 1985-03-13(4)

Where the Appeals Court gave no directive concerning the allowance by the trial court of appellate attorney’s fees, the trial court had no authority to award such fees under G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (4).

Section 9 entitles a tenant who prevails on a c. 93A claim to reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal, even if she represented herself at trial.

Manzaro v. McCann · filed 1988-03-16

The tenant, who represented herself at the trial, is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal under G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (see Leardi v. Brown, 394 Mass. 151, 168 [1985]), and under G. L. c. 186, § 14 (Darmetko v. Boston Hous. Auth., 378 Mass. 758, 763 [1979]).

Section 9(4) allows a prevailing party to recover reasonable attorney’s fees for an appeal.

Yorke Management v. Castro · filed 1989-11-07(4)

The language of G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (4), leaves no doubt as to the right to recover attorney’s fees without any suggestion that fees for the appeal are excluded.

Section 9(4) authorizes attorney’s fees incurred in connection with an action under § 9, but not fees incurred in a separate arbitration.

Schultz v. Subaru of America, Inc. · filed 1990-05-09(4)

The attorney’s fees that the plaintiff seeks to recover were incurred in connection with the arbitration pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 7N’/i, not in connection with an action under c. 93A, § 9. Therefore, § 9 (4) does not authorize an award of attorney’s fees in this case.

Section 9(4) requires a court finding of a § 2 violation before attorney’s fees may be awarded; relief obtained through a settlement does not itself supply that finding.

Matusko v. Gourlay · filed 1990-10-15(4)

The statutory condition for recovery of attorney’s fees is a finding by the court. ... Although the agreement between the parties provided some relief to the defendants, it in no way was equivalent to a court finding that a violation of § 2 had occurred.

Section 9 allows twenty-five dollars in statutory damages and reasonable attorney's fees unless the consumer proves a greater actual loss or harm.

DePasquale v. Ogden Suffolk Downs, Inc. · filed 1990-12-31

If successful, unless the plaintiff can prove an actual loss or harm in excess of statutory damages, his recovery would be limited to statutory damages of twenty-five dollars plus reasonable attorney's fees related to the collection of the same. G.L.c. 93A, § 9.

Section 9 provides actual damages and attorney’s fees for a violation, with enhanced damages when the deceptive act was knowing or willful or the refusal to grant relief upon demand was in bad faith.

DiBlasi v. Hern · filed 1993-02-17

The measure of damages once a violation of section 9 is found, is actual damages and attorney’s fees, unless the court finds that the deceptive act or practice was engaged in knowingly or willfully, or that the defendants’ refusal to grant relief upon demand was in bad faith.

Section 9(3) allows a tenant who proves an unfair practice but no actual loss to recover $25 in nominal damages and a reasonable attorney’s fee.

Poncz v. Loftin · filed 1993-02-19(3)

On the record before us, however, we answer the reported question that the tenant was entitled to recover $25, plus a reasonable attorney’s fee, but not the cost of providing his own heat and hot water during the tenancy.

Section 9(4) authorizes attorney’s fees incurred in a Chapter 93A action, but not fees for a separate malpractice action.

Miller v. Risk Management Foundation of the Harvard Medical Institutions, Inc. · filed 1994-04-29(4)

Chapter 93A, § 9(4), as inserted by St. 1969, c. 690, authorizes the award of legal fees “incurred in connection with said action” (i.e., the action under c. 93A), but not for other actions.

Section 9(4) permits an award of reasonable attorneys fees and expenses to a prevailing consumer.

Morani-Vegnani v. Travelers Insurance · filed 1996-01-31(4)

The last issue is the award of attorneys fees. G.L.c. 93a §9(4). The amount requested with expenses, through January 17, 1996 is $18,656.49. This amount is supported by a detailed affidavit, admitted into evidence without objection. The hourly rate requested is reasonable and the work performed was appropriate. The court determines that amount requested is reasonable.

Section 9 permits reasonable attorney’s fees for work connected with the chapter 93A claim.

Bruning v. Welch · filed 1997-07-25

The plaintiff is entitled to recover a reasonable award of attorneys fees pursuant to G.L.c. 93A, §9. A defendant found to be responsible for attorney’s fees under chapter 93A is only liable for that portion of the attorney’s fees which represents work connected with the 93A claim.

Section 9(4) provides for reasonable attorneys fees and costs as part of a plaintiff’s recovery.

Clegg v. Butler · filed 1998-01-14(4)

3. Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorneys fees and costs, pursuant to G.L.c. 93A, §9(4), together with interest, at the annual rate of 12 percent, on the damages (not trebled).

Section 9(4) allows recovery of all reasonable attorneys fees and costs when a Chapter 93A claim is inextricably intertwined with other claims.

Harkins v. Colonial Floors, Inc. · filed 1998-01-20(4)

In accordance with G.L.c. 93A, §9(4), the plaintiff is entitled to recovery of reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred in connection with this litigation. Since the Chapter 93A claim is inextricably intertwined with the other claims, I award the full amount of reasonable attorneys fees and costs, and do not attempt to determine what share of those fees and costs derive from the Chapter 93A claim rather than the other claims.

Section 9(4) gives the prevailing party the attorney’s fee award; the award does not cap what the client owes under a contingent fee agreement.

Graves v. R.M. Packer Co. · filed 1998-11-18(4)

The award of fees under c. 93A belongs to the prevailing party, not the attorney, see G. L. c. 93A, § 9(4); Smith v. Consalvo, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 192, 195 (1994) (claimant under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 [1988] and under agreement not the same person), and the c. 93A award does not impose a ceiling on what the client is obliged to pay his attorney; that obligation is defined in the contingent fee agreement between the client and the attorney, subject to the client’s right to receive the c. 93A award.

Section 9(4) allows reasonable attorney’s fees even when counsel represented the consumer pro bono; related non-core work may be compensated at a reduced rate.

United Companies Lending Corp. v. Sargeant · filed 1999-01-04(4)

Consequently, this Court refuses to reduce Sargeant’s attorneys’ fees award based on the pro bono nature of the representation. ... In accordance with the foregoing discussion, this Court hereby ORDERS United to pay Sargeant the following assessment of reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to Mass. Gen.Laws ch. 93A, § 9(4): attorneys’ fees of $83,115.70, representing the total requested by Sargeant less $3479.80 for non-core services arising out of counsel’s interaction with the Attorney General’s office.

Section 9(4) authorizes an award of attorney fees and court costs to a plaintiff who prevails on a Chapter 93A claim.

Lewis v. Ariens Co. · filed 1999-02-24(4)

(4) pursuant to G.L.c. 93A, §9(4) the court orders defendants to pay plaintiffs’ attorneys fees of $55,520.50 and court costs of $12,249.65.

Section 9 provides for proceedings to determine damages and attorney’s fees after judgment for a consumer on a c. 93A claim.

Green v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc. · filed 1999-07-29

A new judgment shall enter for the plaintiff on her claim pursuant to G. L. c. 93A. The case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings on the issue of damages and attorney’s fees pursuant to G. L. c. 93A, § 9.

Section 9(4) requires plaintiffs to prove which attorney fees and expenses are connected to their Chapter 93A claim.

McDonough v. Ferrari Pool 'N Patio, Inc. · filed 2000-04-14(4)

The burden is on the plaintiffs to prove what portions of their fees and expenses are 93A related. G.L.c. 93A, §9(4).

Section 9(4) cuts off recovery of attorney’s fees incurred after a claimant rejects a reasonable written settlement offer made in response to a demand for relief.

Hart v. GMAC Mortgage Corp. (In Re Hart) · filed 2000-03-27(4)

The Court finds that the Defendants’ response to the Debtor’s Chapter 93A letter was not unreasonable. The Court further finds that GMAC and Fannie Mae’s conduct was not a willful and knowing violation of § 2, but rather the result of poor management practices relating to its computer system and personnel training. Accordingly, under G.L. c. 93A, § 9(4), Debtor’s counsel is only entitled to attorney’s fees up until the date that the Debtor rejected the offer of settlement.

Section 9(4) limits attorney’s fees to those incurred before a reasonable written settlement offer that the plaintiff rejects.

Alkon v. Capital Masonry & Paving Contractors, Inc. · filed 2000-09-19(4)

If a reasonable written offer of settlement is made under this section and rejected, the fees are limited to those incurred before the offer.

Section 9(4) authorizes attorney’s fees but does not assign a class’s anticipated fees to the named plaintiff for purposes of federal jurisdiction.

Spielman v. Genzyme Corp. And Genzyme Development Corp. · filed 2001-05-24(4)

The text of § 9(4) does not support Spielman’s argument that the statute uses the word “petitioner” as the equivalent of the term “representative” in the Louisiana statute.

Section 9(4) allows a prevailing plaintiff to recover reasonable additional attorney’s fees and costs incurred after a case is removed from District Court to Superior Court.

O'Connor v. Brophy · filed 2002-08-20(4)

In view of these decisions, we can see no reason why a plaintiff should be denied an award of additional fees and costs where, as here, the plaintiff has been compelled to incur such additional fees and costs as a result of the removal of a case from District to Superior Court. The statutory provisions would be rendered equally hollow if they did not provide for an award of additional fees or costs incurred in such removed proceedings.

Section 9(4) allows recovery of reasonable attorney fees and costs fairly attributable to a successful Chapter 93A claim and proportionate to its damages.

Lane v. Commerce Insurance · filed 2003-05-27(4)

The plaintiff is also entitled under G.L.c. 93A, §9 (4) to recover his reasonable attorney fees and costs that are fairly attributable to the Chapter 93A claim and proportionate to the Chapter 93A damages.

Section 9(4) does not require a class’s anticipated attorney’s fees to be attributed to the named plaintiff when determining federal jurisdiction.

Spielman v. Genzyme Corporation · filed 2001-06-01(4)

In sum, we reject Spielman's argument that Chapter 93A's authorization of attorney's fees requires that such fees be aggregated to the named plaintiff for purposes of determining federal jurisdiction.

Section 9 limits damages in consumer securities actions to actual damages, but permits a prevailing plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

Barron v. Fidelity Magellan Fund · filed 2003-03-05(3), (4)

Reading these two sections in tandem, we conclude that, although the restrictive language contained in § 9(3) limits recovery to actual damages in a matter involving securities, it does not preclude an award of either attorney’s fees or costs otherwise available pursuant to § 9(4).

Section 9 allows reasonable attorney fees for work on an insurance claim that is inextricably linked to the Chapter 93A claim.

Mongeon v. Arbella Mutual Insurance · filed 2004-08-24

However, if the defendant had acted lawfully and tendered the policy limits at the point when liability in that amount was reasonably clear, the plaintiff would not have been required to expend the effort that he did expend. Thus, I find that the effort made by plaintiffs counsel after January 21, 2001 to and including November 2002 is inextricably linked to the G.L.c. 93A claim and should be counted for purposes of the fee award.

Section 9 permits a court to reduce an attorney's fee award when the plaintiff achieves limited success.

French v. Corporate Receivables, Inc. · filed 2007-06-07

It is also permissible under ch. 93A to reduce a fee award because of the limited success achieved by the plaintiff.

Section 9(4) allows reasonable attorney fees and costs for a consumer claim, but fees for an underlying tort claim must be excluded.

Sterlin v. Commerce Insurance Co. · filed 2009-03-26(4)

In awarding costs and attorneys fees, the Court must distinguish between those charges related to the c. 93A claim and those of the underlying tort claim.

Section 9 allows a prevailing consumer to recover reasonable attorney’s fees for appellate work and trial court work reasonably necessary to obtain a final judgment.

Ross v. Continental Resources, Inc. · filed 2009-01-12

In Yorke Mgmt. v. Castro, 406 Mass. 17, 19 (1989), the Supreme Judicial Court said that a prevailing plaintiff was entitled to appellate attorney’s fees in an action under G. L. c. 93A, § 9, because “statutory provisions for a ‘reasonable attorney’s fee’ would ring hollow if it did not necessarily include a fee for the appeal.” ... For the same reason, a prevailing party is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee for all other trial court actions reasonably necessary to obtain a final judgment.

Section 9 entitles a plaintiff who recovers to attorney’s fees, even if the fee issue was not raised at trial or in a posttrial motion.

Soderlund v. Mosher · filed 2009-02-03

A plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees for any recovery under G.L.c. 93A, §9, even though the issue of attorney’s fees was not raised at trial or in a posttrial motion and the absence of a fee award was complained of for the first time on appeal.

Section 9(4) allows attorney’s fees and costs even when the court awards only single damages.

Pella Windows, Inc. v. Burman · filed 2009-06-17(4)

There is nothing in G.L.c. 93A, §9(4) that restricts entitlement to statutory attorney’s fees and costs to only those cases in which multiple or punitive damages are awarded.

Section 9(4) allows a court to award attorney's fees to a party that successfully defends a chapter 93A arbitration award against a petition to vacate; the award is discretionary.

Janney Montgomery Scott LLC v. Tobin · filed 2009-07-08(4)

Against this backdrop, we think that the Massachusetts courts would allow attorneys' fees to be awarded to a party who successfully defends a petition to vacate a chapter 93A arbitration award at the trial court level. ... We cannot ignore this clear statement, and thus reject the Tobins' contention that an award of attorneys' fees at the district court was mandatory.

Section 9(4) requires reasonable attorney’s fees, generally determined using a lodestar analysis.

McCarthy v. Quirk Nissan, Inc. · filed 2009-09-15(4)

Any fees awarded under c. 93Amustbe “reasonable,” G.L.c. 93A, §9(4); and, as Quirk notes, to determine what amount is “reasonable,” the court generally utilizes a “lodestar” analysis.

Section 9(4) allows attorney’s fees only when the consumer is entitled to actual damages, minimum statutory damages, or equitable relief.

DeBettencourt v. Aronson · filed 2011-02-08(4)

Pursuant to G.L.c. 93A, §9(4), a petitioner shall be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees “in addition to other relief provided for by this section.” ... Where we have concluded that the Aronsons suffered no loss of money or property as a result of the contractors’ violation of Chapter 142A, they are not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.

Section 9(4) entitles a prevailing plaintiff to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs when a Chapter 93A violation is established by default.

Pizzo v. Gambee · filed 2011-05-12(4)

Thus, as the prevailing party, Pizzo is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

Section 9(4) allows reasonable attorney fees and costs even when additional damages would duplicate recovery for the same injury.

Evans v. Lorillard Tobacco Co. · filed 2011-09-06(4)

Here, a further award of damages would be duplicative;... however, the plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys fees and costs pursuant to G.L.c. 93A, §9(4).

Section 9(4) entitles a claimant who establishes a Chapter 93A violation to an award of attorneys fees.

LaBouef v. St. Laurent · filed 2010-07-28(4)

Having found violations of the Act, the defendants are entitled to an award of attorneys fees. G.L.c. 93A, §9(4).

Section 9(4) allows fees for developing facts shared with other claims, but excludes time spent trying claims unrelated to the chapter 93A claim.

Evans v. Lorillard Tobacco Co. · filed 2011-12-02(4)

While the facts underlying the plaintiffs G.L.c. 93A claim and his other claims were so intertwined as to make it unnecessary to segregate out the time spent developing those facts, the time spent actually trying the non-93A claims may not be included in the final attorneys fees award.

Section 9(4) entitles a consumer who prevails in a Section 9(1) action against the Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

Wheatley v. Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund · filed 2013-05-31(4)

All we decide today is that a plaintiff who prevails in a consumer action brought against the insolvency fund pursuant to § 9 (1) is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under c. 93A, § 9 (4).

Section 9(4) allows an estate to recover attorney’s fees after a consumer claimant dies if a Section 2 violation is found.

Klairmont v. Gainsboro Restaurant, Inc. · filed 2013-05-16(4)

Because c. 93A, § 9 (4), mandates recovery of attorney’s fees where a violation of § 2 has occurred, an estate may recover attorney’s fees under c. 93A after a plaintiff’s death.

Section 9 entitles a consumer who successfully prosecutes a claim to reimbursement of attorneys fees.

Groleau v. Russo-Gabriele · filed 2014-12-05

Under G.L.c. 93A, §9, Russo-Gabriele is entitled to reimbursement of her attorneys fees for her successful prosecution of the c. 93A claim.

Section 9(4) gives the judge discretion to award attorney's fees based on how much of the claimed work contributed to the result against the defendant.

Passatempo v. McMenimen · filed 2014-12-11(4)

Like the judge, we "know of no reported case on like facts" and, like the judge, we consider "the fundamental question" to be "how much of the fees claimed actually contributed to the result obtained against Nationwide." ... He analyzed the relevance of efforts during the latter period to the eventual judgment obtained against Nationwide and applied a reduction of twenty-five percent to the State court proceedings while deducting the costs incurred in Federal court in their entirety. This resulted in a deduction of more than $170,000 from a fee request totaling more than $870,000. There was no abuse of discretion.

Section 9 authorizes reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred as separate categories.

Styller v. National Fire & Marine Insurance Co. · filed 2019-06-26

Thus, unlike the statute in Jones, 464 Mass. at 297, which identified "attorney's fee[s] as part of the costs," G. L. c. 93A distinguishes between "costs incurred" and "attorney's fees."

A consumer who successfully defends a § 9 judgment on appeal is entitled to appellate attorney's fees and costs.

Kimberly G. Granatino & Associates, P.C. v. John Afanasiw. · filed 2024-10-07

Afanasiw is entitled to an award of fees and costs in connection with his successful opposition to Granatino's appeal from the judgment on the 93A claim.

Section 9 does not entitle a claimant to appellate attorney's fees while the underlying Chapter 93A claim remains undecided.

Goncalves v. Joseph Caustrita. · filed 2025-02-05

As for the tenant's request for appellate attorney's fees and costs pursuant to G. L. c. 186, § 15B, and G. L. c. 93A, § 9, we decline to award them. ... And because the tenant's 93A claim remains undecided, he is not entitled to appellate attorney's fees under that statute.

Section 9(4) entitles a prevailing consumer plaintiff to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

Urban v. Zurich American Insurance Company · filed 2025-07-17(4)

A prevailing Chapter 93A plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. See M.G.L. c. 93A, § 9(4). ... Thus, Urban’s request for attorneys’ fees is GRANTED IN PART and, after adjustments, the Court awards attorneys’ fees in the amount of $138,817.75.

Section 9(4) allows an award of appellate attorney's fees to successful claimants.

ALAN FILZER & Others v. PITSICK LLC & Others. · filed 2025-11-18(4)

The abutters seek an award of appellate attorney's fees pursuant to G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (4), which we allow.

A request for appellate attorney's fees under § 9(4) is premature before the plaintiff has prevailed on the c. 93A claim.

Agnitti v. Philip Morris USA Inc. · filed 2026-03-13(4)

The plaintiff's request for appellate attorney's fees is denied without prejudice as premature as there is not a prevailing party. See G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (4).

Section 9(4) permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred in a Chapter 93A action.

Shapiro v. American Home Assurance Co. · filed 1985-08-12(4)

The statute also provides for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in connection with an action under ch. 93A. ... Finding the claimed amounts to be reasonable, I award $6,066.13 to DePalo and $8,812 to Bloom as fees and expenses incurred in connection with this action after December 31, 1984.

Section 9 does not require a consumer to arbitrate before suing, but a consumer who voluntarily submits a § 9 claim to arbitration cannot pursue the same claim in court afterward.

Gargano & Associates, P.C. v. Swider · filed 2002-06-21(6)

Before proceeding to court with a claim under G. L. c. 93A, § 9, a consumer is under no obligation to exhaust other remedies, including arbitration provisions provided by contract. ... Having elected to submit their § 9 claim to arbitration, the Garganos were foreclosed from pursuing the same claim in Superior Court.

A consumer need not include a Section 9 claim in mandatory arbitration of an underlying insurance claim and may pursue it separately.

Beals v. Commercial Union Insurance · filed 2004-05-19

There is nothing in the Porn, Saint Louis, or TLT Constr. Corp. opinions that contradicts Hannon or otherwise holds that a person can be forced to arbitrate a claim brought under G. L. c. 93A, § 9. ... we conclude that Beals did not have to include her bad faith claims in her complaint for the arbitration mandated by G. L. c. 175, § 111D. Her decision not to do so does not preclude her from pursuing those allegations on her present complaint.

Section 9(1) permits a consumer to bring a chapter 93A claim in a complaint seeking de novo review of a home improvement arbitration award.

Booth v. Augis · filed 2008-06-27(1)

We see no reason why a complaint filed in the Superior Court by a party seeking de novo review of a nonbinding arbitrator’s decision would be inconsistent with the language of G. L. c. 93A, § 9(1).

Section 9 cannot prevent arbitration of a consumer claim when an enforceable arbitration agreement is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act.

McInnes v. LPL Financial, LLC · filed 2013-08-12(6)

In Hannon v. Original Gunite Aquatech Pools, Inc., 385 Mass. 813, 826-827 (1982) (Hannon), we held that, even where a consumer executed a valid contract agreeing to arbitrate all disputes, a plaintiff may not be compelled to arbitrate a claim alleging an unfair or deceptive trade practice in violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 9. We hold today that such claims must be referred to arbitration where the contract involves interstate commerce and the agreement to arbitrate is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (2006) (FAA).

Section 9(8) does not displace federal res judicata rules governing the preclusive effect of a federal judgment.

Anderson v. Phoenix Investment Counsel of Boston, Inc. · filed 1982-10-01(8)

We need not reach the question of the extent to which § 9 (8) modifies traditional rules of res judicata or collateral estoppel, however, because its modifying effect, if any, is superseded by the Federal rule of res judicata.

Section 9(8) does not modify the rules against splitting claims while an earlier action is pending.

Keen v. Western New England College · filed 1986-10-31(8)

We have examined the legislative history of G. L. c. 93A, § 9(8), ... and see nothing to suggest that the Legislature in ... tended to modify the salutary and well established rules against claim splitting which are now comprehended within rule 12(b) (9).

Section 9(8) does not prevent claim preclusion when a plaintiff fails to appeal the denial of leave to amend a complaint to add a Chapter 93A claim.

Hatch v. Trail King Industries, Inc. · filed 2012-11-02(8)

But, in our view, under the plain language of c.93A, § 9(8), the provision does not apply here. The "bar to" relief was not the outcome as to an award of damages in the 2007 action.

Section 9 does not give consumers a right to a jury trial, even after the Legislature removed the words “in equity” from subsection (1).

Nei v. Burley · filed 1983-03-04(1)

In all, the equitable nature of the relief permitted and the silence of the Legislature leads us to conclude that there is no right to a trial by jury for actions cognizable under G.L.c. 93A.

Section 9 does not provide a right to a jury trial on a Chapter 93A claim.

Wallace Motor Sales, Inc. v. American Motors Sales Corp. · filed 1985-12-19(1)

Although the Nei court did not explicitly address the seventh amendment requirement, we believe that the reasoning employed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Nei is determinative of the seventh amendment issue.

Section 9(3A) bars a district court from ordering the return of a purchased car as equitable relief in a Chapter 93A case.

Paquin v. Arruda · filed 1983-09-08(3A)

As we have mentioned, the district court in Chapter93A cases has no power to grant equitable relief.

Section 9(3A) makes the amount of single damages claimed control remand, removal, and transfer, even when treble damages are sought.

Cifizzari v. D'Annunzio · filed 1985-02-28(3A)

Although the complaint also included a count seeking treble damages under G. L. c. 93A, § 9, that section provides that “[t]he provisions of sections ninety-five to one hundred and ten, inclusive, of chapter two hundred and thirty-one, where applicable, shall apply to a claim under this section, except that the provisions for remand, removal and transfer shall be controlled by the amount of single damages claimed hereunder.” G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (3A), inserted by St. 1978, c. 478, § 46. Thus, the defendant could have caused the case to be transferred to the Superior Court for a new trial within ten days after receiving notice of the Appellate Division’s decision.

Section 9(3A) limits Chapter 93A claims in District Court to money damages; claims for equitable relief must be brought in Superior Court.

First Agricultural Bank v. Cappuccino of the Berkshires, Inc. · filed 1986-08-15(3A)

However much we may emphathize with the trial court’s approach to this question on this record, it is clear that claims brought in a District Court under Chapter 93A are delimited to recovery of money damages only. G.L.c. 93A, § 9 (3A) (West 1984).

Section 9(3A) makes the amount of claimed single damages, excluding possible multiple damages, control removal and transfer of a District Court consumer claim to Superior Court.

Eisenberg v. Phoenix Ass'n Management, Inc. · filed 2002-11-04(3A)

Where, as here, a complaint is filed in District Court alleging a claim under G. L. c. 93A, § 9, the provisions for removal and transfer to the Superior Court set forth in G. L. c. 231, § 104, are controlled by the amount of single damages claimed in the complaint, and not by the possibility of multiple damages. G. L. c. 93A, § 9(3A).

Section 9(1) allows a c. 93A claim within the Housing Court’s jurisdiction to be brought as a counterclaim seeking equitable relief or damages.

Bank of America, N.A. v. Rosa · filed 2013-12-18(1)

General Laws c. 93A, § 9 (1), provides that a claim within the jurisdiction of the Housing Court may be presented in a counterclaim, and that equitable relief, monetary damages, attorney’s fees, and costs may be awarded.

Section 9(3A) gives the District Court jurisdiction to decide a Chapter 93A consumer counterclaim.

Blunsden v. Marks · filed 2001-06-27(3A)

Res judicata bars relitigation of matters which could have been litigated in the. prior action, and the District Court had jurisdiction to decide Blunsden’s Chapter 93A counterclaim. See G.L.c. 93A, §§9(3A), 11.

Section 9 does not make every tort or breach of promise by a business toward a consumer automatically actionable.

Budway v. Vadala · filed 1983-05-02

The trialjudge was not required as a matter of law to grant relief under G.L. c. 93A § 9. Not every tortious act or breach of promise by a businessman in dealing with a consumer is automatically actionable under G.L. c. 93A.

Section 9 permits a claim based on unfair insurance practices prohibited by c. 176D independently of a breach of contract claim.

Mueller Co. v. Commercial Union Insurance · filed 2010-12-21

OneBeacon’s argument that Mueller’s claim for a violation of c. 93A fails as a matter of law is unavailing. The complaint states that the claim is premised on the defendants’ alleged wilful and knowing violation of G.L.c. 176D, §3(9). See Third Amended Complaint, para. 97. “Conduct prohibited in c. 176D is not merely ‘duplicative’ of ordinary breach of contract claims based on the policy, although there may be some parallels. Rather, in this case, engaging in the conduct prohibited by G.L.c. 176D, and made unfair and deceptive by G.L.c. 93A, §9, creates an action independent from the contract.”

Section 9(2) gives judges discretion to decide whether proposed class members are similarly situated and similarly injured; satisfying Rule 23(a) alone does not require certification.

Fletcher v. Cape Cod Gas Co. · filed 1985-04-18(2)

However, we cannot say that a finding that the plaintiffs satisfied each of these four elements with respect to certification under rule 23 automatically entitles them to certification under § 9 (2). A judge does possess a degree of discretion in determining whether certain plaintiffs adequately have alleged that they are “similarly situated” and have suffered a “similar injury” as members of the class they seek to represent.

Section 9(2) requires plaintiffs seeking class certification to show that numerous people suffered damages from violations of their legal rights.

Langevin v. Vertical Club & Spa · filed 1994-05-12(2)

Under both Rule 23(a) and §9(2) there is a requirement that the class be numerous. ... The plaintiffs in this case have not met their burden of showing that there are numerous persons who have sustained damages by violations of their legal rights by Vertical.

Section 9(2) permits class certification despite difficulty identifying class members and calculating damages when denying certification would leave injured consumers without a remedy.

Olson v. Energy North, Inc. · filed 1999-01-14(2)

Yet, the difficulty in identifying and locating the members of the class and ascertaining the amount of damages should not defeat class certification where the alternative is to leave those aggrieved without a remedy and to permit those who allegedly perpetrated the fraud to keep the ill-gotten gains.

Section 9(2) permits class certification when consumers allege similar economic injury arising from a common deceptive practice.

Aspinall v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. · filed 2004-08-13(2)

The plaintiffs are similarly situated to other consumers of Marlboro Lights, and, because the injury claimed is an economic, and not a personal, injury, all have been similarly injured.

Section 9(2) makes the similarity of proposed class members’ claims and injuries relevant to class certification.

Jewel v. Unimprovident Corp. · filed 2005-02-22(2)

Using Mass.R-Civ.P. 23(a) as a framework but with G.L.c. 93A, §9(2) as the determinative standard, I find that although there is a certain similarity of situation and injury among and between the proposed class and named plaintiffs, there are also significant differences.

Section 9(2) treats class members as similarly situated when they claim the same economic injury from deceptive advertising.

Aspinall v. Philip Morris Companies · filed 2005-11-22(2)

As discussed above, because the plaintiffs claim economic, and not personal injury, all class members have been similarly injured and are, thus, similarly situated.

Section 9(2) requires notice to class members in the most effective practicable manner; when reliable addresses are available, individual mailed notice may be required.

Aspinall v. Philip Morris Companies · filed 2005-12-07(2)

Thus, in order to comply with c. 93A, §9(2) and to provide constitutionally adequate notice, plaintiffs will be required to mail individual notice to those Massachusetts residents.

Section 9(2) permits a consumer class action when an unfair or deceptive act causes similar injury to numerous similarly situated people.

Waters v. Earthlink, Inc. · filed 2006-05-11(2)

Waters may bring this action on behalf of a class of “numerous” “similarly situated” persons if the defendants’ allegedly unfair or deceptive act “caused similar injuiy” to them.

Section 9(2) requires similar injury to numerous similarly situated consumers for class certification; differences in exposure to deceptive advertising and its effect on purchases can defeat certification.

Kwaak v. Pfizer, Inc. · filed 2008-02-29(2)

This case falters on the first of the G. L. c. 93A requirements: that the use of an unfair or deceptive act or practice has caused similar injury to numerous other persons similarly situated. ... The trial judge erred as matter of law in certifying the class under both G. L. c. 93A, § 9(2), and rule 23.

Section 9 requires court approval of a consumer class action settlement and notice of the proposed settlement to all class members.

In re Massachusetts Smokeless Tobacco Litigation · filed 2008-04-09

A class action in Massachusetts, including but not limited to a class action bringing claims under Chapter 93A, may not be settled without the final approval of the court, and notice of any proposed settlement must be provided to all members of the class. Mass.RCiv.P. 23(c); G.L.c. 93A, §9.

Section 9(2) allows a court to consider predominance and superiority when deciding whether proposed class members are similarly situated and have suffered similar injuries.

Moelis v. Berkshire Life Insurance · filed 2008-05-22(2)

Nonetheless, in determining whether members of the proposed class are “similarly situated” and have suffered a “similar injury” under § 9 (2), the court has discretion to consider issues of predominance and superiority.

Section 9(2) requires a proposed consumer class to show that an unfair or deceptive practice caused similar injury to similarly situated people; a shared power outage is insufficient when causation varies by customer.

Bellerman v. Fitchburg Gas & Electric Light Co. · filed 2013-01-07(2)

The customer’s loss of power must be traced to a c. 93A violation before a cause of action exists.

Section 9(2)’s policy favoring consumer class actions cannot, by itself, invalidate an arbitration agreement’s class waiver because the Federal Arbitration Act preempts that ground.

Machado v. System4 LLC · filed 2013-06-12(2)

Accordingly, Feeney II clearly indicates that any invalidation of an arbitration agreement on public policy grounds following Concepcion must be based not on the public policy favoring class actions manifested in G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (2), and G. L. c. 149, § 150, which the FAA will preempt,... but instead on a public policy opposing exculpatory contracts, which under certain conditions can coexist with the FAA.

Section 9(4) does not limit a class’s recovery of damages or attorneys’ fees when its representative rejects a settlement offer made only to the representative.

Hermida v. Archstone · filed 2013-06-14(4)

This Court holds that a petitioner’s rejection of a settlement offer to the individual petitioner alone does not limit the recovery of damages or attorneys’ fees available to the class because the statute provides that the petitioner shall be awarded attorneys’ fees in “any action commenced hereunder.”

Section 9(2) requires class certification before the court addresses requests for relief on behalf of the class.

Dorrian v. LVNV Funding, LLC · filed 2015-03-30(2)

A class action only formally begins after certification, and of course Dorrian has yet to obtain class certification under Mass.R.Civ.P. 23 and/or G.L.c. 93A, §9(2). For this reason, the judgment issues LVNV raises are best addressed after Dorrian moves to certify a class and the court rules on that motion.

Section 9(2) permits class certification for consumers who allegedly overpaid for a deceptively represented service without proof of each class member’s individual harm.

Bellerman v. Fitchburg Gas & Electric Light Co. · filed 2015-07-29(2)

Where, as here, the focus is on the defendant’s deceptive conduct which caused the plaintiffs and the putative class members to purchase a service, i.e., electricity, for a price that was more than the service was worth, the plaintiffs need not prove individual harm in order to recover.

Section 9(2) requires proposed class members to have similar, though not necessarily identical, injuries caused by the unfair or deceptive conduct.

Bellermann v. Fitchburg Gas & Electric Light Co. · filed 2014-10-30(2)

To pursue a class action under G. L. c. 93A, plaintiffs must show that the putative class members suffered "similar," although not necessarily identical, injuries as a result of the defendant's unfair or deceptive conduct.

Section 9(2) allows a consumer class action to continue when the defendant pays the named plaintiff’s individual claim but leaves the class claims unresolved.

Reniere v. Alpha Management Corp. · filed 2014-11-25(2)

Similarly, consumers do not lose the chance to seek an effective private remedy through a c. 93A class action merely because the defendant chooses to pay the entire amount of the named plaintiffs individual claim.

Section 9(2) does not necessarily bar consumer class certification because class members’ injuries or damages vary; the court must assess whether their injuries are sufficiently similar.

Layes v. RHP Properties, Inc. · filed 2019-08-28(2)

The fact that injury or damages may vary across the class is not necessarily a bar to class certification.

Section 9(2) requires proposed consumer class members to be similarly situated and to have suffered similar injuries.

Harold Parsons, on Behalf of Himself and Others Similarly Situated v. the Commerce Insurance Company · filed 2025-06-23(2)

The Court finds, however, that the proposed classes would not meet the requirements under G.L. c. 93A, § 9(2), that class members be similarly situated and have suffered similar injuries.

Section 9 requires proof of a distinct injury caused by a Chapter 93A violation; call records alone did not establish that injury for every proposed class member.

Nightingale v. National Grid USA Service Company, Inc. · filed 2023-04-06

Even if the subject disposition records may be relied upon to establish a per se violation of Chapter 93A, § 2, they do not provide common proof that individual class members suffered a separate, distinct injury caused by that violation as required by § 9.

Section 9 does not provide a claim for unfair practices arising from an employment relationship.

Anzalone v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority · filed 1988-08-01

Anzalone asserts that Manning is inapposite because it was decided pursuant to G. L. c. 93A, § 11, and Anzalone’s action is brought under G. L. c. 93A, § 9. ... We stated that “we believe that the Legislature did not intend [c. 93A] to cover employment contract disputes between employers and the employees who work in the employer’s organization, nor . . . disputes between members of that organization arising out of the employment relationship.” ... Nothing stated in the complaint makes this case anything other than a dispute arising out of an employment relationship.

A claim under § 9 that an insurer failed to settle promptly, fairly, and equitably depends on the facts of the claim.

Evans v. Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Life Insurance · filed 1992-03-05

Generally, a claim against an insurance company under G.L.c. 93A based upon an alleged failure to effectuate a prompt, fair and equitable settlement of a claim is one which must be determined from the factual circumstances present.

Section 9 permits recovery for a single unfair or deceptive act and incorporates the claim settlement standards of chapter 176D, § 3(9).

Commercial Union Insurance v. Watson · filed 1993-07-16

Furthermore, the Marshes have brought their counterclaim under G.L.c. 93A, §9, which allows recovery for a single unfair or deceptive act and which expressly incorporates the standards of c. 176D, §3(9). Thus, the fact that the Marshes complain of only a single claim incident does not insulate CU from liability.

Section 9 does not permit recovery for an insurer’s denial of a claim when the insurer had a reasonable basis for its decision and acted in good faith.

Meagher v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · filed 1994-07-18(A)

The dispositive issue under G.L.c. 176D and 93Awas not whether the damage to the plaintiff’s car was accidental and thus covered by the parties’ insurance policy, but whether the insurer had a reasonable basis for concluding, in good faith, that it was not.

A prompt denial of a PIP claim does not support a § 9(3) claim without evidence that the denial was unreasonable or made in bad faith.

Cox v. Safety Insurance · filed 1996-12-20(3)

After a review of the Rule 56 materials submitted, there exists no evidence that can be drawn to support a c. 93A claim. Safety’s denial of Cox’s claim for PIP benefits was prompt. Furthermore, there was no evidence that Safety’s denial of Cox’s claim was made in bad faith or was unreasonable. See G.L.c. 93A, §9(3) and G.L.c. 176D.

Section 9 treats a violation of G.L. c. 176D, §3(9) as a violation of Chapter 93A.

St. Paul Village Condominium Ass'n v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance · filed 1996-06-15

A violation of c. 176D, §3(9), automatically comprises a violation of c. 93A, §9, because §9 so provides.

Section 9’s 1989 amendment sets a baseline for multiple damages but does not change how single damages for unfair settlement practices are calculated.

Kapp v. Arbella Mutual Insurance · filed 1996-06-25

Neither the text nor any necessary implication flowing from the 1989 amendment to G.L.c. 93A, §9, Stat. 1989, c. 580, changed c. 93A in away that undercut that uniform body of decisional law. ... On its face and in context, the amendment’s language was designed to provide a uniform baseline for computing multiple damages, not to prescribe a method for calculating single damages.

Section 9 provides a private remedy when an insurer insists on a release before paying policy limits despite reasonably clear liability and damages that substantially exceed those limits.

Kapp v. Arbella Mutual Insurance · filed 1996-08-27

Based on the preceding findings of fact and rulings of law, defendant Arbella’s insistence after October 10, ... 1994 that plaintiff release his claims against the insured as a condition of payment of the maximum policy limits, even though Arbella knew or had reason to know that the liability of the insured was reasonably clear and that plaintiffs damages substantially exceeded the policy limits, was an unfair and deceptive insurance settlement practice in violation of G.L.c. 176D, §(3)(9)(f) and G.L.c. 93A, §9.

Section 9 permits a private claim against an insurer for unfair settlement practices that violate Chapter 176D.

Bruning v. Welch · filed 1996-12-27

Conduct that violates G.L.c. 176D, §3, the Massachusetts statute defining unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance, also violates G.L.c. 93A, §9 and §2(a).

Section 9 provides an action for unfair insurance claim settlement practices prohibited by chapter 176D that is independent of a claim under the insurance policy.

Schwartz v. Travelers Indemnity Co. · filed 2001-01-08(1)

Rather, in this case, engaging in the conduct prohibited by G. L. c. 176D, and made unfair and deceptive by G. L. c. 93A, § 9, creates an action independent from the contract.

Section 9(1) allows a private action for unfair insurance settlement practices that violate chapter 176D, section 3(9).

M. Dematteo Construction Co. v. Century Indemnity Co. · filed 2001-10-03(1)

Section 9(1) of chapter 93A expressly allows a section 9 plaintiff to bring an action against persons violating clause 9 of section 3 of chapter 176D as well as against persons violating section 2 of chapter 93A.

Section 9 permits a separate private action for unfair claim settlement practices even when an insurer pays PIP benefits during litigation.

Boehm v. Commerce Insurance · filed 2003-03-11

Therefore, even in cases where summary judgment may have been allowed as to a claim under G.L.c. 90, §34M because of an insurer’s PIP payment during the course of the litigation, it is appropriate for the court to consider a separate claim brought pursuant to G.L.c. 93A.

Section 9 permits an action for unfair claims settlement practices by a self-insuring business with a claims facilitation department, even if the business is not subject to the insurance regulations in chapter 176D.

Morrison v. Toys "R" Us, Inc. · filed 2003-10-16(1)

Rather, there is an independent sustaining cause of action in c. 93A, § 9, for unfair claims settlement practices (apart from the incorporation of unfair insurance-based claims settlement practices predicated exclusively on c. 176D).

Section 9 permits insured parties and affected third parties to recover for unfair insurance claims settlement practices.

David L. Reicher, D.P.M. Affiliated Podiatrists, P.A. v. Berkshire Life Insurance Company of America the Guardian Life I · filed 2004-02-23

Chapter 93A defines certain acts and omissions as unfair claims settlement practices, permitting insured parties and even third parties whose rights are affected to recover under that statute. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9 (2003); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 176D, § 3(9) (2003).

Section 9 does not impose liability for bad faith settlement practices on a business that handles its own claims but is not engaged in the business of insurance.

Morrison v. Toys "R" Us, Inc. · filed 2004-04-15

Because Toys is not an insuring entity subject to standards imposed by G. L. c. 176D, § 3 (9), it cannot, as matter of law, be held liable under G. L. c. 93A for bad faith settlement practices. As an ordinary defendant, Toys had no affirmative duty to settle the plaintiff’s claim.

Section 9 permits a policyholder to sue over unfair or deceptive handling of an insurance benefits claim.

Gorsuch v. Paul Revere Life Insurance · filed 2006-12-20

Regarding insurance contracts, “[a] policyholder may have a claim under G.L.c. 93A, §9 . . . for unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the handling of claims for the payment of insurance benefits.” Swanson v. Bankers Life Co., 389 Mass. 345, 348 (1983). ... Here, whether Paul Revere violated chapter 93A is a question of fact for the jury.

Section 9(1) permits an unfair settlement practices claim against an insurer before the insured’s liability has been determined.

Reardon v. Carter · filed 2007-04-02(1)

Neither law requires that the liability of the insured party be determined before an unfair practices claim against the insurer can be pursued.

Section 9(1) lets consumers recover for violations of the unfair insurance settlement practices statute without separately proving a violation of chapter 93A, section 2.

Hartunian v. Pilgrim Insurance · filed 2012-11-19(1)

Pilgrim correctly maintains that G.L.c. 176D violations are not specified as grounds for claims by businesses under G.L.c. 93A §11, as they are for consumers ... under G.Lc. 93A, §9.

Section 9(1) permits an unfair settlement practices claim against an insurer before its insured’s liability is determined.

Gillis v. Peerless Insurance · filed 2013-08-27(1)

Neither law requires that the liability of the insured party be determined before an unfair practices claim against the insurer can be pursued.

Section 9 allows a consumer to bring a chapter 93A claim based on an insurer’s violation of chapter 176D, section 3(9).

River Farm Realty Trust v. Farm Family Casualty Ins. Co. · filed 2019-11-19

For a consumer plaintiff, a violation of chapter 176D, section 3(9) constitutes a violation of chapter 93A. ... Like the district court, we treat this as a section 9 case, but do not think the result would be different under section 11.

Section 9 lets consumers affected by specified unfair insurance practices sue and recover double or treble damages for knowing or willful violations.

WILLIAM TERRY v. HOSPITALITY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY. · filed 2022-08-31(1), (3)

A consumer whose rights are affected by violations of G. L. c. 176D, § 3 (9) (c), (d), or (f), may bring an action under c. 93A and recover double or treble damages for knowing or willful violations.

Section 9 permits recovery for violations of G. L. c. 176D without a separate showing that the conduct was unfair or deceptive under G. L. c. 93A, § 2.

MARK R. VENTO v. VERMONT MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY; J. BRIAN DAY, INC., Third- Party · filed 2025-08-19

While Vento argues that a violation of G. L. c. 93A requires an additional showing that the defendant's conduct was unfair or deceptive not required to prevail in a contract action, G. L. c. 93A, § 9, provides for recovery for violations of G. L. c. 176D, without regard to whether the defendant's actions would constitute unfair or deceptive acts as defined in G. L. c. 93A, § 2.

Section 9 permits a damages claim supported by evidence of actionable misrepresentations by a real estate broker.

Hinkley v. Vital · filed 1992-05-15

Evidence of Mrs. Vital’s actionable misrepresentations supports not only the plaintiffs’ tort claims, but their claims for G.L.c. 93A, §9 damages as well.

Section 9 does not require reasonable reliance to support a claim based on misrepresentation.

Lincoln Ventures, Inc. v. FSL Associates, Inc. · filed 2006-04-25

Notwithstanding the common-law requirement of reasonable reliance on claims of misrepresentation, actions brought under G.L.c. 93A, §9, do not require a demonstration of reasonable reliance.

Section 9 permits a court to award specific performance as equitable relief for an unfair or deceptive practice.

Greenfield Country Estates Tenants Ass'n v. Deep · filed 1996-06-26(1)

Section 9 (1) of G. L. c. 93A allows a consumer to bring an action for damages “and” such equitable relief as the court deems necessary and proper. ... So, too, is specific performance often an appropriate “remedy of enforcement” which furthers the preventive goal of the statute.

Section 9 permits rescission as an equitable remedy, but its award is within the court’s discretion.

Augustine v. Rogers · filed 1999-06-03

That rescission was an available remedy does not lead to the conclusion that it was required, particularly here where, after requesting such relief in her complaint, the plaintiff never raised the issue again until her brief on appeal. In any case, rescission is an equitable remedy awarded at the discretion of the court. See Ann & Hope, Inc. v. Muratore, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 223, 230 (1997). See also G. L. c. 93A, § 9. There was no abuse of discretion here.

Section 9(3A)'s limit on district courts to money damages was implicitly repealed by the later grant of equitable authority under the one-trial system.

Herman v. Home Depot, Inc. · filed 2001-06-19(3A)

That power, we conclude, implicitly repeals the limitations of G.L.c. 93A, §9(3A), restricting the district courts to money damages only.

Section 9(3A) does not bar a District Court from granting equitable relief in a consumer action when another statute gives it equity jurisdiction.

Herman v. Home Depot · filed 2002-03-05(3A)

Second, G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (3A), does not expressly prohibit a District Court from exercising equity power in a consumer protection action. Rather, the statute states that “no rights to equitable relief [in the District Court] shall be created under this paragraph.”

Section 9(3) does not allow profit disgorgement as an additional monetary remedy and provides the $25 statutory minimum per class member, rather than per purchase.

Aspinall v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. · filed 2014-02-07(3)

For the reasons that follow, the court holds that: (1) the plaintiffs cannot be awarded damages in an amount equal to the profits that the defendants earned on the sale of Marlboro Lights in Massachusetts during the class period as an “equitable remedy" under G.L.c. 93A, §9; and (2) if the plaintiffs cannot prove actual damages of more than $25 per class member, the statutory damages under G.L.c. 93A, §9(3) for “the injury suffered” will be $25 for each class member.

Section 9(1) permits injunctive relief even when a consumer has not pleaded entitlement to damages.

Foley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2015-06-05(1)

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(1) provides for injunctive relief. Although Foley has failed to plead what “damages” he might be entitled to, if any, Foley adequately alleged entitlement to injunctive relief under ch. 93A.

Section 9 permits a consumer to seek an injunction for a Section 105 violation without an injury distinct from the collection of cardholder identification information.

Diviacchi v. Speedway LLC · filed 2015-06-12(1)

Accordingly, based on this record and in the absence of further guidance from the SJC, the Court rules that a plaintiff may pursue a claim for purely injunctive relief under Section 105 absent any injury distinct from the collection of cardholder identification information in and of itself.

Section 9 does not support a claim based on a good faith dispute over money owed without unfair or deceptive conduct.

Duclersaint v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n · filed 1998-07-15

The plaintiff seeks additional relief under the provisions of G. L. c. 93A, §§ 9 and 11. ... However, a good faith dispute as to whether money is owed, or performance of some kind is due, is not the stuff of which a c. 93A claim is made.

Section 9 claims for single compensatory damages and reasonable attorney’s fees survive the plaintiff’s death; claims for double or treble damages do not.

Gordan v. Archer · filed 1999-06-10

There was, therefore, no error in the court’s ruling that the claim for single, compensatory damages under G.L.c. 93A survived the death of the plaintiff. ... Clearly, G.L.c. 93A double and triple damages are punitive in nature, and a claim for such damages does not survive the death of the plaintiff. ... In view of the compensatory character of such fees, the claim for attorney’s fees and the award of the same against the defendant in the present case survived the death of the plaintiff.

Section 9 does not require a consumer sale or transaction to occur primarily and substantially in Massachusetts; jurisdiction is determined under the Massachusetts Longarm Statute.

Snyder v. ADS Aviation Maintenance · filed 2000-01-10

However, G.L.c. 93A, §9, which applies to the consumer plaintiffs in this case, does not require that the sale or transaction occur “primarily and substantially” within Massachusetts. Rather, jurisdiction under §9 is determined under the Massachusetts Longarm Statute.

Section 9 imposes no express territorial limit on the conduct covered by a private consumer action.

Buckley v. JR Builders, Inc. · filed 2003-01-17

Unlike section 11, which limits actions thereunder to those arising from violations that “occurred primarily and substantially within the commonwealth,” section 9 does not impose any express territorial limit on the conduct within the statute’s reach.

Section 9 consumer actions are not subject to the requirement that the challenged conduct occur primarily and substantially in Massachusetts.

Vaughn v. AMERICAN AUTO. ASS'N, INC. · filed 2004-07-19

However, this requirement only applies to disputes between businesses under ch. 93A, § 11, not to actions such as this one brought by individuals under § 9.

Section 9 does not provide a cause of action to a plaintiff acting in a business context; that claim belongs under § 11.

Frullo v. Landenberger · filed 2004-09-13

Whereas a defendant must be engaged in trade or commerce, i.e., acting in a business context, to be liable under either § 9 or § 11, a plaintiff who acts in a business context has a cause of action exclusively under § 11.

Section 9 plaintiffs need not show that the challenged conduct occurred primarily and substantially in Massachusetts.

RLI Insurance v. Klonsky · filed 2011-02-11

Chapter 93A provides for two classes of plaintiffs, persons who engage in the conduct of any trade or commerce (§ 11) and any other person (§ 9). Only § 11 plaintiffs must satisfy the Massachusetts nexus.

Section 9 governs a subrogated insurer’s claim arising from its insureds’ property damage when the insureds were not engaged in trade or commerce.

Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Lampro · filed 2014-07-24

Because the Levkoffs were not "engaged in trade or commerce," we treat the claim as one arising under § 9.

Section 9 does not require a consumer to live in Massachusetts or the allegedly deceptive activity to occur primarily and substantially there.

Geis v. Nestlé Waters N. Am., Inc. · filed 2018-07-02(1)

On its face, chapter 93A does not require that a plaintiff reside in Massachusetts to bring a claim. ... Moreover, to bring an action under § 9, there is no requirement that the allegedly deceptive activity had to occur "primarily and substantially" in Massachusetts.

Section 9 does not require the allegedly deceptive activity to occur primarily and substantially in Massachusetts.

Lyndon v. Nestle Waters North America, Inc. · filed 2018-07-02

Moreover, to bring an action under § 9, there is no requirement that the allegedly deceptive activity had to occur “primarily and substantially” in Massachusetts.

Section 9 consumer claims based on alleged anticompetitive conduct may survive a motion to dismiss even when the theory of liability is novel.

Alvares v. Microsoft Corp. · filed 2001-07-06

It appears that there is no express prohibition against the plaintiffs from bringing G.L.c. 93A, §9 claims that are based on allegations of anticompetitive conduct. Instead, there is a reasonable possibility that Massachusetts appellate courts would, in fact, approve of such claims. This court, therefore, feels that it is inappropriate to dismiss the plaintiffs action simply because it addresses a novel theory of liability.

Section 9(1) allows indirect purchasers injured by price-fixing or other anticompetitive conduct to sue even when they cannot bring a claim under the Massachusetts Antitrust Act.

Ciardi v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd. · filed 2002-02-08(1)

The only issue before us is whether indirect purchasers can assert claims for price-fixing or other anticompetitive conduct under G. L. c. 93A, § 9, where they have no standing to bring such claims under the Massachusetts Antitrust Act (Antitrust Act), G. L. c. 93, §§ 1-14A. Because we conclude that indirect purchasers can assert such claims, we affirm the order of the Superior Court judge.

Section 9's private remedy for unfair insurance claim settlement practices is preempted by ERISA when the claim seeks multiple damages and attorney's fees for delayed processing of plan benefits.

Hotz v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc. · filed 2002-06-11(1)

The substantive prohibition on delay in claim processing in chapter 176D is directed solely at the insurance industry, but the private action for multiple damages and attorney's fees claim brought by Hotz is created by chapter 93A, § 9, which applies to unfair commercial practices in any industry. ... But under current Supreme Court precedent, we feel bound by the similarity of Pilot Life to our own case and by the close fit of its final rationale to Hotz's chapter 93A claim.

Section 9 does not support a claim based solely on a breach of the warranty of habitability when that underlying claim fails as a matter of law.

Goulet v. Actionvest Management Corp. · filed 2002-08-01

Finafly, because the Chapter 93A claims asserted in Counts X, XI, XXA and XXIII are based solely on the defendants’ alleged breach of the warranty of habitability, those claims fail as wefl.

Section 9 gives people affected by a violation of chapter 176D a cause of action under chapter 93A.

C-Mart Herald Street, Inc. v. AmTrust Financial Services, Inc. · filed 2020-01-23

C-Mart brings this claim based on ch. 93A, § 9, which provides a cause of action to persons “whose rights are affected by another person violating the provisions” of another Massachusetts statute, ch. 176D.

A mortgage servicer’s delayed response to a RESPA information request can support a private consumer claim under Section 9 when the delay plausibly caused injury.

Searle v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC · filed 2022-08-02

Taking the facts alleged as true, the Searles have sufficiently pleaded that Nationstar violated Section 93A by not complying with RESPA. There remains a plausible question as to whether the failure to respond caused the Searles’ injury. Thus, Nationstar’s motion is DENIED only as to whether Nationstar’s delayed response to the November 26, 2019 communication violated Section 93A.

Section 9 claims derived from viable negligence and warranty claims can proceed even when other underlying claims are preempted.

Slotnick v. Dymon, Inc. · filed 1994-04-26

Counts seven and eight allege that the defendants violated G.L.c. 93A, §9. Arguing that these counts are derivative, the defendants move to dismiss them on the grounds that FIFRA preempts counts one through, and including, six. As noted, this court allows the defendants’ motion to dismiss exclusively with respect to counts five and six. To the extent that counts seven and eight derive from counts one through four, they are viable.

Section 9 permits a charitable nonprofit to sue when the transaction furthers its core mission and it is not engaged in trade or commerce.

In Re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litigation · filed 2003-10-17

The Court finds that BCBS Massachusetts has demonstrated that it is not engaged in "trade or commerce" for the purposes of barring it from bringing a Section 9 claim, as it is a charitable institution not engaged in trade or commerce when it undertakes activities in furtherance of its core mission.

Section 9 provides no recovery when the underlying claim fails and there is no evidence of another unfair or deceptive business practice.

Crean v. Stoughton Motor Mart, Inc. · filed 2005-10-24

Given the failure of her underlying “lemon law” claim and in the absence of any evidence of some other unfair or deceptive business practice by the defendants, Crean could not recover under G.L.c. 93A, §9.

Section 9(1) permits a private action for violations of G. L. c. 176D, § 3, but does not expressly permit one for alleged violations of the workers’ compensation laws.

Fleming v. National Union Fire Insurance · filed 2005-11-23(1)

In 1979, the Legislature rewrote G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (1), explicitly to allow a private right of action for violations of G. L. c. 176D, § 3. ... No such private right of action under G. L. c. 93A was explicitly allowed for alleged violations of G. L. c. 152 or G. L. c. 23E.

Section 9(1) permits consumer actions against the Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund for violations of the unfair claims settlement provisions of chapter 176D.

Wheatley v. Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund · filed 2010-04-27(1)

For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the 1996 amendment had the effect of subjecting the insolvency fund, among other things, to consumer actions brought pursuant to G. L. c. 93 A, § 9 (1).

Section 9(1) allows consumers injured by unfair or deceptive insurance sales practices to sue under its first prong.

Passatempo v. McMenimen · filed 2012-01-12(1)

Accordingly, G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (1), affords the plaintiffs a private right of action in this case.

Section 9 permits anyone injured by unfair or deceptive practices, including a third-party insurance claimant, to sue.

Eight Bulls v. Miller · filed 2012-01-24

Statute 1979, c. 406, §1 amended G.L.c. 93A, §9 by changing the definition of persons entitled to sue for unfair or deceptive practices from a “purchaser” of goods or services to anyone “injured” by such practices.

Section 9(1) gives a private cause of action to a person whose rights are affected by a violation of Chapter 176D, § 3(9).

Estrada v. Progressive Direct Insurance · filed 2014-10-20(1)

The 1979 amendment to Chapter 93A granted a private cause of action to "any person whose rights are affected by another person violating the provisions of clause (9) of section three of chapter one hundred and seventy-six D.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(1); see also National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. West Lake Academy, 548 F.3d 8, 12 n. 2 (1st Cir.2008).

Section 9(1) does not provide a consumer claim based on a personal representative’s administration of an estate, because those actions are outside trade or commerce under chapter 93A.

THOMAS J. MANNING v. MICHAEL D. GARGAS & Others. · filed 2023-08-17(1)

As the judge correctly discerned, Gargas's pre and post decree "actions in administering the estate" were not "trade or commerce 'directly or indirectly affecting the people of this Commonwealth,'" Gannett v. Lowell, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 325, 328 (1983), quoting G. L. c. 93A, § 1 (b), and thus fell outside the scope of the "acts or practices" actionable under c. 93A, G. L. c. 93A, § 2 (a), whether the transaction was a consumer or commercial one. See G. L. c. 93A, §§ 9 (1), 11.

Section 9 does not apply to conduct before its November 13, 1969 effective date.

Evans v. Lorillard Tobacco Co. · filed 2007-02-07

Accordingly, the Defendants’ motions to dismiss Count VI are ALLOWED to the extent that Count VI concerns conduct that occurred prior to November 13, 1969.