Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4

Section 4(16) disability claims follow ADA standards; a flexible schedule may be a reasonable accommodation when the employer has not shown it would cause undue hardship.

Ward v. Massachusetts Health Research Institute, Inc. · filed 2000-04-12(16)

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has indicated that federal case law construing the ADA should be followed in interpreting the Massachusetts disability law. ... We decline to hold that the flexible schedule Ward proposes is per se unreasonable. ... Because there exist genuine disputes of material facts as to the appellant's performance and whether he was discharged because of his disability, and because MHRI has not established that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Section 4(16) requires a handicap discrimination plaintiff to show a qualifying handicap, ability to perform the job, an adverse employment action, and that the position remained open while the employer sought to fill it.

Dartt v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. · filed 1998-02-26(16)

We rule that to establish a prima facie case of unlawful employment discrimination on the basis of handicap under G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (16), a plaintiff must present credible evidence that (1) he is handicapped within the meaning of the statute; (2) he is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation; (3) he was terminated or otherwise subject to an adverse action by his employer; and (4) the position he had occupied remained open and the employer sought to fill it.

Section 4(16) prohibits terminating a qualified handicapped person because of the person's handicap.

Piderit v. Siegal & Sons Investments, Ltd. · filed 1998-08-19(16)

Termination of a qualified handicapped person because of his handicap is unlawful employment discrimination, G.L.c. 151B, §4(16), and plaintiff thus had available to him the remedies provided by G.L.c. 151B.

Section 4(16) prohibits dismissing an otherwise qualified employee because of a handicap, even if the employer is also motivated by a desire to avoid insurance costs.

Westinghouse Electric Supply Corp. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1999-03-05(16)

Even if Westinghouse’s termination of Chanson was partially motivated by a desire to avoid paying insurance benefits, Chanson still has a claim under Chapter 151B. Chapter 151B prohibits an employer from dismissing a disabled, yet otherwise qualified and capable employee, because of his or her handicap.

Section 4(16) protects a qualified person from employment discrimination when the employer regards a physical impairment as substantially limiting the person’s ability to work.

Plante v. Shawmut Bank, N.A. · filed 1999-04-12(16)

Since “working” is defined as a “major life activity,” G.L.c. 15IB, §1(20), and since there is evidence that the defendant regarded Plante’s lymphoma as a physical impairment that substantially limited his ability to work, Plante is a “qualified handicapped person” under c. 15IB, §4(16) who may not be discriminated against in employment because of his handicap.

A prior claim for disability benefits does not bar a § 4(16) claim when a jury could find that the employee could perform essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation.

Griggs v. Hardwick Knitted Fabrics, Inc. · filed 2000-04-25(16)

Nonetheless, given the totality of the evidence before the court, and the seemingly low hurdle enunciated by Cleveland, this court finds that it is entirely possible that a reasonable juror could, assuming the truth of, or Griggs’ good faith belief in, her statements to the DET and DIA, conclude that she could perform the essential functions of her job, with or without reasonable accommodation."

Material factual disputes about a claim that an employer fired an employee because of a handicap preclude summary judgment under § 4(16).

Femino v. Data Technology, Inc. · filed 2001-12-11(16)

This court concludes that none of the issues raised by defendants are capable of resolution by summary judgment as there are numerous material factual disputes relative to certain elements of plaintiff s claim based upon defendants’ alleged unlawful termination due to disability or handicap in violation of G.L.c. 151B, §4(16) (1990).

An employer’s violation of workers’ compensation law does not, by itself, establish handicap discrimination.

Brienzo v. Town of Acushnet · filed 2002-08-27(16)

The mere fact that particular employment action may violate the provisions of Chapter 152 does not mean that it is discriminatory.

Section 4(16) applies essentially the same prima facie standard for disability discrimination as the ADA.

Rennie v. United Parcel Service · filed 2001-05-10(16)

The prima facie case for a claim under the ADA and a claim brought pursuant to Mass.Gen.L. c. 151B, § 4(16) are essentially identical.

Section 4(16) protects a handicapped employee from discrimination only if the employee can perform the job’s essential functions, with or without reasonable accommodation.

Barry v. Wing Memorial Hospital · filed 2001-05-14(16)

Barry’s chapter 151B claim fails for the same reason as her FMLA claim; she has not met the statute’s necessary requirements. Barry has never sought a reasonable accommodation and has effectually conceded that there is no accommodation that would allow her to return to work. As a result, she does not fit the criteria of a qualified handicapped person protected under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B.

For a § 4(16) employment discrimination claim, a person’s handicap is determined without considering corrective devices or other mitigating measures.

Dahill v. Police Department · filed 2001-05-25(16)

We construe G. L. c. 151B, § 4, to give the fullest effect to that recognition. ... The question we are asked to answer is whether our antidiscrimination statute requires “consideration of mitigating or corrective devices in determining whether a person has a handicap.” It does not, regardless of whether a plaintiff can prevail under the first prong of the definition, as well as under the third.

Section 4(16) does not require an employer to reassign a handicapped employee to a vacant position when the employee cannot perform the current job even with reasonable accommodation.

Hayward v. Massachusetts Water Resources Authority · filed 2001-05-25(16)

Nor will this Court, in the absence of such statutory language, interpret “reasonable accommodation” as that term is used in G.L.c. 15 IB to impose an obligation upon an employer to reassign a handicapped employee to a vacant position when the employee, even with reasonable accommodation, cannot perform his present job.

Section 4(16) requires reasonable accommodation to help a qualified handicapped employee perform the essential functions of a particular job.

Sattler v. Natick Animal Clinic, Inc. · filed 2001-09-20(16)

The employer’s duty of reasonable accommodation exists only with respect to a particular job — this duty obligates the employer to make reasonable adjustments or adaptations to permit a handicapped person to perform the essential functions of a particular job.

Section 4(16) does not automatically bar a disability discrimination claim because the employee previously sought and received total disability benefits, if a factual dispute remains about her ability to perform the job’s essential functions.

Russell v. Cooley Dickinson Hospital, Inc. · filed 2002-08-08(16)

We similarly conclude that a plaintiff’s prior pursuit, and receipt, of benefits based on an assertion of “total disability” does not automatically estop her from pursuing a claim of employment discrimination on the basis of disability under G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (16), so long as a disputed issue of fact remains whether the plaintiff is able to perform the “essential functions of the position involved.”

Section 4 provides an exclusive remedy for handicap discrimination that is not displaced by chapter 152, § 75B(1).

Azzolino v. Woodlawn Cemetery · filed 2003-02-14

That Section 75B(1) entities an employee protected by G.L.c. 152 to the benefits of G.L.c. 15IB does not alter the exclusivity provision of G.L.c. 151B, §4.

A handicap discrimination claim under § 4(16) fails when the employee produces no evidence that the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretextual or that handicap discrimination was the real reason.

Birnbrich v. New England Business Service, Inc. · filed 2003-07-21(16)

She has not, however, produced competent evidence that the asserted reason for her termination was pretextual, or that the real reason was discrimination based on handicap. Summary judgment will therefore enter, dismissing Count I.

Section 4(16) permits a handicap discrimination claim based on removal of some job responsibilities even when the employee’s overall employment status remains unchanged.

City of New Bedford v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 2003-12-02(16)

Because Turgeon was relieved only of some job responsibilities, and his employment status as a police officer remained otherwise unchanged, his claim under G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (16), is that he was “otherwise discriminate[d] against.”

Section 4(16) does not require employers to substantially change job standards to accommodate an employee’s handicap.

Dziamba v. Warner & Stackpole LLP · filed 2002-11-08(16)

To fulfill their obligation of a reasonable accommodation to a handicap, employers need not make substantial changes in the standards of a job.

Section 4(16) requires reasonable accommodation when a qualified handicapped employee can perform essential job functions but cannot enjoy equal terms, conditions, and benefits of employment without it.

Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 2004-05-12(16)

When a qualified handicapped individual’s disability permits him to perform the essential functions of a job without accommodation but prevents him from doing enjoying equal terms, conditions, and benefits of employment, the failure to provide a reasonable accommodation constitutes discrimination under § 4 (16).

Section 4(16) requires a failure-to-accommodate claimant to show that the employee was qualified, requested a reasonable accommodation that the employer refused, and suffered harm as a result.

Alba v. Raytheon Co. · filed 2004-06-01(16)

To prove her case, the plaintiff must show that Alba was a “qualified handicapped person” capable of performing the essential functions of his job with reasonable accommodation; Alba requested such accommodation, and Raytheon refused to provide it; and, as a result of this refusal, he suffered some harm.

Section 4(16) does not require an employer to modify an attendance policy when the modification would impose an undue hardship on its business.

Beane v. Massachusetts Container Corp. · filed 2004-09-08(16)

Such a modification would therefore result in an undue hardship for MCC. Accordingly, MCC was not required to modify its absenteeism policy to accommodate Beane.

Section 4(7) does not require a housing authority to delay eviction as a disability accommodation when tenants fail to show that the delay is reasonable.

Andover Housing Authority v. Shkolnik · filed 2005-01-14(7)

In conclusion, the tenants have failed to establish that the authority discriminated against them in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (f)(3)(B), and G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (7), by failing reasonably to accommodate Barskaya’s medical conditions.

Section 4(16) requires a disability discrimination plaintiff to show that he has a disability; a plaintiff found to have recovered from his disability cannot establish that element.

Curtis v. City of Fitchburg · filed 2003-04-04(16)

Under G.L.c. 151B, §4(16) the plaintiff must show that 1) he suffers from a disability, 2) he is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation, 3) he suffered an adverse employment decision because of the handicap, and 4) the position remained open and the employer sought to fill the position. ... The medical panel’s review of Curtis’ condition in May of 1997 specifically found that Curtis did not suffer from a disability. ... Therefore, Curtis’ claim of disability discrimination under both state and federal law must fail.

Section 4(16) requires a person claiming employment discrimination because of a handicap to show a qualifying handicap.

Dube v. Middlesex Corp. · filed 2003-10-24(16)

He claims that he suffered employment discrimination in violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4(16), when he was not rehired in the spring of 1996 after what he claims was a seasonal layoff. ... We affirm the judgment, but on the ground that plaintiff was not, on the summary judgment record, a “handicapped person” as that term is used in G. L. c. 151B, § 1(17).

Section 4(16) requires a fact-specific determination of whether a job duty is essential; conflicting evidence about the duty's necessity can preclude summary judgment.

Cargill v. Harvard University · filed 2004-03-08(16)

Based on our independent review, we determine that the record reveals sharply conflicting evidence on the essential function issue, thereby presenting genuine issues of disputed material fact for trial, in which a fair-minded jury could reasonably find that paging/retrieval or shelving were not necessary to accomplish the principal objectives of the job of reference librarian.

Section 4(16) allows a claim based on a request for indefinite part-time work to proceed when facts remain disputed about reasonable accommodation, essential job functions, and undue hardship.

Cedrone v. American Express One Travel Services, Inc. · filed 2004-09-10(16)

Summary judgment is not appropriate on this claim because material issues of fact exist as to the reasonableness of Cedrone’s request for indefinite part-time work, whether Cedrone could perform the essential function of her job while working a reduced schedule and whether Cedrone’s reduced schedule constituted an undue hardship on American Express.

Section 4’s disability discrimination provisions track the ADA in the respects relevant to determining whether an employee is disabled.

Cornwell v. Dairy Farmers of America, Inc. · filed 2005-03-30

In all aspects relevant to the instant case, the Massachusetts counterpart to the ADA, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 15IB, § 4, tracks the ADA, so no separate analysis is necessary.

Section 4 permits a disability discrimination hiring claim to proceed when conflicting medical evidence creates a genuine dispute about the applicant’s handicap status.

Madden v. Town of Framingham Fire Department · filed 2006-09-26

On November 7, 2003, the plaintiff filed in this court a complaint, which provides the following claims against the defendant; 1) disability discrimination in violation of G.L.c. 151B, §4 (Count One); and, 2) violation of G.L.c. 93, §103 (Count Two). ... These contrary positions present a genuine issue of material fact regarding the issue of the plaintiffs handicapped status at the time of the defendant’s conditional offer of employment. Therefore, the defendant is not entitled to summary judgment as to Count One.

Section 4(16) requires proof of a handicap, ability to perform essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation, and an adverse action based on the handicap.

Clancy v. Town of Mashpee · filed 2006-12-20(16)

To establish a prima facie case of unlawful employment discrimination on the basis of handicap under G.L.c. 151B, §4(16), Clancy must present credible evidence that (1) she is handicapped within the meaning of the statute; (2) she is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) the adverse action was the cause of a handicap. ... However, Clancy fails to prove that a discrimination against her disability was the basis of any adverse action.

Section 4(16) generally requires an employee to bring the need for accommodation to the employer’s attention before the employer’s duty to accommodate arises.

Leach v. Commissioner of the Massachusetts Rehabilitation Commission · filed 2005-05-19(16)

Ordinarily, an employer’s obligation to attempt to accommodate a handicapped employee comes into being when the employee brings his or her need for accommodation to the employer’s attention.

Section 4(16) requires an employer to participate in a dialogue about reasonable accommodation after an employee requests one.

School Committee v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 2005-07-12(16)

The school committee incorrectly asserts that it was not obligated to engage Woodason in dialogue regarding accommodations: “[I]t is the employee’s initial request for an accommodation which triggers the employer’s obligation to participate in the interactive process of determining one.”

Section 4(16) requires reasonable accommodation for a qualified handicapped employee who can perform essential job functions with that accommodation.

Gargano & Associates v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 2005-10-28(16)

The record, therefore, reflects that there was substantial evidence to support the hearing officer’s conclusion that Nicklas was capable of performing the essential functions of her job with the reasonable accommodation of a part-time schedule.

Section 4(16) does not define reasonable accommodation to include reassignment to a vacant position or require an employer to create a new position.

St. Laurent v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2006-01-04(16)

Moreover, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(16), unlike' its federal counterpart, does not define reasonable accommodation to include reassignment to vacant positions, and under neither federal nor state law is an employer obligated to create a new position for the plaintiff.

Section 4(16) allows a public safety employer to reject an accommodation as unreasonable when expert-supported safety risks would impose an undue hardship.

Carleton v. Commonwealth · filed 2006-12-07(16)

In an area where public safety is paramount, we do not read § 4 (16) to preclude a determination by the division (rather than by a judge or a jury) that an accommodation is not reasonable because it would impose an undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s (in this case the public’s) business due to the dangerous type of work involved and the nature of the risk to public safety that would arise if the accommodation failed (leaving the fire fighter without adequate hearing function) at a critical moment in the work.

Section 4(10) requires an employer to engage in an interactive process to identify a reasonable accommodation only for an employee who is actually a qualified handicapped person.

Moreau v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance · filed 2007-05-07(10)

The jury finding that the plaintiff had not proven she was a qualified handicapped individual is fatal to her claim that MassMutual failed to engage in the interactive process. The law only requires employers engage in the interactive process with qualified handicapped employees.

Section 4(16) may require an employer to allow work from home as a reasonable accommodation when the employee can perform essential job functions remotely.

Smith v. Bell Atlantic · filed 2005-06-10(16)

We therefore look to the specific facts of this case to determine whether a jury question was presented. We conclude that there was ample evidence from which the jury could find that allowing Smith to do substantial amounts of her work at home (she did not request to work exclusively at home) was a reasonable accommodation.

Section 4(16) requires a handicap discrimination claimant to show a qualifying handicap, ability to perform the job with or without reasonable accommodation, termination, and an open position the employer sought to fill.

Wilfert Bros. Realty Co. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 2006-03-21(16)

To establish a prima facie case of handicap discrimination under G.L.c. 151B, §4(16), the claimant must present evidence that: (1) he is handicapped within the meaning of the statute; (2) he is qualified to perform the essential functions of the position with or without reasonable accommodation; (3) he was terminated; and (4) the position he had occupied remained open and the employer sought to fill it.

An eleven-year age difference between a discharged employee and her replacement is sufficient by itself to support a prima facie case of age discrimination.

Flanders v. Levy Home Entertainment, Inc. · filed 2006-05-17(1B)

In the case at bar where Flanders was replaced by a person eleven (11) years younger, such disparity by itself is sufficient to support a prima facie case of discrimination.

Section 4(16) permits an employer to terminate a handicapped employee for egregious workplace misconduct that would result in the termination of a nonhandicapped employee, regardless of the type of handicap underlying the misconduct.

Mammone v. President & Fellows of Harvard College · filed 2006-05-12(16)

Because we conclude that Garrity applies to all employment discrimination cases brought under G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (16), and G. L. c. 93, § 103, regardless of the type of handicap underlying the workplace misconduct, we affirm the grant of summary judgment.

Section 4 requires a disability discrimination plaintiff to be capable of performing the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation, even when the plaintiff invokes the workers’ compensation law for a work-related injury.

Mulloy v. Acushnet Company · filed 2006-08-24

Since Mulloy cannot show that he was capable of performing the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable accommodation, he is not a "qualified handicapped person" under Chapter 151B, § 4.

Section 4(7A)(2) does not require a housing authority to provide a reasonable accommodation to a disabled tenant whose rule-breaking conduct seriously undermines its duty to keep other tenants physically safe.

Boston Housing Authority v. Bridgewaters · filed 2007-08-20(7A)(2)

We therefore conclude that an individual who engages in conduct that violates a housing authority’s rules and that is significantly inimical to an authority’s obligation to provide a physically safe environment for its tenants is not a “qualified handicapped person” entitled to an authority’s general obligation to provide reasonable accommodations for its handicapped tenants.

Section 4(16) requires an employee to request a reasonable accommodation to sustain a claim that the employer failed to provide one.

Woldemariam v. Parking · filed 2008-02-08(16)

Woldemariam’s failure to request reasonable accommodation is fatal to his claim that Pilgrim did not reasonably accommodate his disability.

Section 4(16) requires an employer to provide reasonable accommodation for disability-related limitations unless doing so would impose an undue hardship.

Crevier v. Town of Spencer · filed 2008-09-26(16)

In general, an employer must only accommodate the limitations that flow from the disability that affect the employee in the workplace. ... In short, plaintiff has established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her requested accommodations were facially feasible. Accordingly, the Court will deny defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the claims based on failure to accommodate.

Section 4(16) does not require an employer to accommodate an employee by awarding them a different position.

Fiumara v. PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLL. · filed 2007-11-26(16)

The Van Job was not an accommodation for “the position involved” but instead was a separate position. As a result, Harvard was not obligated under Massachusetts law to accommodate Fiumara by awarding him the Van Job, a different position than the one for which he had been hired.

Section 4(16) permits a disability discrimination claim to proceed when disputed facts could show that an employer applied its return-from-medical-leave policy discriminatorily.

DeCaro v. Hasbro, Inc. · filed 2008-03-31(16)

These disputed facts are sufficient to raise a question as to whether, with respect to Plaintiff, Hasbro applied its policies related to employees returning from medical leave in a discriminatory manner. Plaintiffs claim is not undermined by Hasbro’s assertion that it applied its policies to other employees who have successfully made the transition back to work from medical leave, because it is the specific application of the policy to DeCaro, rather than the substance of the policy, which is allegedly discriminatory.

A plaintiff claiming handicap discrimination under § 4 must present evidence that he can perform the job’s essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation.

Canfield v. CON-WAY FREIGHT, INC. · filed 2008-07-23

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Canfield, there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether he was able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation.

A § 4(16) handicap discrimination claimant must show that they are handicapped and can perform the job’s essential functions with or without accommodation; a work-related injury alone does not establish handicap status.

Hatch v. Townsend Oil Co. · filed 2009-01-23(16)

Therefore, to prevail on his handicap discrimination claim Hatch must demonstrate the traditional statutory criteria of (1) that he is handicapped, and (2) that he can perform the essential functions of the job with or without accommodation. The resolution of these issues involves questions of fact for the jury.

Section 4(16) requires a plaintiff alleging handicap discrimination through termination to show that the position remained open and the employer sought to fill it.

Hooker v. Trusted Care, Inc. · filed 2009-03-11(16)

This fourth prong is an essential element of a handicap discrimination “termination” case, which Hooker has failed to establish, and summary judgment must be allowed.

Section 4(16) requires a disability discrimination plaintiff to show that the employer discharged a qualified employee because of disability; when the employer gives a reason for discharge, the plaintiff must show that reason was pretextual.

Kinch v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc. · filed 2009-09-09(16)

Kinch must prove: 1) he has a disability; 2) with or without reasonable accommodation, he was a qualified individual able to perform the essential functions of the position involved; and 3) Quest discharged him because of his disability. ... Given the three year history of poor performance evaluations, many of which occurred long before Kinch began taking medications to treat Hepatitis C and pertained to deficiencies that were unrelated to Hepatitis C, Kinch has failed to show a pretext.

Section 4(16) does not require an employer to provide an open-ended or indefinite extension of medical leave as a reasonable accommodation.

Singleton v. Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. · filed 2009-10-06(16)

However, providing for an open-ended or indefinite leave extension is not a reasonable accommodation under ch. 151B, § 4(16). ... Therefore, Sinclair did not discriminate against Plaintiff by failing to provide her with a reasonable accommodation as required under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B.

Section 4 (16) prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee because of the handicap of the employee’s spouse.

Flagg v. AliMed, Inc. · filed 2013-07-19(16)

For all these reasons, we hold that associational discrimination based on handicap is prohibited under § 4 (16).

Section 4 permits an employee who can perform the job without accommodation to bring a disability discrimination claim without having requested accommodation.

Gil v. VORTEX, LLC · filed 2010-03-25

Counts I and II of the Complaint allege disability discrimination in violation of the ADA and the virtually identical Massachusetts anti-discrimination in employment statute. ... Whether an employee has requested an accommodation is irrelevant when he makes no allegation that he required an accommodation to perform his job.

Section 4(16) does not require a school to give a teacher flexible arrival and departure times when prompt attendance is essential to the class schedule.

Pierson v. Stembridge · filed 2010-05-24(16)

It would be unreasonable to compel the school to depart from its rigid class schedule in order to accommodate the needs of specific teachers, and the defendants therefore did not run afoul of G.L.c. 15 IB by failing to grant Pierson “flex time” for her arrival and departure from school.

Section 4(16) does not require an employer to transfer an employee to a light-duty position as a reasonable accommodation.

Brelin-Penney v. Encore Images, Inc. · filed 2010-06-01(16)

Under Massachusetts law, an employer is barred from dismissing employees who are “capable of performing the essential functions of the position involved with reasonable accommodation.” G.L.c. 151B, §4(16) (emphasis added). ... Even if Encore had had an alternate light-duty position available for Scott, and Scott offers no evidence that it did, it was under no obligation to transfer Scott to such a position.

Section 4(16) does not require an employer to discuss accommodations when an employee cannot perform an essential job duty with or without a reasonable accommodation.

Godfrey v. Globe Newspaper Co. · filed 2010-06-16(16)

Since at the time his employment was terminated the plaintiff was unable to perform one of the essential duties of an assistant press foreman, with or without a reasonable accommodation, he was not a qualified handicapped person pursuant to G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (16), and the Globe had no obligation to engage in dialogue concerning a nonexistent possibility of accommodation.

Section 4(16) requires reasonable accommodation for the employee’s existing position but does not require an employer to create a new position or reassign the employee to a vacant one.

Andrews v. Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority · filed 2012-05-31(16)

As the statute makes clear, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(16) only applies to the “position involved.” The requirement that an employer make “reasonable accommodation” for an employee alleging to be a qualified handicapped person does not, therefore, include creating a new position for that employee or reassigning that employee to a vacant position.

Section 4(16) requires an employee bringing a handicap discrimination claim to show a qualifying handicap.

Mercado v. Manny's T.V. & Appliance, Inc. · filed 2010-06-28(16)

To prevail on his handicap discrimination claim under G. L. c. 151B, § 4(16), Mercado must demonstrate that he has a qualifying handicap under the statute.

Section 4(16) requires an employee claiming disability discrimination to show that she can perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation.

Jones v. Walgreen Co. · filed 2011-02-24(16)

Because “Chapter 151B is considered the ‘Massachusetts analogue’ to the federal Americans with Disabilities Act,” the court’s analysis under federal and state law is the same. ... In conclusion, because Plaintiff has failed to establish that she was able to perform the essential functions of her job, the court will allow Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Counts III and IV and deny Plaintiffs motion on the same counts.

A required license can be an essential job function when the employee needs it to perform the duties of the position.

Jones v. Nationwide Life Insurance · filed 2012-09-26

We analyze claims under the ADA and under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 151B using the same framework. ... This reinforces that obtaining the license was an essential function.

Section 4(16) does not require an employer to reassign an employee to a different position as a reasonable accommodation.

Johansson v. Massachusetts Department of Correction · filed 2011-03-31(16)

There is no requirement “that an employer provide a ‘reasonable accommodation’ in the form of a reassignment to new or different position.”

Section 4(16) requires a plaintiff claiming disability discrimination or denial of reasonable accommodation to show that he was disabled.

Estock v. City of Westfield · filed 2011-07-26(16)

Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from depression, stress, and anxiety and was both discriminated against because of these disabilities and denied reasonable accommodations in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12111 and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(16). Plaintiffs claims fail for the simple reason that he has presented no evidence that he was disabled.

Section 4(16) does not cover an associational discrimination claim based solely on an employee’s advocacy for disabled students.

Perez v. Greater New Bedford Vocational Technical School District · filed 2013-11-13(16)

Put simply, such advocacy on behalf of disabled students is not enough to sustain a violation of § 4(16).

Section 4(16) requires an employee bringing a reasonable accommodation claim to show a handicap during employment, the ability to perform the job with or without accommodation, and an accommodation request the employer did not meet.

Williams v. Robert F. Kennedy Children's Action Corp. · filed 2014-08-06(16)

To establish discrimination under this latter theory, a plaintiff must show: (1) she suffered from a disability as defined by the ADA and a handicap as defined by ch. 151B; (2) she was a “qualified person” capable of performing the essential elements of her job with or without an accommodation; and (3) the employer knew of the disability but did not accommodate it upon a request. ... Ultimately Plaintiffs claim falters at the first step—she has provided insufficient evidence to allow a jury to conclude that she was disabled at the time of her employment with Defendant.

Section 4(16) prohibits disability discrimination, including failure to reasonably accommodate a qualified employee who can perform the essential duties of the job with an accommodation.

Consedine v. Willimansett East SNF · filed 2016-09-30(16)

The ADA and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B make it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability, ... including by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation. ... Even assuming Plaintiffs PMLA constituted a reasonable accommodation, Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated she could perform the essential functions of her position by September 10, 2012 with reasonable accommodations, and that Defendant failed to provide her a reasonable accommodation, despite repeated requests to do so. ... Accordingly, the court will deny Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims for disability discrimination (Counts I and VI) and failure to accommodate (Counts II and VII).

Section 4(16) treats an exception to an employer’s drug policy as a facially reasonable accommodation when medical marijuana is the most effective treatment for an employee’s debilitating condition.

Barbuto v. Advantage Sales and Marketing, LLC · filed 2017-07-17(16)

Where, in the opinion of the employee's physician, medical marijuana is the most effective medication for the employee's debilitating medical condition, and where any alternative medication whose use would be permitted by the employer's drug policy would be less effective, an exception to an employer's drug policy to permit its use is a facially reasonable accommodation.

Section 4(16) requires an employer to produce specific evidence of an unacceptably significant risk of serious injury before a handicapped employee must prove that they can safely perform the job’s essential functions.

Gannon v. City of Boston · filed 2017-04-18(16)

While the handicapped employee ultimately bears the burden of proving that he or she can safely perform the essential functions of a particular job, the employee need only confront this burden where the employer has met its burden of producing specific evidence showing that the employee would pose an unacceptably significant risk of serious injury to the employee or others.

Poor job performance alone does not prevent an employee from proving that they are a qualified handicapped person under Section 4(16).

Massacani v. Kelly Services, Inc. · filed 2018-01-16(16)

While poor job performance may be an issue for Defendant to raise at the second stage of the burden shifting framework, it does not negate Plaintiff’s ability to prove that she is a qualified handicapped person.

Section 4(16) protects an employee whom an employer regards as having a substantially limiting impairment, even if the employee is not actually disabled.

Massasoit Industrial Corp. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 2017-03-23(16)

The evidence was more than sufficient to demonstrate that Glynn was regarded as having an impairment, as the hearing officer found.

A disability discrimination claim under § 4 requires the employee to be capable of performing the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation.

Tarbell v. Rocky's Ace Hardware · filed 2018-03-20

The undisputed facts establish that Tarbell's claims for disability discrimination fail on the merits. Specifically, the undisputed facts do not show, or tend to show, that Tarbell was capable of performing the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable accommodation.

Section 4(16) requires evidence that an employer terminated an employee because of a disability.

Miceli v. JetBlue Airways Corporation · filed 2018-03-28(16)

Defendants contend, and the court agrees, that Miceli has not proffered evidence that would allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude that JetBlue terminated her “because of” her disability.

Section 4(16) requires a disability discrimination claimant to be qualified for the job; an employee who lacks authorization needed to perform its essential functions does not meet that requirement.

Flaherty v. Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc · filed 2019-12-23(16)

Flaherty also brought claims under Chapter 151B, which prohibits discrimination in employment against qualified individuals with disabilities. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(16). Flaherty does not contest that his Chapter 151B claims should be evaluated under the same standards as ADA claims, as has been done before. ... Since we have already found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking those statements which contradicted his prior testimony, it follows that the district court correctly concluded that Flaherty failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination inasmuch as he could not prove that he was qualified for the position he held at Entergy.

Section 4(16) requires evidence that an employer regarded the employee as substantially limited in a major life activity to support a regarded-as handicap discrimination claim.

The Estate of Patrick G. Russi v. East Side Enterprises, LLC · filed 2020-11-25(16)

Russi, however, has not offered any evidence that East Side viewed him as substantially limited in the ability to perform a major life activity.

Section 4(16) does not require an employer to reassign a disabled employee to a vacant position as a reasonable accommodation.

Eustace v. Springfield Public Schools · filed 2020-05-29(16)

Therefore, unlike under the ADA, a reasonable accommodation does not include reassignment to vacant positions, and an employer has no duty to reassign a disabled employee to another position.

Section 4(16) requires an employer that knows of an employee’s disability to provide a reasonable accommodation that lets the employee perform the essential functions of the job.

Callbeck v. Fallon Community Health Plan, Inc. · filed 2020-08-14(16)

To establish a prima facie case of failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must show that (1) she suffers from a disability or handicap;4 (2) she could perform the essential functions of her job with reasonable accommodations, (3) she requested reasonable accommodations; and (4) her employer, despite knowing of her disability, denied to grant her reasonable accommodations.

Section 4(16) permits a disability discrimination wrongful termination claim to proceed when evidence supports that the employee could perform the job with or without reasonable accommodation and suffered an adverse employment action.

Ellis v. North Andover Public Schools · filed 2021-10-29(16)

To establish her prima facie case for wrongful termination based on disability discrimination under either federal or state law, Ellis must present credible evidence that, at the time of her termination: (1) she was handicapped within the meaning of the statute, (2) she was qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation, (3) she was terminated or otherwise subject to an adverse action by her employer, and (4) the position she occupied remained open and the employer sought to fill it. ... Plaintiff has presented sufficient credible evidence that she was qualified to perform her job with or without accommodation to survive defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

A failure-to-accommodate claim under § 4(16) fails when the employee was allowed the requested breaks and identifies no other accommodation the employer was legally required to provide.

Melcher v. Lowe's Home Centers, LLC · filed 2022-08-03(16)

Plaintiff has not identified such an accommodation that Defendant was legally required to provide, and, therefore, his claim fails.

Section 4(16) requires a disability-discrimination claimant to be qualified to perform the job's essential functions, with or without reasonable accommodation, and to have suffered an adverse employment action because of disability.

STEPHEN B. CORN, M.D. v. BRIGHAM AND WOMEN'S HOSPITAL & Others · filed 2023-06-15(16)

To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination based on disability, a complainant must show that he was a "qualified handicapped person" capable of performing the essential functions of his job, either with or without a reasonable accommodation, and that he was subject to an adverse employment action because of his disability. Godfrey. 457 Mass. at 120; G.L. c. 151B,§ 4(16).

Section 4(16) can require an employer to excuse a disabled employee from overtime as a reasonable accommodation.

Tufts Medical Center v. Dalexis · filed 2023-09-21(16)

The commission concluded that, by refusing to excuse Dalexis from the obligation to work overtime when needed, Tufts had failed to offer Dalexis a reasonable accommodation for her disability. ... Our review of the administrative record reveals that the commission's decision was supported by ... substantial evidence and free from error of law.

Section 4(16) requires a disability-discrimination plaintiff to show that a reasonable accommodation would allow her to perform the essential functions of her job.

Der Sarkisian v. Austin Preparatory School · filed 2023-11-07(16)

We begin with Der Sarkisian's claims for disability discrimination under Title I of the ADA and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(16). ... The parties agree that Der Sarkisian generally possesses the requisite skills and qualifications; they dispute only whether she has demonstrated that a reasonable accommodation would allow her to perform the essential functions of her job. ... Because Der Sarkisian has not carried her burden to set out a genuine issue of material fact on an essential element of her prima facie case of disability discrimination, Austin Prep was entitled to summary judgment on her ADA and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B disability discrimination claims.

Section 4(16) generally requires an employee to make a sufficiently specific request linking the needed accommodation to a disability before the employer's duty to accommodate arises.

Stratton v. Bentley University · filed 2024-08-15(16)

Typically, an employer's obligation to make a reasonable accommodation arises only when an employee provides a "sufficiently direct and specific" request for the needed accommodation.

Section 4(16) allows a failure-to-accommodate claim to proceed when the complaint sufficiently alleges that the employee is a qualified handicapped person.

Mendes v. WinnCompanies LLC · filed 2023-12-14(16)

Accordingly, the complaint sufficiently alleges that she was a “qualified handicapped person” and her claim against defendant WinnCompanies for failure to accommodate disability in violation Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(16) will not be dismissed.

Section 4(16) disability discrimination claims are analyzed under the same legal framework as ADA disability discrimination claims.

Sutherland v. Peterson's Oil Service, Inc. · filed 2025-01-16(16)

We apply the same legal framework to analyze disability discrimination claims under both federal and Massachusetts law.

Section 4(16) bars employment discrimination based on disability; once an employer gives a legitimate reason for termination, an employee must produce evidence permitting a reasonable inference of pretext to survive summary judgment.

Locklear v. Argenx US, Inc. · filed 2025-02-20(16)

Because Locklear failed to produce evidence that allows for a reasonable inference of pretext, argenx has demonstrated the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and we conclude that Locklear is ineligible for relief under G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (16).

Section 4(16) requires a disability discrimination plaintiff to show that they can perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation.

STEPHEN B. CORN v. BRIGHAM & WOMEN'S HOSPITAL & Others. · filed 2025-05-19(16)

Under G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (16), a claim of employment discrimination based on disability requires proof that an employee is a "qualified handicapped person" capable of performing essential job functions of his job, either with or without a reasonable accommodation.

Section 4(16) permits a failure-to-accommodate claim when an employer terminates an employee who requested a leave extension without discussing a reasonable accommodation.

Germoso · filed 2026-03-20(16)

The absence of a conversation with Germoso, even an informal one, demonstrates a failure to engage with Germoso for potential reasonable accommodation to address her needs.

Section 4(16) prohibits an employer from discriminating against a qualified person because of a handicap.

Brader v. Biogen Inc. · filed 2020-12-18(16)

Specifically, the Massachusetts antidiscrimination statute makes it unlawful for employers to "refuse to hire, rehire or advance in employment or otherwise discriminate against, because of his handicap, any person alleging to be a qualified handicapped person . . . ." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(16).

A disability discrimination claim under § 4(16) can fail when the plaintiff cannot reconcile an SSDI assertion of total inability to work with a claim of being qualified for the job.

Thompson v. Gold Medal Bakery, Inc. · filed 2021-03-02(16)

The District Court also granted summary judgment to Gold Medal on Thompson's state-law disability discrimination claims, which paralleled his federal ones. The District Court did so based on the same reasoning that we have described above. Because Thompson makes no contention that Cleveland's logic has no application to his state-law disability discrimination claims, we reject his challenge to this aspect of the District Court's summary judgment ruling as well.

A labor arbitrator’s finding does not preclude an employee’s handicap discrimination claim under § 4(16) when the collective bargaining agreement does not provide for arbitration of that claim.

Carr v. Transgas, Inc. · filed 1993-12-06(16)

Because there was no agreement to arbitrate handicap discrimination claims in the collective bargaining agreement between Carr’s union and Transgas, the arbitrator lacked the authority to decide whether Transgas discriminated against Carr on the basis of a handicap. Therefore, the arbitrator’s finding that Carr “was not unable to perform his duties by reason of a handicap or impairment” when he refused to drive equipment assigned to him does not preclude Carr’s handicap discrimination action brought in Superior Court pursuant to G. L. c. 151B, § 4(16).

A plaintiff bringing a sex discrimination claim under § 4(1) is entitled to a jury trial under article 15 when the claim seeks predominantly legal relief.

Dalis v. Buyer Advertising, Inc. · filed 1994-07-11(1)

Under art. 15, the plaintiff is constitutionally entitled to a trial by jury for her claim of employment discrimination based on sex.

In a § 4(1) discrimination proceeding, the MCAD must examine a prior arbitration decision before deciding what weight to give it, though failure to do so may be harmless.

City of Boston v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1995-09-13(1)

It was error on the part of the MCAD to ignore, i.e., not even to examine, the arbitration decision, but it was not an error warranting reversal.

Section 4 allows an individual to pursue an age or handicap discrimination claim in court after submitting the same claim to arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement.

LaChance v. Northeast Publishing, Inc. · filed 1997-04-21

The rights provided in ch. 151B § 4 are guaranteed to individuals. ... In conclusion, the purpose and procedures of 151B suggest that an individual does not lose the option to submit a claim in a judicial forum by submitting the same claim to arbitration, at least in the context of a CBA.

A union cannot bargain away an employee’s personal rights under § 4, including the right to pursue a retaliation claim in court.

Blanchette v. School Committee of Westwood · filed 1998-04-06(4)

We note first that Blanchette did not waive her right to pursue her statutory civil rights claim in a judicial forum merely by being a member of a union that was covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Although a union has the power to waive statutory rights related to collective activity, rights of the kind protected by G. L. c. 151B, § 4, which are of a personal, and not merely economic, nature are beyond the union’s ability to bargain away.

The continuing violation doctrine applies to hostile work environment claims based on racial discrimination under § 4(1).

Clifton v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority · filed 2004-09-30(1)

The underpinnings of the continuing violation doctrine set forth in Cuddyer support its application to hostile work environment claims based on racial discrimination.

Section 4(4) retaliation claims may qualify as continuing violations when the retaliatory conduct forms a continuing pattern.

Clifton v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority · filed 2005-12-21(4)

We find no basis to except a claim of retaliation, in violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (4), from the proper scope of the continuing violation doctrine.

A claim for discriminatory dismissal under § 4(16) survives the employee’s death, along with all available remedies, including punitive damages.

Gasior v. Massachusetts General Hospital · filed 2006-05-11(16)

A claim that an employee was wrongfully dismissed in violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (16), survives the employee’s death, as do all of the remedies available to him under G. L. c. 151B.

A jury deciding a claim under § 4(4A) or (5) must be instructed on the meaning of the statutory terms it is asked to apply.

Bhaduri v. Middlesex County Sheriff's Department · filed 2007-03-28(4A), (5)

As a result of this error, the juiy was left to speculate as to what the statutory terms meant, which constitutes error. Therefore, the verdict must be vacated with respect to Question 3.

Section 4(16) supports retroactive seniority as a remedy for discriminatory refusal to hire; a credible settlement can provide that remedy without an adjudication of discrimination.

Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority v. Boston Carmen's Union, Local 589 · filed 2009-06-04(16)

The most meaningful remedy for discrimination in hiring is retroactive seniority. ... An adjudication of discrimination and a tribunal’s order for retroactive seniority may indeed be outcome determinative, but they are not necessary. In certain circumstances, which exist here, a settlement may suffice to reliably and substantially establish a violation of the law proscribing discrimination that an arbitrator may not ignore.

Section 4 permits punitive damages for discrimination only when the defendant’s conduct is outrageous or egregious; intentional discrimination alone is insufficient.

Haddad v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2009-10-05

To sustain an award of punitive damages under G. L. c. 151B, § 4, a finding of intentional discrimination alone is not sufficient. An award of punitive damages requires a heightened finding beyond mere liability and also beyond a knowing violation of the statute. Punitive damages may be awarded only where the defendant’s conduct is outrageous or egregious.

Section 4 requires proof of outrageous or egregious conduct before punitive damages may be awarded for discrimination or retaliation.

Brown v. Office of Commissioner of Probation · filed 2011-07-05

Accordingly, in discrimination/retaliation cases, it is not enough for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant violated G.L.c. 15IB, §4; the plaintiff must additionally prove that the defendant’s conduct was “outrageous or egregious.”

A § 4 claim against an individual omitted from the MCAD complaint cannot proceed when the individual lacked notice and an opportunity to conciliate.

Preston v. Second Wind, Inc. · filed 2011-11-17

Without any notice, the individual Defendants could not anticipate future civil action against them, and had no opportunity to conciliate. ... For these reasons and the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Lee and Sass arising under M.G.L. c. 151B § 4 (stated in counts III and IV of the Complaint) are DISMISSED.

Section 4 requires more than a finding of retaliation or a knowing violation to support punitive damages.

Kiely v. Teradyne, Inc. · filed 2014-06-06

As the Supreme Judicial Court made clear in Haddad, 455 Mass, at 110, “[t]o sustain an award of punitive damages under G. L. c. 151B, § 4, a finding of intentional discrimination alone is not sufficient.” Likewise here, a finding of retaliation alone is insufficient to support the jury’s award of $1.1 million in punitive damages; “[a]n award of punitive damages requires a heightened finding beyond mere liability and also beyond a knowing violation of the statute.”

Lost profits may be recovered for retaliation under § 4(4) when the evidence shows they were a natural and probable consequence of the retaliation.

Quarterman v. City of Springfield · filed 2017-03-29(4)

Bearing in mind these principles, we conclude that the natural and probable consequence of retaliation under c. 151B can, if supported by the evidence, include lost profits.

Citing § 4(16) in an MCAD charge does not, by itself, exhaust a failure-to-accommodate claim when the charge alleges only disability discrimination.

Flaherty v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. · filed 2018-07-09(16)

Flaherty contends that because he cited Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(16) in his MCAD charge, Entergy was provided sufficient notice of his failure to accommodate claims. That argument is unavailing. A threadbare recitation to a broad statutory provision does not support the conclusion that the MCAD charge included allegations of failure to accommodate, particularly where the charge specified that Flaherty “was discriminated against by [Entergy] on the basis of Disability” and “charge[d] the Respondent with discrimination on the basis of disability.” (Keith Decl. Ex. 2 at 102-03).

Section 4 does not make an employer liable merely for offering severance conditioned on releasing an age-discrimination claim.

Karimpour v. Stanley Black & Decker, Inc. · filed 2022-05-02

Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 151B, § 4, it is illegal to discriminate based on age. ... As a preliminary matter, it is well-settled law that an employer may condition receipt of a severance payment upon the release of claims, including those for age discrimination pursuant to M.G.L. c. 151B. ... While such agreements may not be enforceable under all circumstances, ... no liability attaches to the proposal of such conditions.

Section 4(4A) and (5) provide interference and aiding and abetting theories of liability; instructions on those theories can coexist with instructions limiting liability for time-barred conduct.

Shervin v. Partners Healthcare System, Inc. · filed 2015-10-09(4A), (5)

The district court properly instructed the jury on both aiding and abetting and interference under Massachusetts law. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(4A), (5); Lopez v. Commonwealth, 978 N.E.2d 67, 78-79, 82 (Mass. 2012); Melnychenko v. 84 Lumber Co., 676 N.E.2d 45, 51 & n.8 (Mass. 1997). These instructions in no way conflicted with the limitations instructions.

Section 4(11A) makes retaliation for parental leave and failure to comply with the Massachusetts Parental Leave Act unlawful practices subject to Chapter 151B’s filing deadline.

Eissa v. LEDVANCE LLC · filed 2022-08-17(11A)

Violations of M.G.L. c. 149, § 105D are subject to the same limitations period. See M.G.L. c. 151B, § 4(11A) (designating as an unlawful practice under c. 151B retaliation under c. 149, § 105D, or the failure of an employer to otherwise comply with that section); Global NAPs, Inc. v. Awiszus, 930 N.E.2d 1262, 1267-68 (Mass. 2010) (explaining that the MCAD is responsible for enforcing the Massachusetts Parental Leave Act).

Section 4(16A) prohibits same-sex sexual harassment regardless of the harasser’s sexual orientation.

Melnychenko v. 84 Lumber Co. · filed 1997-02-18(16A)

Sexual harassment as defined in § 1 (18), and prohibited by § 4 (16A), is not limited to conduct of a supervisor aimed at a subordinate of the opposite sex, nor is it limited to same-sex conduct only where the harasser is a homosexual.

Section 4(16A) prohibits employer sexual harassment; for a hostile work environment claim, the jury may assess the conduct from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering all the circumstances.

Muzzy v. Cahillane Motors, Inc. · filed 2001-06-27(16A)

The language, “a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering all the circumstances,” is a sufficient and appropriate instruction for a trial judge to give on the “reasonable person” standard.

Section 4 permits a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim based on repeated workplace conduct.

Cuddyer v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. · filed 2001-07-12

She brought a complaint in the Superior Court against the defendant seeking damages for discrimination by means of sexual harassment in the workplace in violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (1) and (16A), alleging that she had been subjected to a hostile work environment. ... We conclude that the plaintiff has set forth an actionable case of sexual harassment and that, based on the continuing violation doctrine, her claim is not barred by the six-month limitation period.

Section 4(1) prohibits gender discrimination in employment; harsh treatment does not establish gender-based harassment without substantial evidence that it was based on sex.

Perini/Kiewit/Cashman v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 2006-07-27(1)

G.L.c. 151B, §4(1) prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of gender. ... This court does not find substantial support for the Hearing Officer’s decision that Buckjune subjected Flaherty to gender harassment while she was under his supervision.

Section 4(16A) prohibits sexual harassment of employees by employers, including conduct that creates a hostile work environment.

Manganella v. Jasmine Co. · filed 2007-10-16(16A)

Sexual harassment of an employee by an employer is expressly prohibited by G.L.c. 151B, §4(16A). ... Those factual findings leave no room for doubt that Manganella’s sexual advances created a hostile work environment for the victims.

Section 4(1) covers a racially hostile work environment when severe and pervasive harassment unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance and would interfere with a reasonable person’s work performance.

Windross v. Village Automotive Group, Inc. · filed 2008-06-03(1)

To prevail on this claim, Windross was required to establish a work environment pervaded by harassment or abuse that unreasonably interfered with his work performance, and that such conduct was sufficiently severe and pervasive to interfere with a reasonable person’s work performance.

Section 4(4A) makes a general contractor liable when it knows its supervisor has subjected a subcontractor’s employee to unlawful discrimination at a shared work site and fails to take reasonably adequate remedial action.

Thomas O'Connor Constructors, Inc. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 2008-09-09(4A)

In such circumstances, we hold that an employer who is on notice of unlawful discriminatory acts by its supervisor, directed toward an employee of a subcontractor at a unitary work site, and fails to take reasonably adequate remedial action is liable under G. L. c. 151B, § 4(4A).

A hostile work environment claim requires the plaintiff to have been subjectively offended by the conduct at issue; participation in other sexual behavior at work does not automatically defeat the claim.

Dahms v. Cognex Corp. · filed 2009-10-15(16A)

While it was proper for the jury to consider Dahms’s behavior within Cognex in evaluating her hostile workplace environment claim, and evidence of her willing participation in sexualized behavior in the workplace was probative of whether she was subjectively offended by the work environment that she claims the defendants created, such evidence is not dispositive. The fact finder is not required to return a verdict for the defendants merely because the plaintiff participated in sexualized behavior with third-party coworkers.

Section 4(16A) requires alleged harassment to be sexual in nature; comments about appearance that are not sexual in context or nature do not qualify.

Pigott v. Northern Bank & Trust Co. · filed 2012-03-21(16A)

Pursuant to the plain language of the statute, the alleged harassment must be “sexual” in nature. ... Accepting for purposes of this motion the entirety of Pigott’s description of the circumstances, surrounding the alleged comments of Mawn, Sr., the conduct was not “sexual” in context or nature.

Section 4(16A) covers an employer’s failure to address a customer’s sexual harassment of an employee and its attempt to suppress the employee’s efforts to seek a remedy.

Ryan v. Holie Donut, Inc. · filed 2012-10-15(16A)

If an employer’s inaction in the face of sexual harassment and assault of an employee by a customer falls within the operation of § 4(16A), then all the more so would the employer’s attempt to suppress the employee’s efforts for a remedy. Under this standard, the allegations of Ryan’s complaint fall within the operation of § 4(16A).

Section 4(5) permits individual liability for sexual harassment and for aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing another person’s sexual harassment.

Fisher v. Town of Orange · filed 2013-08-09(5)

Under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, individual defendants may be liable for engaging in sexually harassing conduct or for aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling or coercing sexually harassing acts by another. See Beaupre v. Cliff Smith & Assocs., 50 Mass.App.Ct. 480, 491, 738 N.E.2d 753 (2000); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B § 4(5).

Section 4 requires an employer to take adequate remedial action when it learns of workplace sexual harassment.

City of Springfield v. United Public Service Employees Union · filed 2016-03-25

General Laws c. 151B requires an employer to take some remedial action in cases of confirmed sexual harassment.

An employer may be liable for compensatory damages when its supervisor creates a sexually hostile or offensive work environment.

Gyulakian v. Lexus of Watertown, Inc. · filed 2016-08-24(16A)

Compensatory damages incurred based on the actions of supervisory personnel who create a sexually hostile or offensive work environment can be imputed to the employer.

Section 4(1B) prohibits hostile work environments; a claim requires conduct that is severe or pervasive.

Tombeno v. FedEx Corporate Servs., Inc. · filed 2018-01-09(1B)

Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) and 631(a) under the ADEA and Mass. Gen. Laws ch.151B, § 1 and § 4(1B), employers are prohibited from creating hostile work environments. ... The Plaintiff fails to meet the severe or pervasive standard required to establish a hostile work environment claim.

Section 4 permits employer liability for sexual harassment by a coworker or nonemployee when the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt, appropriate action.

Cagle v. Estes · filed 2018-08-22(16A)

Similar to Title VII, Chapter 151B imposes liability on an employer for the acts of a co- employee or a non-employee only when the employer "knew or should have known of the charged sexual harassment and failed to implement prompt and appropriate action." Sauer, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 218 (quoting White v. N.H. Dep't of Corrs., 221 F.3d 254, 261 (1st Cir. 2000)).

Section 4 prohibits quid pro quo sexual harassment when a supervisor uses their position to seek sexual favors or threatens punishment or loss of a benefit if an employee refuses.

Martinelli v. The Bancroft Chophouse, LLC · filed 2019-02-22

Title VII and Chapter 151B also prohibit quid pro quo sexual harassment. Under that form of discrimination, an employer or supervisor uses his or her position to extract sexual favors from a subordinate employee or threatens to punish that employee or withhold a benefit if he or she does not comply.

Section 4(16A) makes an employer strictly liable for a supervisor’s sexual harassment when the supervisor has some authority over employees, such as authority to assign work, scrutinize their work, or protect them from coworker harassment.

Romero v. McCormick & Schmick Restaurant Corp. · filed 2020-03-24(16A)

In sum, the court finds that, under Chapter151B, to find an employer strictly liable for a putative supervisor’s sexual harassing conduct, the putative supervisor need not have the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer or discipline an employee, but must have “some modicum of authority,” such as the authority to assign work, impose particularly exacting scrutiny, or a responsibility to protect other workers from sexual harassment.

Section 4(1) allows a hostile work environment claim based on sexual conduct directed at coworkers if it unreasonably interferes with the employee’s work through an intimidating work environment.

Romero v. McCormick & Schmick Restaurant Corp. · filed 2020-03-17(1)

Under the statute, if the purpose or effect of sexual conduct is to unreasonably interfere with employees’ work performance through an intimidating work environment, the fact that a particular employee has not yet been grabbed, touched or ridiculed does not negate the hostile work environment.

Section 4(4) requires a causal connection between an employee’s complaints and the harassment considered in a retaliatory hostile work environment claim.

Ahmed v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority · filed 2020-09-03(4)

The Court will therefore limit its review to those incidents that demonstrate a clear causal connection between Plaintiff’s complaints and harassment.

Section 4(16A) makes sexual harassment of an employee by an employer an unlawful employment practice under chapter 151B.

Green v. Wyman-Gordon Co. · filed 1995-12-15(16A)

The Supreme Judicial Court’s reasoning in Char-land compels this court to conclude similarly that plaintiffs claim of a Sexual Harassment Act violation (Count I) must also be dismissed because G.L.c. 151B would have applied had she timely filed a complaint with the MCAD. On the same day that the Legislature enacted G.L.c. 214, §1C, it amended G.L.c. 151B, §4, adding subsection 16A which declares it an unlawful practice for an employer to sexually harass an employee.

Section 4(4A) prohibits threatening or intimidating an employee for bringing a discrimination complaint, even if the complaint proves unfounded.

Bain v. City of Springfield · filed 1997-04-18(4A)

The mayor’s order to Pike and its communication to Bain together constituted a threat or intimidation in the enjoyment of her right under the statute to bring a complaint — unfounded though the jury found the complaint to be.

Section 4(4) does not treat an employee’s request for reasonable accommodation as opposition to a forbidden practice, so the request alone does not create a retaliation claim.

Cullinane v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology · filed 1997-06-12(4)

An employee’s request for reasonable accommodation of her handicap is not the equivalent of “opposing] any practices forbidden” by c. 151B. Again, an employer who fails to provide reasonable accommodation to a qualified handicapped person, thus precipitating the employee’s departure or removal from the position, has unlawfully discriminated against that employee on the basis of handicap. There is no reason to read §4(4) in a way that would automatically make every handicap discrimination case a case of retaliation. This aspect of Cullinane’s retaliation claim fails to state a claim.

Section 4(4) prohibits retaliation against a person who complains of discrimination.

Harriman v. Riemer & Braunstein · filed 1997-08-15(4)

The legislature recognized that a person who complains of discrimination risks retaliation and prohibited such conduct at G.L.c. 151B, §4(4).

Section 4 protects people who oppose forbidden discrimination or participate in MCAD proceedings from retaliation; allegations that an employee objected to harassment and reported it to management can support a retaliation claim.

Leclerc v. Interstate Distributors, Inc. · filed 1998-02-11(4)

The retaliation provision under the Massachusetts Anti-Discrimination Statute protects those who have opposed any practice forbidden under G.L.c. 151B and those who file complaints ... or assist in any proceedings before the MCAD. ... The courtis satisfied that the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to maintain a claim for retaliation. Accordingly, dismissal of this claim is not proper.

Section 4(4) requires a retaliation claimant to show protected conduct, an adverse employment action, and a causal link between them.

Riebold v. Eastern Casualty Insurance · filed 1999-03-02(4)

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, plaintiff must show that (1) she was engaged in protected conduct; (2) she was subjected to an adverse employment action at the time or after the protected conduct occurred; and (3) there was a causal link between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action.

Section 4(4A) prohibits retaliation for filing a discrimination complaint, but does not bar adverse employment decisions made without retaliatory motive.

Trabilcy v. ENSR Corp. · filed 1999-08-19(4A)

More simply, c. 151B, §4(4A) prohibits retaliation. ... Filing a discrimination complaint does not produce an invisible shield that thereafter wards off all adverse employment decisions. Here, there simply was no pretext and, although different people might have come to different conclusions regarding who in Mr. Trabilcy’s group should have been “variablized,” the decision Mr. Resch in fact made was a decision uninfluenced by any retaliatory animus.

Section 4(4) permits retaliation claims against individual employees because it applies to any person.

Ladd v. Everett Savings Bank · filed 1998-01-05(4)

Individual employees are subject to suit for retaliation under c. 151B, §4(4), which applies to “any person.”

Section 4(16) permits a disability discrimination claim against an individual defendant.

Meara v. Bennett · filed 1998-12-02(16)

By contrast, virtually unanimous authority supports individual liability under both the FMLA and ch. 151B. The court will therefore allow the motion to dismiss Count I, and deny it as to Counts II and IV.

Section 4(5) allows personal liability for individuals who aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce unlawful employment discrimination.

Schutz v. Go Ahead Vacations, Inc. · filed 1999-09-01(5)

Such conduct, if proved, would also come within the prohibition set forth in §4(5). As such, the individual defendants may be held personally dable for their adeged conduct in aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling or coercing unlawful employment discrimination on the part of Go Ahead Vacations, Inc.

Section 4(4) requires a retaliation plaintiff to show that the employer acted in response to protected activity; using a book in class and publishing a book did not qualify.

Martin v. Wellesley College · filed 1999-06-02(4)

Martin’s use of The Secret Relationship and his publication of The Jewish Onslaught are not protected activities. As Martin has not alleged that he filed a complaint or participated in any governmental proceedings, his retaliatory discharge claim must be dismissed.

A retaliation claim under § 4(4) may proceed even when the underlying discrimination claim fails.

Igartua v. City of Newton · filed 2000-01-20(4)

As declared earlier, the grant of summary judgment on the claim of handicap discrimination does not bar the plaintiff from proceeding on her claim of retaliation for her complaints of handicap discrimination under G.L.c. 151B, §4(4).

Section 4(4) requires a materially disadvantageous change in working conditions for an employment retaliation claim; a brief reassignment to address a harassment complaint does not qualify.

Goguen v. Quality Plan Administrators · filed 2000-02-11(4)

Such a temporary change in employment made in an attempt to deal with Ms. Goguen’s allegations of sexual harassment certainly does not constitute the kind of material disadvantage that is the predicate for a finding of unlawful retaliation.

Threats to sue or bring counterclaims because a person filed an MCAD complaint can state a claim under § 4, paragraph 4A.

Mogilevsky v. Keating · filed 2000-02-11(4A)

Taken as true, Mogilevsky alleges facts that the Defendants violated G.L.c. 186, §18 by threatening to retaliate against him for having made the complaint to BIS and that the Defendants threatened to sue him or bring counterclaims against him because of the complaints he filed with the MCAD, in violation of G.L.c. 15 IB, §4, par. 4A. ... As such, the Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count V, threatening to sue for having made the complaint, is denied.

Section 4 does not treat withdrawal of a conditional severance offer as retaliation when the employee refuses to sign the required agreement.

Cathey v. Fallon Clinic, Inc. · filed 2001-07-03

The offer was expressly conditioned on his signing of the agreement as well as on his release of claims pursuant to signing the agreement, and because Cathey subsequently refused to sign the agreement, his claim that filing an MCAD complaint triggered the withdrawal of the offer fails. Moreover, Fallon’s withdrawal of the severance offer in accordance with the express conditions of the severance agreement shows no evidence of retaliatory conduct on Fallon’s part.

Section 4(4) requires evidence of a material adverse employment action and retaliatory motive to support a retaliation claim.

Guthrie v. Raythoen Co. · filed 2002-07-16(4)

Plaintiffs failure to provide sufficient evidence to show a material adverse action, or to show retaliatory animus on the part of the defendants undermine her claim of retaliation pursuant to G.L.c. 151B, §4(4).

Section 4(4) does not treat an employee’s compliance with an employer’s request to cooperate in an internal investigation as opposition to unlawful practices.

Locke v. Sales Consultants of Boston, Inc. · filed 2001-04-13(4)

Following instructions to cooperate with an internal investigation undertaken by am employer is not “opposition” to unlawful employer behavior within the meaning of G.L.c. 15 IB.

Section 4(4A) permits a retaliatory termination claim when an employee suffers an adverse employment action for aiding another employee’s right to be free from retaliation.

Pontremoli v. Spaulding Rehabilitation Hospital · filed 2001-05-23(4A)

If believed, the alleged facts demonstrate activity that was covered by G. L. c. 151B, and subjected Pontremoli to an adverse employment action supporting a claim for retaliatory termination under subsections 4 and 4A of G. L. c. 151B, § 4.

Section 4(4) requires a causal connection between a discrimination complaint and an adverse employment action to establish retaliation.

Flanagan-Uusitalo v. D.T. Industries, Inc. · filed 2001-12-20(4)

The plaintiff cannot, however, establish a causal connection between those actions and the filing of her discrimination claims which is required in an action for retaliation.

Section 4(4) and (4A) do not prohibit an employer’s reasonably based lawsuit in response to a discrimination claim solely because the lawsuit is unsuccessful.

Sahli v. Bull HN Information Systems, Inc. · filed 2002-09-09(4), (4A)

Applying these principles to G. L. c. 15IB, we decline to read § 4 (4) and § 4 (4A) as reaching all reasonably based but unsuccessful lawsuits brought in response to the filing of a discrimination claim.

Section 4(4) makes retaliation for opposing discrimination a separate cause of action and prohibits expelling a person for that opposition.

Soltys v. Wellesley Country Club · filed 2002-10-28(4)

Retaliation is a separate and independent cause of action. M.G.L.c 151B, §4(4), prohibits retaliation by making it unlawful for “any person ... to discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against a person because he has opposed any practices” forbidden under G.L.c. 151B. ... There is a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.

Section 4(4) requires an adverse employment action to be caused by the employee’s opposition to discrimination or discrimination complaint.

Berger v. Brandeis University · filed 2002-10-31(4)

This court concludes that the actions of Brandeis do not constitute retaliation pursuantto G.L.c. 151B, §4(4), because Brandéis’ actions toward Berger were not taken because of his earlier claim of discrimination or because of his Jewish faith, but because of recurring issues that had been addressed prior to his claim.

Section 4 prohibits discrimination against a person for opposing practices forbidden by chapter 151B or participating in a proceeding under section five.

Brissette v. Franklin County, Sheriff's Office · filed 2003-01-06

Likewise, under Massachusetts law, it is unlawful to “discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any person because he has opposed any practices forbidden under this chapter or because he has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under section five.” Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 151B, § 4. ... The evidence of deliberate retaliation against the plaintiffs for their formal and informal complaints about discrimination is overwhelming.

Section 4(4) permits a retaliation claim even if the underlying harassment claim fails.

Ritchie v. Department of State Police · filed 2004-03-19(4)

The plaintiff’s claim of retaliation may succeed even if her underlying claim of harassment fails.