Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1507

An untimely § 60-1507 movant must establish manifest injustice to obtain review, even when claiming that a defective complaint deprived the trial court of jurisdiction.

Woods v. State · filed 2021-05-21(f)(2)(A)

But the Kansas Supreme Court has held that procedural bars to untimely and successive 60-1507 motions also apply to motions arguing that a defective complaint deprived the district court of jurisdiction. See State v. Robertson, 309 Kan. 602, 608-09, 439 P.3d 898 (2019). ... Woods fails to show by a preponderance of the evidence that manifest injustice would result from the district court's refusal to consider the merits of his untimely K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. Thus, the district court did not err in denying the motion as untimely.

Section 60-1507(f)(3) requires dismissal of an untimely motion when the movant fails to show manifest injustice excusing the delay.

Love v. State · filed 2021-07-30(f)(3)

If an offender fails to make this showing, a Kansas court "must dismiss the motion as untimely filed." K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1507(f)(3).

A movant’s ignorance of the law does not establish manifest injustice that excuses a late § 60-1507 motion.

Becker v. State · filed 2021-08-27(f)(2)

Ignorance of the law does not constitute manifest injustice to extend the time limitation for filing a 60-1507 motion.

Section 60-1507(f)(2) allows an extension of the one-year filing limit to prevent manifest injustice, which the movant must show.

Peterson v. State · filed 2021-09-10(f)(2)

Nevertheless, the one-year time limitation for bringing a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion may be extended to prevent a manifest injustice. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2). ... Peterson has not asserted anything that would rise to the level of manifest injustice for his belated filing.

A § 60-1507 motion generally must be filed within one year after direct appeal, and successive motions are generally barred; exceptional circumstances or manifest injustice may permit an exception.

Drennan v. State · filed 2022-03-25(c), (f)

A movant must typically file this motion within the first year following the conclusion of a direct appeal, and successive motions are not generally permitted. Limited exceptions apply if the movant can demonstrate exceptional circumstances or if the court finds it necessary to lift the procedural bar to prevent manifest injustice.

A late § 60-1507 motion may proceed on manifest injustice grounds only if the movant gives a compelling reason for the delay or makes a colorable claim of actual innocence; the merits of the underlying claims alone do not suffice.

Overman v. State · filed 2022-03-04(f)(2)(A)

Considerations of manifest injustice are limited to two circumstances: (1) whether the person has provided a compelling explanation why they "failed to file the motion within the one-year time limitation" and (2) whether the person "makes a colorable claim of actual innocence." K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A).

Ignorance of the one-year filing deadline alone does not establish manifest injustice warranting an extension of time to file a motion under § 60-1507.

Cash v. State · filed 2022-03-11(f)(2)

Thus, the fact that Cash became aware, or chose to act, after the one-year time limitation in K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1507(f)(1) is not alone sufficient to warrant a manifest injustice finding.

Section 60-1507(f) bars a motion filed after the one-year limit unless the prisoner establishes manifest injustice to excuse the delay.

White v. State · filed 2022-04-15(f)

As such, his motion is time-barred unless he can show manifest injustice for the belated filing.

Section 60-1507(f) requires a post-conviction motion within one year after the final state appellate order on direct appeal or the end of that appellate jurisdiction, with an extension available to prevent manifest injustice.

Farmer (ID 78747) v. Schnurr · filed 2022-01-28(f)

If Farmer were to raise this claim in a second state habeas proceeding, his petition would be untimely under K.S.A. § 60-1507(f), which requires an action to be “brought within one year of . . . [t]he final order of the last appellate court in [Kansas] to exercise jurisdiction on a direct appeal or the termination of such appellate jurisdiction”—a limitation that may be extended only to prevent “manifest injustice.”

A motion under § 60-1507 must be filed within one year after the conviction becomes final, unless an extension is needed to prevent manifest injustice.

State v. Brown · filed 2022-04-22(f)

Similarly, a defendant has one year from when a conviction becomes final to file a motion under K.S.A. 60-1507(a). K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1507(f)(1). Notwithstanding, courts may extend the time limitation for bringing a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion to prevent a manifest injustice. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2). ... Thus, we conclude that Brown did not timely file his motions; and, as such, the district court appropriately denied them.

An untimely § 60-1507 movant must explain why the motion was not filed within one year to establish manifest injustice; later legal developments do not excuse delay when the claim’s factual basis was known before the deadline.

Crum v. State · filed 2022-06-03(f)(2)(A)

But this difference between Crum's and the Kirtdoll holding does nothing to explain why Crum failed to file his motion within the one-year time limitation. Crum knew at sentencing that the State had filed its intent to pursue a hard 50 sentence only three days before sentencing. He knew of the three-day gap between the State's filing and his sentencing hearing long before his 2009 deadline to file a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

Ignorance of the law does not establish manifest injustice to extend the one-year filing deadline for a motion under § 60-1507.

State v. Cash · filed 2022-07-15(f)(2)(A)

But ignorance of the law cannot provide the foundation for a manifest injustice claim.

Section 60-1507(f)(3) requires dismissal of untimely post-conviction claims when the movant does not show manifest injustice warranting an extension.

Dupree v. State · filed 2022-06-10(f)(3)

Thus, the district court correctly concluded that these claims from Dupree's 2020 motion were not timely filed. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1507(f)(3) thus required the district court to dismiss the balance of Dupree's claims in his second K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

A colorable claim of actual innocence can excuse an untimely motion, but conclusory assertions of innocence cannot establish manifest injustice.

Elliott v. State · filed 2022-07-29(f)(2)

While a colorable claim of actual innocence may act as a gateway to permitting the consideration of an untimely 60-1507 motion, a movant must provide more than conclusory assertions of innocence.

Section 60-1507(f)(2) permits consideration of claims filed after the one-year deadline only to prevent manifest injustice; untimely claims that do not relate back are barred when the movant does not assert that exception.

Johnson v. State · filed 2022-07-22(f)(2)

A court may consider claims filed after the one-year period in K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-1507(f)(1)(A) "only to prevent a manifest injustice." K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60- 1507(f)(2). A movant who "fails to assert manifest injustice is procedurally barred from maintaining the action." State v. Trotter, 296 Kan. 898, Syl. ¶ 3, 295 P.3d 1039 (2013). Johnson's brief does not assert, or even mention, why considering his claims is necessary to prevent manifest injustice. The district court did not err when it denied his untimely claims—those that do not relate back to his original K.S.A. 60-1507 motion—without an evidentiary hearing.

A late § 60-1507 motion requires a showing of manifest injustice, and a movant who offers no reason for missing the one-year deadline cannot obtain relief from that deadline.

Neal v. State · filed 2022-08-19(f)(2)(A)

By statute, we are required to determine why Neal failed to file his K.S.A. 60- 1507 motion within the one-year time limit. See K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A). Yet Neal simply does not answer that question.

An untimely § 60-1507 motion must be summarily dismissed when the movant fails to show that considering it is necessary to prevent manifest injustice.

Payton v. State · filed 2023-01-27(f)(3)

Because Payton did not provide a persuasive explanation for why the district court could review Payton's untimely K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, the court was required to summarily dismiss the motion.

An untimely Section 60-1507 motion is procedurally barred when the movant fails to show manifest injustice to excuse the late filing.

Sigler v. State · filed 2024-01-05(f)(3)

As Sigler has made no effort to show manifest injustice to excuse the untimely filing of his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, we find that he is procedurally barred from seeking relief under that statute.

The one-year deadline for a 60-1507 motion may be extended only to prevent manifest injustice, which a movant must establish to avoid dismissal as untimely.

Holloway v. State · filed 2024-03-22(f)(2)

Finally, because Holloway failed to establish manifest injustice would result without an extension of time to file his motion, the district court properly denied Holloway's motion as untimely.

A prisoner’s lack of legal knowledge does not establish manifest injustice permitting an extension of the one-year deadline for a Section 60-1507 motion.

McKinnis v. State · filed 2024-04-19(f)(2)

Ignorance of the law is not manifest injustice. A prisoner's lack of legal knowledge cannot be used as a reason to extend the one-year time limitation.

Section 60-1507(f)(1) allows its one-year filing deadline to be extended only when failure to consider the motion would result in manifest injustice.

Bloom v. State · filed 2024-07-19(f)(1)

And the only way to extend the one-year time limit provided in K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-1507(f)(1) is if Bloom can establish that the failure to consider the motion would result in manifest injustice.

An untimely § 60-1507 motion requires a showing of manifest injustice to excuse the late filing.

Richardson v. State · filed 2024-07-26(f)(2)(A)

Richardson's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion was untimely, and she failed to show manifest injustice defined in K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A) to excuse her late filing.

An untimely motion does not establish manifest injustice by stating the underlying claim without explaining the delay or asserting actual innocence.

Barnett v. State · filed 2024-08-09(f)(2)(A)

Barnett presented the district court with only the claim itself, without any explanation for why the district court should examine the claim despite its untimely presentation. K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A) limits the district court to determining why Barnett did not file his motion within the one-year limitation. But Barnett did not provide the district court with any explanation for why he failed to make his claim within the one-year limitation. Barnett also did not state a claim of actual innocence. Thus, the district court did not err by denying Barnett's motion for failing to show manifest injustice.

A subject matter jurisdiction claim raised through a § 60-1507 motion remains subject to the one-year filing deadline unless review is needed to prevent manifest injustice.

Downing v. State · filed 2024-09-13(f)(2)

Thus, although subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, there must be a procedural avenue available to the litigant which enables them to bring that claim before the court. By failing to file his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion within a year of his direct appeal's dismissal, that pathway was no longer open to Downing unless he established that review of the claim would prevent a manifest injustice in accordance with K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2).

An untimely Section 60-1507 motion may proceed only if the prisoner shows manifest injustice, including through a colorable claim of actual innocence based on new evidence.

Torrence v. State · filed 2025-05-16(f)(2)(A)

This procedural barrier to judicial review can be overcome by a showing of manifest injustice, which Torrence failed to do. Torrence's 60-1507 motion is impermissibly untimely, and the district court did not err in summarily denying it without a hearing.

Section 60-1507(f) imposes a one-year filing limit that a court may extend only to prevent manifest injustice; a motion filed years late without a basis for manifest injustice is facially untimely.

State v. Brown · filed 2025-06-06(f)

K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(1) imposes a one- year time limit that "may be extended by the court only to prevent a manifest injustice." K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2). Brown's 2023 motion, filed more than six years after the last appellate mandate in his direct appeal, would have been facially untimely but asserts no basis for us to conclude manifest injustice exists.

The one-year limit for a 60-1507 motion may be lifted for manifest injustice shown by a compelling reason for the late filing or qualifying new evidence of actual innocence.

Kidd v. State · filed 2025-06-06(f)(2)(A)

For that purpose, a manifest injustice is either a compelling reason that would excuse an untimely filing or new evidence of actual innocence of sufficient weight to show that a reasonable juror would be more likely than not to vote against conviction. K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2)(A). Kidd has shown neither ground for relief from the time bar.

A late § 60-1507 movant does not show manifest injustice merely by obtaining evidence recently when the movant gives no reason for failing to seek it within the filing period.

Underwood v. State · filed 2025-06-20(f)(2)(A)

When considering whether manifest injustice exists, courts are "limited to determining why the prisoner failed to file the motion within the one-year time limitation or whether the prisoner makes a colorable claim of actual innocence." K.S.A. 2024 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A). ... Underwood asserts the evidence he relies on—the result of his FOIA request—was discovered in January 2020 and was thus unavailable prior to his current K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. But Underwood never addresses the obvious—that he could have filed a FOIA request and hired a private investigator to obtain this evidence 20 years ago.

The manifest injustice exception in § 60-1507(f)(2) applies to the filing deadline for KSVPA detainees’ § 60-1501 petitions.

In re Care and Treatment of Thomas · filed 2025-07-03(f)(2)

This statutory construction dictates that the timeline for KSVPA detainees to file a petition under K.S.A. 60-1501(c) is also subject to the conditions or exceptions set forth in K.S.A. 60-1507.

A double jeopardy claim waived by a no contest plea, with no new evidence offered, does not establish manifest injustice to excuse an untimely postconviction motion.

State v. Duff · filed 2025-08-15(f)(2)(A)

Accordingly, his manifest injustice argument fails and his claim for relief on appeal under K.S.A. 60-1507 fails as untimely.

An untimely § 60-1507 motion requires a persuasive explanation for the delay or a colorable claim of actual innocence to establish manifest injustice.

Carter v. State · filed 2025-08-29(f)(2)(A)

Carter has failed to make a colorable claim of actual innocence, identify any new evidence to justify his late filing of the motion, or offer any persuasive explanation for why the motion was not timely filed.

An untimely motion requires a showing of manifest injustice through excusable delay or a colorable claim of actual innocence.

Britt v. State · filed 2025-10-17(f)(2)(A)

Because Britt demonstrated neither excusable delay nor a colorable claim of actual innocence, he is unable to demonstrate manifest injustice under K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2)(A).

Section 60-1507(f)(2)(A) permits an otherwise late motion when manifest injustice is shown by an exceptional reason for delay or a colorable claim of actual innocence based on new evidence.

Allison v. State · filed 2026-02-20(f)(2)(A)

In turn, a manifest injustice entails either an exceptional reason for the late filing or a "colorable claim of actual innocence" based on "new evidence."

Section 60-1507 permits an extension of the filing deadline only to prevent manifest injustice.

Denney v. State · filed 2026-03-13(f)(2)

The statutory deadline can be extended only to prevent manifest injustice.

Subsection (f)(2) is the exclusive exception to § 60-1507’s filing deadline; a movant seeking that exception must show manifest injustice, including a colorable claim of actual innocence when relying on new evidence.

Cook v. State · filed 2026-03-27(f)(2)

We agree with the district court that Cook's claim falls short of a colorable claim of actual innocence under the Beauclair standard. Cook has not shown manifest injustice under K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2). Because K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2) is the exclusive exception to statutory time limitations, Cook has failed to show that the untimeliness of his motion should be excused.

The one-year filing deadline may be extended for manifest injustice when the movant explains the delay or presents a colorable claim of actual innocence.

State v. Morgan · filed 2026-06-05(f)(2)

Morgan did not explain the delay of her latest motion, and she did not advance a colorable claim of actual innocence. Thus, Morgan has failed to establish manifest injustice as contemplated in K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2).

An untimely § 60-1507 motion may be considered to prevent manifest injustice only if the movant explains the filing delay or makes a colorable claim of actual innocence.

Silverson v. State · filed 2026-06-05(f)(2)(A)

K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2)(A) limits the scope of "manifest injustice" to two considerations—whether the movant has explained why they "failed to file the motion within the one-year time limitation" and whether the person "makes a colorable claim of actual innocence." If the movant does not show that dismissal will result in manifest injustice under either of these provisions, the court must dismiss the untimely motion. K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(3).

Section 60-1507(f) requires dismissal of a motion filed more than one year after the direct appeal unless the movant shows manifest injustice through an explanation for the delay or a colorable claim of actual innocence.

Atkinson v. State · filed 2026-06-26(f)

A court may only consider a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion filed outside this one-year statutory period if the movant can show that consideration is necessary "to prevent a manifest injustice." K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2). This exception is a narrow one. K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2)(A) limits the scope of "manifest injustice" to two considerations—whether the movant has explained why they "failed to file the motion within the one-year time limitation" and whether the person "makes a colorable claim of actual innocence." If the movant does not show that dismissal will result in manifest injustice under either of these provisions, the court must dismiss the untimely motion. K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(3).

Limited access to a law library does not establish manifest injustice sufficient to extend the one-year filing deadline.

Brown v. Young · filed 2021-10-01(f)(2)

Our court has consistently determined limited access to a law library is insufficient to establish manifest injustice and excuse a movant's failure to abide by the one-year filing deadline provided under K.S.A. 60-1507(f).

A movant's lack of legal knowledge does not establish manifest injustice excusing an untimely motion under § 60-1507(f)(2).

Cash v. State · filed 2022-01-28(f)(2)

Considering Cash's lack of legal knowledge is the only argument he provides to explain his nearly decade-long delay in filing his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, he has not made a sufficient showing of manifest injustice. Thus, the trial court properly summarily dismissed Cash's motion as untimely.

Section 60-1507(f)(2) gives a prisoner a reasonable time after discovering counsel’s failure to file a motion to claim manifest injustice based on that failure, but that time cannot exceed another year.

Hernandez v. State · filed 2025-09-05(f)(2)

Although the movant is entitled to a reasonable amount of time from the discovery of counsel's representational deficiencies to bring the motion under the excusable-delay component of manifest injustice, we note our court's decisions finding that this reasonable amount of time cannot exceed another year.

A prisoner seeking to excuse an untimely § 60-1507 motion based on actual innocence must point to new evidence; an unsupported claim that trial counsel could have performed better does not warrant an evidentiary hearing.

Britt v. State · filed 2019-07-26(f)(2)(A)

But Britt has not made a sufficient showing on that point even to justify an evidentiary hearing. The statutory test for actual innocence contemplates some "new evidence," but Britt hasn't pointed to any.

A movant relying on actual innocence to overcome the one-year filing limit must support the claim with facts; conclusory allegations do not warrant an evidentiary hearing.

Greene v. State · filed 2024-11-22(f)(2)(A)

Greene failed to establish his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion warranted an evidentiary hearing because his allegations are conclusory contentions. See Noyce, 310 Kan. at 398. Greene provided no factual support for his claim of actual innocence, such as how he received such information, when the victim allegedly recanted her testimony, or even what statements were recanted.

A movant seeking to excuse an untimely § 60-1507 motion through actual innocence must present new evidence supporting a colorable claim.

McNellly v. State · filed 2025-01-10(f)(2)(A)

McNelly has failed to present any new evidence to support a colorable claim of actual innocence, as required by K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A).

Section 60-1507(f)(2)(A) permits an untimely motion based on actual innocence only when new evidence makes it more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted the prisoner.

Adams v. State · filed 2025-01-31(f)(2)(A)

For an innocence claim to warrant extending the filing deadline for a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, a movant must show that "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted the prisoner in light of new evidence." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A).

A late post-conviction motion claiming actual innocence must point to new evidence making it more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted the movant.

Edwards v. State · filed 2025-01-31(f)(2)(A)

To establish a claim of actual innocence, Edwards must show that "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted [him] in light of new evidence." K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A).

An untimely § 60-1507 motion is not excused by an actual-innocence claim unless new evidence shows it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted the movant.

Cochran v. State · filed 2025-03-14(f)(2)(A)

Cochran does not establish it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of new evidence, as our statute requires. See K.S.A. 2024 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A).

An untimely § 60-1507 motion cannot rely on speculation that an expert might support an actual-innocence claim; the movant must present new evidence.

State v. Taylor · filed 2024-11-01(f)(2)(A)

He merely speculates that, given the existence of this article, such an expert exists. This speculation is not new evidence within the meaning of K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2) that warrants consideration of a motion submitted outside the statutory time frame.

Section 60-1507(f) requires manifest injustice to extend its one-year filing limit, and a conclusory assertion of actual innocence does not establish it.

State v. Olds · filed 2015-10-23(f)

Clearly, the motion was well beyond the 1-year time limitation in K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(1). Thus, we conclude that Olds' motion was untimely. ... Accordingly, Olds must show that manifest injustice would occur unless the time limitation for filing a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion is extended. ... Without something more than a conclusory statement, we find that Olds has failed to demonstrate a colorable claim of actual innocence. ... Thus, we conclude that Olds has failed to show manifest injustice, and, as such, his motion was untimely.

Section 60-1507(f)(2)(A) permits a late motion based on actual innocence when new evidence makes it more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted the prisoner.

Hill v. State · filed 2017-05-12(f)(2)(A)

Likewise, we do not find that Hill has shown that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the additional evidence he wishes to present. Accordingly, we find no manifest injustice and conclude that the district court's summary dismissal of Hill's 60-1507 motion as being untimely filed was proper.

The 2016 amendment to § 60-1507(f)(2)(A) applies retroactively and limits the manifest injustice inquiry for late motions to reasons for the delay or a colorable claim of actual innocence.

Parks v. State · filed 2017-09-29(f)(2)(A)

Because we find the 2016 statutory amendment is to be applied retroactively, any consideration of manifest injustice must be limited to assessing why the prisoner failed to file the motion within the one-year time limitation or whether the prisoner makes a colorable claim of actual innocence.

Section 60-1507(f)(2)(A) limits the manifest-injustice inquiry for an untimely motion to the reasons for late filing and a colorable claim of actual innocence, excluding the merits of the underlying claim as a factor.

Garcia-Gomez v. State · filed 2017-08-11(f)(2)(A)

As is readily apparent, the 2016 amendment eliminated the second factor of the Vontress test while statutorily adopting the first and third factors. The 2016 amendment, therefore, narrowed the focus of a Kansas court's inquiry into the matter of manifest injustice.

A colorable claim of actual innocence under § 60-1507(f)(2)(A) requires factual innocence; legal innocence does not establish manifest injustice.

Gant v. State · filed 2017-08-25(f)(2)(A)

The statute, K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60- 1507(f)(2)(A), requires a movant to show factual, not legal, innocence to support a finding of manifest injustice.

Section 60-1507(f)(2) limits the manifest injustice inquiry for an untimely motion to the reason for delay or a colorable claim of actual innocence; courts do not consider the merits of the underlying claims.

Gholston v. State · filed 2017-10-13(f)(2)

However, the legislature recently amended K.S.A. 60-1507(f) and limited the manifest injustice inquiry. Now, courts no longer consider the merits of a movant's claims. See K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2). The inquiry is limited to considering the movant's reason for delay in filing within the time limitation or whether the movant presents a colorable claim of actual innocence.

The 2016 amendment to § 60-1507(f)(2)(A) applies retroactively and limits the manifest injustice inquiry to the reason for late filing or a colorable claim of actual innocence.

Mendoza-Hernandez v. State · filed 2018-04-27(f)(2)(A)

Because the 2016 amendment is procedural in nature and the amendment can be applied retroactively, our inquiry is limited to determining why Hernandez failed to file the motion within the one-year time limitation or whether he makes a colorable claim of actual innocence.

Section 60-1507(f)(2)(A) limits the manifest injustice inquiry for an untimely motion to the reason for missing the one-year deadline or a colorable claim of actual innocence, and the 2016 amendment applies retroactively.

Wildy v. State · filed 2017-10-27(f)(2)(A)

In 2016, the Kansas Legislature amended K.S.A. 60-1507 to limit the inquiry into manifest injustice to "determining why the prisoner failed to file the motion within the one-year time limitation or whether the prisoner makes a colorable claim of actual innocence." K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A). Multiple panels of this court have determined that this amendment was procedural in nature and, as such, is to be applied retroactively. ... We find the analysis of these panels persuasive.

The manifest-injustice exception to Section 60-1507’s one-year filing limit permits courts to consider only the movant’s reason for filing late or a colorable claim of actual innocence.

Hayes v. State · filed 2017-11-09(f)(2)(A)

The plain language of the statute makes it clear that courts are limited to considering (1) a movant's reasons for the failure to timely file the motion and (2) a movant's claims of actual innocence.

Section 60-1507 allows an untimely motion when necessary to prevent manifest injustice; the court considers the reason for the delay or a colorable claim of actual innocence.

Mitchell-Pennington v. State · filed 2018-04-27(f)(2)(A)

Mitchell-Pennington has failed to explain why his sixth motion could not have been filed within the statutory time frame. As a result, he has failed to show the manifest injustice necessary to extend the filing time period.

A colorable claim of actual innocence can excuse both the time limit and the bar on successive motions under § 60-1507.

Beauclair v. State · filed 2018-06-22

Thus, if Beauclair is successful on remand in showing a colorable claim under the Carrier standard, he will meet not only the manifest injustice standard to excuse untimeliness but also the exceptional circumstances standard to excuse successiveness.

For motions filed after July 1, 2016, the manifest-injustice exception to the one-year filing limit requires consideration of why the prisoner filed late and whether the prisoner makes a colorable claim of actual innocence.

Houston v. State · filed 2018-10-26(f)(2)(A)

Houston's motion was filed after July 1, 2016, so the statutory factors were clearly the factors that the court was required to apply (why the prisoner failed to file within one year and whether the prisoner makes a colorable claim of actual innocence).

A prisoner claiming actual innocence to excuse an untimely § 60-1507 motion must present new evidence; without it, the prisoner cannot establish manifest injustice.

State v. Sanders · filed 2018-08-10(f)(2)(A)

So while Sanders says he's innocent, he hasn't presented new evidence to support that claim. And without new evidence, Sanders hasn't brought a "colorable claim of actual innocence." Sanders therefore failed to establish manifest injustice, a requirement for substantive consideration of his untimely motion.

In deciding whether manifest injustice warrants extending the one-year filing limit, courts consider only the reason for the late filing or a colorable claim of actual innocence.

Wimbley v. State · filed 2018-08-17(f)(2)(A)

To determine whether manifest injustice would exist without extension of the statutory time limitations, we are now limited to "determining why the prisoner failed to file the motion within the one-year time limitation or whether the prisoner makes a colorable claim of actual innocence."

A conclusory claim of actual innocence without evidentiary support does not establish manifest injustice to excuse an untimely § 60-1507 motion.

Hall v. State · filed 2018-08-24(f)(2)

Without at least naming the witnesses or providing any additional evidentiary support, Hall failed to provide the trial court with an evidentiary basis for his claim. Hall's conclusory statement is insufficient to rise to the level of a colorable claim of actual innocence. ... Hall, therefore, failed to show manifest injustice or a colorable claim of actual innocence as required to excuse his failure to file his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion within the one-year time limitation.

For motions filed after the 2016 amendment, § 60-1507(f)(2)(A) limits manifest-injustice review of an untimely motion to the reason for delay and whether the prisoner makes a colorable claim of actual innocence.

Dodge v. State · filed 2019-02-15(f)(2)(A)

Here, however, Dodge filed his second motion in April 2017, so this court can consider only the statutory factors: why the prisoner failed to file in time and whether the prisoner makes a colorable claim of actual innocence. As discussed earlier under Beauclair, Dodge does not make a sufficient colorable claim of actual innocence to salvage his untimely claim.

For motions filed after the 2016 amendments, § 60-1507(f)(2)(A) limits manifest injustice extensions of the one-year filing deadline to the reason for late filing or a colorable claim of actual innocence.

Reed v. State · filed 2019-02-22(f)(2)(A)

When Reed filed his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, the only considerations relevant to whether manifest injustice would occur absent an extension of the one-year deadline were those set forth by the 2016 amendments: (1) why Reed failed to timely file the motion, and (2) whether Reed made a colorable claim of actual innocence.

An untimely motion relying on actual innocence must support that claim with evidence; bare allegations do not establish manifest injustice or warrant an evidentiary hearing.

Kingsley v. State · filed 2019-02-08(f)(2)(A)

Again, Kingsley offers no proof of his allegations, and Beauclair seems to make it clear that bare allegations, without support, are not enough to prove actual innocence.

An untimely motion under § 60-1507 must state facts showing a compelling reason for the delay or a colorable claim of actual innocence; the movant cannot reserve that factual showing for a later hearing.

Ridge v. State · filed 2019-02-15(f)(2)(A)

A party seeking 60-1507 relief doesn't have the option to defer the factual showing required to avert dismissal for untimeliness or to establish grounds warranting a hearing to the hearing itself.

A prisoner cannot use facts known from the start as new evidence of actual innocence to extend Section 60-1507’s one-year filing limit for manifest injustice.

Alcala v. State · filed 2019-06-28(f)(2)(A)

As a result, Alcala's contention that he was actually innocent because his brother's friend shot his wife was not "new evidence" as meant under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A) because Alcala knew of this information from the start.

A prisoner claiming actual innocence to overcome § 60-1507’s one-year filing limit must present new evidence of innocence.

Murdock v. State · filed 2019-04-05(f)(2)(A)

For Murdock to overcome the late filing of his motion with a claim of actual innocence, he must come forward with new evidence of his innocence.

Section 60-1507(f)(2)(A) limits manifest-injustice extensions of the one-year filing deadline to the reasons for late filing and a colorable claim of actual innocence.

Miller v. State · filed 2019-04-05(f)(2)(A)

In determining whether a defendant has met the manifest-injustice standard, the court may only consider (1) the reasons a defendant failed to timely file and (2) whether the defendant can make "a colorable claim of actual innocence." K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A).

For motions filed after July 1, 2016, subsection (f)(2)(A) limits manifest injustice review of a late motion to why the movant missed the one-year deadline or whether the movant makes a colorable claim of actual innocence.

Eddy v. State · filed 2019-04-05(f)(2)(A)

Also, Eddy's motion was filed over one year after the 2016 statutory amendments to K.S.A. 60-1507(f) went into effect. Thus, the appropriate legal standards for determining manifest injustice to excuse Eddy's late filing are the ones set out in K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 60-1507(f). Under that provision, in considering manifest injustice the court is limited to determining why Eddy failed to file his motion on time or whether Eddy makes a colorable claim of actual innocence.

A late motion under § 60-1507 must show manifest injustice, and the court limits that inquiry to the reason for delay or a colorable claim of actual innocence.

State v. Davis · filed 2019-06-28(f)(2)(A)

To warrant extension of the time limitation, he must have shown that manifest injustice would result from dismissing his motion. K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60- 1507(f)(2). Under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A), "the court's inquiry shall be limited to determining why the prisoner failed to file the motion within the one-year time limitation or whether the prisoner makes a colorable claim of actual innocence."

For motions filed after the 2016 amendment, the manifest-injustice exception to the one-year filing deadline considers reasons for delay and actual innocence, but excludes whether the claims raise substantial issues of law or fact.

Allen v. State · filed 2019-05-17(f)

When K.S.A. 60- 1507(f) was amended, however, the Kansas Legislature removed the second factor from consideration and limited review to only the first and third Vontress factors.

For a motion filed after the 2016 amendments, Section 60-1507(f)(2)(A) permits an extension of the one-year deadline for manifest injustice based on the reason for the delay or a colorable claim of actual innocence.

Williams v. State · filed 2019-07-26(f)(2)(A)

The statute allows courts to consider why the movant failed to file the motion within the one-year time frame and whether the movant makes a colorable claim of actual innocence.

Under § 60-1507(f)(2)(A), a claim of manifest injustice based on actual innocence requires new evidence making it more likely than not that a reasonable juror would have acquitted the movant.

Brown v. State · filed 2019-08-30(f)(2)(A)

Manifest injustice requires some "new evidence" which would make it more likely than not that a reasonable juror would have acquitted the movant.

Section 60-1507(f)(2)(A) limits manifest-injustice review of an untimely motion to the reasons for late filing and any colorable claim of actual innocence.

Hernandez v. State · filed 2019-12-06(f)(2)(A)

When determining manifest injustice, the district court is limited to considering the defendant's reasons for failing to timely file and whether the defendant makes a colorable claim of actual innocence.

A colorable claim of actual innocence under § 60-1507(f)(2)(A) requires new evidence making it more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted the prisoner.

Avila v. State · filed 2019-08-30(f)(2)(A)

At the outset, Avila's claim of actual innocence is fatally defective. While Avila cites K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A) as the correct legal standard, he never contends in his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion or in his appellate brief that "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted the prisoner in light of new evidence." K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A).

Section 60-1507(f)(2) limits manifest injustice for a late motion to the movant’s reasons for filing late and any claim of actual innocence.

Holt v. State · filed 2019-12-13(f)(2)

The plain language of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2) limits a court's consideration of what constitutes a manifest injustice to "(1) a movant's reasons for the failure to timely file the motion and (2) a movant's claims of actual innocence." 307 Kan. at 14.

A prisoner claiming actual innocence to excuse an untimely motion must present new evidence of innocence.

Martinez v. State · filed 2019-12-13(f)(2)(A)

If Martinez falsely confessed to the crime, it was incumbent on him to show new evidence of his actual innocence, as the statute requires, before getting relief under K.S.A. 60-1507.

To overcome the one-year filing limit through actual innocence, a prisoner must provide evidentiary support showing that, in light of new evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted the prisoner.

State v. Ballard · filed 2020-01-31(f)(2)(A)

Thus, for Ballard to show "actual innocence" to overcome the one-year time limitation, he needed to show that it was more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of Simpson's purported recantation of his trial testimony. But he also needed to provide some evidentiary support for that assertion, which he failed to do.

Section 60-1507(f)(2)(A) limits manifest injustice for an untimely motion to the reason for delay or a colorable claim of actual innocence.

State v. Reed · filed 2020-04-24(f)(2)(A)

We are thus restricted to considering why he failed to file his motion within the statutory time limit or whether he made a colorable claim of actual innocence.

An untimely § 60-1507 motion may be considered if the prisoner makes a colorable claim of actual innocence, meaning new evidence makes it more likely than not that no reasonable juror would convict.

Young v. State · filed 2020-05-29(f)(2)(A)

Relevant here, K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A) allows a court to consider an otherwise-untimely motion for postconviction relief if the prisoner makes "a colorable claim of actual innocence." The statute clarifies that "the term actual innocence requires the prisoner to show it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted the prisoner in light of new evidence." K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A).

Section 60-1507(f)(2)(A) limits the manifest-injustice inquiry for an untimely motion to the movant’s reasons for late filing or claims of actual innocence.

State v. Morris · filed 2020-08-14(f)(2)(A)

In considering whether manifest injustice compels the court to consider his untimely motion, we only consider the movant's reasons for failing to timely file or the movant's claims of actual innocence.

A movant who voluntarily pleaded guilty cannot establish manifest injustice for an untimely motion by claiming actual innocence based on insufficient evidence.

Woods v. State · filed 2020-07-24(f)(2)(A)

Even if this court liberally construes Woods' third K.S.A. 60-1507 motion to include a claim of actual innocence, the fact remains that by pleading guilty, he admitted to the facts underlying his conviction and may not collaterally attack his conviction on the basis of insufficient evidence or actual innocence. Because he is precluded from making these arguments, it cannot be manifest injustice to deny the consideration of their merits.

Section 60-1507(f)(2)(A) limits the manifest-injustice inquiry for extending the one-year filing deadline to why the prisoner filed late or whether the prisoner has a colorable claim of actual innocence.

Stafford v. State · filed 2020-08-28(f)(2)(A)

Under those amendments, to find manifest injustice the court's inquiry is limited to two factors: "determining why the prisoner failed to file the motion within the one-year time limitation or whether the prisoner makes a colorable claim of actual innocence." K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60- 1507(f)(2)(A); see White, 308 Kan. at 497.

Section 60-1507(f)(2)(A) permits an extension of the filing deadline to prevent manifest injustice when the movant shows a good reason for the delay or a colorable claim of actual innocence.

Trussell v. State · filed 2020-09-04(f)(2)(A)

When a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion is untimely, an extension of the time period is permitted only "to prevent manifest injustice." K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2). Under this statute, an inmate must either show some good reason why the motion was not filed within the time period or present a colorable claim of actual innocence. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A).

A late § 60-1507 motion requires a showing of manifest injustice through a reason for the delay or a colorable claim of actual innocence based on new evidence.

Rash v. State · filed 2020-09-04(f)(2)(A)

So the trial court could excuse the delay only if he showed manifest injustice. He did not do so, however, because he offered neither a reason for the delay nor a colorable claim of actual innocence based on new evidence.

A plausible claim of actual innocence based on new evidence removes the one-year time limit for a § 60-1507 motion when the evidence makes it more likely than not that no reasonable juror would convict.

McKinney v. State · filed 2020-10-02(f)(2)(A)

But when a defendant makes a plausible argument of his or her actual innocence—that is, that new evidence has come to light and that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would convict the movant in light of the new evidence—the one-year time limitation in Kansas' habeas statute does not apply. See K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A); Beauclair v. State, 308 Kan. 284, 299-300, 419 P.3d 1180 (2018).

A movant cannot overcome the one-year filing limit by claiming actual innocence through conclusory, unsupported assertions.

Makthepharak v. State · filed 2020-10-09(f)(2)(A)

The sort of conclusory and unsupported representations Makthepharak has offered do not establish a bona fide claim of actual innocence lifting the time bar in K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-1507(f)(1).

When deciding whether to extend the filing deadline for manifest injustice, a court may consider only the prisoner’s reasons for missing the deadline or a colorable claim of actual innocence.

Stafford v. State · filed 2021-02-12(f)(2)(A)

When assessing manifest injustice, the court may only consider a prisoner's colorable claim of actual innocence or the reasons why the prisoner failed to meet the deadline. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A).

Section 60-1507(f)(2) permits a late motion only to prevent manifest injustice, which requires a good reason for the delay or a colorable claim of actual innocence.

State v. Verge · filed 2021-01-29(f)(2)

When a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion is untimely, an extension of the time period is permitted only "to prevent manifest injustice." K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2). Under this statute, an inmate must either show a good reason why the motion was not filed within the time period or present a colorable claim of actual innocence.

A colorable claim of actual innocence based on new evidence can overcome the one-year filing limit and the restriction on successive motions.

Peppers v. State · filed 2021-02-05

A colorable claim of actual innocence based on new evidence can establish both the manifest injustice and exceptional circumstances needed to overcome the procedural bars of untimeliness and successiveness.

Actual innocence under the manifest-injustice exception requires factual innocence; suppression of evidence for a Fourth Amendment violation does not establish it.

Bailey v. State · filed 2021-02-12(f)(2)(A)

Actual innocence bears on whether the defendant factually committed the charged criminal conduct. ... Suppression of evidence as a remedy for a government agent's violation of the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not rest on or establish a defendant's innocence.

A movant who files after the one-year deadline must show manifest injustice for the delay or actual innocence based on new evidence; facts known when the case began do not satisfy the new-evidence requirement.

Gichamu v. State · filed 2021-03-26(f)(2)

If a defendant files a 60-1507 motion outside the one-year deadline in K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1507(f)(1), as Gichamu plainly did, he or she must show "manifest injustice" in the reason for the delay or "actual innocence," meaning a likelihood "no reasonable juror would have convicted [movant] in light of new evidence" to bypass the time bar.

Conclusory assertions of actual innocence do not overcome the one-year limit for a § 60-1507 motion; the prisoner must support a colorable claim with new evidence.

State v. Tiger · filed 2021-03-19(f)(2)(A)

Tiger's conclusory assertions fail to show "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted [him] in light of [the] new evidence." K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60- 1507(f)(2)(A). Thus the district court did not err by holding Tiger failed to show actual innocence as would overcome the bar on untimely motions.

An untimely § 60-1507 motion requires new evidence supporting a colorable claim of actual innocence to qualify for the actual-innocence ground of the manifest-injustice exception.

Klein v. State · filed 2021-04-09(f)(2)(A)

In short, Klein has not provided new evidence that gives rise to a colorable claim of actual innocence within the meaning of K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A).

An untimely § 60-1507 motion requires a showing of manifest injustice based on the filing delay or a colorable claim of actual innocence.

Barnett v. State · filed 2021-08-27(f)(2)(A)

Absent any explanation regarding Barnett's filing delay or any attempt to put forth exculpatory evidence to establish his actual innocence, we agree with the district court that Barnett did not establish manifest injustice to justify the untimely filing of his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

Section 60-1507(f)(2)(A) permits an actual innocence claim based on exculpatory evidence available but not presented at trial when the motion also claims counsel was ineffective for failing to present that evidence.

Taylor v. State · filed 2021-05-21(f)(2)(A)

The Skaggs panel, while adopting the Reeves standard, emphasized the limited scope of its holding. The panel recognized that in cases similar to Reeves—where the new evidence is used to both excuse an untimely motion and to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the failure to discover or present that evidence—"new evidence" includes evidence available but not presented at trial. But the panel explicitly declined to consider whether this formulation applied to other situations. Skaggs, 59 Kan. App. 2d at 144. Skaggs is persuasive. Taylor has presented new evidence, i.e., evidence not presented at the trial.

A colorable claim of actual innocence must rest on new evidence to excuse an untimely § 60-1507 motion.

State v. Dudley · filed 2021-09-03(f)(2)(A)

The problem we have with Dudley's argument is that a colorable claim of actual innocence must turn on new evidence. The video of his fight with the officers is not new.

A late § 60-1507 movant who neither explains the delay nor claims actual innocence fails to show manifest injustice.

Wimbley v. State · filed 2021-11-24(f)(2)(A)

Accordingly, we find that Wimbley's motion was untimely and that he has failed to establish manifest injustice to justify the belated filing of his most recent motion.

Section 60-1507 limits the manifest injustice inquiry for an untimely motion to the movant’s reasons for delay and any claim of actual innocence; an unexplained delay in seeking language assistance and the cost of transcripts did not excuse late filing.

Ambris-Morales v. State · filed 2021-10-01(f)(2)(A)

Under the amended statute, we are limited to considering (1) a movant's reasons for the failure to timely file the motion and (2) a movant's claims of actual innocence. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A). ... We thus hold that his motion is time-barred and affirm the district court's ruling.

A movant invoking actual innocence to excuse an untimely § 60-1507 motion must support a colorable claim with factual representations and evidentiary materials; a bare assertion does not warrant a hearing.

Wheeler v. State · filed 2021-10-15(f)(2)(A)

Wheeler was obligated to offer factual representations in his motion supported with evidentiary materials setting out a colorable claim of actual innocence. Beauclair v. State, 308 Kan. 284, 302, 419 P.3d 1180 (2018). His bare assertion of or reference to actual innocence was insufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing.

Section 60-1507(f)(2)(A) does not excuse a late motion based on a claim of actual innocence supported by untested evidence the prisoner knew about at trial.

Evans v. State · filed 2022-03-25(f)(2)(A)

By their very nature, these untested samples are not "newly discovered" evidence. As to these samples, Evans has known about them since his trial. Thus, he cannot meet the requirements of K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A) for a colorable claim of actual innocence.

An actual-innocence claim under subsection (f)(2)(A) cannot excuse an untimely motion unless it rests on new evidence.

Williams v. State · filed 2022-04-29(f)(2)(A)

But this assertion does not meet the actual innocence requirement because it is not new evidence.

A prisoner seeking to extend the filing deadline through actual innocence must show, with new evidence, that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted the prisoner; a conclusory claim does not meet that burden.

Marks v. State · filed 2022-12-09(f)(2)(A)

Marks has failed to meet his burden to show that "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted the prisoner in light of new evidence." K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A); Beauclair, 308 Kan. at 294. Marks merely makes a conclusory claim that no reasonable juror would have convicted him of premeditated first-degree murder if his trial counsel had pursued a mental disease or defect defense, but he points to no evidence to support this claim.

A colorable claim of actual innocence may allow a movant to pursue a successive § 60-1507 motion filed after the one-year limit.

Beauclair v. State · filed 2022-12-09(c), (f)(1)

The motion is plainly successive under K.S.A. 60-1507(c) and was filed beyond the one-year time limit in K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(1). To avoid those procedural barriers, Beauclair had to show exceptional circumstances or manifest injustice respectively. A colorable claim of actual innocence may be legally sufficient.

Alleged errors in jury instructions are not new evidence supporting a colorable claim of actual innocence to excuse an untimely post-conviction motion.

Lee v. State · filed 2023-11-09(f)(2)(A)

We note that Lee also attempts to argue that there were erroneous jury instructions given in the underlying criminal trial. But the alleged erroneous instructions do not constitute new evidence as required to establish a claim of actual innocence.

A colorable claim of actual innocence can excuse an untimely motion only when it rests on evidence that was not argued or known at trial.

Gonzales v. State · filed 2024-04-26(f)(2)(A)

While the nature of the evidence that may give rise to such a claim varies, at a minimum the statute contemplates the presentation of evidence that was not argued or known by the defendant at trial.

A prisoner claiming actual innocence to overcome the one-year filing limit must present credible new evidence showing that no reasonable juror would have convicted the prisoner.

Shears v. State · filed 2024-07-26(f)(2)(A)

Actual innocence means that the prisoner must "show it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted the prisoner in light of new evidence." K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A). ... With no credible new evidence, Shears failed to show it was more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him of the robbery in light of new evidence.

A general allegation of police corruption does not establish actual innocence under § 60-1507(f)(2)(A) without a link to the officers in the case sufficient to show that no reasonable juror would have convicted.

Coppage v. State · filed 2024-07-05(f)(2)(A)

A general allegation of police corruption without connecting Blake and Gunzenhauser to that corruption, therefore, is insufficient to show that "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted" Coppage. See K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A).

A claim of actual innocence under § 60-1507(f)(2)(A) permits an untimely post-conviction motion to proceed to other claims, but does not itself provide substantive relief.

Gray v. State · filed 2024-10-11(f)(2)(A)

Under K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A), a claim of actual innocence is a procedural gateway to permit filing a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion beyond the one-year time limit of K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-1507(f)(1). That is, a proper claim of actual innocence allows the district court to consider the merits of other claims in a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. But Kansas appellate courts have not recognized the existence of a free-standing, substantive claim of actual innocence as a ground for relief under K.S.A. 60-1507.

An untimely § 60-1507 motion cannot proceed on an actual innocence claim based on conclusory allegations of an officer’s involvement when the record and trial evidence do not support the claim.

Herron v. State · filed 2025-09-12(f)(2)(A)

Given Herron's conclusory allegations about Golubski's involvement in his case and the strength of the evidence against him at trial, he fails to establish a colorable claim of actual innocence to overcome the untimeliness of his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

Section 60-1507 permits a late motion on a claim of actual innocence only when the prisoner points to new evidence making it more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted.

Freeman v. State · filed 2025-11-26(f)(2)(A)

A claim of actual innocence sufficient to overcome the one-year time limit for asserting a 60-1507 motion must make more than a conclusory claim of innocence—it must produce or point to new evidence that makes it more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted Freeman.

The actual innocence exception to the filing deadline requires new evidence; alleged recantations already raised in earlier proceedings do not qualify.

Anderson v. State · filed 2025-10-03(f)(2)(A)

Still, the alleged recantations do not count as "new evidence" since this issue was previously presented by Anderson—in both his initial appeal and his previous K.S.A. 60- 1507 motions. And Anderson has not shown how the alleged recantations make it more probable than not that a reasonable juror would have acquitted him.

Section 60-1507(f)(2)(A) requires new evidence showing that, more likely than not, no reasonable juror would have convicted the prisoner to establish a colorable claim of actual innocence that excuses a late motion.

Hudgins v. State · filed 2026-02-13(f)(2)(A)

To successfully allege a colorable claim of actual innocence, Hudgins must establish that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him considering the new evidence.

An untimely Section 60-1507 motion asserting actual innocence may be considered on the merits only if new evidence makes it more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted the movant.

Merced v. State · filed 2026-03-06(f)(2)(A)

When a movant alleges a claim of actual innocence to overcome an untimely filed K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, they are only entitled to consideration of the merits of their claim if they can demonstrate that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted them in light of the new evidence.

A movant claiming actual innocence to excuse an untimely § 60-1507 motion must present new evidence; recasting old trial rulings as judicial bias does not establish manifest injustice.

Weeks v. State · filed 2019-06-07(f)(2)(A)

But Weeks provides none of the "new evidence" he concedes is a prerequisite for relief. He merely dresses up old adverse trial rulings in the robes of judicial bias. The district court did not err in summarily dismissing these old judicial bias claims because his motion was untimely, and Weeks has failed to establish manifest injustice necessary to bypass the time requirement.

The civil discovery rules of K.S.A. 60-234(a) do not apply in a Section 60-1507 proceeding.

LaPOINTE v. State · filed 2009-08-28

We hold that the discovery rules of K.S.A. 60-234(a) are not applicable in a K.S.A. 60-1507 proceeding.

Section 60-1507’s limits on successive and untimely habeas motions do not categorically violate procedural due process or the Supremacy Clause.

Gilbert v. State · filed 2016-08-19

We hold that the restrictions on habeas corpus motions codified in K.S.A. 60-1507 do not categorically impair constitutionally protected procedural due process rights in a way that offends the Supremacy Clause.

Subsections (c) and (f) impose procedural limits on successive and untimely motions that do not suspend the constitutional right to seek habeas corpus relief.

Coleman v. State · filed 2019-04-12(c), (f)

As a result, we conclude that the limitations in K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-1507(c) and (f) did not suspend Coleman's constitutional right to seek habeas corpus relief.

The 2016 limits on the manifest injustice inquiry in subsection (f)(2)(A) do not apply to § 60-1507 motions filed before July 1, 2016.

Perry v. State · filed 2017-02-03(f)(2)(A)

Perry filed his motion in 2015, so in accordance with White, subsection (f)(2)(A) of K.S.A. 60-1507 does not apply to Perry's appeal.

The 2016 amendments to § 60-1507’s manifest injustice exception do not apply to motions filed before July 1, 2016.

White v. State · filed 2018-07-06(f)

We hold the amendments to K.S.A. 60-1507 adopted in L. 2016, ch. 58, § 2, do not apply retroactively to motions filed before July 1, 2016.

An ineffective assistance of counsel claim that did not receive complete review on direct appeal is not barred by res judicata in a later K.S.A. 60-1507 proceeding.

Bogguess v. State · filed 2017-06-09

When a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim does not receive complete review during a direct appeal the claim is not barred by res judicata during a subsequent collateral action proceeding pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1507.

A § 60-1507 ineffective-assistance claim is barred by res judicata when the movant could have raised it in an earlier motion to withdraw the guilty plea.

Brown v. State · filed 2017-10-06

The doctrine of res judicata applies in the context of K.S.A. 60-1507 motions. ... As the trial court ruled, Brown's current ineffective assistance of counsel claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata because he could have presented it in his earlier motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.

A movant may not use a § 60-1507 motion to relitigate the effectiveness of trial counsel after that issue was raised and denied in an earlier proceeding.

Tiger v. State · filed 2018-09-14

Tiger had his day in court on this issue; he is procedurally barred from relitigating the effectiveness of his trial counsel as the issue was previously raised and denied.

Section 60-1507 does not allow a prisoner to relitigate claims already decided against the prisoner on direct appeal.

Ponds v. State · filed 2019-02-08

Ponds' attempt to relitigate the same claims in his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

A 60-1507 ineffective-assistance claim is not barred by res judicata merely because the movant raised the underlying trial errors on direct appeal under a different legal theory.

Carter v. State · filed 2022-07-15

The doctrine of res judicata did not bar Carter's 60-1507 motion for ineffective assistance of counsel where he previously asserted the trial errors on direct appeal underlying his ineffective assistance of counsel claims—but his claims fail nonetheless.

Res judicata bars a § 60-1507 ineffective-assistance claim that was fully developed and decided on direct appeal; a new factual basis not reviewed on direct appeal may avoid that bar.

Sheppard v. State · filed 2026-03-06

Still, res judicata does not bar a prisoner from raising an IAC claim based on a new factual basis that was not reviewed on direct appeal. ... When the direct appeal record contains comprehensive factual development—such as trial counsel's testimony during the evidentiary hearing explaining his strategic decisions and Sheppard's own testimony identifying potential witnesses to counsel—the IAC claims received adequate appellate consideration and res judicata applies.

A K.S.A. 60-1507 claim is barred by res judicata when previously raised, but a distinct claim not raised in the earlier motion is not barred.

Milo v. State · filed 2016-12-09

For the reasons we explained in detail in our opinion in No. 114,832, we conclude that Milo's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim in his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion was barred by res judicata. However, Milo's claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was not barred by res judicata because that claim was not raised in Milo's presentence motion to withdraw his plea.

A K.S.A. 60-1507 claim is barred by res judicata when it depends on an issue rejected on direct appeal.

Schumacher v. State · filed 2017-02-10

In turn, the second part of Schumacher's K.S.A. 60-1507 claim—the Confrontation Clause argument—is also barred under the doctrine of res judicata because this argument hinges on Schumacher successfully establishing the first part of his claim.

A prisoner may validly waive the right to bring a collateral challenge under K.S.A. 60-1507, leaving a motion subject to summary denial.

Floyd v. State · filed 2018-05-04

We conclude that Floyd validly waived his right to bring a collateral challenge under K.S.A. 60-1507. Because he waived this right, Floyd's motion states no grounds for relief, and the district court's summary denial of the motion was proper.

Section 60-1507 does not apply before the defendant has been sentenced.

State v. Reed · filed 2015-06-19

Because Reed had yet to be sentenced, strictly speaking, K.S.A. 60-1507 was inapplicable.

A speedy-trial claim does not prevent a post-conviction motion from being treated as a properly filed § 60-1507 motion.

Strong v. Hrabe · filed 2018-10-19

Thus, the fact that Petitioner raised speedy trial claims in his “motion to dismiss” would not prevent this motion from being construed as a properly filed post-conviction § 60-1507 motion under Kansas law.

After an evidentiary hearing on a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, the court must make findings of fact and conclusions of law on all issues presented.

McGill v. State · filed 2020-08-14(b)

When a district court denies a K.S.A. 60-1507 claim after holding an evidentiary hearing—as the court did here on McGill's ineffective assistance claim based on the lack of plea negotiations—the court must issue findings of fact and conclusions of law on all issues presented at the evidentiary hearing.

After a full evidentiary hearing on a § 60-1507 motion, the district court must make findings of fact and conclusions of law on every issue presented.

Quezada-Duran v. State · filed 2015-11-13

After a full evidentiary hearing on a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, the district court must issue findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning all issues presented.

A court denying a motion to reconsider a K.S.A. 60-1507 ruling need not make the findings of fact and conclusions of law required by Rule 183(j) for a decision on the merits.

Phillips v. State · filed 2016-07-01

Moreover, the plain language of Rule 183(j) appears to apply only to decisions on the merits of K.S.A. 60-1507 motions and does not mention motions to reconsider. Although failure to follow Rule 183(j)'s requirements may be a reason for a district court to grant a motion for reconsideration, we find that the district court is not required by Rule 183(j) to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law when denying a motion to reconsider.

After a full evidentiary hearing on a § 60-1507 motion, the district court must issue findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Salazar-Moreno v. State · filed 2017-01-27

If the district court conducts a full evidentiary hearing to consider the claims alleged in a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, it must issue findings of fact and conclusions of law.

A district court summarily denying a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion must make findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficient for meaningful appellate review.

Lewis v. State · filed 2026-01-30

Although we undergo this unlimited review of the K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, Supreme Court Rule 183(j) (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 238) still requires a district court to make explicit findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting its decision when it summarily denies a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. ... Applying these principles to the case before us, we cannot avoid determining that the district court's findings here are inadequate under Supreme Court Rule 183(j).

A court should not construe a prisoner’s petition as a § 60-1507 motion when the prisoner expressly disclaims that construction and intentionally seeks relief under § 60-1501.

Johnson v. Zmuda · filed 2025-05-23

While courts should liberally construe pro se pleadings to give effect to the petition's content rather than the label and forms used, that does not mean this court should force a construction not intended—let alone explicitly disclaimed—by the petitioner. ... On appeal, he explains why his petition should not be considered a 60-1507 petition and asserts his requested relief is purposely and properly considered under K.S.A. 60-1501.

A motion labeled under § 60-1507 is treated according to its substance as a motion to correct an illegal sentence when it seeks relief under K.S.A. 22-3504.

Stark v. State · filed 2020-09-25

Thus, the district court should have treated Stark's motion as a motion to correct illegal sentence and not as a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

An illegal sentence motion filed more than 14 days after sentencing is treated as a § 60-1507 motion for procedural purposes.

State v. Ewing · filed 2021-03-12

But when a defendant makes an illegal sentence motion more than 14 days after sentencing, that illegal sentence motion is treated like a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion for procedural purposes.

A notice of appeal that does not purport to be a § 60-1507 motion and meets none of the requirements for such a motion cannot be converted into one.

State v. McCarty · filed 2021-03-26

Although the State argues that McCarty's notice of appeal is a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion in disguise, the notice of appeal does not purport to be such a motion. Nothing in the notice of appeal comports with any of the requirements for a 60-1507 motion, meaning McCarty's notice of appeal cannot be successfully converted to a 60-1507 motion.

Section 60-1507 allows a court to construe an improper motion to correct an illegal sentence as a collateral challenge, but does not require it to recast a clear illegal sentence claim as an ineffective assistance claim.

State v. Andersen · filed 2022-03-18

The appellate court has discretion to construe an improper motion to correct an illegal sentence as a motion challenging the sentence under K.S.A. 60-1507. ... First, the trial court's reading of Andersen's motion was correct because the pleading's content clearly establishes a claim of illegal sentence rather than a collateral attack on his conviction. See Ditges, 306 Kan. at 457-58. Second, it would take more than a liberal construction for the trial court to view Andersen's claim as one for ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court would be virtually rewriting Andersen's motion rather than interpreting it.

A district court has discretion to treat a motion for new trial as a § 60-1507 motion, and its refusal is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

State v. Davidson · filed 2022-06-03

Appellate courts review a district court's refusal to consider a motion for new trial filed under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3501 as a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion for an abuse of discretion.

A pro se motion labeled under K.S.A. 60-1507 may be treated as a motion to withdraw a plea when its contents seek that relief.

Martinez v. State · filed 2021-09-03

Applying these principles here, the district court properly found that it was not bound by the title of Martinez's motion: "Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1507."

A pro se motion expressly seeking relief under another statute need not be construed as a § 60-1507 motion when it does not mention § 60-1507.

State v. Jones · filed 2021-11-19

Here, Jones' motion was labeled as a motion to correct illegal sentence and it expressly requested relief under K.S.A. 22-3504. There is no mention of K.S.A. 60-1507 in the motion. Further, even if we were to construe Jones' motion as one brought under K.S.A. 60-1507, Jones does not address the issues of timeliness or successiveness that would potentially preclude relief. As a result, we do not consider it error for the district court to construe Jones' motion as one seeking relief under K.S.A. 22-3504.

Section 60-1507 does not exclusively govern a motion to correct an illegal sentence that also raises constitutional claims when the motion alleges statutory violations and lack of sentencing jurisdiction.

Bradford v. State · filed 2024-11-01

Bradford's pro se filing is somewhat of a hybrid motion, raising both a constitutional claim that his sentence is illegal and other claims based on statutory violations and lack of jurisdiction. The district court oversimplified matters by construing the motion only under K.S.A. 60-1507 and denying the motion as untimely without attempting to address the merits of any of Bradford's arguments. Thus, we reverse the summary denial of Bradford's motion and remand with directions for the district court to treat it as a motion to correct illegal sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504.

A § 60-1507 motion must be filed in the sentencing court, which has jurisdiction to grant relief on the motion.

McCarty v. Cline · filed 2020-11-25(a)

And the district court did not have jurisdiction to grant relief for any of his claims, even if it had liberally construed his petition as a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion because a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion must be filed in the sentencing court.