Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1507

A movant seeking relief under section 60-1507 must prove the grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence; uncorroborated statements do not meet that burden.

Ramsey v. State · filed 1965-03-06

Under Rule No. 121(g) of this court the movant in an action under K. S. A. 60-1507 has the burden of establishing his grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. The uncorroborated statements of the movant are insufficient to sustain the burden of proof.

A movant seeking relief under section 60-1507 must prove the grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence; uncorroborated statements do not satisfy that burden.

Huston v. State · filed 1965-06-12

“Burden of Proof. The movant has tire burden of establishing his grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. The uncorroborated statements of the movant shall be insufficient to sustain the burden of proof.” ... After a complete review of the record, we hold that the plaintiff did not sustain his burden of proof.

A prisoner seeking relief under § 60-1507 must sustain the burden of proof to obtain release from the judgment and sentence.

Witt v. State · filed 1966-07-14

The petitioner having failed to sustain the burden of proof in this 1507 proceeding is not entitled to a release from the judgment and sentence imposed against him in the criminal proceeding.

A § 60-1507 movant must prove grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence; uncorroborated statements in the motion do not satisfy that burden.

Miksell v. State · filed 1966-07-14

“The uncorroborated statements of a movant made in support of a motion brought by him pursuant to K. S. A. 60-1507, to set aside a sentence previously imposed against him, are insufficient to sustain his burden of proof.”

A person attacking a conviction under § 60-1507 on constitutional grounds must prove the violation by a preponderance of the evidence; unsupported and uncorroborated assertions do not meet that burden.

Thompson v. State · filed 1966-11-05

“A judgment of conviction of crime carries with it a presumption of regularity, and where one convicted of a crime attacks such a judgment pursuant to K. S. A. 60-1507, on the ground that his constitutional rights were violated, he has the burden of proof to establish such fact by a preponderance of the evidence, and such burden is not sustained by unsupported and uncorroborated statements by the plaintiff (Huston v. State, 195 Kan. 140, 403 P. 2d 122).” (Syl. ¶ 8.) ... The trial court committed no error in finding appellant failed to meet the requisite burden of proof and its order denying relief is affirmed.

A movant’s uncorroborated testimony is insufficient to carry the burden of proof for relief under § 60-1507.

Lieser v. State · filed 1967-07-12

We have often held, and reiterate once again, that under Rule No. 121 (g) the uncorroborated testimony of a movant is insufficient to sustain his burden of proof under K. S. A. 60-1507.

A movant seeking relief under § 60-1507 must establish the grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence.

Metcalf v. State · filed 1967-11-13

Under the provisions of K. S. A. 60-1507 and Rule No. 121 (g) the movant has the burden of establishing his grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence.

A movant seeking relief under § 60-1507 must prove a constitutional violation by a preponderance of the evidence; unsupported and uncorroborated statements do not meet that burden.

Rodgers v. State · filed 1968-07-13

This court has repeatedly said a judgment of conviction of crime carries with it a presumption of regularity and when one convicted of a crime attacks such a judgment he has the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence his constitutional rights have been violated. This burden is not sustained by unsupported and uncorroborated statements of the movant.

A movant seeking to vacate an enhanced sentence under § 60-1507 for discriminatory use of the Habitual Criminal Act bears the burden of proving arbitrary and invidious discrimination.

Scoggins v. State · filed 1969-05-17

“ . . . If the county attorney acts corruptly, willfully and in bad faith in invoking the Act, the sentence imposed thereunder may be vacated pursuant to K. S. A. 60-1507, but the burden of proof rests upon the movant. (Citing cases.)” (p. 235.) ... After a thorough review of the record, we agree with the trial court that the petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proving arbitrary and invidious discrimination on the part of either the county attorney or the sentencing judge.

A petitioner seeking relief under § 60-1507 must prove entitlement to relief by a preponderance of the evidence; uncorroborated statements do not meet that burden.

Lee v. State · filed 1969-12-06

A petitioner seeking relief under K. S. A. 60-1507 bears the burden of establishing his right to relief by a preponderance of the evidence, and his uncorroborated statements are insufficient to sustain that burden.

Section 60-1507 places the burden of proof on the petitioner, and allegations without a factual foundation do not support relief.

Jackson v. State · filed 1970-03-07

The burden of proof in a proceeding conducted pursuant to K. S. A. 60-1507 is upon the petitioner. Allegations by the petitioner in his motion which have no foundation in fact do not give rise to a basis for relief.

A petitioner seeking relief under § 60-1507 bears the burden of proving that a guilty plea was involuntary.

Jones v. State · filed 1971-06-12

It suffices to say that a petitioner in a 1507 proceeding has the burden of proving that his plea of guilty was involuntary.

A proceeding under § 60-1507 is civil, and the petitioner bears the burden of proof.

Winter v. State · filed 1972-11-04

A proceeding on a motion to set aside a sentence pursuant to K. S. A. 60-1507 is a civil proceeding and the burden of proof is upon the petitioner.

A movant challenging a guilty plea under § 60-1507 bears the burden of proving grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence.

Jackson v. State · filed 1972-12-09

This is an appeal from an order overruling petitioner’s motion to set aside his plea and sentence pursuant to K. S. A. 60-1507, after a full evidentiary hearing. ... Petitioner testified but he did not call his two retained attorneys, the jailers or the county attorney to testify. Upon this showing the trial court was not required to find that petitioner had sustained his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

A § 60-1507 petitioner alleging incompetent or ineffective counsel bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the conviction is regular.

Burns v. State · filed 1974-07-17

The burden of establishing incompetency of an attorney or ineffective assistance of counsel to the extent necessary to overcome the presumption of regularity of a conviction is upon the petitioner.

A petitioner seeking relief under § 60-1507 must prove the grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence.

Schoonover v. State · filed 1975-12-13

In its findings of fact the trial court correctly stated that in a proceeding under K. S. A. 60-1507 the petitioner had the burden of proof to sustain by a preponderance of the evidence her claim of relief upon the issues presented.

A § 60-1507 petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel bears the burden of overcoming the presumption of regularity of the conviction.

Oswald v. State · filed 1977-03-05

The burden of establishing the ineffective 'assistance of counsel to the extent necessary to overcome 'the presumption of regularity of a conviction is upon the petitioner.

A § 60-1507 movant claiming that the sentencing court failed to advise him about expungement must prove that the omission violated his constitutional rights.

Ruebke v. State · filed 1986-07-03

Arnold L. Ruebke, Jr. appeals the denial of his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion to set aside a 1984 felony theft conviction that followed a plea of guilty. ... Appellant had the burden to prove that his constitutional rights were violated by the inaction here. ... We find no prejudicial error in the trial court’s denial of the relief sought.

Section 60-1507(b) places on the movant the burden to raise grounds for relief that the movant can establish by a preponderance of the evidence.

Bloom v. State · filed 2016-05-06(b)

At the same evidentiary hearing, Bloom had the burden to raise those issues he believed he could establish by a preponderance of the evidence that would entitle him to relief under K.S.A. 60-1507.

A § 60-1507 movant claiming ineffective assistance bears the burden of proof and must support the claim with evidence in the motion or record rather than conclusory assertions.

Bengtson v. State · filed 2017-03-10

The burden to establish ineffective assistance of counsel under K.S.A. 60-1507 procedures rests on the moving party—the convicted defendant. To meet this burden, a movant's contentions must be more than conclusory; either the movant must set forth an evidentiary basis to support those contentions or the basis must be evident from the record.

A movant seeking relief for a constitutional violation under § 60-1507(b) must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that trial counsel or the district court infringed the asserted right.

Yarbrough v. State · filed 2020-09-25(b)

To be entitled to relief, Yarbrough must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his trial counsel or the district court infringed on either of these rights. See K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-1507(b).

A person seeking relief under § 60-1507 must support the claim with evidence; conclusory allegations do not satisfy the movant’s burden.

Gormly v. State · filed 2022-07-08

Conclusory allegations with no evidentiary basis in the record are not enough to satisfy a person's burden in a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

A § 60-1507 movant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the judgment lacked jurisdiction, the sentence was unlawful or otherwise subject to collateral attack, or a constitutional violation made the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack.

Lowery v. State · filed 2024-10-18(b)

To be entitled to relief under K.S.A. 60-1507, the movant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence either: (1) "the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction"; (2) "the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or is otherwise open to collateral attack"; or (3) "there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack." K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-1507(b) (grounds for relief); see also Supreme Court Rule 183(g) (preponderance burden).

At an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a § 60-1507 motion, the movant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence a denial or infringement of constitutional rights that makes the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack.

Betts v. State · filed 2025-05-02(b)

The proper evidentiary standard when ruling on the merits of Betts' K.S.A. 60- 1507 motion is a preponderance of the evidence that "there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack." See K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-1507(b) (grounds for relief); Rule 183(g) (preponderance of evidence burden).

A K.S.A. 60-1507 movant bears the burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel.

Anzua-Torres v. State · filed 2016-09-23

The burden of proof in establishing ineffective assistance of counsel is on the K.S.A. 60-1507 movant.

A movant under K.S.A. 60-1507 must prove the grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence.

Brown v. State · filed 2017-04-14

As the district court noted, the burden of proof on a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion is on the movant, so Brown was required to establish his grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence.

A movant bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence at a K.S.A. 60-1507 hearing.

Zabala v. State · filed 2017-10-13

At the hearing on that motion Zabala bore the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

A K.S.A. 60-1507 movant bears the burden of proving the claims in the motion.

Mata-Estrada v. State · filed 2017-10-20

Fundamentally, in order for Mata-Estrada to prevail on his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion he had the burden to prove his claims.

A § 60-1507 movant cannot satisfy the burden of proof with uncorroborated testimony alone.

Lloyd v. State · filed 1966-07-14

The only evidence to the contrary was the uncorroborated testimony of the petitioner himself, which, of course, is insufficient to sustain the burden of proof in this type of proceeding.

Section 60-1507 is the proper procedure for raising a claim that McAdam applies to a sentence.

State v. McCoin · filed 2004-12-03

The proper procedure for raising the application of McAdam to McCoin’s sentence would be by filing a motion pursuant to K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 60-1507. McCoin did not file a 60-1507 motion.

A represented defendant must follow the procedures for instituting a § 60-1507 proceeding for a motion to be treated as one.

State v. Phinney · filed 2005-11-10

However, Phinney did not institute a 60-1507 proceeding. ... Phinney complied with none of the detailed procedures required to institute a 60-1507 proceeding, and he was not pro se.

A § 60-1507 motion is a separate civil action, so an order entered only in the related criminal case does not dispose of it.

Hachmeister v. Williams · filed 2026-02-03

Because there is no legal authority in Kansas allowing a judge to deny a civil 60-1507 motion by way of an order entered in a criminal case, the 2018 MD&O had no effect on the 60-1507 case.

A motion under § 60-1507 is an independent civil action attacking the criminal judgment and should be separately docketed.

State v. Richardson · filed 1965-03-06(a)

While the motion attacks the judgment in the criminal case it is separate from the criminal case and is, in fact and theory, a new case. The motion should be given a separate docket number and be captioned in a manner which will describe the new case and not cause confusion with the previous criminal case.

Section 60-1507 permits challenges to the validity of a judgment or sentence, but does not permit review of later actions by the Kansas Board of Probation and Parole.

Foor v. State · filed 1966-04-28(a)

The provisions of K. S. A. 60-1507 do not provide a method for inquiring into the propriety of the acts of the Kansas Board of Probation and Parole. The provisions are available only for the purpose of inquiring into the propriety of a judgment or sentence.

Section 60-1507 permits a prisoner to challenge sentences in the court that imposed them.

Carroll v. Sherman H. Crouse, Warden · filed 1966-06-07

Appellant may return to the sentencing court which imposed the sentences for larceny and burglary and attack those sentences there under K.S.A. 60-1507.

Section 60-1507 provides state court review of claims that a conviction followed denial of counsel at critical stages or a coerced guilty plea.

Davis v. Sherman H. Crouse, Warden, Kansas State Penitentiary, Lansing, Kansas · filed 1966-07-18

As to his claim that his constitutional rights had been denied during the Leavenworth County proceedings by reason of failure of the state to furnish assistance of counsel at the critical stages and because of being coerced into pleas of guilty, these are matters subject to review in the state court under K.S.A. 60-1507.

Section 60-1507 is the exclusive statutory remedy for a prisoner in custody under a sentence of a court of general jurisdiction to collaterally attack that sentence; Section 60-260 is unavailable for that purpose.

Smith v. State · filed 1967-05-13

We hold this to be the exclusive statutory remedy authorizing a prisoner in custody under sentence of a court of general jurisdiction to make a collateral attack upon the sentence in a criminal case, and that K. S. A. 60-260 is not available to him for this purpose.

Section 60-1507(a) requires a prisoner challenging a sentence to file the motion in the court that imposed that sentence.

Williams v. State · filed 1969-04-12(a)

The sentence which appellant attacks in the present case was imposed by the District Court of Johnson County. The provisions of K. S. A. 60-1507 (a) require the proceedings to be brought in the court which imposed the sentence. The present proceedings were improvidently filed in Shawnee county.

Section 60-1507 does not provide a way to challenge acts of the Kansas Board of Probation and Parole.

Prescher v. State · filed 1970-06-25

Assuming that this may be true, the provisions of K. S. A. 60-1507 do not provide a method for inquiring into the propriety of the acts of the Kansas Board of Probation and Parole.

Section 60-1507 does not permit review of a probation revocation for evidentiary sufficiency absent constitutional irregularities.

Stewart v. State · filed 1970-11-07

We hold that in the absence of irregularities of constitutional propositions, a proceeding to revoke probation pursuant to 62-2244, supra, is not reviewable by a motion to vacate, set aside or correct a sentence under 60-1507.

Section 60-1507 does not permit a court to relitigate guilt or innocence, including the factual basis for a voluntarily entered guilty plea.

Hughes v. State · filed 1971-01-23

Such action clearly exceeded the scope of the remedy afforded for post-conviction relief. This court has held many times that the guilt or innocence of a convicted person is not properly justiciable in a 60-1507 proceeding.

Section 60-1507 tests the propriety of a judgment or sentence and does not provide a way to challenge acts of penal authorities.

Lee v. State · filed 1971-04-10

A 1507 proceeding is designed only to test the propriety of a judgment or sentence. It provides no method for inquiring into the propriety of acts of the penal authorities (Foor v. State, 196 Kan. 618, 413 P. 2d 719; Prescher v. State, 205 Kan. 636, 471 P. 2d 349).

Section 60-1507 does not permit review of probation revocation proceedings unless the alleged irregularities are of constitutional proportions.

Toman v. State · filed 1974-01-26

In the absence of irregularities of constitutional proportions a proceeding to revoke probation is not reviewable by a motion to vacate, set aside or correct a sentence under K. S. A. 60-1507.

Section 60-1507 permits a court to consider a post-appeal motion for new trial alleging ineffective assistance and judicial bias as a post-conviction motion.

State v. Logan · filed 1984-03-22

Further, in order to resolve defendant's contention, we shall consider this matter as having been filed and considered by the trial court under the provisions of K.S.A. 60-1507.

A proceeding under § 60-1507 is collateral and does not extend the deadline for moving to modify the sentence in the criminal case.

State v. Timmerman · filed 1984-11-30

The time for filing a motion to modify a sentence in the criminal action is not extended by the filing of a collateral proceeding pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1507.

Section 60-1507 can provide a basis for appellate jurisdiction when a defendant who pleaded no contest received extensive discovery and hearings after the plea and before sentencing.

State v. Alsup · filed 1986-07-18

K.S.A. 22-3602(a) precludes a direct appeal from a “judgment of conviction” where the defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere. However, in this case the court permitted extensive additional discovery and held additional hearings after the plea and before pronouncing sentence some six months later. In light of the foregoing circumstances we consider this appeal as if it were a proceeding under K.S.A. 60-1507 and not a direct appeal. We thus have jurisdiction of the appeal.

Section 60-1507 provides a Kansas collateral remedy for challenging a denial of probation when direct appellate review is unavailable.

Owens v. Raymond Roberts, Kansas State Penitentiary Warden, and Attorney General of the State of Kansas · filed 1991-09-05

It appears that those courts do have jurisdiction to entertain a collateral challenge. See K.S.A. § 60-1507. Thus, Mr. Owens must exhaust that state remedy before bringing a federal habeas corpus action.

A § 60-1507 motion is a separate civil action that may proceed simultaneously with a motion for a new trial.

State v. Harris · filed 1991-10-25

A 60-1507 motion attacking sentence creates a new civil case. ... We hold a 1507 motion and a motion for a new trial can proceed simultaneously.

An evidentiary hearing under § 60-1507 is a civil proceeding governed by applicable civil procedure rules, and an appeal from a § 60-1507 motion receives the same standard of review as other civil proceedings.

Taylor v. State · filed 1992-12-11

An evidentiary hearing held pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1507 is a civil proceeding and, thus, governed by the rules of civil procedure insofar as applicable. ... Thus, the standard for review of an appeal of a 1507 motion is the same as the standard required for other civil proceedings.

Under § 60-1507, the sentencing court means the district court that imposed the sentence, and any judge of that court may hear the motion.

Morrow v. State · filed 1993-04-09

In K.S.A. 60-1507 and Rule 183, the phrases “sentencing court” and “trial court” refer to the district court, not a specific judge.

A § 60-1507 evidentiary hearing is a civil proceeding governed by applicable rules of civil procedure.

Graham v. State · filed 1998-01-23

In Kansas, an evidentiary hearing pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1507 is a civil proceeding, governed by the rules of civil procedure insofar as applicable.

A § 60-1507 petition attacking a conviction or sentence must be filed in the court of conviction.

Szczygiel v. Nelson · filed 2002-04-25

The appropriate forum for a § 60-1507 petition is in the court of conviction, which, in Szczygiel’s case, is the Wyandotte County, Kansas district court.

Section 60-1507 provides the exclusive post-conviction remedy for a prisoner in custody under a sentence, apart from certain sentencing issues, and requires filing in the sentencing court.

Bloom v. McKune · filed 2005-04-13(a)

Kansas Statute Annotated § 60-1507 (2003) provides the exclusive remedy for post-conviction relief (except for certain sentencing issues, see Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3504) when a prisoner is in custody under a sentence, see Smith v. State, 427 P.2d 625, 627 (Kan. 1967), and a petition under that section must be filed in the sentencing court. § 60-1507(a).

A § 60-1507 motion is a separate civil proceeding from the criminal case, so the law of the case doctrine does not govern issues decided on direct appeal.

Drach v. Bruce · filed 2006-06-09

The law of the case doctrine is thus inapplicable to this case where the appeal stems from a K.S.A. 60-1507 civil proceeding, which is a separate case from the criminal proceedings considered by this court on direct appeal in 2000.

A motion under § 60-1507 begins a separate civil action, so a court cannot extend the time to file it through a motion in a completed criminal case.

Hickson v. State · filed 2008-05-16(a)

Hickson’s criminal case was finished. We hold the district court had no jurisdiction to rule on the motion to extend time in that case. Such relief can only be granted to a motion made in a civil proceeding filed according to K.S.A. 60-1507.

Section 60-1507 provides the exclusive postconviction procedure for a prisoner to collaterally attack a criminal judgment.

State v. Mitchell · filed 2013-04-12(e)

The Smith rule finds support in our statutes and Supreme Court Rules addressing K.S.A. 60-1507. K.S.A. 60-1507(e), labeled “Exclusiveness of remedy,” provides that the remedy of a writ of ha-beas corpus is excluded where a prisoner is authorized to apply for relief with a 1507 motion, suggesting that K.S.A. 60-1507 is the exclusive postconviction procedure.

Section 60-1507 is the exclusive statutory remedy for a collateral attack on a criminal conviction or sentence, excluding relief under K.S.A. 60-2606.

State v. Kingsley · filed 2014-06-13

The exclusive nature of K.S.A. 60-1507 likewise excludes K.S.A. 60-2606 as a procedural mechanism for relief from Kingsley’s convictions and sentences.

Section 60-1507(e) generally makes a motion under the section the exclusive postconviction remedy, but allows another type of challenge when that motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of custody.

State v. Sellers · filed 2015-03-06(e)

Indeed, both K.S.A. 60-1507(e) (exclusiveness of remedy) and its implementing Supreme Court Rule 183(b) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 286) explicitly contemplate the possibility that there may be circumstances when a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion is "inadequate or ineffective to test the legality" of a movant's custody. In such circumstances, another type of challenge would be appropriate.

Section 60-1507 provides the required procedure for seeking reversal of a conviction based on a court’s failure to suspend proceedings and hold a competency hearing under K.S.A. 22-3302.

State v. Ford · filed 2015-07-31

Future movants seeking to reverse a conviction because of an alleged violation of K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-3302 must utilize the procedures in K.S.A. 60-1507 or be subject to summary dismissal.

Section 60-1507 is the exclusive statutory procedure for collaterally attacking a criminal conviction and sentence; a defendant cannot use K.S.A. 60-260(b) for that purpose.

State v. Loggins · filed 2016-08-12

This question is not one of first impression. The Kansas Supreme Court has squarely rejected the claim that K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-260(b) is available in this context, holding: "K.S.A. 60-1507 provides the exclusive statutory procedure for collaterally attacking a criminal conviction and sentence. Therefore, neither K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60- 260(b) nor K.S.A. 60-2606 can be used for that purpose." State v. Kingsley, 299 Kan. 896, Syl. ¶ 1, 326 P.3d 1083 (2014). Although Kingsley cited the 2011 version of K.S.A. 60-260(b), the language is identical in K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-260(b). Therefore, the holding in Kingsley governs Loggins' appeal.

Section 60-1507 provides the exclusive statutory procedure for collaterally attacking a criminal conviction and sentence, so section 60-260(b) cannot be used for that purpose.

Loggins v. State · filed 2016-08-19

This question is not one of first impression. The Kansas Supreme Court has squarely rejected the claim that K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-260(b) is available in this context, holding: "K.S.A. 60-1507 provides the exclusive statutory procedure for collaterally attacking a criminal conviction and sentence. Therefore, neither K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60- 260(b) nor K.S.A. 60-2606 can be used for that purpose." Kingsley, 299 Kan. 896, Syl. ¶ 1. Although Kingsley cited the 2011 version of K.S.A. 60-260(b), the language is identical in K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-260(b). Therefore, the holding in Kingsley governs Loggins' appeal.

Section 60-1507 permits a prisoner to challenge a determinative sentence, while a challenge to the mode of confinement after postrelease supervision is revoked belongs in a § 60-1501 petition.

State v. Miller · filed 2016-12-02(a)

Miller could have attacked his determinative sentence under K.S.A. 60-1507, but he is now attacking the mode of his present confinement.

Section 60-1507 motions must be filed with the sentencing court, and another district court lacks jurisdiction to consider them.

Johnson v. Pryor · filed 2017-06-02

Because K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1507 motions must be filed with the sentencing court, the Leavenworth County District Court should have ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Johnson's motion challenging his Shawnee County sentence for that reason.

Section 60-1507 requires a motion challenging a conviction or sentence to be filed in the sentencing court, which alone has jurisdiction to hear it.

Ali v. Cline · filed 2017-10-06

However, a challenge to a conviction or sentence is filed by a motion under K.S.A. 60-1507, and only the sentencing court has jurisdiction to hear such a motion.

Section 60-1507 motions cannot be used to challenge the Prisoner Review Board’s decision to grant or deny parole.

Fields v. State · filed 2017-09-08

Even if Fields' claims had merit, K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1507 motions cannot be used to challenge the Prisoner Review Board's decision to grant or deny parole.

Section 60-1507 does not apply to prison disciplinary actions.

Ali v. Heimgartner · filed 2017-12-01

K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 60-1507 is inapplicable to disciplinary actions, which is what Ali is contesting.

Section 60-1507 provides the exclusive statutory procedure for collaterally attacking a criminal conviction or sentence; a motion under section 60-260(b)(6) cannot reopen a prior habeas proceeding when it amounts to such an attack.

Davis v. State · filed 2018-11-09

But K.S.A. 60-260(b) cannot be used to collaterally attack a criminal conviction or sentence and Davis' attempt to reopen his prior habeas proceeding is, at its core, indistinguishable from initiating a collateral attack on his conviction or sentence. ... Davis has provided us with no such vehicle here, as K.S.A. 60-260 cannot be used to collaterally attack a criminal conviction and sentence.

Section 60-1507 is the exclusive statutory remedy for a collateral attack on a criminal conviction or sentence.

State v. Pouncil · filed 2019-04-26

But as the district court correctly held, K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-1507 provides the exclusive statutory remedy to collaterally attack a criminal conviction or sentence.

Section 60-1507 allows a prisoner to challenge only his or her own sentence in the court that imposed it, even when another person has similar issues.

Roeder v. State · filed 2019-07-19(a)

The statute permits a prisoner to challenge his or her sentence in the court which imposed the sentence, not to challenge anyone else's sentence. It does not matter if the issues involved are similar.

A person seeking relief under § 60-1507 must file in the county where the person was sentenced.

White v. State · filed 2020-05-22(a)

Because White was sentenced in Butler County, he must seek relief available under K.S.A. 60-1507 in Butler County.

Section 60-1507 is the exclusive statutory procedure for collaterally attacking a conviction or sentence.

Ferguson v. State · filed 2021-06-11

First, Kansas law does not allow a defendant to use a motion for relief from judgment to collaterally attack their convictions. See State v. Kingsley, 299 Kan. 896, Syl. ¶ 1, 326 P.3d 1083 (2014). In that case, the Kansas Supreme Court held that a defendant cannot use K.S.A. 60-260 to collaterally attack a conviction or sentence because K.S.A. 60-1507 is the "exclusive" statutory procedure for pursuing that relief.

Section 60-1507(e) makes a 60-1507 motion the exclusive habeas vehicle for challenging a conviction or sentence, but does not require a prisoner to move to withdraw a plea first.

Caddell v. State · filed 2021-12-17(e)

The subsection designates a motion under K.S.A. 60-1507 to be the proper or exclusive habeas corpus vehicle for prisoners to challenge the legality of their convictions and resulting sentences, thereby precluding use of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under K.S.A. 60-1501 for that purpose. ... The exclusive remedy requirements of K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1507(e) did not obligate Caddell to file a motion to withdraw his pleas before seeking relief...through a habeas corpus motion.

Section 60-1507 is the exclusive statutory remedy for collaterally attacking a criminal conviction and sentence.

State v. Brown · filed 2024-03-01

But that law is settled. This court has held that "K.S.A. 60-1507 provides the exclusive statutory remedy to collaterally attack a criminal conviction and sentence." State v. Mitchell, 297 Kan. 118, Syl. ¶ 1, 298 P.3d 349 (2013).

Section 60-1507 provides a collateral challenge to a conviction, not a direct appeal.

Hachmeister v. Williams · filed 2025-12-10

A K.S.A. 60-1507 proceedings is not a direct appeal. “Direct appeal” is a legal term of art with a specific meaning in the context of criminal law and criminal procedure. It refers to an appeal from the judgment of conviction in a criminal case, not a habeas corpus challenge, which is a collateral attack and is separate from the criminal case.

Section 60-1507 permits a prisoner to challenge a sentence enhanced under the Habitual Criminal Act when the challenge raises a question of law about whether the enhancement was authorized.

State v. Felton · filed 1965-03-06(a)

From the foregoing issue, supported by an uncontroverted record from the standpoint of controlling facts on which it is based, it appears that we are confronted with a question of law that, contrary to contentions advanced by appellee, can properly be raised by motion pursuant to existing provisions of K. S. A. 60-1507 which, so far as here material, read: ... The order denying appellant’s motion to set aside and correct his prior sentence is reversed and the trial court is directed to re-sentence appellant in the original case in accord with the views herein expressed.

Section 60-1507 does not afford relief from a sentence merely because officers delayed taking the defendant before a magistrate; the delay must have prejudiced the defendant at trial.

Cooper v. State · filed 1966-03-05

This appeal is from an order of the district court of Bourbon County overruling plaintiff’s motion for relief under K. S. A. 60-1507. ... We are cited to no authority holding that undue delay in taking a prisoner before a magistrate is of itself a denial of due process. It is only where the unwarranted delay has prejudiced the accused upon his trial that it may be said to violate the precepts of due process.

Section 60-1507 affords no relief for lack of counsel at a preliminary examination when the record shows no violation or prejudice to the defendant’s substantial rights.

State v. Ross · filed 1965-05-15

With respect to the lack of counsel at his preliminary examination there is nothing in the record to indicate that his substantial rights were in any way violated or prejudicially affected by lack of counsel at that hearing. ... The court did not err in denying relief under K. S. A. 60-1507.

Section 60-1507 does not permit a convicted person to raise insanity at the time of the offense as a ground for post-conviction relief.

Van Dusen v. State · filed 1966-12-10

Hence appellant’s allegation in his 1507 motion that he was insane at the time of the commission of the alleged offenses affords no ground for relief.

Section 60-1507 does not permit a convicted person to raise mental responsibility at the time of the crime, because guilt or innocence is not justiciable in that proceeding.

Kiser v. State · filed 1966-05-07

The question of mental responsibility must be presented and determined during the trial (Fisher v. Fraser, 171 Kan, 472, 233 P. 2d 1066, 29 A. L. R. 2d 699) and it cannot be raised in a 60-1507 proceeding, inasmuch as the guilt or innocence of a convicted person is not properly justiciable therein (Hanes v. State, 196 Kan. 404, 411 P. 2d 643).

A question of mental responsibility must be raised and decided at trial and is not properly litigated in a later § 60-1507 proceeding.

Allen v. State · filed 1967-05-13

The question of mental responsibility must be presented and determined during trial, and is not properly justiciable in a subsequent 60-1507 proceeding.

Section 60-1507 can permit a prisoner to challenge an expired conviction in the court that imposed it when that conviction enhanced a sentence the prisoner is serving and prior efforts to challenge it were thwarted.

Chance v. State · filed 1967-01-21

Under all of the facts, conditions and circumstances of this case we think there is a sufficient thread connecting the sentence of the Linn County district court, which the petitioner is presently serving, to the Labette County conviction to authorize this proceeding in the district court of Labette County. It cannot be denied that but for the Labette County conviction the sentence of the Linn County district court would have been different. (See, G. S. 1949 [now K. S. A.] 21-609; 21-631; and 21-107a.) We therefore hold the petitioner is entitled to relief under 60-1507, supra, in this proceeding in the Labette County district court.

Section 60-1507 relief is denied when the accused, with counsel, freely and knowingly pleaded guilty in open court with full knowledge of the plea’s consequences.

Perry v. State · filed 1968-03-09

It is the law of this jurisdiction that where an accused appears in open court with his counsel and freely and understandingly enters a plea of guilty with full knowledge of the consequences of such plea, the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, making obligatory the provisions of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution upon the states, have been fully complied with and the application under 60-1507 for post-conviction relief will be denied.

In a § 60-1507 proceeding, whether a guilty plea was voluntary is a fact question, and the movant bears the burden of proving involuntariness.

White v. State · filed 1969-06-14

In a 60-1507 proceeding the question of whether a plea of guilty was voluntarily entered is a question of fact, and the burden of proving the involuntariness of such plea is upon the movant.

Section 60-1507 does not warrant relief on a claim of inadequate representation when the record and counsel’s testimony support a finding that counsel represented the movant effectively.

Mathues v. State · filed 1969-11-08

The judge at that hearing also was the sentencing judge in 1966 when petitioner entered his plea of guilty, and he simply did not believe petitioner’s uncorroborated statements with respect to the alleged inadequate representation by Mr. Jones. The court’s findings were fully supported by the record and the testimony of Mr. Jones. ... The findings denying relief under K. S. A. 60-1507 are fully supported by the evidence.

Section 60-1507 authorizes an appellate court to grant a new trial when a constitutional violation makes a criminal judgment vulnerable to collateral attack.

Barnes v. State · filed 1969-12-06

The provisions of K. S. A. 60-1507 specifically authorize the appellate court to grant the appellant a new trial, upon finding that the judgment in a criminal case is open to collateral attack or that, there has been a denial or infringement of constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack.

Section 60-1507 permits review of constitutional trial errors when exceptional circumstances excuse the failure to obtain direct appellate review.

Davis v. State · filed 1970-03-07

“A proceeding under K. S. A. 60-1507 cannot be used as a substitute for a direct appeal involving mere trial errors; but if the trial errors affect constitutional rights, they may be raised in the collateral proceeding, even though they could have been raised by direct appeal, provided there were exceptional circumstances excusing the failure to appeal. (Rule No. 121 [c] [3].)” (Syl. ¶ 2.) ... For reasons stated above, we are of the opinion there are “exceptional circumstances” existing in this case within the meaning of Rule No. 121 (c) (3), Rules of the Supreme Court, 201 Kan. xxxiii, so as to entitle the petitioner to have review of alleged trial errors having a constitutional basis.

A void sentence may be considered on appeal from a § 60-1507 proceeding even if the petition did not challenge it and the trial court did not address it.

Tuscano v. State · filed 1970-12-12

Concededly, no point was raised in plaintiff's 1507 petition with respect to the validity of the sentence. Hence, the question was not presented to the trial court and the judge was afforded no opportunity to pass upon the issue. Normally this would preclude us from considering the point, for we have often said this court will heed no matters not first presented to the trial court. (See 1 Hatcher's Kansas Digest [Rev. Ed.] Appeal & Error, § 304.) However, we believe the present case illustrates one of the exceptions to the general rule. The sentencing judge was without authority to pronounce an increased sentence under 21-107a in the absence of any evidence of previous conviction. The present sentence was void within the purview of McCarthy v. Hudspeth, 166 Kan. 476, 201 P.2d 658, where we held that an increased sentence imposed under the Habitual Criminal Act was void where it was predicated on void prior convictions.

A claim of innocence is not properly decided in a § 60-1507 post-conviction proceeding.

Wood v. State · filed 1971-01-23

The first ground is patently without merit for the reason that the question of guilt or innocence is not properly justiciable in a K. S. A. 60-1507 proceeding.

A § 60-1507 motion may challenge the sufficiency of an information only when the information fails to state a public offense and thereby deprives the court of jurisdiction.

Carithers v. State · filed 1971-06-12

As a general rule, except in those cases where an information fails to state a public offense, thus giving the court no jurisdiction of the matter, the sufficiency of an information must be challenged by appeal and not by a postconviction proceeding.

Section 60-1507 does not permit review of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction following a voluntary guilty plea.

State v. Dunham · filed 1972-12-08

There can be no review of the sufficiency of the evidence in a proceeding under 60-1507 (McCarther v. State, 211 Kan. 152, 505 P. 2d 773.) The requirement of K. S. A. 1972 Supp. 22-3210(4) is that the court be satisfied there is a factual basis for the plea. The court was satisfied in this regard after allocution.

Section 60-1507 does not permit review of the sufficiency of the evidence after judgment and sentence on a guilty plea.

McCarther v. State · filed 1973-01-20

“. . . [W]here judgment and sentence have been entered upon a plea of guilty, there can be no review of the sufficiency of the evidence in a 60-1507 proceeding.”

Section 60-1507 does not permit relitigation of guilt or innocence issues resolved at trial.

Davis v. State · filed 1972-12-09

This matter of intent, of course, was a disputed issue of fact at appellant’s first trial — where it was resolved against him— and went to the very heart of appellant’s guilt or innocence, which issue is not justiciable in a 1507 proceeding (Wolfe v. State, 201 Kan. 790, 443 P. 2d 260).

Section 60-1507 permits a claim that a guilty plea was coerced, but a motion alleging no facts to support that claim may be denied.

Mayberry v. State · filed 1973-11-03

Claims of illegality of the proceedings leading to conviction may still be raised in 1507 proceedings. Appellant’s contention that his guilty plea was coerced is such a claim. ... Moreover, and this was the basis of the trial court’s denial, appellant’s motion alleged no facts to support his claim that his guilty plea was coerced and his 1507 motion was properly overruled (Winter v. State, 210 Kan. 597, 502 P. 2d 733).

Section 60-1507 permits a collateral attack after a plea of nolo contendere only on jurisdictional grounds or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings; denial of a suppression motion does not supply such a ground.

Lill v. State · filed 1979-11-09

A conviction based on a plea of nolo contendere may be collaterally attacked only on “jurisdictional or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings . . . .” The order which denied the motion to suppress evidence in this case does not provide those grounds.

A criminal defendant may use a § 60-1507 motion to challenge a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel.

Garrett v. State · filed 1995-02-10

We are convinced a criminal defendant may, under the facts shown here, challenge his or her guilty plea based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by a 1507 motion.

Section 60-1507 permits an inmate to challenge the Department of Corrections’ conviction severity level classification in the sentencing court, including a classification that excludes the inmate from retroactive sentencing guidelines relief.

State v. Mejia · filed 1995-04-14

We hold that an inmate may challenge his or her conviction severity level classification as set forth in the notification of findings by filing a motion pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1507. Under 60-1507, an inmate may challenge his or her conviction or sentence.

Section 60-1507 permits an offender to challenge a sentence conversion and the facts supporting it in the sentencing court without first appealing directly under § 21-4724.

Farris v. McKune · filed 1996-02-02

Thiis, the appellees could have and still may contest KDOC’s recommendation and the facts it relied upon in the sentencing court under K.S.A. 60-1507. The offenders may request their sentencing courts to correct their sentences at any time under K.S.A. 60-1507 if the sentences are illegal even without a prior direct appeal pursuant to 21-4724.

A prisoner’s motion for sentence conversion filed after the 30-day period in K.S.A. 21-4724(d)(1) may be construed as a motion under § 60-1507.

State v. Harlin · filed 1997-04-18

We conclude that the district court incorrectly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Harlin’s motion is to be construed as one under K.S.A. 60-1507.

Section 60-1507 permits relief from a conviction that is void because the statute of conviction was applied ex post facto, even when the trial court attempted to substitute a conviction under the law in effect at the time of the offense.

Seaton v. State · filed 2000-02-25

Because Seaton’s conviction for aggravated indecent liberties is void and the trial court’s attempt to modify that conviction was fruitless, the conviction must be vacated. See Petty, 22 Kan. at 483 (indicating that if a sentence and judgment imposed under an ex post facto law “are wholly void, and not merely irregular or erroneous, then the petitioner is entitled to his discharge”). As a result, the trial court erred in refusing to grant Seaton’s K.S.A. 60-1507 motion on the ground that the aggravated indecent liberties conviction violated the prohibition against ex post facto application of the law.

Section 60-1507(a) permits a prisoner to challenge the constitutionality of a presumptive sentence by collateral attack when the issue could not be raised on direct appeal.

State v. Lewis · filed 2000-03-03(a)

In this case, even if the issue was raised in the trial court, Lewis was barred by statute from raising the issue of the constitutionality of his sentence on direct appeal. Therefore, because the issue is not one that could have been presented on direct appeal, it necessarily is one whose only chance of review is by collateral attack, i.e., a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. This is the type of issue that the plain language of K.S.A. 60-1507 will allow.

Section 60-1507 does not provide relief based on a later favorable felony-murder ruling to a defendant who knowingly waived that challenge through a favorable guilty plea when the later ruling is not applied retroactively.

Easterwood v. State · filed 2002-04-19

We hold that Sophophone should not be retroactively applied as a matter of public policy under all the facts of this case. Our facts are totally different from Bousley, and we hold that Bousley does not require relief under K.S.A. 60-1507 to be granted to Easter-wood.

Section 60-1507 does not permit retroactive McAdam resentencing on collateral review after a favorable plea agreement when the defendant failed to raise the issue at trial or on direct appeal.

Collins v. State · filed 2005-01-14

As in Wilson, we hold that McAdam does not apply retroactively to those cases on collateral review because to do so would give the movant the double benefit of a favorable plea agreement, with a significant downward durational departure, and then the benefit of an issue he or she failed to raise at the trial court or on direct appeal.

A Section 60-1507 motion must state all grounds for relief; new grounds raised after the filing deadline cannot be added through relation back.

Ludlow v. State · filed 2007-04-20(c)

With no ability to amend or supplement a 60-1507 motion, the “relation-back” doctrine found in K.S.A. 60-215(c) is inoperative here.

A K.S.A. 60-1507 motion raising a Frazier or McAdam identical offense claim cannot succeed unless a direct appeal of the sentence was pending when the relevant decision issued.

State v. Harp · filed 2007-04-27

Thus, where a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion raises a Frazier or McAdam claim, the appellate courts have jurisdiction over such cases, but the claims will not be successful unless a direct appeal of the sentence was pending at the time Frazier or McAdam was decided.

Section 60-1507 provides the means to erase a prior misdemeanor DUI conviction; a successful appeal of a later enhanced sentence does not erase that conviction.

State v. Key · filed 2013-11-08

A successful appellate challenge on that ground will not erase the prior conviction; only a successful motion under K.S.A. 60-1507 can do that.

Section 60-1507 does not permit review of the sufficiency of the evidence after judgment and sentence have been entered on a guilty plea.

Woods v. State · filed 2016-09-02

Where judgment and sentence have been entered upon a plea of guilty, there can be no review of the sufficiency of the evidence in a K.S.A. 60-1507 proceeding.

An allegation that the trial judge failed to assure a defendant’s competency before accepting a plea must be raised in a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

State v. Hill · filed 2020-07-17

The only issue raised by Hill in his brief which is arguably outside the purview of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3210 is the alleged failure of the trial judge to assure his competency prior to accepting his pleas. And, this issue is one that must be raised as part of a motion filed pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1507.

Relief under § 60-1507 for ineffective assistance in an extended jurisdiction juvenile case may include setting aside the order executing the adult sentence.

A.D.T. v. State · filed 2020-12-23

If the district court finds that A.D.T. is entitled to relief on this claim under K.S.A. 60-1507, the district court shall determine the appropriate relief to be granted which may include setting aside the district court's final order for execution of adult sentence dated November 6, 2015.

Section 60-1507 permits a timely substantive claim of actual innocence in a habeas proceeding, treated as a motion for new trial under K.S.A. 22-3501(1).

Beltz v. State · filed 2025-12-26

Thus, we find that an inmate may bring a substantive claim of actual innocence in a habeas proceeding to be treated as a motion for new trial under K.S.A. 22-3501(1), providing the claim is brought in a timely manner.

Section 60-1507(b) provides relief when a judgment was entered without jurisdiction, a sentence is unauthorized or open to collateral attack, or a constitutional violation makes the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack.

Clary v. State · filed 2017-11-09(b)

To be entitled to relief under K.S.A. 60-1507, the movant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence either: (1) "the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction"; (2) "the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or is otherwise open to collateral attack"; or (3) "there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack." K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1507(b) (grounds for relief); Supreme Court Rule 183(g) (preponderance burden).

Section 60-1507(b) requires a movant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the judgment lacked jurisdiction, the sentence was unauthorized or open to collateral attack, or a constitutional violation made the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack.

Bevan v. Cline · filed 2018-07-20(b)

To be entitled to relief under K.S.A. 60-1507, the movant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction; (2) that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or is otherwise open to collateral attack; or (3) that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack.

Section 60-1507 movants are presumed to have listed all grounds for relief in their motion.

Reed v. State · filed 2020-03-06

A K.S.A. 60- 1507 movant is presumed to have listed all grounds for relief.

Section 60-1507 permits summary dismissal when the motion, files, and case records conclusively show the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Gibson v. State · filed 2017-03-10

Summary dismissal of a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion is appropriate when the motion, files, and case records conclusively show the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Section 60-1507(b) permits summary disposition of a motion when the case files and records conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

State v. Burnett · filed 1965-04-10(b)

The corollary of the requirement that a full, or plenary, hearing be accorded a prisoner, when substantial questions are raised, is the court’s right to dispense with such a complete hearing and to determine the questions submitted in a more summary fashion whenever “the files and records of the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.”

When the files and records conclusively show that a prisoner is not entitled to relief under § 60-1507, the court may decide the motion summarily without appointing counsel or producing the prisoner.

Kenreck v. State · filed 1967-01-21

We have frequently held that where, as here, the files and records conclusively show the prisoner is not entitled to relief in an action brought under K. S. A. 60-1507, there is no requirement for appointment of counsel or the production of the prisoner, but that the trial court may proceed to hear the matter in a summary fashion.

Section 60-1507 does not require an evidentiary hearing when the motion and case records conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Case v. State · filed 1966-03-05(b)

Matters raised in petitioner’s motion did not require that an evidentiary hearing be held. The court was entirely correct in finding and concluding that an examination of the motion and the files and records of the two cases showed conclusively that petitioner was entitled to no relief under K. S. A. 60-1507.

Section 60-1507 does not require an evidentiary hearing when the motion raises no triable issue of fact and the legal issue can be decided from the files and records.

Byrd v. State · filed 1966-04-09

His motion to vacate the sentence presented no triable issue of fact, for it was predicated solely on lack of counsel at the preliminary examination. That issue of law was determinable, so far as this case is concerned, from the files and records which were available to the court. Accordingly, no evidentiary hearing was required.

A motion under § 60-1507 does not require an evidentiary hearing when it presents no disputed facts.

Chappell v. State · filed 1966-07-14

Relief was sought on motion under the provisions of K. S. A. 60-1507 implemented by Rule No. 121 of this court (194 Kan. xxvn). ... When there are no disputed facts presented in the motion to vacate, an evidentiary hearing is not required.

Section 60-1507 requires a prompt hearing when a motion alleges specific facts that a prosecutor induced perjured testimony and the court files and records cannot resolve the claim.

Rodgers v. State · filed 1966-11-05

Even though the charges leveled by the petitioner may seem improbable the matter raised could not be determined alone by the files and records of the court. Perjured testimony induced by a prosecutor to obtain a conviction would impugn the dignity and integrity of our courts and would destroy the very foundations of peace under law, and any conviction resting thereon cannot stand. Under such a charge K. S. A. 60-1507 as implemented by Rule No. 121 of this court requires that the trial court act on the motion by notifying the county attorney and by granting a prompt hearing.

Section 60-1507 does not require an evidentiary hearing for an unsupported assertion of inadequate counsel that raises no substantial issue of fact.

Davis v. State · filed 1966-11-05

Neither does he state any facts or name any witnesses or indicate any evidence whatsoever that would support his complaint. Nor do we find any of these factors offered in the argument of his counsel to the district court on the motion for rehearing. The bald assertion o.f petitioner standing alone is insufficient to raise a substantial issue of fact.

Section 60-1507 does not require an evidentiary hearing based on a petitioner’s uncorroborated claim that retained counsel failed to advise him of his right to appeal.

Ware v. State · filed 1967-04-08

The petitioner’s uncorroborated statement that counsel did not advise him of his right to appeal would hardly seem to present a justiciable question requiring the district court to grant an evidentiary hearing. (K. S. A. 60-1507; Rule No. 121 [g],—Procedure Under 60-1507, 194 Kan. xxviii.)

Section 60-1507 permits denial without a hearing when the petition, files, and record show that the movant is entitled to no relief.

Henderson v. State · filed 1967-04-08

As it appeared from the files, the record of the case and the appellant’s petition that he was entitled to no relief, the trial court properly disposed of the contentions without a hearing.

Section 60-1507 permits a sentencing court to deny an evidentiary hearing and the petitioner’s presence when the claims are insubstantial and can be resolved from the case files and records.

Call v. State · filed 1965-12-11

We have held in State v. Burnett, 194 Kan. 645, 400 P. 2d 971, that the right to an evidentiary hearing in proceedings brought under K. S. A. 60-1507 does not extend to those instances where the claims advanced are trivial, frivolous or insubstantial. In Webb v. State, 195 Kan. 728, 408 P. 2d 662, we further hold that a sentencing court is vested with discretion in ascertaining whether a claim made under the foregoing statute is substantial before granting an evidentiary hearing thereon and requiring the petitioner’s presence. ... Viewing the present record as a whole, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that the contentions placed before it by the petitioner did not merit an evidentiary hearing in the petitioner’s presence, but that they could be resolved by reference to the files and records of the case itself.

Section 60-1507 does not require a plenary hearing when a motion to vacate presents no disputed facts.

Earwood v. State · filed 1967-04-08

When there are no disputed facts presented in the motion to vacate a plenary hearing is not required.

Section 60-1507(h) does not require an evidentiary hearing when a collateral attack raises no substantial issues.

Smith v. State · filed 1967-06-10(h)

The rule is well settled that where substantial issues are lacking, an evidentiary hearing is not required to be held on a motion collaterally attacking a criminal judgment. Such is the undeniable import both of the statute (60-1507 [h]), and of Rule No. 121 (194 Kan. xxvn).

Section 60-1507 does not require the prisoner’s presence at an evidentiary hearing when the issue is not substantial to the validity of the conviction.

King v. State · filed 1968-01-27

Whenever the trial court considers it advisable to hear evidence relating to a motion filed under K. S. A. 60-1507, we deem it by far the best practice for the court to require that the prisoner be present, even though his presence may not be essential to the regularity of the proceedings under every set of circumstances. ... In summation, we hold the trial court did not err in receiving evidence, in the petitioner’s absence, on the question of whether he had been informed, before trial, of the correct penalty for the offense with which he was charged; that this issue was not substantial so far as the validity of the conviction was concerned and did not necessitate an evidentiary hearing, either with or without the petitioner’s presence; and that whether the finding as to this matter was supported by evidence is not material to this appeal.

A § 60-1507 movant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing when the criminal record is sufficient to resolve the only question raised.

Rollins v. State · filed 1968-03-09

The petitioner contends whether or not “evidence” in fact was presented to the trial court prior to the sentencing raises a substantial question of fact as to events which transpired entitling him to a full evidentiary hearing, citing Brown v. State, 196 Kan. 236, 409 P. 2d 772. We find no merit in this contention in that the record made in the criminal proceeding was sufficient to determine the only question raised by the petitioner in his application for relief.

A § 60-1507 motion does not require an evidentiary hearing when it presents no substantial issue of fact affecting the movant’s rights.

Stiles v. State · filed 1968-05-11

This court has held an evidentiary hearing is not required when no substantial issue of fact affecting his rights is presented in the motion.

Section 60-1507 does not require an evidentiary hearing when an unsupported claim of counsel’s incompetency raises no substantial issue of fact.

Wisely v. State · filed 1968-05-11

Under all the circumstances petitioner’s claim of incompetency of counsel was not substantial, and the district court did not err in failing to grant an evidentiary hearing.

A § 60-1507 motion requires no evidentiary hearing when it raises no disputed facts and the motion, files, and records conclusively show the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Bundy v. State · filed 1968-07-13

The motion for relief filed by petitioner presented no disputed facts, and there was nothing about the case to cause the court to hold an evidentiary hearing (Smith v. State, 196 Kan. 438, 411 P. 2d 663; Chappell v. State, 197 Kan. 407, 416 P. 2d 786). As found by the trial court—the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively showed that petitioner was entitled to no relief.

When a substantial claim of inadequate counsel involves events in which the movant participated and the court hears evidence about the need for a hearing, § 60-1507 requires a full evidentiary hearing with the movant present and permitted to testify.

Ray v. State · filed 1968-11-09

It is the opinion of a majority of the members of this court that the facts we have related bring this case within the scope of our decision in Brown v. State, 196 Kan. 236, 409 P.2d 772. ... Under the circumstances which appear in this case, we conclude that a full evidentiary hearing should have been held with the movant present and permitted to testify.

Section 60-1507 does not require a hearing or the movant’s presence when the motion presents no factual issue and the court can decide its legal question from the record.

Huncovsky v. State · filed 1968-11-09

In this appeal from that order — and for which new counsel was appointed — petitioner contends the court erred in failing to appoint counsel to represent him on his motion and in failing to grant a full and complete hearing thereon. Neither contention has merit. No issues of fact were presented by the motion and there was no necessity for petitioner’s presence. As to the one question of law — the sufficiency of the information— the court had that document before it for consideration.

Section 60-1507 does not require an evidentiary hearing on uncorroborated allegations that counsel coerced a guilty plea when the plea record affirmatively shows the plea was voluntary.

Sharp v. State · filed 1969-07-17

The record here affirmatively shows the pleas to have been voluntarily and understandingly made, and it is not to be impeached nine years later on the mere uncorroborated bald statements in petitioner's motion. Our decision is not to be construed as completely foreclosing all inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding a plea of guilty — but under this record the court was fully justified in not granting an evidentiary hearing and in denying relief.

Section 60-1507 permits summary denial when the motion and case record conclusively show no entitlement to relief and the motion raises no substantial factual issue.

Chritton v. State · filed 1968-11-09(b)

We are of the opinion the district court did not err in concluding ... that the allegations of the appellant’s motion and the files and records of the case conclusively showed he was entitled to no relief. The motion contained no substantial issues of fact and no further discussion of the appeal is warranted.

A § 60-1507 motion stating only legal conclusions without supporting facts presents no justiciable issue and may be summarily denied.

Redd v. State · filed 1967-07-12

We are of the opinion the petitioner’s motion stated nothing but conclusions, and the district court did not err in summarily overruling it. Its allegations presented no justiciable issue under K. S. A. 60-1507.

Section 60-1507 does not provide relief from a conviction based on conclusory allegations with no stated or apparent evidentiary basis.

Wolfe v. State · filed 1968-07-13

Mere conclusionary contentions of a petition in a 1507 proceeding for which no evidentiary basis is stated or appears are not sufficient basis for relief from conviction.

Section 60-1507 permits summary disposition without the movant present or appointed counsel when the sentencing court’s files and records conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.

Daugherty v. State · filed 1970-01-24

In proceedings under K. S. A. 60-1507 when the files and records of the sentencing court conclusively show the movant is entitled to no relief it is not error to conclude the proceedings by summary hearing in the absence of the movant and without appointing counsel to represent him.

A court may deny a § 60-1507 motion without an evidentiary hearing when the record conclusively shows the movant is entitled to no relief.

Griffin v. State · filed 1969-12-06

On this record, and pursuant to Rule No. 121 (f), (g), (h), (i), (201 Kan. xxxii) the court did not err in denying an evidentiary hearing and in denying relief.

Section 60-1507 does not require an evidentiary hearing in the movant’s presence when the files and records conclusively show no entitlement to relief.

Barnes v. State · filed 1970-11-07

This appeal is from an order denying relief under K. S. A. 60-1507. Relief was denied by the district court without a plenary hearing for the reason that the files and records of the case conclusively showed the petitioner was entitled to no relief. This appeal raises no new questions of law and we affirm the order of the district court on the basis of prior decisions of this court. ... His claim that the court erred in not granting an evidentiary hearing in his presence is without merit under the rules laid down by this court in Fields v. State, 195 Kan. 718, 408 P. 2d 674 and Stiles v. State, 201 Kan. 387, 440 P. 2d 592.

Section 60-1507 does not require an evidentiary hearing when the record shows that the guilty pleas were voluntary and the application for relief is patently groundless.

Greathouse v. State · filed 1971-04-10

This is a proceeding for postconviction relief under K. S. A. 60-1507. ... The sentencing court exerted a painstaking effort to ascertain the facts surrounding the pleas of guilty with the result the record affirmatively revealed those pleas were voluntarily made with full awareness of their consequences. ... In view of the foregoing, appellant’s application was patently groundless and the trial judge, the same judge who had sentenced appellant, properly denied relief without evidentiary hearing.

A court may deny a section 60-1507 motion challenging the voluntariness of a guilty plea without appointing counsel or holding an evidentiary hearing when the record conclusively shows that the movant is entitled to no relief.

Weigel v. State · filed 1971-06-12

The present action is brought under K. S. A. 60-1507. It attacks the sentence pronounced on March 1, 1967, on the premise that Weigel’s plea was not voluntarily entered. The trial court found it unnecessary to appoint counsel or to hold an evidentiary hearing, and overruled Weigel’s motion on the ground that the records conclusively showed he was entitled to no relief. The present appeal followed. For reasons hereinafter stated we conclude the trial court was correct in its judgment.

Section 60-1507 does not provide relief based solely on conclusory allegations lacking an evidentiary basis or named witnesses.

Hacker v. State · filed 1971-04-10

Mere conclusionary contentions of a petitioner in such a proceeding under K. S. A. 60-1507, for which no evidentiary basis is stated or appears and no witnesses named, are not suffiicient basis for relief from the conviction.

Appointing counsel on a § 60-1507 motion does not require an evidentiary hearing when the files and records conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.

Kowalec v. State · filed 1972-01-22

Here the appointment of counsel proved, ultimately and by hindsight, to have been technically unnecessary under the test laid down by the rule. In the meantime it performed the valuable function of assuring the trial court, first, that there was not concealed beneath the opaque prose of a laymans pleading some justiciable issue requiring a plenary hearing, and, secondly, that to decide the one issue presented there was nothing outside the “files and records” which needed to be considered. Once it received such assurance the court below properly disposed of the proceeding summarily, and its judgment is affirmed.

Section 60-1507 requires a prompt evidentiary hearing when the motion alleges facts that would warrant relief and the files and records do not conclusively refute them, even if the allegations seem implausible.

Floyd v. State · filed 1972-03-04

What is a trial court’s duty when confronted with such a motion? Under K. S. A. 60-1507 it is to grant a prompt hearing “unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” ... We have examined the proceedings during which appellant entered his plea. They show a careful inquiry by the sentencing court designed to ascertain the voluntary and knowledgeable nature of the plea, and the factual basis for it. Appellant’s present contentions are rendered highly implausible thereby, but they are not conclusively disproved. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the case remanded with directions to appoint counsel and conduct an evidentiary hearing on the original motion.

A motion under § 60-1507 that raises only a question of law does not require an evidentiary hearing.

Sanders v. State · filed 1972-05-06

It is clear the one question raised by appellant’s motion was one of law. It was correctly decided by the district court. An evidentiary hearing was not required to determine that question.

A 60-1507 motion alleging a request for disposition of a pending charge and failure to act within the detainer statute’s time limit warrants an evidentiary hearing on those allegations.

Hayes v. State · filed 1972-07-19

This is an appeal from an order of the district court summarily denying relief on petitioner’s motion under K. S. A. 60-1507. ... In the instant case petitioner by his own allegations in paragraphs 10 and 11 of his motion at least raised a question which warranted inquiry by the district court in an evidentiary hearing. The case must be remanded with directions to set aside the judgment, appoint counsel and proceed with an evidentiary hearing to determine the truth or falsity of petitioner’s allegations to which we have referred.

Section 60-1507 permits summary denial without an evidentiary hearing when the record conclusively establishes that the movant’s guilty plea was voluntary.

Collins v. State · filed 1972-11-04

The record shows conclusively that the plea of guilty was voluntarily, freely and understandingly entered, and that no force, coercion or duress of any nature was exercised to obtain the plea. It was not error for the district court to summarily deny appellant’s 60-1507 motion.