Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1507

Section 60-1507 does not permit a prisoner to be released on an appeal bond while appealing denial of post-conviction relief.

Schicke v. State · filed 2016-04-15

Neither K.S.A. 60-1507 nor Rule 183 permit the release of a prisoner on an appeal bond.

After a full evidentiary hearing on a § 60-1507 motion, appellate courts defer to factual findings supported by substantial competent evidence and review determinative legal issues without deference.

Sampson v. State · filed 2016-09-09

When reviewing the denial of a 60-1507 motion after a full evidentiary hearing, an appellate court accepts the district court's findings of fact to the extent they are supported with substantial competent evidence. The appellate court exercises unlimited review of the determinative legal issues.

After an evidentiary hearing on a Section 60-1507 motion, appellate review asks whether substantial evidence supports the district court’s factual findings and whether those findings support its legal conclusions, even when the testimony was taken by deposition.

Aguirre v. State · filed 2016-09-09

Still, an evidentiary hearing was held, so the standard of review is the one we apply in such cases—we determine whether the district court's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether its factual findings are sufficient to support its legal conclusions.

After a preliminary or evidentiary hearing on a § 60-1507 motion, appellate review asks whether substantial evidence supports the district court’s factual findings and whether those findings support its legal conclusions.

Chavez-Aguilar v. State · filed 2016-12-02

When the district court has conducted a preliminary or evidentiary hearing on a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, as it did here, we apply a two-part standard of review, asking: (1) Are the district court's factual findings supported by substantial evidence? and (2) Are those findings sufficient to support the district court's conclusions of law?

After a full hearing on a Section 60-1507 motion, an appellate court reviews factual findings for substantial competent evidence and legal conclusions without deference.

Davis v. State · filed 2016-09-23

On review from a full hearing, this court reviews the district court's findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by substantial competent evidence and are sufficient to support the court's conclusions of law. This court exercises unlimited review over those legal conclusions.

Summary dismissal of a Section 60-1507 motion is reviewed de novo on appeal.

Gaona v. State · filed 2017-02-10

Summary dismissal of a 60-1507 motion is also reviewed de novo.

A summary denial of a Section 60-1507 motion receives de novo appellate review to determine whether the motion, files, and records conclusively establish that the movant is not entitled to relief.

Mitchell-Pennington v. State · filed 2017-03-24

When the district court summarily denies a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, an appellate court conducts de novo review to determine whether the motion, files, and records of the case conclusively establish that the movant is not entitled to relief.

A summary denial of a § 60-1507 motion receives de novo appellate review to determine whether the motion, files, and records conclusively show that the movant is not entitled to relief.

Tapedo v. State · filed 2017-03-03

When the district court summarily denies a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, an appellate court conducts de novo review to determine whether the motion, files, and records of the case conclusively establish that the movant is not entitled to relief.

An initial appeal from a district court ruling on a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion goes to the Court of Appeals.

State v. Vontress · filed 2017-05-12(d)

In contrast, the initial appeal of a district court's ruling on a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion goes to the Court of Appeals.

A denial of a Section 60-1507 motion based only on the motions, files, and records after a preliminary hearing receives de novo appellate review.

Jaeger v. State · filed 2017-10-20

When the district court denies a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion based only on the motions, files, and records after a preliminary hearing, the appellate court is in just as good a position as the district court to consider the merits. Thus, the standard of review is de novo.

After a full evidentiary hearing on a § 60-1507 ineffective-assistance claim, the appellate court reviews factual findings for substantial competent evidence and whether those findings support the legal conclusions.

Bowen v. State · filed 2017-12-29

When such claims are brought under K.S.A. 60-1507 and the district court conducts a full evidentiary hearing, as is the case here, this court reviews the district court's factual findings for substantial competent evidence and determines whether the factual findings support the court's legal conclusions.

Summary denial of a Section 60-1507 motion receives de novo appellate review to determine whether the motion, files, and records conclusively show that the movant is not entitled to relief.

Evarts v. State · filed 2018-06-08

When the district court summarily denies a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, an appellate court conducts a de novo review to determine whether the motion, files, and records of the case conclusively establish that the movant is not entitled to relief.

A summary denial of a § 60-1507 motion is reviewed without deference, with the appellate court able to examine the motion and underlying criminal record itself.

Scott v. State · filed 2018-10-05

When a district court summarily denies a 60-1507 motion, we review the ruling without deference. We can review the motion and the record in the underlying criminal case just as well as the district court.

When a district court denies a § 60-1507 motion after a preliminary hearing based only on the motion, files, and records, appellate review is de novo.

Williams v. State · filed 2018-10-12

Our review of a district court's denial of a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion depends on which option the district court applied. "When, as here, a court denies a 60-1507 motion based only on the motion, files, and records after a preliminary hearing, we are in as good a position as that court to consider the merits." 300 Kan. at 881. Therefore, our review is de novo.

After an evidentiary hearing on a K.S.A. 60-1507 claim, appellate review asks whether substantial evidence supports the district court’s factual findings and whether those findings support its legal conclusions.

Briseno v. State · filed 2018-11-16

When the district court has conducted an evidentiary hearing on a habeas claim under K.S.A. 60-1507, as it did here, we apply a two-part standard of review, asking (1) whether the district court's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and (2) whether those findings are sufficient to support the district court's conclusions of law.

When no full evidentiary hearing has been held on a § 60-1507 motion, appellate review is de novo to decide whether the motion, files, and records conclusively establish that the movant is not entitled to relief.

Mays v. State · filed 2019-04-26

Because we can find nothing in the record to establish that the district court held a "full hearing" or that Mays ever turned down the opportunity to present evidence, we conduct a de novo review to determine whether the motion, files, and records of the case conclusively establish that Mays is not entitled to relief.

A denial of a § 60-1507 motion after a preliminary hearing receives de novo appellate review because the appellate court can determine from the motion and record whether an evidentiary hearing is required.

Little v. State · filed 2019-08-16

When the trial court denies a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion following a preliminary hearing, this court exercises de novo review because this court is in the same position as the trial court to determine if the K.S.A. 60-1507 motion and record entitles the movant to an evidentiary hearing.

Summary dismissal of a § 60-1507 motion receives de novo review to determine whether the motion, files, and records conclusively show the movant has no right to relief.

McConnell v. State · filed 2020-05-01

When the district court summarily dismisses a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, we conduct a de novo review to determine whether the motion, files, and records of the case conclusively establish that the movant has no ight to relief. Beauclair v. State, 308 Kan. 284, 293, 419 P.3d 1180 (2018).

After a preliminary hearing on a Section 60-1507 motion, an appellate court defers to the district court’s factual findings and reviews whether substantial competent evidence supports them and whether they support the court’s legal conclusions.

State v. Adams · filed 2020-06-12

When a preliminary hearing is utilized, the appellate court must give deference to any factual findings made by the district court and apply a findings of fact and conclusions of law standard of review. The court must determine whether the findings are supported by substantial competent evidence and whether those findings are sufficient to support its conclusions of law.

After a full evidentiary hearing on a § 60-1507 ineffective assistance claim, an appellate court reviews factual findings for substantial competent evidence and legal conclusions de novo.

Balbirnie v. State · filed 2020-07-24

After a full evidentiary hearing about an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under K.S.A. 60-1507, an appellate court reviews a district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law under a mixed standard of review. The appellate court examines the record and determines whether substantial competent evidence supports the district court's factual findings and determines whether the court's factual findings support its conclusions of law. The appellate court then reviews the district court's conclusions of law de novo.

After a full evidentiary hearing on an ineffective assistance claim under § 60-1507, appellate courts review factual findings for substantial competent evidence and legal conclusions de novo.

Khalil-Alsalaami v. State · filed 2020-09-11

After a full evidentiary hearing about an ineffective assistance of counsel claim brought under K.S.A. 60-1507, an appellate court reviews a district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law under a mixed standard of review. The appellate court examines the record and determines whether substantial competent evidence supports the district court's factual findings and determines whether those findings support the district court's conclusions of law. The appellate court then reviews the conclusions of law de novo.

After a full evidentiary hearing on a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, appellate courts review factual findings for substantial competent evidence and legal conclusions de novo.

Wasylk v. State · filed 2020-11-13

Our review of the denial of a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion depends on how the district court resolved it. When, as in this case, the district court denied the motion after a full evidentiary hearing, we apply a mixed standard of review. First, we determine whether the district court's factual findings are 6 supported by substantial competent evidence. Second, we review the district court's legal conclusions based on those facts de novo.

After a full evidentiary hearing on an ineffective assistance claim under § 60-1507, appellate courts review factual findings for substantial competent evidence and legal conclusions de novo.

Geist v. State · filed 2020-12-23

After a full evidentiary hearing about an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under K.S.A. 60-1507, an appellate court reviews a district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law under a mixed standard of review. The appellate court examines the record and determines whether substantial competent evidence supports the district court's factual findings and determines whether the court's factual findings support its conclusions of law. The appellate court then reviews the district court's conclusions of law de novo.

After a full evidentiary hearing on a § 60-1507 ineffective-assistance claim, appellate courts review factual findings for substantial competent evidence and legal conclusions de novo.

Taylor v. State · filed 2021-03-12

After a full evidentiary hearing about an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under K.S.A. 60-1507, an appellate court reviews a district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law under a mixed standard of review. The appellate court examines the record and determines whether substantial competent evidence supports the district court's factual findings and determines whether the court's factual findings support its conclusions of law. The appellate court then reviews the district court's conclusions of law de novo.

After an evidentiary hearing on a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, appellate review asks whether substantial competent evidence supports the district court’s factual findings and reviews its ultimate legal conclusions de novo.

Lemons v. State · filed 2021-04-02

When the district court holds an evidentiary hearing on a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, this court applies a two-step review process. First, this court reviews the district court's findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by substantial competent evidence and are sufficient to support the court's conclusions of law. Second, this court conducts a de novo review of the district court's ultimate conclusions of law. Fuller v. State, 303 Kan. 478, 485-86, 363 P.3d 373 (2015).

A § 60-1507 motion decided after a full evidentiary hearing receives mixed appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions.

Khalil-Alsalaami v. State · filed 2021-05-14

The procedural posture of a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion also affects the nature and scope of our review. Where, as here, the district court conducts a full evidentiary hearing and makes findings of fact and conclusions of law in ruling on the motion, we apply the mixed standard of review customarily applied in similar civil proceedings.

After an evidentiary hearing on a § 60-1507 motion, appellate courts review factual findings for substantial competent evidence and legal conclusions de novo.

Dulaney v. State · filed 2021-06-25

When the court holds an evidentiary hearing, like it did here, an appellate court reviews the court's findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by substantial competent evidence and are sufficient to support the court's conclusions of law. Appellate review of the district court's ultimate conclusions of law is de novo.

A movant may appeal the denial of a § 60-1507 motion even when the district court did not hold a hearing.

Walker (ID 122256) v. Geither · filed 2021-10-26(d)

The Court is unaware of any state-law requirement that a hearing occur on a 60-1507 motion in order for a movant to file a notice of appeal from the denial of such a motion.

A summary denial of a § 60-1507 motion receives unlimited appellate review.

Warren v. State · filed 2022-03-18

When the district court summarily denies a 60-1507 motion, we exercise unlimited review.

After a full evidentiary hearing on a Section 60-1507 motion, appellate courts review factual findings for substantial competent evidence and legal conclusions de novo.

Brice v. State · filed 2022-07-22

When, as here, a district court conducts a full evidentiary hearing on claims raised under K.S.A. 60-1507, we review the district court's factual findings for substantial competent evidence, and the district court's legal conclusions de novo.

After a full evidentiary hearing on a Section 60-1507 motion, appellate courts review factual findings for substantial competent evidence and legal conclusions and the decision to grant or deny relief without deference.

Ojeda v. State · filed 2023-01-20

When, as here, the district court conducted a full evidentiary hearing of the defendant's 60-1507 motion, and made findings of fact and conclusion of law, this court applies the bifurcated standard of review typically applied in civil proceedings. See Khalil-Alsalaami v. State, 313 Kan. 472, 486, 486 P.3d 1216 (2021). This court first determines "whether the district court's factual findings are supported by substantial competent evidence" and whether those factual findings support the district court's legal conclusions. Khalil-Alsalaami, 313 Kan. at 486 (quoting Bellamy v. State, 285 Kan. 346, 355, 172 P.3d 10 [2007]). This court exercises unlimited review over the district court's legal conclusions and its decision to grant or deny the 60-1507 motion. 313 Kan. at 486.

A summary denial of a § 60-1507 motion is reviewed de novo to determine whether the motion, files, and records conclusively establish that the movant is not entitled to relief.

Levy v. State · filed 2024-09-06

When the district court summarily denies a 60-1507 motion without any hearing, this court reviews the motion, files, and records of the case de novo to determine whether they conclusively establish the movant was not entitled to relief.

Summary dismissal of a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion is reviewed de novo to determine whether the motion, files, and records conclusively establish that the movant is not entitled to relief.

Kelly v. State · filed 2024-09-13

When the district court summarily dismisses a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, we conduct a de novo review to determine whether the motion, files, and records of the case conclusively establish that the movant is not entitled to relief. State v. Vasquez, 315 Kan. 729, 731, 510 P.3d 704 (2022).

After an evidentiary hearing on a § 60-1507 motion, appellate review asks whether substantial competent evidence supports the district court’s factual findings and whether those findings support its legal conclusions.

Thomas v. State · filed 2024-10-11

When, as here, the movant received an evidentiary hearing on their K.S.A. 60- 1507 motion, this court reviews the district court's ruling to determine whether its factual findings are supported by substantial competent evidence and whether those findings support its legal conclusions.

After a full evidentiary hearing on a § 60-1507 motion, appellate courts review the district court’s factual findings for substantial competent evidence sufficient to support its legal conclusions.

Burdick v. State · filed 2025-06-20

Here, the district court held a full evidentiary hearing on Burdick's motion, so we review the court's findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by substantial competent evidence and are sufficient to support the court's conclusions of law.

After an evidentiary hearing on a Section 60-1507 motion, appellate courts review factual findings for substantial competent evidence and legal conclusions de novo.

State v. Moser · filed 2025-10-31

After an evidentiary hearing on a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, an appellate court reviews the district court's findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by substantial competent evidence and are sufficient to support the court's conclusions of law. Appellate review of the district court's ultimate conclusions of law is de novo.

After an evidentiary hearing, appellate review of a denied Section 60-1507 motion asks whether substantial competent evidence supports the factual findings and whether those findings support the legal conclusions.

Patterson v. State · filed 2026-01-30

When a district court denies a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion after holding an evidentiary hearing—as the district court did here—appellate courts review factual findings for substantial competent evidence, then determine whether those findings support the district court's legal conclusions.

Summary denial of a § 60-1507 motion is reviewed de novo to determine whether the motion, files, and records conclusively establish that the movant is not entitled to relief.

Campbell v. State · filed 2026-04-24(b)

Because the district court summarily denied Campbell's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, we conduct a de novo review by reviewing the record on appeal to determine whether the motion, files, and records conclusively establish that Campbell is not entitled to relief.

When a court holds an evidentiary hearing on a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, appellate review uses a mixed standard.

Quinton v. State · filed 2015-11-25

Because the trial court appointed counsel to represent Quinton and held an evidentiary hearing at which Quinton testified, we apply a mixed standard of review.

After an evidentiary hearing on an ineffective-assistance claim under § 60-1507, appellate review asks whether substantial competent evidence supports the factual findings and whether those findings support the legal conclusions.

Hernandez v. State · filed 2016-06-24

When such a claim is brought under K.S.A. 60-1507 and the district court holds an evidentiary hearing on the claim, this court reviews whether substantial competent evidence supports the district court's findings of fact and whether those findings of fact are sufficient to support its conclusions of law.

After a full evidentiary hearing on a § 60-1507 motion, appellate courts review factual findings for substantial competent evidence and legal conclusions de novo.

Alvarez v. State · filed 2020-11-25

After a full evidentiary hearing on a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, the district court must issue findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning all issues presented. Supreme Court Rule 183(j) (2020 Kan. S. Ct. R. 223). An appellate court reviews the district court's factual findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial competent evidence and are sufficient to support the court's legal conclusions. Appellate courts review the district court's ultimate legal conclusions de novo.

Appellate courts review legal conclusions and decisions granting or denying a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion without deference.

Hunter v. State · filed 2021-01-29

But we exercise unlimited review over the district court's conclusions of law and its decision to grant or deny the K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

After an evidentiary hearing on a § 60-1507 motion, factual findings are reviewed for substantial competent evidence and legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.

Araujo v. State · filed 2021-07-02

When the district court denies a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion following an evidentiary hearing, this court reviews the district court's factual findings for substantial competent evidence and the district court's legal conclusions based on those factual findings de novo.

After an evidentiary hearing on a § 60-1507 motion, appellate courts review factual findings for substantial competent evidence and determine whether those findings support the legal conclusions.

Stenberg v. State · filed 2022-02-25

When a district court denies a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion after holding an evidentiary hearing—as the district court did here—appellate courts review factual findings for substantial competent evidence, then determine whether those findings support the district court's legal conclusions.

After an evidentiary hearing on a § 60-1507 motion, appellate courts apply a mixed standard of review and review factual findings for substantial competent evidence.

Netherland v. State · filed 2022-07-22

When, as here, the district court conducts an evidentiary hearing pursuant to a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, the appellate court applies a mixed standard of review. We review the district court's factual findings using a substantial competent evidence standard.

The standard of review for a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion depends on how the district court handled the motion.

Pollard v. State · filed 2022-08-19

A district court has three options when handling a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. Our standard of review turns on which of these options a district court used.

After a full evidentiary hearing on a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, appellate courts review factual findings for substantial competent evidence and legal conclusions without deference.

Owens v. State · filed 2022-09-23

After a full evidentiary hearing on a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, an appellate court reviews the district court's factual findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial competent evidence and can support the district court's legal conclusions. An appellate court exercises unlimited review over the district court's ultimate legal conclusions.

After an evidentiary hearing on a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, appellate courts review factual findings for substantial competent evidence and determine whether those findings support the legal conclusions.

Fraire v. State · filed 2024-04-05

When a district court denies a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion after holding an evidentiary hearing—as the district court did here—appellate courts review factual findings for substantial competent evidence, then determine whether those findings support the district court's legal conclusions.

After an evidentiary hearing on a § 60-1507 motion, appellate courts accept factual findings supported by substantial competent evidence and review legal issues without limitation.

Everette v. State · filed 2024-06-07

Because the district court held an evidentiary hearing on Everette's 60-1507 motion, we accept the resulting findings of fact to the extent they are supported with substantial competent evidence. But we make an unlimited review of the determinative legal issues based on those factual findings.

After a full evidentiary hearing on an ineffective assistance claim in a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, appellate courts review factual findings for substantial competent evidence.

Littlejohn v. State · filed 2025-06-13

When a district court holds a full evidentiary hearing on such a claim raised in a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, an appellate court reviews the district court's factual findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial competent evidence.

After a full evidentiary hearing on a § 60-1507 motion, appellate courts accept factual findings supported by substantial competent evidence and review determinative legal issues without deference.

Filbert v. State · filed 2025-08-22

When reviewing a denial of a 60-1507 motion after a full evidentiary hearing, as here, this court must accept the district court's findings of fact as long as they are supported with substantial competent evidence. But this court exercises unlimited review of the determinative legal issues.

After a full evidentiary hearing on a Section 60-1507 motion, an appellate court accepts the district court's factual findings if substantial competent evidence supports them.

Bojorquez-Carrasco v. State · filed 2026-02-06

When, as here, the district court denies a 60-1507 motion after a full evidentiary hearing, this court must accept the district court's findings of fact as long as they are supported with substantial competent evidence.

Section 60-1507 permits a prisoner in state custody to seek his own release, not relief on behalf of someone else.

Roeder (ID 65192) v. Schnurr · filed 2022-08-05

The Court agrees. The KCOA dismissed this claim because it fell outside the scope of K.S.A. § 60-1507, which only permits a prisoner in state custody to move the court for his own release, an individual remedy. This rule is firmly established.

Courts construe pro se postconviction motions liberally when deciding whether to treat them as § 60-1507 motions, considering the relief requested rather than requiring a particular form of pleading.

State v. Denney · filed 2026-01-16

Courts construe pro se postconviction motions liberally when deciding whether to treat them as motions to correct an illegal sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504 or motions seeking habeas corpus relief under K.S.A. 60-1507. Courts consider the relief requested rather than adhere to formulaic pleading requirements.

A pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence should be treated as a § 60-1507 motion when its content raises a colorable ineffective-assistance claim supported by the record.

State v. Garza · filed 2019-03-29

Thus, the district court erred when it failed to construe Garza's pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence as a motion under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 60-1507 and hold at least a preliminary hearing under applicable statutory standards for such a motion.

Section 60-1507 does not permit Alleyne to be applied retroactively to invalidate a sentence in a case that was final when Alleyne was decided.

State v. Robertson · filed 2017-05-12

In State v. Kirtdoll, 306 Kan. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (No. 114,465, this day decided), slip op. at 8, we held that the rule of law established by Alleyne cannot be applied retroactively via a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion to invalidate sentences in cases that were final when Alleyne was decided.

Section 60-1507 provides relief only when a conviction or sentence is subject to collateral attack; guilt or innocence is not a justiciable issue under it.

Jackson v. State · filed 1977-12-16

The trial court was clearly correct in denying the motion under 60-1507. Relief under that section is available only if the conviction or sentence is subject to collateral attack; guilt or innocence is not a justiciable issue.

K.S.A. 60-1507 provides relief to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence; it cannot be used to expunge an arrest charge or obtain sanctions for malicious prosecution.

Miller v. State · filed 2000-10-06

K.S.A. 60-1507 provides a civil action to challenge the validity of a sentence. It must be separately docketed and is exclusively for motions “to vacate, set aside or correct sentences.” Supreme Court Rule 183(b) (1999 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 197). Clearly, none of the relief requested in Miller’s motions could be classified as vacating, setting aside, or correcting his sentence. Therefore, the issues are not properly brought under K.S.A. 60-1507.

Section 60-1507(b) gives courts broad authority to tailor post-conviction relief, including a remand for a hearing on unresolved claims.

Fuller v. State · filed 2015-12-23(b)

K.S.A. 60-1507(b) allows a court to "grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate." We read this broad language to allow us to craft an appropriate remedy in this unusual case, i.e., to remand this case to the district court to hold a hearing on those arguments Fuller raised before the district court in support of his pro se motion for new trial that have not already been decided adversely to him in these K.S.A. 60-1507 proceedings.

Section 60-1507 covers collateral attacks on a sentence, but a claim that confinement continues after the sentences have been completed belongs under section 60-1501.

Wheeler v. State · filed 2019-10-04(a)

Wheeler's petition raises an issue properly brought under K.S.A. 60-1501, not K.S.A. 60-1507.

Section 60-1507 does not cover a claim of illegal confinement after completion of a sentence; that claim belongs under K.S.A. 60-1501.

Wheeler v. State · filed 2020-04-03

Wheeler's Wyandotte County motion alleged that he is being illegally confined despite having completed his sentences of imprisonment—an issue properly brought under K.S.A. 60-1501, not K.S.A. 60-1507—and K.S.A. 60-1501 proceedings must be filed in the county of imprisonment.

Section 60-1507 permits a prisoner to challenge a conviction or sentence, but a challenge to correctional officials’ calculation of an aggregated sentence must be brought under § 60-1501.

State v. Harbacek · filed 2020-04-17

But a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion is not the proper vehicle for Harbacek's claims. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-1507 allows a prisoner to challenge the propriety of his or her conviction or sentence. "Challenges to the mode or condition of confinement, including administrative actions of the correctional institution—like calculating the end date for indeterminate sentences that are aggregated—should be brought under K.S.A. 60-1501."

Section 60-1507 does not apply when a petitioner is not attacking the validity of a sentence in the court that imposed it.

Beard v. Maynard · filed 1978-04-01

K.S.A. 60-1507 has no application in this case since the petitioner is not attacking the validity of a sentence in the court which imposed the sentence.

Section 60-1507(e) permits habeas corpus relief for a constitutional challenge to prison conditions when relief under § 60-1507 would be inadequate.

Shepherd v. Davies · filed 1990-04-13(e)

Habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy where an inmate attacks the conditions of his confinement, and his treatment by the institution clearly infringes upon his constitutional rights, yet relief via K.S.A. 60-1507 would be inadequate.

Section 60-1507 places challenges to criminal history and crime severity determinations affecting a sentence within the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.

Safarik v. Bruce · filed 1994-10-28(a)

The determination of petitioner’s criminal history classification and crime severity level, however, is a sentencing matter within the jurisdiction of the sentencing court under both K.S.A. 60-1507 and the Sentencing Guidelines Act.

Section 60-1507 is not the proper means to challenge action or inaction by the Kansas Parole Board or the Kansas Sentencing Commission.

Bookless v. State · filed 1997-03-28

An action under K.S.A. 60-1507 is not the appropriate means to raise challenges to the action or inaction of the Kansas Parole Board or the Kansas Sentencing Commission.

Section 60-1507 does not cover challenges to the Department of Corrections’ aggregation of sentences and calculation of release dates; those claims arise under section 60-1501(a) and must be filed in the county of incarceration.

McKinney v. State · filed 2000-07-28

A careful review of the pleadings reflects McKinney is not challenging the legality of the sentence imposed by the trial court; rather, he is challenging the Department of Corrections’ (DOC) aggregation of his two sentences and the calculation of his conditional release and maximum release dates pursuant to that aggregation. ... Under these circumstances, McKinney’s petition purports to state a claim under K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 60-1501(a) and must be filed in the county of incarceration rather than with the sentencing court.

Section 60-1507(b) authorizes a court to vacate a judgment and discharge the prisoner, resentence the prisoner, grant a new trial, or correct the sentence, but does not authorize a second direct appeal.

State v. Howard · filed 2010-09-10(b)

Thus, K.S.A. 60-1507(b) gives the trial court the authority to vacate and set aside the judgment and discharge the prisoner, re-sentence the prisoner, grant a new trial, or correct the sentence. Nothing in K.S.A. 60-1507 provides the trial court with authority to grant a second direct appeal.

A jail-time-credit motion cannot be treated as a § 60-1507 motion unless it alleges that the sentence is illegal or unconstitutional.

State v. Burnett · filed 2016-01-15

Similarly, this court cannot construe Burnett's jail-time-credit motion as a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion because Burnett never argued that his sentence was illegal or unconstitutional as stated under K.S.A. 60-1507.

Section 60-1507(a) permits a challenge to a sentence imposed by a court of general jurisdiction, so it does not provide relief from a municipal court conviction or sentence.

Douglas v. State · filed 2016-10-07(a)

The district court properly determined that it had no jurisdiction to consider Douglas' motion because K.S.A. 60-1507 applies only in cases where a person is attempting to vacate a sentence imposed by a court of general jurisdiction, and municipal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction.

A counseled motion to withdraw a plea is not construed as a § 60-1507 motion merely because it alleges ineffective assistance during the plea process.

State v. Edwards · filed 2017-09-15

Further, this court cannot properly construe Edwards' motion as a 60-1507 motion.

Section 60-1507 motions may be construed to include requests for DNA testing when the requests satisfy K.S.A. 21-2512.

Stevenson v. State · filed 2017-11-09

Although the district court is incorrect in its statement that "a request for DNA testing . . . is [not] cognizable under K.S.A. 60-1507," Stevenson's motion is not included in the record on appeal.

Section 60-1507 covers collateral attacks on a sentence seeking dismissal of charges or resentencing based on alleged errors by counsel, the prosecutor, or the sentencing court, even when the motion also seeks plea withdrawal in the alternative.

Ramdorsingh v. State · filed 2018-04-20(a)

Clearly, Ramdorsingh's other alternative requests for relief involved a collateral attack on his sentence that had nothing to do with the withdrawal of his pleas. Therefore, these arguments fall under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 60-1507.

Section 60-1507 hearing procedures apply to motions to withdraw a guilty plea filed after sentencing.

State v. Wilson · filed 2018-07-06

Generally, Wilson is correct that "[t]he K.S.A. 60-1507 procedure governing hearings should apply to motions to withdraw guilty plea filed after imposition of sentence." State v. Jackson, 255 Kan. 455, 459, 874 P.2d 1138 (1994).

A court may decline to construe a motion to correct an illegal sentence as a § 60-1507 motion; that choice is reversible only for abuse of discretion.

State v. Redding · filed 2019-07-12

That discretionary language in Harp does not appear to benefit Redding's cause; if the district court was not required to construe a motion to correct an illegal sentence as a 60-1507 motion, then the declination to do so would not be reversible without a showing of an abuse of discretion. Redding makes no attempt at that showing.

A court may decline to construe a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence as a § 60-1507 motion when the motion’s filing and contents support its stated basis.

State v. Blaurock · filed 2020-02-07

In light of the entirety of Blaurock's filings, however, we hold the district court did not err in refusing to construe the motion as a 60-1507 motion.

A pro se pleading that seeks relief under § 60-1507 in both form and substance is properly construed as a § 60-1507 motion.

Lingenfelter v. State · filed 2020-06-19

Thus, Lingenfelter's pleading was a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion in both form and substance. The district court correctly construed it as such.

Section 60-1507(b) provides relief for defects in a conviction or sentence, not for challenges to conditions of confinement.

Denney v. State · filed 2021-04-23(b)

Denney's actual arguments relate to his conditions of confinement. Denney should have raised his challenges in a K.S.A. 60-1501 petition in the county where he is confined. ... The district court properly dismissed Denney's motion as he failed to present any valid grounds for relief under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1507.

Section 60-1507 provides the procedure for a prisoner to challenge the validity of a conviction, rather than the mode or conditions of confinement.

Reynolds v. Geither · filed 2024-06-21

Thus, Reynolds did not challenge the mode or conditions of his confinement and instead attacked the validity of his convictions. The district court correctly construed Reynolds' motion under K.S.A. 60-1507.

Section 60-1507 provides relief directed at a conviction or sentence, while challenges to conditions of confinement proceed under section 60-1501.

Strader v. Kansas Dept. of Corrections · filed 2026-02-06

This distinction demonstrates that K.S.A. 60-1507 relief goes to the heart of a conviction and sentencing, whereas K.S.A. 60-1501 relief seeks to resolve deficiencies in conditions of confinement.

Exceptional circumstances that excuse procedural default in a Section 60-1507 appeal do not carry over to a new direct appeal granted after a Section 60-1507 motion.

State v. Salazar-Moreno · filed 2020-04-10

Second, the exceptional circumstances in Bledsoe only apply to K.S.A. 60-1507 appeals.

Section 60-1507 is a possible remedy for an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that the court cannot decide on direct appeal because the claim was not raised below and depends on facts outside the record.

State v. Roberts · filed 1979-12-01

Following this well established rule, we decline to determine the issue on this appeal. Defendant’s remedy, if any, is under K.S.A. 60-1507.

Section 60-1507 permits a defendant to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim before the trial court when that court has not yet considered the claim.

State v. Chamberlain · filed 1983-12-02

This appeal is dismissed without prejudice to the defendant’s right to raise this issue before the trial court in proceedings under K.S.A. 60-1507.

Section 60-1507(b) permits a court to set aside a conviction and grant a new trial when prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel warrants relief.

Mullins v. State · filed 2002-05-24(b)

In the present case, we must conclude the adversary process was so broken down by the failure of trial counsel to consult and/or procure an expert witness that we are compelled to hold the trial court erred in denying Mullins’ 1507 motion. ... Accordingly we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand with directions to set aside the conviction and grant a new trial to Mullins. See K.S.A. 60-1507(b).

A movant cannot use § 60-1507 to claim ineffective assistance of counsel in a postconviction proceeding when the asserted right to counsel is statutory rather than constitutional.

McCarty v. State · filed 2004-01-30

Despite the existence of the Kansas statutory right to counsel, we have consistently held that a person cannot bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim against his or her K.S.A. 60-1507 counsel under that statute because it does not create a constitutional right to counsel in postconviction proceedings.

Section 60-1507 permits relief when appellate counsel unreasonably fails to preserve a sentencing claim and that failure prejudices the defendant.

Laymon v. State · filed 2005-11-10

a lawyer’s failure to foresee a change in the law may lead to 60-1507 relief if the failure was not objectively reasonable.

In a § 60-1507 collateral claim of ineffective assistance for failing to challenge a defective charging document, courts apply the liberal common-sense rule of Hall to assess prejudice.

Ferguson v. State · filed 2003-11-12

The liberal common-sense rule enunciated in Hall should extend not only to challenges to the sufficiency of the charging document, but also will apply for purposes of analyzing the prejudicial effect of trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to vacate in a collateral attack based on ineffective assistance of counsel.

Section 60-1507 affords no relief for ineffective assistance when counsel reasonably relied on the defendant’s account and the defendant first disclosed a different defense in testimony near the close of trial.

Alderson v. State · filed 2006-06-30

Shawn Alderson appeals from the trial court’s denial of his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion after an evidentiary hearing. ... Alderson’s trial counsel cannot be found deficient for her failure to present such evidence when Alderson never provided her with any information that he committed the crime in self-defense until his testimony at trial.

A § 60-1507 motion cannot relitigate trial counsel’s effectiveness after a Van Cleave remand resolved that issue on direct appeal, absent exceptional circumstances.

Rice v. State · filed 2007-03-30

In summary, we find that, when an appellant effects a Van Cleave remand during the direct appeal for the purpose of adjudicating the effectiveness of trial counsel, the appellant is procedurally barred from relitigating the effectiveness of trial counsel in a 1507 motion, absent exceptional circumstances.

Section 60-1507 permits relief when appellate counsel ineffectively fails to file a petition for review; if ineffective assistance is established, the district court may allow 30 days to file the petition.

Kargus v. State · filed 2007-07-27

Ortiz obtained the remedy by filing a motion pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1507. ... We conclude, therefore, that the relief should be granted to Kargus and to the defendant in the companion case Swenson v. State, 284 Kan. 648, 162 P.3d 808, modified 284 Kan. 931, 169 P.3d 298 (2007). ... If on remand the district court determines that Kargus has established ineffective assistance of counsel, the district court should allow counsel 30 days in which to file a petition for review from the Court of Appeals’ unpublished decision filed June 2, 2000.

Section 60-1507 permits relief when ineffective appellate counsel fails to file a requested petition for review, including time to file the petition after relief is granted.

Kargus v. State · filed 2007-10-15

Before we remand the case, however, we must determine whether the district court could grant the relief requested by Kargus. Kargus argues that once he establishes that he requested counsel to file a petition for review, the district court has the power to grant relief under a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion and, in doing so, grant jurisdiction to allow the filing of a petition for review within 30 days of the district court’s ruling. ... We conclude, therefore, that the relief should be granted to Kargus and to the defendant in the companion case Swenson v. State, No. 94,207, this day decided. ... If on remand the district court determines that Kargus has established ineffective assistance of counsel, the district court should allow counsel 30 days in which to file a petition for review from the Court of Appeals’ unpublished decision filed June 2, 2000.

A movant claiming ineffective assistance under § 60-1507 must establish both deficient trial counsel performance and prejudice to the defense.

Silvers v. State · filed 2008-01-11

Before defense counsel’s assistance is determined to be so defective as to require reversal of a conviction, a 60-1507 movant must establish first that trial counsel’s performance was deficient. In other words, trial counsel made errors so serious that his or her performance was less than guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Second, movant must establish trial counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense.

Section 60-1507 affords no relief for counsel’s failure to advise a defendant of appeal rights when the defendant already knew those rights and cannot show that counsel’s conduct caused the failure to appeal.

Barr v. State · filed 2008-11-14

He fails to assert a viable claim of deficient lawyering which caused him not to appeal his departure sentence. Accordingly, the district court did not err in refusing to grant relief on Barr’s K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, and the Court of Appeals properly affirmed that ruling.

A movant challenging the effectiveness of appointed counsel in a Section 60-1507 proceeding must show legal prejudice under the same standard used for constitutional ineffective-assistance claims.

Robertson v. State · filed 2009-02-06

We agree that a showing of legal prejudice is required when the performance of statutorily provided counsel on a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion is questioned. ... But we disagree with those Court of Appeals panels that have appeared to impose a more rigorous standard of prejudice than that imposed in constitutional cases. The required showing of prejudice is the same.

A § 60-1507 movant claiming ineffective assistance of appointed postconviction counsel must show deficient performance and resulting legal prejudice.

Alford v. State · filed 2009-07-31

Thus, under Robertson, the K.S.A. 60-1507 movant must establish the following two things in order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of appointed K.S.A. 60-1507 counsel’s claim: (1) that the performance by appointed counsel was deficient and (2) that the movant suffered legal prejudice as a result of appointed counsel’s performance.

A movant may present further arguments for ineffective assistance of counsel in a § 60-1507 motion when the claim did not receive complete review on direct appeal.

Rowland v. State · filed 2009-11-20

Because Rowland’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim did not receive the complete review it was due during his direct appeal, he may advance further arguments in support of the claim on his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

Section 60-1507 requires a movant claiming ineffective assistance based on counsel’s drug use to show deficient performance and prejudice; drug use alone does not establish ineffective assistance.

Johnson v. State · filed 2009-12-11

Although it is undisputed that defense counsel was using cocaine during the time period that he was representing Johnson, the critical inquiry is whether counsel’s performance was deficient and whether that deficiency prejudiced Johnson. ... In addressing Johnson’s argument, this court bears in mind that the great weight of authority is that a defense attorney’s use of drugs or alcohol does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel per se. ... As a result, the trial court properly denied Johnson’s K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

An ineffective assistance of counsel claim affecting a guilty plea need not always be treated as a § 60-1507 motion; it may support a motion to withdraw the plea.

State v. Kelly · filed 2010-12-10

The district court erred in assuming that all ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be construed as K.S.A. 60-1507 motions.

A movant with appointed counsel in a Section 60-1507 proceeding may take an untimely appeal when counsel’s deficient failure to file a timely appeal deprived the movant of that appeal.

Albright v. State · filed 2011-05-20

We agree with Albright that 60-1507 movants who have counsel are entitled to the effective assistance of that counsel, and if counsel’s performance was deficient for failure to file a timely appeal, as a remedy a 60-1507 movant should be allowed to file an out-of-time appeal.

A movant seeking relief under K.S.A. 60-1507 for ineffective assistance in entering a guilty plea must show a reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s errors, the movant would have rejected the plea and insisted on trial.

State v. Adams · filed 2013-06-21

Although a lack of factual findings from the district court hinders our ability to review Adams’ claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we conclude Adams failed to demonstrate that even if she had received effective assistance of counsel, she would have declined to plead guilty and insisted on going to trial. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of her K.S.A. 60-1507 motion and her motion to withdraw her guilty plea.

Section 60-1507(a) permits relief for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel when deficient performance prejudiced the direct appeal.

Miller v. State · filed 2014-02-14(a)

Following the adverse outcome in his direct appeal, Miller moved for relief from the judgment under K.S.A. 60-1507(a) (prisoner in custody may claim sentence imposed in violation of state or federal Constitution), alleging numerous instances of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel under the Sixth Amendment. ... To prove he received ineffective assistance of counsel in his direct appeal, Miller must demonstrate: (1) His appellate counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) this deficient performance prejudiced his direct appeal. ... Appellate counsel’s error prejudiced Miller.

Appointed counsel in a K.S.A. 60-1507 proceeding must advocate for the movant; when counsel fails to function as an advocate, prejudice is presumed.

State v. Samuels · filed 2017-11-09

Samuels' appointed counsel failed to advocate for his position. ... Here, appointed counsel did not function as an advocate for Samuels. Accordingly, with counsel's deficient performance, prejudice is presumed.

Section 60-1507 is a proper vehicle for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Mondragon v. State · filed 2018-02-09

Although he asserted the district court erred by imposing the off-grid sentences, he couched his claim as one of ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his constitutional rights. Such a claim is properly raised in a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

A movant appointed counsel in a Section 60-1507 proceeding has a statutory right to effective assistance from that counsel.

Stotts v. State · filed 2018-11-21

The district court appointed counsel to represent Stotts during his first 60-1507 proceeding; thus, he was entitled to the effective assistance of that counsel.

A movant claiming ineffective assistance by counsel appointed for a § 60-1507 proceeding must show deficient representation and prejudice when counsel has not completely abandoned the movant.

Powell v. State · filed 2020-12-23

Erickson did not completely abandon Powell. Thus, Powell must show a deficiency of representation and prejudice to obtain relief.

Section 60-1507 does not provide relief for inadequate representation in the underlying criminal case when the movant represented himself or herself.

State v. Torrence · filed 2020-11-25

The rule also applies in 60-1507 proceedings—a party cannot request a habeas corpus remedy for inadequate representation in the underlying criminal case based on his or her self-representation.

Section 60-1507 allows a probationer to seek habeas corpus relief for ineffective assistance of counsel in probation revocation proceedings.

State v. Allen · filed 2021-01-15

Probationers who believe they have been aggrieved by constitutionally deficient legal representation in probation proceedings may seek habeas corpus relief under K.S.A. 60-1507.

A person appointed counsel in a Section 60-1507 proceeding is entitled to effective representation from that counsel.

Ward v. State · filed 2022-08-05

The extent of a movant's statutory right to be provided with effective assistance of counsel in a K.S.A. 60-1507 proceeding is a legal question subject to unlimited review. ... Once counsel has been appointed in a postconviction matter, the appointment should not be a useless formality, and the appointed counsel has a duty to provide effective representation.

A movant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in a K.S.A. 60-1507 proceeding must show a reasonable probability that the proceeding would have ended differently without counsel’s deficient performance.

King v. State · filed 2022-09-30

Even if we assume solely for the purposes of argument that the representation provided by King's K.S.A. 60-1507 counsel—or by implication his trial counsel—was deficient, we find that he has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome of either the K.S.A. 60-1507 proceeding or his trial would have been different.

A claim that counsel in a § 60-1507 proceeding was ineffective may be raised in another § 60-1507 motion to develop the factual record.

Fulton v. State · filed 2018-10-19

Based on the current state of the record, we decline to address Fulton's ineffective assistance of counsel claim for the first time on appeal. ... If Fulton wishes to pursue this claim, he may file another K.S.A. 60-1507 motion and develop the factual record below.

A court may assess ordinary court costs against an unsuccessful Section 60-1507 petitioner in its discretion.

Fought v. State · filed 1989-10-27

Under that reasoning we conclude that, since the legislature only excused 1507 petitioners from the assessment of attorney fees under 60-2007, it must have envisioned that they would be liable for ordinary court costs under 60-2002.

Section 60-1507 permits a prisoner to seek a new trial based on newly discovered evidence after the two-year limit under § 22-3501 has expired.

State v. Bradley · filed 1990-03-02

K.S.A. 60-1507, like 28 U.S.C. § 2255, provides the method for a prisoner to request that his or her sentence be set aside and the prisoner be granted a new trial for newly discovered evidence after the two-year limitation of 22-3501 has expired.

Section 60-1507 permits a new-trial request based on newly discovered evidence after the two-year limit under § 22-3501 has expired, and denial is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Taylor v. State · filed 1992-07-10

There, a time-barred K.S.A. 22-3501(1) motion for a new trial was converted into a 60-1507 motion and, after a brief comparison to Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 33, it was determined a request for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence can be raised in a 60-1507 motion and the granting of a new trial for newly discovered evidence is in the trial court's discretion. The same rules governing abuse of discretion for a trial court's refusal to grant a defendant's 22-3501(1) motion for a new trial for newly discovered evidence apply to appellate review of a denial of a new trial under 60-1507.

Section 60-1507 permits a prisoner to challenge a conviction based on newly discovered evidence.

Henderson v. State · filed 2020-09-04

A K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-1507 habeas corpus proceeding may be used to challenge a conviction based on newly discovered evidence.

A proceeding under § 60-1507 may be voluntarily dismissed under § 60-241(a)(1), and a timely filed document seeking dismissal takes effect upon filing even if captioned as a motion rather than a notice.

Smith v. State · filed 1996-10-18

We hold that a proceeding pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1507 may be voluntarily dismissed under K.S.A. 60-241(a)(l) by the filing of an appropriate document. We further hold that when a document seeking dismissal is filed within the time frame set out in K.S.A. 60-241(a)(l), it will operate as an automatic dismissal of the action upon filing even though it may be labeled “Motion to Dismiss” rather than “Notice to Dismiss.”

An appeal from a § 60-1507 petition is moot when the petitioner dies and no collateral consequences are shown.

Kirkland v. State · filed 1998-08-07

Pending a hearing on this appeal, Kirkland died. The issue before us is whether his death makes an appeal from a K.S.A. 60-1507 petition moot. ... Accordingly, given the record before us, and with no showing that there are any collateral consequences flowing from a finding of mootness, the appeal is dismissed as moot. The judgment of the district court is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition as moot.

A § 60-1507 proceeding is a civil action subject to laches when the petitioner unreasonably delays raising a known claim and the delay prejudices the State.

Roach v. State · filed 2000-05-19

A proceeding under K.S.A. 60-1507 is a civil action to which laches may apply.

Section 60-1507(f)’s one-year deadline does not bar a request for DNA testing under K.S.A. 21-2512.

Goldsmith v. State · filed 2005-12-23(f)

Following similar reasoning, nothing within K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 21-2512 imposes a 1-year limitation on claims for DNA testing. Therefore, the district court erred in dismissing Goldsmith’s request for DNA testing under K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 60-1507(f).

A claim added after § 60-1507(f)'s time limit requires a showing of manifest injustice to warrant consideration.

Goodpasture v. State · filed 2020-02-21(f)

Goodpasture presents no manifest-injustice argument warranting an extension of the time limitation of K.S.A. 60-1507(f) to encompass his new suppression claim.

A claim that counsel in a prior § 60-1507 proceeding was ineffective may be filed within one year of the later specified disposition of that prior motion.

Ebihara v. State · filed 2025-03-28(f)(1)(C)

The Kansas Supreme Court denied review of the decision from a panel of this court affirming the summary denial of Ebihara's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion in 14-CV-8 on October 26, 2017, and this court issued its mandate the following month. Ebihara's amended K.S.A. 60-1507 motion—filed in September 2018—was therefore timely as it relates to his claims of ineffective assistance of his postconviction counsel.

A motion under § 60-1507 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in an earlier § 60-1507 appeal must be filed within the one-year statutory period.

Stevenson (ID 95612) v. Snyder · filed 2025-03-07(f)

But he filed his second K.S.A. 60-1507 motion well beyond the one-year period in which he was statutorily required to do so.

A movant seeking to extend the filing deadline through a claim of actual innocence must present new evidence showing that no reasonable juror would have convicted the movant.

State v. Wooley · filed 2025-04-25(f)(2)(A)

To do so, the movant must show that "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted the [movant] in light of new evidence." ... Accordingly, we find that Wooley has not come forward with any new evidence to establish actual innocence.

Section 60-1507(f)(2) does not extend the one-year filing limit based on counsel’s failure to raise an unmeritorious issue.

Robertson v. State · filed 2024-11-15(f)(2)

Thus, the failure of his counsel to raise an unmeritorious issue did not enable Robertson to meet his burden to establish manifest injustice.

The one-year limit for a preexisting post-conviction claim begins on July 1, 2003, the effective date of the amendment imposing that limit.

Hayes v. State · filed 2005-07-15(f)(1)

We hold the 1-year statute of limitations at 60-1507(f) begins to run for preexisting claims on the date the statute became effective.

Section 60-1507(f)'s 1-year filing limit does not apply to a motion to correct an illegal sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504.

State v. Flores · filed 2007-03-16(f)

In short, the district court erred in its alternative ruling that Flores’ motion to correct an illegal sentence was procedurally barred by the 1-year limitation of K.S.A. 60-1507(f).

The one-year period for challenging an original plea, conviction, or sentence runs from the end of direct appellate jurisdiction over those proceedings; a later appeal from probation revocation does not extend that period.

Wilkerson v. State · filed 2007-12-07(f)

His motion filed 2 years later is time barred as to matters surrounding the plea, conviction, or sentence. ... The appeal of a probation revocation may properly be considered a “direct appeal” thereof, but it may not raise issues related to the original conviction or sentence.

Section 60-1507(f)’s one-year filing limit gives movants constructive notice when enacted; a preexisting claim filed after even an assumed one-year grace period is untimely.

Tolen v. State · filed 2008-02-01(f)

Tolen’s direct appeal outcome became final on March 20, 2002. K.S.A. 60-1507(f) did not take effect until July 1, 2003. Even if a 1-year grace, period is permitted, it expired on July 1, 2004, and Tolen did not file his 60-1507 motion until January 18, 2005. ... The legislature’s adoption of a 1-year time limit for filing motions under K.S.A. 60-1507 put all persons, including inmates such as Tolen, on constructive notice of the new provision.

Section 60-1507(f)(2) does not permit an untimely motion based on an alleged victim’s recantation when the prisoner admitted the conduct at sentencing and has not challenged the validity of the no contest plea.

Cranford v. State · filed 2008-02-15(f)(2)

Even more significant, Cranford testified at his sentencing hearing and admitted that he did indeed molest A.C. Thus, although Cranford asserts A.C. recanted her accusation of sexual abuse, he has not attacked the validity of his no contest plea. ... The district court did not err in finding K.S.A. 60-1507(f) precludes Cranford's claim.

Section 60-1507(f)(2) does not extend the one-year filing limit merely because an untimely movant would otherwise lose an evidentiary hearing on an ineffective assistance claim.

Toney v. State · filed 2008-06-27(f)(2)

If this court were to accept Toney’s argument, we would have to remand for an evidentiary hearing every time the trial court dismisses a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion as untimely. This cannot be done as it would render the 1-year time limitation under K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(1) essentially meaningless.

When no petition for review or postdecision motion is filed, the one-year period for a Section 60-1507 motion begins when the appellate court files its final decision, rather than when it issues the mandate.

Wilson v. State · filed 2008-08-22(f)(1)

Wilson did not file a petition for review or any postdecision motions. As a result, the judgment was finalized by our Supreme Court’s decision on March 17, 2006. The substantive aspects of the case had been fully determined. Under this reasoning, Wilson’s time limitation period would have commenced when our Supreme Court filed its opinion. As a result, Wilson’s amended motion was untimely filed.

New grounds added to a § 60-1507 motion after the one-year deadline do not relate back when they differ from the grounds in the timely motion.

Pabst v. State · filed 2008-09-19(f)(1)

K.S.A. 60-1507 was amended, effective July 1, 2003, to add a 1-year time hmitation for bringing an action. ... Accordingly, the district court was unquestionably correct in finding no relation back for the claims set forth in paragraphs (d), (e), (i), (j), (1), (m), and (p) of the amended motion because they are based on different grounds than asserted in the original motion.

When a direct appeal results in resentencing, the one-year period under § 60-1507(f) does not begin on the date of the appellate opinion ordering resentencing.

Baker v. State · filed 2009-11-20(f)

Although our Supreme Court's opinion, filed June 9, 2006, may have been the final order for that direct appeal, it would seem that the legislature did not intend for the time limit in this case to begin to run on the date of our Supreme Court's opinion. To say otherwise would create a situation where a defendant could file a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion within 10 days after our Supreme Court filed its opinion stating that the defendant needed be resentenced.

Section 60-1507(f)(1) imposes a one-year filing deadline that can bar a later post-conviction application and support an anticipatory procedural bar on federal habeas review.

Livingston v. State of Kansas · filed 2010-11-02(f)(1)

Although technically unexhausted, it is beyond dispute that these claims would be deemed procedurally barred by a Kansas state court were Mr. Livingston to attempt to present them in a second application for post-conviction relief. Not only would such an application be untimely under K.S.A. § 60-1507(f), ... Thus, these claims are subject to what we have deemed an “anticipatory procedural bar.”

An amendment to a § 60-1507 motion relates back to the original filing when the new claim rests on facts that do not differ in time and type from the original grounds.

Rice v. State · filed 2010-03-12(f)(1)

An amendment to a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion that asserts a new ground for relief which is supported by facts that do not differ in time and type from those grounds set forth in the original motion does relate back to the date of the original motion.

A § 60-1507 motion may be amended with leave of court, but an amended claim filed after the one-year deadline relates back only if it arises from the conduct, transaction, or occurrence alleged in the original motion.

Thompson v. State · filed 2011-12-30(f)

Two avenues of amendment are available under K.S.A. 60-215(a), one as of right that is inapphcable to K.S.A. 60-1507 motions, and one with leave of court that is applicable to K.S.A. 60-1507 motions, as weh as other pleadings. If an amendment to a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion is permitted, the timeliness of amended claims is subject to the Pabst time and type test enunciated in K.S.A. 60-215(c), i.e., relation back is permitted only if the new claims arose “out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.”

An amended § 60-1507 claim based on the same general conduct, transaction, or occurrence as a timely original motion relates back and avoids the one-year filing bar.

Shumway v. State · filed 2013-01-18(f)(1)

There is nothing to bar these amended claims from relating back to Shumway’s original K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

When a conviction is affirmed on direct appeal but the sentence is vacated and remanded for resentencing, the one-year period to file a Section 60-1507 motion begins after the time to appeal the new sentence expires.

Baker v. State · filed 2013-06-07(f)(1)(i)

After construing K.S.A. 60-1507 as a whole and in harmony with Supreme Court Rule 183, we hold that under the facts of this case, the 1-year time limitation in which to file a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion does not begin until the time to appeal from die resentencing expires.

The one-year period to challenge convictions and sentences affirmed on direct appeal runs from issuance of the mandate, even when a different conviction is reversed and remanded.

Scaife v. State · filed 2015-05-29(f)(1)(i)

Therefore, pursuant to Baker and Supreme Court Rule 183(c), Scaife was free to pursue his present motion as of September 24, 2008, because the mandate on his direct appeal had been issued and appellate jurisdiction had terminated as to those affirmed convictions and sentences, the remand on the first-degree murder charge notwithstanding.

A prisoner files a § 60-1507 motion within the one-year limit by delivering it to prison authorities for mailing before the deadline.

Wahl v. State · filed 2015-03-13(f)(1)

A prisoner's delivery of a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion to prison authorities for mailing constitutes a timely filing if delivered within the 1-year time limitation in K.S.A. 60- 1507(f)(1).

A timely 60-1507 motion that lacks the grounds needed for relief is untimely when the prisoner supplies those grounds only after the one-year filing deadline.

Hill v. State · filed 2015-10-30(f)

Without the additional information, Hill's motion would have been legally insufficient. ... The memorandum, however, was filed after the 90-day continuance the district court did grant and after the 1-year statutory deadline for filing 60-1507 motions. ... Accordingly, we are constrained to affirm both the district court's finding that Hill's 60-1507 motion was untimely and the district court's denial of the motion.

An appeal from a motion to correct an illegal sentence is a collateral attack, not a direct appeal that restarts the one-year period for filing a § 60-1507 motion.

Davis v. State · filed 2016-01-29(f)(1)

We thus find no support for Davis' argument that his motion to correct an illegal sentence should be construed as a direct appeal, and we agree that his K.S.A. 60-1507 motions were untimely.

New claims that were not raised or suggested in the original motion are facially untimely when first asserted after § 60-1507(f)'s one-year limitation period.

May v. State · filed 2016-04-08(f)

First of all, we note the new claims regarding ineffective assistance of trial counsel were, indeed, facially untimely. They were not raised in the original 60-1507 motion and were not even suggested within the 1-year limitation set forth in K.S.A. 60-1507(f) and Supreme Court Rule 183(c)(4) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 271).

A motion under § 60-1507 must be filed within 1 year after the conviction becomes final.

Flournoy v. State · filed 2016-09-30(f)(1)

First, Flournoy's motion is clearly untimely. A defendant has 1 year from when his or her conviction becomes final to file a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

Under the manifest-injustice standard applied here, an untimely § 60-1507 motion is not excused when the asserted conflict of counsel raises no substantial issue of law or fact.

Keltner v. State · filed 2017-05-19(f)(2)

Accordingly, Keltner's claim regarding a conflict of interests with his trial counsel does not raise a substantial issue of law or fact under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution that is sufficient to show manifest injustice.

Section 60-1507(f)(1) imposes a one-year deadline; a claim raised after that deadline cannot be considered unless it relates back to a timely original motion.

Tush v. State · filed 2017-02-10(f)(1)

Thus, the district court could not consider the merits of Tush's untimely claim that his jury trial waiver was inadequate without finding that the amended claim related back to Tush's original motion.

When a conviction is not appealed, the one-year period for filing a Section 60-1507 motion begins 14 days after sentencing, when appellate jurisdiction terminates.

State v. Ragsdale · filed 2017-05-26(f)(1)(A)

When a conviction is not appealed, appellate court jurisdiction is terminated 14 days after sentencing. See K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 22-3608(c); Cox v. State, No. 109,593, 2014 WL 1887642, at *3 (Kan. App. 2014) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 302 Kan. 1009 (2015). Because Ragsdale did not appeal his convictions or sentences, he had 1 year and 14 days to file his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

Section 60-1507(f) can bar a successive postconviction motion filed after its one-year limit.

Blaurock v. State of Kansas · filed 2017-04-25(f)

Mr. Blaurock would also be procedurally barred from raising these claims in a successive 60-1507 motion because they would be untimely and because, in large measure, a Kansas court ... has already ruled on their merits.

A constitutional collateral challenge to a sentence under § 60-1507 is subject to the section’s filing deadline.

Buehler-May v. State · filed 2017-07-28(f)(1)

His claim must be construed as a collateral challenge under K.S.A. 60-1507 and is subject to the timeliness requirements thereunder.