Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-308

Section 60-308(b)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident when business transacted in Kansas gives rise to the claim, including a check executed there and later dishonored in another state.

National Bank of America at Salina v. Calhoun · filed 1966-01-25(b)(1)

Thus a Kansas contract was breached when the check was not accepted and paid and the cause of action contemplated by K.S.A. 60-308 (b) arose in Kansas. ... The motion of defendant to quash service of summons personally served on defendant in Nebraska and to dismiss plaintiff’s action is overruled.

Section 60-308(b)(1) treats loans made in Kansas for living and education expenses, with a promise to repay, as transacting business in the state.

Woodring v. Hall · filed 1968-03-09(b)(1)

Considering the quality and nature of the defendant’s activities, it may be said he invoked the benefits and protection of the laws of this state as contemplated in Hanson v. Denckla, supra, and we have no hesitancy in concluding that the loaning of money as disclosed by the record with a corresponding promise to repay constituted the “transaction of business” within the meaning of 60-308 (b) (1).

Section 60-308(b)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state buyer whose purchases were arranged and delivered outside Kansas, despite phone calls and returned goods sent to Kansas.

Oswalt Industries, Inc. v. Gilmore · filed 1969-01-10(b)(1)

In view of this, the Court finds that Gilmore did not have those minimum contacts within the State of Kansas which constitute the transaction of business within the meaning of K.S.A. 60-308 (b) (1).

Section 60-308(b)(1) gives out-of-state service the effect of personal service only when the claim arises from or is connected with the nonresident’s transaction of business in Kansas.

Land Manufacturing, Inc. v. Highland Park State Bank · filed 1970-06-13(b)(1)

If process under K. S. A. 60-308 (b) (1) is to have the effect of personal service the claim for relief must arise from, or be connected with, the act or transaction by which the nonresident submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.

Section 60-308(b)(1) does not treat an out-of-state guaranty as transacting business in Kansas when the guarantor had no contact with Kansas in person or through an agent.

Misco Leasing, Inc. v. Vaughn · filed 1971-10-26(b)(1)

Since Keller had no physical contact with Kansas, and since there was no contact through an agent, jurisdiction is wholly dependent on his execution of the guaranty contract in Oklahoma. This is insufficient basis for holding that he transacted business so as to be subject to the operation of the long arm statute.

Section 60-308(b)(1) requires a nonresident’s purposeful business activity in Kansas to have a substantial connection to the state and to give rise to the claim.

Stonecipher v. Sexton · filed 1972-02-24(b)(1)

At most, we have the telephone conversation initiated by plaintiff in Kansas with Sexton in Arizona, and Sexton’s later appearance as a witness in this court. Neither can be said to have been acts whereby Sexton purposely availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within Kansas so as to invoke the benefits and protections of its laws. They had no substantial connection with this state in the sense of transacting business here, nor did they give rise to the present cause of action for malpractice.

Section 60-308(b)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a nonresident’s solicitation and regular business contacts with Kansas amount to transacting business in the state and satisfy constitutional minimum contacts.

Odam v. Arthur Murray, Inc. · filed 1980-12-31(b)(1)

In summary, we find the personal solicitation of plaintiff by Chalda, combined with that defendant’s regular efforts to attract Kansas residents, its history of carrying on business with Kansas residents, and the foreseeable consequences of doing so in the greater Kansas City area, satisfy the requirements of both K.S.A. 60-308(h)(1) and of constitutional minimum contacts.

Section 60-308(b)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over nonresident partners when their partnership transacts business in Kansas through its managing partner and the claim arises from that business.

Intercontinental Leasing, Inc. v. Chester A. Anderson, M.D. · filed 1969-04-28(b)(1)

The Kansas long-arm statute applies when a defendant “in person or through an agent or instrumentality” transacts business in the state. Through the instrumentality of the partnership, the individual partners purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting business activities in Kansas and invoked the benefits and protections of its laws to satisfy their personal economic desires. This is enough to invoke the long-arm statute and to subject them to personal jurisdiction.

A claim against a nonresident must be sufficiently connected with the defendant’s business activity in Kansas to support personal jurisdiction under subsection (b)(1).

White v. Goldthwaite · filed 1969-11-08(b)(1)

Viewing all the circumstances of the case, we conclude the claim sued upon is not sufficiently connected with defendant’s transaction of business within the state to warrant assumption of in personam jurisdiction over her by our courts.

Section 60-308(b) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who transacts business in Kansas for claims arising from those transactions, when exercising jurisdiction is fair.

Doyn Aircraft, Inc., a Corporation v. James C. Wylie and Atlas Aviation Sales, Inc., a Corporation · filed 1971-06-04(b)

K.S.A. 60-308(b) generally provides that a nonresident submits to the jurisdiction of the Kansas courts as to a cause of action which arises from his transacting business within the state. ... The trial court properly assumed in personam jurisdiction over Wylie as to the distributorship contract, the loan agreement, and the exclusive use agreement.

Section 60-308(b)(1) subjects a person to Kansas jurisdiction over a claim arising from business the person transacted in Kansas.

Gloria FORD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VALMAC INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant-Appellant · filed 1974-04-03(b)(1)

Valmac was doing business in Kansas, and employed the plaintiff to work in that business. The transaction of business in Kansas suffices to establish Kansas jurisdiction.

Section 60-308(b)(1) does not support jurisdiction based on limited calls and mail concerning a performance outside Kansas when those contacts are insufficient under due process.

Peebles v. Murray · filed 1976-04-16(b)(1)

Instead, if jurisdiction over the person of defendant M.J.A. may be found to exist, it must be based upon the ground stated in (b)(1)— “the transaction of any business within this state.” ... The limited mailing of contract forms and publicity materials with supplementary correspondence, including a telegram, simply does not equate with the transaction of business sufficient for due process requirements.

Section 60-308(b)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident whose takeover filing, shareholder solicitations, and brokerage arrangements constitute transacting business in Kansas.

Professional Investors Life Insurance v. Roussel · filed 1978-01-11(b)(1)

National American’s act of filing its take-over proposal with the Kansas Commissioner of Insurance and mailing of solicitations to shareholders in Kansas, alleged in paragraphs 7 and 38 of the amended complaint, as well as its hiring of the Mick Stack brokerage firm, clearly constitute the transaction of business as contemplated by that section.

Section 60-308(b)(1) reaches a nonresident whose repeated visits and business dealings in Kansas amount to transacting business in the state.

Inter-Collegiate Press, Inc. v. Myers · filed 1981-08-05(b)(1)

Thus, considering all the defendant’s business activities, we find that the defendant did transact business in Kansas within the meaning of K.S.A. 60-308(b)(l).

Section 60-308 permits personal jurisdiction over a company doing business in Kansas through an agent it controls.

International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers v. Cardwell Manufacturing Co. · filed 1976-05-11

Thus, this Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the common law causes of action brought by the Local against BTB under 28 U.S.C. § 1332; and further, this Court has jurisdiction of and over BTB as BTB was, at all times material hereto, doing business within the District of Kansas within the meaning of K.S.A. 60-308.

Section 60-308(b)(1) and (5) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident when the claim arises from business transacted in Kansas or a contract with a Kansas resident performed at least partly in Kansas.

Prather v. Olson · filed 1977-03-25(b)(1), (b)(5)

We conclude the court’s factual determination of personal jurisdiction was sufficiently supported by the evidence, that the activities of the parties brought defendant within the ambit of K.S.A. 60-308 (b) (1) and (5) and, under the circumstances, constitutional due process was not thereby offended.

Section 60-308(b)(1) and (5) permit personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who arranges a loan with a Kansas bank and delivers a renewal note for acceptance and payment in Kansas, even if the note was signed elsewhere.

Rosedale State Bank & Trust Co. v. Stringer · filed 1978-05-19(b)(1), (b)(5)

Plaintiff’s position is that defendant submitted himself to the jurisdiction in Kansas by doing one of the acts enumerated in K.S.A. 60-308(b)(l) and (5). We agree. ... The fact that the renewal note was executed outside the state of Kansas is immaterial. ... We therefore conclude the trial court correctly determined there were sufficient contacts with Kansas to support in personam jurisdiction.

Section 60-308(b)(1) does not require a defendant to be physically present in Kansas to transact business there; physical presence is one factor to consider.

Thermal Insulation Systems, Inc. v. Ark-Seal Corp. · filed 1980-10-09(b)(1)

Therefore, we hold that physical presence by the defendant is no longer a requirement in determining jurisdiction under K.S.A. § 60-308(b)(l), but rather it is only a factor to consider.

Subsection (b)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant purposefully acts in Kansas and the claim arises from that act; an agent’s solicitation that leads to the disputed contract qualifies.

Source Associates, Inc. v. Suncast Group · filed 1989-03-06(b)(1)

Plaintiff has established the existence of both factors. By having their agent, Ken Hornung, contact plaintiff for purposes of soliciting plaintiff’s purchase of merchandise from defendants, defendants purposefully did some act in Kansas. ... Since defendants’ solicitation of plaintiff’s business resulted in plaintiff contracting with defendants to purchase certain merchandise, and the plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of defendants’ alleged breach of the contracts, plaintiff also satisfies the second factor for personal jurisdiction under subsection (b)(1).

Section 60-308(b)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over nonresidents doing business in Kansas through an agent for claims arising from those operations, including claims brought by the agent.

Klippel v. Heintz · filed 1982-05-08(b)(1)

K.S.A. 60-308 does not make any exception denying jurisdiction to a nonresident agent who is conducting business in Kansas for a nonresident principal. The defendants are doing business in Kansas and have subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of the Kansas courts for actions growing out of such business operations.

Soliciting a Kansas attorney to represent someone, without an employment contract or financial gain, does not constitute transacting business in Kansas under § 60-308(b)(1).

MORRIS BY RECTOR v. Peterson · filed 1983-10-04(b)(1)

Therefore, his attempt to secure representation for Mr. Rector does not constitute the “transaction of business” under K.S.A. § 60-308(b)(l) as interpreted in Thermal.

Section 60-308(b)(1) does not reach a nonresident defendant when the claim is unrelated to its Kansas business contacts.

Hall v. National Basketball Ass'n · filed 1987-01-09(b)(1)

Since the plaintiff’s claim is unrelated to the isolated contacts the NBA has with this state, the court finds the Kansas long-arm statute, K.S.A. 60-308(b), does not reach this defendant.

Section 60-308(b)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident when an insurance coverage claim is sufficiently connected to its product sales in Kansas.

St. Paul Surplus Lines Insurance v. International Playtex, Inc. · filed 1989-07-14(b)(1)

K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 60-308(b) is to be liberally construed. It was not error for the trial court to find that the declaratory judgment action was sufficiently connected to the sale of Playtex products in Kansas to warrant personal jurisdiction over Playtex.

Section 60-308(b)(1) reaches a nonresident that transacts business in Kansas through independent licensing companies acting as instrumentalities.

Triple a Partnership v. MPL Communications, Inc. · filed 1986-03-10(b)(1)

From these facts, we conclude that the Hal Leonard Publishing Company and the other companies with which defendant has licensing agreements are “instrumentalities” through which defendant transacts business in Kansas.

Section 60-308(b) does not authorize jurisdiction over a nonresident buyer based on routine mail and telephone contacts with a Kansas seller or the seller’s purchase of goods in Kansas when the contract requires delivery elsewhere.

Green Country Crude, Inc. v. Avant Petroleum, Inc. · filed 1986-12-03(b)(1), (b)(5)

Weighing the facts of the present case, we cannot find Green Country has made the prima facie showing Avant was transacting business in Kansas necessary to support the assertion of jurisdiction under K.S.A. 60-308(b)(l). ... The court rejects plaintiff’s contention that its purchase of oil in Kansas, for delivery in Oklahoma in satisfaction of the contract, constitutes performance of that contract in this state sufficient to meet K.S.A. 60-308(b)(5).

Section 60-308(b)(1) requires the nonresident defendant to purposefully act or transact business in Kansas; a plaintiff’s unilateral activities there do not establish jurisdiction.

Thompson v. Chambers · filed 1992-09-18(b)(1)

The Goldthwaite standard for jurisdiction under K.S.A.1991 Supp. 60-308(b)(1) is essentially the same as the three-prong test for determining the sufficiency of contacts necessary to ensure that the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process. ... In this case, the court finds that the defendant did not purposefully do any act or consummate any transaction in Kansas, either himself or through plaintiff as his agent.

Section 60-308(b)(1) does not reach a nonresident seller merely because independent distributors resell its goods in Kansas when the seller receives no further benefit from their Kansas contacts.

Anguish v. Seymour Mann, Inc. · filed 1993-07-14(b)(1)

The court concludes that the actions of the defendant in selling the allegedly infringing dolls to two distributors who subsequently sold them in Kansas does not fall within the scope of the Kansas long-arm. The evidence before the court shows that the sales were made to the distributors and the defendant obtained no further benefit from any contact the distributors had with Kansas.

Section 60-308(b)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident when the claim arises from its transaction of business in Kansas.

Heating & Cooling Master Marketers Network, Inc. v. Contractor Success Group, Inc. · filed 1996-08-09(b)(1)

The court also concludes that the cause of action here arose from defendant’s transaction of business in Kansas, as required by the long-arm statute.

Section 60-308(b)(1) treats a nonresident’s negotiation of an employment contract through communications into Kansas as transacting business in the state.

Etienne v. Wolverine Tube, Inc. · filed 1998-06-02(b)(1)

The court thus concludes that defendant’s negotiation of an employment contract with plaintiff by means of communications into Kansas constitutes the transaction of business within Kansas for purposes of long-arm jurisdiction.

Section 60-308(b)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident for a claim arising from business the nonresident transacts in Kansas.

Hudye Soil Services, Inc. v. Tyler · filed 1999-04-08(b)(1)

Neither has transacted business in Kansas, nor have they engaged in any other activities which would subject them to this court’s jurisdiction.

Section 60-308(b)(1) can reach a nonresident seller whose sale-related contacts with a Kansas buyer are sufficient, even if the seller never enters Kansas.

Environmental Ventures, Inc. v. Alda Services Corp. · filed 1994-02-11(b)(1)

Based on the rule that the statute should be liberally construed to the limits of due process, we conclude that Alda’s contacts with Kimbrell, a Kansas resident, are sufficient. ... Although not dispositive of the final ruling here, we find that jurisdiction lies under K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 60-308(b)(1) or (b)(5).

Section 60-308(b)(1) does not treat a social encounter in Kansas as a business transaction when there is no evidence of purposeful solicitation.

Blue Beacon International, Inc. v. American Truck Washes, Inc. · filed 1994-09-30(b)(1)

This mutual, friendly and social encounter with Mike Walker, the Vice President of Blue Beacon, does not rise to the level of a business transaction as envisioned by the statute or the case law.

Section 60-308(b)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident that transacts business in Kansas when the claims arise from its Kansas contacts.

Caldwell-Baker Co. v. Southern Illinois Railcar Co. · filed 2001-09-28(b)(1)

Given these contacts, the court finds defendant transacted business within the State of Kansas. Defendant had knowledge that plaintiff was a Kansas company when it initiated contact with plaintiff in Kansas with the intent to conduct business with plaintiff. Further, defendant stood to gain significant economic advantage by transacting with plaintiff to lease railcars that defendant could subsequently sublease at a profit. Through the course of the agreement, defendant subleased at least 183 railcars in the State of Kansas, thereby earning a profit in the state based upon the agreement at issue in this case.

Soliciting business and forming a contract in Kansas satisfy the section’s transacting-business requirement, but personal jurisdiction must also satisfy due process.

Vestring v. Halla · filed 2013-01-30(b)(1)(A)

Soliciting business and forming a contract in Kansas satisfy the Kansas long-arm statute’s requirement of “transacting business.”

Section 60-308(b)(1) requires a nexus between a nonresident defendant’s Kansas business transaction and the claim.

Kluin v. American Suzuki Motor Corp. · filed 2002-11-01(b)(1)

For jurisdiction to exist under subsection (b)(1) of 60-308, there must be a nexus between the transaction of business and the alleged claim.

Section 60-308 requires a claim against a nonresident defendant to arise from the defendant’s qualifying contacts with Kansas.

Wilshire Oil Company of Texas v. L. E. Riffe, O. Homer Riffe and Thomas J. Masterson · filed 1969-04-15(b)

We therefore conclude that the cause of action against Homer Riffe did not arise out of these contacts which cannot provide a basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.

Section 60-308(b)(1) requires some causal connection between business transacted in Kansas and the claim, but does not require proximate causation.

Grimandi v. Beech Aircraft Corp. · filed 1981-04-07(b)(1)

This Court interprets the statute to require only that there be some causal connection between the enumerated act and plaintiffs’ cause of action. In this case that causal connection is present.

Section 60-308(b)(1) requires a causal connection between business transacted in Kansas and the plaintiff’s claim to support personal jurisdiction.

Dirks v. Carnival Cruise Lines · filed 1986-08-28(b)(1)

The connection between Carnival’s activities in Kansas and plaintiff’s cause of action is too tenuous to sustain a prima facie showing of jurisdiction under K.S.A. 60-308(b)(1).

Section 60-308(b) requires a defendant’s Kansas contact to be related to the cause of action; a single cease and desist letter did not establish jurisdiction over an unrelated declaratory judgment claim.

Electronic Realty Associates, L.P. v. Paramount Pictures Corp. · filed 1996-08-12(b)

Similarly, defendant Famous Music’s mailing of one cease and desist letter into the forum state does not satisfy the requirements of the Kansas long-arm statute because that letter is unrelated to the subject matter of the claims in plaintiffs declaratory judgment action. The court concludes that defendant Famous Music is not subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction under the provisions of the Kansas long-arm statute.

Section 60-308(b) does not authorize personal jurisdiction based on Kansas business transactions unless the claim arises from those transactions.

Cotracom Commodity Trading AG v. Seaboard Corp. · filed 2000-04-05(b)

Seaboard claims that § 60-308(b) authorizes personal jurisdiction over IBN AG because IBN AG directly transacted business in Kansas. The court’s examination of the record reveals a few limited business transactions involving IBN AG that may have occurred in Kansas. The court concludes that those transactions, however, are insufficient to justify exercising personal jurisdiction over IBN AG. Most notably, the transactions do not give rise to Seaboard’s claims against IBN AG in this case.

Section 60-308(b) does not permit personal jurisdiction over nonresident loan assignees whose contacts with Kansas do not support purposeful availment.

Pilcher v. Direct Equity Lending · filed 2002-02-27(b)

Given the totality of the circumstances of the case, ... the court finds no basis under which it can exercise jurisdiction over the Trusts pursuant to KSA 60-308(b) in a manner which would be consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

Section 60-308(b) permits personal jurisdiction based on an agent’s conduct in Kansas when the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of agency, even if agency remains disputed until trial.

Hanson v. Murphy · filed 1971-12-11(b)

Just as clearly, plaintiff presented a prima facie case for the existence of that fact. Plaintiff may not be able to prove all he claims at trial, but if he can, “Murphy” is subject to Kansas jurisdiction. We believe, on the record here, plaintiff was entitled to an opportunity to present his evidence of agency at a trial on the merits. It was therefore error to quash the service of summons.

Section 60-308(b)(1) does not give Kansas courts jurisdiction over a nonresident parent corporation based on its subsidiary’s Kansas business when the corporations remain separate and the subsidiary is not the parent’s agent.

Quarles v. Fuqua Industries, Inc. · filed 1974-11-05(b)(1)

Consequently, jurisdiction of Fuqua cannot be established via application of the alter ego theory.

Section 60-308 permits personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporation doing business in Kansas through a local corporation it controls as its alter ego.

INTERN. U., UNITED AUTO., ETC. v. Cardwell Mfg. Co. · filed 1976-05-11

Thus, this Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the common law causes of action brought by the Local against BTB under 28 U.S.C. § 1332; and further, this Court has jurisdiction of and over BTB as BTB was, at all times material hereto, doing business within the District of Kansas within the meaning of K.S.A. 60-308.

A parent corporation’s Kansas business contacts can support personal jurisdiction over its subsidiary when the parent so controls the subsidiary that they operate as a single economic entity.

Farha v. Signal Companies, Inc. · filed 1975-03-01(h)(1)

The sole issue is whether Signal Properties, a wholly owned subsidiary, was also within the ambit of the long arm statute by virtue of its relationship with Signal Companies. ... Under such conditions we must conclude Signal Properties was operated as a mere instrumentality of the parent corporation. We agree with the finding of the trial court that there was in personam jurisdiction over defendant Signal Properties.

A foreign corporation operating in Kansas can be a Kansas resident under subsection (b)(5) even if it obtains authorization to do business there after filing suit.

Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Markets, Inc. · filed 1977-12-16(b)(5)

The fact that Pedi Bares did not comply with the pertinent Kansas statutes until four months after filing of suit is not material to the question of residence. We agree with the trial court that Pedi Bares was a resident of Kansas.

Section 60-308(b) applies to the personal representatives of persons who commit torts or transact business in Kansas.

Professional Investors Life Insurance v. Roussel · filed 1981-12-04(b)

It should be noted that defendant’s reliance upon the fact that some of his actions were taken as an agent or personal representative of another person or corporation is to no avail. The Kansas long-arm statute, K.S.A. § 60-308(b) applies to the personal representatives of persons committing torts or transacting business within the state.

Section 60-308(b)(6) requires a nonresident director to act within Kansas; serving as a director or failing to act is insufficient for personal jurisdiction.

Schlatter v. Mo-Comm Futures, Ltd. · filed 1983-04-29(b)(6)

The statutory phrase “acting within this state” requires something more than a failure to act on the part of a nonresident director.

Section 60-308 can reach an out-of-state coconspirator through acts committed in Kansas by its coconspirators.

Mid-West Underground Storage, Inc. v. Porter · filed 1983-09-06

Citing Ammon v. Kaplow, 468 F.Supp. 1304, 1312 (D.Kan.1979), and Professional Investors Life Insurance Co. v. Roussel, 445 F.Supp. 687, 696 (D.Kan.1978), Midwest argues that because M-P participated in a conspiracy to commit a business tort in Kansas, the actions of the coconspirators bring M-P within the reach of the Kansas long-arm statute. Kaplow and Roussel represent the general rule regarding long-arm jurisdiction over out-of-state coconspirators.

Section 60-308(b) does not confer personal jurisdiction over an individual based on Kansas communications made solely in a representative capacity.

Knuth v. Lutheran Church Missouri Synod · filed 1986-09-08(b)

None of the acts specified in the Kansas Long-Arm Statute upon which a person is considered to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court appears applicable to this case. K.S.A. 60-308(b). ... Barth’s letters and communications to residents of Kansas were made solely in his official representative capacity with the LCMS. An individual’s actions, solely in the capacity as a corporate officer, does not create personal jurisdiction over that individual even though the state may have personal jurisdiction over the corporation.

Section 60-308(b)(6) subjects a nonresident director of a corporation organized under Kansas law or having a place of business in Kansas to personal jurisdiction in Kansas.

Anderson v. Heartland Oil & Gas, Inc. · filed 1991-10-25(b)(6)

Membership by a nonresident upon the board of directors of a corporation organized under the laws of or having a place of business within Kansas subjects such a director to in personam jurisdiction in Kansas under 60-308(b)(6).

Section 60-308(b)(2) does not confer personal jurisdiction over directors based solely on their knowledge of and acquiescence in securities sales in Kansas.

Farr v. Designer Phosphate & Premix International, Inc. · filed 1991-11-12(b)(2)

Under Schlatter, such nonfeasance is not enough to subject the defendant directors to personal jurisdiction under the Kansas long-arm statute.

Section 60-308(b) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to the extent allowed by federal due process.

Kimbrell v. ADIA, S.A. · filed 1993-10-12(b)

Since this is a diversity case, our exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with the standards of the Kansas long-arm statute, K.S.A. 60-308(b), and the United States Constitution. ... After reviewing the record, the court is satisfied that plaintiffs have demonstrated a prima facie case in support of personal jurisdiction. Therefore, we reject defendant’s first argument for dismissal.

Section 60-308(b)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a parent company that transacts business in Kansas through subsidiaries it controls.

In Re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation · filed 2003-07-07(b)(1)

Finally, because the U.S. subsidiaries have stipulated to doing business in Kansas and the Court has found that Cope "controls" these subsidiaries, plaintiffs have also satisfied subsection (1) of the Kansas long-arm statute.

Section 60-308(b)(1) permits jurisdiction over a company based on Kansas business conducted through subsidiaries it controls, subject to due process.

Midland v. F. Hoffman-Laroche, Ltd. · filed 2003-07-07(b)(1)

Accordingly, the Court finds that jurisdiction based upon the Kansas long-arm statute is appropriate in this case considering the ongoing contacts that Cope and its subsidiaries have with Kansas.

Section 60-308(b) permits service on a nonresident corporation when an affiliated corporation transacts business or enters contracts in Kansas at its direction or for its benefit.

Ireland v. Dodson · filed 2008-05-01(b)

K.S.A. § 60-308(b) permits service of process on a nonresident corporation that has in the forum state an affiliated corporation that has transacted business or entered into contracts at the direction of or for the benefit of the nonresident corporation.

Section 60-308 does not confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate officer based on limited contacts unrelated to the claim.

Blair-Naughton, L.L.C. v. Diner Concepts, Inc. · filed 2008-07-17(b)(6)

The court finds that these contacts, extremely limited in scope and unrelated to the basic claim of breach of trust, fail to authorize any application of jurisdiction pursuant to the Kansas long-arm statute.

Section 60-308(b)(1) permits an agent’s Kansas contacts to be attributed to a nonresident when assessing personal jurisdiction.

Near v. Crivello · filed 2009-11-25(b)(1)

K.S.A. § 60-308(b)(l) (Kansas long-arm statute confers jurisdiction over any nonresident who "in person or through an agent or instrumentality” does any of the enumerated acts). ... Whether or not Goldberg Kohn’s contacts would be sufficient by themselves to confer jurisdiction, the Court considers the contacts of both Grey-stone and Goldberg Kohn as its agent in determining whether Greystone’s contacts are sufficient.

Section 60-308(b)(1)(F) treats acting as an officer of a corporation with a Kansas place of business as submission to personal jurisdiction.

Lucas v. Dadson Manufacturing Corporation · filed 2021-07-07(b)(1)(F)

Although the Kansas long-arm statute states that acting as an officer of a corporation that has a place of business in Kansas acts as a submittal to personal jurisdiction,51 Plaintiff’s new assertions are not present in the amended complaint. That document only states that Peter Lucas is a resident of Missouri and Dadson is also located in Missouri. Even with all reasonable inferences and consideration of his pro se status, James Lucas has not alleged any facts in his amended complaint that place Peter Lucas or Dadson in the state of Kansas outside of the Johnson County Proceeding. Because this Court must rely only on the complaint, the remaining counts must be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Subsection (b)(5) allows personal jurisdiction based on a contract with a Kansas resident to be performed at least partly in Kansas, subject to due process limits.

Misco-United Supply, Inc. v. Richards of Rockford, Inc. · filed 1974-12-07(b)(5)

It follows that the amendment was made to avoid the definition of “[t]he transaction of any business within this state,” and to broaden the effect of the statute. Notwithstanding the legislative purpose, the 1971 amendment remains subject to the requirements of due process.

Section 60-308(b)(5) covers a contract with a Kansas resident that calls for partial performance in Kansas; the performance need not be substantial.

Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Superior Oil Co. · filed 1978-10-17(b)(5)

This Court specifically finds that Superior Overseas by itself falls within the ambit of subsection (b)(5). ... The Court agrees that this does not constitute substantial performance in Kansas, but the statute does not require as much.

Section 60-308(b)(5) reaches a contract with a Kansas resident that calls for performance in Kansas, regardless of where the contract was made.

Davis v. Grace · filed 1980-05-09(b)(5)

Undoubtedly, this transaction falls within the literal language of K.S.A. 60-308(h)(5). The place where the contract was actually made, which is discussed at great length in the plaintiff’s brief, is really irrelevant to this initial inquiry.

Section 60-308(b)(5) authorizes service when a third-party beneficiary’s claim arises from a contract with a Kansas resident that calls for performance in Kansas.

International Pizza Hut Franchise Holders Ass'n v. Supreme Pizza, Inc. · filed 1978-10-31(b)(5)

Nothing in subsection (b)(5) restricts service only to those whose contract has given rise to a claim asserted by a party to the contract. Plaintiff’s third party claim arises out of the Pizza Hut contract. It falls within the literal ambit of the statutory provision.

Section 60-308(b)(5) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant contracts with a Kansas resident for performance in whole or in part in Kansas and the claim arises from that contract.

US Sprint Communications Co. v. Boran · filed 1988-02-19(b)(5)

Boran allegedly entered into a contract with a Kansas resident which was performed in part in Kansas. Additionally, a causal connection exists between the contract and the plaintiffs’ cause of action, and therefore the action “arises from” the contract.

Subsection (b)(5) applies to bondholders with enforceable contractual rights under a Kansas trust agreement, even if they claim to be only third-party beneficiaries.

Kansas Turnpike Authority v. Wheeler · filed 1988-08-24(b)(5)

The defendants contend that 60-308(b)(5) does not apply to them in the present case since, as bondholders, they “are only third party beneficiaries under the Trust Agreement.” We disagree. The defendants possess enforceable contractual rights under the Trust Agreement, and have sought to enforce those rights both in Illinois and in the present action.

Section 60-308(b)(5) authorizes Kansas courts to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident who enters a contract with a Kansas resident that is to be performed at least partly in Kansas, including in a third-party beneficiary’s suit arising from that contract.

Noel v. Pizza Hut, Inc. · filed 1991-02-15(b)(5)

We affirm the trial court’s decision in this regard. PMI entered into the same agreements as did Torres. It is an agreement with a Kansas resident, which was intended to be performed in full or in part in the State of Kansas. Under those circumstances, K.S.A. 1990 Supp. 60-308(b)(5) authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction by this state.

Section 60-308(b)(5) permits jurisdiction over a contract with a Kansas resident when either party performs part of the contract in Kansas.

Halstead Hospital, Inc., Plaintiff/appellant/cross-Appellee v. Northern Bank Note Company, Defendant/appellee/cross-Appe · filed 1982-06-21(b)(5)

The evidence in this case supports the application of the “contracts” provision of the long-arm statute quoted above. Significantly, the statute requires only that the contract “be performed in whole or in part by either party” in Kansas.

Section 60-308(b)(5) reaches a nonresident’s contract with a Kansas resident when either party is to perform part of the contract in Kansas; payments there can show that agreed performance.

Continental American Corporation, D/B/A Pioneer Balloon Company, Plaintiff v. Camera Controls Corporation, D/B/A Max Bal · filed 1982-11-12(b)(5)

These two payments, along with the receipt of thirteen payments in Wichita after this action was commenced, provide circumstantial proof that the parties agreed some performance would be rendered in the forum state. We hold, therefore, that the present events created a contract to be performed in part in Kansas, and that these events satisfy the terms of K.S.A. 60-308(b)(5).

Section 60-308(b)(5) permits personal jurisdiction when either party is to perform part of a contract with a Kansas resident in Kansas, regardless of the contract’s purpose.

Carrothers Construction Co. v. Quality Service & Supply, Inc. · filed 1984-06-20(b)(5)

Regardless of the purpose of the contract, the requirements of subsection (5) are satisfied if the contract is “to be performed in whole or in part by either party in this state.”

Section 60-308(b)(5) permits personal jurisdiction when a nonresident contracts with a Kansas resident for performance in Kansas and the nonresident’s contacts with Kansas satisfy due process.

Petroleum Data Services, Inc. v. First City Bancorporation of Texas, Inc. · filed 1985-12-02(b)(5)

Turning to the question of this Court’s personal jurisdiction over defendant under the provisions of the Kansas long-arm statute, K.S.A. 60-308(b)(5), a two-step analysis is involved in considering jurisdictional questions. ... Certainly, when the facts are resolved in plaintiff’s favor, there is even more of a basis for exercising personal jurisdiction in this case than there was in Continental American Corp., and defendant’s arguments to the contrary are rejected.

Section 60-308(b)(5) permits jurisdiction over a claim arising from a contract with a Kansas resident to be performed at least partly in Kansas, including a note payable at a Kansas bank’s offices.

Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Culver · filed 1986-07-03(b)(5)

Service of process on this defendant was clearly authorized by the Kansas Long-Arm Statute. Under K.S.A. 60-308(b)(5), the courts of this state may assert jurisdiction over any cause of action arising from the “entering into an express or implied contract, by mail or otherwise, with a resident of this state to be performed in whole or in part by either party in this state.” As quoted above, the note in question provides that its maker is to pay the stated amount to the Rexford State Bank “at its offices.” Because those offices are in Kansas, some portion of the contract represented by that note was to be performed in this state. Accordingly, the long-arm requirement has been satisfied.

Section 60-308(b)(5) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident when a contract with a Kansas resident is performed in part in Kansas, including through payments from the resident’s Kansas office.

Slawson v. Hair · filed 1989-06-16(b)(5)

As shown by the facts previously summarized, a contractual relationship existed between plaintiff and each of the defendants, and performance upon all of the contracts was partially accomplished in Kansas. Under the contracts, each of the defendants were paid out of the plaintiff’s Wichita office and records relevant to those agreements and transactions were also maintained in the Wichita office. In addition, defendant Hair received overriding royalty income from oil and gas leases in Kansas, and defendant Sequential had an interest in four Kansas wells. Plaintiff has presented a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction under K.S.A. 60-308(b)(5).

Section 60-308(b)(5) permits personal jurisdiction when a contract with a Kansas resident is performed in part in Kansas, including through design, fabrication, and partial assembly there.

Insulation Corp. of America v. Sportsplex, Inc. · filed 1989-07-24(b)(5)

In the instant action, the requirements of K.S.A. 60-308(b)(5) are met. ICA and the defendants entered into a contract for the installation of an insulation system. Under the contract, ICA installed in the defendants’ New Jersey sports facility an insulation system which was designed, fabricated, and partially assembled in Kansas. Thus, the contract was performed in part by ICA in Kansas, and the conditions of the long-arm statute are satisfied.

Section 60-308(b)(5) permits personal jurisdiction when a contract with a Kansas resident requires performance in Kansas, including payments to be made there.

Marcus Food Co. v. Family Foods of Tallahassee, Inc. · filed 1990-01-29(b)(5)

The contract between the parties was one in which the parties’ obligations were to be performed, in part, in Kansas. The defendants were required to make payments in Kansas. The plaintiff was required to submit invoices from Kansas for goods shipped under the contract. As a result, subsection (b)(5) renders the defendants subject to the exercise of jurisdiction in Kansas.

Section 60-308(b)(5) permits personal jurisdiction when a nonresident contracts with a Kansas resident for performance at least partly in Kansas, including payments made to the resident there.

Travel Unlimited, Inc. v. Touch Technologies, Inc. · filed 1991-01-31(b)(5)

This contract was to be performed in part in Kansas by virtue of plaintiff’s payments for the stock and issuance of the loan and defendant’s return of the stock certificate and payments on the loan to plaintiff in Kansas. ... Under these facts, the court finds that some portion of the parties’ contract was to be performed in this state.

Section 60-308(b)(1) requires a claim to arise from the defendant’s business transactions in Kansas; subsection (b)(5) requires a contract that contemplates or requires performance in Kansas.

Biederman v. Schnader, Harrison, Siegal & Lewis · filed 1991-05-10(b)(1), (b)(5)

Resolving all doubts in plaintiffs favor, the court finds that plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to make a prima facie showing that the defendant’s conduct falls within either of these provisions. As previously stated, Schnader, Harrison’s only “transaction of business” in Kansas involved three brief visits in connection with the North Carolina litigation, one to copy documents and two to attend plaintiff’s deposition noticed by Hardee’s counsel. Neither in their petition nor in their memorandum in opposition to this motion, have plaintiffs alleged facts to support their contention that this action for declaratory judgment and breach of contract arises from any of these visits to Kansas. ... Here, the court finds that the contracts under which Schnader, Harrison agreed to represent plaintiffs in the North Carolina and Pennsylvania litigation fail to satisfy this provision of the long arm statute in that nothing in the contracts contemplated or required Schnader, Harrison to perform any portion of the contracts in Kansas.

Section 60-308(b)(5) allows personal jurisdiction based on an express or factually implied contract with a Kansas resident, but a warranty arising by operation of law is not an implied contract under the section.

Eferakeya v. Twin City State Bank · filed 1988-12-29(b)(5)

Although K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 60-308(b)(5) provides personal jurisdiction over a nonresident if the nonresident enters into an express or implied contract with a resident of the state, the statute should not be interpreted to include warranties implied by law. The statute provides that jurisdiction arises when a nonresident does one of the enumerated acts. There was no intentional act on the part of the parties to create a contract here. “Implied contract” should be read to include only contracts implied from the facts of the case, not warranties created by operation of law.

Section 60-308(b) permits personal jurisdiction over a person who enters an express contract with a Kansas resident to be performed at least partly in Kansas.

SOURCE DIRECT, INC. v. Mantell · filed 1994-03-18(b)

K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 60-308(b) states that any person, whether or not a resident of Kansas, submits to the jurisdiction of this state for any cause of action arising from entering into an express contract with a resident of this state to be performed in whole or in part by either party in this state. ... Thus, Source Direct presented ample evidence to show Mantell had entered into a contract with a Kansas resident that was to be performed, at least in part, in Kansas.

Subsection (b)(5) covers a contract partly performed in Kansas through billing and payment there, subject to due process limits.

Marcus Food Co. v. Crown Meat Co., Inc. · filed 1991-11-05(b)(5)

Based on plaintiff’s allegations, the contract was to be performed in part in Kansas in the following two particulars: Crown Meat was to mail the bill to Marcus Food in Kansas and Marcus Food was to remit payment to Crown Meat from Kansas. ... The defendant’s conduct falls within the language of subsection (b)(5) of the long arm statute.

Section 60-308(b)(5) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who contracts with a Kansas resident when payment from the resident’s Kansas office constitutes part performance in Kansas.

Oxford Transportation Services, Inc. v. Mab Refrigerated Transport, Inc. · filed 1992-05-04(b)(5)

In this case, it is uncontroverted that the parties entered into a contract and that MAB was to receive payment under the contract from Oxford’s office in Kansas. The Kansas long-arm statute requires no more. Therefore, the court concludes that personal jurisdiction may be asserted over MAB under K.S.A. § 60-308(b)(5).

Section 60-308(b)(5) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who enters into a contract with a Kansas resident to be performed at least in part in Kansas, when the claim arises from that contract and the required minimum contacts exist.

Hesston Corp. v. Kays · filed 1994-03-11(b)(5)

We conclude that the district court correctly determined that the dissenters submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state under the long arm statute, K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 60-308(b)(5), by entering into a contract with Hesston and that Hesston made a prima facie showing of the minimum contacts necessary to establish jurisdiction over those dissenters who corresponded with the corporation, threatened litigation, demanded information, agreed to work together to prevent Fiat’s takeover, and/or objected to the 1989 merger.

Section 60-308(b)(5) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who contracts with a Kansas resident and sends payment under the contract to that resident in Kansas.

Pehr v. Sunbeam Plastics Corp. · filed 1995-01-06(b)(5)

In this case, it is uncontroverted that the parties entered into a contract and that plaintiff received payment of $15,000 under the contract in Kansas from Sunbeam’s office in Indiana. The Kansas long-arm statute requires no more. Therefore, the court concludes that personal jurisdiction may be asserted over Sunbeam under K.S.A. § 60-308(b)(5).

Section 60-308(b)(5) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant that contracts with a Kansas resident for performance at least partly in Kansas.

Topliff v. Atlas Air, Inc. · filed 1999-07-08(b)(5)

Atlas is subject to jurisdiction under the Kansas long arm statute because it entered into a contract with a Kansas resident which was to be performed, in part, in Kansas.

Section 60-308(b)(5) treats manufacturing ordered goods in Kansas and making a partial payment to the Kansas seller as partial performance of a contract in the state.

Aspen Products, Inc. v. Global Distributors, Inc. · filed 1997-10-31(b)(5)

We hold that two things happened in the dealings between the parties which amounted to a partial performance of the agreement between the parties within the state of Kansas: (1) The paper plates ordered by defendant were manufactured in Kansas for delivery to defendant on the contract in question; and (2) defendant made a partial payment on the agreement between the parties for the purchase of the paper plates.

Section 60-308(b)(5) does not support specific jurisdiction based on a settlement agreement when the claim arising from that agreement rests on supplemental jurisdiction.

Morrison Co., Inc. v. WCCO Belting, Inc. · filed 1999-01-11(b)(5)

This section may have applied if the settlement agreement was an independent ground for asserting subject ■ matter jurisdiction, but Morrison admits this claim is based on supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Therefore, K.S.A. 60-308(b)(5) does not provide the basis for specific jurisdiction.

Section 60-308(b)(5) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident in a claim arising from a contract with a Kansas resident when either party performs any part of the contract in Kansas.

Caring Hearts Personal Home Services, Inc. v. Hobley · filed 2006-03-24(b)(5)

K.S.A. 60-308(b)(5) states that any person, whether or not a resident of Kansas, submits to the jurisdiction of this state for any cause of action arising from entering into an express or implied contract with a resident of this state, by mail or otherwise, to be performed in whole or in part by either party in this state. ... In fact, all of Caring Hearts’ performance of this Kansas contract occurred in Kansas. Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding that the Kansas long-arm statute applied.

Section 60-308(b)(5) permits personal jurisdiction when a contract with a Kansas resident is to be performed at least partly in Kansas; payments due to the resident’s Kansas office satisfy that requirement.

Rusty Eck Ford-Mercury Corp. of Leavenworth v. American Custom Coachworks, Ltd. · filed 2002-01-23(b)(5)

In the present case, plaintiff has offered the affidavit of Danny Zeck, President of Rusty Eck, to support its contention that a contract between plaintiff and defendants was formed, and that under the contract, defendants were to make payments to plaintiffs offices in Kansas. Therefore, the court concludes that, for purposes of defendants’ motion to dismiss, plaintiff has offered sufficient facts to establish that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants pursuant to § 60-308(b)(5).

Section 60-308(b)(5) permits personal jurisdiction over a person who contracts with a Kansas resident for performance in whole or in part in Kansas.

Universal Premium Acceptance Corp. v. Oxford Bank & Trust · filed 2003-08-18(b)(5)

The fact that Oxford Bank anticipated payment from Kansas is evident because it requested the demand promissory note from O’Neil in Kansas and faxed to O’Neil’s office in Kansas a document which stated the payment required at closing. Accordingly, Universal has made a prima facie showing that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Oxford Bank under K.S.A. § 60 — 308(b)(5).

Section 60-308(b)(1)(E) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who contracts with a Kansas resident when either party performs part of the contract in Kansas.

Smith & Loveless, Inc. v. Caicos Corp. · filed 2007-02-01(b)(1)(E)

As to the Kansas long-arm statute, the evidence in this case clearly establishes the pumps and control panels were manufactured and assembled in Kansas. Thus, at least part of the performance of the contract occurred within the state. The court therefore concludes that its exercise of personal jurisdiction over Caicos is proper.

Section 60-308(b)(1)(E) does not subject an individual to Kansas jurisdiction based on a partial payment made on behalf of a corporation.

MR. CINNAMON OF KANSAS, INC. v. Hall · filed 2009-03-13(b)(1)(E)

We conclude Hall's partial payment for the cigarettes on behalf of A & H Tobacco does not render him subject to Kansas jurisdiction under subsection (b)(1)(E) of the long arm statute.

Section 60-308(b)(1)(A) and (E) does not confer personal jurisdiction when the defendant neither transacted business in Kansas nor contracted with a Kansas resident for partial performance there.

Gfsi, Inc. v. Comfort Knitwears (Pvt), Ltd. · filed 2010-07-29(b)(1)(A) and (E)

In sum, the Court finds that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendant is not proper under Kansas’ long-arm statute because Defendant neither transacted business within the state nor entered into a contract with a Kansas resident to be partially performed in Kansas.

Section 60-308(b)(1)(E) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on a contract with out-of-state residents merely because a Kansas resident claims to be its intended third-party beneficiary.

Central Bank of the Midwest v. Nueterra Capital, LLC · filed 2023-03-06(b)(1)(E)

“[E]ntering into an express or implied contract . . . with a resident of this state to be performed in whole or in part by either party in this state” is sufficient to subject an individual to personal jurisdiction in this state. K.S.A. § 60-308(b)(1)(E). Platinum did not contract with Nueterra, a Kansas resident. Instead, Nueterra alleges it is an intended third-party beneficiary to the contract Platinum entered into with several Missouri residents. Nueterra does not point the court to any case which shows that a party can be hauled into court by a third-party on the basis of a contract it entered into with a resident of another state.

Section 60-308(b)(1)(E) permits personal jurisdiction when a contract with a Kansas resident requires either party to perform at least part of it in Kansas.

Rhythm Engineering, LLC v. A.D. Electric, Inc. · filed 2021-05-07(b)(1)(E)

Therefore, pursuant to K.S.A. 60-308(b)(1)(E), jurisdiction over Defendant is legitimate under Kansas law as the contract entered into by the parties required some performance in Kansas.

Section 60-308(b)(1)(E) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on a contract to be performed in Kansas when the defendant was not a party to it directly or through an agent.

Temple v. Ghadimi · filed 2023-01-24(b)(1)(E)

Because Defendants were not a party to the contract either directly or through Miranda as an agent, ... they are not subject to personal jurisdiction under K.S.A. § 60-308(b)(1)(E)—accordingly, the Court need not address whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process.

Section 60-308(b)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who transacts business in Kansas or contracts with a Kansas resident for performance in Kansas when the claim arises from that act.

Gudenkauf Tree Svc. v. Jacobs · filed 2021-06-25(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(E)

We find the district court had personal jurisdiction over Virginia Diesel under the "[t]ransacting any business" section of the liberally construed long-arm statute. ... Because Jacobs sent Steve a contract requiring performance from both parties and because Steve performed his part while in Kansas, personal jurisdiction over Virginia Diesel is proper under this subsection.

Section 60-308(b)(2) does not treat consensual intercourse resulting in a child as a tortious act that establishes personal jurisdiction over a nonresident putative father.

State Ex Rel. Carrington v. Schutts · filed 1975-05-10(b)(2)

Before the Kansas long-arm statute could become operative in the case now before us, we would have to hold that the act of siring a child is a tortious act committed within the state. The most liberal rules of construction of the phrase “tortious act” would not tolerate the inclusion of an act of sexual intercourse between consenting parties.

Section 60-308(b)(2) does not permit personal jurisdiction over parents whose liability for their child’s Kansas tort arises solely from a statute imposing vicarious liability.

Memorial Lawn Cemeteries Association, Inc. v. Carr · filed 1975-09-09(b)(2)

It is our conclusion that this vicarious liability does not fall within the provisions of the Kansas “long-arm” statute, K. S.A. 60-308, requiring, as a condition of valid personal service on a party outside the state, that such party (insofar as applicable here) commit a tortious act within Kansas “ * * in person or through an agent or instrumentality * There was no legal basis for personal service of summons outside the state of Kansas.

Section 60-308(b)(2) reaches a fraudulent misrepresentation made outside Kansas that causes tortious injury within the state.

J. E. M. Corp. v. McClellan · filed 1978-12-04(b)(2)

The primary issue before this Court is whether a fraudulent misrepresentation made from without the jurisdiction that causes tortious injury in the jurisdiction constitutes a “tortious act within this state” within the meaning of K.S.A. § 60-308(b)(2). This Court finds that it does.

Subsection (b)(2) does not require the defendant to be physically present in Kansas for a tortious act to support personal jurisdiction.

Ammon Ex Rel. Ammon v. Kaplow · filed 1979-04-26(b)(2)

We concur with Judge Theis’ opinion in J.E.M. Corporation that subsection (b)(2) requires no physical presence of the defendant within the state.

Section 60-308(b)(2) permits jurisdiction on a prima facie showing of tortious conduct, while (b)(5) covers a contract with a Kansas resident performed partly in Kansas.

Kemper v. Rohrich · filed 1980-10-23(b)(2), (b)(5)

This court feels that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of “tortious conduct” and that the defendant has not sufficiently rebutted it. Therefore, the court finds that the plaintiff has made a sufficient showing to establish that defendants’ conduct falls within subsection (b)(2). ... Subsection (b)(5) permits jurisdiction to be asserted over defendants who enter into an express or implied contract, by mail or otherwise, with a resident of this state to be performed in whole or in part by either party in this state. ... Therefore, this court concludes that in personam jurisdiction over the defendants is proper under the facts of this case under both subsection (b)(2) and (b)(5).

Section 60-308(b)(2) permits service for a tort causing injury in Kansas even if the defendant was never present there and the act occurred elsewhere.

Louis W. Wegerer and Judith A. Wegerer v. First Commodity Corporation of Boston · filed 1984-09-10(b)(2)

A plaintiff need not establish that a defendant was actually present in Kansas to effectuate service under Sec. 60-308(b)(2), or that the tortious act complained of occurred in Kansas.

Section 60-308(b)(2) permits a Kansas suit for an injury in Kansas caused by negligent conduct outside the state.

Ling v. Jan's Liquors · filed 1985-07-17(b)(2)

Therefore, we hold that under the provisions of K.S.A. 60-308(b)(2), it is possible to bring suit in Kansas to recover damages for injuries occurring in this state which resulted from negligent conduct outside the state.

Section 60-308(b)(2) permits jurisdiction for an alleged tort committed outside Kansas when the resulting injury occurs in Kansas.

Fidelity State Bank & Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. · filed 1991-06-07(b)(2)

Therefore, even though most of the tortious acts did not occur in Kansas, there can be little doubt that the “injury resulting from the tortious act” occurred in Kansas since the plaintiff is a Kansas bank. ... As a result, this case falls within the parameters of K.S.A. 60-308(b)(2), and the first step in establishing personal jurisdiction over Moody’s is satisfied.

Section 60-308(b)(2) treats conduct outside Kansas that causes injury in Kansas as a tortious act within the state.

Ray v. Heilman · filed 1987-03-11(b)(2)

Similarly, the court finds that in this case the injury occurred in Kansas and thus, defendant’s conduct constitutes a “tortious act within the state” within the ambit of § 60-308(b)(2).

Section 60-308(b)(2) covers negligent conduct outside Kansas that causes injury in Kansas as a tortious act within the state.

Taylor v. Phelan · filed 1990-08-27(b)(2)

Because there is no indication of any retreat under Kansas law from the broad reading of the tortious act section of the state long-arm statute as put forth in Ling, see Volt Delta Resources, 740 P.2d at 1092; Ray v. Heilman, 660 F.Supp. 122, 123-24 (D.Kan.1987) (applying Kansas law), we conclude that the district court was correct in determining that the Kansas long-arm statute applies to the defendants’ actions.

Section 60-308(b)(2) reaches an alleged tort that injures a corporation at its Kansas principal place of business, and subsection (b)(5) reaches a contract to be performed partly in Kansas.

Corinthian Mortgage Corp. v. First Security Mortgage Co. · filed 1989-07-14(b)(2), (b)(5)

Corinthian suffered the alleged injury not where the closing was to take place or where the deposit was to be made, but at its principal place of business, which is in Kansas. ... Thus, the requirements of K.S.A. 60-308(b)(2) are met. ... Because Corinthian’s principal place of business is in Kansas, the contract was to be performed in part in Kansas. Thus, the conditions of K.S.A. 60-308(b)(5) were met.

Section 60-308(b)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident that brings allegedly infringing products into Kansas for a presentation to a Kansas customer.

Snyder Industries, Inc. v. Clawson Container Co. · filed 1998-01-30(b)(2)

Under the applicable standards set forth above, the Court finds that this contact is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction under K.S.A. § 60-308(b)(2).

Section 60-308(b)(2) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident when its agents’ tortious conduct causes injury in Kansas.

Battenfeld of America Holding Co., Inc. v. Baird, Kurtz & Dobson · filed 1999-02-05(b)(2)

VGT is subject to the jurisdiction of this court under section 60-308(b)(2) of the Kansas long-arm statute. ... Because VGT’s agents’ conduct caused injury to BKD in Kansas, the tortious act occurred in Kansas within the meaning of the Kansas long-arm statute.

Section 60-308(b)(2) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s tortious conduct outside Kansas causes injury in Kansas.

Fidelity State Bank, Garden City, Kan. v. Oles · filed 1991-07-29(b)(2)

The fraudulent scheme apparently originated in Texas; however, the injury occurred in Kansas. The defendant’s conduct falls within subsection (b)(2) of the long arm statute; thus, the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

Section 60-308(b)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident whose alleged fraud causes financial loss to a corporation in Kansas.

Dazey Corp. v. Wolfman · filed 1996-11-19(b)(2)

Under the standard discussed in Continental Am. Corp and the cases Dazey cites, the court concludes it is proper to invoke jurisdiction over Wolfman pursuant to K.S.A. § 60-308(b)(2). The plaintiffs financial loss, allegedly caused by the defendant’s fraudulent conduct, occurred in Kansas.

Subsection (b)(2) reaches tortious acts committed outside Kansas when they cause injury in Kansas.

Maverick Paper Co. v. Omaha Paper Co., Inc. · filed 1998-08-12(b)(2)

Defendant does not deny that his alleged actions fall within the reach of the Kansas Long-Arm Statute, and the Court finds that it authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction in this case. K.S.A. § 60-308(b)(2) subjects a party to the jurisdiction of the State of Kansas for the “commission of a tortious act within this state.” Kansas interprets the term “tortious act” broadly, covering injuries that result from tortious acts committed outside the state.

Subsection (b)(2) covers alleged tortious conduct outside Kansas that causes economic injury to a Kansas resident in Kansas.

Worthington v. Small · filed 1999-02-05(b)(2)

In her complaint, she alleges several tortious acts which, if proved, caused economic injury to her in Kansas. Accordingly, although defendant’s connections to Kansas are highly attenuated here, the court concludes that defendant’s conduct is sufficient to bring him within the purview of K.S.A. § 60-308(b)(2) for purposes of plaintiff Eichenwald’s case.

Subsection (b)(2) does not provide personal jurisdiction based on a tortious injury in Kansas unless the plaintiff suffered that injury.

National Gypsum Co. v. Dalemark Industries, Inc. · filed 1991-11-12(b)(2)

This court, therefore, does not read Volt Delta Resources as extending (b)(2) jurisdiction over a defendant whose tortious actions did not cause an injury to a plaintiff in Kansas.

Section 60-308(b)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a corporate principal for his own tortious acts in Kansas despite the fiduciary shield doctrine.

Key Industries, Inc. v. O'Doski, Sellers & Clark, Inc. · filed 1994-12-09(b)(2)

The court concludes that O’Doski cannot use the fiduciary shield doctrine to preclude the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over him under the “tortious acts” provision of the Kansas long-arm statute, section 60 — 308(b)(2).

Section 60-308(b)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident whose alleged tortious conduct causes injury in Kansas, where the tort is deemed to have occurred.

Blue Moon Licensing, Inc. v. Gregorek · filed 1995-11-08(b)(2)

Although it has never done business in Kansas, A & A’s conduct allegedly caused injury to BML-KS in Kansas and, therefore, the alleged tort is deemed to have occurred in Kansas.

A claim that a lien arises under Kansas law, without facts showing a tortious act or resulting injury in Kansas, does not establish personal jurisdiction under subsection (b)(2).

Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Allen · filed 1997-07-11(b)(2)

How or why the injury to Safeco occurred in Kansas is not explained, nor is it self-evident. Safeco alleged only that it was authorized to transact business in Kansas. Thus, Safeco has failed to bring to this court’s attention any facts or legal authorities that would cast doubt on the correctness of the district court’s decision on jurisdiction.

Section 60-308(b)(2) permits personal jurisdiction based on a tortious act in Kansas when the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the defendant committed the act there.

Scott v. Home Choice, Inc. · filed 2003-02-20(b)(2)

After carefully examining plaintiffs complaint, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, the court concludes plaintiff has failed to allege that defendant Littler or its agents engaged in the torts of fraud and malicious abuse of process in the state of Kansas. Although plaintiff discusses the fact that he was engaged in previous litigation in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas, plaintiff has not stated the location of the acts that he identifies as tortious, nor has he stated that defendant Littler or its agents committed them. Plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie showing that a Kansas court may exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant Littler.

Section 60-308(b)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident whose alleged misrepresentations cause economic injury in Kansas, even when the communications originate elsewhere.

Loeffelbein v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach LLP · filed 2005-02-18(b)(2)

K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 60-308(b)(2) states that a nonresident will be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of Kansas if the nonresident commits a tortious act within this state. Plaintiffs have established a prima facie case that Milberg Weiss has committed a tortious act within this state.

Section 60-308(b)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant whose alleged tortious conduct causes injury in Kansas, even if the defendant acted outside the state.

Thermal Components Company v. Griffith · filed 2000-04-17(b)(2)

Accordingly, the court concludes that it is proper to invoke jurisdiction over defendants pursuant to K.S.A. § 60 — 308(b)(2).

Section 60-308(b)(1)(B) reaches tortious acts committed outside Kansas that cause injury in Kansas to a Kansas resident, subject to due process limits.

Midwest Manufacturing, Inc. v. Ausland · filed 2012-03-30(b)(1)(B)

Under Kansas law, “committing a tortious act in this state” is broadly construed under the long-arm statute to include tortious acts performed outside the state which cause injury in Kansas to a Kansas resident. ... Accepting Midwest’s allegations as true, and liberally construing the Kansas long-arm statute as we are required to do, Midwest has presented a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction under K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 60-308(b)(l).

Section 60-308(b)(1)(B) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant whose conduct outside Kansas causes injury within the state.

Arnold v. Maxmind, Inc. · filed 2016-10-20(b)(1)(B)

The court finds that, at the present stage of the litigation, the plaintiffs’ allegations satisfy the requirements of K.S.A. 60-308(b)(l)(B) and due process.

Section 60-308(b)(1)(B) permits personal jurisdiction over an alleged conspirator when a coconspirator acts in Kansas to further the alleged tort and the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of jurisdiction.

AEROFLEX WICHITA, INC. v. Filardo · filed 2012-04-27(b)(1)(B)

Hence, we conclude that when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Aeroflex, Aeroflex presented a prima facie case of jurisdiction by providing evidence from which it can be inferred that TIC, through its alleged coconspirator Filardo, acted in Kansas to misappropriate Aeroflex’s trade secrets. As a result, there was a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over TIC pursuant to K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-308(b)(l)(B).

An alleged misrepresentation that causes monetary injury to a Kansas resident can establish a prima facie basis for jurisdiction under subsection (b)(1)(B), subject to due process limits.

Ray Hodge & Assocs. v. Cannon · filed 2017-12-15(b)(1)(B)

Based on these allegations, and resolving any factual disputes in Hodge's favor, Hodge made a prima facie showing of jurisdiction under the Kansas long- arm statute.

Section 60-308(b)(1)(B)’s tortious act provision covers an alleged wrongful termination in Kansas.

Simmons v. Amsted Rail Company · filed 2019-04-30(b)(1)(B)

Here, the tortious act provision in Kansas’s long-arm statute covers the alleged wrongful termination.

Section 60-308(b)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a person who commits a tortious act in Kansas or has contacts with Kansas that support jurisdiction under the state and federal constitutions.

Pennington v. Meyers · filed 2022-03-04(b)(1)(B) & (b)(1)(L)

Also, plaintiffs assert that Mr. Meyers committed the alleged FACE Act violations at a Planned Parenthood Clinic in Overland Park, Kansas. So, the court has personal jurisdiction over Mr. Meyers. See Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermillion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1070 (10th Cir. 2008) (explaining that Rule 4(k)(1)(A) applies when a federal statute does not provide for nationwide service of process and requires the court to apply the law of forum state where the district court is situated); see also Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-308(b)(1)(B) & (b)(1)(L) (providing that, under the Kansas long-arm statute, a party submits to personal jurisdiction in Kansas by “committing a tortious act” in the state or “having contact with this state which would support jurisdiction consistent with the constitutions of the United States and of this state”).

Section 60-308(b)(5)(ii) requires more than foreseeable injury in Kansas from a defective product; the defendant must reasonably obtain or anticipate financial benefit from its products’ sale, trade, use or servicing in Kansas.

Tilley v. Keller Truck & Implement Corp. · filed 1968-03-09(b)(5)(ii)

The particular product or service causing the injury need not be sold or performed in the forum state but the defendant must reasonably have or anticipate financial benefit from the sale, trade, use or servicing of its products in the forum state. ... This construction is reasonable and proper under our statute and it appears to meet the requirements set forth in Hanson v. Denckla, supra.

Section 60-308(b)(7)(ii) requires more than a single isolated injury in Kansas to establish jurisdiction over an out-of-state supplier.

Midwest Elevator Systems, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance · filed 1981-01-08(b)(7)(ii)

It is clear from a reading of K.S.A. § 60-308(b)(7) that the legislature intended that something more than a single isolated injury had to occur before jurisdiction could be exercised. Provisoes (i) and (ii) supply the additional factor.

Section 60-308(b)(7) permits service on an out-of-state manufacturer when its product causes injury while used in Kansas in the ordinary course of use.

Cunningham v. Subaru of America, Inc. · filed 1986-03-12(b)(7)

The court finds that Fuji is properly subject to service under the Kansas long-arm statute because an injury arose out of the use of a Subaru vehicle in Kansas manufactured by the defendant and which was used in Kansas in its ordinary use.

Section 60-308(b)(7)(B) permits jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer when its product is used in Kansas in the ordinary course of trade and causes an injury there.

Johnson v. Goodyear S.A. Colmar Berg · filed 1989-07-21(b)(7)(B)

Plaintiff’s complaint states that she seeks relief for the fatal injuries her husband received while operating a machine manufactured by defendant Goodyear S.A. and used within Kansas in the ordinary course of trade. Plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently states a prima facie case of long-arm jurisdiction under K.S.A. 60-308(b)(7)(B), see Bohannon v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 682 F.Supp. 42, 43 (D.Kan.1988), and defendant offers nothing to refute plaintiff’s prima facie showing.

Subsection (b)(7) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a product liability case involving an injury in Kansas.

Bohannon v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd. · filed 1988-03-28(b)(7)

This provision confers jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in product liability cases. ... Therefore, plaintiff has complied with the Kansas Long Arm Statute.

Section 60-308(b)(7) applies only to products liability cases.

Composite Marine Propellers, Inc. v. Vanderwoude · filed 1990-07-03(b)(7)

However, subsection (b)(7) applies only to products liability cases. ... We therefore conclude that subsection (b)(7) is inapplicable to the present case.

Subsection (b)(7) reaches a foreign manufacturer whose product, manufactured or designed outside Kansas, allegedly injures a person in Kansas.

Redwine v. Franz Plasser Bahnbaumaschinen Industriegesellschaft, M.B.H. · filed 1992-07-07(b)(7)

K.S.A. 60-308(b)(7) was intended to provide jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers in products liability cases. ... The case at bar fits this description. The defendant has manufactured a product outside of Kansas whose manufacture and design has allegedly caused injury to a person within this state. The long-arm statute therefore covers the defendant’s acts.

Section 60-308(b)(7) applies only to products liability cases, so it does not provide personal jurisdiction for a patent infringement claim.

Hodgdon Powder Co. v. Clean Shot Technologies, Inc. · filed 2000-03-21(b)(7)

The Kansas Supreme ... Court has held, however, that K.S.A. § 60-308(b)(7) is limited to products liability cases. ... The case before the court is not a products liability case; it is a patent infringement case.

Section 60-308(b)(7) does not provide personal jurisdiction for an antitrust claim based on price fixing rather than a product liability injury.

Four B Corp. v. Ueno Fine Chemicals Industry, Ltd. · filed 2003-01-08(b)(7)

Consequently, the court finds plaintiffs have failed to make a prima facie showing that the exercise of jurisdiction under § 60-308(b)(7) is appropriate in this antitrust violation case.

Section 60-308(b)(7) permits personal jurisdiction over a manufacturer whose product causes injury in Kansas when used there in the ordinary course of trade or use.

Cardenas v. Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc. · filed 2005-03-14(b)(7)

The key question before the court, then, is whether Plaintiffs have established a prima facie case that DI “manufactured” the child safety seat. ... But the court finds it substantial enough to infer that DI is a manufacturer at this stage of the litigation. By holding itself out as a manufacturer, DI has engaged in minimum contacts with the state of Kansas.

Subsection (b)(7) supports a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over a person who designed and tested a product that injured a Kansas consumer, even when the person acted for an employer.

Spicer v. New Image International, Inc. · filed 2006-08-18(b)(7)

Frederic admits that he designed and tested Fastrim, which caused injury to plaintiff in Kansas. The Court, need not decide whether Frederic’s conduct falls within subsection (b)(2) because (b)(7) provides jurisdiction. Resolving all factual disputes in favor of plaintiff, the Court finds that plaintiff has made a prima facie case of jurisdiction under Section 60-308(b)(7).

Section 60-308(b)(6) permits personal jurisdiction over a former spouse served outside Kansas for attorney fees arising from a property settlement or child support proceedings when the other spouse continues to reside in Kansas.

Scott v. Hall · filed 1969-05-17(b)(6)

Hence, the plaintiff may enforce the contractual property settlement made in his favor since Mrs. Hall continues to reside in Kansas, and may likewise enforce the $500.00 additional attorney’s fee ordered paid by the defendant on February 25, 1966, since its allowance arose out of proceedings with respect to child support, which is specifically enumerated in the subsection.

Section 60-308(b)(8) allows personal jurisdiction in family relationship cases only when the parties lived in a marital relationship in Kansas.

Whisenant v. Whisenant · filed 1976-04-10(b)(8)

It requires as the minimum contact necessary for in personam jurisdiction in actions involving family relationships that the parties live in a marital relationship within the state of Kansas.

Section 60-308(b)(8) allows a Kansas court to decide child custody and support in an original divorce action when the spouses lived together in Kansas and one remains there after the other leaves.

Varney v. Varney · filed 1977-07-11(b)(8)

Clearly, the intent of K.S.A. 60-308 (b) (8) is to allow a trial court to draw these matters together for unified disposition, even when one of the partners to the marital union has established a domicile elsewhere, once the initial requirements of the subsection are met.

Section 60-308(b)(8) permits a personal judgment against a spouse or former spouse when the parties lived together in Kansas during the marriage and the party bringing the action continues to reside there.

Kendall v. Kendall · filed 1978-10-28(b)(8)

This provision as to long arm jurisdiction is almost identical to our statute, K.S.A. 60-308(b)(8). Both statutes give the party to the marital relationship the right to obtain a personal judgment against the other spouse, or ex-spouse, if the parties lived in the marital relationship within the state and if the party bringing the action continues to reside in the state where the action is commenced.

Section 60-308(b)(8) does not support personal jurisdiction when the defendant spouse never lived in a marital relationship in Kansas.

Perry v. Perry · filed 1981-01-23(b)(8)

Although counsel argued otherwise, there was no evidence the wife ever “lived in the marital relationship” here.

Section 60-308(h)(8) permits personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state spouse for alimony, child support, or property settlement arising from a Kansas marital residence only if the other spouse has continued to reside in Kansas.

Guye v. Guye · filed 1982-12-02(h)(8)

The emphasized language plainly requires continuous residence in the state by the remaining party. Although plaintiff and defendant once lived as husband and wife in this state, they left together and established a new marital residence in Illinois. Plaintiff did not continue to reside in this state but rather returned to Kansas after having left it for a new domicile. Based on the above statute, we conclude that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider issues of property division and child support.

Section 60-308(b)'s minimum-contacts requirement does not apply to parental-rights termination proceedings under the KCCC or UCCJA because they adjudicate status.

In Re MLK · filed 1989-02-03(b)

Therefore, it is our determination that the trial court correctly ruled that it had jurisdiction over the termination proceedings filed under the KCCC and/or UCCJA in this case, and that such jurisdiction was not subject to the requirements of the "minimum contacts" rule and K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 60-308(b).

Section 60-308(b)’s minimum-contacts requirement does not apply to termination of parental rights proceedings when jurisdiction rests on the child’s Kansas residence under the KCCC or UCCJA.

In re the Interest of M.L.K. · filed 1989-02-03(b)

Therefore, it is our determination that the trial court correctly ruled that it had jurisdiction over the termination proceedings filed under the KCCC and/or UCCJA in this case, and that such jurisdiction was not subject to the requirements of the “minimum contacts” rule and K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 60-308(b).

Section 60-308(5) requires sufficient contacts with Kansas before its courts may exercise personal jurisdiction.

Eferakeya v. Twin City State Bank · filed 1989-07-14(5)

MHT has insufficient contacts with the state to warrant Kansas courts invoking personal jurisdiction over it pursuant to K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 60-308(5).

Section 60-308(b)(8) permits personal jurisdiction over an absent spouse for covered marital obligations when the spouses lived in a marital relationship in Kansas, the other spouse continues to reside there, and the absent spouse had sufficient minimum contacts; a Kansas marital domicile is not required.

In Re the Marriage of Brown · filed 1990-07-13(b)(8)

The scope of in personam jurisdiction for issues arising out of the marital relationship for those obligations covered by 60-308(b)(8) is to be determined by constitutional limitations and does not contain an additional requirement to establish a marital domicile.

Section 60-308(b)(8) permits Kansas courts to exercise personal jurisdiction based on a person’s prior residence in Kansas in a marital relationship.

In Re Marriage of Ruth · filed 2004-02-06(b)(8)

Also, Denise has submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the Kansas courts by virtue of the fact that she had lived in Kansas in a marital relationship. See K.S.A. 60-308(b)(8). Service of John’s motion was in conformity with Kansas law. The trial court did not err in its decision that Denise had been given proper notice of the hearing and the trial court had jurisdiction to decide the issue.

Section 60-308(b)(1)(H) permits personal jurisdiction over a person who lived in a marital relationship in Kansas before leaving the state if the other party still resides in Kansas.

In re Marriage of Brizendine & Randall · filed 2017-03-03(b)(1)(H)

K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-308 (b)(1)(H) (the "Long Arm Statute") provides for personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state person if that person had lived in a marital relationship in Kansas before moving out of state and if the other party to the marital relationship continues to reside in Kansas. ... The district court, therefore, had neither personal nor subject matter jurisdiction to hear Brizendine's case and properly granted Randall's motion to dismiss.

Section 60-308(b)(1)(H) allows personal jurisdiction based on a past marital relationship in Kansas when one spouse remains there, but federal law limits that ground in military retirement pay disputes.

In re Marriage of Williams · filed 2018-05-18(b)(1)(H)

But, by providing limited grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction, the USFSPA preempts Kansas' long-arm statute and, for example, its provision that allows personal jurisdiction if the parties lived in a marital relationship in Kansas and one person continues to reside in the state. See K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 60-308(b)(1)(H).

Section 60-308(b)(1)(H) permits personal jurisdiction over a person who lived in a marital relationship in Kansas and later left, if the other party continues to reside in Kansas.

In re Marriage of Gracey and Albawardi · filed 2026-05-22(b)(1)(H)

Accepting the district court's factual findings as true, we find the district court clearly had personal jurisdiction over Albawardi under K.S.A. 60-308(b)(1)(H).