Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4

Section 4's expanded exemption for qualifying religious and affiliated organizations reaches protections against discrimination based on race, sex, and other listed traits as well as sexual orientation.

Collins v. Secretary of the Commonwealth · filed 1990-07-05

These amendments represent a broadening of the statutory exemption previously accorded religious institutions and organizations, and certain affiliated charitable or educational organizations, from the anti-discrimination provisions of c. 15IB. The exemptions they create are not limited to the new provisions of c. 15IB barring discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, but extend to provisions barring discrimination on the basis of race, color, religious creed, national origin, sex, ancestry, age, or handicap.

Section 4(16A) prohibits employers from sexually harassing employees, but independent contractors are outside its protected employee class.

Cody v. Sutar · filed 1996-05-15(16A)

The Supreme Judicial Court has declined to include independent contractors in the protected class of employees covered by G.L.c. 151B. ... Accordingly, this court concludes that Cody has no cause of action under G.L.c. 151B.

Section 4(1) does not make parenthood a protected class.

Gunther v. Gap, Inc. · filed 1998-03-31(1)

Second, to the extent that Gunther is claiming she was discriminated against as a single mother, she can not prevail. Parenthood is not listed as a protected class in the statute.

Section 4 does not excuse a discharge based solely on age because the employer mistakenly believed age was a bona fide occupational qualification for the job.

Gates v. Flood · filed 2003-04-09

It is no defense to a discharge based solely on age that the employer mistakenly believed that age was a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) for the employee’s job.

Section 4(16A)'s prohibition on sexual harassment of employees does not cover volunteers because they are not employees under traditional common-law standards.

Lowery v. Klemm · filed 2005-04-21(16A)

In the same vein, a volunteer is not an employee under traditional common-law standards and, thus, would fall outside the protection for employees as codified in G. L. c. 151B.

Section 4(1B)'s age discrimination claim is unavailable against an employer with fewer than six employees.

Rodman v. Murphy · filed 2006-03-21(1B)

In this case, however, Mail Boxes employs fewer than six employees; therefore, Rodman may not bring his claim under c. 151B.

Section 4(1) does not govern a discrimination claim by a shareholder who functions as an owner rather than an employee; status depends on the full relationship, not the label on an employment agreement.

Theroux v. Stephen Singer, DDS, PC · filed 2006-04-20(1)

Taking all these factors into consideration, Dr. The-roux appears to have been an employer not an employee of BVDA for the purposes of c. 15 IB. ... Having found that Dr. Theroux was not an employee of BVDA, it follows that she is not subject to the requirements of c. 15 IB.

Section 4(1) and (1C) do not protect political beliefs, refugee status, or American refugees as such.

Nguyen v. University of Massachusetts · filed 2006-05-11(1), (1C)

They do not provide protection for political beliefs; they do not provide protection for refugees; and they do not provide protection for refugees who are American.

Section 4 is preempted by ERISA when applied to the discrimination claims concerning an ERISA benefit plan in this case, but remains applicable to non-ERISA benefits.

Partners Healthcare System, Inc. v. Sullivan · filed 2007-06-25

Having found the state law broader than the federal law, and finding no meaningful factual dispute, the court holds application of M.G.L. ch. 151B § 4 to the Plaintiffs ERISA plans in the MCAD proceedings on Defendant Webster’s charge to be facially conclusively preempted by ERISA.

Section 4(1) requires an employment relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant for an employment discrimination claim.

Araujo v. UGL Unicco-Unicco Operations · filed 2014-09-30(1)

Because there was no employment relationship between Araujo and athenahealth, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim against athenahealth under Section 4(1) of Chapter 151B.

Section 4(9) covers an employer’s decision to exclude an applicant from consideration, even before a final hiring decision.

Heagney v. Wong · filed 2019-02-11(9)

But, Chapter 151B expressly applies to the decisions of "an employer, himself or through his agent, . . . to exclude, limit, or otherwise discriminate" against an applicant.

Section 4 does not support a claim by someone who is neither a current nor a prospective employee of the defendant.

Doe v. Harvard University · filed 2019-10-17

Second, plaintiff lacks standing to assert a claim under M.G.L. c. 151B, the Fair Employment Practices Act, because she is not a current or prospective employee of Harvard. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4 (prohibiting certain unlawful practices by employers); 10 Mass. Prac., Procedural Forms Annotated § 29:1 (6th ed.) (“M.G.L.A. c. 151B, the Fair Employment Practices Act, applies to a claim for employment discrimination against an employer with six or more employees.”).

Section 4(2) prohibits discrimination by labor organizations and does not apply to a claim that an employer discharged an employee because of race.

Sweeney v. Santander Bank, N.A. · filed 2021-09-16(2)

Section 4(2) prohibits discrimination by labor organizations, and § 2 states a special commission will make policy recommendations relating to Chapter 151B. Neither provision applies to this case, and the Court assumes that Plaintiff intended to bring a claim under § 4(1), which prohibits discharge from employment due to race.

Section 4(2) does not treat an apprenticeship training program as a labor organization when it does not engage in collective bargaining or handle employment grievances.

Hussey v. East Coast Slurry Co., LLC · filed 2022-03-01(2)

Plaintiff does not contend that the School was formed for the purpose of engaging in collective bargaining or mediating employment grievances as opposed to training Union members in their trade. ... Summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim against the School under § 4(2), Count IV, is therefore allowed.

Section 4(1B) does not apply to an age discrimination claim when the termination decision and the core of the employment relationship were outside Massachusetts.

Wilson v. Recorded Future, Inc. · filed 2025-09-30(1B)

Accordingly, the court finds that Chapter 151B does not apply to Wilson’s age discrimination claims, and summary judgment is granted as to Count II.

Section 4 does not protect against discrimination based on family status.

Keith · filed 2026-03-30

Chapter 151B does not protect against discrimination on the basis of family status.

Section 4(16) protects an employee’s discrimination claim independently of a collective bargaining agreement, so the claim is not preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.

Cullen v. Henry Haywood Memorial Hospital · filed 2015-03-26(16)

While the reference to the promotion and termination provisions of the CBA may be relevant to the analysis of this claim, resolution of the discrimination claim does not in any way “depend” on interpretation of the CBA. The rights guaranteed to the Plaintiff by Chapter 151B exist independent of the CBA; and as such, the principles mandating preemption under § 301 are inapplicable here.

Section 4 claims arising from federal employment cannot be brought against federal employees because Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act provide the exclusive remedy.

Connolly v. Massachusetts Department of Conservation and Recreation · filed 2025-02-28

Thus, because Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act provide the exclusive remedy for workplace discrimination in a federal workplace and because these claims cannot be asserted against individual employees, the Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Chapter 151B claims (Count III-VIII) is GRANTED as to Robinson and Vasquez.

Section 4(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on sexual orientation, including during 2016 and 2017.

Welch v. People's United Bank, National Association · filed 2021-04-13(1)

Chapter 151B explicitly proscribes employment discrimination based on sexual orientation. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(1) (“It shall be an unlawful practice . . . [f]or an employer, by himself or his agent, because of the . . . sexual orientation . . . of any individual to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment . . . .”). Further, the statute has barred sexual orientation-based discrimination since DeMello’s employment at PUB (i.e., in 2016 and 2017).

Section 4(5) prohibits an employer from aiding or abetting discriminatory acts by its own employees.

Walters v. President & Fellows of Harvard College · filed 1985-08-15(5)

Clearly, the statute draws a distinction between an employer and its employees, i.e., the statute does not consider them to be a single entity. Thus, a straightforward reading of the statute leads to the conclusion that an employer can aid or abet its own employees.

Section 4(1) makes an employer liable for discrimination committed by a supervisor without an additional notice requirement.

College-Town, Division of Interco, Inc. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1987-06-03(1)

Whatever application the Henson distinction receives in cases interpreting Title VII, we conclude that, in enacting G.L.c. 151B, § 4, the Legislature intended that an employer be liable for discrimination committed by those on whom it confers authority, without an additional notice requirement.

Section 4 may hold an employer liable for workplace sexual harassment when it has notice and fails to take adequate steps to remedy the situation.

Battenfield v. Harvard University · filed 1993-08-31

An employer who is on notice of sexual harassment in the workplace, whether caused by supervisors, co-workers, or customers, and who fails to take adequate steps to remedy the situation, may be liable for sexual harassment under G.L.c. 15IB.

Section 4 permits employees to be held liable for their own acts of discrimination; liability is not exclusive to employers.

Salhab v. Middlesex County · filed 1994-03-23

Contrary to defendants’ assertions, College-Town does not stand for the converse, i.e., that employers are exclusively liable and employees cannot be held liable for their own acts of discrimination.

Section 4 makes an employer vicariously liable for sexual harassment by personnel who supervise an employee on its behalf.

Albee v. New England Medical Center Hospitals, Inc. · filed 1997-10-30

Under G.L.c. 151B, §4, an employer is vicariously liable for the sexually harassing conduct of its supervisory personnel, who act as the employer’s agents.

Section 4(1) may make an employer liable for sexual harassment when it knows of workplace harassment and fails to take adequate steps to remedy it.

Burman v. Boch Oldsmobile, Inc. · filed 1995-04-11(1)

An employer who is put on notice of sexual harassment in the workplace, whether caused by supervisors, co-workers or customers, and who fails to take adequate steps to remedy the situation, may be liable for sexual harassment pursuant to G.L.c. 151B. ... After reviewing the summary judgment materials, the Court agrees with the Commissioner’s conclusion and holds that summary judgment on the claim of failure to investigate the plaintiffs allegations is inappropriate.

Section 4(16A) permits employer liability for sexual harassment by an agent even when the harasser does not directly supervise the employee.

Morehouse v. Berkshire Gas Co. · filed 1997-12-31(16A)

The plain language of section 4(16A) forbids the employer, personally or through its agents, from sexually harassing “any employee.” Nothing in this provision explicitly requires that a direct supervisory relationship exist between the harasser and the victim for liability under the chapter to attach to the employer.

Section 4(5) permits upper level managers to be held liable for aiding and abetting violations of chapter 151B.

DuPuis v. Con-Test, Inc. · filed 1995-05-01(5)

Under §4(5), the Verattis, as members of “upper level management,” may be liable as aiders and abettors for violations of c. 15 IB.

Section 4(4A) permits individual liability for interfering with another person’s right to work free of unlawful discrimination or retaliation.

Ruffino v. State Street Bank and Trust Co. · filed 1995-11-29(4A)

Specifically, M.G.L. c. 151B, § 4(4A) prohibits “any person” from interfering “with another person in the exercise of enjoyment of any right granted by this chapter.” ... Accordingly, individual defendants’ motions for summary judgment as to plaintiffs retaliation claims brought under both Title VII and M.G.L. e. 151B are denied.

Section 4(5) permits an individual claim against a supervisor for aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing acts forbidden by chapter 151B.

Walsh v. Sodexho USA, Inc. · filed 1995-12-15(5)

Marquis, as Walsh’s supervisor, would be liable under G.L.c. 151B, for aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing the doing of any acts forbidden by G.L.c. 15IB. Accordingly, Walsh may pursue Marquis in her individual capacity.

Section 4(5) does not impose aiding-and-abetting liability when no underlying discrimination or retaliation occurred.

Ligenza v. Genesis Health Ventures of Massachusetts, Inc. · filed 1998-02-20(5)

Absent any discrimination or retaliation by Genesis, the Individual Defendants cannot be responsible under M.G.L. ch. 151B § 4(5) for aiding and abetting unlawful discrimination that simply did not exist.

Section 4 permits a discrimination claim against a person who aids and abets discriminatory conduct.

Winsmann v. Choate Health Management, Inc. · filed 1998-05-29(5)

It is clear, from a plain reading of the statute, that its terms apply not only to employers acting through their principals and agents, but also to any person who aids and abets discriminatory conduct.

Section 4(5) can hold an employer liable for aiding and abetting discrimination, but the claim must identify someone the employer aided or abetted.

DeBarboza v. Cablevision of Boston, Inc. · filed 1999-01-15(5)

The court disagrees with Cablevision’s contention that an employer cannot be held liable as a principal discriminator and an aider and abettor of discrimination at the same time. ... However, the court finds that DeBarboza’s claim must fail because he fails to allege the person or persons that Cablevision allegedly aided or abetted in violation of G.L.c. 151B, §4(5).

Section 4(5) allows individual employees to be sued for aiding and abetting an employer’s discrimination, but the complaint must allege facts showing each person’s role.

Hennessy v. Perico, Inc. · filed 1999-05-21(5)

General Laws c. 151B, §4(5) states that it is unlawful for “any person, whether an employer or an employee ... to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any acts forbidden under this chapter or to attempt to do so.” ... I agree with the reasoning of those decisions, and conclude, therefore, that the individual defendants may be sued individually for aiding and abetting the defendant corporation Perico. ... The plaintiffs complaint, however, even with notice pleading as the standard, does not allege sufficient facts to raise a claim of aiding and abetting on the part of any of the individual defendants.

Section 4 applies to people who are not an employer’s agents when they interfere with protected employment rights or aid or coerce unlawful discrimination.

Andrews v. Cressy · filed 1998-03-04(4A), (5)

By its express terms, G.L.c. 151B would apply to Cressy even though he is not an agent of Marriott for any alleged discriminatoiy conduct.

Section 4(16A) makes an employer strictly liable for sexual harassment committed by its supervisors.

Brimage v. City of Boston · filed 2001-01-24(16A)

To reiterate because of its importance, under c. 15IB, an employer is “strictly liable” for sexual harassment committed by its supervisors.

Section 4(16)(A) holds an employer liable for sexual harassment by a supervisor who exercises authority over the employee.

Weston v. Town of Middleborough · filed 2002-02-15(16)(A)

Massachusetts holds employers unconditionally liable for sexual harassment by their supervisors, but limits such strict liability to situations where the supervisor/alleged harasser exercises “supervising authority” over the plaintiff.

Section 4 holds employers responsible for employees’ discriminatory acts even when the employer did not authorize or support them.

Thomas v. EDI Specialists, Inc. · filed 2002-08-15

Thus, the statute clearly evinces an intent to reduce discrimination in the workplace by holding employers responsible for the discriminatory actions of their employees, regardless of whether these actions were authorized or supported by the employer or its policies.

Section 4(5) adds no separate aiding and abetting claim against an employer already liable for its supervisor’s underlying discrimination.

Richards v. Walter Fernald State School · filed 2000-07-31(5)

As the employer of the supervisor that was allegedly committing'these violations, Fernald School would be held liable irrespective of whether it was “aiding” or “abetting” Bruk. This allegation is completely superfluous of the underlying claims for sexual harassment and race and sex discrimination and will therefore be stricken.

Section 4(5) permits personal liability for coercing or compelling acts forbidden by chapter 151B, as well as for aiding and abetting them.

Beaupre v. Cliff Smith & Associates · filed 2000-11-16(5)

The defendants’ focus on the aiding and abetting provision of § 4(5) is, moreover, unduly narrow. When instructing the jury that they were to confine their liability deliberations to whether Smith’s alleged conduct amounted to sexual harassment as defined in c. 151B, § 1(18), and, if so, whether that conduct fell within § 4(5), the judge did not confine their consideration of Smith’s personal liability to whether his conduct constituted aiding and abetting.

Section 4 allows a police chief to be held individually liable for unlawful acts committed in his capacity as chief.

Dalrymple v. Town of Winthrop · filed 2000-12-28

He claims that he cannot be held individually liable for any of the acts he committed in his capacity as chief of the Winthrop police department. The argument fails for those reasons most recently discussed in Beaupre v. Cliff Smith & Assocs., 50 Mass. App. Ct. 480, 492-495 (2000).

Section 4 permits an individual claim against a supervisor alleged to have participated in age or disability discrimination.

Orell v. UMass Memorial Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2002-04-29(5)

Such allegations are sufficient at this stage of the proceedings to state a claim against Corbett individually for discrimination in violation of M.G.L. c. 151B.

Section 4(5) does not give an employer a right to contribution or indemnification from an employee for expenses the employer paid to resolve a discrimination complaint.

Astra USA, Inc. v. Bildman · filed 2000-12-19(5)

As argued by Bildman, Chapter 15 IB contains no provision for contribution or indemnification, and the intent of that statute would be contravened if a corporation that breached anti-discrimination laws could recover from its employees the amounts the corporation paid to investigate and resolve an EEOC complaint.

Section 4(16) makes an employer liable for a co-worker’s sexual harassment when the employer has notice and fails to take adequate remedial action.

Manno v. BJ's Wholesale Club Inc. · filed 2001-07-17(1), (16A)

As stated above, BJ’s liability under Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 151B attaches when BJ’s was notified of the harassment and failed to take adequate remedial action.

Section 4(1) permits employer liability for a coworker’s sexual harassment even when the employer stops the conduct after a complaint.

Gerhmann v. Sager Electrical Supply Co. · filed 2002-07-29(1)

While there is evidence that the defendants did, in fact, remedy the situation, this does not erase their potential liability for sexual harassment by one of their employees.

Section 4 requires an employer notified of workplace sexual harassment to take adequate remedial action.

Dahms v. Cognex Corp. · filed 2001-10-29

An employer who is notified of sexual harassment in the workplace and fails to take adequate remedial action also violates G.L.c. 151B, §4.

Section 4 permits joint and several liability for age discrimination when two entities share control over an employee’s employment.

Hanke v. Genzyme Transgenics Corp. · filed 2002-06-13(1B)

Where two parties share control over an individual’s employment they will be held jointly and severally liable for violations under G.L.c. 151B.

Section 4 permits an employer to be held liable for discriminatory actions by its supervisors.

Foley v. Commonwealth Electric Co. · filed 2002-12-10

An instruction as to the Company's liability for Campbell and the other supervisors' actions certainly would have been appropriate under Title VII and chapter 151B.

Section 4 permits employer liability for an age-based discharge when a biased supervisor manipulates the information on which neutral decisionmakers rely.

Cariglia v. Hertz Equipment Rental Corp. · filed 2004-04-05

This focus on whether Heard’s animus infected people (the decisionmakers) rather than the process (manipulating the information relied upon by the decisionmakers) was erroneous.

Section 4 makes an employer liable for age discrimination when a biased supervisor withholds exculpatory information and thereby influences the decision to discharge an employee.

Cariglia v. Hertz Equipment Rental Corp. · filed 2004-11-05

The record thus compels a finding that Heard withheld from his superiors exculpatory information pertinent to the plaintiffs conduct with respect to the booms. ... And so it is based on the foregoing finding. Accordingly, I find HERC liable as to the plaintiffs claim of age discrimination.

Section 4 covers allegations that third parties conspired with an employer to discriminate against employees because of pregnancy.

Butner v. Department of State Police · filed 2004-02-18(4A), (5)

Chapter 151B, § 4 (4A) and (5), as amended by St. 1989, c. 722, § 14, prohibits any person from interfering with another’s exercise of rights granted or protected under c. 15 IB, and proscribes aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling or coercing (or attempting to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce) “the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this chapter.” As the plaintiffs allege that the medical defendants conspired with the department in discriminating against the officers on the basis of their pregnancies, it is apparent that their allegations give rise to a c. 15 IB claim.

Section 4(5) does not impose aiding-and-abetting liability for an employer’s conduct when the employer falls outside chapter 151B’s definition of “employer.”

Terespolsky v. Law Offices of Stephanie K. Meilman, P.C. · filed 2004-02-24(5)

Meilman may not be held liable under c. 151B, §4(5) for aiding, abetting, or compelling an act forbidden by chapter 151B if Meilman P.C. was not an “employer” within the meaning of chapter 151B, and the plaintiff does not contend otherwise.

Section 4 allows joint employer liability based on control over employment; a nursing home licensee’s regulatory duties are relevant but do not automatically make it a joint employer.

Commodore v. Genesis Health Ventures, Inc. · filed 2005-03-02(1), (4)

Despite these nondelegable responsibilities, however, we do not interpret this regulation as dictating, as a matter of law, that all licensees are joint employers for the purposes of G. L. c. 151B.

Section 4(1) permits employer liability when an employer fails to respond reasonably to sexual harassment by a nonemployee that it knows or reasonably should know about.

Modern Continental/Obayashi v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 2005-09-07(1)

We thus conclude, consistent with the MCAD Guidelines, the EEOC regulations interpreting Title VII, and the vast body of precedent applying those regulations, that an employer may be held liable for failing to respond reasonably to acts of sexual harassment of which it is aware or reasonably should be aware, even though the harassing acts are perpetrated by someone who is not an agent or employee of the employer.

Section 4(16A) holds an employer liable for a coworker’s sexual harassment if the employer knew or should have known about it and failed to stop it.

Newell v. Celadon Security Services, Inc. · filed 2006-01-17(16A)

When co-workers, rather than supervisors, are the perpetrators of sexual harassment, both Title VII and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B apply the same standard in assessing employer liability. ... Similarly, under [C]hapter 151B, employer liability for coworker harassment requires a showing that the employer knew or should have known about the harassment, yet failed to halt it.” ... The record also fails to establish that Celadon is liable under the lesser standard applied to co-worker harassment.

Section 4(5) does not impose aiding-and-abetting liability on an individual when the employer is entitled to summary judgment on the underlying discrimination claim.

Beasley v. Aramark Uniform & Career Apparel, Inc. · filed 2006-04-26(5)

First, Hess may not be found liable for aiding and abetting discrimination by ARAMARK (the § 4(5) claim) where the Court has concluded that ARAMARK is entitled to summary judgment.

Section 4(5) does not support an aiding and abetting retaliation claim when there was no unlawful retaliation.

Bennett v. SAINT-GOBAIN CORPORATION · filed 2006-09-29(5)

Again, because the Court has concluded that there was no unlawful retaliation, the claim of aiding and abetting must necessarily fail.

Section 4(1) makes an employer liable for discrimination committed by a supervisor on whom it confers authority.

Augis Corp. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 2009-10-14(1)

Augis’s liability for Lesman’s conduct flows from the language of G. L. c. 151B, § 4(1), as appearing in St. 1989, c. 516, § 4, making it unlawful “[f]or an employer, by himself or his agent,” to discriminate. Through use of that language “the Legislature intended that an employer be liable for discrimination committed by those on whom it confers authority.”

Section 4(5) requires an underlying discrimination violation for aiding and abetting liability.

Johnson v. Verizon New England, Inc. · filed 2007-08-22(5)

There cannot be liability for aiding and abetting discrimination unless there is liability for the discrimination itself.

Section 4 permits personal liability for aiding and abetting discrimination.

Gledhill v. University of Massachusetts Medical School · filed 2007-09-17(5)

G.L.c. 151B, §4 provides for personal liability, based on the theory of aiding and abetting discrimination.

Section 4(5) requires an underlying act of unlawful discrimination or retaliation for aiding and abetting liability.

Bennett v. Saint-Gobain Corp. · filed 2007-11-02(5)

After all, it stands to reason that one cannot aid or abet a wrong that never occurred.

Section 4(9) may apply to a de facto employer, but control over access to a workplace alone does not establish the pervasive control of employment needed for liability.

Baldwin v. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station · filed 2008-01-04(9)

Here there is no evidence that Entergy controlled any aspect of Baldwin’s work other than granting or denying her a clearance. All other aspects of Baldwin’s employment were under the exclusive direction of Williams, her true employer. Absent a showing of a pervasive control of the employment relationship by Entergy, the motion for summary judgment as to Count I must be ALLOWED.

Section 4(4A) requires evidence that an individual acted in deliberate disregard of protected rights to sustain an interference claim.

Furtado v. Standard Parking Corp. · filed 2011-10-27(4A)

Absent evidence that Santiago or Hajjar acted in deliberate disregard of Furtado’s rights, Furtado’s ninth cause of action, against the individual defendants for interference under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 151B, section 4(4A), cannot survive.

Section 4(5) permits individual liability for intentional, substantial assistance to prohibited discrimination; allegations of joint harassment can state an aiding and abetting claim.

Fisher v. Town of Orange · filed 2012-02-24(5)

Under this second subsection, an individual may be held separately liable if he actively and intentionally provides substantial, supporting assistance to intentional conduct that is prohibited by chapter 151 B. ... These allegations, while not models of proper pleading, provide a sufficient factual basis to state a claim for aiding and abetting.

Section 4(5) allows an individual aiding-and-abetting claim only when the person's wrongful conduct is distinct from the employer's alleged discrimination.

Welgoss v. Department of Transportation · filed 2013-06-21(5)

Mullan’s purportedly discriminatory behaviors are not “distinct and separate” from either the discrimination ascribed to MassDOT or his duties as that entity’s CEO.

Section 4(4) and (4A) allow individual liability for a coworker even without supervisory authority.

Martin v. Irwin Industrial Tool Co. · filed 2012-05-03(4), (4A)

Thus, a defendant’s managerial position may render it more likely that he or she may run afoul of one or more of these provisions, but a co-employee could also be held liable without any such supervisory responsibility.

Section 4 treats an employer’s failure to take adequate action after a complaint of workplace harassment as an act of discrimination.

Cook v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. · filed 2013-05-21

As plaintiff correctly notes, however, under College-Town v. MCAD, 400 Mass. 156, 508 N.E.2d 587 (1987), ENOI’s failhre to take adequate steps in response to Cook’s March 2011 complaint can itself be considered an act of discrimination.

Section 4(4A) does not impose liability for interference with the right to be free from handicap discrimination when the same conduct does not support an actionable discrimination claim.

McLaughlin v. City of Lowell · filed 2013-07-25(4A)

Where, on the present facts, action does not lie against the city under G. L. c. 151B, § 4(16), we conclude that the same conduct cannot impose liability on the city under G. L. c. 15IB, § 4(4A).

Section 4 does not support a claim for failure to investigate and remedy alleged discrimination without an actionable discrimination claim.

Verdrager v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C. · filed 2013-12-17

Mintz Levin has also moved for summaiy judgment on Ms. Verdrager’s claim that it failed to investigate and remedy alleged discrimination under G.L.c. 151B, §4. Similar to the aiding and abetting claim, a claim for failure to investigate and remedy alleged discrimination cannot survive absent an actionable discrimination claim.

Section 4(4A) permits individual liability for a person whose discriminatory conduct interferes with another’s right to a workplace free from discrimination.

Moser v. Cheney · filed 2014-05-06(4A)

Dr. Cheney may be held individually liable, because Dr. Moser alleges that she was the perpetrator of the alleged discriminatory acts. ... At this stage, Dr. Moser has presented enough evidence to support her individual claim against Dr. Cheney.

Section 4(5) does not impose aiding and abetting liability for helping others give an employee the cold shoulder, because that conduct is not forbidden under Chapter 151B.

Thirkield v. Neary & Hunter Ob/Gyn, LLC · filed 2015-01-02(5)

In any event, relief would not available for one who merely aids and abets the cold shoulder, because the cold shoulder is not "an act forbidden” under 151B.

Section 4 permits a discrimination claim against an employer when a jointly employed supervisor plausibly takes adverse action for a discriminatory reason.

Desai v. University of Massachusetts Memorial Medical Center · filed 2019-11-12

Plaintiff has raised seven claims against Defendant Medical School: ... (5) discrimination based on race, national origin, age, and disability in violation of the Massachusetts’ Fair Employment Practices Act, M.G.L. c. 151B § 4; ... Because any discriminatory motivation underlying these actions may be attributable to Defendant Medical School, the Court finds that Plaintiff has shown a plausible entitlement to relief on her discrimination claims.

Section 4(5) requires an aiding and abetting claim to rest on an individual wrong distinct from the underlying discrimination.

Davidowicz v. 4M Fruit Distribs., Inc. · filed 2018-06-28(5)

In the context of an aiding and abetting action brought under c. 151B, the plaintiff must show, in relevant part, an individual and distinct wrong, separate from the underlying claim of discrimination.

Section 4(4A) covers interference with an employee’s right to a reasonable accommodation.

Kleya v. Karl Storz Endovision, Inc. · filed 2019-06-25(4A)

Put another way, it is also plausible that Defendant Peck interfered with Plaintiff’s rights to have a reasonable accommodation (Count VII).

Section 4(4A) permits a rights interference claim for actionable discrimination outside the employment unit.

Soni v. Wespiser · filed 2019-08-19(4A)

But the McLaughlin court explicitly noted that discrimination outside of the employment context seems to be precisely the kind of discrimination Section 4(4A) is meant to address. Accordingly, if Defendant Counihan discriminated against Plaintiff, it would be actionable.

Section 4 permits personal liability for supervisors whose conduct plausibly supports a hostile work environment or retaliation claim.

Posada v. Acp Facility Servs., Inc. · filed 2019-07-29

For the same reasons that Posada has stated a plausible claim as to ACP on the basis of the alleged misconduct of Ronquillo and White, she has also stated plausible claims against both Ronquillo and White personally under Chapter 151B.

Section 4 permits personal liability for supervisors whose alleged conduct plausibly supports hostile work environment or retaliation claims.

Posada v. Suarez · filed 2019-07-29

For the same reasons that Posada has stated a plausible claim as to ACP on the basis of the alleged misconduct of Ronquillo and White, she has also stated plausible claims against both Ronquillo and White personally under Chapter 151B.

Section 4(4A) does not make a software vendor liable for interference with employees’ rights solely because it knowingly sells inaccessible software to their employer.

The National Federation of the Blind. Inc. v. Epic Systems Corporation · filed 2020-01-31(4A)

Epic’s knowing sale of software that is inaccessible to blind users is not enough to trigger liability for its customers’ treatment of their blind employees.

Section 4(4A) permits an interference claim when a defendant deliberately disregards a person’s right to be free from discrimination; continued harassment after notice can support that claim.

Saari v. Allegro MicroSystems, LLC · filed 2020-02-03(4A)

Here, Mrs. Saari has alleged facts plausibly establishing that Defendants deliberately disregarded her right to be free from discrimination. ... Despite having notice that his conduct made Mrs. Saari uncomfortable, however, Mr. Moore continued to harass Mrs. Saari. (Docket No. 1 at 3, 4). The Court therefore denies the motion to dismiss Counts VII and XII.

Section 4(4A) prohibits interference with an employee’s right to work free of unlawful discrimination; an interference claim fails without admissible evidence of deliberate disregard of that right.

Jacquet v. City of Somerville, Massachusetts · filed 2020-06-30(4A)

Here, both parties present their arguments regarding the § 4(4A) claim in mostly the footnotes of their memoranda. The record simply does not contain admissible evidence of “deliberate disregard” of Jacquet’s rights.

Section 4(16) does not impose individual liability on a supervisor for disability discrimination; its reference to an employer acting through an agent establishes employer liability for the agent’s actions.

Melo v. City of Somerville · filed 2020-11-25(16)

Chapter 151B, in contrast, does provide for individual liability in some circumstances. But Melo has not shown that the section upon which he relies – § 4(16) – constitutes one of those circumstances. Indeed, the plain text of § 4(16) appears to suggest the opposite.

Section 4(4A) can impose individual liability for workplace sexual harassment even when the person is neither the employee’s employer nor supervisor.

Cagle v. Estes · filed 2021-03-31(4A)

Section 4(4A) of Chapter 151B makes it ... unlawful "[f]or any person to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with another person in the exercise or enjoyment of any right granted or protected by this chapter . . . " Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(4A). ... Consequently, even if the Trial Court was not Plaintiff's joint employer and Estes was not functioning as her supervisor, he may still be found liable for sexual harassment that occurred in the workplace.

Section 4(5) makes an aiding and abetting claim derivative of an underlying discrimination claim.

Daniels v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. · filed 2021-02-18(5)

An aiding and abetting claim under § 4(5) is “entirely derivative” of an underlying discrimination claim. Id. As the court has found no evidence to support Daniels’s federal and state claims of discrimination or violation of the FMLA, a claim for aiding and abetting also fails.

Section 4(5) requires an aiding and abetting claim to rest on an individual wrong distinct from the underlying discrimination claim.

Staples v. Verizon Data Services, LLC · filed 2021-05-18(5)

Here, Staples cannot sustain his aiding and abetting claim against Gopal because he has not alleged an “individual and distinct wrong.”

Section 4(5) makes an aiding and abetting retaliation claim dependent on a viable underlying retaliation claim.

Downey v. Earl Johnson and Massachusetts Department of State Police · filed 2021-10-08(5)

To the extent Downey seeks to assign liability to Johnson individually for retaliation, she can only do so under a theory of “aiding and abetting.” See G.L. c. 151B, § 4(5) (making it unlawful for “any person, whether an employer or an employee or not, to aid [or] abet . . . the doing of any of the acts forbidden under [G. L. c. 151B] or to attempt to do so.”). However, aiding and abetting claims here are “entirely derivative” of the retaliation claim. See Lopez v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 696, 713 (2012) (quoting Abramian, 432 Mass. at 122). As set forth above, Downey has failed to establish a viable claim of retaliation. Plaintiff thus cannot sustain a claim for aiding and abetting retaliation against Johnson, and summary judgment against the claim shall be allowed.

Section 4(5) requires an underlying act of discrimination by a principal offender to support an aiding and abetting claim.

Caruso v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. · filed 2022-03-09(5)

The sex discrimination claims are the only possible foundation for the § 4(5) claim because they are the only claims for which Lucas, rather than Delta itself, is the alleged principal offender. Because Caruso’s claims of sex discrimination have been dismissed, the derivative claim cannot stand.

Section 4(5) permits individual liability for aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing a discriminatory employment practice.

Larde v. Commonwealth Zoological Corp · filed 2022-10-28(5)

Massachusetts law permits a finding of individual liability for discriminatory employment practices.

Section 4 requires an individual defendant to interfere with protected rights or participate in discrimination; passing a complaint to human resources does not establish liability.

Khan v. Sedgwick Claims Management, Inc. · filed 2023-07-07(4A), (5)

As a result, the Court finds that these defendants did not interfere with Plaintiff’s enjoyment of his rights or otherwise participate in any alleged discrimination.

Section 4(5) permits claims for aiding and abetting discrimination, but the complaint must allege facts supporting that liability.

Connolly v. Woburn Public Schools · filed 2023-03-02(5)

It is true that Chapter 151B provides for an action for aiding and abetting discrimination. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(5). The complaint, however, makes no such allegation. In any event, the complaint does not allege sufficient facts to establish aiding and abetting liability.

Section 4 permits claims against a tenant-screening company for aiding or abetting housing discrimination under subsections (6) and (10) through its role in rental decisions.

Louis v. SAFERENT SOLUTIONS, LLC · filed 2023-07-26(5)

The Massachusetts Supreme Court has found that defendants who play a role in the tenant selection process may be held liable under, at minimum, Section 4(10), even if they only “aid[ed] or abet[ted]” a violation of Section 4(10). See DiLiddo v. Oxford St. Realty, Inc., 876 N.E.2d 421, 430 (Mass. 2007). Such logic similarly applies here to both the Section 4(6) and 4(10) claims, and they survive the motion to dismiss on this basis.

An aiding and abetting claim under Section 4(5) fails when the underlying discrimination claim fails.

O'Horo v. Boston Medical Center Corp. · filed 2023-09-27(5)

Dr. O’Horo brings an aiding and abetting claim against Dr. Soto pursuant to M.G.L. c. 151B, § 4(5). ... Because Dr. O’Horo’s underlying gender discrimination claims do not survive summary judgment, her aiding and abetting claim does not either.

Section 4(1) applies to employers, not employees who are not themselves the employer.

Urella v. Verizon · filed 2024-03-12(1)

Section 4(1) applies, on its face, to employers, not employees.

Section 4 requires an employment discrimination plaintiff to sue an entity that employed or controlled them.

Baez v. BayMark Detoxification Services, Inc. · filed 2024-12-12

The district court had no reason to get into the sufficiency of Baez's evidence of discrimination because Baez's Chapter 151B claim failed for a more fundamental reason: that he did not name his employer as the defendant as Massachusetts law requires. See DeLia v. Verizon Commc'ns Inc., 656 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that defendant "cannot be held liable under [Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4] because it is not [plaintiff]'s 'employer'").

Section 4(4A) requires proof that an individual intentionally interfered with another person's right to employment free of discrimination; the claim fails when the underlying discrimination is not shown.

Cocuzzo v. Trader Joe's East Inc. · filed 2024-11-15(4A)

To prevail on a claim of interference under section 4(4A), Cocuzzo must show that Gillum "'interfered ... with [her] rights in deliberate disregard of those rights,' which requires a showing of 'an intent to discriminate.'" ... For the reasons we have described, Cocuzzo has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's decision granting summary judgment for Gillum on Cocuzzo's state law claim.

Section 4(4A) permits an interference claim when a person deliberately disregards another’s protected rights with intent to discriminate; an alleged threat after an employee announces an MCAD charge can suffice at the pleading stage.

Frank v. Hightower Holding, LLC d/b/a Lexington Wealth Management · filed 2025-09-16(4A)

The allegations are sufficient to state a viable Section 4(4A) claim against Porcaro.

Section 4(16) allows individual liability in some circumstances, but a plaintiff must show that those circumstances apply.

Fitzgerald v. City of Lawrence · filed 2024-11-21(16)

While Chapter 151B provides for individual liability in some circumstances, Fitzgerald has not shown that such circumstances apply in this case.62 See Melo v. City of Somerville, No. 18-10786-RGS, 2020 WL 6945938, at *3 (D. Mass. Nov. 25, 2020). Accordingly, this Court grants summary judgment in favor of Moriarty on Fitzgerald’s claims against him individually.

Individual liability under § 4(4A) or § 4(5) requires a plausible showing that the individual personally intended to discriminate.

Llorens v. LexShares, Inc. · filed 2024-12-03

These allegations do not support a plausible inference that Rosner and van Lint personally acted with intent to discriminate on the basis of race, which is a necessary element for liability under either § 4(4A) or § 4(5).

Section 4(4A) allows personal liability when an individual’s discriminatory or retaliatory conduct interferes with another person’s protected rights.

Khan · filed 2025-10-23(4A)

Thus, if a person’s individual conduct amounts to discrimination or retaliation, that person may be held personally liable under section 4(4A) for interfering with another’s right to be free from such treatment.

Section 4(4A) permits retaliation claims against individuals who are neither employers nor supervisors.

Martin · filed 2025-11-03(4A)

An employment relationship is not required to impose liability under §4(4A).

Section 4(5) makes an aiding and abetting claim dependent on an underlying discrimination claim; if that claim is dismissed, the aiding and abetting claim cannot stand.

O'Horo v. Boston Medical Center Corporation · filed 2025-03-12(5)

This means that where the underlying discrimination claim is dismissed, the aiding and abetting claim cannot stand.

Section 4(5) permits an aiding and abetting claim against individuals who commit distinct acts in a shared scheme of retaliation.

Sheldon v. F.W. Webb Company, alias · filed 2025-09-26(5)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has properly alleged individual and distinct acts in a common scheme to amount to aiding and abetting. ... Therefore, the Court DENIES, the motion to dismiss as to Count VI.

Section 4(1A) requires an employer to prove that accommodating an employee’s religious obligations would impose an undue hardship.

New York & Massachusetts Motor Service, Inc. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1988-01-19(1A)

The burden then shifts to the defendant-employer to prove that accommodation of the complainant’s religious obligations would impose on the employer an undue hardship as defined by the statute.

Section 4(1A) applies retroactively to religious discrimination claims arising within three years before its effective date, including claims being transferred from the MCAD to court on that date.

Herrera v. Boyd Coating Research Co., Inc. · filed 1997-11-19(1A)

Although the statute does not specifically refer to claims which were in the process of being transferred from the MCAD to a court on its effective date, it defies logic to suppose the legislature intended to exclude such claims from coverage. In any event, this Court finds that Chapter 151B, § 4 applies retroactively to the present action because it arose less than three years before its effective date and, as of that date, had not yet been filed in court.

Section 4(1A) requires an employee to show that an employer interfered with the employee’s practice of religion.

Johnson v. Adesa Auctions Corp. · filed 1998-07-27(1A)

Chapter 151B, §4A does not encompass plaintiffs’ claims. Under the statute, plaintiffs have the burden of demonstrating that the employer interfered with the employee’s practice of religion.

The 1997 amendment to § 4(1A) applies to a pending claim when a timely petition for certiorari was filed before the amendment took effect.

Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc. · filed 1999-07-21(1A)

Given that definitional function, it would be inconsistent to treat a claim in a case as pending for purposes of the retroactivity provision until the time for filing a petition for certiorari has expired but as not pending when a certiorari petition properly has been filed within that time.

Section 4(1A)'s 1997 protection for sincerely held religious beliefs cannot be applied retroactively to impose new liability for this employer's earlier conduct.

Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc. · filed 2004-03-11(1A)

Because we conclude that the changes to G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (1A), have a substantial effect on the defendant’s rights, retroactive application of those changes violates the defendant’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 10 of Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

Section 4(1A)'s examples of undue hardship are not exhaustive; exempting an employee from a dress code can impose undue hardship by harming the employer's public image.

Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp. · filed 2004-12-01(1A)

From this, we understand Chapter 151B's definition of undue hardship to be a non-exclusive list. ... Exempting Cloutier from the dress code would have imposed more than a de minimis burden on Costco for the reasons outlined above. Her refusal to consider anything less means that Costco could not offer a reasonable accommodation without incurring an undue hardship.

Section 4(1A) does not require an employer to engage in an interactive process if it can conclusively show that every conceivable religious accommodation would impose undue hardship.

Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 2008-01-04(1A)

There is no obligation to undertake an interactive process if an employer can conclusively demonstrate that all conceivable accommodations would impose an undue hardship on the course of its business.

Section 4(1A) requires an employer to provide a reasonable religious accommodation unless it would cause undue hardship; an employee’s initial request for an exemption from a grooming policy does not relieve the employer of that duty.

Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co. · filed 2008-12-02(1A)

In any event, G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (1A), requires an employer to provide a reasonable accommodation unless there is an undue hardship. We conclude that the plaintiff’s initial request for an exemption did not relieve the defendant of this obligation.

Section 4(18)'s religious exemption for employment actions applies only to organizations that limit membership, enrollment, admission, or participation to members of their religion.

Barrett v. Fontbonne Academy · filed 2015-12-16(18)

The best way to harmonize and preserve, as much as possible, the literal meanings of §1(5) and §4(18) is to read an implicit limitation into the latter provision, such that the phrase “any organization” refers, at least in the employment context, to organizations that meet the limited membership clause.

Section 4 permits an employer to deny a religious accommodation that would impose an undue hardship, including more than de minimis health and safety costs.

Brox v. Wood's Hole, Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket Steamship Authority · filed 2022-03-10

Even assuming arguendo that plaintiffs have established a prima facie case of religious discrimination, the Authority has readily demonstrated that accommodating plaintiffs’ religious obligations would impose an undue hardship.

Section 4(1A) does not require an adverse employment action for a religious discrimination claim; failure to accommodate a required religious practice can itself constitute discrimination.

Rossman v. Nashoba Regional School District · filed 2024-08-28(1A)

Accordingly, construing a ch. 151B religious discrimination claim to require an adverse employment action as an element is incorrect.

Section 4(1A) supports a religious discrimination claim when an employee plausibly alleges that a religious tenet conflicts with an employer’s vaccination requirement.

Usmanov v. Massachusetts Financial Services Company · filed 2024-09-03(1A)

While the sufficiency of Scott’s allegations is a closer question than the sufficiency of Usmanov’s, particularly in light of Usmanov’s decades-long history of vaccine refusal on religious grounds, the Court concludes that both plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged claims of religious discrimination under Title VII and Chapter 151B.

A religious accommodation claim under § 4(1A) can survive a pleadings motion when the alleged facts plausibly connect a vaccination objection to a tenet of the employee’s religion.

Munroe v. Boston Medical Center · filed 2024-09-16(1A)

It appears that there is no material distinction between the analysis of this issue under Title VII and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(1A), and the Court will accordingly treat the claims identically. ... That asserted connection is sufficient to support a plausible claim that accepting at least some of the COVID-19 vaccines would violate a tenet of her idiosyncratic religion.

Section 4(1A) permits an employer to deny a religious accommodation that would impose an undue hardship.

Geronimo v. Melrose-Wakefield Healthcare Corporation · filed 2025-07-22(1A)

The case law is clear, as explained, that federal and state law permit employers to deny religious exemption requests on undue hardship grounds.

Section 4(1A) does not require further religious accommodation when an employer has provided reasonable accommodations and further measures would cause undue hardship.

LaFreniere v. Spectrum Health Systems, Inc. · filed 2025-09-30(1A)

Accordingly, based on the undisputed factual record, the Court finds that Spectrum is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s religious discrimination claim because Spectrum both provided reasonable accommodations and met its burden in demonstrating that any further accommodations would pose an undue hardship.

Religious discrimination claims under § 4 rise and fall with parallel Title VII claims when the parties identify no relevant difference between them.

Rodrique v. Hearst Communications, Inc. · filed 2025-01-17

As neither party has identified relevant differences between religious discrimination claims under Title VII and Chapter 151B, nor provided any analysis specific to Chapter 151B, we treat the claims as rising and falling together.

Section 4(9A) prohibits questions about an applicant’s admission to a mental health treatment facility and bars discharge for false answers to those prohibited questions.

Kraft v. Police Commissioner of Boston · filed 1991-05-15(9A)

In asking questions of Kraft that sought information about his admission to a facility for the care and treatment of mentally ill persons, the commissioner violated G. L. c. 15IB, § 4 (9A) (1988 ed.). ... The commissioner had no authority to discharge Kraft for giving false answers to questions that the commissioner under law had no right to ask, and he does not argue otherwise.

Section 4(9) limits an employer’s requests for certain criminal record information from employees and applicants, but does not prohibit requests to other sources.

Bynes v. School Committee of Boston · filed 1991-11-21(9)

Having determined that G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (9), only affects an employer’s ability to request certain criminal record information from employees and potential employees, we have no need to consider the relationship between § 4 (9) and the CORI statute.

Section 4(16) requires proof of injury caused by an unlawful preemployment disability inquiry to recover damages, assuming a private claim is available.

Martino v. Forward Air, Inc. · filed 2010-06-14(16)

But here we need not decide whether there is indeed a cause of action under the Massachusetts statute because, even assuming such a claim were permitted, there is no doubt that a plaintiff would need to show proof of injury caused by the illegal questioning in order to recover damages.

Section 4(16) permits an employer to require medical or psychological testing after an offer of employment, but not before one.

Police Department of Boston v. Kavaleski · filed 2012-11-06(16)

To comport with the requirements of the Massachusetts antidiscrimination law, G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (16), and provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2006), an employer may not conduct medical or psychological testing prior to making an offer of employment, but may condition an offer of employment on the successful completion of such testing.

Section 4(16) prohibits preemployment inquiries about an applicant’s handicap; an innocuous exchange about possible accommodations does not qualify.

Felix v. Town of Kingston · filed 2019-07-08(16)

In the court’s view, this exchange was innocuous and does not rise to the level of a preemployment inquiry within the meaning of the statute.

Section 4(16) prohibits preemployment inquiries about an applicant’s disability, but a request for possible accommodations in this context was not such an inquiry.

Felix v. Town of Kingston · filed 2021-12-23(16)

Therefore, as the magistrate judge noted, this inquiry, when viewed in context, is not the type of pre-employment inquiry contemplated by Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 151B § 4(16).10 We agree -- so we decline to consider it further.

Section 4(16) does not require an employer to excuse an employee from an essential job function as a reasonable accommodation.

Cox v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1993-02-24(16)

As we have said earlier in this opinion, the Federal law is clear, and there is no reason to construe the Commonwealth's law differently, that reasonable accommodation does not include waiving or excusing an inability to perform an essential job function.

Section 4(16) does not require an employer to give an employee additional time to prove he can perform essential job functions when doing so would impose an undue burden.

Perkins v. Flatley · filed 1993-09-30(16)

Reasonable accommodation in this case did not require the Flatley Company to provide plaintiff with additional time within which to prove that he was capable of performing the essential functions of a “house person.” This would have imposed an undue burden on the employer.

Section 4(16) does not require an employer to depart from a bona fide seniority system to accommodate a handicap when the system is not a subterfuge to evade the law.

Buckley v. Department of Mental Health · filed 1994-03-21(16)

Plaintiff fails to assert or introduce evidence demonstrating that the seniority system was not bona fide or a subterfuge designed to evade the law. Thus, by following the dictates of a bona fide seniority system, DMH cannot be found to violate Buckley’s rights under G.L.c. 15 IB, §4(16).

Section 4(16) requires a handicap discrimination claimant to show that he can perform the job’s essential functions with reasonable accommodation; a genuine dispute about those functions prevents summary judgment.

Rice v. M/A-Com, Inc. · filed 1993-10-07(16)

The party claiming handicap discrimination under G.L.c. 151B, §4(16) must be able to establish the following: he is handicapped: he is a “qualified handicapped person”: and he is capable of performing the essential functions of his position with reasonable accommodation at the time the discrimination occurred. ... Because there is still a dispute as to the essential functions of the stockroom job, hindering a determination of Mr. Rice’s status as a handicapped person, summary judgment for Count I is denied.

Section 4 governs employment discrimination against a qualified handicapped person, including one whose work-related injury qualifies under chapter 152, §75B(1).

Belonni v. Reservoir Nursing Center · filed 1994-01-18

While arguably the term “this section” applies to all of §75B and not just §75B(2), §75B(1) is simply definitional and adds certain work-related injuries to the roster of handicaps otherwise defined in c. 15 IB, §§1(16), 1(17). An employer who impermissibly deals with a handicapped person thus violates c. 151B, §4, not c. 152, §75B and the former statute’s remedial scheme therefore controls.

A disability benefits application does not conclusively establish that an employee is unqualified under § 4(16) when the employee states that reasonable accommodation would have enabled him to perform his job.

Ward v. Westvaco Corp. · filed 1994-07-06(16)

Ward’s clear and deliberate qualification of his handicap status in his application for disability benefits takes his case outside the framework of August. ... Here, disputed issues exist as to whether Ward was a “qualified handicapped person.”

Section 4(16) protects employees with known heart disease who can perform their jobs from discharge solely because of their condition.

Talbert Trading Co. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1994-07-22(16)

We conclude that persons suffering from heart disease or other cardiac conditions known to their employers at the time of hiring and who are otherwise able to perform their work, are protected by the statute from discharge solely on account of their heart condition.

Section 4(16) requires a person claiming handicap discrimination to be capable of performing the job’s essential functions with reasonable accommodation.

Beal v. Board of Selectmen · filed 1995-02-21(16)

Because police officers are responsible for public safety, and the plaintiff’s handicap severely compromises her capability to ensure the general safety of the public, we think that there are no reasonable accommodations that would enable the plaintiff to perform the essential functions of a police officer. The plaintiff, therefore, has no reasonable expectation of demonstrating that she is a qualified handicapped person under either G. L. c. 15IB or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

Section 4(16) limits its prohibition on otherwise discriminating because of handicap to decisions affecting employment status; a supervisor’s isolated instruction that causes an injury does not itself state a claim.

Smedley v. Everett Management Corp. · filed 1995-07-14(16)

The specific terms in Section 4(16) have in common that they are decisions relating to employment status.

Section 4 requires an employee claiming handicap discrimination to be qualified for the position from which they were discharged, with or without reasonable accommodation.

Reidy v. Travelers Insurance · filed 1996-06-03

Because plaintiff in this case admits that he could not perform any of the functions of a claims representative, regardless of accommodation, the Court concludes that plaintiff has faffed to show that he was “qualified” for the position from which he was discharged.

Section 4(16) requires consideration of accommodations that would enable a handicapped employee to perform essential job functions, but does not require an employer to waive those functions.

Picot v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1994-12-15(16)

Section 4(16) of c. 151B provides that where a handicapped person is unable to perform essential job functions courts must consider whether any reasonable accommodation by the employer would have enabled the person to perform. However, Coxmakes clear that reasonable accommodation does not require an employer to disregard or waive an employee’s inability to perform an essential function of the job.

Section 4(16)’s reasonable accommodation inquiry applies when a handicapped employee cannot perform the essential functions of the job.

Tate v. Department of Mental Health · filed 1995-01-24(16)

Although the plaintiff argues on appeal that there is a factual issue whether the Association reasonably accommodated her handicap, this issue is only considered when a handicapped person is not able to perform the essential functions of the job.

Section 4(16) requires reasonable accommodation for a qualified handicapped employee; whether working from home is reasonable may depend on the employee’s job duties and the available arrangements.

Mason v. Pegasystems, Inc. · filed 1996-06-10(16)

Such a determination, however, is more appropriately determined by the trier of fact as the summary judgment record is replete with numerous issues of material fact. For example, issues of material fact are presented as to what functions Mason’s job consisted of, and whether reasonable accommodations, such as sending in her assignments via a home computer and modem, were plausible.

Section 4(16) requires a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment based on a handicap to produce some evidence that he was handicapped, qualified for an open position, rejected despite his qualifications, and that the employer continued seeking applicants.

Whalen v. Nynex Information Resources Co. · filed 1995-03-28(16)

To establish a prima facie case of “disparate treatment” on the basis of a handicap, a plaintiff must produce some evidence that: (1) he is handicapped; (2) he is a qualified handicapped person and he applied for a position for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) the employer rejected the plaintiff for the position in spite of his qualifications; (4) after the employer rejected the plaintiff, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants.

Section 4(16) protects an employee whom the employer perceives as handicapped, even if the employee disputes having a handicap.

Lee v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority · filed 1995-08-08(16)

The MBTA relies on the fact that Lee himself argues that he is not handicapped. I find, however, that Lee is a member of the class of handicapped individuals protected by G.L.c. 151B, §4(16) because he is perceived by his employer as handicapped.

Section 4(16) allows a handicap discrimination claim by a worker who can perform essential job functions with reasonable accommodation; that ability does not rule out handicap status.

Stoupakis v. Midas International Corp. · filed 1995-12-19(16)

If ability to work were, by itself, sufficient to take a plaintiff outside the definition of “handicapped,” there could never be a viable claim of handicap discrimination in employment. Defendants’ argument would lead to the absurd result that in proving that a plaintiff was “capable of performing the essential functions of the position involved with reasonable accommodation,” G.L.c. 15 IB, §4(16), every plaintiff would simultaneously be proving that he was not “handicapped.” This is obviously not what the statute means.

A person who seeks disability benefits after termination is not automatically estopped from bringing a handicap discrimination claim under § 4 when evidence shows that reasonable accommodation could have enabled the person to perform the job.

Labonte v. Hutchins & Wheeler · filed 1997-05-05

We conclude that the judge did not err in denying the law firm’s claim that the plaintiff was estopped from pursuing a claim under G. L. c. 151B, § 4, by filing for disability benefits.

Section 4(16) prohibits an employer from refusing to hire a qualified person because of a handicap when the person can perform the job’s essential functions with reasonable accommodation that does not impose an undue hardship.

Broadway Brake Supply, Inc. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1997-06-12(16)

Malone established a prima facie case that he was a qualified individual who was rejected on the basis of his handicap. Because Broadway failed to show that it refused to hire Malone for reasons other than his handicap, the Decision and Order of the Full Commission holding that Broadway discriminated against Malone is AFFIRMED.

Section 4(16) permits an employer to require medical examinations of an employee seeking re-employment after disability retirement to assess fitness for the job.

White v. City of Boston · filed 1997-07-22(16)

Because the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and c. 15 IB do not specifically prohibit medical examinations for persons applying for re-employment, and because case law supports examinations in these circumstances, this court finds that the City did not violate the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or c. 151B when it required White to submit to the exams.

Pregnancy complications that substantially limit daily activities can qualify as a handicap for a § 4(16) discrimination claim.

Sbrogna v. ChipCom Corp. · filed 1997-09-30(16)

Because Sbrogna was limited in her ability to conduct her daily activities due to her pregnancy complications, it cannot be said that her pregnancy was not a physical impairment which substantially limited one or more major life activity.

Section 4(16) did not require an employer that had already granted leave for substance abuse treatment to grant a second leave for alcoholism in these circumstances.

Evans v. Federal Express Corporation · filed 1998-01-09(16)

We need not resolve such issues in this case because we agree with the district court’s final ground for summary judgment, namely, that the company was not obliged to give Evans a second leave of absence for substance abuse. Evans had already been given a month’s leave to deal with cocaine addiction. His present claim rests on the view that in his circumstances a second leave to treat alcoholism was an obligatory reasonable accommodation. The district court said it was not, and we agree.

Section 4(16) did not require an employer to grant a second leave for substance abuse treatment after an earlier treatment leave failed to resolve the employee's problem.

Evans v. Federal Express · filed 1998-01-14(16)

We need not resolve such issues in this case because we ... agree with the district court's final ground for summary judgement, namely, that the company was not obliged to give Evans' a second leave of absence for substance abuse.

Section 4(16) does not require an employer to accommodate a handicap that does not prevent the employee from performing the essential functions of the job.

Beling v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc. · filed 1999-09-22(16)

RMD is not subject to c. 15IB liability for failing to accommodate Beling’s MS if her MS is not the reason for her inability to perform the essential functions of her job.