Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1507

A K.S.A. 60-1507 motion must be filed in the sentencing court, and a motion filed in the wrong venue should be transferred there rather than dismissed.

Lucas v. Schnurr, Warden · filed 2026-02-13

When a K.S.A. 60-1507 habeas action is filed at an improper venue, the district court should transfer the case to the district court in the county where the inmate was sentenced, as opposed to dismissing the case.

Section 60-1507 requires a prisoner challenging a conviction or sentence to file the motion in the sentencing court.

Brown v. Sauers · filed 2019-03-22(a)

A K.S.A. 60-1507 motion must be filed in the sentencing court, while a K.S.A. 60-1501 petition must be filed in the county of confinement.

A K.S.A. 60-1507 motion challenging a conviction or sentence must be filed in the sentencing court.

Cochran v. Snyder, Warden · filed 2025-03-07

We, therefore, decline to recast what Cochran has plainly presented here as a 60-1501 petition as a successive 60-1507 motion. Because such motions must be filed with the sentencing court, the Cowley County District Court should have ruled Cochran failed to present a claim that could be adjudicated under K.S.A. 60-1501 and should have dismissed his petition for that reason.

Section 60-1507(f)(2) allows an untimely motion to be heard to prevent manifest injustice; equitable tolling provides no separate exception to the one-year filing limit.

McKinney v. State · filed 2021-12-17(f)(2)

Essentially, if an untimely K.S.A. 60-1507 motion cannot be saved under the manifest injustice exception, equitable tolling cannot provide an alternate exception to the one-year time limit.

The one-year filing limit in subsection (f)(1) is an affirmative defense that is waived if not raised.

Perez v. State · filed 2021-05-14(f)(1)

This court has interpreted the one-year limitation set forth in K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1507(f)(1) as an affirmative defense that must be raised or else it is waived.

The one-year deadline in § 60-1507(f) is a statutory bar that the State cannot waive; a movant must show manifest injustice to extend it.

Seacat v. State · filed 2022-02-11(f)

We conclude the one-year deadline under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1507(f) is not a statute of limitation. It is a statutory bar with one exception for manifest injustice; and that exception places the burden on the movant to show the court why the untimely filing should be considered. Thus, the State could not waive the deadline and the district court properly applied the statute in finding the supplement was untimely.

Section 60-1507 does not require a court to treat a motion for a new trial as a postconviction motion, especially when the written motion does not allege deficient trial counsel performance.

State v. Day · filed 2022-08-05

Finally, we know of no rule or case that requires a trial court to treat a motion for a new trial as if it were a motion for habeas corpus relief under K.S.A. 60-1507. This is especially true here where there was no mention of deficient trial counsel performance in Day's motion for a new trial.

An untimely motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance is treated as a Section 60-1507 motion, requiring appointed counsel and a hearing unless the motion, files, and record conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.

State v. Butler · filed 2022-08-26

The motion is treated as a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion and the trial court must appoint counsel and hold a hearing unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.

An amendment filed after the one-year deadline cannot relate back to a § 60-1507 motion containing only generic assertions, because the original motion identifies no claim by time or type.

Booker v. State · filed 2024-04-12(f)(1)

Because his initial 60-1507 motion consisted of nothing more than generic assertions without any descriptive detail, the motion defined no colorable claims by time or type. As a result, there were no anchors to which the series of amendments filed more than a year later could relate back. Accordingly, they remained untimely, and the district court properly declined to consider them for that reason.

Arguments in a later memorandum that were already presented in a timely original motion under Section 60-1507 are not untimely new claims.

State v. James · filed 2023-11-22

But focusing on James' 2020 Memorandum, we find the four claims stated in that document to be entirely consistent with his original pro se motion. Each of his counsel's 2020 arguments were presented in his original 2018 motion, so any ruling by the district court contrary to that would be erroneous.

A § 60-1507 proceeding remains pending after an oral ruling until a written order disposing of the case is filed.

Johnson v. Schnurr · filed 2024-05-09

Thus, although the district court may have orally announced at a hearing in November 2020 that the State’s motion for summary judgment was granted, the 60-1507 proceeding continued until a written order disposing of the case was filed.

A plea-withdrawal claim filed under § 60-1507 is analyzed under the same framework as a motion to withdraw a plea under § 22-3210.

Mendoza v. State · filed 2025-03-14

Turning to the merits of Mendoza's singular claim, while he requested to withdraw his pleas via a motion filed under K.S.A. 60-1507, rather than as a motion to withdraw a plea under K.S.A. 22-3210, Kansas appellate courts have confirmed that there is no distinction in the appropriate analysis for each type of motion. Therefore, we are free to look to K.S.A. 22-3210 as the framework for our analysis of Mendoza's claim.

A motion to withdraw a guilty plea under K.S.A. 22-3210 does not itself constitute a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion or preclude a later K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

State v. Mossor · filed 2024-09-06

This court agrees that Mossor's motion to withdraw his plea explicitly invoked K.S.A. 22- 3210(d)(1) and did not implicate or constitute a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. To the extent the district court's comment can be taken as an intent to construe Mossor's motion to be a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, the district court erred, and that narrow portion of its judgment is reversed. Mossor's motion to withdraw his plea in this case does not preclude any future K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

A K.S.A. 60-1507 motion cannot be read to include a motion to withdraw a plea when the record contains no such motion.

White v. State · filed 2019-11-15

But since the record in this case does not contain a motion to withdraw White's plea, his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion cannot be read to include one, nor does White claim one existed.

Section 60-1507 does not govern a motion that, by its content and requested relief, seeks to withdraw a guilty plea.

State v. Hodge · filed 2017-06-23

Even though similar procedures apply to both motions to withdraw a plea and motions filed under K.S.A. 60- 1507, according to State v. Williams, 303 Kan. 605, 607, 366 P.3d 1101 (2016), we apply different standards to the two. ... We must judge Hodge's motion by the words she uses. When we do so, we conclude that we should treat her motion as a motion to withdraw her plea.

Section 60-1507 does not require the State to respond to a post-conviction motion.

Foster v. State · filed 2025-11-26

Even so, there is no requirement that the State respond, and this claim provides no basis for relief.

Section 60-1507 relief requires the applicant to be in custody and seeking release; an ongoing offender registration duty alone does not satisfy the custody requirement.

State v. Saunders · filed 2026-02-06(a)

Saunders has completed his sentence for this conviction and is not entitled to a K.S.A. 60-1507 action because he is not a person in custody claiming the right to be released. Additionally, the ongoing duty to register cannot be considered custodial for establishing jurisdiction under K.S.A. 60-1507.

A court retains jurisdiction over a Section 60-1507 motion filed while the movant was in custody even if the movant is released before the judgment becomes final.

Frost v. State · filed 2026-04-24

If a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion is filed while a prisoner is in custody, jurisdiction is not lost if the movant is released before judgment on the motion becomes final.

Section 60-1507 permits a prisoner to seek relief in the sentencing district court while serving the sentence, but that avenue closes when the sentence ends.

– State v. Smith – · filed 2020-01-31(a)

While he was serving his sentence, he could have filed a motion in the district court under K.S.A. 60- 1507. Because he is no longer serving his sentence, this avenue is foreclosed to him.

Section 60-1507 does not require a movant to be present at the hearing when the record supports proceeding without him.

Smith v. State · filed 1966-03-05

In the face of the agreed statement of facts, and what has been heretofore stated and held, we have no difficulty whatsoever in concluding this is a case wherein the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, as set forth in the quoted journal entry of judgment, including its finding “that it is not necessary to produce the plaintiff in person from the Kansas State Penitentiary for hearing,” are completely sustained by the record presented and fully warrant that tribunal’s action in denying appellant’s motion to vacate the involved judgment.

Section 60-1507 makes a motion in the sentencing court a prisoner's exclusive remedy unless that motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention.

Lewis Jones, Jr. v. Raymond Roberts, Attorney General of Kansas · filed 1992-10-16(e)

Petitioning the sentencing court is a prisoner's exclusive remedy "unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of said applicant's detention." Id. § 60-1507(e).