Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9

Section 9 requires facts showing that the alleged unfair or deceptive practice occurred in trade or commerce and involved a business, commercial, or transactional relationship.

Labranche v. United States Liability Insurance Company · filed 2025-05-30

Plaintiffs neither allege that the deceptive act or practice occurred in the conduct of trade or commerce, nor do they identify any “business, commercial, or transactional relationship.” ... Count I is dismissed as to all Defendants for failure to state a claim.

Section 9 requires a consumer to show injury from the unfair or deceptive practice; an asserted loss of statutory protections alone does not suffice.

YEVGENIA ALBATS TOWN SPORTS INTERNATIONAL, INC. D/B/A BOSTON SPORTS CLUB, & Another · filed 2023-10-12

Although the "invasion of a legally protected interest” may satisfy the injury requirement of G.L. c. 93A, § 9, see Leardi v, Brown, 394 Mass. 151, 160 (1985), that is a limited holding.

Section 9 consumer claims require some business, commercial, or transactional relationship, though the requirement is less demanding than under Section 11.

Ryan v. The Newark Group, INC. · filed 2023-12-21

On de novo review, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs are subject to the requirements of consumer lawsuits of Chapter 93A § 9 rather than the requirements of commercial plaintiffs under Section 11. While the requirement of a commercial relationship is evaluated at a somewhat laxer standard under Section 9 compared to Section 11, See Begelfer, 409 N.E.2d at 190-191, “some business, commercial, or transactional relationship is [still] required.” Steinmetz, 862 F.3d at 141.

Section 9 allows an indirect purchaser to satisfy the commercial relationship requirement when an upstream seller’s conduct indirectly affects the purchaser.

Courtemanche v. Motorola Solutions, Inc. · filed 2025-03-28(1)

Plaintiffs can meet their burden on the commercial relationship requirement because, although they are not direct purchases of Motorola’s products, Chapter 93A permits a cause of action for cases where a defendant has an indirect effect on the people of the Commonwealth.

Section 9 treats receipt of excessive debt collection calls as a cognizable privacy injury.

Nightingale v. National Grid USA Service Company Inc. · filed 2024-07-09(1)

Once Nightingale receives excessive collection calls, the caller has caused a privacy-related injury under section 9.

Section 9 allows a person injured by an unfair or deceptive act in trade or commerce to bring a private action without a business relationship with the defendant.

Doane v. Tele Circuit Network Corporation · filed 2024-08-26(1)

Given the plain language of the statute, the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiff must show a business relationship between the parties.

Section 9 permits individual consumers to recover for emotional distress or an invasion of a legally protected interest without proving a loss of money or property.

Tommy Royal and Bernadette Costa, Individually and on Behalf of Similarly Situated Individuals v. Andrew Metcalf, Judgme · filed 2025-06-23

Royal has established that he has suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest. Plus, most anyone compelled to answer a small claim action will have suffered some amount of emotional distress. Both of these kinds of injury are compensable under G.L. c. 93A, § 9.

Section 9 requires a consumer to allege an unfair or deceptive act in trade or commerce, an injury, and a causal connection between the conduct and the injury.

Vaiano v. Experian Information Solutions Inc. · filed 2025-08-12

“To state a claim under the consumer protection statute, G. L. c. 93A, § 9, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to establish four elements: first, that the defendant has committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice; second, that the unfair or deceptive act or practice occurred ‘in the conduct of any trade or commerce;’ third, that the plaintiff suffered an injury; and fourth, that the defendant’s unfair or deceptive conduct was a cause of the injury.” ... As described in the complaint, Experian’s actions were neither unfair nor deceptive. ... Accordingly, it cannot form the basis of a Chapter 93A claim.

Section 9 does not cover an alleged injury unconnected with the purchase of household goods.

American Hospital Supply Corp. v. Roy Lapidus, Inc. · filed 1980-07-31

I would add that an additional ground for dismissing Lapidus’ claim under ch. 93A, § 9 is that he does not allege that he was injured in ... connection with the purchase of household goods.

Section 9 permits consumer protection claims by consumers but excludes entities engaged in trade or commerce.

In re Novartis and Par Antitrust Litigation · filed 2019-08-15

Under Massachusetts law, indirect purchasers may not bring claims under § 11 of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, so EPPs have sought to bring them under § 9 of the Act, which excludes those engaged in “trade or commerce.”

Section 9 (3) limits recovery to a reasonable settlement offer even when the seller’s violation was wilful or knowing.

Kohl v. Silver Lake Motors, Inc. · filed 1976-03-02(3)

Thus, plainly, the statute contemplates that even a wilful or knowing violator of § 2 may limit his maximum potential damages by making a reasonable offer of settlement.

Section 9(3) requires a settlement offer to provide an ascertainable minimum recovery to be considered reasonable.

Patry v. Harmony Homes, Inc. · filed 1980-06-04(3)

Such an offer is too indefinite as to the minimum recovery to be regarded as reasonable.

A written settlement offer limits recovery under § 9 only if the court finds it reasonable in relation to the consumer’s actual injury, and the defendant bears the burden of showing reasonableness.

Calimlin v. Foreign Car Center, Inc. · filed 1983-03-28(3)

Pursuant to G.L. c. 93A, § 9, a written tender of settlement may limit recovery to the relief tendered only where “the court finds that the relief tendered was reasonable in relation to the injury actually suffered...” The reported evidence clearly discloses that the defendant failed to sustain its burden of establishing that its settlement offer was reasonable in the light of all attendant circumstances and the demands of the plaintiffs.

Section 9(3) measures the adequacy of a response to a consumer’s demand for relief by whether the offer is reasonable in the circumstances and in light of the demand.

Calimlim v. Foreign Car Center, Inc. · filed 1984-06-19(3)

The standard for examination of the adequacy of a response to a demand for relief under G. L. c. 93A, § 9(3), is whether, in the circumstances, and in light of the complainant’s demands, the offer is reasonable.

Section 9(3) limits a consumer’s recovery to the relief tendered, plus certain attorney’s fees, when the defendant’s settlement offer is reasonable in relation to the injury suffered.

Briggs v. Carol Cars, Inc. · filed 1990-05-15(3)

Under c. 93A, § 9 (3), if the judge finds that the defendant’s settlement offer was “reasonable in relation to the injury actually suffered” by the plaintiff-buyer, recovery is limited to “the relief tendered (plus attorney’s fees incurred prior to the date of the buyer’s rejection of the tender [G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (4)]). . . .”

Section 9(3) does not limit a claimant’s recovery to a settlement tender when the defendant makes no written tender.

Belfon v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance · filed 1996-06-03(3)

As Metropolitan did not make a written tender of settlement, Belfon’s recovery is not limited in such a manner.

A settlement offer equal to the amount the claimant is legally entitled to recover is not unfair or deceptive under § 9(3).

Dinsfriend v. Fine Arts Express, Inc. · filed 1996-12-31(3)

Presumably, the gravamen of this argument is that FAE’s settlement offer of $18 in response to his Chapter 93 A demand letter was unreasonable “in relation to the injury” claimed. G.L.c. 93A, §9(3). We agree with the trial court finding that “as a matter of law a settlement offer in the exact amount to which [Dinsfriend] is entitled is not an unfair or deceptive act.”

Section 9(3) allows a reasonable written settlement tender made within thirty days to limit later recovery if the claimant rejects it.

Allison v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance · filed 1996-06-04(3)

General Laws c. 93A, §9(3), provides that one who receives a demand letter may, within thirty days, make “a written tender of settlement,” which, if reasonable, and if rejected by the claimant, will limit any subsequent recovery to the relief tendered.

Section 9(3) gives a defendant thirty days to make a written settlement tender that, if reasonable in relation to the injury, limits recovery to the tendered relief.

Ramirez v. C.L.A.S., Inc. · filed 2000-01-13(3)

Moreover, even if this evidence were to be considered a “tender of settlement” under G.L.c. 93A, §9(3), it was woefully too late to avoid the imposition of multiple damages. ... The defendant had thirty days to make a “written tender of settlement” which, if found to be “reasonable in relation to the injury actually suffered,” would have limited the amount of any recovery to “the relief tendered.” G.L.c. 93A, §9(3).

Section 9(3) allows a defendant to make a reasonable settlement offer to limit potential liability but does not require one.

Kanavos v. Bayer Corp. · filed 2001-06-21(3)

Neither G.L.c. 93A, §9(3), nor G.L.c. 93A, §11, requires reasonable settlement offers; rather, they only offer them as an option to defendants, as a means of fixing potential liability.

Section 9(3)’s thirty-day response period may be extended by the claimant, making an offer within the extension timely.

Bobick v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · filed 2003-06-27(3)

We note that, although this date was beyond the thirty-day period allowed by G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (3), the time period had been extended by the plaintiff, and, thus, the offer was timely.

Section 9(3) requires a reasonable written settlement offer within 30 days of a demand letter; an insurer need not raise an already reasonable offer to the top of its authorized range.

Shaffer v. Metlife, Inc. · filed 2006-09-20(3)

The Court concludes, however, that it was reasonable for the company not to increase its $25,000 offer in the circumstances. ... G.L.c. 93A, §9(3) provides that the recipient of a c. 93A demand letter must make a reasonable “written tender of settlement” within 30 days.

Section 9(3) requires a written demand before suit and permits a reasonable written settlement offer to limit recovery; it does not require a written offer to satisfy an insurer’s duty to settle.

NAT'L UNION FIRE INS., PITTS., PA. v. W. Lake Acad. · filed 2008-11-13(3)

But section 9(3) simply establishes a procedure to resolve claims under Chapter 93A, by requiring a plaintiff to file a written demand before bringing such a claim and allowing a defendant to avoid punitive damages by providing a reasonable written settlement offer in response.

Section 9(3) measures an insurer’s response to a demand by whether its offer is reasonable in the circumstances; an insurer need not make an offer before liability and damages are apparent.

Hanley v. Walker · filed 2009-06-23(3)

‘The standard for examining the adequacy of an insurer’s response to a demand for relief under G.L.c. 93A, §9(3) is ‘whether, in the circumstances, and in light of the complainant’s demands, the offer is reasonable.’ ” ... But an insurer is “not required to put a fair and reasonable offer on the table until liability and damages [are] apparent.” ... It was not unreasonable, under the circumstances, for Tutunjian to believe his driver rather than the passenger.

Section 9(3) allows a defendant to avoid multiple damages by making a timely settlement offer reasonable in relation to the claimant’s actual injury, even if potential multiple damages are much greater.

Boyle v. Zurich American Insurance · filed 2013-04-12(3)

The §9(3) safe harbor applies even where, as here, the injury actually suffered by the claimants is far less than the multiple damages they would be entitled to collect if they proved at trial that the insurer or other defendant committed a willful or knowing violation of c. 93A.

Section 9(3) allows statutory or treble damages only when the defendant fails to offer a settlement reasonable in relation to the consumer’s actual injury.

Cooper v. Charter Communications Entertainments I, LLC · filed 2014-07-23(3)

Consequently, they also may not receive statutory or treble damages under the Massachusetts unfair business practices law, which makes such relief available only where a defendant has failed to offer a settlement "reasonable in relation to the injury actually suffered."

Section 9(3) gives an insurer thirty days to make a fair and reasonable settlement offer when liability and damages are clear, or requires an offer as soon thereafter as they become clear.

McCarthy v. Safety Insurance · filed 2015-03-24(3)

Taken together, Chapters 93A and 176D “require an insurer . . . promptly to put a fair and reasonable offer on the table when liability and damages become clear, either within the thirty-day period set forth in G.L.c. 93A, §9(3), or as soon thereafter as liability and damages make themselves apparent.” Hopkins v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 434 Mass. 556, 566 (2001); R.W. Granger & Sons v. J&S Insulation, 435 Mass. 66, 72-78 (2001).

A consumer’s § 9 claim concerning an insurer’s settlement offer can survive summary judgment when facts remain disputed about whether the offer was fair and equitable and liability was reasonably clear.

Entwistle v. Safety Indemnity Insurance · filed 2015-03-31

These factual disputes preclude entry of summary judgment on the Entwistles’ claim under G.L.c. 93A against Safety, insofar as it concerns Safety’s offer of settlement with respect to the personal property usually located in the Cambridge house.

Section 9(3) calls for a fair and reasonable settlement offer within thirty days of a demand when liability and damages are clear, or as soon as they become clear afterward.

Graf v. Hospitality Mutual Insurance · filed 2015-06-29(3)

Taken together, c. 93A and c. 176D “require an insurer . . . promptly to put a fair and reasonable offer on the table when liability and damages become clear, either within the thirty-day period set forth in G.L.c. 93A, §9(3), or as soon thereafter as liability and damages make themselves apparent.”

Section 9(3) measures the reasonableness of an insurer’s response to a demand for relief in light of the circumstances and the claimant’s demands; the insurer may condition payment of its policy limit on a release of its insureds even when excess insurance is available.

Caira v. Zurich American Insurance Co. · filed 2017-04-21(3)

"Our standard for examining the adequacy of an insurer's response to a demand for relief under G. L. c. 93A, § 9(3), is 'whether, in the circumstances, and in light of the complainant's demands, the offer is reasonable.'" ... The availability of excess insurance did not change the applicability of Lazaris to the facts in the present case, and was not material to Zurich's legally sound settlement position.

Section 9(3)'s settlement offer defense does not limit an insurer's liability for a consumer protection claim when the written offer settles only the underlying insurance claim.

Chiulli v. Liberty Mutual Insurance, Inc. · filed 2020-04-02(3)

In these circumstances, Liberty Mutual may not properly avail itself of the settlement-offer defense to limit its liability for Chiulli's c. 93A claim.

Section 9(3) requires an insurer’s settlement offer to be reasonable in relation to the petitioner’s actual injury.

Martins v. Vermont Mutual Insurance Group · filed 2023-03-13(3)

Chapter 93A requires that relief tendered by the insurer be “reasonable in relation to the injury actually suffered by the petitioner.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(3) (emphasis added).

Section 9(3) allows a court assessing a safe harbor settlement offer to consider injuries beyond the loss of use of money, including injury from being forced to litigate.

Urban v. Zurich American Insurance Company · filed 2024-06-14(3)

A plain reading of the phrase “injury actually suffered” suggests that it can account for various forms of injury—such as any injury resulting from being forced to litigate—so long as it was an “injury actually suffered.”

Section 9(3) does not require a particular formula for measuring the injury actually suffered when assessing a settlement offer under its safe harbor provision.

Urban v. Zurich American Insurance Company · filed 2024-09-30(3)

The plain language of the statute does not indicate or require that courts use a particular formula for the “injury actually suffered.”

Section 9’s instruction to bring an action in Superior Court does not exempt claims about medical treatment from malpractice tribunal screening.

Little v. Rosenthal · filed 1978-11-09(1)

It is the plaintiffs contention that the procedural instructions of G. L. c. 93A, § 9, exempt such claims from the medical malpractice screening procedure. We do not agree.

Section 9(3) permits double or treble damages for a knowing or wilful violation, or for a bad-faith refusal to grant relief on demand when the defendant knew or had reason to know the practice violated § 2.

Heller v. Silverbranch Construction Corp. · filed 1978-11-14(3)

In such circumstances, c. 93A, § 9 (3), authorizes the judge to award up to three, but not less than two, times the amount of actual damages if he finds a wilful or knowing violation of c. 93A, § 2, or that the refusal to grant relief on demand was made in bad faith with knowledge or reason to know that the practice complained of violated § 2.

Section 9(3) permits double or treble actual damages when an unfair practice is willful or knowing, or when relief is refused after demand in bad faith with knowledge or reason to know the practice violates Chapter 93A.

Noyes v. Quincy Mutual Fire Insurance · filed 1979-06-07(3)

Resolution of the basic dispute under the circumstances of this case depends upon a factual determination of Quincy’s knowledge and intent. ... and provides for recovery of up to three but not less ... than two times actual damages if the judge finds that "the use or employment of the act or practice was a willful or knowing violation ... or that the refusal to grant relief upon demand was made in bad faith with knowledge or reason to know that the act or practice ... violated [Chapter 93A].” G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (3) (inserted by St. 1969, c. 690). ... The existence of those issues of fact is made out from the allegations of the complaint admitted by Quincy and by the Fanikos affidavit and is such that summary judgment for the defendant should not have been entered on the second cause of action.

Section 9(3) permits an award of actual damages without multiple damages when the violation was not willful or knowing and the refusal to grant relief was not in bad faith.

Mannion v. Norwood Aviation, Inc. · filed 1981-08-04(3)

In short, the trial court, by awarding actual damages, did not find a willful or knowing violation of section two or that bad faith was involved.

Section 9 damages for an unintentional misrepresentation of the square footage of improved real estate are measured by the purchase price minus the property's actual value, plus pecuniary loss caused by reliance on the misrepresentation.

Anzalone v. Strand · filed 1982-06-18

In sum, we hold that, at least when dealing with improved real property, the proper measure for damages for the unintentional misrepresentation of the square footage of such real estate is the difference between the actual value of what the plaintiff-purchaser received and the purchase price, plus pecuniary loss shown to have been suffered as a consequence of reliance on the misrepresentation.

Section 9(3) allows the cost of correcting damage as actual damages when that cost directly results from a deceptive practice.

Grossman v. Waltham Chemical Co. · filed 1982-07-07(3)

The judge awarded damages in an amount equal to the cost of correcting the structural damage ultimately discovered in the barn. On the evidence it could reasonably be found that the damages incurred by the plaintiff were “direct results of the [defendant’s] wrong.” Rice v. Price, supra at 511. Thus, these costs were the “actual damages” (G. L. c. 93A, § 9[3], inserted by St. 1969, c. 690) suffered by the plaintiff due to the defendant’s deceptive acts and practices.

Section 9(3) permits a judge to award triple damages for willful or knowing misconduct and a bad-faith settlement response.

Patry v. Liberty Mobilhome Sales, Inc. · filed 1983-04-27(3)

We have reviewed the record, and it supports the judge’s findings. His decision to assess triple damages in accordance with G. L. c. 93A, § 9(3), in view of conduct by Liberty which he characterized as callous, was within his discretion.

Section 9(3) permits treble damages when a defendant responds in bad faith to a consumer’s demand letter.

Brown v. LeClair · filed 1985-09-11(3)

Even if each violation must, for purposes of c. 93A, be considered separately, we think the judge’s additional finding of bad faith in responding to LeClair’s demand letter — the alternate prong permitting an assessment of punitive damages — leaves no doubt of the judge’s finding sufficient ground to award treble damages.

Section 9 requires proof of damages to recover more than the $25 statutory minimum, even after the 1979 amendment.

Antonelli v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1986-05-27(3)

Plaintiffs’ brief argues that a 1979 amendment of G.L.c. 93A, § 9, now affords a remedy to any person “injured by another’s unfair or deceptive act or practice,” thus creating a different version of the 93A claim, and that a plaintiff is not currently required to prove a “loss of money or property.” While Trempe was analyzed and decided according to the pre-amendment requirement of proof of a loss of money or property, footnote 6 in Trempe (20 Mass. App. Ct. at 457) makes clear that damages still must be established in order to avoid the $25 minimum.

Section 9(3) allows double the $25 statutory minimum for a willful and knowing violation when no actual damages are proved.

Local 63, Sheet Metal Industry Joint Apprenticeship Committee v. Bean · filed 1988-11-30(3)

The trialjudge found the plaintiffs’ violation wilfull and knowing and assessed double damages. G.L. c. 93A §9(3). There was no evidence presented at trial that the defendant suffered actual damages. As a result judgment should be entered for the defendant in double the statutory amount of $25.00 ...plus reasonable attorney’s fees.

Section 9(3)’s willful-or-knowing standard concerns knowledge or reckless disregard of unlawful rental conditions, regardless of whether the defendant knows the legal requirements.

Montanez v. Bagg · filed 1987-07-17(3)

The “willful or knowing” requirement of § 9(3), goes not to actual knowledge of the terms of the statute, but rather to knowledge, or reckless disregard, of conditions in a rental unit which, whether the defendant knows it or not, amount to violations of the law.

Section 9 permits a court to award a warranted multiple of actual damages, together with attorneys’ fees and costs.

Business Brokers International Corp. v. Roderick · filed 1987-07-17

The judgment in connection with the plaintiff’s G. L. c. 93A claim (count four) is vacated, and the matter is remanded to the Superior Court for entry of a new judgment in such multiple of the plaintiff’s actual damages under G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (reduced by the plaintiff’s recovery under count two), as the judge deems warranted in light of what we have said above, and such attorneys’ fees and costs as have already been determined by the master.

Section 9(3) permits a judge to award two to three times actual damages for a wilful or knowing § 2 violation, or for a bad faith refusal of demanded relief with knowledge or reason to know the practice violated § 2.

In re Arlmont Services, Inc. · filed 1987-09-21(3)

Chapter 93A § 9(3) authorizes the judge to award up to three, but not less than two, times the amount of actual damages if he finds a wilful or knowing violation of c. 93A, § 2, or that the refusal to grant relief on demand was made in bad faith with knowledge or reason to know that the practice complained of violated § 2.

Section 9(3) allows multiple damages for wilful or knowing violations; a grievous violation alone does not establish that level of culpability.

Shawmut Community Bank, N.A. v. Zagami · filed 1991-03-28(3)

A violation may be “grievous” without being wilful or knowing. ... In order to determine whether the judge correctly determined that there was no wilful or knowing violation, we need a more comprehensive and connected explanation than her findings and conclusions provide.

Section 9(3) treats unfair practices during the statutory demand process under its provision for bad-faith refusal to grant relief.

Limina v. Tenaglia · filed 1992-03-26(3)

Quite apart from the fact that the plaintiff has not followed the procedure of the statute for this claimed second violation (i.e., a demand letter), it does not appear that the design of Section 9 (3) lends itself to this interpretation and usage. Afair reading of Section 9 (3) suggests that unfair practices occurring within the procedural framework created by G.Lc. 93A are to be pursued under the second clause of §9(3) dealing with bad faith in failing to grant relief.

Section 9(3) permits interest as damages for the loss of use of money caused by an unfair settlement practice.

Bertassi v. Allstate Insurance · filed 1988-05-13(3)

The plaintiff, then, is entitled to damages under G.L.c. 93A, § 9 (3), in the form of interest, for his loss of use of money during those periods the money that was due him remained unpaid.

The 1989 amendment to § 9(3) clarifies the base amount for multiplying damages and applies to claims arising before it took effect.

Ransow v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. · filed 1993-11-09(3)

I rule that the amendment did not increase the statutory duty of fair dealing owed by Aetna to the Ransows. Indeed, the change in §9 should be viewed simply as a clarification of what constitutes base damage for purpose of multiplication. ... The fact that the amendment has the effect of increasing the amount of the damages awarded in this case is immaterial since the underlying obligation to refrain from unfair insurance practice remains unchanged.

Section 9(3) permits recovery of the punitive portion of doubled damages for a wilful violation even when the underlying damages are included in a parallel common law award.

Wyler v. Bonnell Motors, Inc. · filed 1993-12-01(3)

When doubled because Bonnell had acted wilfully, the c. 93 award, exclusive of legal fees, is $15,000. The punitive component of that figure, $7,500, is not subsumed in the recovery under the parallel common law claim, and the plaintiff is entitled to recover that $7,500.

Section 9(3) requires a finding that the defendant’s conduct was willful, knowing, or in bad faith before multiple damages may be awarded.

Jensen v. Jordan · filed 1994-04-26(3)

Even assuming arguendo that the plaintiff’s complaint required a finding in his favor under G.L.c. 93A, it remained for the trial judge to make the additional finding that the defendant’s conduct was willful, knowing or in bad faith so as to render the defendant liable for multiple damages.

Section 9(3) permits double or treble damages for a willful or knowing violation or a bad faith refusal to grant relief upon demand; negligent repair attempts do not require such an award.

Cruz Management Co. v. Thomas · filed 1994-05-12(3)

Under G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (3) (1992 ed.), a plaintiff prevailing on a c. 93A claim may be awarded “up to three but not less than two times [the actual damages] if the court finds that the use or employment of the act or practice was a willful or knowing violation ... or that the refusal to grant relief upon demand was made in bad faith.” ... The judge was not required to award double or treble damages.

Section 9(3) does not warrant multiple damages for an unreasonable settlement offer when the defendant did not act in bad faith in responding to the demand letter.

O'Neil v. Sciaba Construction Corp. · filed 1994-05-16(3)

A failure to make a reasonable and timely offer of settlement may also give rise to multiple damages. ... I find that the defendant did not make a reasonable settlement offer, but that the defendant did not act in bad faith in responding to the demand letter. For these reasons, an award of multiple damages is not warranted in this case. G.L.c. 93A, §9(3).

Section 9(3) excludes a purchase price refunded to effect rescission from the actual damages subject to multiplication.

Schwartz v. Rose · filed 1994-06-06(3)

Although an amount of money, here $270,000, is necessary to secure the rescission, this does not make that money itself part of the “amount of the judgment.”

Section 9(3) permits $25 in nominal damages when an injury cannot be measured in dollars.

Carey v. Bray · filed 1995-08-16(3)

Even when an “injury” is not quantifiable in a dollar amount, the statute provides for an award of $25 nominal damages. G.L.c. 93A, §9(3). Accordingly, the fact that Carey may only be able to prove nominal damages is not fatal to his G.L.c. 93A claim.

Section 9(3) does not authorize multiple damages for a settlement response that was reasonable and made in good faith under the circumstances at the time of the demand.

Parker v. D'Avolio · filed 1996-05-06(3)

Even if we accept the representations made by the plaintiff’s counsel at oral argument and construe the facts revealed by the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the defendants’ conduct fails to rise to the level necessary to trigger an award of multiple damages under the bad faith settlement aspect of G. L. c. 93A, § 9(3).

Section 9(3) provides actual or nominal damages, without multiple damages, when a violation is not willful or knowing and the response to a demand is not in bad faith.

Lentini v. Peart · filed 1996-11-25(3)

Thus, the plaintiffs are to be awarded only their actual damages or the nominal damages provided in G.L.c. 93A, §9(3).

Section 9(3) measures treble damages by the judgment on all claims arising from the same underlying transaction or occurrence.

Dujon v. Williams · filed 1996-06-26(3)

The actual damages under G.L.c. 93A which are to be multiplied are “the amount of the judgment on all claims arising out of the same and underlying transaction or occurrence . . .” G.L.c. 93A, §9(3). Dujon has been found entitled to recover $85,000 for the underlying accident. This is the amount to be trebled, for a total of $255,000.

Section 9(3) measures actual damages for an insurer’s unfair settlement delay by the interest the claimant would have earned between when settlement should have been paid and when it was paid.

Falvo v. Safety Insurance · filed 1996-06-26(3)

Plaintiffs damages are the interest she would have earned on a damage award for her underlying claim between the time that Safety should have tendered a settlement and the time she actually received the settlement.

Section 9(3) permits multiplication of the judgment on the underlying claim for a bad faith violation; without that judgment, base damages are the interest lost on money wrongfully withheld.

Kapp v. Arbella Mutual Insurance · filed 1998-02-12(3)

The 1989 amendment provides that a bad faith defendant risks multiplication of the judgment secured by the plaintiff on the underlying claim, thereby risking exposure to punitive damages many times greater than multiplication of the lost use of money alone.

Section 9(3) provides actual or nominal damages, rather than multiple damages, when a violation is not willful or knowing and the response to a consumer’s demand is not in bad faith.

Quillard v. Safety Insurance · filed 1996-10-30(3)

Under the circumstances, this Court concludes that Safety has violated G.L.c. 176D, §3(9) and G.L.c. 93A, §9(2), but that its violation was not willful or knowing, and that its response to the plaintiffs’ c. 93A demand was not in bad faith. Accordingly, the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment on Count V, but shall be awarded only their actual damages or the nominal damages provided by c. 93A, §9(3), not multiple damages.

Section 9(3) requires a causal connection between the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the claimant’s damages; both the underlying damages and accrued interest may be multiplied.

Cohen v. Liberty Mutual Insurance · filed 1996-12-04(3)

Based on the information at hand, we conclude that the 1989 amendment did not abolish the need for a plaintiff under c. 93A to show a causal connection between a defendant’s wrongful conduct and the resulting damages, nor was the amendment meant to do anything more than modify our holding in Wallace that only the interest and not the underlying damages, was subject to multiplication.

Section 9(3) calls for multiple damages when a landlord knowingly charges rent above the rent control board’s maximum.

Grekin v. Baer · filed 1997-01-08(3)

Therefore, an award of some multiple of damages is called for under G.L.c. 93A, §9(3).

Section 9(3) does not allow the settlement amount to serve as the basis for multiple damages when the case settles without a court judgment.

Clegg v. Butler · filed 1997-03-12(3)

When a case has been settled outside the courtroom, there is no “judgment” on which to base the multiple damage calculus.

Section 9(3) permits multiple damages for a willful violation when a defendant recklessly represents a fact without knowing whether it is true.

Piers v. Wheeler & Taylor, Inc. · filed 1998-01-26(3)

A violation is “willful” if the defendant knew that she did not know whether the fact represented was true or false; i.e., if she made the representation without knowing whether it was true or false and with reckless disregard for whether it was true or false.

Section 9(3) limits multiple damages to interest lost on withheld insurance proceeds when there has been no final judgment on the underlying claim.

Phoenix Home Life Mutual Insurance v. Brown · filed 1998-04-10(3)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that, although Phoenix’s continued withholding of the funds was “knowing and wilful” from and after the date when the Superior Court determined, by way of summary judgment, that the funds should be deposited in the trust, as contended by the counterclaimants, there was, until today, never a “judgment” as construed by the Supreme Judicial Court. Accordingly, the counterclaimants are entitled to a punitive award only with respect to the amount of interest on the withheld funds, from and after the date of the court’s allowance of summary judgment.

Section 9(3) allows a tenant who withheld rent to recover damages measured by the difference between the warranted rental value and the value of the defective unit, even for months when the tenant paid no rent.

Tosi v. Adams · filed 1997-01-06(3)

In Wolfberg v. Hunter, 385 Mass. 390, 399 (1982), this court held that, when a tenant, who has withheld rent under G. L. c. 239, § 8A, prevails in a claim for damages under G. L. c. 93 A, the tenant’s “damages under G. L. c. 93A shall be calculated by determining the rental value of the unit as warranted — the agreed rent — minus the value of the unit in a defective condition,” and in appropriate circumstances, the amount should “be doubled or trebled, in accordance with G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (3).” The trial judge, citing the Wolfberg case, properly calculated the tenant’s damages. ... The Appeals Court erred in limiting the tenant’s damages by ignoring our Wolfberg opinion and by applying instead a contrary principle earlier stated in McKenna v. Begin, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 168, 173-174 (1975).

Section 9(3) provides $25 in statutory damages when a consumer proves a violation but no actual damages.

Deane v. Snelling & Snelling Personnel Services · filed 1997-05-08(3)

If a violation G.L.c. 93A, §9 is found, recovery will be in the amount of actual damages or $25, whichever is greater. ... Thus, the court finds Deane is entitled solely to statutory damages in the amount of $25.

Section 9(3) measures single damages by the loss caused by the unfair practice; the underlying judgment is used to calculate multiple damages for bad faith violations.

Yeagle v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. · filed 1997-05-20(3)

The sentence preceding the amendment tells us that single recovery shall be “the amount of actual damages,” meaning the (foreseeable) loss to the claimant caused by the violation, this amount to be doubled or tripled where the violation was in bad faith.

Section 9(3) provides $25 in nominal damages and a reasonable attorneys fee when tenants prove a sanitary code violation but no actual damages.

Freeman v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology · filed 1997-10-21(3)

If that calculation demonstrates that the tenants suffered no actual damages, they will be entitled to recover only nominal damages in the amount of $25, plus a reasonable attorneys fee, pursuant to G.L.c. 93A, §9(3).

Section 9 allows $25 in nominal damages, plus attorney’s fees and costs, when a consumer proves a Chapter 93A violation but no causally related actual damages.

Thompson v. Main Street Auto Sales & Service, Inc. · filed 1999-11-09

Having failed to prove any damages causally related to the defendant’s G.L.c. 93A violation, the plaintiff was entitled to statutory nominal damages of $25.00 only, plus attorney’s fees and costs as assessed by the trial court.

Section 9 permits the twenty-five-dollar minimum award only when the court finds for the plaintiff.

Spenlinhauer v. Kane · filed 1998-08-04(3)

The fact that the plaintiff has “alleged” a violation of the statute does not entitle her to an award of twenty-five dollars. Under the statute, such an award is permitted only “if the court finds for the petitioner,” which it has not done here.

Section 9(3) allows minimum damages only when the consumer suffers actual damages or an invasion of a legally protected interest.

Altoonian v. Flagship Motor Cars, Inc. · filed 1999-03-09(3)

In the absence of actual damages or the invasion of a legally protected interest, the plaintiff suffered no harm for which minimum damages under G.L.c. 93A, §9(3) could have been awarded.

Section 9(3) awards a consumer the greater of actual damages or $25.

Feijo v. Harte Toyota, Inc. · filed 2000-12-20(3)

Where the court has found for the plaintiff, recovery should be “in the amount of actual damages or twenty-five dollars, whichever is greater. ...” G.L.c. 93A, §9 (3). ... Feijo’s damages, therefore, are twenty-five dollars, the greater of the actual and nominal amounts.

Section 9(3) requires a court decision for a judgment to serve as the basis for multiplying damages; an accepted settlement offer does not qualify.

Hopkins v. Liberty Mutual Insurance · filed 1998-08-05(3)

A judgment, within the context of G.L.c. 93A, §9(3), as amended by St. 1989, c. 580, § 1, presupposes a decision by a court.

Section 9(3) allows double or treble damages for a knowing or willful unfair practice; the lender's lack of knowledge of other lenders' charges precluded that award here.

United Companies Lending Corp. v. Sargeant · filed 1998-09-11(3)

Nonetheless, the record does not indicate whether United had any data regarding the points charged by other subprime lenders in Massachusetts. Although this lack of knowledge does not preclude a determination that such, conduct constituted an unfair or deceptive trade practice, it does preclude the awarding of double or treble damages to Sargeant.

Section 9 allows a confirmed arbitration award reduced to judgment to serve as a possible basis for multiple damages, even if the award has been paid.

Goodman v. Seaver · filed 2000-08-15(3)

The Supreme Judicial Court did not reach the questions presented in this case and did not suggest that the only measure of damages under G.L.c. 93A, §9 in a case such as this is the interest lost on the delay in securing the monies awarded by the arbitrator. ... The alleged wrong by defendant Holyoke Mutual in not making a good faith settlement offer was still a live issue and the arbitrator’s award had practical legal significance in relation to that live issue because if confirmed and made a judgment it could result in an award of multiple damages.

Section 9(3) excludes the equitable return of a deposit from multiplied damages but permits multiplication of interest lost on the deposit for a willful deceptive act.

Mitchell v. Money Store Massachusetts, Inc. · filed 2000-11-20(3)

Keeping in mind that duplicative damages are not permitted and recission damages are not subject to multiplication, the court rules as follows with respect to damages. ... Consequently, double damages are appropriate in the instant case, but only with respect to the interest on the $5,000 deposit.

Section 9(3) does not require a finding that a violation was knowing or wilful when the circumstances leave the parties’ rights and obligations uncertain.

Brossi v. Fisher · filed 2001-05-10(3)

While the landlord subsequently failed to send the tenant the remaining interest due within 30 days of the termination of his tenancy, as G. L. c. 186, § 15B(2)(o), requires, the landlord’s default occurred only in the context of the tenant’s causing substantial damage to the premises, as well as the unit below it, rendering the parties’ respective rights and obligations uncertain. See G. L. c. 186, § 15B(4)(iii). In these circumstances, the trial judge was not required to find that the landlord’s violation of G. L. c. 186, § 15B(2)(s), was knowing or wilful within the meaning of G. L. c. 93A, § 9(3).

Section 9 permits multiple damages, attorney’s fees, and costs for an insurer’s violation of the unfair claim settlement statute.

Hopkins v. Liberty Mutual Insurance · filed 2001-07-12(3) and (4)

We reject the defendant’s argument that a violation of G. L. c. 176D, § 3 (9) (f), cannot be the basis under G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (3) and (4), for an award of multiple damages and attorney’s fees and costs.

Section 9 permits attorney fees for a proven Chapter 93A violation, but fees incurred prosecuting the action are not actual damages used to calculate multiple damages.

Wasserman v. Commerce Insurance · filed 2002-07-09

In the absence of precedent, this Court declines to consider those fees part of Wasserman's damages, particularly since this lawsuit sought much more than a simple declaration that Commerce had a duty to defend Wasserman against the NOR. Chapter 93A allows a plaintiff to recover attorneys fees upon proof of a 93A violation; to make those fees part of the damages seems to go beyond what the legislature intended.

Section 9(3) permits an award of two to three times actual damages for a willful and knowing Chapter 93A violation.

Haser v. Wright · filed 2002-09-04(3)

Because he knew that the income statement was materially false when he prepared and submitted it, this was a willful and knowing violation. The plaintiffs are therefore entitled to “up to three but not less than two times” their actual damages. G.L.c. 93A, §9(3). The false income statement was not a minor exaggeration. The materiality and magnitude of the false statement and its willfulness call for triple rather than double damages.

Section 9 permits a claimant to pursue multiple damages for unfair settlement practices through arbitration even after the insurer tenders the policy limit.

Mongeon v. Arbella Mutual Insurance · filed 2002-12-27

The Court finds no reason why the plaintiff should not be allowed to proceed to arbitration, even if the main purpose for doing so is to eventually obtain a judicial confirmation of the arbitrator’s award.

Section 9 does not allow a claimant to turn an arbitration award already paid in full into a judgment for calculating double or treble damages.

Murphy v. National Union Fire Insurance · filed 2003-01-23

Furthermore, a plaintiff is not permitted to have an arbitration award reduced to a “judgment,” which may then be subject to doubling or trebling under G. L. c. 93A, by refusing to accept full payment of a proper award.

A claimant whose arbitration award has been fully paid cannot have that award entered as a judgment for doubling or trebling under Section 9, but may still pursue a separate Chapter 93A claim.

Mahan v. Arbella Mutual Insurance · filed 2003-01-23(3)

Nothing in our decision precludes Mahan from pursuing her claims under G. L. c. 93A and G. L. c. 176D. However, because Mahan has been fully paid, she is not entitled to have her arbitration award reduced to a “judgment” that may then be subject to doubling or trebling under G. L. c. 93A.

Section 9(3) requires a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the actual damages used to calculate multiple damages.

Liquor Liability Joint Underwriting Ass'n v. Great American Insurance · filed 2003-04-14(3)

The requirement that a plaintiff show a causal connection between the damages and the wrongful conduct necessarily excludes the default judgment in the underlying tort action as the basis for the award of multiple damages.

Section 9 provides for double or treble damages for a willful and knowing violation, with the multiplier reflecting the defendant’s culpability.

Buckley v. J.R. Builders, Inc. · filed 2003-06-03

That refusal in the face of the G.L.c. 93A letter was unreasonable, given the information available, and constituted a willful and knowing violation of G.L.c. 93A, §9. ... General Laws c. 93A, §9 requires that damages be multiplied by a factor of no less than two nor greater than three. The Court elects a multiplier of two. Although J.R. Builder’s ultimate head-in-the-sand approach left the Buckleys without relief, the contractor did make significant initial efforts to resolve the problem, and those efforts mitigate its culpability to some degree.

Section 9 permits a plaintiff to recover the greater of actual damages or twenty-five dollars.

Smilow v. Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc. · filed 2003-03-07(3)

Section 9 allows plaintiffs to recover the greater of actual damages or twenty-five dollars; Section 11 allows plaintiffs to recover actual damages.

Section 9(3) allows minimum damages of $25 only when the defendant’s conduct caused some injury, even if the loss cannot be quantified.

Lord v. Commercial Union Insurance · filed 2004-01-08(3)

If so, actual damages, but not less than $25, are awarded. If not, there will be no damages because judgment will enter for the defendant. We do not believe that the Legislature intended the $25 figure to be an automatic award whenever an unfair or deceptive act or practice has been identified.

When an insurer wrongfully delays payment and there is no underlying judgment, Section 9 measures damages by the interest lost on the withheld money.

Mongeon v. Arbella Mutual Insurance · filed 2004-04-23(1)

Although the circumstances of this case are unusual, see note 9 supra, this case is nonetheless governed by the rule that where there has been no judgment damages are calculated according to the interest lost on the money wrongfully withheld by the insurer which serves to compensate the wronged insured for the costs and expenses directly resulting from the insurer’s conduct.

Section 9 does not permit multiple damages for a negligent overcharge without a willful or knowing violation.

Snowden v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. · filed 2004-04-27(3)

There is no evidence that the overcharge was a willful or knowing violation, however, at most it appears to have been negligent, and does not justify multiple damages.

Section 9’s double or treble damages are punitive in nature.

Oats v. Whittaker · filed 2005-01-03

The provisions of G.L.c. 93A, §§9 and 11, allowing for double or treble damages, are punitive in nature.

Section 9(3) permits an award of two to three times actual damages for a knowing violation, even when the violation is not wilful.

Arno v. Arbella Mutual Insurance · filed 2005-08-26(3)

Those facts fall short of wilfulness, but do establish that the violation was knowing. ... Accordingly, pursuant to G.L.c. 93A, §9(3), the plaintiff is entitled to “up to three but not less than two times” his actual damages.

Section 9 permits double damages when an insurer’s unfair acts are wilful and knowing.

Bithoney v. Pilgrim Insurance · filed 2006-01-04(3)

This court further finds that Pilgrim’s unfair acts were done wilfully and knowingly. Therefore, Bithoney shall be awarded double damages in the amount of Thirty-eight Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty and 32/100 ($38,820.32) Dollars, along with attorneys fees and costs.

Section 9 permits double damages for a wilful unfair or deceptive practice.

Homesavers Council of Greenfield Gardens, Inc. v. Sanchez · filed 2007-10-10

The same finding of wilfulness in turn justified the double damages award. See G. L. c. 93A, § 9.

Section 9 permits an award of $25 and reasonable attorneys’ fees when a claimant proves a violation but no actual damages.

Redlich v. Lanell · filed 2006-03-03

Under G.L.c. 93A, §9, P. Lanell is entitled to $25.00 or his actual damages, doubled or trebled if Redlich’s conduct is found by this Court to be willful or knowing. This Court finds that P. Lanell has failed to demonstrate any actual damages. Further, this Court does not find Redlich’s violation of G.L.c. 93A, §9 to be willful or knowing. Consequently, this Court shall award him $25.00 in damages plus his reasonable attorneys fees.

Section 9 permits treble damages for a willful or knowing violation of section 2 without a finding of fraud.

Rivers Edge Condominium Homeowners Ass'n v. Cohen (In Re Cohen) · filed 2007-04-26(3)

The superior court trebled the damages pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9, which allows trebling for willful or knowing violations of section two of the statute. The statute does not require a court to find false pretenses, false representation, or fraud before it can treble the damages.

Section 9(3) does not permit a stipulated judgment entered pursuant to a settlement to be multiplied for punitive damages.

Dattilo v. Arbella Mutual Insurance · filed 2007-05-03(3)

It is not, however, an amount which is to be multiplied by a court for punitive damages under C. 93A §9(3).

Section 9(3A) requires multiple damages for a willful violation and allows the court to double or treble the award.

In Re Pharmaceutical Industry Average Wholesale Price Litigation · filed 2007-11-01(3A)

Because the conduct was willful, I must award multiple damages. ... Given these mitigating factors, I will only double the damages.

Section 9(3) permits multiple damages for a bad faith refusal to settle when the defendant knew or had reason to know its conduct violated chapter 93A.

Mustapha v. DaimlerChrysler Co. · filed 2008-01-15(3)

However, because DaimlerChrysler and Clark did not know that the leak was occurring despite conducting an investigation of Mustapha’s claim, they cannot be said to have refused to settle, in bad faith, with knowledge or reason to know that their actions violated c. 93A.

Section 9(3) makes each defendant independently liable for the punitive portion of a double or treble damages award for a willful violation.

In Re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litigation · filed 2008-01-24(3)

Multiple defendants who willfully violate Massachusetts antitrust law and who are therefore liable for double or treble damages are independently liable for the punitive portion of the award.

Section 9(3) measures recovery by actual damages, which may include a tenant’s out-of-pocket expenses.

Wendt v. Barnum · filed 2007-06-18(3)

The court’s ruling, therefore, must be read in terms of the measure of damages mandated by G.L.c. 93A, §9(3), namely, actual damages, which of course would have allowed the court to consider out-of-pocket expenses.

A defendant’s default alone does not justify multiple damages under § 9; a willful or knowing violation must be proved.

Rudin v. Kayafas · filed 2008-11-14(1)

Awarding multiple damages under G.L.c. 93A is only appropriate where the Court finds a “willful or knowing violation” of the statute. G.L.c. 93A, §9(1). Kayafas’s default alone does not entitle Rudin to multiple damages; rather the willful state of mind must be proved.

Section 9(3) permits treble damages when a defendant knowingly and wilfully violates chapter 93A and unreasonably refuses in bad faith to respond to a consumer’s demand letter.

Schaumberg v. Friedmann · filed 2008-06-13(3)

Since, as the judge found, the defendant knowingly and wilfully violated his obligations under the purchase and sale agreement “for the purpose of securing unwarranted benefits from the plaintiffs,” and “unreasonably and in bad faith” refused to respond to the plaintiffs’ c. 93A demand letter, her decision to award treble damages, and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, was appropriate.

Section 9 permits double damages for willful or knowing Chapter 93A violations and allows attorney’s fees.

Farris v. Field · filed 2009-11-25(3) and (4)

Stated alternatively, the judge found that Farris’ actions were “willful or knowing” violations. G.L.c. 93A, §9(3). ... There was no error. The trial judge appropriately assessed double damages and attorneys fees against Farris. G.L.c. 93A, §9(3) and (4).

Section 9(3) permits treble damages for wilful unfair or deceptive practices.

Porcaro v. O'Rourke · filed 2008-09-25(3)

It is no wonder, then, that the judge concluded that Porcaro’s actions were “as egregious a violation of consumer protection laws as there can be,” and justifiably trebled the damages pursuant to G.L.c. 93A, §9(3).

Section 9(3) treats a claimant’s loss of use of settlement funds wrongfully withheld by an insurer as actual damages.

Sterlin v. Commerce Insurance Co. · filed 2009-02-02(3)

A claimant’s loss of use of money that should have been obtained through settlement constitutes “actual damages” under M.G.L.c. 93A, §9(3), and, is applicable in this case.

Section 9(3) treats a claimant’s loss of use of settlement funds as actual damages when an insurer wrongfully delays settlement.

MacKenzie v. Comeau · filed 2009-07-13(3)

A claimant’s loss of use of money that should have been obtained through settlement constitutes “actual damages” under G.L.c. 93A, §9(3), and is applicable in this case.

Section 9 measures damages for an insurer’s late but reasonable settlement offer that the claimant rejects by the loss of use of the offered amount from the breach until the offer, rather than by the underlying tort judgment.

Rhodes v. AIG Domestic Claims, Inc. · filed 2010-11-23

In keeping with the statute’s purpose of fostering out-of-court resolution of insurance claims, we conclude that the amount of the damages for AIGDC’s tardy but reasonable offer, rejected by the plaintiffs, should not be measured by the judgment obtained in the underlying tort action, as urged by the plaintiffs but, rather, should be measured by loss of use principles. As such, damages should be calculated between the time AIGDC breached its duty to make the initial offer, and the date the reasonable offer finally was made and rejected; this is the same result to the insurer had its late but reasonable offer been accepted.

Section 9(3) requires knowing or willful conduct for multiple damages based on a violation of Chapter 93A.

Maston v. Poirier · filed 2009-12-14(3)

Here, although ServPro’s own written materials advised its employees to take additional precautions, I do not find the level of culpability required under §9 for multiple damages.

Section 9(3) permits reasonable attorney fees for a prevailing tenant, but a negligent habitability violation does not warrant multiple damages when no knowing or willful violation is proven.

Star Lane, LLC v. Simas · filed 2010-07-07(3)

Accordingly, the Court rules that Star Lane’s breach of the warranty of habitability constituted a violation of c. 93A. The Court finds, however, that Star Lane’s inaction was attributable to negligence rather than to a knowing and willful disregard of the conditions in the apartment. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that the $10,000 in damages already awarded to Simas fairly and reasonably compensates him for his damages resulting from the c. 93A violation. He is, however, entitled to an award of his reasonable attorney fees.

Section 9(3) allows exemplary damages of two to three times actual damages, subject to a $25 minimum.

In re M3 Power Razor System Marketing & Sales Practice Litigation · filed 2010-08-06(3)

While punitive damages are not available as such, exemplary multiple damages are available up to three times actual damages but not less than two times actual damages (or $25, whichever is greater). Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(3).

Section 9(3) permits multiple damages on a reasonable assigned claim when the underlying damages and the multiple damages claim are determined in the same proceeding.

Gore v. Arbella Mutual Insurance · filed 2010-08-30(3)

Therefore, like the actual damages in Drywall Sys., Inc. v. ZVI Constr. Co., supra, the actual damages on the assigned claim are subject to multiplication.

Section 9 permits multiplication of damages on other claims only when they arise from the same underlying transaction or occurrence as the Chapter 93A violation.

Kherlop v. Domos · filed 2011-01-24(3)

The remaining damages, the jury found, resulted from conduct that, while culpable, did not violate Chapter 93A on any of the three theories presented. This amounts to a finding that Kherlop’s deviations from plans, specifications, and the Building Code were separate occurrences from the rest. ... I will therefore apply the multiplier only to the $15,000 award on the Chapter 93A claim.

Section 9(3) permits treble damages when a Chapter 93A violation is knowing or willful.

Klairmont v. Gainsboro Restaurant, Inc. · filed 2011-02-17(3)

The defendants knowingly, intentionally and willfully engaged in acts that violate c. 93A. In light of that fact, I award treble damages, plus attorneys fees and costs, to the plaintiffs.

Section 9(3) permits multiple damages for a knowing or willful violation of §2, or a bad faith refusal to settle made with knowledge or reason to know of a §2 violation.

DeNava v. Reilly · filed 2011-06-13(3)

Based on his findings and the circumstances of this case, the judge was within his discretion in concluding that Reilly did not wil-fully or knowingly violate G.L.c. 93A §2, and that his initial refusal to pay the money on demand “was [not] made in bad faith with knowledge or reason to know” that he was violating §2. See G.L.c. 93A §9(3).

Section 9(3) permits double or treble damages for a willful or knowing Chapter 93A violation, with the amount based on the defendant’s conduct.

Smith v. Jenkins · filed 2011-10-11(3)

Multiple damages may be awarded if a violation of Chapter 93A was willful or knowing or “the refusal to grant relief upon demand was made in bad faith.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(3). ... As Jenkins and Bertucci conspired to enrich themselves by taking advantage of a person who they knew, or should have known, lacked the ability to anticipate, or even identify, the consequences of his actions, an award of treble damages is appropriate. Noyes’ conduct was not as egregious as she had no personal knowledge of Smith, but she knew (or should have known) that the financial information about him she had been given was false in several material respects. Thus, in the case of NEMC, the court will award double damages.

Section 9(3) treats a claimant’s loss of use of settlement funds wrongfully withheld by an insurer as actual damages.

Martinez-Rivera v. Commerce Insurance · filed 2011-04-11(3)

A claimant’s loss of use of money that should have been obtained through settlement constitutes “actual damages” under G.L.c. 93A, §9(3), and is applicable in this case.

Section 9’s damages requirement is sufficiently pleaded by allegations of fees incurred to avoid foreclosure and harm to credit.

Dill v. American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. · filed 2013-03-28

Plaintiffs also sufficiently allege damages, such as fees incurred to avoid foreclosure and harm to Plaintiffs’ credit.

Section 9’s multiple damages provision includes damages on related claims arising from the same underlying transaction or occurrence when the violation is wilful or knowing.

T. Butera Auburn, LLC v. Williams · filed 2013-04-17

This provision applies to wilful or knowing violations of c. 93A that injure persons engaged in trade or commerce; identical language is included in the statute’s consumer provision, G. L. c. 93A, § 9. Our construction of the statute in this case thus affects both sections. ... Thus, Butera is correct that, under the plain language of § 11, the underlying contract damages as well as the c. 93A damages therefore must be doubled.

Section 9(3) calculates multiple damages for a wilful or knowing unfair settlement practice by multiplying the underlying judgment when it arises from the same transaction or occurrence.

Rhodes v. AIG Domestic Claims, Inc. · filed 2012-02-10(3)

Under the plain language of the 1989 amendment, if a defendant commits a wilful or knowing c. 93A violation that finds its roots in an event or a transaction that has given rise to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, then the damages for the c. 93A violation are calculated by multiplying the amount of that judgment.

Section 9(3) allows actual damages to be doubled or trebled for a wilful or knowing violation.

Evans v. Lorillard Tobacco Co. · filed 2013-06-11(3)

If the judge finds a violation of § 2, the judge shall also determine whether the violation was wilful or knowing and, if so, whether actual damages should be doubled or trebled in accordance with G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (3).

Section 9(3) allows recovery of reasonable tort-related expenses caused by an insurer’s bad faith settlement delay when those expenses were foreseeable.

Rivera v. Commerce Insurance · filed 2013-08-16(3)

Applying DiMarzo and Miller here, we conclude that the plaintiffs may be entitled to reasonable tort-related expenses and disbursements caused by the bad faith delay.

Section 9(3) permits treble damages for knowing or willful unfair or deceptive practices.

Karasavas v. Gargano · filed 2014-02-07(3)

Because of the number of violations of Chapter 93A, and the fact they occurred not in an ordinary commercial relationship but in attorney/client relationship in which the attorney owes a higher duty to the other party, I conclude that it is appropriate to award treble damages to Plaintiff.

Section 9(3) requires double or treble damages for a knowing violation of Chapter 93A; good faith conduct does not qualify.

McDermott v. Marcus, Errico, Emmer & Brooks, P.C. · filed 2014-12-29(3)

Chapter 93A, § 9(3) requires a court to double or treble a plaintiff's damages if that court finds a defendant's violation of Chapter 93A was "a willing or knowing violation" of Chapter 93A, § 2. ... And in the absence of intentional or bad faith violations of Chapter 93A, MEEB is not liable for double or treble damages.

A plaintiff may prevail under Section 9 without multiple damages when the violation was not found to be willful or knowing.

Medeiros v. Marisqueira Madeira, Inc. · filed 2015-05-18(3)

Neither the magistrate’s failure to award multiple damages nor his failure to award attorney’s fees excludes the possibility of the magistrate’s finding in favor of the plaintiffs on their G.L.c. 93A claim in this case: the magistrate could have found a violation of G.L.c. 93A, §9 without finding the violation to be a “willful and knowing” violation of §2; the plaintiff may not have proved reasonable attorney’s fees connected to the G.L.c. 93A claim.

A consumer may recover statutory damages under § 9 when a deceptive act causes an identifiable injury, even if the amount of actual damages cannot be proved.

Aspinall v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. · filed 2015-08-11(3)

If proved, plaintiffs have suffered a separate, identifiable harm arising directly from the alleged unfair or deceptive acts. That the less safe product actually received has a true market value less than the product ás advertised is a reasonable inference. ... Thus, harm of at least a penny may be inferred. Accordingly, PM’s motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the case is denied.

Statutory damages do not relieve a § 9 plaintiff from proving injury and causation.

Ferreira v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc. · filed 2015-09-15(3)

But the Supreme Judicial Court has made clear that statutory damages cannot substitute for the requirement that a plaintiff prove injury and causation in a chapter 93A claim.

Section 9(3) provides $25 in statutory damages to each class member when actual damages cannot be proved with reasonable certainty.

Geanacopoulos v. Philip Morris Usa, Inc. · filed 2016-02-24(3)

Because plaintiffs could not prove with reasonable certainty a specific measure of the actual damages incurred by the class members as a result of the deception, I award damages of the statutory amount of $25 per class member, or a total of $4,942,500, plus prejudgment interest.

Section 9(3) requires doubling or trebling actual damages when a violation is knowing, wilful, or in bad faith.

McLaughlin v. American States Insurance Co. · filed 2016-08-12(3)

Under that chapter, actual damages shall be doubled or trebled if the violation is knowing, wilful, or in bad faith. See G. L. c. 93A, § 9(3).

Section 9(3) excludes postjudgment interest from the amount used to calculate double or treble damages for wilful or knowing misconduct.

Anderson v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh PA · filed 2017-02-02(3)

Moreover, under the rule of lenity, given the absence of an express textual provision or an indication of legislative ... intent, G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (3), cannot be read implicitly to allow (or to require, as the multiplication of an award of damages for wilful misconduct is mandatory) doubling or trebling an award of postjudgment interest.

Section 9(3A) permits multiple damages in certain circumstances, but a complaint must plausibly allege a Chapter 93A violation and conduct sufficient to support that award.

Auctus Fund, LLC v. MJ Biotech, Inc. · filed 2021-06-18(3A)

Turning to damages, to the extent Auctus Fund seeks “punitive” damages, which this Court construes as a request for double or treble damages as set forth in Chapter 93A, the requested relief will be denied. See M.G.L. c. 93A, § 9(3A) (permitting multiple damages in certain circumstances). Not only does the complaint lack sufficient detail to allege a Chapter 93A claim plausibly, it also fails to show that MJ Biotech engaged in the level of “rascality” or “immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous” behavior necessary to support an award of multiple damages under the statute.

Section 9 allows multiple damages only when a Chapter 93A violation is knowing or willful.

Pimentel v. Amguard Insurance Company · filed 2024-10-23

There is not sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that any violation of Chapter 93A was knowing or willful, so plaintiff may not recover multiple damages.

Section 9(3) requires at least double actual damages for a willful or knowing violation and permits up to triple damages.

KPM Analytics North America Corporation v. Blue Sun Scientific, LLC · filed 2024-04-10(3)

Since these two predicates were satisfied, the Court was statutorily mandated to award “not less than two times [the amount of ‘actual damages’].” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(3) (emphasis added).

Section 9(3) requires a willful or knowing violation for multiple damages; negligent misrepresentation alone does not require them.

LAWRENCE BUCCI & Another v. LINDSEY CAMPBELL & Another. · filed 2025-02-24(3)

By contrast, the ambivalence of the judge's findings -- pronouncing the Campbells' conduct to be "sleazy," yet not rising to the level of a c. 93A violation -- does not compel the legal conclusion that the Campbells' "use or employment of the act or practice was a willful or knowing violation" requiring multiple damages. G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (3). Chapter 93A does not mandate multiple damages for negligent misrepresentations.

Section 9(3) excludes prejudgment interest and attorney's fees from the actual damages multiplied for a damages award.

THERESA DIPIRO & Another v. GROUND UP CONSTRUCTION, INC., & Another. · filed 2025-05-06(3)

The $89,898.64 figure referenced by the homeowners includes prejudgment interest and attorney's fees. These are not elements of actual damages but rather are "in addition to other relief" provided by the statute.

Section 9 provides $25 in damages and reasonable attorney's fees when a consumer proves a $20 loss from an unfair or deceptive practice.

BOSWORTH v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC D/B/A MR. COOPER · filed 2025-03-18(3), (4)

Mr. Bosworth has proven his G.L. c. 93A claim and a loss of $20. He is therefore entitled to a nominal damages award of $25 and reasonable attorneys' fee .

Section 9 allows a single $25 nominal damages award when a consumer proves a cognizable injury but cannot prove greater actual damages.

Powers v. Receivable Performance Management, LLC · filed 2025-09-25(3)

In further deference to legislative intent, Plaintiff shall be entitled to a single award of $25, not $25 per excessive call made by RPM.

Section 9(3) makes double or treble damages available when a plaintiff proves willful or knowing conduct.

CHARLES TAYLOR & Another v. NEW HEIGHTS BUILDERS OF MA, LLC. · filed 2025-10-02(3)

If a plaintiff additionally proves that a defendant engaged in "willful or knowing" conduct, see G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (3), then double or treble damages become available.

Section 9 permits prejudgment interest on attorney’s fees awarded as actual damages for unfair conduct even when counsel deferred payment until the plaintiff recovered.

Siegel v. Berkshire Life Insurance · filed 2007-09-28

In any event, unlike the insurer in Sterilite Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., supra, here it was Berkshire’s deceitful actions that caused Carole immediate injury, and it would be unfair in these circumstances to allow Berkshire to profit (i.e., have the use of funds) because of Carole’s inability to pay for counsel before Berkshire’s liability for its wrongful actions was established. The award of prejudgment interest was properly calculated.

Section 9(4) permits a judge to determine counsel fees from observations made during trial without a separate evidentiary hearing.

McLoughlin v. Disarro · filed 1979-02-05(4)

The portions of the record before us do not afford a basis for determining the amount of counsel fees, but an evidentiary hearing is not necessary; the determination can be based upon the judge’s own observations of the relevant factors on this issue gained during the course of the trial.

Section 9(4) allows the judge to use experience and expertise to determine an appropriate attorney’s fee.

Goes v. Feldman · filed 1979-07-11(4)

The judgment included a substantial component on account of a legal fee awarded pursuant to G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (4). The defendant’s brief attacks the evidentiary basis for fixing this fee. Determination of what was appropriate compensation for the plaintiffs’ counsel was within the experience and expertise of the judge.

Section 9(4) entitles a plaintiff who prevails on a § 2 claim to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs regardless of the amount in controversy.

Hanner v. Classic Auto Body, Inc. · filed 1980-06-27(4)

Under G. L. c. 93A, § 9(4), a plaintiff who prevails in an action under § 2 of the statute is entitled to “reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred in connection with [the] action,” “irrespective of the amount in controversy.”

Section 9 provides $25 in statutory damages plus reasonable attorney’s fees.

Brow v. Stanton · filed 1981-12-14

Judgment is to be entered for the plaintiff in the statutory amount (G. L. c. 93A, § 9) of twenty-five dollars plus reasonable attorney’s fees in an amount to be determined in the Superior Court.

Section 9(4) requires reasonable attorney’s fees and costs when a plaintiff obtains relief under Chapter 93A.

Giannasca v. Everett Aluminum, Inc. · filed 1982-02-18(4)

We conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to relief under c. 93A. In addition to the actual damages already awarded, that relief must include reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. See G. L. c. 93A, § 9(4).