Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for tort actions, subject to accrual when the resulting injury becomes reasonably ascertainable.

Elliott v. White, O'Connor & Werner, P.A. · filed 1990-09-11(a)(4)

We conclude that plaintiffs’ alleged injuries should have become reasonably ascertainable to plaintiffs when the will was admitted to probate on May 7, 1986. The statute of limitations for bringing plaintiffs' negligence cause of action thus expired on May 7, 1988, prior to the commencement of the present ease. Plaintiffs’ claims for negligence are dismissed. K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4).

The subsection provides a two-year limitations period for actions for injury to another’s rights not arising on contract, and that period applies to Kansas Act Against Discrimination claims because the KAAD has no statute of limitations of its own.

Witherspoon v. Roadway Express, Inc. · filed 1992-01-30(a)(4)

The Kansas Act Against Discrimination (“KAAD”) does not contain its own statute of limitations. Therefore, the general statute of limitations for tort actions applies to claims under the KAAD. K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4) provides for a two (2) year statute of limitations for actions for injury to the rights of another not arising on contract.

Subsection (4) requires actions for injury to another’s rights, except contract actions, to be commenced within two years.

Lindsey v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. · filed 1973-02-12(4)

The issue is whether K.S.A. 60-512(2), providing an action upon a liability created by statute must be commenced within three years, or K.S.A. 60-513(4), as amended Laws 1968, providing an action for injury to the rights of another, except contracts, must be commenced within two years, applies. We hold it is the latter and affirm the action of the trial court dismissing the action.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for Kansas tort claims, with accrual determined by the governing claim, including completion of required administrative proceedings for the Kansas Act Against Discrimination claim.

Edwards v. The Boeing Company International Association of MacHinists and Aerospace Workers, Afl-Cio · filed 1993-06-18(a)(4)

Both of these claims are torts under Kansas law, see e.g. Murphy v. City of Topeka, 630 P.2d 186, 190 (Kan.App.1981) (public policy); Kansas Commission on Civil Rights v. Service Envelope Corp., 660 P.2d 549 (Kan.1983) (statutory violation). Under Kansas law, tort claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4). The limitations period governing the public policy violation accrued on June 6, 1986, at the time of the unlawful act. The claim was time barred on June 7, 1988. Because the Kansas Act Against Discrimination contains an administrative exhaustion requirement, its limitations period did not accrue until May 7, 1987, when the EEOC issued its right-to-sue letter and the administrative proceedings were completed. It was time barred on May 8, 1989.

Subsection (a)(4)'s two-year limitation period governs § 1983 claims in Kansas.

Smith v. TFI Family Services, Inc. · filed 2019-11-14(a)(4)

In Kansas, the two-year limitation period in K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4) governs § 1983 claims.

Subsection (1) requires an action for trespass upon real property to be brought within two years.

J. A. Tobin Construction Co. v. Holtzman · filed 1971-06-12(1)

Clearly, under K. S. A. 60-513 (1) this is an action for trespass upon real property which must be brought within two years.

Section 60-513(3) imposes a two-year limitation period on fraud claims.

Griffith v. Byers Construction Co. of Kansas, Inc. · filed 1973-05-12(3)

It is now conceded their petition was filed almost four years later and that their cause of action based on fraud was barred by the two year statute'of limitations, K. S. A. 1972 Supp. 60-513 (3). Therefore, as to District Court Case No. C-21628 entitled George M. Parsons and .Linda M. Parsons v. Byers Construction Co. of Kansas, Inc., appellants’ claim cannot be upheld on either the theory of implied warranty or fraud, as to them the summary judgment in favor of the appellee is affirmed.

Section 60-513 gives a plaintiff two years to bring a tort claim after the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable, subject to a ten-year limit from the act.

Rogers v. Williams, Larson, Voss, Strobel & Estes · filed 1989-07-14(b)

William Rogers had knowledge of the cause of action on July 1, 1985. He (and Beverly Rogers) brought the first action on June 22, 1987 — within the two-year period.

Section 60-513(a)(4)’s two-year limitation applies when a claim against auditors concerns their failure to exercise due care, even if they worked under a written engagement letter.

Hunt v. KMG Main Hurdman · filed 1992-09-18(a)(4)

If, however, the trial court was correct that Hunt’s action is a. tort action, the two-year statute of limitations applies and the action is time barred. K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 60-513(a)(4). ... We, like the trial court, conclude that the gravamen of this action is one in tort, not in contract. The action is therefore barred by the two-year statute of limitations.

Section 60-513(a)(3) sets a two-year limitations period for tort claims.

Kansas Public Employees Retirement System v. Reimer & Koger Associates, Inc. · filed 1995-09-06(a)(3)

When KPERS filed this lawsuit in December 1991 alleging fraud in a 1986 transaction, the applicable Kansas statutes were the two-year torts statute, Kan.Stat.Ann. Sec. 60-513(a)(3), and the three-year statute for statutory claims, Kans.Stat.Ann. Sec. 60-512(2).

The statute's discovery rule delays the limitations period until the fact of injury becomes known, but it does not apply when the injury was not concealed or incapable of ascertainment.

Welch v. City of Kansas City · filed 1970-03-07

Never, to our knowledge, has the cause of action been said to originate in the filing of the written statement required by K. S. A. 12-105. In every case where the limitation upon actions of this character has been involved, the two-year statute, K. S. A. 60-513, has been applied. ... Neither do we find any relevancy in the plaintiffs’ allusion to that portion of K. S. A. 60-513, providing in essence that the period of limitation shall not commence to run until the fact of injury becomes known. There is no allegation in the instant petition that the fact of injury was concealed, or incapable of ascertainment. Indeed, the very opposite impression is to be gleaned from the plaintiffs’ pleading.

Section 60-513 requires a fraud action to be brought within two years, with accrual delayed until the fraud is discovered.

Martin v. Martin · filed 1967-12-09(3)

The testimony clearly shows that plaintiff knew of this deed both before and after the death of her husband in 1955 and took no steps to assert her claim of fraud until the present action was filed in 1966. ... K. S. A. 60-513 provides: ... “The following actions shall be brought within two (2) years: ... “(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud, but the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the fraud is discovered.” ... As shown by plaintiff’s evidence such a claim is now barred.

Section 60-513(3) gives a two-year limitations period for fraud claims, measured from discovery of the fraud.

Seiffer v. Topsy's International, Inc. · filed 1974-06-27(3)

We have already determined that the statute of limitations in this private suit for damages under Rule 10b-5 is the Kansas statute of limitations for fraud, K.S.A. 60-513(3), which provides for a two-year period from the date of discovery of the fraud.

For fraud claims, the two-year limitations period begins when the fraud is discovered, but the claimant must exercise diligence, judged by the facts and relationship of the parties.

Unified School District No. 490 v. Celotex Corp. · filed 1981-05-29(a)(3)

As we view the Supreme Court's decision in the Friends University case, its interpretation of K.S.A. 60-513( a )(3) requires some degree of diligence by any party claiming fraud, the exact degree to depend upon the facts of each case and the relationship of the parties. We thus are of the opinion, based on the record before us, that as a matter of law the statute of limitations had expired as to Sunflower's claim for actual and punitive damages.

Section 60-513(a)(3) requires fraud actions to be brought within two years, with accrual delayed until the fraud is discovered.

Covell v. Photo Images, Inc. · filed 1991-09-26(a)(3)

As for Count III of plaintiff’s first amended complaint, defendants argue that plaintiff’s claim for fraud is barred by the two-year statute of limitations found in K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3) which provides in pertinent part that: ... (a) The following actions shall be brought within two years: ... (3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud, but the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the fraud is discovered. ... Therefore, we find that the fraud was not discovered until August of 1988, and that consequently, plaintiff’s action for fraud was timely filed.

For fraud claims, the two-year limitations period begins when the fraud is discovered, meaning when the injury or the acts giving rise to the claim were known or reasonably should have been known.

Monarch Normandy Square Partners v. Normandy Square Associates Ltd. Partnership · filed 1993-03-16(a)(3), (b)

K.S.A. 60 — 513(a)(3) provides that an action for relief on the ground of fraud shall be brought within two years, but the cause of action does not accrue until the fraud is discovered. A fraud is deemed “discovered” when “the act giving rise to the cause of action causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until sometime after the initial act, then ... [when] the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injury party.” K.S.A. 60-513(b). Therefore, a plaintiff is deemed to have discovered the fraud when he knew, or, with reasonable diligence, should have known of the acts or conduct giving rise to the conduct.

For fraud claims, the two-year limitations period begins when the fraud is discovered, which Kansas applies as when it could reasonably have been discovered by a reasonably prudent person exercising reasonable diligence.

Wolf v. Preferred Risk Life Insurance Co. · filed 1984-03-09(a)(3)

Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-513(a)(3) provides: The following actions shall be brought within two (2) years: ... (3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud, but the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the fraud is discovered. Although the statute is phrased in terms of actual discovery, the rule in Kansas has been that the two year limitations period begins to run when the fraud could reasonably have been discovered: ... [T]he phrase ‘discovery of the fraud,’ which would start the statute of limitations to running, means the discovery by the person defrauded of such facts indicating he had been defrauded as would cause a reasonably prudent person to investigate, and which, if investigated with reasonable diligence, would lead to knowledge of the fraud.

For fraud claims, the two-year limitations period begins when the fraud is discovered, meaning when the defrauded person learns facts that would cause a reasonably prudent person to investigate and reasonable diligence would reveal the fraud.

Eric C. Rajala, Trustee in Bankruptcy for General Poly Corporation, and Cross-Appellant v. Allied Corporation, and Cross-Appellee · filed 1990-12-14(a)(3)

An action for fraud must be brought within two years of when it accrues, “but the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the fraud is discovered.” Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-513(a)(3) (1983). The Supreme Court of Kansas has interpreted discovery of the fraud under the statute of limitations to mean the discovery by the person defrauded of such facts indicating he had been defrauded as would cause a reasonably prudent person to investigate, and which, if investigated with reasonable diligence, would lead to knowledge of the fraud.

Section 60-513(a)(3) provides a two-year limitations period for fraud claims, with accrual delayed until the plaintiff discovers the fraud or learns facts that would lead a reasonably prudent person to investigate.

Great Plains Christian Radio, Inc. v. Central Tower, Inc. · filed 2005-11-08(a)(3)

A cause of action for fraud “shall not be deemed to have accrued until the fraud is discovered.”

The discovery exception in § 60-513(a)(3) applies to claims requiring proof of fraud, but not to contract-reformation claims based on mutual mistake.

Law v. Law Co. Building Associates · filed 2012-09-28(a)(3)

The discovery exception of K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3) does not apply to a claim for reformation of a contract based on an alleged mutual mistake.

Section 60-513(b) delays accrual of a cause of action until the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable when the injury is not immediately ascertainable.

In re Purcell · filed 2017-07-19(b)

This Court must apply Kansas law to determine when Debtor’s cause of action accrued in order to determine whether, as of the closing date of her case, she had an actionable property interest in that cause of action. Kansas law is clear on this point. Under K.S.A. § 60-513(b), the discovery rule governs her cause of action. The trustee has failed to meet his burden of proving that Debtor could reasonably have ascertained that she was injured as a result of the medical product before her case was closed.

Section 60-513(a)(4) sets a two-year period for the specified tort claim, and subsection (b) delays accrual until substantial injury occurs or the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable.

Morris v. KanEquip, Inc. · filed 2019-08-16(a)(4), (b)

K.S.A. 60-513(b) states the statute of limitations in a tort action begins to run when the act first causes substantial injury. ... Of importance to this appeal, K.S.A. 60-513(b) provides a discoverability provision which tolls the statute of limitations until a point in time at which the injury was reasonably ascertainable. ... Under either factual scenario, given that the negligence claim was filed on August 1, 2017, by operation of K.S.A. 60-513(b) the claim was not barred by the two-year statute of limitations provided in K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4).

For a fraud claim, the two-year limitations period does not accrue until the fraud is discovered, including when the claimant has actual or constructive notice or could have discovered it with reasonable diligence.

Textron Aviation Inc. v. Superior Air Charter, LLC · filed 2019-11-21(a)(3)

Under K.S.A. 60–513(a)(3), “the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the fraud is discovered.” Bonura v. Sifers, 39 Kan. App. 2d 617, 630, 181 P.3d 1277, 1286 (2008). “Discovered” means that the action accrues when SAC “possesses actual or constructive notice of the fraud or when, with reasonable diligence, the fraud could have been discovered.”

Section 60-513(a)(3) gives a fraud plaintiff two years from discovery, and discovery occurs when fraud is actually discovered or reasonably could have been discovered; mere suspicion does not trigger the period when the plaintiff was lulled by later misrepresentations, omissions, or lies.

Mid Kansas Agri Co. v. Pawnee County Cooperative Ass'n · filed 2022-02-25(a)(3)

Under K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3), a plaintiff has two years to file an action based on fraud from the time the fraud is discovered. But our appellate courts have held the statute of limitations is not triggered by actual knowledge of the fraud; rather, "[u]nder Kansas law, a fraud is discovered at the time of actual discovery or when, with reasonable diligence, the fraud could have been discovered." Waite v. Adler, 239 Kan. 1, 6, 716 P.2d 524 (1986). However, as Mid-Kan points out, mere suspicion is not enough to trigger the statute of limitations where the plaintiff forgoes further investigation after being lulled into confidence by the other party's actions. In other words, if the party committing fraud covers up the initial fraud with additional lies, omissions, or misrepresentations, the statute of limitations is not triggered. See Price v. Grimes, 234 Kan. 898, 900, 677 P.2d 969 (1984).

Section 60-513(a) provides a two-year limitations period, and under subsection (b) the period begins when a substantial, or actionable, injury occurs or becomes reasonably ascertainable, with accrual potentially presenting a jury question when the facts conflict.

Davis v. Johnson & Johnson · filed 2022-05-18(a) (b)

The parties don’t dispute that Plaintiff’s claims for negligence and strict liability all are governed by the two-year statute of limitations in K.S.A. § 60-513(a). See Pedro, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 1158-59. That statute incorporates a discovery rule. K.S.A. § 60-513(b) states that causes of action under subsection (a) do not accrue “until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.” This provision “postpones the running of the limitations period until the time the plaintiff is able to determine that her injury may be caused by some act of the defendant.” Benne v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 87 F.3d 419, 427 (10th Cir. 1996). The term “substantial injury” is interpreted to mean “actionable injury.” Michaelis v. Farrell, 296 P.3d 439, 444 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013). But this does not require knowledge of the full extent of a plaintiff’s injuries. Id. Rather, a “substantial injury” is one that justifies a legal action for damages. See Roeder, 2021 WL 4819442, at *4; Moss v. Mamalis, 138 P.3d 380, 384 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006) (“It is knowledge of the fact of an actionable injury, not the extent, which triggers the statute of limitations.”). The term “reasonably ascertainable” confers some obligation to investigate. See Michaelis, 296 P.3d at 444. It is an “objective standard based on an examination of the surrounding circumstances.” See Davidson v. Denning, 914 P.2d 936, 943 (Kan. 1996). It also confers an obligation on a plaintiff to reasonably investigate the cause of the harm once she has sufficient notice of an injury. Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 397 F.3d 906, 915 (10th Cir. 2005). “If examining the surrounding circumstances shows that the plaintiff clearly had knowledge of his or her injury and that the defendant was the likely cause, the trial court can make the legal determination that the injury was reasonably ascertainable at that point.” Michaelis, 296 P.3d at 445. If there are conflicting facts about when a substantial injury occurred or was reasonably ascertainable, it is a question of fact for the jury. Id.; see also Burton, 397 F.3d at 914; Roeder, 2021 WL 4819442, at *4. ... Based on this conflicting evidence, the Court cannot make a legal determination that Plaintiff’s injuries were reasonably ascertainable at a specific point in time. Michaelis, 296 P.3d at 445.

Section 60-513(a)(3) gives fraudulent misrepresentation claims a two-year limitations period that begins when the fraud is discovered, including when the plaintiff has actual or constructive notice or could have discovered it with reasonable diligence.

Swender v. Lamfers · filed 2024-07-26(a)(3)

Kansas law prescribes a two-year statute of limitations for fraudulent misrepresentation claims. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(3). And “‘the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the fraud is discovered.’” Bonura v. Sifers, 181 P.3d 1277, 1286 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(3)). “‘Discovered’ means that the action accrues when [plaintiff] ‘possesses actual or constructive notice of the fraud or when, with reasonable diligence, the fraud could have been discovered.’” Textron Aviation, Inc. v. Superior Air Charter, LLC, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1186, 1194 (D. Kan. 2019) (quoting Bonura, 181 P.3d at 1286).

Under § 60-513(3), a fraud action must be brought within two years, and the cause of action accrues when the fraud is discovered.

Hartman v. Stumbo · filed 1965-12-11(3)

The petition being filed August 12, 1964, more than two years later, it would appear any cause of action based on fraud was clearly barred by the provisions of K.S.A. 60-513 (3).

Section 60-513's fraud provision is not subject to the ten-year limitation; its two-year period runs from discovery of the fraud.

Jennings v. Jennings · filed 1973-03-03(3)

In order to harmonize the statute and give effect to each of its provisions we must conclude the legislature did not intend that an action based on fraud was subject to the ten-year limitation.

Section 60-513(3) imposes a two-year limitations period for fraud claims that begins when the fraud is known or, through reasonable diligence, could have been discovered.

Jones v. B. C. Christopher & Co. · filed 1979-02-14(3)

The statute provides that “the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the fraud is discovered.” Judicial constructions of this provision, however, have held that the period should begin running when the fraud is known or through the exercise of reasonable diligence could have been discovered.

Under § 60-513(a)(3), a fraud claim does not accrue until the fraud is discovered, and reasonable assurances may postpone discovery so that a later-filed action is timely.

Price v. Grimes · filed 1984-02-18(a)(3)

“(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud, but the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the fraud is discovered.” ... Here, Price was constantly reassured by Grimes he would sell his property and repay the money loaned, even as late as November 13, 1980. The suit was filed November 13, 1980. We hold the suit timely filed.

Under § 60-513(a)(3), a fraud claim accrues when the plaintiff should reasonably know of the fraud, here upon public announcement of the contract award.

Andersen-Myers Co., Inc. v. Roach · filed 1987-02-25(a)(3)

The court finds that any cause of action for fraud arose upon public announcement of the particular contract award.

Section 60-513(a)(3) provides a two-year limitations period for fraud actions running from discovery, but that period does not bar a State fraud action arising from a governmental function because limitations do not apply to such actions.

State Ex Rel. Stephan v. GAF Corp. · filed 1987-12-11(a)(3)

We turn now to GAF’s claim that the State’s fraud claim is barred by the statute of limitations, K.S.A. 60-513, which provides in substance that an action for relief on the grounds of fraud must be brought within two years of the discovery of the fraud. ... The action was not untimely and it is not barred by the two-year statute of limitations.

Under § 60-513(a)(3), a fraud claim accrues when the fraud is discovered, and the two-year limitation period bars the claim when discovery and substantial injury occurred more than two years before suit.

City of Ulysses v. Neidert · filed 1966-01-22(a)(3)

Appellants having discovered any fraud practiced on them and having first been caused substantial injury by at least June 1, 1961, and suit thereon not having been brought until December 14, 1964, the action comes within the bar of the two year statute of limitations.

Section 60-513(b)'s discovery rule starts the limitation period when the injury and its cause become reasonably ascertainable, not merely when the initial tortious act occurs.

Koch v. Shell Oil Co. · filed 1998-07-16(b)

As a general rule, the cited statute requires that a tort action be brought within two years from the date the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury. Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-513(a), (b). However, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until sometime after the initial tortious act, the limitation period commences at the time the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party. Kan.Stat. Ann. § 60-513(b). Ascertainment of the “fact of injury” for purposes of triggering the discovery rule contained in Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-513(b) includes not only ascertainment of the injury itself, but also the cause of the injury.

Section 60-513(3) gives a plaintiff two years to bring an action for relief on the ground of fraud, with the claim accruing when the fraud is discovered.

Dreiling v. Home State Life Insurance · filed 1973-11-03(3)

A two year statute of limitations under K. S. A. 1972 Supp. 60-513 (3) is prescribed for “An action for relief on the ground of fraud, but the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the fraud is discovered.” The fraud was first discovered on the record here presented in April, 1971 when the third premium notice was received. The action was filed approximately two months after discovery of the fraud.

Section 60-513 requires an action for fraud to be commenced within two years after discovery of the fraud.

Letzig v. Rupert · filed 1972-04-08(3)

An action for fraud must be commenced within two years after discovery of the fraud.

Under § 60-513(a)(3), when a plaintiff could reasonably have discovered fraud through due diligence is a question of fact.

Rajala v. Allied Corp. · filed 1986-10-30(a)(3)

Likewise, whether the statute of limitations is a bar because plaintiff could, with due diligence, have “reasonably discovered” the fraud prior to August of 1980 (two years before the filing of this lawsuit) must be decided by the trier of fact. The point of reasonable discovery is a question of fact.

Section 60-513(b)’s discovery rule applies to a claim for breach of implied warranty of authority when the claim sounds in tort.

Farm Credit Bank of Wichita v. FCB Ltd. Partnership · filed 1993-04-02(b)

Thus, the court concludes that plaintiffs’ claim for breach, of implied warranty of authority may be considered to sound in tort. Accordingly, as to this theory of recovery, plaintiffs may rely on the discovery rule of the two year statute of limitations for tort actions.

Section 60-513(a)(3) gives fraud claims a two-year limitations period that begins when the fraud is discovered or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence.

Paulsen v. Gutierrez · filed 1997-03-20(a)(3)

Under Kansas law, a fraud action is governed by a two-year statute of limitations. K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(3). A cause of action for fraud accrues at such time as the fraud is discovered. ... This means the time of actual discovery or when, with reasonable diligence, the fraud could have been discovered.

Section 60-513(a)(3) gives a fraud claim a two-year limitations period that begins when the fraud is discovered or reasonably could have been discovered.

Thomas v. Sifers · filed 2007-12-21(a)(3)

In Kansas, a fraud claim has a two-year statute of limitations. K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(3). The claim does not accrue “until the fraud is discovered.” ... Here, the court has no difficulty concluding that a rational trier of fact could find that she could not have discovered the alleged fraud with reasonable diligence before January 3, 2005.

Section 60-513(a)(3) allows a fraud claim filed within two years after the plaintiff discovers the fraud or facts that would lead a reasonably prudent person to investigate.

Hemphill v. Shore · filed 2012-12-07(a)(3)

Assuming as we must the truth of this statement, plaintiff did not discover the alleged fraud or learn facts that would lead a reasonably prudent person to investigate until within 2 years before the filing of this lawsuit, as required by K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3).

Section 60-513(b) starts the limitations period when a plaintiff reasonably ascertains substantial injury caused by the defendant’s negligence, while its ten-year maximum runs from the act first giving rise to the cause of action.

Gilger v. Lee Construction, Inc. · filed 1990-12-19(b)

After a careful analysis of the Kansas cases pertaining to the issue, we hold that the “fact of injury” is not reasonably ascertainable until the plaintiff has discovered that a substantial injury has been sustained and has discovered that the cause of that injury is the negligence of the defendant.

Subsection 60-513(4) imposes a two-year limitations period on tort actions.

Kelley v. Lee · filed 1969-12-06(4)

We think this point is not well taken. The collision occurred December 22, 1962. The initial petition was filed November 14, 1964, well within the prescribed limitation.

For negligent-tort actions, the two-year period begins when the tortious act first causes substantial injury; the ten-year limitation applies only when the injury is not reasonably ascertainable until later and does not limit actions where substantial injury is immediately apparent.

Ruthrauff, Administratrix v. Kensinger · filed 1974-03-02(4)

Accordingly we hold that the last clause in this statute, which states “but in no event shall the period be extended more than ten (10) years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action”, does not affect or limit the primary 2 year period for bringing an action where the fact of substantial injury is immediately apparent as in the case of an explosion and resulting fire. The provision in K. S. A. 1973 Supp. 60-513 imposing the 10 year limitation is intended to apply only to those cases in which the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after substantial injury occurs.

Section 60-513 imposes a two-year statute of limitations on each of the plaintiffs' counts, and the claims were time-barred before valid personal jurisdiction was obtained over the defendant.

Haley v. Hershberger · filed 1971-06-12

The statute of limitations for each such count is two years. (K. S. A. 60-513.) ... This court concludes that, as did the district court, the statute of limitations had run against the claims of plaintiffs before jurisdiction was legally obtained over the person of the defendant.

Section 60-513's limitations period for tort actions begins when the injury occurs.

Forsyth v. Cessna Aircraft Company · filed 1975-06-26

Even if it could be said that the cause of action "arose" in Kansas, the action would not be barred under the applicable Kansas statute on torts, KSA 60-513. This statute also does not begin to run until the injury occurs. Kitchener v. Williams, 171 Kan. 540, 236 P.2d 64, 73 (1951).

Section 60-513 provides that a cause of action does not accrue until the act giving rise to it first causes substantial injury.

Augustine v. Hinnen · filed 1968-07-13

In the instruction concerning the two-year statute of limitations the jury was told that the cause of action did not arise until plaintiffs were injured by the discharge of salt water, and that if their injury occurred more than two years prior to the date of filing suit they could not recover. We see nothing wrong with the instruction ( Gardenhire v. Sinclair — Prairie Oil Co., 141 Kan. 865, Syl. 1, 44 P.2d 280; McComb v. Stanolind Oil and Gas Co., 164 Kan. 1, 7, 186 P.2d 574.) And see K.S.A. 60-513 in which it is stated that a cause of action under such section shall not be deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to such cause of action first causes substantial injury.

Section 60-513(4) requires a tort action based on use of this type of trade secret to be brought within two years after the plaintiff could reasonably ascertain the fact of the use.

Lockridge v. Tweco Products, Inc. · filed 1972-05-06(4)

We therefore hold that an action based on the tortious use of plaintiff's particular trade secret could only be brought within two years of the time plaintiff first could reasonably have ascertained the fact of such use.

For permanent damage to land from flooding, the two-year limitations period begins when the permanent damage is reasonably ascertainable and encompasses past, present, and future losses.

Thierer v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 1973-07-14(4)

When damage to the land from flooding becomes permanent, the statute of limitations bars recovery two years after the permanent damage is reasonably ascertainable.

Section 60-513's two-year wrongful-death limitation bars the mother's claim but does not bar minor heirs whose own claims are preserved by the tolling rule in § 60-515(a).

Frost v. Hardin · filed 1977-07-22

Under K.S.A. 60-513 a wrongful death action must be brought within two years of the date of death, and this action would clearly be barred by that statute except for the tolling provisions of K.S.A. 60-515 (a): ... We think an analogous result should obtain here. Defendants have a good statute of limitations defense against any claim by Mrs. Frost, but that does not bar these plaintiffs. They are given the right by statute to bring the action in their own names, and that right was preserved to them by statute during their respective minorities.

(a)(3) permits discovery-based accrual when the legislature provides for it, while (a)(4) supplies a two-year catch-all limitations period for tort injuries not otherwise enumerated.

Rinsley v. Brandt · filed 1977-12-15(a)(3) (a)(4)

An examination of K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(3) indicates that the Kansas legislature will apply the discovery accrual rule when it desires to do so.

Section 60-513(a)(4) does not bar a flooding-damage claim when the flooding is temporary, occasional, and recurrent and no permanent injury occurred outside the limitations period.

Dougan v. Rossville Drainage District · filed 1978-03-17(a)(4)

The flooding in this case is temporary, occasional and recurrent. There is no indication or allegation that the flooding caused permanent injury to the land itself in 1967. We cannot say plaintiff’s cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations under the facts before the court.

Section 60-513 requires negligence actions to be brought within two years.

Belger Cartage Service, Inc. v. Holland Construction Co. · filed 1978-07-15

Had Belger recovered, the negligence claim of Holland could have been used as a setoff. However, Belger did not recover against Holland. Therefore, any recovery on the negligence theory of the counterclaim was barred by the statute of limitations which was two years, pursuant to K.S.A. 60-513.

Subsection (a)(4) imposes a two-year limitation period on actions for injury to another's rights not arising on contract.

Gideon v. Gates · filed 1980-05-23(a)(4)

Having examined this record on appeal in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as we are required to do, we are convinced that the facts as shown were not sufficient to toll the operation of K.S.A. 60-513( a )(4) for a period of time sufficient to bring the commencement of this action within the two-year limitation prescribed by that statute, and that defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Section 60-513(a)(2) requires actions for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including specific recovery, to be brought within two years.

Yunghans v. O'TOOLE · filed 1978-07-21(a)(2)

K.S.A. 60-513(a)(2) provides that any action for taking, detaining or injuring personal property, including actions for the specific recovery thereof shall be brought within two years. James J. O’Toole died in 1968 and this action was not filed until 1973. Although the statutes allow partition of personal property, appellant’s action in this case was not timely filed.

Section 60-513's two-year limitations period does not apply to this wage-recovery action arising from an oral employment contract.

Head v. Knopp · filed 1978-12-09

In our judgment, the provisions of K.S.A. 60-513 do not apply. This action is controlled by 60-512(1), which assigns a three-year statute of limitations to all actions upon contracts, obligations or liabilities expressed or implied, but not in writing, unless defendants are correct in their assertion that the action is barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 60-514(3).

The limitation period begins when the fact of substantial injury is reasonably ascertainable; the claimant need not know the precise scientific cause of the injury.

Friends University v. W. R. Grace & Co. · filed 1980-04-05(b)

Friends’ letter of October 18, 1974, above recited, clearly shows that Friends was aware of its serious problem at least as early as August, 1972. ... From 1970 forward, Friends was complaining about the roof and demanding that the roof problems be remedied. Friends frequently urged the defendants and the roofing company to stop arguing among themselves about whose fault it was and repair the roof. The fact Friends had not determined the exact scientific cause of the leaking did not toll the running of the statute. Fully cognizant that a severe problem existed, Friends elected to seek nonjudicial resolution of the controversy. Simply stated, Friends lost its right to a judicial determination of the dispute by its own delay and inactivity.

For a tort action based on negligence in breaching an implied warranty, the two-year limitation period begins when substantial damage occurs or the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable.

Ware v. Christenberry · filed 1981-12-10(a)(4) and (b)

On the other hand, an action in tort for negligence in the breach of an implied warranty is governed by K.S.A. 60-513 and the time does not begin to run against the cause of action until substantial damage has first occurred, or the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.

Section 60-513 starts the malpractice limitations period when the act first causes substantial injury, or, if the injury is not reasonably ascertainable then, when the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable, subject to a ten-year outside limit.

Hecht v. First National Bank & Trust Co. · filed 1971-11-06(4)

Under the new provision the period of limitation does not commence until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or in the alternative, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then not until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.

For tort actions, § 60-513(a)(4) accrues when the act first causes substantial injury and requires suit within two years.

Chavez v. Saums · filed 1977-08-12(a)(4)

A tort action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury. Such an action must be brought within two (2) years. (K.S.A. 60-513.)

Section 60-513 imposes a two-year statute of limitations on the conversion action.

Cairo Coop. Exchange v. First Nat'l Bank of Cunningham · filed 1981-01-27

We held Cairo had proven a case of conversion and breach of express contract. The statutes of limitations for those two actions are two and five years respectively, K.S.A. 60-513 and 60-511.

Subsection (b) provides that a tort cause of action accrues when the act giving rise to it first causes substantial injury.

Kennedy v. City of Sawyer · filed 1980-11-01(b)

The action was and is essentially a tort action which accrued when the act giving rise to the cause of action first caused substantial injury. K.S.A. 60-513( b ). This was no earlier than July 17, 1975, when the sewage lagoons were sprayed by Mr. Aubley.

For professional-negligence claims against health care providers, subsection (c) generally starts the limitations period at the negligent act, subject to delayed ascertainability but with a four-year outer limit; subsection (d) preserves the former rule for two years after the 1976 amendment for pre-effective-date acts.

Stephens v. Snyder Clinic Ass'n · filed 1981-07-17(c), (d)

In our judgment, both the result reached and the rationale followed by the district court are legally sound and should be applied. We, therefore, hold that the 1976 amendments to K.S.A. 60-513 are applicable to the plaintiff’s cause of action. ... We have concluded from a study of the legislative history of the medical malpractice legislation enacted in the 1976 session that the amendments to K.S.A. 60-513 satisfy the requirements of the “reasonable basis” test and that the classification distinguishing health care providers from other persons in respect to the statute of limitations bears a rational relation to the purpose of the health care legislation enacted in 1976. Stated in another way, we find there is a reasonable relation existing between the legislative objective of assuring continued quality health care in this state and the amendment of K.S.A. 60-513 to shorten the statute of limitations to four years for tort actions brought against health care providers. K.S.A. 60-513, as amended in 1976, does not violate equal protection guarantees.

Section 60-513(a) imposes a two-year limitation on actions for injury to personal property or another’s rights, and subsection (b) delays accrual until the injury has resulted and can be ascertained.

Kansas City Star Co. v. Gunn · filed 1982-01-12(a), (b)

So, too, is it apparent that K.S.A. 60-513(a) places a two-year limitation on actions for injury to the personal property or rights of another. ... For purposes of applying the statute of limitations, both Kansas law, K.S.A. 60-513(b), and Missouri law, § 516.100, RSMo 1978, provide that the cause of action is not deemed to have accrued until injury has resulted and can be ascertained.

For tort claims under subsection (b), the limitations period begins when substantial injury occurs, or when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable if that is later; the ten-year language is not an absolute cutoff from the wrongful act.

Gilger v. Lee Construction, Inc. · filed 1991-10-02(b)

Analysis of the foregoing cases clearly establishes that the statute of limitations under K.S.A. 60-513(b) is not triggered until substantial injury occurs or is reasonably ascertainable, regardless of the antiquity of the wrongful act which caused the injury.

Section 60-513(a)(4) requires actions for injuries to personal rights not arising out of contract to be filed within two years after accrual, and that period is the appropriate limitations period for § 1983 claims.

Derstein v. Van Buren · filed 1987-09-14(a)(4)

In Kansas, actions for injuries to personal rights not arising out of contract must be brought within two years from the time the cause of action accrued. K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4). Notwithstanding the “not arising out of contract” language appearing in § 60-513(a)(4), we have held that, under Kansas law, this two-year statute is the “most appropriate limitations period” for a § 1983 proceeding.

A tort claim accrues when the underlying act first causes substantial injury, or when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable if that fact cannot reasonably be known earlier.

Mo-Kan Teamsters Pension Fund v. Creason · filed 1987-06-26(b)

In K.S.A. 60-513(b), the Legislature provided a mechanism to determine when a tort cause of action accrues: ... [T]he cause of action in this [section] shall not be deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact or injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.... ... The court finds that under the statute and Kansas case law, Creason’s cause of action accrued in late August, 1981.

Section 60-513(a)(4)'s two-year limitation applies to a tort cause of action, but not to enforcing an existing judgment through subrogation.

Michael D. Young, and Cross-Appellee v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, and Cross-Appellant · filed 1992-01-03(a)(4)

The statute plainly allows subrogation in two different contexts: "to any cause of action in tort" which the insured may have, and "to the extent of such payment, to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment that may thereafter result." Id. (emphasis added). Only the first of these two avenues of relief, the prosecution of a tort claim, is subject to the two year tort statute of limitations. The second is subject to the Kansas procedural statutes on enforceability of judgments, Kan.Stat.Ann. §§ 60-2403-2407.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for tort claims, while warranty claims seeking economic-loss damages are governed by the UCC's four-year limitations period.

prod.liab.rep. (Cch) P 13,395 Dennis Winchester and John Winchester v. Lester's of Minnesota, Inc. · filed 1993-01-12(a)(4)

If we could agree with the district court that plaintiffs’ losses were properly characterized as property damage, in the same sense as collision damage in an accident caused by a faulty automobile wheel, then we would also agree that the Kansas Supreme Court would likely apply the two-year tort statute of Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-513(a)(4) rather than the four-year limitation of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), id. § 84-2-725, even though plaintiffs attempted to characterize the claims as breaches of express or implied warranties. ... Applying these considerations to the facts at hand, we hold that plaintiffs’ warranty claims sound in contract rather than tort. ... Because their claims are contractual in nature, the plaintiffs are entitled to the four-year statute of limitations under the UCC.

Section 60-513 supplies a two-year statute of limitations for product liability claims, subject to applicable statutory exceptions.

Fennesy v. LBI Management, Inc. · filed 1993-03-05

Instead of that provision, the Kansas Legislature provided: “[N]othing contained in subsections (a) and (b) above shall modify the application of K.S.A. 60-513, and amendments thereto.” K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 60-3303(c). ... • K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 60t3303(c) makes specific reference to 60-513 and does not mention 60-512. The KPLA provides a two-year statute of limitations for a product liability claim, unless exceptions stated or referenced within the Act apply. We conclude a two-year statute of limitations applies to Fennesy’s implied warranty claim against Redman.

Section 60-513(a)(4) requires § 1983 claims to be brought within two years, running from accrual of the claim.

Dees v. Vendel · filed 1994-09-27(a)(4)

A claim relating to the conditions of the jail must be raised within two years. Hamilton v. City of Overland Park, 730 F.2d 613, 614 (10th Cir.1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1052, 105 S.Ct. 2111, 85 L.Ed.2d 476 (1985) (all § 1983 claims are actions governed by the Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-513(a)(4) two-year statute of limitations). Plaintiff was released from the Linn County jail on January 10, 1990. Accordingly, any claim regarding the conditions of the jail accrued at that time and was barred by the two-year statute of limitations on January 10, 1992. Plaintiff did not make his allegations about the substandard conditions of the jail until his amended complaint filed October 15, 1993. Plaintiffs amended complaint did not relate back because defendants did not have notice of a claim based on jail conditions within the limitations period. ... We therefore conclude that any Eighth Amendment claim against Brown, Gable, and Tatum based on allegedly substandard jail conditions must be dismissed.

Section 60-513(b) delays accrual of a negligence claim until the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of a substantial injury and that the defendant’s negligence caused it.

Johnson v. Board of Pratt County Comm'rs · filed 1995-05-31(b)

Under K.S.A. 60-513(b), a cause of action for negligence does not accrue until plaintiff knows or has reason to know that a substantial injury has been suffered and that defendant’s negligence is the cause of the injuiy.

Section 60-513(a)(4) supplies a two-year period for actions for injury to another's rights not arising on contract, but a KAAD employment-discrimination claim is instead an action on liability created by statute governed by the three-year period in § 60-512(2).

Wagher v. Guy's Foods, Inc. · filed 1994-12-09(a)(4)

Subsection (a)(4) provides that “[a]n action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract,” shall be brought within two years. ... Therefore, his claim was an “action upon a liability created by statute” and thus barred by the three-year limitation of K.S.A. 60-512(2).

Section 60-513's two-year tort limitations period does not govern a properly pleaded breach-of-warranty claim seeking economic-loss damages from a defective product when the claim is timely under the Uniform Commercial Code's limitations period.

Lim Enterprises v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. · filed 1996-01-19

The court rejects the defendant’s argument that it can be liable for breach of warranty if the product it sells fails to operate properly, but not if the product fails in such a way that it causes property damage in addition to the claimed economic loss. Where the facts alleged would support a claim under either tort or contract law, the plaintiff is entitled to pursue the theory of its choice. Here, the plaintiff properly set forth a claim for breach of warranty and brought the claim within the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year statute of limitations on tort claims.

Burnham v. Humphrey Hospitality Reit Trust, Inc. · filed 2005-03-04(a)(4)

Because she brings a tort claim, a two-year statute of limitations applies. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4). As such, the statute of limitations ran on March 29, 2003.

Section 60-513 provides a two-year limitations period for product-liability claims, accruing when the injury occurs.

Danaher v. Wild Oats Markets, Inc. · filed 2011-03-14

A review of the relevant Kansas law makes it clear that the applicable statute of limitations for Plaintiffs breach of implied warranty claim is the two-year statute of limitations for product liability claims set forth in K.S.A. § 60-513, which accrues at the time of injury.

Subsection (a) gives common-law fraud claims a two-year limitations period that runs from discovery of the fraud.

LOUISBURG BLDG. & DEV'T CO. v. Albright · filed 2011-04-08(a)

Common-law-fraud claims have a 2-year statute of limitations, running from the discovery of the fraud.

Section 60-513(a)(3) imposes a two-year limitations period for breach-of-trust and constructive-fraud claims, beginning when the breach or alleged fraud is discovered.

Boucek v. Boucek · filed 2013-07-12(a)(3)

John’s breach of trust and constructive fraud claims are subject to K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3), and its 2-year limitations period begins to run from the discovery of the breach or the alleged fraud. These two claims are based on Bernice’s transfers of property out of the 1996 Trust, and Richard and Diana point to some evidence that John was aware of certain transfers dating back as far as 1999. The problem for them is that John is not suing on those transfers. His petition and his later arguments focus on Bernice’s September 8, 2004, transfers. This means, again, that his September 6, 2006, claims were timely filed.

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year limitations period on comparative implied indemnity claims, running from accrual of the underlying fault cause of action.

Watco Companies, Inc. v. Campbell · filed 2016-04-01(a)(4)

A comparative implied indemnity claim must be made within the 2-year statute of limitations set out in K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4). The time to bring a claim begins running when the underlying fault cause of action accrues. ... Although this action was not filed until July 1, 2011, well after the 2-year statute of limitations for property damage, negligence, and comparative implied indemnity contained at K.S.A. 60-513, K.S.A. 60-518 allows that "[i]f any action be commenced within due time, and the plaintiff fail[s] in such action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited for the same shall have expired, the plaintiff . . . may commence a new action within six (6) months after such failure." The savings statute applies even if the first action was not filed in a Kansas state court. ... Accordingly, Watco's claims are timely, having been timely filed in the federal court and then filed in the state court within 6 months of dismissal.

Section 60-513(a)(4) gives tort claims a two-year limitations period that begins when the injury and the defendant's likely responsibility are reasonably ascertainable.

Page v. Haun · filed 2016-08-26(a)(4)

"The statute of limitations starts to run in a tort action when the act first causes 'substantial injury.' [Citation omitted.] Kansas courts have interpreted the phrase 'substantial injury' to mean 'actionable injury.' [Citation omitted.] 'The rule which has developed is: The statute of limitations starts to run in a tort action at the time a negligent act causes injury if both the act and the resulting injury are reasonably ascertainable by the injured person.' [Citation omitted.]" ... In summary, the uncontroverted facts prove all of the Pages' injuries and Knisleys' injuries related to cattle and corn losses were reasonably ascertainable before April 1, 2012. Moreover, the uncontroverted facts prove that the fact that the Hauns may have caused those injuries was also reasonably ascertainable before April 1, 2012. As a result, no genuine issue of material fact exists. In turn, the Pages and Knisleys' remaining claims concerning injuries stemming from cattle and corn losses are clearly barred under the 2-year time limit in K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4).

Section 60-513(a)(3) allows a fraud claim up to two years after discovery, but § 60-513(b) bars it in all events more than ten years after the act giving rise to the claim.

In re Estate of Frost · filed 2019-03-01(a)(3)

Finally, we observe that Jane brought her claim outside the statute of limitations for fraud. As Jane notes, a fraud claim can be brought up to two years after the discovery of the fraud. K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3). But "in no event shall an action be commenced more than 10 years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action." K.S.A. 60-513(b). So even if this court were to accept Jane's claim that she did not discover the fraud until recently, the statute of limitations has already run because the alleged fraud happened more than 10 years before she brought her claim.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims in Kansas.

Marconette v. Reader · filed 2020-05-05(a)(4)

In Kansas, the statute of limitations for personal injury claims is two years. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4); see Eikenberry v. Seward Cty., Kan., 734 F. App’x 572, 575 (10th Cir. 2018).

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year statute of limitations for Kansas § 1983 claims.

Lowry v. Rop · filed 2023-10-31(a)(4)

A two-year statute of limitations applies to § 1983 claims from Kansas. K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4); Johnson, 925 F.2d at 1301. ... Here, Dowling knew that his craft supplies had been confiscated on June 30, 2017, and he provides no basis for tolling the statute of limitations. ... Here, there is one specific discrete act alleged—the taking of the craft supplies—and that occurred well outside the statute of limitations. Therefore, this claim is time-barred.

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year limitations period on Kansas personal-injury claims, including § 1983 claims brought in Kansas.

Kelly v. Schnurr · filed 2024-09-19(a)(4)

State statutes of limitations applicable to general personal injury claims supply the limitations periods for § 1983 claims. See Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 651 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc). Kansas’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4), is two years.

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year limit on ordinary negligence claims, including claims against governmental entities under the Kansas Tort Claims Act.

Gehring v. State · filed 1994-12-09(a)(4)

Under the Kansas Code of Civil Procedure, a two-year limitations period applies to negligence claims against private persons. K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 60-513(a)(4). Based on the legislature’s clearly expressed intention that governmental entities are to be liable under circumstances in which a private person would be liable, we conclude the two-year statute of limitations applies to this action.

Section 60-513(a)(4) requires negligence actions alleging damages to be brought within 2 years.

University of Kansas Memorial Corp. v. Kansas Power & Light Co. · filed 2003-01-24(a)(4)

Although the trial court failed to state the applicable statute of limitations, negligence actions alleging damages are governed by K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 60-513(a)(4), which requires that such actions be brought within 2 years.

Section 60-513 provides that an action for injury to another’s rights accrues when the act first causes substantial injury, or when an injury that was not initially apparent becomes reasonably ascertainable.

Pitcher v. Centene Corporation · filed 2020-03-03

While Acaria argues that the decision to terminate Pitcher was made in Florida, the tort did not accrue until it became reasonably ascertainable to Pitcher that she had been injured. Pursuant to K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 60- 513, an action for injury to the rights of another “shall not be deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then … [when] the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party[.]”

Subsection (b) starts the applicable limitations period when the wrongful conduct becomes reasonably ascertainable, with three years for Kansas securities claims and two years for common-law tort claims.

Benedetto v. PaineWebber Group, Inc. · filed 1998-09-01(b)

The statute of limitations on Kansas securities law and common law tort actions runs for three and two years, respectively, from the time at which wrongful conduct becomes reasonably ascertainable. See Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-513(b) (1994); Kelly v. Primeline Advisory, Inc., 256 Kan. 978, 889 P.2d 130, 134, 137 (Kan.1995); Knight v. Myers, 12 Kan.App.2d 469, 748 P.2d 896, 901 (Kan.1988).

For professional-services claims, the limitations period begins when the injury is reasonably ascertainable, subject to an absolute four-year limit from the act giving rise to the claim.

Crockett v. Medicalodges, Inc. · filed 1990-10-26(c)

K.S.A. 1989 Supp. 60-513(b) and (c) provide that the time for filing suit will not begin until the injury is reasonably ascertainable, but no longer than four years after the injury. The question of when an injury is reasonably ascertainable is a question of fact. ... The trial court made no findings as to when this alleged malpractice was reasonably discoverable. We are unwilling to hold that a patient has a duty to monitor medicine prescribed and administered by his or her physician in the absence of facts not present in the record before us; thus, the statute of limitations would not necessarily commence to run as of the day care and treatment ceased. Based on the record before us, we hold that the trial court erred in holding the statute of limitations barred claims against Medicalodges and Dr. Marvin for negligent prescription and administration of medication.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for tort actions, and under subsection (b) the claim accrues when substantial injury, or the fact of injury, becomes reasonably ascertainable.

Phillips USA, Inc. v. Allflex USA, Inc. · filed 1994-11-30(a)(4) (b)

A cause of action covered under K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4) shall not be deemed to have accrued “until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or until the time of the fact of injury (inferentially, the fact of substantial injury) becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.”

Under subsection (b), a listed cause of action accrues when the underlying act first causes substantial injury, or, if the injury is not reasonably ascertainable then, when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.

McIntire v. Apertus Technologies · filed 1996-10-11(b)

Except as provided in subsection (c), the causes of action listed in subsection (a) shall not be deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party . . . .

The limitations period begins when the act causes substantial injury, or, if the injury was not then reasonably ascertainable, when the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.

Bagby v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. · filed 2000-06-08(b)

The accrual of claims controlled by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in K.S.A. 60-513 is generally governed by K.S.A. 60-513(b), which provides that these claims “shall not be deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party....” K.S.A. 60-513(b). ... The same circumstances are present here. In December 1993, Mrs. Klugg was made aware through the bankruptcy proceeding that most of the assets she had entrusted to Hardesty had disappeared. She further understood by at least January 1994 that some of her assets had been held by the defendant. At that point, plaintiffs’ injury was reasonably ascertainable. Plaintiffs had a duty to investigate the cause of her loss and timely file an action within the applicable statute of limitations.

A personal-injury claim accrues when the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable, even if the injured party does not yet know of the injury.

Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. · filed 2002-01-08(b)

As both parties concede, the relevant issue under Kansas law is when the fact of injury became “reasonably ascertainable” to the injured party-not when the injured party had knowledge of the fact of injury.

Under subsection (b), “substantial injury” means actionable injury, and the limitations period begins when the injury is reasonably ascertainable.

BRADBURY CO., INC. v. Teissier-DuCros · filed 2006-02-02(b)

Kansas courts construe “substantial injury” in Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(b) to mean “actionable injury”.

Section 60-513(c) starts the limitation period when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party; for a comatose patient’s survival claim, the court held that point was when the estate could ascertain the injury at the patient’s death.

Martin v. Naik · filed 2010-04-15(c)

At that time the fact of injury was reasonably apparent to the estate, the successor-injured party, thereby causing the survival action for medical malpractice to accrue and the running of the period of hmitation to commence pursuant to K.S.A. 60-513(c).

For causes of action listed in subsection (a), subsection (b) delays accrual until substantial injury occurs or, if the injury is not reasonably ascertainable immediately, until its fact becomes reasonably ascertainable, subject to a 10-year outer limit.

Enneking v. Schmidt Builders Supply Inc. · filed 2012-06-19(b)

These allegations are sufficient to establish that the fact of injury did not become reasonably ascertainable to Plaintiffs until Schmidt Builders collapsed in July 2011 and the Complaint was filed in September 2011, well within the two-year limit.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for the listed noncontractual injury actions, and subsection (b) delays accrual until substantial injury, or the fact of injury and its cause, becomes reasonably ascertainable; the plaintiff need not know the full extent of the injury.

Michaelis v. Farrell · filed 2013-03-08(b) (a)(4)

The use of the phrase “substantial injury” in K.S.A. 60-513(b) does not require tire injured person to have knowledge of the full extent of his or her injuries, but the person must have a “sufficient [reasonably] ascertainable injury to justify an action for recovery of damages.”

Section 60-513(b) delays accrual until substantial injury occurs or, when the injury is not reasonably ascertainable at first, until the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable; public records can provide constructive notice that starts the limitations period.

Hoskinson v. Heiman · filed 2017-11-09(b)

"[T]he causes of action listed in subsection (a) shall not be deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party." ... "The cause of action became reasonably ascertainable no later than April 24, 2013. ... Parties are charged with constructive notice of public records and cannot claim ignorance of public records to toll the statute of limitations. ... The statute of limitations began running on April 24, 2013, when the will was filed with the district court. It expired two years later, on April 24, 2015. Since Madonna did not file her petition alleging outrage until August 2015, her claim is barred by the statute of limitations."

Section 60-513(a)(4) gives two years for tort claims, and subsection (b) delays accrual until substantial injury occurs or, if later, becomes reasonably ascertainable; whether injury is reasonably ascertainable is a question of fact.

LCL, LLC v. Falen · filed 2018-07-27(a)(4) and (b)

Whether a substantial injury is "reasonably ascertainable" under K.S.A. 60-513(b) is a question of fact, not resolvable as a matter of law under the constructive notice provision in K.S.A. 58-2222. The filing and recording of a deed is only one piece of relevant evidence to be considered by the fact-finder in deciding whether a substantial injury caused by the deed's omission of a seller's reserved mineral interest is "reasonably ascertainable."

Under subsection (b), a claim generally accrues when the act first causes substantial injury, while under subsection (c), a health-care professional-services claim accrues when the act occurs; under either subsection, accrual is delayed until injury is reasonably ascertainable, subject to the statutory outside limit.

Estate of Doty v. Dorsch · filed 2019-10-11(b), (c)

Because there are different points in time at which a cause of action could accrue under these subsections, "there are different points in time at which the statute of limitations could begin to run. It is equally clear that one of those points in time is the 'occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action.'" Martin, 297 Kan. at 247. Depending on the cause of action, a cause of action shall accrue either when "the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury," or "at the time of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action." K.S.A. 60-513(b), (c). However, the two-year time period is extended if "the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until sometime after the initial act." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 60-513(b), (c).

For negligence claims, the limitations period starts when the negligent act causes injury and both the act and resulting injury are reasonably ascertainable to the injured person.

Tran v. Douglas County, Kansas · filed 2021-11-24(b)

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 and negligence claims (Counts 1, 2 and 3) accrued on June 29, 2019, when he knew of both Williams’s conduct and the resulting injury. See Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006) (Section 1983 action accrues when facts that would support cause of action are or should be apparent); Moon v. City of Lawrence, 267 Kan. 720, 727, 982 P.2d 388, 394 (1999) (under K.S.A. § 60-513(b), statute of limitations starts to run when negligent act causes injury if both act and resulting injury are reasonably ascertainable to injured person).

Section 60-513(b) delays accrual until the plaintiff can determine that the injury may have been caused by the defendant’s act; not remembering all details of how the injury occurred does not make the provision applicable.

Eden v. Webb · filed 2022-03-03(b)

The second problem with Plaintiff’s accrual argument is that even if the provisions of K.S.A. 60-513(b) applied, it is not clear that he would fall within its coverage. “Kansas' ‘fact of injury’ standard postpones the running of the limitations period until the time the plaintiff is able to determine that [his or her] injury may be caused by some act of the defendant.” Michaelis v. Farrell, 296 P.3d 439, 444–45 (Kan. App. 2013) (quoting Benne v. International Business Machines Corp., 87 F.3d 419, 427 (10th Cir. 1996)). ... Plaintiff does not claim that he did not realize or remember that he was injured until he saw the body camera footage two years after his arrest. Rather, he argues that he did not remember all the details of how he came to be injured. The provisions of K.S.A. 60-513(b) appear to be inapplicable to Plaintiff’s claim.

Section 60-513(b) delays accrual of a listed cause of action until substantial injury occurs, or until the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable, while subsection (a) requires the action to be filed within two years.

Bott v. State · filed 2022-11-10(a), (b)

Thus, under K.S.A. 60-513(b), Bott suffered an actionable injury on either September 30, 2016, or October 25, 2016, and the existence of the injury became reasonably ascertainable then. See Falen, 308 Kan. at 583. As a result, Bott's claim against the State and KHP needed to have been brought within two years from those dates. See K.S.A. 60-513(a). Because he failed to do so, we conclude that the district court correctly dismissed his claim.

Section 60-513(a) provides a two-year limitations period, and under subsection (b) it begins when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable, requiring reasonable investigation of reliable sources available to the injured party.

Murray v. Miracorp, Inc. · filed 2024-04-05(a), (b)

K.S.A. 60-513(a) provides a two-year statute of limitations for several civil actions. K.S.A. 60-513(b) provides that, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party. For such situations, there are thus two questions involved in determining when a statute of limitations begins to run: (1) When did the plaintiffs suffer an actionable injury—i.e., when were all the elements of the cause of action in place? and (2) When did the existence of that injury become reasonably ascertainable to them?

Under § 60-513(b), an injury that is reasonably ascertainable on the date of an accident accrues then, rather than when later medical expenses reach a statutory threshold.

Dinesen v. Towle · filed 1979-07-13(b)

The presence of an injury in this case became reasonably ascertainable on the date of the accident, although the nature and extent of the injury, as well as the amount of medical treatment that would be needed, was not certain at that time.

When the evidence is disputed about when substantial injury first appears or becomes reasonably ascertainable, the statute of limitations issue is for the trier of fact.

Kristek v. Catron · filed 1982-05-06(h)

When, as here, the evidence is in dispute as to when substantial injury first appears or when it becomes reasonably ascertainable, the issue is for determination by the trier of fact.

Section 60-513(a)’s two-year period for wrongful discharge begins when the injury is ascertainable, even if the amount of damages is unknown.

Miller v. Foulston, Siefkin, Powers & Eberhardt · filed 1990-04-13(a)

Although he did not know the amount of fees that would be recovered, he would have been aware of sufficient ascertainable injury to justify an action for recovery of damages at the time he now alleges that he was wrongfully expelled. Therefore, the two-year statute of limitations under K.S.A. 1989 Supp. 60-5l3(a) accrued at the time he left the firm.

Section 60-513(b)'s reasonable-ascertainability rule can require factual findings about when an injured party could have discovered the injury.

Osterhaus v. Schunk · filed 2011-03-11(b)

In short, this issue involves a question of fact that was not resolved by the district court, and we are unable to resolve on appeal. Accordingly, we remand to the district court for a determination of when the fact of injury was reasonably ascertainable by Osterhaus.

Section 60-513(b) delays the start of the limitations period until the fact of injury is reasonably ascertainable, which can be a question of fact.

Redmond v. Kutak Rock, LLP (In Re Brooke Corp.) · filed 2012-02-02(b)

When the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable is a question of fact. The Amended Complaint alleges that Brooke continued in business until 2008 based upon a false belief of solvency. Under the Trustee’s allegations, it is plausible that the fact of the injury alleged to have been caused by Underwriters’ conduct relating to the 2005 stock offering was not reasonably ascertainable until after October 28, 2006. The claims against Underwriters will not be dismissed based upon the statute of limitations defense.

Section 60-513(4) imposes a two-year statute of limitations that barred this action as untimely.

Oliver v. G. Wilkinson, Regional Director J. O'brien, Warden W. Scott, Idc Chairman Unknown Cim Officer · filed 1991-10-15(4)

The court may, at any time, raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction and apply the statute of limitations. See K.S.A. 60-513(4) (Supp.1990). ... Mr. Oliver's claim expired in April 1987.

Section 60-513 provides the general two-year limitations period, which controls these claims absent applicable tolling or relation back.

Gardner Ex Rel. Gardner v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. · filed 1992-06-03

There is nothing to suggest that Michael’s independent claims for expenses and punitive damages, however, are entitled to such treatment. The basis for these claims is not clear under Kansas law. It is certain, however, that the law provides no indication that the general two-year limitations period of K.S.A. 60-513 does not or should not control. And since, as indicated earlier, the amended complaint does not relate back, Michael’s claims for expenses and punitive damages against Chrysler are untimely and must be dismissed.

Section 60-513(a)(4) supplies a two-year limitations period for federal civil rights claims arising in Kansas.

Jenkins v. F.L. Moss, Individually Kansas City, Kansas, Police Department City of Kansas City, Kansas, a Municipal Corporation · filed 1992-10-19(a)(4)

Federal civil rights claims arising in the State of Kansas are governed by a two-year statute of limitations. Johnson v. Johnson County Comm'n Bd., 925 F.2d 1299, 1300-01 (10th Cir.1991) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim; applying Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-513(a)(4)); Payne v. General Motors Corp., 731 F.Supp. 1465, 1473 (D.Kan.1990) (42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim); see Callwood v. Questel, 883 F.2d 272, 273-74 (3d Cir.1989) (applying same state statute of limitations to claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985).

Section 60-513(4) supplies a two-year limitations period for actions alleging constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Ruth Cooper, a Single Person v. State of Kansas · filed 1992-12-18(4)

In her complaint, Ms. Cooper alleged that defendant violated the United States Constitution. Such allegations are authorized to be brought in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The two-year statute, see Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-513(4), thus governs this action. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985).

Section 60-513(a)(2) bars a conversion action filed more than two years after the cause of action accrued.

Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Mid-America Pipeline Co. · filed 1993-02-24(a)(2)

The parties agree that the statute of limitations applicable to this action is two years. K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(2). ... If the defendant committed conversion at all, it did so no later than August 12, 1988. The plaintiff brought this action more than two years later. Therefore, action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Subsection (a)(3) provides a two-year limitations period for fraud-based actions, including pre-Ceres § 10(b) claims heard by Kansas federal courts.

In Re Integrated Resources Real Estate Ltd. Partnerships Securities Litigation · filed 1994-01-04(a)(3)

Pre-Ceres actions for § 10(b) violations heard by district courts sitting in Kansas are governed by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Kansas State Acts (“KSA”) 60-513(a)(3), which provides a two year statute of limitations for actions sounding in fraud.

For actions under subsection (a), the two-year limitations period is calculated by the anniversary-date method, excluding the accrual day and including the same calendar date two years later.

State v. Johnson · filed 1994-02-18(a)

In applying the “anniversary date” method to this case, we hold that to be timely the State’s petition should have been filed within two years of or by September 10, 1992. The State’s petition filed on September 11, 1992, is untimely and barred by the statute of limitations. Therefore, we reverse and remand with direction to grant appellant’s motion to dismiss the State’s petition as barred by the statute of limitations, K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 60-513(a).

Section 60-513 provides a two-year limitations period for tort claims seeking recovery for personal injury, including a warranty claim that results in personal injury.

Bloesser v. Office Depot, Inc. · filed 1994-08-18

Plaintiffs negligence claim clearly falls within the two-year statute of limitations. ... Because plaintiff claims personal injury as a result of the alleged breach of warranty, however, his claim sounds in tort and is governed by K.S.A. 60-513. ... Thus, both of plaintiffs claims against TPM fall under the two-year limitations period.

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year limitations period on noncontractual actions for injury to another’s rights that are not otherwise enumerated, including negligence, strict liability, and breach of implied warranty.

Hamner v. BMY Combat Systems · filed 1994-11-15(a)(4)

K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4) provides for a two year limitation period for “[a]n action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not herein enumerated.” This section applies to plaintiff's claims of negligence, strict liability and breach of implied warranty.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year statute of limitations for an injury to the rights of another, including the civil-rights claims at issue.

Saviour v. City of Kansas City, Kan. · filed 1992-06-22(a)(4)

In Kansas, K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4) provides for a two-year statute of limitations for an “injury to the rights of another.”

Section 60-513(a) imposes a two-year limitations period on the common-law claims at issue.

McCaffree Financial Corp. v. Nunnink · filed 1993-03-05(a)

We agree and find that all of Columbian Tide’s common-law claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 60-513(a).

Section 60-513(a)(4) requires actions for injury to another's rights, when not arising on contract or otherwise enumerated, to be brought within two years.

Baker v. The Board of Regents of the State of Kansas and University of Kansas Medical School--School of Medicine · filed 1993-04-12(a)(4)

Because both section 1983 and 1981 claims are actions for injury to the rights of another, the appropriate state statute of limitations is Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-513(a)(4) (1983 & Supp.1992).

Subsection (a)(4) provides a two-year limitation period for the claims it covers, which begins to run based on the injury-producing accident.

Hamner v. BMY Combat Systems, a Div. of Harsco Corp. · filed 1996-02-26(a)(4)

The district court found, and the parties do not dispute, the applicable statute of limitations is K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4), which establishes a two-year limitation period for the claims asserted by plaintiff. ... The two-year statute of limitations under Kansas law was triggered by the accident which plaintiff suffered.

Subsection (a)(4) supplies the two-year period only for noncontract injuries to another’s rights that are not otherwise enumerated; false imprisonment is separately enumerated and governed by § 60-514(b).

Brown v. State · filed 1996-12-06(a)(4)

K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4) provides: “The following actions shall be brought within two years: ... An action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not herein enumerated.” K.S.A. 60-514(b) specifies that “[a]n action for assault, battery, malicious prosecution, or false imprisonment” shall be brought within 1 year. Thus, false imprisonment is one of the actions for injury to the rights of another which is enumerated in the Kansas statutes.

Subsection (a)(4) imposes a two-year statute of limitations on professional malpractice actions.

Augustine v. Adams · filed 2000-02-04(a)(4)

In Kansas, the statute of limitations governing professional malpractice actions is two years.

Section 60-513(a)(3) imposes a two-year limitations period on actions for injury to another's rights that do not arise from contract and are not otherwise enumerated.

Golden v. Den-Mat Corp. · filed 2012-05-04(a)(3)

We now turn to the district court’s characterization of Golden’s assertions against Den-Mat as tort claims and against Dr. Gill as professional negligence claims subject to a 2-year statute of limitations. See K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3), (a)(4), and (a)(7). We are handicapped in trying to discern die district court’s rationale because neither die letter ruling nor the journal entry reflecting die rulings contains any detailed explanations for the conclusions. Given the pleadings, the summary judgment briefing, and the pretrial order, we find the district court’s approach erroneous.

Section 60-513(a)(3) requires fraud claims to be brought within two years.

Thomas v. Grant Thornton LLP · filed 2015-10-06(a)(3)

Under Kansas law, claims for negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and professional negligence are governed by the two-year statute of limitations. K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4). Fraud claims shall also be brought within two years. K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(3).

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year limitation period on an action for injury to the rights of another, including a § 1983 personal-injury claim in Kansas.

Simmons (ID 86544) v. Crawford County Jail · filed 2019-10-18(a)(4)

The statute of limitation for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983 is governed by the personal injury statute of the state in the which federal district court is located. ... In Kansas, the governing limitation period is two years. See K.S.A.

Section 60-513(a) imposes a two-year limitations period on negligence claims.

Babakr v. Goerdel · filed 2021-02-25(a)

This claim of negligence is subject to the two-year limitations period in K.S.A. 60-513(a), and a tort action generally accrues when: “the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of the injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party . . . .” K.S.A. 60–513(b).

Section 60-513 imposes a two-year limitations period on claims for fraud, tortious interference, trespass, and conversion, running for fraud from discovery.

Spencer v. Millsap and Singer, LLC. · filed 2021-04-21(a)(1)–(4), (a)(3), (a)

The governing Kansas law comes from Kan. Stat. Ann § 60-513. Under it, the statute of limitations is two years for claims based on fraud, tortious interference, and trespass or conversion. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(1)–(4). For claims based on fraud, that two year period begins from the date of discovering the fraud. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(3).

Section 60-513(a)(4) gives a two-year limitations period for an abuse-of-process suit.

Midwest Crane and Rigging v. KCC · filed 2021-08-27(a)(4)

First, even if we accept Midwest Crane's allegation that the trooper was acting at the KCC's behest in issuing the traffic citation, that citation was issued in 2013 and dismissed that same year, while there's a two-year period within which an abuse-of-process suit must be brought. See K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4); Lindenman, 255 Kan. at 620. This suit wasn't filed until 2018, well after the two-year period, and each defendant raised the statute of limitations in their motions to dismiss.

Section 60-513 imposes a two-year limitations period on breach-of-fiduciary-duty and fraud claims, running when the injury is substantially suffered or reasonably ascertainable and when fraud is discovered or could reasonably have been discovered.

Day v. DeVries · filed 2022-04-14(a)(4), (a), (b)

In Kansas, the statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty is two years. K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4); Mynatt v. Collis, 274 Kan. 850, 866, 57 P.3d 513, 525 (2002). A cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty occurs at the latter of (1) the date when plaintiff suffers a substantial injury or (2) the date when the “injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.” K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4), (b). ... Plaintiff filed his complaint in 2021. He could have reasonably ascertained his injuries 16 years before filing this lawsuit and Section 60-513(a)(4) therefore bars his breach of fiduciary duty claim against all defendants. ... In Kansas, the statute of limitations for a fraud cause of action is two years. K.S.A. § 60-513(a). The statute of limitations is not triggered by actual knowledge of the fraud, but the time of actual discovery or when, “with reasonable diligence, the fraud could have been discovered.” ... Section 60-513(a) therefore bars his fraud on the court claim against all defendants.

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year limitations period on negligence claims.

Korgan v. Cramer · filed 2022-09-26(a)(4)

In a diversity action such as this one, a federal court must apply the statute of limitations which would apply in state court. ... The applicable statute of limitations for Plaintiffs’ negligence claim is two years. K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4). Because Plaintiffs’ claim accrued on October 19, 2019, and the lawsuit was filed on December 2, 2021, it is untimely unless the statute of limitations was tolled.

Section 60-513(a)–(b) gives fraud claims a two-year limitations period, measured from injury or when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable, with accrual upon discovery of the fraud.

Sorenson v. Car Store USA · filed 2025-01-28(a)–(b)

Pursuant to Kansas statute, a party must bring an action for fraud within two years of the injury or, if the fact of the injury is not reasonably ascertainable until sometime after the initial act, within two years of when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party. K.S.A § 60-513(a)–(b). A fraud claim is not deemed to have accrued until the plaintiff discovers the fraud. Id. “The statute of limitations does not start to run until plaintiff discovers the fraud or learns facts that would lead a reasonable person to investigate.” Marsical v. Valadez, --- F.Supp.3d ---, 2024 WL 4692054, at *6 (D. Kan. Nov. 6, 2024) (citing Bonin v. Vannaman, 261 Kan. 199, 206–207, 929 P.2d 754, 762 (1996)). Plaintiff has alleged no facts that would support a finding that the statute of limitations on this claim should be tolled. This raises serious concerns that Plaintiff’s potential fraud claim should be dismissed on the basis of the statute of limitations.

Section 60-513(a)(2) imposes a two-year limitations period for actions involving the taking of property, and subsection (b) starts the period when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable.

Clelland · filed 2025-11-19(a)(2), (b)

Because § 1983 itself does not contain an express statute of limitations, courts generally “apply the statute of limitations applicable for personal injury actions in the state where the claim accrued.” ... Plaintiff’s claims accrued in Kansas, so the applicable statute of limitations to his claims is two years. ... Similarly, a plaintiff’s state law claims accrue when “the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.”

For claims subject to subsection (a)(4)'s two-year limitations period, subsection (b) measures accrual from when the plaintiff knew or reasonably could have known of the injury-causing negligence, rather than from the injury's full extent.

Swender v. Garden City Community College · filed 2024-03-29(a)(4), (b)

Rather, “an injury is ‘reasonably ascertainable’ under § 60-513(b) ‘when the plaintiff knew or could reasonably have been expected to know of the alleged negligence.’”

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for tort actions involving injury to another's rights when no more specific provision applies.

Newcomb v. Ingle · filed 1987-08-27(a)(4)

The statute of limitations for an invasion of privacy claim in Kansas is Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-513(a)(4) (1983) which is the two-year tort catch-all provision for actions involving “injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not herein enumerated.” Ringsley v. Brandt, 446 F.Supp. 850, 858 (D.Kan. 1977). Accordingly, we hold that actions brought under 18 U.S.C. § 2520 in Kansas are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Section 60-513(a)(4) gives a plaintiff two years from an automobile accident to file an injury action.

Slayden v. Sixta · filed 1992-01-17(a)(4)

Under the statute of limitations, K.S.A. 1990 Supp. 60-513, Slayden was required to file suit within two years from the date of the accident.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for an automobile accident injury claim.

Morris v. Morris · filed 2000-09-01(a)(4)

K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 60-513(a)(4) provides a 2-year statute of limitations on the cause of action set forth in Virginia’s petition.

Section 60-513 bars tort claims when the action commences more than two years after the claims accrue.

Tharp v. Lee · filed 2004-03-26

Since that occurred more than 2 years after the causes of action accrued, the tort claims asserted in Tharp’s September 2001 suit were barred by the 2-year statute of hmitations, K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 60-513; and his later refiling in August 2002 was to no avail.

Section 60-513(a) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims filed in Kansas.

Balance (ID 130120) v. Johnson County, Kansas, Board of Commissioners · filed 2025-09-05(a)

In Kansas, that is the two-year statute of limitations in Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60–513(a).” Brown v. Unified Sch. Dist. 501, Topeka Pub. Sch., 465 F.3d 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). ... It plainly appears from the face of the Complaint that Plaintiff’s claims are subject to dismissal as barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

Section 60-513 provides a two-year limitations period for actions involving injury to personal property or rights not arising on contract.

Penalosa Cooperative Exchange v. A.S. Polonyi Co. · filed 1991-01-02(a)

Consequently, the Kansas statute of limitations will be borrowed and applied to plaintiff’s tort claims. ... K.S.A. 60-513 provides: ... (a) The following actions shall be brought within two years: ... (2) an action for taking, detaining or injuring personal property, including actions for the specific recovery thereof. ... (4) an action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not herein enumerated.

Section 60-513(a)(4) supplies a two-year limitations period for Bivens claims arising in Kansas.

Elrod v. Swanson · filed 2007-03-19(a)(4)

In this case, the statute of limitations is two years. See K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4). Thus, plaintiff may only assert claims for alleged exposure that occurred between March 1, 2003 and March 1, 2005.

Section 60-513(a) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 personal-injury claims arising in Kansas.

Booher v. Trexler · filed 2010-11-02(a)

Upon de novo review, exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms the district court’s conclusion that Booher’s § 1983 claim against Officer Trexler was not timely filed.

Section 60-513(a)(4) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Kansas.

Bledsoe v. Jefferson County · filed 2017-08-04(a)(4)

Because plaintiffs § 1983 claims arose in Kansas, the court applies Kansas’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions to his claims.

Section 60-513(a)(4) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a negligence claim.

Ortiz v. QuikTrip Corporation · filed 2022-04-11(a)(4)

Under Kansas law, a two-year statute of limitations applies to Plaintiff’s negligence claims.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for Kansas claims analogous to § 1983 claims.

Pierce v. Cannon · filed 2025-03-25(a)(4)

Here, Kansas’s statute of limitations for analogous claims is two years. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4) (2024).

Section 60-513(a)(4) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 personal injury claims arising in Kansas.

McGuire · filed 2025-10-24(a)(4)

Applied here, the statute of limitations is ... two years.

Section 60-513(a) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Kansas.

Shrum v. Cooke · filed 2021-07-20(a)

In Kansas, such claims are governed by the two-year period in K.S.A. 60-513(a).

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for the retaliatory-discharge claim, but equitable estoppel may prevent a defendant from asserting the limitations bar when its conduct delayed suit, and whether estoppel applies may be a question of fact.

Grissom v. Dayco Products, Inc. · filed 1991-02-07(a)(4)

However, the record also fails to satisfy us, as a matter of law, that defendant is estopped from relying on the bar of the statute of limitations. ... We conclude that the issue of whether defendant misled defendant as to its true identity until after the period of limitations expired is a question of fact that should be determined by the trier of fact. Plaintiff must show, at trial, that defendant is estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a bar to this action.

For permanent-damage claims to real property caused by harmful substances, the 10-year limitation begins when exposure becomes sufficient to produce substantial injury, whether or not the injury has yet developed or been discovered.

Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co. · filed 1991-03-06(b)

The court therefore concludes that in an action for permanent damages to real property caused by harmful substances, the 10-year limitation of K.S.A. § 60-513(b) begins to run only when the plaintiff’s property has been exposed to quantities of that substance sufficient to produce a substantial injury, regardless of whether that injury first develops or is discovered after the exposure to the substance.