Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4

Section 4(4) prohibits retaliation for opposing discrimination and requires a retaliation claimant to show protected activity, an adverse employment action, and a causal link between them.

Collison v. Sun Microsystems, Inc. · filed 2004-11-05(4)

Under G.L.c. 151B, §4(4), it is unlawful for an employee to discriminate against any person who has filed a complaint or opposed any practice forbidden by the discrimination statute. In order to survive summary judgment on the retaliation claim, Ms. Collison must provide evidence satisfying the following three elements: 1) that the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity; 2) that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action; and 3) that there is a causal link between the protected activity and the employment action.

Section 4(4) protects an employee’s complaint about suspected discrimination, but a retaliation claim requires a causal connection between that complaint and an adverse employment action.

Ahanon v. Cerebral Palsy of Massachusetts · filed 2005-01-31(4)

Assuming this meeting took place as described by the plaintiff, this activity would be sufficient to activate the protection of c. 151B, §4(4). ... The court finds that the causal nexus is too attenuated for the plaintiff to sustain a claim of retaliation.

Section 4(4) protects an employee who supports a spouse’s sexual harassment complaint from retaliation by the employer.

Mole v. University of Massachusetts · filed 2003-05-08(4)

General Laws c. 151B, § 4(4), inserted by St. 1946, c. 368, § 4, declares that it is an unlawful practice for an employer “to discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any person because he has opposed any practices forbidden under this chapter.” The plaintiff’s support of his wife’s sexual harassment complaint was a protected activity, thereby satisfying the first requirement of a prima facie case.

Section 4(4A) protects the exercise of rights under chapter 151B; seeking workers’ compensation benefits under chapter 152 does not qualify.

Courtois v. Legal Seafoods, Inc. · filed 2004-02-06(4A)

The plaintiffs retaliation claim invokes G.L.c. 151B, §4.4A. That statute provides, in pertinent part, that it is unlawful “for any person to coerce, intimidate or threaten to interfere with another person in the exercise or enjoyment of any right granted or protected by this chapter.” The complaint alleges, without specificity, that the plaintiff “exercised statutory rights permitted and protected under G.L.c. 151B.” The record presented on this motion does not identify any conduct of the plaintiff in the exercise of such rights prior to his termination. Indeed, there is nothing whatever in the record to indicate that the plaintiff ever invoked any rights under c. 151B, or engaged in any conduct protected under that statute, prior to his termination.

Section 4(4) does not protect complaints about discrimination based on patients’ ability to pay for medical care or an employee’s status as a single mother.

Martinez v. New England Medical Center Hospitals, Inc. · filed 2004-03-03(4)

Neither of these actions constitutes a protected activity under Title VII or chapter 151B § 4(4).

Section 4(4) and (4A) prohibit a supervisor from recommending an employee’s termination in retaliation for filing an MCAD complaint.

Williams v. Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency · filed 2003-09-17(4), (4A)

In finding that defendant Connolly engaged in unlawful retaliation, the jury necessarily found that Connolly, motivated by a retaliatory animus, recommended that plaintiff be terminated because he had filed an MCAD complaint. That is clearly conduct prohibited by G.L.c. 151B, §4(4) and (4A).

Section 4 permits a retaliation claim even when the employee fails to establish a disability discrimination claim.

Wright v. Comp USA, Inc. · filed 2003-12-22

Massachusetts's anti-discrimination law also treats retaliation as a "separate and independent cause of action." ... Wright's failure to establish a disability does not preclude his retaliation claim.

Section 4(4) and (4A) do not permit an inference of retaliation from later adverse actions when the employee’s problems began before the employer knew of the protected activity.

Mole v. University of Massachusetts · filed 2004-09-01(4) and (4A)

Where, as here, adverse employment actions or other problems with an employee predate any knowledge that the employee has engaged in protected activity, it is not permissible to draw the inference that subsequent adverse actions, taken after the employer acquires such knowledge, are motivated by retaliation.

Filing a discrimination charge is protected activity under § 4(4), but the filing may still be unreasonable for purposes of proving retaliation.

Pardo v. General Hospital Corp. · filed 2006-01-26(4)

Although the filing of a charge of discrimination is a “protected” activity under G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (4), it may not be “reasonable” for purposes of proving retaliation.

Section 4(4) requires a retaliation claimant to show a causal link between protected activity and an adverse employment action.

Douglas v. JC Penney Co., Inc. · filed 2006-03-30(4)

Plaintiff has failed, however, to carry his burden on the third element of his case. Plaintiff has made no showing of a causal link between his complaints and his termination.

Section 4(4) covers an employer’s refusal to renew an appointment in retaliation for an employee’s gender discrimination lawsuit.

Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Institute · filed 2005-02-09(4)

Based on the facts set forth in part l.d of this opinion, a reasonable jury could conclude that Dana-Farber’s decision not to renew the plaintiff’s appointment was motivated by retaliatory animus fueled by the plaintiff’s filing of a lawsuit against Dana-Farber alleging discrimination based on gender.

Section 4(4) treats a hostile work environment imposed in retaliation for protected activity as an adverse employment action.

Noviello v. City of Boston · filed 2005-02-16(4)

For the reasons elucidated above, we hold that, under Massachusetts law as under Title VII, subjecting an employee to a hostile work environment in retaliation for protected activity constitutes an adverse employment action (and, thus, triggers the statutory prophylaxis).

Section 4(16A) requires sexual harassment to create a hostile, intimidating, or abusive work environment that affects the employee’s work; a vague, isolated suggestion is insufficient.

Mireault v. Northeast Motel Associates, LP · filed 2006-02-02(16A)

In Massachusetts, employers are prohibited from discriminating against their employees on the basis of sexual harassment pursuant to G.L.c. 151B, §4(16A). ... Assuming Tucker made the comment, it is too vague, ambiguous and innocuous to connote sexual harassment.

Section 4 permits significant harassment outside work to be considered when assessing whether a work environment is hostile.

Salvi v. Suffolk County Sheriff's Department · filed 2006-10-20

In determining whether the work environment is hostile, significant out-of-work harassment such as this may be considered as well.

Section 4(4) does not protect an employee from retaliation for objecting to another employee’s promotion unless the objection is based on a claim of discrimination.

Montlouis v. Pirus Networks, Inc. · filed 2005-03-15(4)

There is no cause of action under G.L.c. 15IB for retaliating against an employee for objecting to someone else’s promotion when that objection is not based on a claim of discrimination.

Section 4(4) permits a retaliation claim when retaliatory harassment creates a hostile work environment.

Gerrie v. Karl Storz Endovision, Inc. · filed 2005-12-29(4)

In recent years, the definition of the “adverse employment action” element of a retaliation claim under 15 IB has been expanded to include a retaliatory hostile work environment.

Section 4(4) prohibits retaliation for testifying in a discrimination proceeding; a claim requires protected activity, an adverse employment consequence, and causation.

Ciccarelli v. School Department of Lowell · filed 2007-12-07(4)

An employer may not “discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any person . . . because he has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under section five.” G. L. c. 151B, § 4(4), inserted by St. 1946, c. 368, § 4. A retaliation claim under c. 151B must fulfill three elements: (1) the employee engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employee faced an adverse employment consequence; and (3) the protected activity caused the adverse employment action.

Section 4(4) requires a causal link between protected conduct and an adverse employment action; an earlier termination decision does not establish retaliation without evidence of a later adverse action.

Rhodes v. JPMorgan Chase & Co. · filed 2008-06-24(4)

The adverse action alleged by Rhodes is the job elimination/termination letter of June 17, 2005. The earliest instance of arguably “protected conduct” by Rhodes occurred on July 20, 2005, when her lawyer sent a demand letter to JPMSI’s general counsel. The offer by JPMSI of a transfer to Beinstein’s group, which was made in mid-June (before the demand letter was sent), remained open to at least August 8, 2005. Rhodes offers no evidence that JPMSI withdrew or suspended the offer after receiving the demand letter.

Section 4(4) requires a retaliation plaintiff to show that the employer knew of the protected conduct before taking adverse action.

Navarro v. U.S. Tsubaki, Inc. · filed 2008-09-17(4)

If the defendant did not know that the plaintiff undertook conduct that was protected, then any subsequent adverse employment action cannot be linked to the protected conduct.

Sections 4(4) and 4(4A) require a retaliation plaintiff to show protected conduct, an adverse action, and a causal connection between them.

Bolduc v. Town of Webster · filed 2009-05-22(4), (4A)

To maintain a claim of retaliation under sections 4(4) and 4(4A), the plaintiff has the burden of establishing (1) that he engaged in protected conduct; (2) that he suffered adverse action; and (3) that a causal connection existed between the protected conduct and the adverse action.

Section 4(4) requires a person claiming retaliation to show an adverse employment action, even when the alleged retaliation is a lawsuit.

Visnick v. Marriott International, Inc. · filed 2007-08-06(4)

However, even with a lawsuit filed against an employee, to make out a claim for retaliation pursuant to G.L.c. 151B, §4(4), the employee must still show she suffered an adverse employment action.

Section 4(1) permits a gender discrimination claim when denying employees a rank-specific locker room could deprive them of a material condition or privilege of employment.

King v. City of Boston · filed 2008-03-28(1)

Here, the plaintiffs have presented evidence that the denial of a rank-specific locker facility deprives them of a material feature of their employment. While such a finding may not be compelled, it would be permissible and thus precludes summary judgment on the issue.

Section 4(16) treats removal from the work schedule and an offer of substantially reduced pay and hours as materially adverse employment actions.

Sensing v. Outback Steakhouse of Florida, LLC · filed 2009-08-11(16)

The record establishes that appellees removed Sensing from the work schedule after she missed only one and a half covered shifts, offering her in the alternative a "light duty" position with substantially reduced salary, hours and responsibilities. These actions disadvantaged Sensing with respect to the terms and conditions of her employment, see MacCormack, 672 N.E.2d at 8, and amounted to far more than mere trivial inconveniences.

Section 4 may treat a policy requiring teachers to submit to searches of their persons and vehicles as an adverse employment action if it disadvantages their employment conditions.

Lucien v. Conlee · filed 2009-09-03

Because a new policy (particularly one not approved by the teachers’ union) requiring that teachers submit to searches of their persons and vehicles prior to leaving school property could be considered a disadvantageous change in employment conditions, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Lucien was subjected to an adverse employment action.

A workplace complaint is protected against retaliation under Section 4 when it challenges an employment practice prohibited by Chapter 151B.

Walker v. City of Holyoke · filed 2007-11-30(4)

However, the court need not consider this as possible evidence of retaliation under Title VII or Chapter 151B since the dispatching complaint was not a protected activity. Walker did not assert at the time that she was challenging an employment practice prohibited by either statute.

Section 4(4) protects opposition to practices forbidden by Chapter 151B; complaints about alleged financial-law violations do not qualify.

Fantini v. Salem State College · filed 2009-02-23(4)

Again we find that Fantini did not comply with the first prong by failing to show that she engaged in a protected activity, since the “misconduct of male, Edward Manning under the (“Conflict of Interest Law and Financial Disclosure Law”) ...; for changing the general ledger system contrary to law,” does not constitute a forbidden practice under the Massachusetts anti-discrimination statute, M.G.L.A. ch. 151B § 4.

Section 4(4) protects an employee who requests an accommodation for a disability from retaliation, even if the employee never files a formal complaint.

Gauthier v. Sunhealth Specialty Services, Inc. · filed 2008-03-27(4)

In a disability-based retaliatory discharge claim, requesting workplace accommodations because of a disability constitutes “protected activity” whether or not a formal complaint or charge was ever made.

Section 4(4) and (4A) allow retaliation claims based on acts that occur after employment ends; the timing alone does not bar the claims.

Ngassa v. Ocean State Job Lot Stores of SE MA, Inc. · filed 2010-02-03(4), (4A)

I find that the acts complained of in the instant action, ie. post-termination retaliation, state claims under G.L.c. 151B, §§4(4) and 4(4A). Having found that the post-termination nature of the alleged retaliatory acts do not present a legal bar, the plaintiffs complaint must be examined to determine whether such counts set forth allegations which, when read most favorably for plaintiff, plausibly suggest plaintiffs entitlement to relief.

Section 4(4) permits a retaliation claim when an employer places an employee in a job he cannot perform because he complained of racial discrimination, causing constructive discharge.

Green v. Harvard Vanguard Medical Associates, Inc. · filed 2011-03-03(4)

Given the evidence in the summary judgment record, there is a genuine issue of material fact whether Green was intentionally recommended for (and subsequently hired into) a job for which he was not qualified and from which he was consequently bound to separate such that his resignation from that position amounted to constructive discharge — an adverse employment consequence — and whether Harvard Vanguard’s decision to take this course of action was a result of his having complained about his supervisor’s alleged racially discriminatory conduct.

Section 4(4) protects requests for disability accommodations from retaliation, but a claim requires evidence that retaliatory animus motivated the adverse employment action.

Cyr v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2011-06-16(4)

Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant retaliated against her in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(4). ... Without passing judgment on the propriety of Defendant’s conduct, the court cannot identify a single fact tending to show that Defendant harbored any animus toward Plaintiff based on her invocation of her rights under the ADA. ... Thus, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs retaliation claims, Counts III and VI, will be allowed.

A retaliation claimant under § 4(4) need not prove actual discrimination, but must reasonably and in good faith have believed that unlawful discrimination occurred.

Cánovas v. University of Massachusetts Medical School · filed 2011-12-08(4)

To succeed on his retaliation claim, the plaintiff need not prove that Dr. Altieri actually discriminated against him, but he must “prove that he reasonably and in good faith believed that the [employer] was engaged in wrongful discrimination.”

Section 4(4) permits a retaliation claim to proceed when evidence links disability leave to an adverse evaluation and creates a factual dispute over the employer’s reason for discharge.

Haraden v. Verizon New England, Inc. · filed 2012-06-05(4)

Prouty’s allegedly discriminatory evaluation and animus occurred in the immediate aftermath (in fact, during) the plaintiffs disability leave. This supports an inference of causation. There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Verizon’s business reason for discharging Haraden in part as a result of that retaliatory evaluation was a pretext for retaliation.

Section 4 retaliation requires protected conduct, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection between them.

Trainor v. HEI Hospitality, LLC · filed 2012-10-31

In such a situation, succeeding on a claim of retaliation under either federal or Massachusetts law entails proof that "(1) [the plaintiff] engaged in protected conduct under federal or [state] law; (2) [he] suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected conduct and the adverse action." McMillan v. Mass. SPCA, 140 F.3d 288, 309 (1st Cir. 1998).

Section 4(4) requires a retaliation plaintiff to show protected activity, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection between them.

Bohigian v. University of Massachusetts Medical Center · filed 2012-11-14(4)

To state a claim against an employer for retaliation under G.L.c. 151B, §4(4) or (4A), a plaintiff must show that 1) he engaged in a protected activity; 2) he suffered an adverse employment action at the time or after the protected conduct occurred; and 3) a causal nexus exists between the adverse action and the protected conduct.

Complaints about reasonably perceived disability harassment of a coworker can be protected activity under Section 4.

Surprise v. Innovation Group, Inc. · filed 2013-02-14

Accordingly, plaintiffs complaints could reasonably be found to constitute protected activity under the ADA and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B.

A section 4 retaliation claim requires a causal link between protected activity and an adverse action; after a substantial delay, other evidence of retaliatory animus is needed to support that inference.

Dias v. Verizon New England, Inc. · filed 2014-06-05

Here, even assuming that the October 2007 e-mail was activity protected under a state law, it is clear that no rational, properly instructed jury could find that Verizon fired Dias in retaliation for sending it. ... And, to the extent that causation may ever be inferred despite a substantial delay between the protected conduct and the retaliation claimed, this would only be where the record contains some other evidence of an employer's retaliatory animus during the intervening time, casting a light of revenge on what the employer did.

Section 4(4) protects an employee who complains to human resources about discrimination from retaliation; termination is an adverse employment action.

Xiaoyan Tang v. Citizens Bank, N.A. · filed 2016-05-19(4)

There is no question that Tang undertook protected conduct by submitting her complaint to human resources and subsequently suffered an adverse employment action upon her termination.

Section 4(4) prohibits retaliation for protected discrimination complaints, but a claim fails when the employee cannot show that the employer's stated reason for termination was pretextual.

Jones v. Walgreen Co. · filed 2012-05-10(4)

At issue is whether the district court erred when it granted summary judgment against Jones in connection with her claim that Walgreens retaliated against her for protected conduct in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(4). ... We accordingly find that her retaliation claim fails as a matter of law.

Retaliation claims under § 4(4) follow the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Ray v. Ropes & Gray LLP · filed 2013-08-16(4)

Like discrimination claims, the framework also applies to retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(4).

Section 4(4) protects an employee who reasonably and in good faith complains of gender discrimination, even if the discrimination is not ultimately proved.

Shervin v. Partners Healthcare System, Inc. · filed 2014-03-07(4)

That is, on this record, a reasonable jury could find that, at a minimum, Dr. Shervin had a reasonable and good faith basis for believing that the probationary decision was discriminatory for the purposes of her timely retaliatory claims.

Section 4(4) prohibits retaliation for good faith internal complaints about perceived gender discrimination, even before a formal discrimination charge is filed.

Shalaby v. Arctic Sand Technologies, Inc. · filed 2014-12-16(4)

Retaliating against someone for making internal complaints in good faith regarding perceived gender discrimination among employees violates G.L.c. 151B, §4(4), even if the alleged retaliation occurs before the plaintiff has filed a formal charge with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination.

Section 4(4) protects employees who oppose conduct they reasonably and in good faith believe is unlawful discrimination.

Downing v. Omnicare, Inc. · filed 2017-10-25(4)

When the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, he has presented evidence from which a jury could find that he reasonably and in good faith believed that Stamps was engaged in conduct in violation of chapter 151B.

An employee’s self-help discovery in support of a discrimination claim may be protected activity under § 4 if the employee’s actions are reasonable in the totality of the circumstances.

Verdrager v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. · filed 2016-05-31

Taking into consideration the interests at stake and the views of other courts that have addressed the matter, we conclude that such conduct may in certain circumstances constitute protected activity under that statute, but only if the employee's actions are reasonable in the totality of the circumstances.

Section 4 requires a retaliation claimant to have engaged in activity or exercised a right protected by the statute.

Schwartz v. Hri Hosp., Inc. · filed 2017-12-29

The fatal flaw in Schwartz's complaint is the absence of any allegation that he engaged in any activity, or exercised any right, protected by these statutes.

Section 4(4) requires a retaliation claimant to prove protected conduct, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection between them by a preponderance of the evidence.

Saxe v. Baystate Med. Ctr., Inc. · filed 2018-06-11(4)

To prevail on his retaliation claim under G. L. c. 151B, § 4(4), Saxe was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) he engaged in protected conduct, (2) an adverse employment action was taken against him, and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected conduct and the action taken. ... However, the jury, after Saxe's cross-examination, were warranted in choosing to discredit the hospital's evidence and find retaliatory motive sufficient for judgment.

Section 4 requires a retaliation plaintiff to show protected conduct, an adverse employment action, and a causal link between them.

Votolato v. Verizon New England, Inc. · filed 2018-10-01

In order to establish a claim for retaliation under either statute, “a plaintiff must show that (i) she undertook protected conduct, (ii) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (iii) the two were causally linked.”

Section 4 requires a causal connection between protected activity and the alleged retaliatory conduct; mere ostracism does not establish retaliation through a hostile work environment.

Martinelli v. Bancroft Chophouse, LLC · filed 2019-02-22

Finally, Martinelli cannot prevail on his claims for retaliation under Title VII and Chapter 151B. ... In summary, because Martinelli cannot establish a hostile work environment or that any of the alleged misconduct of Seznec or the other managers was causally linked to his protected activity, defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's retaliation claims will be allowed.

Section 4(4) protects employees who oppose unlawful employment practices, file a complaint, or participate in an EEOC or MCAD proceeding.

Brader v. Biogen Inc. · filed 2019-03-04(4)

Under both state and federal law, "protected activity" includes opposing unlawful employment practices, filing a complaint, or testifying or assisting in a proceeding before either the EEOC or MCAD. See M.G.L. c. 151B § 4(4) ; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).

Section 4(4) prohibits retaliation for complaints about unlawful employment discrimination, but a retaliatory termination claim fails when the evidence cannot support a finding that the employer's stated reason was pretextual.

Baer v. Montachusett Reg'l Technical Sch. Dist. · filed 2019-05-17(4)

Both Title VII and Chapter 151B contain provisions that prohibit employers from retaliating against persons who complain about unlawful discriminatory employment practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) ; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(4). ... In the end, despite Mrs. Baer's efforts, she only "points us to de minimis evidence, insufficient for a rational factfinder to infer" pretextual termination. ... Thus, the Court must grant Defendant summary judgement on Counts II and IV.

Section 4(4) permits a retaliation claim when a supervisor allegedly denies benefits after learning of protected activity despite having approved similar requests before.

PREDELLA v. Braintree · filed 2018-09-14(4)

While Predella’s claim may ultimately fail if O’Brien denied similar claims, or if Predella’s claim is not similar to the claims that O’Brien approved, at this stage he has sufficiently plead a retaliation claim under M.G.L. c. 151B, § 4(4).

Section 4 requires a retaliation claimant to show protected activity, a materially adverse action, and a causal link between them.

Hall v. Hayes Management Consulting · filed 2018-11-26

To make out a prima facie case of retaliation under Massachusetts law, Hall must show that (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) he suffered a materially adverse action; and (3) the adverse action was causally linked to his protected activity.

Section 4 protects an internal complaint from retaliation only when it opposes conduct the employee reasonably believes is unlawful discrimination.

Motowski v. Ferring Pharmaceuticals Inc. · filed 2019-02-14

Ferring contends, and the court agrees, that whatever one makes of Motowski’s allegations, they fail to support her contention that her complaint amounted to protected activity, namely opposition to unlawful discrimination.

A retaliation claim under § 4 fails without a causal link between protected activity and the adverse employment decision.

Theidon v. Harvard University · filed 2020-01-31

Since Theidon cannot establish (directly or via the cat's paw) a causal link between her protected activity and the adverse employment decision, her Title IX retaliation claim must fail. ... We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment as to Theidon's state law retaliation claim under 151B for the same reasons.

Section 4(4) protects an employee who files an internal discrimination complaint from retaliation, including a hostile work environment caused by that complaint.

Cadigan v. Align Technology, Inc. · filed 2020-07-07(4)

Plaintiff has stated a claim for retaliation and a retaliatory hostile work environment because she has sufficiently pled that she engaged in a protected activity by filing the Internal Complaint; that she suffered an adverse employment action in the hostile work environment subsequently created by Johnson and Anistasi; and that that hostile work environment was causally linked to the Internal Complaint.

Section 4(4) permits retaliation claims against individual defendants when an alleged adverse action follows protected activity and supports an inference of causation.

Savage v. City of Springfield · filed 2021-03-08(4)

Retaliation is actionable under both Title VII and Mass Gen. Laws ch. 151B. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(4). ... Here, Plaintiffs’ amended complaint states plausible claims for retaliation against Conant and Calvi.

Section 4(4) requires a retaliation plaintiff to show protected activity, a materially adverse action, and a causal connection between them; denying a requested accommodation alone does not establish retaliation.

Rivera v. Altranais Home Care LLC · filed 2022-01-18(4)

A prima facie case of retaliation under both the ADA and Chapter 151B consists of a showing by the plaintiff that (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) she suffered a materially adverse action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. ... The court therefore allows Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claims.

Section 4(4) applies the materially adverse action standard to retaliation claims, including a series of employer actions that could dissuade a reasonable employee from reporting discrimination.

Gunter v. Shapley & Stern, Inc. · filed 2021-04-30(4)

Absent any protest from the Massachusetts courts, this court therefore proceeds as though the standard for materially adverse employment actions articulated in Burlington Northern for retaliation claims under Title VII applies equally to those brought under chapter 151B.

Section 4(4)’s participation clause protects involvement in external or formal proceedings, but not internal or informal workplace investigations.

Dusel v. Factory Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2021-07-14(4)

It is undisputed that Dusel did not engage in the latter form of protected activity because the participation clause applies solely to external or formal as opposed to internal or informal investigations and proceedings.

Section 4(4) does not provide a retaliation claim for an employee who requests medical leave.

Kuc v. Smith & Nephew, Inc. · filed 2022-02-14(4)

Her claim is instead asserted under state law, specifically chapter 151B. But that statute does not provide recourse for an employee who suffers retaliation for seeking medical leave.

Section 4(4) requires a plausible connection between an employee’s complaint about discrimination and an adverse employment action to state a retaliation claim.

Salomon v. Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency · filed 2023-03-21(4)

The Court concludes, even assuming that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that he participated in oppositional conduct—which is questionable—and was subject to an adverse employment action, the claim nonetheless fails because the amended complaint does not plausibly allege a connection between his negative performance review and the race-based concerns he shared with supervisors.

Section 4 retaliation claims require protected conduct, an adverse action, and a causal connection between them.

Boykin v. Genzyme Therapeutic Products · filed 2023-07-12(4)

To show a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must “show that he engaged in protected conduct, that he suffered some adverse action, and that ‘a causal connection existed between the protected conduct and the adverse action.’” ... Boykin’s claims falter on the third element.

Section 4 requires a retaliation plaintiff to show protected conduct, an adverse employment action, and a causal link between them.

Ing v. Tufts University · filed 2023-08-29

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, Title IX, or Massachusetts state law, Ing must prove: "(1) she engaged in protected conduct; (2) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) the adverse employment action is causally linked to the protected conduct." Theidon, 948 F.3d at 505 (quoting Rivera-Rivera v. Medina & Medina, Inc., 898 F.3d 77, 94 (1st Cir. 2018)); see id. at 508 (evaluating a prima facie case of retaliation under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4 under the ... same test).

A § 4(4) retaliation claim fails when the complaint alleges no protected conduct or opposition to unlawful practices.

McIntosh v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority · filed 2024-05-27(4)

There are no allegations of protected conduct or opposition to unlawful practices. ... His claim of retaliation necessarily fails.

Section 4(4) prohibits retaliation for filing an MCAD charge, but a denied promotion fourteen months later, without other evidence of discriminatory treatment, does not establish causation.

Knightly v. Town of Amherst. · filed 2023-04-21(4)

The judge concluded that the fourteen months that elapsed between those two events was too long a period to give rise to an inference of causation, particularly because the plaintiff pointed to no other evidence of any discriminatory or disparate treatment during that time. We agree.

Section 4(4) allows a supervisor's knowledge of alleged retaliation to be imputed to the employer.

Ferrie v. Department of Correction. · filed 2023-10-19(4)

As detailed supra, and taken in the light most favorable to Ferrie, the record supports an inference that, at a minimum, Ferrie complained about a sergeant's allegedly-retaliatory behavior to a captain, and was promised that it would be dealt with. Under agency principles, this knowledge is imputed to the DOC.

Section 4's retaliation provisions can cover a failure to hire even when the employer did not post the position and the applicant did not formally apply.

Cafarella v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology · filed 2023-11-02(4), (4A)

Unlike the federal courts, state courts have not articulated hard-and-fast requirements that the job position be posted, and that the plaintiff apply for it, in order for the failure to hire to qualify as an adverse employment action.

Section 4(4) requires a retaliation plaintiff to plausibly link protected conduct to an adverse employment action.

Robert v. Raytheon Technologies Corporation · filed 2024-04-25(4)

Title VII and Chapter 151B generally make it unlawful for employers to retaliate against employees who complain about discriminatory employment practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(4). ... Robert fails plausibly to allege, however, that his vaccination exemption and subsequent termination were causally linked.

Section 4(4) protects an employee who complains about retaliation.

Rae v. Woburn Public Schools · filed 2024-08-22(4)

But this argument ignores the obvious fact that retaliation is a forbidden practice under all three statutes, and thus, complaining about retaliation is itself protected conduct.

Section 4(4) permits a retaliation claim without proof that the employee has a handicap.

Moore v. Industrial Demolition LLC · filed 2025-05-13(4)

First, we pause to emphasize that Massachusetts antidiscrimination law treats retaliation as a "separate and independent cause of action" that does not require proof of a handicap.

Section 4(4) requires a retaliation plaintiff to show protected conduct, an adverse action, and a causal connection between them.

OLIVEIRA v. CITY OF NEW BEDFORD & Others. · filed 2026-05-07(4)

To make out a prima facie case of retaliation under G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (4), the plaintiff was required to show (1) his engagement in protected conduct, (2) the infliction of some adverse action by the defendants, and (3) a causal connection between the two.

Section 4(4) protects employees from workplace retaliation for advocating for the rights of students of color.

Scalone-Finton v. Falmouth Public Schools · filed 2024-09-27(4)

The same logic leads to the conclusion that advocating on behalf of the rights of students of color likewise constitutes protected conduct under chapter 151B’s bar against workplace retaliation.

Section 4(4) protects employees who file discrimination complaints with MCAD, report sexual assault to police, or complain to management about harassment.

Tardiff v. Laborers International Union of North America, Local 609 · filed 2025-08-15(4)

Ms. Tardiff engaged in conduct protected by Chapter 151B, §4 when she filed the complaint of gender discrimination with MCAD and filed her criminal complaint against Mr. Gardner. She also engaged in protected conduct when she made her complaints about Mr. Gardner to Mr. Murphy.

Section 4 makes Chapter 151B the exclusive remedy for workplace retaliation based on complaints of gender discrimination.

Leon-McCormick v. City of Revere · filed 2025-02-12(4), (4A)

Thus, Chapter 151B is the exclusive remedy for the gender-based retaliation claim raised by McCormick in the Whistleblower Statute Count. See M.G.L. c. 151B, § 4(4) (unlawful for any person or employer to “discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any person because he has opposed any practices forbidden under this chapter”); id. § 4(4A) (unlawful for “any person to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with another person in the exercise or enjoyment of any right granted or protected by this chapter”).

Section 4(4) allows a constructive discharge to count as an adverse employment action in a retaliation claim when the alleged conditions could compel a reasonable employee to resign.

JOSEPH T. BAKER v. MASSACHUSETTS STATE POLICE DEPARTMENT & Others. · filed 2025-05-02(4)

Where Baker plausibly alleges that the choices he faced upon Majenski's return to Troop D headquarters were all "totally unacceptable" and, as a result, "a reasonable person in [Baker's] shoes would have felt compelled to resign," it was improper to dismiss his retaliation claim on the ground that he failed to plead an adverse employment action.

Section 4(4) protects an employee who makes an internal complaint to their employer about allegedly unlawful discrimination because the complaint opposes a forbidden practice.

Michael F. Holick, ph.D., M.D. v. Boston Medical Center and Evans Medical Foundation, Inc. · filed 2025-05-12(4)

An employee who lodges an internal complaint with their employer about allegedly unlawful discrimination has “opposed” forbidden practices and therefore is protected by this antiretaliation provision.

Section 4(4) requires a retaliation plaintiff to show that an adverse action was causally connected to protected conduct.

Frenette · filed 2026-03-20(4)

Therefore, assuming arguendo that all Plaintiffs had engaged in protected conduct, they have failed to show that they suffered an adverse action causally connected to complaints of age ... discrimination.

Retaliation under § 4(4)–(4A) requires a causal connection between protected conduct and termination.

Harris v. National Grid USA Service Company, Inc. · filed 2026-03-24(4)–(4A)

Harris's retaliation claims require him to prove a causal connection between conduct protected by those laws and his termination.

In a § 4(4) retaliation case, the judge must choose the pretext or mixed-motive framework based on the strength of the evidence and instruct the jury under that framework alone.

Robinson v. Marshfield · filed 2026-05-15(4)

Therefore, a jury can only be instructed according to one framework, and it is for the judge to evaluate the strength of the evidence and ultimately decide which framework governs.

Under § 4 (4) and (4A), depriving an employee of core supervisory duties can be an adverse employment action when the disadvantage would be objectively apparent to a reasonable person in the employee’s position.

ROMANO v. CITY OF LAWRENCE & Another. · filed 2025-07-31(4), (4A)

"[T]o make out a prima facie case of retaliation" under G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (4), (4A), Romano was required to show "that [s]he engaged in protected conduct, that [s]he suffered some adverse action, and that a causal connection existed between the protected conduct and the adverse action" (quotations and citations omitted). ... Given that Lawrence public schools deprived her of core functions the Army regulations assign to those in her role, the disadvantage inflicted on Romano would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable person in her shoes and, as the judge concluded, the jury could have found that the restriction of Romano's authority was an adverse employment action.

Section 4(4A) prohibits retaliation, and the state-law claim follows the Title VII claim for purposes of this appeal.

Billings v. Town of Grafton · filed 2008-02-07(4A)

Massachusetts law contains a similar prohibition, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(4A), and, as with the hostile environment claim, neither side argues that the standards of liability for a retaliation claim under federal and state law differ in any respect material to the outcome here. Accordingly, we do not separately consider the state-law retaliation claim which, like the state-law hostile environment claim, rises or falls on the federal claim for purposes of this appeal.

Section 4(4) prohibits retaliation for discrimination complaints; obligatory counseling can qualify as an adverse action when its consequences could dissuade a reasonable worker from complaining and it was prompted by a retaliatory motive.

Tuli v. Brigham & Women's Hospital · filed 2011-08-29(4)

Massachusetts has a counterpart provision. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(4) (2011). ... Obligatory counseling is not a typical adverse action but the impact here could be deemed sufficient by the jury if the action was prompted by a retaliatory motive.

Section 4 prohibits retaliation and coercion against a person for filing a discrimination complaint; using a judgment levy to pressure that person to drop the complaint is unlawful when the levy is not a bona fide collection attempt.

SLIVE & HANNA, INC. v. MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION & another. · filed 2021-10-19(4), (4A)

We conclude that, even if there is a constitutional right to levy on a writ of execution -- a question we do not decide -- it does not extend to abuse of the levying process to extort a person to drop a discrimination claim. ... Based on the hearing officer's findings, the employer's actions in using the seizure of the minivan to pressure Shanahan to drop his discrimination claim were not a bona fide attempt to collect on the judgment and thus were constitutionally unprotected. Extortion is not protected petitioning activity.

Section 4(1B) does not permit an age discrimination claim based solely on disparate impact.

William MULLIN, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. RAYTHEON COMPANY, Defendant, Appellee · filed 1999-01-13(1B)

Under these circumstances, we conclude that, when faced with the question, the SJC likely will look to the federal courts’ interpretation of the ÁDEA and hold that an age discrimination claim cannot be grounded solely on a theory of disparate impact. Accordingly, we sustain the district court’s rejection of the appellant’s remaining claim.

Section 4(1B) does not permit an age discrimination claim based solely on disparate impact.

Flebotte v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc. · filed 1999-06-10(1B)

Bound by the First Circuit’s precedent, this Court holds that the plaintiffs may not pursue their claims of age discrimination on a disparate impact theory.

Section 4(1B) prohibits an employer from firing an employee because of age; liability requires that age actually motivate the decision.

Bloomfield v. Bernardi Automall Trust · filed 2001-08-21(1B)

Both the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), and the Massachusetts Fair Employment Practices Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B § 4(1B), prohibit employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of their age. Under both the federal and the state regime no liability attaches unless age actually motivated the employer’s decision.

Age-discrimination claims under § 4 generally follow the same standards of liability and proof as federal ADEA claims.

Vesprini v. Shaw Industries, Inc. · filed 2002-05-03

As this Court and the First Circuit have observed, the standards of liability and proof for age-discrimination claims arising under the federal ADEA and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4 have generally been held to be the same.

Section 4(1B) prohibits terminating an employee because of age; a jury may find age discrimination when the evidence supports finding the employer’s stated reasons false and age was the reason for termination.

Cormier v. Pezrow New England, Inc. · filed 2002-07-15(1B)

In sum, the jury’s answer of “yes” to the question whether they found Cormier was terminated due to his age, reflected a conclusion that the proffered reasons for termination were false and that the termination was due to age discrimination. There was ample, albeit contested, evidence at trial on which such a conclusion could be based.

In a workforce reduction, an eleven-year age gap between the plaintiff and one of four employees who assumed his duties is insufficient by itself to establish a prima facie age discrimination claim.

Shukhman v. Northeast Lens Corp. · filed 2005-02-04(1B)

This age difference between Shukhman and one of the four employees who assumed his duties is, by itself, not enough to establish a logical basis for a jury to find that Northeast would not have taken the same action had the Shukhman been of ayounger age.

An age discrimination claim may proceed to trial when evidence permits a jury to find that the employer’s stated performance assessment was not made in good faith.

Dragonas v. School Committee · filed 2005-09-06(1C)

In addition to putting almost all the facts underlying the performance evaluation in dispute, Dragonas has also raised triable issues regarding whether the evaluation did not reflect “good faith” judgment on the part of Burke.

Section 4 permits an age discrimination claim to proceed when evidence suggests biased managers influenced a termination and the final decisionmakers did not independently investigate.

Zades v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc. · filed 2006-09-06

Both the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34, and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B prohibit an employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating against an employee because of that employee’s age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4. ... A reasonable fact-finder could also conclude that Canub did not engage in an independent investigation of the allegations against Plaintiff and thereby break the causal connection between Derrico and Gestwicki’s animus and Plaintiffs termination.

Section 4 requires a failure-to-hire age discrimination plaintiff to show that the person hired had similar or lesser qualifications and was substantially younger.

Somers v. Converged Access, Inc. · filed 2008-01-23

The fifth prong requires that Somers show that the individual hired had similar or lesser qualifications, and in the context of age discrimination, that he was substantially younger than the plaintiff.

Section 4(1B) permits an age discrimination claim to proceed to trial when evidence that the employer’s stated reasons were a pretext creates a jury issue.

Fischer v. President & Fellows of Harvard College · filed 2008-06-18(1B)

Although, as in Dragoras, supra, this is a “close case,” the Court concludes that plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to create a jury issue as to whether Harvard’s asserted reasons were a pretext for discrimination.

Section 4(1C) permits an age discrimination claim when an employer’s refusal to approve reinstatement stops the required medical examination from taking place and the evidence shows the worker would have been cleared.

Town of Hull v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 2008-09-03(1C)

The fire chief’s refusal to approve Gillis’s reinstatement, in other words, caused the reinstatement to grind to a halt, simply because there was no point in conducting the examination if the chief would not accept Gillis back in any event. See G. L. c. 151B, § 4(1C), (16).

Section 4 permits an inference of age discrimination in hiring even when the person hired is less than five years younger, if the circumstances support that inference.

Somers v. Converged Access, Inc. · filed 2009-08-21(1B)

We agree with the plaintiff that, in some circumstances, an inference of age discrimination may be established despite the fact that the individual hired in the plaintiff’s place was less than five years younger than the plaintiff.

Section 4(1C) permits age discrimination claims against the Commonwealth based on disparate impact.

Porio v. Department of Revenue · filed 2011-08-09(1C)

We disagree, and we additionally reject DOR’s argument that it is immune from age-based discrimination claims that are based on disparate impact.

Section 4(1B) prohibits age discrimination in employment, and claims without direct evidence follow the three-stage McDonnell Douglas burden framework.

Lewis v. Whitman-Hanson Regional School District · filed 2012-02-13(1B)

Both the ADEA and the Massachusetts Fair Employment Practices Act prohibit employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of their age. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(1B). When there is no direct evidence of discrimination, as is the case here, the burden of proof for cases brought pursuant to both statutes is determined according to the three-stage framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

A mixed-motive analysis may apply to Section 4 age discrimination claims when strong evidence of animus shifts the burden to the employer to show it would have taken the same action.

Diaz v. JITEN HOTEL MANAGEMENT, INC. · filed 2011-01-20

Under Massachusetts law, by contrast, a mixed-motive analysis may still be appropriate. Under that test, the plaintiff would bring "strong” evidence of animus so as to shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant to prove that it would have "taken the same action absent the unlawful motive.” ... Under either test — federal or state — summary judgment is inappropriate.

Section 4 permits a mixed-motive instruction in an age discrimination case when the employee presents strong direct evidence that age was a factor in the employer’s decision.

Diaz v. Jiten Hotel Management, Inc. · filed 2012-02-07

Under Massachusetts law, however, the mixed-motive analysis survives in age discrimination cases, at least for the time being. ... Thus, for purposes of Diaz's state law age discrimination claim, Wynn & Wynn controlled at the time the district court instructed the jury, and we find no error in the court's decision to issue the mixed-motive instruction.

Section 4(4A) permits an interference claim based on disparate impact when a defendant knowingly uses a practice unrelated to job performance and knows it significantly disadvantages a protected group.

Lopez v. Commonwealth · filed 2012-11-09(4A)

Thus, to make out a prima facie claim under § 4 (4A) based on a disparate impact theory of liability, a plaintiff must allege facts that, if proved, would establish that (1) a defendant utilized specific employment practices or selection criteria knowing that the practices or criteria were not reasonably related to job performance; and (2) a defendant knew that the practices or criteria had a significant disparate impact on a protected class or group.

Section 4(6), (7), and (11) allow housing discrimination claims based on disparate impact.

Burbank Apartments Tenant Association v. Kargman · filed 2016-04-13

Therefore, just as the Supreme Court deduced, based on precedent from Title VII, that a disparate impact theory of liability could appropriately be brought under Title VIII in the housing context, we too conclude from our employment discrimination precedent that such a theory of liability is cognizable under G. L. c. 151B, §§ 4 (6), (7), and (11).

An age-discrimination claim under §4(1B) must allege facts plausibly suggesting that age was a factor in the termination.

Sassine v. Fidelity Management & Research Co. · filed 2013-10-22(1B)

Accordingly, the complaint does not plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief for age discrimination under G.L.c. 151B, §4(1B) and must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Section 4(1B) prohibits a private employer from refusing to hire someone because of age; a complaint must allege facts supporting a plausible inference that age caused the refusal.

Wang v. Palmisano · filed 2014-09-30(1B)

But the Complaint does not allege that Defendants told Plaintiff they were rejecting him because of his age, or that they hired a younger individual, or even that Plaintiff applied for an open position. Plaintiff has therefore not stated a plausible claim that Defendants refused to hire him because of his age, and the Court accordingly dismisses his state-law age-discrimination claim.

Section 4(1B) prohibits a private-sector employer from refusing to hire someone because of age, and a claim must plausibly allege facts supporting an inference of age discrimination.

Wang v. Palmisano · filed 2016-01-26(1B)

With respect to Plaintiffs state age-discrimination claims, the Massachusetts statute Plaintiff invokes imposes civil liability on a private-sector employer who “refuse[s] to hire or employ ... [an] individual” “because of the age of [that] individual.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(1B).

Section 4(1B) permits an age discrimination claim to proceed when a reasonable factfinder could find that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for age discrimination.

Grol v. Safelite Grp., Inc. · filed 2018-03-14(1B)

Because a reasonable factfinder could find that Safelite's stated reasons of inappropriate behavior and unprofessionalism were pretextual and motivated by age-based discrimination, defendant's motion for summary judgment will, with respect to Count I, be denied.

Section 4(1C) allows an age discrimination claim to go to a jury when the evidence creates a genuine dispute over whether the employer’s stated reason for a demotion was pretextual.

Younker v. Department of Transitional Assistance · filed 2014-06-16(1C)

This is not to say that the plaintiff has proven discriminatory animus. We hold only that there is sufficient evidence of pretext to send the issue to a jury.

Section 4(1B) permits an age-discrimination claim to proceed when a reasonable factfinder could find that the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual and motivated by age discrimination.

Grol v. Safelite Group, Inc. · filed 2018-03-14(1B)

Because a reasonable factfinder could find that Safelite’s stated reasons of inappropriate behavior and unprofessionalism were pretextual and motivated by age-based discrimination, defendant’s motion for summary judgment will, with respect to Count I, be denied.

In a reduction in force, Section 4(1B) requires evidence beyond a layoff and the transfer of duties to an employee younger than 40 to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.

Dunn v. Trustees of Boston University · filed 2014-07-30(1B)

The district court was correct that, for Dunn to make out such a case, he had to come forward with evidence beyond the mere fact that BU laid him off and reassigned his responsibilities to an employee younger than 40.

Section 4 prohibits age discrimination in employment, but a plaintiff must show a causal connection between age and termination to establish a prima facie claim.

Kuznarowis v. Tobey Hosp. · filed 2018-06-28

Under both state and federal law, it is unlawful for a private sector employer to discharge an employee because of his age or gender. ... Because plaintiff has not shown a "causal connection" between his termination and his age, he has failed to make a prima facie case of age discrimination under federal and state law.

Section 4 requires an age-discrimination plaintiff to plead facts supporting a causal connection between age and an adverse hiring decision.

Higgins v. State St. Corp. · filed 2018-08-17

Accepting the plaintiff's allegations as true, he has asserted that he was a member of a protected class (because he is over the age of 40), was qualified for the job (by virtue of his credentials and experience) and suffered an adverse employment action (because he was not hired). He alleges no facts, however, demonstrating a causal connection between his age and State Street's decision not to interview him. Accordingly, he fails to allege a plausible claim for relief.

Section 4 requires an age discrimination complaint to allege facts plausibly connecting the applicant’s age to the employer’s decision not to interview him.

Higgins v. State Street Corporation · filed 2018-08-17

Because plaintiff has not alleged a “causal connection” between his failure to obtain an interview and his age, he has failed to state a plausible claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 4(1) permits a disparate impact claim to proceed when the complaint plausibly alleges a facially neutral hiring policy with a disproportionate racial effect.

Smith v. Home Health Solutions, Inc. · filed 2018-10-24(1)

Now there are two pending claims against Defendant for race-based discrimination in violation of both 41 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (Count I) and G.L. c. 151B, § 4(1) (Count II). Plaintiff has sufficiently—but barely—alleged a plausible disparate impact claim. ... Plaintiff met her burden of alleging a facially-neutral employment policy that has a disparate impact. She is now entitled to discovery.

Section 4 (1B) requires an employee alleging age discrimination in a reduction in force to show that the layoff occurred in circumstances raising a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination.

Kruczynski v. Cont'l Cas. Co. · filed 2019-02-15(1B)

To establish a prima facie case in a reduction in force case, the employee must prove that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he performed his job at an acceptable level; (3) he was terminated; and (4) his layoff occurred in circumstances that raise a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination.

A Section 4 age discrimination claim against an individual requires facts supporting the allegation that the individual engaged in discriminatory conduct.

Dick v. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution · filed 2021-07-26

Although Dick asserts his age discrimination claim pursuant to Mass. Gen. L. c. 151B, § 4 against Benjamin as well, D. 1 ¶¶ 162-65, he fails to allege any facts supporting the assertion that Benjamin engaged in discriminatory action against Dick.

Section 4(1B) permits employer liability when executives target older workers for layoffs, even if the manager selecting employees does not know their discriminatory purpose.

Adams v. Schneider Electric USA · filed 2023-06-21(1B)

It would constitute unlawful discrimination if executives at the company targeted the HBN R&D group for layoffs in the first place because of the age of the employees in that group, even if Colby himself was ignorant of the larger scheme when he selected individual employees for termination.

An age discrimination claim under § 4(18) requires evidence of an adverse employment action and treatment that was not age-neutral to establish a prima facie case.

Walsh v. HNTB Corporation · filed 2026-03-13(18)

In these circumstances, that framework requires, inter alia, the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination by adducing some evidence that (1) she was at least forty years of age; (2) her job performance met the employer's legitimate expectations; (3) the employer subjected her to an adverse employment action; and (4) the employer did not treat her in an age-neutral manner when taking the adverse action.