Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9

Section 9(3)’s demand letter requirement is satisfied when the consumer properly mails or delivers the letter, even if the recipient refuses to accept it.

Wade v. Clayton · filed 2019-06-07(3)

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ Chapter 93A claim did not comply with Chapter 93A’s 30-day demand letter requirement. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(3). Plaintiffs have put evidence into the record showing that they sent pre-suit demands by either certified or first-class mail to the two most recent addresses for both Touchdown and Clayton. Defendants evidently refused to accept service of the demand letters, but they were properly mailed and delivered.

Section 9(3) requires a claimant to prove that a demand letter was sent before filing suit.

Johnson v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC a division of Ocwen, Inc. · filed 2020-03-05(3)

Because Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that they did in fact send such a demand letter in order to bring a claim under 93A, summary judgment is granted on Count III, Chapter 93A.

Section 9(3) requires a demand letter to reasonably describe the alleged unfair or deceptive practice and give the defendant notice of the claim.

Schuster v. Encore Boston Harbor · filed 2020-07-09(3)

The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff’s allegations in the initial complaint attached to the demand letter were sufficient to put Wynn on notice of his claims regarding the slot machines.

Section 9(3) does not require a pre-suit demand letter when the prospective defendant has no place of business in Massachusetts.

Acuna v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., as Trustee · filed 2020-08-06(3)

The demand letter is not required in all circumstances, however, including if the prospective defendant does not maintain a place of business in Massachusetts. ... Thus, subject to further ... review as additional facts may warrant, I find that count VI need not be dismissed based on Ms. Haro’s failure to send a pre-suit demand letter under chapter 93A.

Section 9(3) requires a written demand that reasonably describes the unfair or deceptive act relied on; a claim outside the demand letter’s scope cannot proceed.

Wagner v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation · filed 2020-10-02(3)

Chapter 93A requires that “a claimant seeking relief must send a written demand ‘reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive act or practice relied upon’ by the claimant.” ... Freddie Mac’s argument that the amended complaint exceeds the scope of the pre-litigation demand letter under chapter 93A has merit. ... Wagner’s demand letter does not describe a breach of contract claim but rather refers to Freddie Mac’s “unwillingness” to give an extension of the closing or execute a new P&S Agreement.

Section 9(3) requires a consumer to allege and prove that a suitable demand letter was sent before bringing a claim under Chapter 93A.

Fasano v. Rbs Citizens & Another · filed 2020-10-28(3)

For the reasons set out in Section II, A, supra, Fasano's (Second) Amended Verified Complaint does not make out a valid claim under G. L. c. 93A because it does not allege that he sent a demand letter as required by that statute.

Section 9(3) requires a pre-suit demand letter to reasonably describe the injury suffered; alleging violations of legal rights alone is insufficient.

McDermet v. DIRECTV, LLC · filed 2021-01-21(3)

But it is not enough for a Chapter 93A letter simply to allege such violations; it must “reasonably describe[e]” the “injury suffered.” ... The letter is therefore inadequate to satisfy the requirements of Chapter 93A.

Section 9(3)'s presuit notice requirement can be satisfied by a notice letter with a return receipt.

Siqueiros v. General Motors LLC · filed 2021-05-25(3)

This Court already rejected this argument, holding that “[Mr.] Smith . . . ha[s] satisfied [his] pre-suit notice requirements through a notice letter with a return receipt dated October 28, 2016.” ... which is now the law of this case.

Section 9(3) requires a plaintiff to send a written demand identifying the claimant and reasonably describing the alleged unfair or deceptive practice before filing suit.

Jones v. Bank of New York · filed 2021-06-03(3)

Before bringing suit under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9, a plaintiff must tender to the defendant a “written demand for relief, identifying the claimant and reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive act or practice relied upon.”

Section 9(3) requires a consumer to send a demand letter at least thirty days before suit that reasonably describes the challenged practice and the injury; a letter giving the defendant adequate notice of the claim satisfies that requirement.

Costa v. FCA US LLC · filed 2021-06-08(3)

Under Chapter 93A, § 9(3), at least thirty days before bringing a Chapter 93A claim, a plaintiff must send the prospective defendant a letter “identifying the claimant and reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive act or practice relied upon and the injury suffered.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(3). ... Although not a model of clarity, Plaintiffs’ letter captures the thrust of Mr. Soares’ claim and therefore provided adequate notice to FCA.

Section 9(3) permits a demand letter to describe economic injury through the purchase of an allegedly mislabeled product without using the word “injury” or stating a specific damages amount.

Lee v. Conagra Brands, Inc. · filed 2021-07-23(3)

Based upon that information, Conagra could reasonably infer that Lee claims to have suffered an economic injury from the purchase of purportedly mislabeled bottles of Wesson Oil. Lee’s failure to use the word “injury” or to identify a specific dollar estimate of damages did not prevent Conagra from being able to approximate its potential liability in this matter.

Section 9 requires a pre-suit demand letter that identifies an unfair or deceptive practice and the injury suffered; a letter seeking policy limits under Rhode Island law without alleging insurer misconduct does not qualify.

Johnson v. Johnson · filed 2022-01-19(3)

And so, with no requisite Chapter 93A demand for relief in play, the district court was right to grant summary judgment as to Carlton's Chapter 93A claim as well.

Section 9(3) requires a demand letter at least thirty days before suit that gives the defendant notice of the Massachusetts consumer protection claim; a letter concerning only a California purchase does not suffice.

MORRISON v. AQ TEXTILES LLC · filed 2022-01-27(3)

Plaintiffs have therefore failed to allege that they submitted a timely demand for relief.

Section 9(3) excuses a Chapter 93A counterclaim from the demand letter requirement.

Skinner Inc. v. Li · filed 2022-03-10(3)

However, defendants were not required to serve a demand letter because their claim was asserted in a counterclaim.

Section 9(3) requires a written demand for relief at least thirty days before suit, unless the prospective respondent has no place of business or assets in Massachusetts.

Pazol v. Tough Mudder Inc. · filed 2019-06-13(3)

In addition, Count VII fails because Chapter 93A includes a pre-suit notice provision which requires that "[a]t least thirty days prior to the filing of any such action, a written demand for relief, identifying the claimant and reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive act or practice relied upon and the injury suffered" be sent to the respondent. ... Therefore, Plaintiffs were required to wait until February 1, 2019 before filing Count VII.

Section 9(3) excuses a pre-suit demand letter when the prospective respondent does not maintain a place of business or does not keep assets in Massachusetts.

Lima v. Post Consumer Brands, LLC · filed 2019-08-13(3)

The Massachusetts requirement that a plaintiff send a pre-suit demand letter does not apply, however, where “the prospective respondent does not maintain a place of business or does not keep assets within the commonwealth.” Id. ... Because it is unclear whether Post currently keeps a place of business in the Commonwealth, the Court cannot conclude that the Commonwealth’s demand letter requirement applies to Post at this stage, even assuming that Massachusetts law applies.

Section 9(3)’s demand requirement does not conclusively bar a consumer claim at summary judgment when the consumer communicated an intent to sue and the sufficiency of that notice remains unresolved.

James v. Ally Financial Inc. · filed 2023-07-05(3)

Here, James’s c.93A is not conclusively barred where she communicated to Ally her intent to sue, although the sufficiency of the notice is “a close question of state law,” that further weighs in favor of remand.

Section 9(3) requires a claimant to send a written demand for relief at least thirty days before filing suit, identifying the claimant and reasonably describing the alleged unfair or deceptive practice and injury.

PATRICIA MARK v. TOWN OF TISBURY & Others. · filed 2024-03-11(3)

If pursuant to § 9, she failed to provide the defendants with "a written demand for relief, identifying the claimant and reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive act or practice relied upon and the injury suffered" at least thirty days prior to filing suit.

Section 9(3) requires a consumer to properly serve a demand letter on each defendant before filing suit.

Keating v. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts · filed 2024-05-13(3)

Keating failed to properly serve a demand letter as required under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(3), on each of the defendants.

Section 9 requires a demand letter before suit; without one, a plaintiff cannot assert a section 9 claim.

Radius Marketing Group, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Company · filed 2024-07-26(3)

In the absence of such a demand letter, plaintiff may not assert a claim under section 9.

Section 9(3) does not require a second demand letter before a consumer amends a complaint to allege later unfair settlement practices covered by the original demand.

Steven B. Deutsch and Joyce I. Greenberg v. Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange · filed 2025-05-12(3)

PURE’s argument that Deutsch and Greenberg may not amend their c. 93A claims to reflect more recent events without first submitting a new demand letter is without merit. Sending a written demand that satisfies the requirements of G.L. c. 93A, § 9(3), is generally required before a plaintiff may bring suit under § 9. ... Since that letter put PURE on notice that it was facing claims it had engaged in unfair claims settlement practices that violate c. 93A, Plaintiffs were not required to deliver an additional demand letter before seeking to further amend their complaint to allege that more recent conduct by PURE also constitutes unfair settlement practices.

Section 9(3) does not require a demand letter when the respondent has no place of business in Massachusetts.

Virani · filed 2026-01-05(3)

In this case, Plaintiff served a demand letter upon Defendants, which was not required because Defendants do not maintain a place of business in Massachusetts.

Section 9(3) requires a demand letter that reasonably describes the alleged unfair or deceptive conduct and injury; conclusory statements without supporting facts do not satisfy this prerequisite to suit.

Nwozuzu v. Safety Insurance Company. · filed 2026-03-12(3)

The judge correctly concluded that these conclusory statements, "unsupported by any factual allegations," failed to "provide any insight into what specific conduct by the defendants violated Chapter 93A" and thus did not satisfy the prerequisite to suit under c. 93A, § 9.

Section 9(3) requires pre-suit notice for a consumer claim; a claim filed without it is dismissed without prejudice.

Adler · filed 2026-01-26(3)

While this does not create any serious issue with standing, the Court DISMISSES without prejudice Plaintiffs’ Massachusetts claim, since pre-suit notice was not provided before filing the complaint.

Section 9(3) requires a plaintiff to send a written demand identifying the claimant and reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive practice before bringing a Chapter 93A claim.

Pressman · filed 2026-03-27(3)

Before bringing a Chapter 93A claim, “a plaintiff must mail to the defendant a ‘written demand for relief, identifying the claimant and reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive act or practice relied upon.’” Rodi v. Southern New Eng. Sch. of L., 389 F.3d 5, 19 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(3)). ... Indeed, the complaint itself alleges that plaintiff “has yet to send [a] demand to the Defendants,” and there is no evidence in the record to suggest otherwise. (Am. Compl. ¶ 79). “That is sufficient ground to justify dismissal of the Chapter 93A claim.” Rodi, 389 F.3d at 19 (collecting cases). The Court will therefore grant summary judgment as to Count 6.

Under the pre-1979 version of § 9(1), a judgment establishing a debt counts as a loss of money even before it is paid.

Smith v. Caggiano · filed 1981-06-08(1)

We are of opinion that the plaintiffs against whom Caggiano obtained judgments have sustained a loss of money. The judgments have established a debt, execution may issue on those judgments, and anyone inquiring into the financial status of the plaintiffs subject to the judgments would, realistically, consider each of them poorer by the amount of the judgment rendered. Loss does not turn, as Caggiano insists, on the flow of dollars from the plaintiffs’ hands to his.

Section 9 does not govern a claim arising from truck renovations for business rather than personal, family, or household purposes.

Frank J. Linhares Co., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co. · filed 1976-11-09

Because Linhares had its truck renovated for business, rather than for personal, family or household purposes, the suit falls within the provisions of c. 93A, § 11, rather than within § 9.

Section 9(1) allows purchasers of motor vehicle insurance policies to sue for monetary losses caused by unfair or deceptive practices in handling their claims.

Dodd v. Commercial Union Insurance · filed 1977-07-19(1)

The plaintiffs in this case have alleged losses of money because of unfair and deceptive practices by Commercial in its sales to them of motor vehicle insurance policies. This allegation states a proper cause of action under G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (1), and, if proved, can support a finding for the plaintiffs.

Section 9 does not provide a consumer remedy against an individual who sells a home outside the ordinary course of a trade or business.

Lantner v. Carson · filed 1978-03-10(1)

We conclude, however, that as broadly and expansively as the statute applies to the regulation of business practices, see Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 693 (1975), G. L. c. 93A is not available where the transaction is strictly private in nature, and is in no way undertaken in the ordinary course of a trade or business.

Under the then-applicable § 9, roofing services purchased for a duplex used entirely as rental property were not purchased primarily for personal, family or household purposes.

Linthicum v. Archambault · filed 1979-12-19(1)

Since the plaintiff was using the entire house as rental property at the time she purchased the defendant’s services, she was acting in a business context and, thus, engaging in “trade” or “commerce.”

Section 9 allows a claimant to recover for an insurer’s unfair claim settlement practice only if the violation injures the claimant or adversely affects the claimant’s rights.

Van Dyke v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. · filed 1983-04-08(1)

Even if St. Paul violated G.L.c. 176D, § 3 (9) ( d ) and ( f ), the plaintiffs had to be adversely affected by that violation in order to be entitled to recover under G.L.c. 93A, § 9.

Section 9 requires a plaintiff to have been adversely affected by an unfair claim settlement practice to recover.

Chub v. Electric Insurance · filed 1983-11-01

“had to be adversely affected by that violation in order to be entitled to recover under G. L. c. 93A, § 9.”

Before its 1979 amendment, § 9 did not treat negligent claim handling alone as deceptive when the insurer disclosed its position.

Swanson v. Bankers Life Co. · filed 1983-06-07

At least under § 9, prior to its significant amendment in 1979, negligent claim handling cannot alone be a deceptive act where the insurer discloses its position.

Under the pre-1979 version of § 9(1), a consumer had to show a loss of money or property caused by the unfair or deceptive act to recover damages.

Trempe v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. · filed 1985-07-24(1)

However, under § 9(1), as amended by St. 1971, c. 241, i.e., as in effect on the date “when the incidents underlying the complaint occurred,” Smith v. Caggiano, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 41, 43 (1981), the Trempes were required to plead and show a loss of money or property as a result of the unfair and deceptive act.

Section 9 requires a fact-specific determination whether the defendant acted in a business context, an issue ordinarily unsuitable for summary judgment.

Yegian v. Isadore · filed 1985-07-29

The characterization of any given transaction as one undertaken in a “business context” which subjects the principals to the penalties of G. L. c. 93A, § 9 can be made solely on a case by case basis. In the absense of a “bright line” test, this issue and the consequent applicability of c. 93A will ordinarily remain questions of fact for the trial court not readily resolved in a summary manner pursuant to Dist./Mun. Cts. R. Civ. P., Rule 56.

Section 9 does not require proof of reliance on a misrepresentation, but does require proof that the misrepresentation caused the claimed loss.

Glickman v. Brown · filed 1985-12-16

To succeed on a claim under either § 9 or §11 the plaintiffs need not offer evidence of reliance. ... All that is required in a case such as the present is proof of a causal relationship between the misrepresentations and the cost of replacing the risers.

Section 9(1) permits a tenant to sue a government agency acting as a landlord because the agency is a person subject to suit.

Pierce v. Dew · filed 1986-01-27(1)

In light of the strong legislative policy to provide aggrieved tenants with a remedy under Chapter 93A, this Court rules that the Secretary, in his capacity as a landlord, is a “person” subject to suit under the statute.

Section 9 does not govern a business’s dispute over roofing repairs to its restaurant; the dispute falls under § 11.

Sacco's Three Sons Restaurant v. Prue · filed 1986-03-06

As the plaintiff engaged the defendant's roofing services for repairs to its restaurant, the parties’ controversy arose in a business context and thus falls within the provisions of G. L. c. 93A, § 11 rather than §9- Frank J. Linhares Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 617, 620 (1976).

Section 9 does not cover a trustee suing on behalf of a bankrupt business over a business contract; section 11 governs that claim.

Kerlinsky v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland · filed 1987-05-05

Plaintiff is simply proxy for the bankrupt, and this action clearly arose within the context of the underlying business contract between bankrupt and defendant’s principal, Drury. Section 11, and not § 9, should be applied in this case.

Section 9(1) allows a person affected by an unfair insurance settlement practice to sue, but excludes anyone entitled to bring a business claim under § 11.

Transamerica Insurance Group v. Turner Construction Co. · filed 1992-10-20(1)

A person whose rights are affected by a violation of G. L. c. 176D, § 3(9), has a right of action under G. L. c. 93A, § 9, but by express language in § 9(1), that right does not inhere in a person entitled to bring an action under G. L. c. 93A, § 11; i.e., a business against business 93A claim does not lie for violation of G. L. c. 176D, § 3(9).

Section 9(1) gives individuals a private right of action for deceptive insurance practices under Chapter 176D.

Muller v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance · filed 1986-09-30(1)

However, the Massachusetts legislature overruled this decision by statute in 1984 by providing for express access to Chapter 176D by private individuals. Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 93A § 9(1) (West 1984 & Supp.1986). Thus, MMLIC’s contention that Muller cannot bring suit under this statute is unfounded.

Evidence that home inspectors provided a contracted inspection can warrant a finding that they engaged in trade or commerce for a private consumer action under §9.

Moniz v. Kingsberry Home Inspection & Testing Service, Inc. · filed 1992-01-24

27. The evidence warrants afinding that the defendants are persons within the meaning of G.L.c. 93A, §9, who engage in the conduct of trade or ... commerce. ... The report to this Division clearly indicates, however, that these requests should have been allowed rather than denied.

In a § 9 consumer action against home inspectors, evidence of their inspection business can warrant a finding that they are persons engaged in trade or commerce.

Moniz v. Kingsberry Home Inspection & Testing Service, Inc. · filed 1993-01-24

27. The evidence warrants a finding that the defendants are persons within the meaning of G.L.c. 93A, §9, who engage in the conduct of trade or commerce. ... The report to this Division clearly indicates, however, that these requests should have been allowed rather than denied.

Section 9 permits a claim for personal injury caused by an unfair or deceptive trade practice.

Maillet v. ATF-Davidson Co. · filed 1990-04-09

Section 9 provides a cause of action to “[a]ny person . . . who has been injured by another person’s use” of an unfair or deceptive trade practice. We see no reason to exclude injury to the person from the category of injuries cognizable under G. L. c. 93A.

Section 9 permits a tenant to recover damages for severe emotional distress caused by an unfair or deceptive practice, including multiple damages when the violation is willful or knowing.

Haddad v. Gonzalez · filed 1991-08-12(1), (3)

We conclude that, in appropriate circumstances, tenants may recover multiple damages for the intentional infliction of emotional distress under c. 93A.

A consumer cannot recover under § 9 when the claimed injury results from pursuing a fraudulent insurance claim.

Do-Souto v. Royal Insurance Co. of America · filed 1992-03-03

The injury sustained by the plaintiff was self-inflicted and, in the final analysis, mortal to his c. 93A claim.

Section 9 does not provide a claim against a city for supplying malpractice insurance to its resident physicians as an employee benefit because that activity is not trade or commerce.

Hyppolite ex rel. Hyppolite v. City of Boston · filed 1993-06-23

Even if the city could be held liable as a person under 93A, §9, in the circumstances of this case, the city was not engaged in trade or commerce when it provided insurance to its employees.

Section 9 requires a claimant’s rights to have been affected by an unfair insurance practice; an assignee cannot recover through an insured who suffered no prejudice.

Nonaka v. Merrimack Mutual Fire Insurance · filed 1993-12-15(1)

With respect to his assertion of rights as D’Urso’s assignee, Nonaka must establish that his rights have been affected where it has already been determined, after full litigation, that D’Urso was not prejudiced by Merrimack’s conduct. Logically, it cannot be done. A finding that D’Urso had not been prejudiced is conceptually synonymous to a conclusion that his rights were not affected. If D’Urso suffered no “prejudice,” then there could have been no effect on his “rights.”

Section 9 does not govern a claim arising from a business insurance contract, even when the plaintiff seeks nonbusiness damages or the business relationship has ended.

Lang v. CNA Insurance · filed 1994-07-05

As to the counts based on G.L.c. 93A (Counts III-IX), the action is governed by G.L.c. 93A, §11, and not, as Lang contends, by §9. ... The fundamental nature of the claim as a business transaction is not changed by the mere fact that the plaintiffs seek non-business damages, nor by the fact that the business relationship ended before damages were recovered.

Section 9(1) allows a person whose rights are affected by an insurer’s unfair claim settlement practice under chapter 176D to sue the insurer.

Femino v. Manufacturers & Merchants Mutual Insurance · filed 1994-12-01(1)

Thus, Femino properly has standing to bring a claim under G.L.c. 93A and G.L.c. 176D against Manufacturers.

Section 9(1) allows a claimant affected by an insurer’s unfair settlement practice to recover without proving actual financial loss or other quantifiable financial injury.

Yeagle v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. · filed 1995-01-11(1)

As the claimant, the plaintiff has been “affected” by Aetna’s violation and is therefore entitled to recover under G.L.c. 93A, §9(1). The plaintiffs recovery is not contingent upon proof of actual financial loss or other quantifiable financial injury.

Section 9(1) covers a consumer’s claim arising from a real estate purchase.

DeLuca v. Lawson · filed 1995-03-06(1)

DeLuca is a “consumer” and the transaction at issue is one covered by G.L.c. 93A. G.L.c. 93A, §9(1).

Section 9 gives a person whose rights are affected by an insurer’s violation of chapter 176D an independent cause of action against the insurer.

Bellanton v. Daniel · filed 1995-12-15

Section 9 of General Laws chapter 93A, however, establishes an independent cause of action for “any person whose rights are affected” by an insurer’s violation of c. 176D, §3(9).

Section 9 gives a right of action only to persons who are not entitled to sue under Section 11.

Westfield Realty Trust v. Continental Casualty Co. · filed 1995-12-19(a)

Section 9 provides a right of action only to those “persons” who are not entitled to bring action under Section 11.

Section 9 allows a person who did not purchase or lease goods or services to bring a private action if injured by an unfair or deceptive act.

Ellis v. Safety Insurance · filed 1996-11-18(1)

Assuming, without deciding, that Goodnews and Little have been injured by unfair and deceptive acts committed by the defendant, we conclude that they (as well as the insurance policyholder, Ellis) have standing to bring a claim under the present version of G. L. c. 93A, § 9.

Section 9 does not provide relief for claims arising from the claimant’s trade or commerce activities.

Employers Insurance of Wausau v. George · filed 1996-11-26

Relief under G. L. c. 93A, § 9, however, is not available respecting the landfill. Since the Georges were engaged in trade or commerce, any violation of c. 176D, § 3(9), is of significance only to the extent that the alleged wrongful conduct violated G. L: c. 93A, § 2 (unfair or deceptive acts or practices).

Section 9 allows consumers to sue for Chapter 176D violations, but persons engaged in trade or commerce must sue under Section 11.

RLI Insurance v. General Star Indemnity Co. · filed 1998-02-25

For these reasons, I conclude that, as a matter of law, RLI may sue only under Section 11 of Chapter 93A for a violation of Section 2 of that chapter, and not under Section 9 of that chapter for a violation of Chapter 176D, § 3(9).

Section 9 requires a claimant to be adversely affected by an insurer’s unfair claim settlement practice to recover.

Abdella v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · filed 1999-06-23

See Van Dyke v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 388 Mass. 671, 678 (1983) (even given violation of G. L. c. 176D, § 3 [9], plaintiff must be adversely affected in order to recover under G. L. c. 93A, § 9); Gurnack v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 406 Mass. 748, 753 n.5 (1990). ... Because Abdella was not injured by USF&G’s violation, the judgment dismissing Abdella’s complaint is affirmed.

Section 9 requires a plaintiff to show injury resulting from the defendant’s unfair and deceptive acts.

Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Marchese · filed 2000-03-14

In order for a plaintiff to prevail on his claim under M.G.L.c. 93A, §9, he must demonstrate that he suffered injury as a result of the defendant’s unfair and deceptive acts.

Section 9(1) does not provide a private remedy against a condominium trust managing common areas outside trade or commerce or its agent lacking the requisite relationship with the buyer.

Eisenberg v. Phoenix Ass'n Management, Inc. · filed 1999-07-23(1)

The plaintiff brings this G.L.c. 93A claim pursuant to §9 of the statute. ... The Salisbury Condominium Trust is not an entily engaged in trade or commerce. ... As agents of the Trustees, Phoenix does not have the relationship with plaintiff that would subject it to liability under G.L.c. 93A.

Section 9 does not provide a cause of action to someone entitled to sue under section 11.

Reisman v. KPMG Peat Marwick L.L.P. · filed 2000-03-02

Therefore, if you are entitled to bring a 93A claim under section 11 of the Act, you cannot bring a claim under section 9.

Section 9 permits consumer actions but affords no relief to a person engaged in trade or commerce, including a landlord renting out property.

Continental Insurance v. Bahnan · filed 2000-06-26

Withal, section 11 affords no relief to consumers and, conversely, section 9 affords no relief to persons engaged in trade or commerce. ... It follows inexorably that the district court appropriately closed the door on Bahnan's section 9 counterclaims.

Section 9 does not allow a business to bring a consumer protection claim against an insurer when the alleged conduct is covered by section 11.

Kay Construction Co. v. Control Point Associates, Inc. · filed 2002-08-16

Therefore, the plaintiffs claim under G.L.c. 93A, §9 must be dismissed, because a plaintiff business is barred from bringing a consumer protection claim against an insurance company under §9, when the claim asserted is based on conduct covered in §11.

Section 9 gives a person outside trade or commerce a cause of action for injury from unfair or deceptive conduct committed in trade or commerce.

Murphy v. National Union Fire Insurance · filed 2003-02-06

Section 9 creates a cause of action for damages and other relief in favor of any person not acting in trade or commerce who is injured or whose rights are affected by such conduct. Thus, to proceed on this claim, the plaintiffs must offer evidence that Jim Beam committed “unfair or deceptive acts or practices,” and that it did so “in the conduct of any trade or commerce.”

Section 9 permits a private claim arising from a stock sale when the seller’s alleged unfair or deceptive conduct occurred in a business context.

Nanfelt v. Asher · filed 2003-06-11(1)

Given these allegations, this Court cannot conclude that there is no set of facts upon which the plaintiffs could establish a claim for unfair or deceptive practices pursuant to G.L.c. 93A, §9.

Section 9 allows a charitable nonprofit to bring a consumer protection claim when the activity at issue furthers its core mission and is not trade or commerce.

Health Care Service Corp. v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc. · filed 2003-10-17

The Court finds that BCBS Massachusetts has demonstrated that it is not engaged in “trade or commerce” for the purposes of barring it from bringing a Section 9 claim, as it is a charitable institution not engaged in trade or commerce when it undertakes activities in furtherance of its core mission.

Section 9 permits a private individual engaged in a commercial transaction on a nonprofessional basis to seek damages for injury caused by an unlawful practice under section 2.

Gossels v. Fleet National Bank · filed 2005-11-08(1)

Under G.L.c. 93A, §9(1), a person who is injured by another’s use or employment of an unlawful act or practice under section two may bring an action for damages. As a private individual engaged in a commercial transaction on a nonprofessional basis, Gossels brought his claim under section 9 of G.L.c. 93A and not section 11.

Section 9(1) allows a tenant’s guest to sue a landlord for injuries directly caused by an unfair or deceptive rental practice, even without a contractual relationship.

Malonson v. Arsenault · filed 2004-01-21(1)

G.L.c. 93A, §9 does not require that the plaintiff have any contractual relationship with the defendant. ... Just as the insured’s parent and the parent’s housemate in Ellis v. Safety Insurance Co., 41 Mass.App.Ct. 630, 639 n. 13 (1996), had standing to maintain a G.L.c. 93A claim even though they had not purchased the insurance policy that gave rise to the tortious conduct by the defendant, the guest of a tenant injured as a direct result of the landlord’s unfair and deceptive acts and practices in renting an apartment that is dangerously uninhabitable has standing to sue the landlord/landowner.

Section 9 does not provide a consumer claim arising from a purely private home sale.

Walsh v. Dodani · filed 2005-02-14

Given the purely private nature of the real estate transaction involved in this case, the plaintiffs have no cause of action under G.L.c. 93A, §9, or any implementing regulation such as 940 C.M.R. §3.16(2), and, therefore, the defendant is entitled to judgment on Count IV.

Section 9 allows consumers injured by a professional trustee’s unfair or deceptive business practices to seek relief against the trustee.

Quinton v. Gavin · filed 2005-10-19

The plaintiffs in the Quinton and Delorey cases, as persons injured by Gavin’s unfair and deceptive acts and practices in the conduct of his business, were entitled to seek relief under G. L. c. 93A, § 9.

Section 9 (1) requires a consumer seeking recovery to show that an unfair or deceptive act caused a loss, even if the act is deceptive per se.

Hershenow v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. · filed 2006-01-17(1)

We conclude that, because the CDW did not cause the plaintiffs to suffer any loss, they have failed to satisfy the causation requirement of the “injury” provision of G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (1); proving a causal connection between a deceptive act and a loss to the consumer is an essential predicate for recovery under our consumer protection statute.

Section 9 requires a cognizable injury; a renter who did not purchase a collision damage waiver lacked injury from its allegedly deficient disclosure.

Roberts v. Enterprise Rent-a-car Co. · filed 2006-01-17

In other words, Roberts is claiming a G. L. c. 93A violation with respect to a product he did not even purchase. ... The judgment for Enterprise is therefore affirmed on the ground that Roberts has suffered no cognizable “injury” under G. L. c. 93A, § 9.

Section 9 permits a consumer who purchased a deceptively advertised product to claim injury from the purchase if the deception is proved.

Chenlen v. Philips Electronics North America · filed 2006-03-01

Accordingly, the alleged deceptive advertising, in this case, if proved, will effect a per se injury on consumers who purchased the lighting products represented to have longer useful lives than is the case. Therefore, Chenlen has standing to bring the G.L.c. 93A, §9 claim against Philips and the motion to dismiss Count V for lack of standing must be DENIED.

Section 9(1) requires a consumer to allege an invasion of a legally protected interest that causes economic or noneconomic loss; a continuing payment obligation after attempted cancellation can satisfy that requirement at the pleading stage.

Ruiz v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. · filed 2007-07-30(1)

The plaintiff's standing to sue in this case is not dependent upon a claim of per se injury, nor upon a nebulous theory of injury that would drain the statutory requirement of all meaning. To the contrary, the raw factual averments in her amended complaint hold out the prospect — if proven — of satisfying both components of the statutory injury requirement. No more is exigible to ward off a dismissal for lack of standing.

Section 9(1) allows a person affected by an unfair insurance settlement practice to sue, but excludes a person entitled to bring a business claim under § 11.

Boehm v. Premier Insurance · filed 2006-03-28(1)

A person whose rights are affected by a violation of... §3(9) has a right of action under G.L.c. 93A, §9, but by express language in §9(1), that right does not inhere in a person entitled to bring action under G.L.c. 93A, §11; i.e., a business against business 93A claim does not lie for violation of G.L.c. 176D, §3(9).

Section 9 requires a consumer seeking actual damages to show that an unfair or deceptive act caused a loss; informed consent to an ATM fee breaks the causal connection to an earlier deficient notice.

Brown v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2006-10-17

A consumer may recover actual damages under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9 (2006) if she proves that the Defendant’s “unfair and deceptive act ... cause[d] loss of money, loss or property, or personal injury,”. ... Thus, even if Plaintiffs can establish that the on-machine notice is defective under state law, they cannot establish loss causation because the click-through screen breaks the causal connection between the defective notice and the payment of the fee.

Section 9 requires a consumer to allege an actual injury from an unfair or deceptive act; speculative future harm does not suffice.

Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2006-12-11

The question is whether plaintiffs allege a cognizable injuiy under c. 93A. ... Similarly here, no plaintiff alleges that he has been in an accident where the door latches failed or has otherwise suffered any actual damage.

Section 9 permits nonprofit health benefit funds acting within their core mission, and consumers who made co-payments, to bring claims.

In Re Pharmaceutical Industry Average Wholesale Price Litigation · filed 2007-06-21

A fortiori, the Taft-Hartley funds may bring their claims under § 9 of Chapter 93A because they were not motivated by the desire to make money from the drugs and were acting within their core mission. Class 3 consumers who made co-payments have a claim under § 9. Plaintiffs are, therefore, not engaged in trade or commerce for the purposes of this case and their claims are properly brought under § 9 of Chapter 93A.

Section 9 permits claims based on violations of Chapter 176D but excludes plaintiffs who must sue under Section 11 because they engage in trade or commerce.

Gray Excavation, Inc. v. Acadia Insurance Co. · filed 2008-01-29

While §9 of G.L.c. 93A, which specifically excludes §11 plaintiffs, creates a cause of action for violations of G.L.c. 176D, there is no such provision under § 11. As such, Acadia’s assertion that Gray, as one engaged in trade or commerce, cannot maintain a direct action against Acadia for violations of G.L.c. 176D is correct.

Section 9 requires an unfair or deceptive act or practice that foreseeably causes injury to the plaintiff.

Gossels v. Fleet National Bank · filed 2007-08-22

Liability under G. L. c. 93A, § 9, requires two elements: the conduct must be an unfair or deceptive act or practice, and the act or practice must be a foreseeable cause of injury to the plaintiff.

Section 9(1) treats a business’s profit from an unfair or deceptive act as a consumer injury and permits the consumer to recover that profit as damages.

Kelley v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. · filed 2007-08-24(1)

Therefore, this Court finds, as a matter of law, that Kelley is entitled to recover as damages under Chapter 93A the net profit that CVS obtained from its unfair and deceptive act of mailing him the Cholesterol Letter. Phrased differently, this Court finds, as a matter of law, that Kelley was “injured” within the meaning of G.L.c. 93A, §9(1) from having been denied CVS’s ill-gotten profit from this unfair and deceptive act.

Section 9 permits a town to bring a Chapter 93A claim when it is carrying out a traditional municipal function rather than engaging in trade or commerce.

Professional Services Group, Inc. v. Town of Rockland · filed 2007-09-26

Thus, the Town of Rockland did not engage in trade or commerce within the definition of Section 11 and its claim is properly brought under Section 9.

Section 9 permits a consumer to recover for severe emotional distress caused by an unfair business practice even without a loss of money or property.

Lepp v. M.S. Realty Trust · filed 2008-02-08

Further, G.L.C. 93A permits recovery when unfair conduct “cause [s] a personal injury loss such as emotional distress, even if the consumer lost no ‘money’ or ‘property.’” Hershenow v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Boston, 445 Mass. 790, 798 (2006). See also Haddad, supra at 865-866 (following 1979 amendment of G.L.c. 93A, §9, severe emotional distress was loss cognizable under statute).

Section 9(1) permits a private consumer action only when the claimant has been injured by conduct violating section 2.

Spence v. Berkshire Life Insurance · filed 2008-06-13(1)

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(1) expressly permits actions to proceed only where an individual “has been injured” by conduct in violation of section 2. ... As discussed above with respect to Count I, Plaintiff has received all of his scheduled indemnity payments, and thus cannot demonstrate any current harm.

Section 9(1) requires a private consumer to show a compensable loss caused by a deceptive act; undisclosed risks do not establish injury when the product performed as promised.

Rule v. Fort Dodge Animal Health, Inc. · filed 2009-03-11(1)

Applying the reasoning from Hershenow and Iannacchino to the instant case, I conclude that Rule has not alleged a cognizable “injury” for purposes of Chapter 93A, § 9(1). ... It is necessary for a private plaintiff to show that the defendants’ deceptive act caused some form of compensable loss.

Section 9 permits a consumer to claim economic loss from paying for a vehicle that fails required safety standards, even without an accident or malfunction, if the noncompliance is adequately alleged.

Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2008-06-13(1)

Such an overpayment would represent an economic loss — measurable by the cost to bring the vehicles into compliance — for which the plaintiffs could seek redress under G. L. c. 93A, § 9.

Section 9 requires a consumer to show that an unfair or deceptive act or practice caused a particular injury.

Reinhart v. Ragsdale Superstore, Inc. · filed 2008-07-08

Plaintiff has not shown any connection between the allegedly deceptive act and particular injury. As discussed above, the evidence taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff cannot support a reasonable inference that plaintiff purchased the Prizm because Ragsdale offered to transfer his registration for him, or that Ragsdale, by not transferring the registration timely, engaged in any act or practice that was unfair or deceptive to Plaintiff.

Section 9 requires a consumer seeking a remedy to show causation and actual injury; an invasion of a legally protected interest may qualify without financial loss.

Gathuru v. Credit Control Services, Inc. · filed 2009-04-14

A demand for payment of a debt that a consumer did not owe appears to fit within that vague formulation. ... The causation requirement is likewise met, because plaintiff actually received and read the collection notices. ... Nonetheless, it appears that causation and injury have been established, and accordingly summary judgment will enter for plaintiff as to liability on the Chapter 93A claim.

Section 9 does not cover a claim arising from conduct undertaken primarily for business objectives, even when personal interests are also involved.

Giuffrida v. High Country Investor, Inc. · filed 2008-11-24

Regardless of the fact that the plaintiffs sent High Country a demand letter asserting a claim under § 9, we think the claim is properly viewed as arising under § 11. The negotiations concerning the exercise of High Country’s option and the eventual termination of the Lease and sale of the Sublease were acts undertaken by the plaintiffs primarily to further business objectives, i.e., to resolve Ranch’s obligations under the Lease and to sell commercial real estate belonging to Ranch.

Section 9 and § 11 are mutually exclusive for business claims; a business claim cannot proceed under § 9.

Blue Cross Blue Shield v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP · filed 2009-09-23

As the district court properly noted, at least as to “business” claims, § 9 and § 11 of Chapter 93A are “mutually exclusive and plaintiffs’ claims can proceed under only one. section.”

Section 9 does not allow a business plaintiff entitled to sue under §11 to bring a claim for a Chapter 176D violation.

Watts Water Technologies, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance · filed 2009-03-25(1)

Therefore, a business plaintiff permitted to sue under §11 of Chapter 93A may not sue under §9 for alleged violations of Chapter 176D.

Section 9 permits a consumer to recover for emotional distress caused by unfair conduct even without a loss of money or property.

Palano v. Bellagio Corp. · filed 2009-06-24

In reliance on Hershenow v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Boston, Inc., 445 Mass. 790, 800 (2006), Bellagio argues, incorrectly, that the judge properly entered summary judgment in its favor on the Palanos’ G.L.c. 93A claim because they suffered no damages as a result of the alleged hotel incident. ... Viewing Bellagio’s conduct in the light most favorable to the Palanos, Kennie, supra at 759, we cannot say that a fact finder could not reasonably conclude that said conduct was unfair or that the Palanos could not prove they had sustained an injury.

Section 9 requires a plaintiff to purchase a ticket to have standing for a consumer claim based on ticket resale pricing under § 185D.

Herman v. Admit One Ticket Agency LLC · filed 2009-08-27(1)

In order to keep a proper perspective on the merits of the case, and in light of the variable nature of the fees a ticket reseller may impose pursuant to § 185D, we hold that to obtain standing, a plaintiff must purchase a ticket to maintain a c. 93 A claim premised on a violation of the policy embodied in § 185D.

For business claims, sections 9 and 11 are mutually exclusive; a plaintiff may proceed under only one.

In Re Pharm. Industry Average Wholesale Price Lit. · filed 2009-09-23

As the district court properly noted, at least as to "business" claims, § 9 and § 11 of Chapter 93A are "mutually exclusive and plaintiffs' claims can proceed under only one section."

A consumer cannot use the costs of bringing a Chapter 93A action as the injury or loss required to bring that action.

Garcia v. 128 Sales, Inc. · filed 2009-11-25

Logically, that loss or injury must have occurred prior to, and form the basis for, the c. 93A claim; the subsequent cost of litigating that c. 93A claim would not constitute an element of the claim itself.

Section 9(1) requires a private consumer to plausibly plead a causal connection between the alleged deception and loss.

In Re WellNx Marketing & Sales Practices Litigation · filed 2009-12-11(1)

None of the bellwether jurisdictions requires anything more than that causation be pled, in other words, that plaintiffs plausibly plead that defendants made representations about the weight-reducing properties of their products, that plaintiffs purchased the products expecting to lose weight, and that the products did not perform as advertised.

Section 9 requires a consumer to show a deceptive act or practice, an injury or loss, and a causal connection between them.

Casavant v. Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd. · filed 2009-12-31

A successful claim under this section thus requires, at a minimum, a showing of (1) a deceptive act or practice on the part of the seller; (2) an injury or loss suffered by the consumer; and (3) a causal connection between the seller’s deceptive act or practice and the consumer’s injury.

A private consumer action requires a cognizable injury; apprehension of a product’s future failure without a malfunction or harm is insufficient.

Watkins v. OMNI LIFE SCIENCE, INC. · filed 2010-03-09

The rule of Rule applies with the same force in consumer protection actions as it does in breach of warranty cases. ... Apprehension of a heightened risk stemming from an allegedly defective product that has not failed or caused harm is insufficient as a matter of law to support a claim.

Section 9 requires a plaintiff to show some loss caused by the unlawful conduct, but does not require a quantifiable amount of damages.

Chery v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance · filed 2011-06-16

A plaintiff seeking redress under c. 93A is not required to show a quantifiable amount of actual damages as an element of her claim. Rather, a plaintiff is required to show only that she suffered some loss caused by the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct. Here, Chery has met this burden.

Section 9(1) does not permit a consumer to recover for an undisclosed product risk that never caused economic injury.

Rule v. Fort Dodge Animal Health, Inc. · filed 2010-06-02(1)

Chapter 93A provides a cause of action for a plaintiff who "has been injured," Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(1), by "unfair or deceptive acts or practices," id. ch. 93A, § 2(a). ... Rule, having suffered no economic injury, may not.

Section 9(1) requires a claimant to show injury caused by the defendant’s unlawful act or practice.

Adamson v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. · filed 2011-10-19(1)

Lastly, a party must show that he was injured by the defendant’s unlawful act or practice. See G.L.c. 93A, §9(1).

Section 9(1) requires a consumer to show a cognizable injury caused by the unlawful practice; a statutory violation alone is insufficient.

Tyler v. Michaels Stores, Inc. · filed 2012-01-06(1)

Michaels’ violation of the Act thus constitutes a per se violation of chapter 93A. Tyler still has the burden of proving that this violation caused a cognizable injury.

Section 9(1) requires injury from an unfair or deceptive practice to bring a private consumer action, but the injury need not be pecuniary.

Ortiz v. Examworks, Inc. · filed 2012-12-18(1)

Only a “person . . . who has been injured by another person’s” unfair or deceptive act or practice may bring a private consumer action. G.L.c. 93A, §9(1). The plaintiff need not allege or prove pecuniary loss, but there must be injury in some form.

Section 9 requires a consumer seeking damages to allege and prove a distinct injury caused by the unfair or deceptive act.

Tyler v. Michaels Stores, Inc. · filed 2013-03-11(1)

Rather, as the Rhodes, Casavant, Iannacchino, and Hershenow decisions indicate, a plaintiff bringing an action for damages under c. 93A, § 9, must allege and ultimately prove that she has, as a result, suffered a distinct injury or harm that arises from the claimed unfair or deceptive act itself.

Section 9 requires a consumer to allege injury caused by the unfair conduct; comparing the consumer's price with a competitor's is not the only way to show injury.

Liu v. Amerco · filed 2012-05-04(1)

Causation of damages is required for a chapter 93A claim, Hershenow v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., 840 N.E.2d 526, 532-33 (Mass. 2006); and Liu might (as the district court implied) have compared her rental price with that of Budget for comparable service if she knew what Budget was then charging. But a comparison is not the only way to show injury; and here Liu--relying on the FTC's allegations--asserted that U-Haul had raised its own prices and that these "price increases were themselves an essential element of the unlawful effort to collude."

Section 9(1) requires a plaintiff to show that a per se FDCPA violation caused a loss; the violation alone does not establish injury.

McDermott v. Marcus, Errico, Emmer & Brooks, P.C. · filed 2012-11-20(1)

A plaintiff seeking a remedy under chapter 93A, section nine, must still demonstrate that a per se violation of the FDCPA “caused a loss.”

Section 9 requires a consumer to show injury caused by an unfair or deceptive practice; a violation alone does not establish injury.

Bellerman v. Fitchburg Gas & Electric Light Co. · filed 2013-01-07

The plaintiffs also speak in terms of a legally protected right to accurate information. That cannot be what Leardi means by a “legally protected right,” for purposes of defining the “injury” test under G.L.c. 93A, §9. The prohibition against deceptive practices itself protects a right to accurate information. If a violation of that prohibition were enough, then the separately stated requirement to show injury would be redundant and therefore meaningless.

Section 9 does not cover an insured business’s claim against its insurer when the insurance was purchased to cover business activities.

Boyle v. Zurich American Insurance · filed 2014-06-23

Since C&N was engaged in trade or commerce and bought insurance to cover its business activities, C&N’s claim that Zurich engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices arises under G.L.c. 93A, §11, and not under §9 of that statute.

Section 9 requires a loss caused by an unfair or deceptive practice; speculation that conflicting rent demands hindered a tenant’s ability to obtain funding does not establish injury.

Clarendon Hill Somerville, LP v. Biagioni · filed 2014-09-12

Even a per se violation of G.L. c. 93A must cause a loss to satisfy the “injury” provision of G.Lc. 93A, §9. ... As to the representations as to what rent arrearage was being demanded through the summary process complaint, the defendant has not demonstrated, apart from speculation, that his ability to secure funding to compensate the plaintiffs for the arrearage was compromised.

A private unfair or deceptive practices claim requires a causal connection between the challenged conduct and the plaintiff’s injury; a speculative chain of possible events is insufficient.

Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC · filed 2015-05-15

Without the offending ads, however, no nexus would exist between Backpage and the harms suffered by the Doe plaintiffs. Their theory — that absent the permissive website design and imperfect filtering, their pimps would not have trafficked them or, if they had attempted to do so, law enforcement would have scrutinized Backpage more closely and would possibly have intervened to prevent their injuries— is too speculative to fall as a matter of law within the penumbra of reasonably foreseeability.

Section 9 requires injury caused by the challenged unfair or deceptive act; a response to a demand letter that causes no injury cannot support a claim.

Ramos v. International Fidelity Insurance · filed 2015-07-09

Nonetheless, the judge was correct that there was no evidence here that this conduct by IFIC injured the plaintiffs. ... Consequently, summary judgment on the c. 93A claims was correctly entered in favor of the defendant to the extent they were based on the defendant’s response to the demand letters.

Section 9 does not provide a claim for antitrust injury to plaintiffs acting in trade or commerce.

United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc. · filed 2014-11-17

Because the EPPs at issue — the City of Providence and the Iron Workers — were acting in trade or commerce when they indirectly purchased or reimbursed their employee or members, they cannot state a claim under § 9 of the Massachusetts consumer protection statute for antitrust injury.

Section 9 does not require consumers to prove reliance on the alleged misrepresentation.

Bezdek v. Vibram USA Inc. · filed 2015-01-16

“Chapter 93A does not require [a showing of] reliance.”

Section 9 requires a consumer to suffer an injury caused by an unfair or deceptive act, including when seeking injunctive relief.

Shaulis v. Nordstrom Inc. · filed 2015-08-14

Although Diviacchi holds that a Chapter 93A claim for injunctive relief may survive even in the absence of an injury, the Court finds that holding unpersuasive. The plain language of Chapter 93A allows a person to bring an action when he or she "has been injured by another ....” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9.

Section 9(1) allows an injured party outside trade or commerce to establish a Chapter 93A violation through a violation of Chapter 176D, § 3(9).

Boyle v. Zurich American Insurance Co. · filed 2015-09-14(1)

A violation of G. L. c. 176D, § 3 (9), itself establishes a violation of G. L. c. 93A unless the injured party is "engage[d] in the conduct of any trade or commerce." See G. L. c. 93A, §§ 9 (1), 11.

Section 9 requires an identifiable injury from an unfair or deceptive practice; speculative future harm is insufficient.

Gallagher v. Amedisys, Inc. · filed 2018-05-15

Plaintiff has not alleged that he suffered any injury from the overcrowding of the Durgin Pines common area, or that any Durgin Pines resident has suffered an injury. Although the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court may have a relaxed standard for showing injury in certain circumstances, the violation of any legal right “must cause the consumer some kind of separate identifiable harm arising from the violation itself.” Tyler v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 984 N.E.2d 737, 745 (Mass. 2013). At most, the Amended Complaint implies that some hypothetical or speculative harm may occur in the future.

Section 9 requires a consumer to show a loss caused by the challenged conduct.

Rojas-Lozano v. Google, Inc. · filed 2016-02-03

Thus, under Chapter 93A, as under the CLRA, Plaintiff must show that Google’s failure to disclose the secondary use for the second reCAPT-CHA prompt caused her a loss.

Section 9 requires a separate, identifiable injury from a regulatory violation; paying for a service that might have been inadequate in an emergency does not establish injury when the emergency never occurred.

Bellermann v. Fitchburg Gas and Electric Light Co. · filed 2016-07-29(1)

We stated clearly, however, that to meet the injury requirement under G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (1) or 11, a plaintiff must have suffered a "separate, identifiable harm arising from the [regulatory] violation" that is distinct "from the claimed unfair or deceptive conduct itself."

Section 9 requires an individual consumer to show an objectively identifiable injury beyond the deception itself; a conclusory allegation of a price premium is insufficient.

O'Hara v. Diageo-Guinness, USA, Inc. · filed 2018-03-29

However, Chapter 93A, § 9 gives the individual consumer a right to sue only when he suffers an "objective, identifiable harm that goes beyond the deception [or unfairness] itself." ... However, the allegation that plaintiff paid a "price premium" "as a result" of defendants' deception is, by itself, too "conclusory" and "speculative" to state a claim for injury or damages.

Section 9 requires an injury distinct from the alleged statutory violation itself.

Walsh v. Teltech Systems, Inc. · filed 2016-05-02(3)

Because Walsh has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she suffered a "distinct injury," Tyler, 984 N.E.2d at 746, we affirm the District Court's award of summary judgment on the Chapter 93A claim to the extent that claim is premised on TelTech's alleged violation of Chapter 272, § 99.

Section 9 requires the defendants, but not the plaintiffs, to be engaged in trade or commerce.

Baker v. Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP · filed 2017-07-21

While only the defendants need be engaged in "trade or commerce" under G. L. c. 93A, § 9, the plaintiffs and defendants must be engaged in "trade or commerce" to sustain a claim under § 11.

An entity engaged in trade or commerce cannot bring suit under § 9.

Redstar Entertainment, LLC v. Sentinel Insurance Co., LTD · filed 2019-03-11

Redstar, as an entity engaged in trade or commerce, would not be able to bring suit under § 9.

Section 9 applies to consumers and excludes business entities engaged in trade or commerce.

Walgreen CO v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation · filed 2019-08-15

Under Massachusetts law, indirect purchasers may not bring claims under § 11 of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, so EPPs have sought to bring them under § 9 of the Act, which excludes those engaged in “trade or commerce.” ... “Those provisions are naturally construed to make section nine exclusively applicable to consumers and section eleven exclusively applicable to business entities.”

A homeowner who rents her own home as a private transaction may bring a Section 9 claim if she meets Chapter 93A’s other requirements.

Bassett v. Jensen · filed 2020-05-11

Provided Bassett can meet the other requirements of Chapter 93A, like causation, she may proceed under § 9 as a “person . . . who has been injured” by Defendant’s commercial practices.

A consumer can plead an injury under Section 9 through invasive debt collection calls and time spent handling them.

Harrington v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. · filed 2019-08-14(1)

Here, Harrington alleges that Wells Fargo’s debt collection calls caused three injuries: (1) he “suffered anger, anxiety, emotional distress, fear, frustration and embarrassment;” (2) the “calls were distracting . . . , an inconvenience . . . , and an invasion of his personal privacy;” and (3) he “wasted [his] time and energy . . . tending to [the] calls.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16-18. These purported injuries suffice.

A consumer can plead injury under Section 9 by alleging a loss in market value separate from the deceptive conduct.

Downing v. Keurig Green Mountain, Inc. · filed 2021-06-11(1)

By tying the injury to the difference in the market value between recyclable Pods and non-recyclable Pods, Downing has plausibly stated an injury that is separate from Keurig’s allegedly false recyclability claim.

Section 9(3) allows nominal damages but still requires a plaintiff to prove injury.

PHOEBE FLEMMING v. GREYSTAR MANAGEMENT SERVICES, L.P. · filed 2021-10-28(3)

Moreover, that G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (3), authorizes nominal damages did not relieve Flemming of the obligation to prove injury.

Section 9 allows an injured beneficiary to bring a consumer protection claim against an IRA custodian even though the custodian’s service contract was with the account holder.

UBS Financial Services, Inc. v. Aliberti · filed 2019-10-22

That the connection between UBS and Aliberti ... arises from UBS's service contract with another account holder (Patrick Kenney) does not render Aliberti an improper plaintiff to assert the c. 93A claim against UBS.

Section 9 allows a consumer whose money was wrongfully retained to bring an individual claim despite a settlement offer.

Gutwill v. Inland Residential Real Estate Services, LLC, D/B/A Cirrus Apartments · filed 2023-02-24

The same reasoning applies in this case and defeats Inland Residential’s claim that Gutwill lacks standing to bring his claim under G. L. c. 93A, § 9.

Section 9 requires a distinct compensable injury caused by the violation, but that injury need not be economic.

BERTHA KANEUNYENYE & Another v. CLINTON MILLWORKS TENANT, LLC, & Others. · filed 2023-07-21

Rather, the plaintiff must also demonstrate that the noncompliance caused a distinct compensable loss, economic or otherwise.

A plausible FDCPA violation during vehicle repossession can satisfy the trade or commerce requirement for a private Chapter 93A claim.

Shue v. JMAC Distribution, LLC · filed 2024-08-16

Additionally, because Shue has adequately pled a violation of the FDCPA, see supra, he has sufficiently alleged that there was “trade or commerce” between the parties.