Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1507

An amendment to a timely Section 60-1507 motion filed after the one-year limit may relate back when the new claims concern the same type of evidence and general conduct as the original claims.

Nichols v. State · filed 2017-08-04(f)(1)(A)

In summary, because Nichols' later arguments concerning the 2006 DCF records and Byrd's testimony were of the same time and type of evidence and general conduct at issue in his timely filed K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to find that these arguments related back.

Section 60-1507(f)(2)(A) requires a colorable claim of innocence of the conviction, rather than a claim that the sentence is unfair, to overcome the one-year filing limit.

Johnson v. State · filed 2017-10-20(f)(2)(A)

As stated in the statute, actual innocence is in regards to the conviction, not the sentence.

A movant seeking the manifest-injustice exception to § 60-1507’s one-year filing limit may justify a late motion by adequately explaining the delay.

State v. Denney · filed 2018-01-26(f)(2)(A)

However, even with this error, the end result—summary dismissal of Denney's motion—is warranted because Denney's motion did not adequately explain why he failed to file the motion within the statutory one-year time limitation or within a reasonable period of time thereafter.

Section 60-1507(f) gives a movant one year after the end of direct appellate proceedings to file a motion.

Austin v. State · filed 2017-11-17(f)

The record would support a finding that Austin's direct appeal process did not end until at least June 14, 2013, when the Kansas Supreme Court declined to review the case. The mandate was issued on June 19, 2013. Austin filed his motion on May 29, 2014, well within the one-year time limit of K.S.A. 60-1507(f). Thus, the district court had jurisdiction to hear the motion, and we have jurisdiction to consider his timely appeal.

When a conviction is affirmed and the case is remanded for resentencing, the one-year limit for a § 60-1507 motion begins after the time to appeal the new sentence expires.

Randolph v. State · filed 2017-12-08(f)(1)

Thus, Randolph had one year and 14 days from his resentencing to file a timely motion under K.S.A. 60-1507. Because he filed his motion one year and six days after resentencing, the district court erred in denying Randolph's motion as untimely.

Section 60-1507(f)(1) imposes a one-year filing deadline, and a late motion cannot proceed without a basis to excuse the delay.

Sims v. State · filed 2018-02-16(f)(1)

The motion was plainly filed well beyond the one-year deadline imposed by K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(1). In assessing manifest injustice that would excuse the untimely filing, we apply the Vontress test because it is more favorable to Sims than the newer statutory approach and it at least arguably could apply, since Sims filed his motion before the amendment went into effect.

An untimely direct appeal does not extend the one-year deadline to file a motion under § 60-1507.

Dupree v. State · filed 2018-03-23(f)(1)(A)

But because the notice of appeal was untimely, this court never had jurisdiction over Dupree's appeal and it did not extend the one-year deadline for Dupree to file his motion.

Section 60-1507(f) imposes a one-year deadline for filing a state habeas motion following the Kansas Supreme Court’s denial of review.

Nelson v. Roberts · filed 2018-07-05(f)

And no time remains for him to file a new state habeas proceeding raising this claim: he had only one year following the Kansas Supreme Court’s denial of review on August 29, 2013, in which to do so. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1507(f).

Section 60-1507(f)(2)'s manifest-injustice exception does not excuse an untimely motion based on Alleyne's prospective rule.

Lee v. State · filed 2018-05-18(f)(2)

But we have rejected above Lee's attempt to extend the "finality" of his case, and Alleyne itself does not amount to manifest injustice and cannot justify his untimeliness.

The one-year filing limit is nonjurisdictional and may be waived if the State does not raise untimeliness in district court.

Lewis v. State · filed 2018-08-24(f)

Because the one-year time limit in K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 60-1507(f) is not jurisdictional, it may be waived if not asserted.

An alibi raised at the plea and sentencing hearings is not new evidence supporting the actual-innocence exception to the filing deadline.

Sellers v. State · filed 2018-08-31(f)(2)(A)

Clearly, an alibi defense that Sellers recited at his plea and sentencing hearing does not constitute "new evidence."

The one-year period for filing a § 60-1507 motion begins with the final order in the direct appeal; the mandate in an earlier § 60-1507 proceeding does not restart it.

Sellers v. State · filed 2018-10-12(f)(1)(A)

In all events, Sellers' argument is unpersuasive. The statute makes it clear that the timing of the one year limitation begins at the "final order of the last appellate court in this state to exercise jurisdiction on a direct appeal or the termination of such appellate jurisdiction." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 60-1507(f)(1)(A).

A movant generally has no right to amend a § 60-1507 motion, and relation back does not justify reopening an adjudicated motion after final judgment and an appellate mandate.

Pabst v. State · filed 2018-10-19

While movants filing K.S.A. 60-1507 motions generally do not have the right to amend their original motions, they may do so if the district court—in its discretion—allows them to do so. ... As such, to allow Pabst to relate the allegations in his current motion back to his prior K.S.A. 60-1507 motion would require the district court to reopen a 15-year-old motion that our Supreme Court has already ruled upon. Furthermore, we find no basis to justify a district court reopening a matter in which the court entered a final judgment and an appellate court has issued a mandate.

The filing deadline for a prisoner’s motion under Section 60-1507(f) must be assessed under the prison mailbox rule, using the date the prisoner delivered the motion to prison officials for mailing.

Rodriguez v. State · filed 2018-12-07(f)

We agree with Rodriguez that the record is unclear as to whether Rodriguez' motion was timely, and the district court should have considered the prison mailbox rule in determining the timeliness issue.

The one-year period measured from the denial of certiorari applies only to certiorari sought in the direct appeal of the criminal conviction, not in a separate habeas action.

State v. Griffin · filed 2019-01-04(f)(1)(B)

The statute does not allow a prisoner to bring a motion for habeas corpus relief within one year of the United States Supreme Court denying a writ of certiorari in any action; rather, the statute only allows a prisoner to bring a motion for habeas corpus relief within one year of the denial of a writ of certiorari in the direct appeal of his or her criminal conviction.

The one-year period for a § 60-1507 motion runs from finality of the direct appeal of the sentence; a later appeal from denial of a motion to withdraw the plea does not restart it.

Bone v. State · filed 2019-05-17(f)(1)(A)

Bone's original K.S.A. 60-1507 motion was untimely because it was filed more than one year after the direct appeal of his sentence became final.

Section 60-1507(f)(2) permits an untimely motion when the totality of the circumstances shows that enforcing the deadline would be obviously unfair or shocking to the conscience.

Noyce v. State · filed 2019-08-23(f)(2)

Under the totality of the circumstances, advising Noyce that the agreed-upon sentence was not appealable does not rise to the level of being obviously unfair or shocking to the conscience.

The State waives the one-year time limit for a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion if it fails to assert the defense in the district court.

Baker v. State · filed 2019-12-20(f)(1)

The State waived the time limit of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-1507(f)(1) by not asserting it earlier.

A § 60-1507 motion filed more than one year after the mandate on direct appeal is untimely unless the movant establishes a basis to extend the deadline.

Blaurock v. State · filed 2019-12-27(f)(1)

The mandate in Blaurock's direct appeal was issued on November 9, 2009, and the mandate from the appeal of his first 60-1507 motion was issued on September 24, 2015, but Blaurock filed his present 60-1507 motion on February 8, 2018, well beyond the one-year time limit contained in K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-1507(f)(1).

A movant seeking an evidentiary hearing on an actual-innocence claim must provide an evidentiary basis beyond a bald assertion.

Williams v. State · filed 2020-07-24

A movant must support a claim with an evidentiary basis, which requires more than a bald assertion of actual innocence.

A claim first raised at an evidentiary hearing cannot be added to timely ineffective-assistance claims in a § 60-1507 motion to avoid the one-year filing limit.

Newborn v. State · filed 2020-06-12(f)

Thus, this claim cannot be bootstrapped to the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised in that motion and was untimely under the one-year limitation in K.S.A. 60-1507(f).

Section 60-1507 ordinarily gives a Kansas prisoner one year after appellate jurisdiction over the direct appeal ends to seek post-conviction relief.

Bell (ID 81096) v. Kansas, State of · filed 2020-10-08(f)(1)(A)

Likewise, a Kansas prisoner ordinarily may seek post-conviction relief under K.S.A. 60-1507 within one year of the end of appellate jurisdiction from his direct appeal.

Section 60-1507(f)(2) does not excuse a late motion merely because the prisoner recently learned of the remedy and counsel had not told the prisoner about it.

McKenith v. State · filed 2020-12-23(f)(2)

The fact that McKenith only recently learned about his rights under K.S.A. 60-1507 and was never informed of those rights by his trial or appellate counsel does not excuse his failure to meet the one-year filing timeline.

Section 60-1507 does not permit an untimely motion based on the change in law announced in Alleyne when the sentence was final before that decision.

State v. Coleman · filed 2020-09-11(f)(2)

For a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion filed in a case that was final when Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013), was decided, the change in the law effected in Alleyne cannot provide the exceptional circumstances required to permit a successive motion or demonstrate the manifest injustice necessary to permit an untimely motion.

The one-year period for a 60-1507 motion runs from the mandate on the direct appeal of the conviction and sentence; a later mandate on a collateral transcript appeal does not restart it.

Cochran v. State · filed 2020-11-20(f)(1)(A)

Instead, the mandate associated with his first appeal is what sets the controlling date for time limitations. The first case was related to his actual conviction, sentence, and issues surrounding the trial. Cochran, 2014 WL 4080162, at *6. That mandate was issued on July 24, 2015, and that date controls the one-year time limitation. See K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-1507(f)(1)(A).

For the actual-innocence gateway to an untimely motion, exculpatory evidence qualifies as new evidence when the movant claims counsel ineffectively failed to discover or present that very evidence at trial.

Skaggs v. State · filed 2020-12-04(f)(2)(A)

To overcome this roadblock, we hold that when a movant asserts ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to discover or present to the fact-finder the very exculpatory evidence that demonstrates his actual innocence, such evidence constitutes new evidence for purposes of the Schlup procedural actual innocence standard.

Section 60-1507 requires a prisoner to file a post-conviction motion within one year after the direct appeal concludes.

Sellers v. Langford · filed 2021-04-26

Section 60-1507 requires a prisoner to file the motion within one year of the conclusion of his direct appeal.

The one-year filing limit in § 60-1507(f)(1) applies to a pleading construed from its contents as a post-conviction motion.

Neloms v. State · filed 2021-05-07(f)(1)

Based on the contents of the pleading, the district court was correct when it construed the May 2019 pleading as a motion under K.S.A. 60-1507 and not a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3501. As a result, it was untimely based on the one-year time limitation in K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60- 1507(f)(1).

Section 60-1507(f) likely makes a new challenge to counsel’s performance in earlier 60-1507 proceedings untimely more than a year after those proceedings became final.

Briscoe (ID 66034) v. Skidmore · filed 2021-07-06(f)

Moreover, because it has now been over a year since the 60-1507 proceedings became final, the state courts would likely find any such challenge untimely. See K.S.A. 60-1507.

A structural-error allegation alone does not excuse an untimely Section 60-1507 motion when the movant gives no explanation for the delay.

State v. Morgan · filed 2021-08-20(f)(2)(A)

Moreover, simply asserting a structural error in a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion without providing an explanation for the untimely filing cannot excuse a motion's untimeliness.

Section 60-1507 permits an extension of the one-year filing limit for a motion challenging counsel in a prior 60-1507 proceeding when the claim arose after the direct-appeal deadline; the year begins when the mandate issues in the prior proceeding.

Rowell v. State · filed 2021-06-04(f)(2)

The one-year period for filing a 60-1507 motion to challenge counsel's representation in a prior 60-1507 proceeding begins when the mandate issued on that prior 60-1507 proceeding.

Under § 60-1507(f)(1), an incarcerated movant can meet the one-year filing deadline by timely giving the motion to prison authorities for mailing.

Jenkins v. State · filed 2021-07-16(f)(1)

However, the prison mailbox rule allows us to deem Jenkins' motion as timely given his incarceration status, provided he timely gave his motion to prison authorities for mailing.

An actual-innocence claim can extend the filing deadline only if new evidence makes it more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted the movant.

Pouncil v. State · filed 2021-08-27(f)(2)(A)

Pouncil does not claim this alleged medical condition constituted "new evidence," nor does he demonstrate it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of this evidence, as required under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A).

Section 60-1507(f)(2)(A) limits the manifest-injustice inquiry for extending the one-year filing deadline to why the movant filed late.

Flores v. State · filed 2021-09-17(f)(2)(A)

But K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A) limits the court's inquiry to only determining why the movant failed to file within the one-year time limit. That said, even liberally construed, Flores' petition did not establish that he was entitled to the extension.

A pro se prisoner’s motion under § 60-1507 is timely filed when submitted to prison authorities for mailing within the one-year period, as shown by the certificate of service.

Haygood v. State · filed 2021-11-12(f)(1)

Under the prison mailbox rule, Haygood's motion was considered filed when he submitted it to prison authorities. Following Wahl and Rowell, we find the date Haygood's motion should be considered filed is the date he submitted his motion to prison authorities as shown on the certificate of service—November 18, 2019. Therefore, Haygood's motion was filed within one year from the date his convictions and sentences became final. The district court erred in dismissing Haygood's motion as untimely.

A movant who did not directly appeal an original conviction must file a Section 60-1507 challenge within one year after appellate jurisdiction over that conviction terminates.

Landers v. State · filed 2022-03-11(f)(1)(A)

Because Landers challenges his original plea and conviction, but he did not file a direct appeal from those matters, he needed to file his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion within one year of the termination of our appellate jurisdiction.

Amendments to § 60-1507 concerning the timeliness of state habeas actions do not change the timeliness of federal habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Becker (ID 91177) v. Schnurr · filed 2022-07-14

The amendments to K.S.A. 60-1507 affect the timeliness of state habeas ... actions brought in state courts under K.S.A. 60-1507; they do not affect the timeliness of federal habeas actions brought in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

When the Kansas Supreme Court denies review of a direct appeal, the one-year period for filing a 60-1507 motion begins on the denial date, rather than the mandate date.

Quinn v. State · filed 2022-11-23(f)(1)(A)

Accordingly, the time frame for filing a 60-1507 motion runs from the date of the decision denying review, not the date the clerk of the appellate courts issues the mandate as Quinn suggests.

Section 60-1507’s filing time limit does not apply to a jail-credit motion that was not brought or treated as a motion under that section.

Taylor (ID 40516) v. Easley · filed 2024-02-02

The April 2021 motion was not brought under K.S.A. 60-1507, nor did the state courts treat it as such. ... Thus, the time limitations for filing a motion under K.S.A. 60-1507 are not relevant here.

Section 60-1507(f) bars a postconviction claim brought decades after conviction under its one-year time limit when the movant presents no argument for an exception.

State v. Harris · filed 2024-06-21(f)

As such, even construed in the light most favorable to Harris as a motion under K.S.A. 60-1507, the claim is procedurally barred by the one-year time limitation of K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-1507(f)—and Harris has presented no argument for an exception.

A late § 60-1507 motion based on actual innocence requires new evidence showing that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted the prisoner.

State v. Garcia-Gomez · filed 2024-07-26(f)(2)(A)

The Kansas Legislature defines actual innocence to mean that a movant must show that "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted the prisoner in light of new evidence." K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A). In this case, Garcia- Gomez has failed to come forward with new evidence to support his claim of actual innocence. Consequently, he has failed to establish manifest injustice to justify his untimely filing.

Subsection (f)(1)(C) extends the one-year filing period only for claims that counsel in an earlier K.S.A. 60-1507 proceeding was ineffective.

Denney v. State · filed 2024-08-09(f)(1)(C)

Thus, there is no question that K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-1507(f)(1)(C) applies only to prolong the one-year time frame to bring ineffective assistance of counsel claims against a previous K.S.A. 60-1507 attorney and is inapplicable to Denney's motion.

For a motion challenging counsel's representation in an earlier 60-1507 proceeding, the one-year filing period begins when the mandate issues in that proceeding.

Smith v. State · filed 2024-09-13(f)

K.S.A. 60-1507(f)'s one-year period for filing a 60-1507 "motion to challenge counsel's representation in a prior 60-1507 motion begins when the mandate [is] issued on that prior 60-1507 proceeding." ... So Smith's one-year period began on September 18, 2018, and ended one year later.

The time limitation in § 60-1507(f) is an independent and adequate state procedural bar that can support procedural default in federal habeas review.

Taylor (ID 40516) v. Easley · filed 2024-08-19(f)

As this Court has previously recognized, the time limitation in K.S.A. 60-1507(f) is “an independent and adequate state procedural bar” in this context.

Section 60-1507(f) subjects later post-conviction motions to its filing time limit.

Donaldson (ID 105233) v. Langford · filed 2025-04-23(f)

Any future K.S.A. 60-1507 motion would be subject to the same time limit that Petitioner’s second K.S.A. 60-1507 motion failed to meet. See K.S.A. 60-1507(f).

A movant must actually file a certiorari petition with the U.S. Supreme Court to obtain additional time to file a 60-1507 motion under subsection (f)(1)(B).

Severs v. State · filed 2025-06-20(f)(1)(B)

The one-year period does not begin to run until the Court either denies a petition for writ of certiorari or grants certiorari and issues a final decision. A defendant actually must file a certiorari petition to trigger the additional time to file a 60-1507 motion. Here, Severs did not file a petition with the United States Supreme Court, so he was entitled to no additional time under K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(1)(B).

Section 60-1507(g) allows claims alleging ineffective assistance by prior habeas counsel that predate the 2022 amendment to be filed within one year of the amendment’s effective date.

Gholston v. State · filed 2025-09-05(g)

As Gholston notes, K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-1507(g) explicitly states that "[t]he amendments made to subsection (f) by this act shall not bar actions under this section that are brought within one year of the effective date of this act." ... Because Gholston's claims challenging the effectiveness of his prior habeas counsel preexisted the 2022 statutory amendment and his motion was filed within a year of that amendment, those claims are timely.

A motion filed outside Section 60-1507’s one-year limit is untimely if the movant fails to demonstrate manifest injustice.

Trotter v. State · filed 2026-02-13

Trotter's motion was untimely as it was filed outside the one-year limitation found in K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(1), and Trotter failed to demonstrate manifest injustice as defined in K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2)(A).

Subsection (f)(1)(C) extends the one-year filing period only for claims of ineffective assistance by counsel in a prior K.S.A. 60-1507 proceeding.

Gordon v. State · filed 2026-03-20(f)(1)(C)

Because Gordon does not raise claims against any prior K.S.A. 60-1507 counsel, K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(1)(C) cannot provide Gordon relief.

For a second § 60-1507 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in the first proceeding, the one-year filing period begins 30 days after the judgment denying the first motion when no appeal is taken.

Ferguson v. State · filed 2026-05-01(f)(1)

So, for purposes of determining application of the one-year limitation of K.S.A. 60-1507(f), the clock for a second habeas corpus action based on Holland's ineffective assistance began running 30 days after the district court's judgment in 2007.

Section 60-1507(f)(2) sets a one-year limit for filing a post-conviction motion, which a court may extend only to prevent manifest injustice.

Griffin v. Scnurr · filed 2016-01-14(f)(2)

Even if the due process claim were not waived, it would be untimely for Mr. Griffin to assert it now, either on direct appeal, see Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 8.03(a)(1) (providing a “jurisdictional” 30-day period for seeking KSC’s discretionary review), or through post-conviction proceedings, id. 183(c)(3) (authorizing collateral post-conviction relief for “trial errors affecting constitutional rights . . . even though the error could have been raised on appeal, provided exceptional circumstances excuse the failure to appeal”); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1507(f)(2) (providing one-year limitation for filing post-conviction relief “may be extended by the court only to prevent a manifest injustice”).

Section 60-1507(f)'s one-year filing limit can make a return to Kansas court futile and leave an unexhausted claim procedurally defaulted.

Juiliano v. Bruce · filed 2006-02-28(f)

This statute of limitations became effective on July 1, 2003. See Hays v. Kansas, 115 P.3d 162, 165 (Kan. App. 2005). Mr. Juiliano “had 1 year from the effective date of the 2003 amendment to file his 60-1507 motion.” Id. A return to Kansas courts now would be futile. The claim is therefore defaulted and the district court did not err in refusing to address the merits.

Section 60-1507(f)(1) imposes a one-year deadline for postconviction motions, running from the end of direct appellate review.

Amos v. Roberts · filed 2006-07-27(f)(1)

Any motion for postconviction relief is now time- barred in state court. See K.S.A. § 60-1507(f)(1) (imposing a one-year limitation period, which runs from the termination of direct appellate review).

Section 60-1507(f)(2) sets a one-year filing limit for post-conviction relief, which a court may extend only to prevent manifest injustice.

Griffin v. Scnurr · filed 2015-12-10(f)(2)

Even if the due process claim were not waived, it would be untimely for Mr. Griffin to assert it now, either on direct appeal, see Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 8.03(a)(1) (providing a “jurisdictional” 30-day period for seeking KSC’s discretionary review), or through post-conviction proceedings, id. 183(c)(3) (authorizing collateral post-conviction relief for “trial errors affecting constitutional rights . . . even though the error could have been raised on appeal, provided exceptional circumstances excuse the failure to appeal”); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1507(f)(2) (providing one-year limitation for filing post-conviction relief “may be extended by the court only to prevent a manifest injustice”).

Section 60-1507(f)’s time limit is an independent and adequate state procedural bar that can prevent federal habeas review of an untimely claim.

Stevenson (ID 95612) v. Snyder · filed 2025-04-22(f)

The time limitation in K.S.A. 60-1507(f) is “an independent and adequate state procedural bar” in this context.

Section 60-1507 limits manifest injustice review of a late motion to the reason for the delay or a colorable claim of actual innocence.

Britt v. State · filed 2019-07-26(f)(2)(A)

So we must determine (1) whether Britt has shown a good reason why he filed the claim after the one-year deadline and (2) whether he has made a colorable claim of actual innocence.

Ignorance of the law does not establish manifest injustice excusing an untimely motion under § 60-1507.

Thomas v. State · filed 2025-02-14(f)(2)(A)

We have consistently recognized that ignorance of the law does not constitute manifest injustice that would excuse an untimely 60-1507 motion.

Section 60-1507 has a one-year filing limit that a state district court may extend when necessary to prevent manifest injustice.

Shadden v. Kansas, State of · filed 2020-06-30(f)(1) and (2)

While there is also a one-year time limitation under K.S.A. 60-1507, the state district court may extend that time where necessary to prevent manifest injustice.

Section 60-1507(f)(2)(A) excuses an untimely motion for manifest injustice shown by actual innocence or a compelling reason for delay; lack of legal training does not qualify.

Copeland v. State · filed 2025-02-14(f)(2)(A)

But K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A) includes an exception to the one-year deadline for "manifest injustice" defined as either a showing of actual innocence or a compelling reason for failing to timely file. Copeland doesn't claim innocence. Rather, he contends his lack of legal training confounded his efforts to timely file a 60-1507 motion on the misdemeanor convictions distinct from the felony convictions in the other criminal cases. We have regularly rejected this sort of claimed lack of competence as manifest injustice permitting an untimely 60-1507 motion.

Section 60-1507(f)(3) bars an untimely motion when the movant fails to assert manifest injustice.

Esher v. State · filed 2024-11-15(f)(3)

Esher's failure to assert manifest injustice requires dismissal of his habeas motion because he is procedurally barred from maintaining it.

The one-year filing period for a 60-1507 motion may be extended only when the prisoner establishes manifest injustice.

Wimbley v. State · filed 2024-12-06(f)(2)

Wimbley has therefore failed to demonstrate that the one-year timeline for filing his 60-1507 motion should be extended to prevent manifest injustice.

A movant seeking review of an untimely § 60-1507 motion must show by a preponderance of the evidence that review is necessary to prevent manifest injustice.

Brice v. State · filed 2024-11-08(f)(2)

To overcome the statute of limitations under K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2), a movant has the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that consideration of the untimely motion is necessary to prevent manifest injustice.

Section 60-1507(f)(2) allows a court to extend the one-year filing deadline only to prevent manifest injustice.

Williams v. State · filed 2024-11-22(f)(2)

A court may only extend the time limitation in K.S.A. 60-1507(f) to prevent manifest injustice.

Section 60-1507(f)(2) permits an untimely motion when failure to enforce an unchallenged federal habeas ruling, coupled with counsel’s failure to secure compliance, amounts to manifest injustice.

Upchurch v. State · filed 2006-09-01(f)(2)

However, the 1-year statute of limitations does not apply when the petitioner establishes manifest injustice. K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2). ... Under the factual circumstances presented here, the failure of the State to comply with the United States District Court’s ruling, as well as movant’s previous counsel’s failure to ensure the ruling was fulfilled, rises to the level of manifest injustice.

Section 60-1507(f)(2) permits an exception to the one-year filing limit to prevent manifest injustice, but merely invoking that phrase without arguing any injustice does not establish the exception.

State v. Mitchell · filed 2007-06-22(f)(2)

The court may excuse the 1-year time limitation to prevent manifest injustice. K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2). Although Mitchell uses the language “to correct manifest injustice” in his brief, he fails to argue any manifest injustice. Thus, we cannot construe Mitchell’s motion to correct an illegal sentence as a 60-1507 motion because it is time-barred.

Section 60-1507(f)(2) permits extension of the one-year filing deadline to prevent manifest injustice, but equitable tolling is unavailable.

Clemons v. State · filed 2008-04-25(f)(2)

Because the Kansas Legislature has not enacted a statutory tolling provision in K.S.A. 60-1507, and has instead provided for extension of the 1-year limitation period upon a showing of manifest injustice, equitable tolling is unavailable in K.S.A. 60-1507 actions.

Section 60-1507(f)(2) permits extension of the one-year filing deadline to prevent manifest injustice; without circumstances preventing a timely filing, the court may deny an untimely motion without reaching its merits.

Vontress v. State · filed 2011-02-25(f)(2)

As in Toney, Vontress does not allege any circumstances preventing him from filing his motion prior to June 30, 2004. In the absence of such circumstances, there is no basis upon which to find that addressing the merits of his claim would prevent a manifest injustice. Accordingly, we find no error in the district court's decision to deny Vontress' motion as untimely without addressing the merits set forth therein.

Section 60-1507(f)(2) allows an extension of the one-year filing limit only when necessary to prevent manifest injustice; applying the limit to a late conflict-of-interest claim was not manifestly unjust.

State v. Kelly · filed 2011-03-25(f)(2)

To avoid the time limitation, he had to convince the district court that an extension of time was necessary to prevent a manifest injustice. See K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2). ... It is not manifestly unjust to apply the time limitation to Kelly’s conflict of interest claim, and we find that claim to be procedurally barred.

A late § 60-1507 motion requires the movant to show that extending the deadline is necessary to prevent manifest injustice.

State v. Holt · filed 2013-12-06(f)(2)

Holt is well beyond the time limit prescribed in K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(l)(i). So he must demonstrate that an extension is necessary to “prevent a manifest injustice.” ... He therefore failed to meet his burden to demonstrate entitlement to an extension. So we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Holt’s motion as untimely.

Failure to allege manifest injustice weighs against construing a pleading as an untimely motion under § 60-1507 and leaves any claim under the statute insufficiently raised for district court review.

State v. Gilbert · filed 2014-06-06(f)(2)

We hold that the failure to allege manifest injustice not only weighs against construing the motion as one falling under K.S.A. 60-1507, but it also supports a conclusion that any K.S.A. 60-1507 argument was insufficiently raised to warrant review by the district court.

Section 60-1507(f)(2) allows the one-year filing limit to be disregarded to prevent manifest injustice, but a new constitutional sentencing rule that does not apply retroactively does not excuse a late motion.

Verge v. State · filed 2014-07-18(f)(2)

Instead, the statute allows the 1-year time limitation to be disregarded to prevent "manifest injustice." K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2). ... In conclusion, although Alleyne created a new constitutional rule, we find that it does not apply retroactively to cases before the court on collateral review. Accordingly, the district court did not err when it summarily dismissed Verge's K.S.A. 60-1507 action.

Section 60-1507(f)(2) requires a movant seeking to bring an untimely motion to demonstrate manifest injustice.

State v. Noyce · filed 2015-02-27(f)(2)

Noyce has not demonstrated manifest injustice to the district court in order to properly bring a 1507 motion. For these reasons, this court rejected a recent motion to convert Noyce's pleading to a 1507 motion.

An untimely motion under § 60-1507 is dismissed unless the movant proves manifest injustice excusing the one-year filing limit.

Iserhardt v. State · filed 2015-10-16(f)(2)

Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Iserhardt has failed to prove a manifest injustice excusing the 1-year time bar on 60-1507 motions. The motion, therefore, was properly dismissed as untimely.

A finding of manifest injustice excusing an untimely § 60-1507 motion can cover a supplemental motion filed before the State responds, including claims first specified in the supplement.

Taylor v. State · filed 2015-11-13(f)(2)

Based on the procedural history and the relevant facts as set forth above, Taylor's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in plea negotiations should not have been dismissed as untimely. Specifically, we conclude that Judge Powell's September 7, 2012, manifest injustice finding applied both to Taylor's original K.S.A. 60-1507 motion filed on April 10, 2012, and to the supplemental motion he filed on July 6, 2012.

A movant seeking to avoid § 60-1507’s one-year time limit must argue manifest injustice before the trial court or be procedurally barred from raising it on appeal.

May v. State · filed 2015-11-13(f)(2)

Because May failed to argue that dismissal under K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(1)(i) would be manifestly unjust before the trial court, May is procedurally barred from maintaining his action on appeal.

Periodic lack of access to a law library does not establish manifest injustice excusing a long delay in filing a Section 60-1507 motion.

Conley v. State · filed 2015-11-20(f)(2)

Conley's periodic lack of access to the law library does not excuse his long delay in filing this motion.

Subsection (f)(2) permits an extension of the filing deadline to prevent manifest injustice, which the movant must show.

Gaddis v. State · filed 2015-11-13(f)(2)

Nevertheless, K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2) allows for an extension of time to be granted to prevent manifest injustice. Thus, we must determine whether Gaddis has shown that manifest injustice would occur unless he is allowed to file his motion out of time.

Section 60-1507(f)(2) permits an extension of the one-year filing deadline to prevent manifest injustice, which the movant must demonstrate.

State v. Shaffer · filed 2015-11-20(f)(2)

K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2) allows the deadline to be extended to prevent manifest injustice. ... Applying the factors set forth in Vontress, it is apparent that Shaffer failed to carry his burden of demonstrating manifest injustice.

A 60-1507 motion filed more than one year after appellate jurisdiction ends may be considered only to prevent manifest injustice.

Brown v. State · filed 2016-01-15(f)(1)-(2)

Since Brown did not file his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion within 1 year of the termination of appellate jurisdiction over his resentencing, the district court could consider the motion only to prevent a manifest injustice.

A movant seeking an extension of the one-year deadline for a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion bears the burden of showing manifest injustice.

State v. LaMae · filed 2016-03-11(f)(2)

The only exception to the 1-year time limit to file a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion is stated in subsection (f)(2), which allows an extension of time "only to prevent a manifest injustice." LaMae has the burden to show "manifest injustice."

An evidentiary hearing that would have been warranted on a timely motion does not by itself establish manifest injustice to extend the one-year filing limit.

Salinas v. State · filed 2016-04-15(f)(2)

Vontress and Toney establish that manifest injustice is not shown simply because an evidentiary hearing would have been warranted if the K.S.A. 60-1507 motion were timely filed.

An untimely § 60-1507 motion requires a showing of manifest injustice before the district court may consider it.

Kelly v. State · filed 2016-05-27(f)(2)

Additionally, Kelly failed to demonstrate manifest injustice as required for the district court to consider an untimely K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

A movant must demonstrate manifest injustice to excuse the one-year time bar for a Section 60-1507 motion.

Aguilera v. State · filed 2016-01-22(f)(2)

Aguilera has failed to demonstrate the manifest injustice required to excuse the 1- year time bar on K.S.A. 60-1507 motions.

A motion under § 60-1507 must be brought within one year after the appellate court’s final order unless an extension is needed to prevent manifest injustice.

State v. Barnes · filed 2016-01-22(f)

Further, even if we were to consider the motion under K.S.A. 60-1507, it would be denied as untimely. See K.S.A. 60-1507(f) (Motion must be brought within 1 year after appellate court's final order, unless time limitation is extended to prevent a manifest injustice.). Even now, Barnes proffers no reason why the 60-1507(f) time limitation should be extended, and we can discern no such manifest injustice.

The one-year deadline for a § 60-1507 motion may be extended to prevent manifest injustice; a late motion cannot be heard when no manifest injustice is found or argued.

Graham v. State · filed 2016-05-20(f)(2)

The 1- year limit for appealing may be extended by the district court to prevent a manifest injustice. K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2). ... The district court did not make a finding of manifest injustice, and neither party has argued the issue in their briefs. Graham was sentenced on September 23, 2010, and did not file his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion until December 2, 2014. As a result, Graham's motion was untimely and cannot be heard.

A motion under § 60-1507 filed more than one year after the direct appeal became final requires a showing of manifest injustice before the court will consider its merits.

State v. Spear · filed 2016-08-26(f)(2)

But K.S.A. 60-1507(f) imposes a 1- year time limitation on K.S.A. 60-1507 motions. ... However, rather than argue why manifest injustice exists for this court to consider his out-of-time motion, he argues the merits of his claim. As such, Spear has failed to show that we should consider his motion as a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

A movant bears the burden to establish manifest injustice to excuse an untimely § 60-1507 motion, and allegations that do not explain the filing delay may fail to meet that burden.

Kebert v. State · filed 2016-08-26(f)(2)

Kebert has the burden to establish manifest injustice. K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2); State v. Holt, 298 Kan. 469, 480, 313 P.3d 826 (2013). ... Even if true, neither of these reasons explains the delay in filing Kebert's motion. ... Kebert fails to show manifest injustice to excuse the untimely filing of his motion.

An untimely § 60-1507 movant must show more than the possibility of a meritorious claim to establish manifest injustice and extend the filing deadline.

Ebihara v. State · filed 2016-10-28(f)

Because Ebihara's motion was untimely, he needed to show more than simply a possibility of a meritorious claim.

When a district court reaches the merits of a Section 60-1507 motion without a State objection to timeliness, an appellate court presumes the court found the motion timely or extended the filing period to prevent manifest injustice.

McIntyre v. State · filed 2016-12-23(f)(2)

When a party files a motion under K.S.A. 60-1507 and the trial court addresses the substantive issue without the State objecting to the timeliness of the filing, it is presumed on appeal that the trial court found either that the motion was timely filed or that an exception based on manifest injustice applied.

Section 60-1507(f)(2) permits a court to consider a motion filed after the one-year deadline only to prevent manifest injustice.

State v. Labrum · filed 2016-09-23(f)(2)

The district court may consider a motion beyond the 1-year time limit only to prevent manifest injustice.

Section 60-1507(f)(2) allows an untimely motion only when the movant carries the burden to show manifest injustice.

Young v. State · filed 2017-01-13(f)(2)

As a result, we conclude that Young has failed to carry his burden to show manifest injustice excusing him from the time limitation in K.S.A. 60-1507(f).

Section 60-1507(f)(2)(A) allows a movant to overcome the one-year filing limit when the reason for the delay demonstrates manifest injustice.

Rojas-Marceleno v. State · filed 2017-03-31(f)(2)(A)

Under the governing language of K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2)(A), a movant may escape the 1-year time bar if the reason why he or she failed to file within that period demonstrates "manifest injustice."

Section 60-1507(f)(2) permits extension of the filing deadline only to prevent manifest injustice.

Gaither v. State · filed 2017-03-10(f)(2)

Under the provisions of K.S.A. 60-1507, the time for filing a motion may only be extended to prevent manifest injustice.

The 2016 amendment limiting the manifest injustice inquiry under § 60-1507(f)(2)(A) is procedural and applies retroactively to motions filed before its enactment.

State v. Phoenix · filed 2017-05-05(f)(2)(A)

While these opinions are unpublished, we find the rationale to be persuasive and supportive of our finding that the 2016 statute amendments are procedural and are to be applied retroactively. Phoenix's claims are limited by the express language of K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A).

A movant seeking to file a § 60-1507 motion out of time bears the burden of establishing manifest injustice; the district court need not eliminate every possibility of manifest injustice.

State v. Ditges · filed 2017-05-26(f)(2)

That burden includes establishing the manifest injustice that would entitle him to file the motion out of time. The district court does not have a duty to eliminate any possibility of manifest injustice.

Section 60-1507(f)(2) places the burden of showing manifest injustice on a party seeking relief from an untimely filing; a failure to explain the delay weighs against relief under the totality of the circumstances.

Mallard v. Bruffett · filed 2017-05-12(f)(2)

Assuming without deciding that manifest injustice allows an SPTP patient to file an untimely habeas petition, relief is not available to Mallard because he fails to meet his burden of showing manifest injustice. See K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2); State v. Holt, 298 Kan. 469, 480, 313 P.3d 826 (2013).

Section 60-1507(f)(3) permits summary denial without an evidentiary hearing when a motion is untimely and dismissal would not cause manifest injustice.

Robinson v. State · filed 2017-06-09(f)(3)

K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60- 1507(f)(3) permits the district court to summarily deny a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing if it determines that the time limits have been exceeded and dismissal would not result in manifest injustice.

A guilty plea prevents a movant from establishing manifest injustice to excuse an untimely § 60-1507 motion through a claim that the evidence was insufficient.

Woodward v. State · filed 2017-07-21(f)(2)(A)

Second, Woodward cannot claim innocence because he pled guilty, which prevents a review of the evidence's sufficiency in a K.S.A. 60-1507 proceeding.

The one-year filing limit for a Section 60-1507 motion may be extended only to prevent manifest injustice, meaning an outcome that is obviously unfair or shocking to the conscience.

Estrada v. State · filed 2017-08-04(f)(2)

Under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2), the 1-year time limitation may be extended only to prevent manifest injustice, which has been interpreted to mean "obviously unfair" or "shocking to the conscience."

Section 60-1507 requires a movant who files after the one-year deadline to assert and demonstrate manifest injustice to overcome the time bar.

State v. Williams · filed 2017-09-08(f)(2)

Construing Williams' motion as a motion under K.S.A. 60-1507, the court still did not err because the motion was untimely and Williams did not overcome this procedural bar by asserting manifest injustice.

A § 60-1507 motion filed after the one-year limit may be dismissed as untimely when the movant does not affirmatively assert manifest injustice.

Rowell v. State · filed 2017-09-22(f)

Rowell filed his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion well outside the one-year time limit. He did not affirmatively assert manifest injustice, and all of his claims were without merit. Thus, the district court did not err in summarily dismissing his motion as untimely.

Once an appellate court finds manifest injustice excusing a late 60-1507 motion and orders an evidentiary hearing, the district court on remand must hear the merits rather than revisit manifest injustice.

State v. Tran · filed 2017-07-28(f)(2)

Thus, the manifest injustice inquiry was final at that point and the parties should not have attempted to relitigate it at the district court. The only purpose of the remand was to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the merits of Tran's ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

The one-year limit for a Section 60-1507 motion may be extended only to prevent manifest injustice.

Hanks v. State · filed 2017-10-06(f)(2)

The one-year time limitation may be extended only to prevent manifest injustice.

Section 60-1507(f) permits a manifest injustice exception to the filing deadline for 60-1507 motions, but the exception does not extend to petitions by civilly committed patients under section 60-1501.

White v. State · filed 2017-12-08(f)

Therefore, the K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1507(f) manifest injustice exception for untimely filing is applicable to 60-1507 motions but not to petitions from those, like White, who must file under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-1501 because they are not prisoners under sentence.

The one-year deadline for a § 60-1507 motion may be extended only to prevent manifest injustice.

Bradford v. State · filed 2017-12-08(f)(2)

This one-year time limit may be extended by the district court only to prevent a manifest injustice.

An Alleyne-based challenge does not establish manifest injustice to excuse an untimely motion under § 60-1507.

State v. Albright · filed 2018-02-02(f)(2)

Because he filed the pleading well after the one-year time limitation and an Alleyne-based challenge does not satisfy the manifest injustice exception, Albright cannot collaterally attack his sentence under K.S.A. 60-1507.

A movant who gives no reason for filing nearly 20 years after the one-year deadline fails to establish a persuasive reason for delay under the manifest injustice inquiry.

Cox v. State · filed 2018-04-06(f)(2)

Our review of the record confirms that Cox failed to establish manifest injustice. In his 60-1507 motion, Cox did not explain why he waited nearly 20 years to file his motion. Because Cox failed to provide persuasive reasons or circumstances that prevented him from filing his 60-1507 motion within the one-year time limitation, he failed to meet the first Vontress factor.

The 2016 amendment limiting the manifest injustice inquiry does not apply to motions filed before July 1, 2016; those motions are assessed under the Vontress factors.

Tatum v. State · filed 2018-08-24(f)(2)(A)

Because Tatum's motion was filed before July 1, 2016, we apply the Vontress factors to determine whether Tatum has established manifest injustice sufficient to justify review of his untimely motion.

A motion under § 60-1507 filed after the one-year deadline is procedurally barred unless the movant affirmatively asserts manifest injustice.

Pabst v. State · filed 2018-10-19(f)

A movant that files a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion outside the one-year time limitation and fails to affirmatively assert "manifest injustice" is procedurally barred from maintaining the action. ... Thus, we find that Pabst's Amended Petition for Relief Pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1507 is untimely on its face.

Section 60-1507(f)(2)'s manifest injustice exception does not extend the filing time for a petition challenging conditions of confinement under Section 60-1501.

Hughes v. Schnurr · filed 2018-08-03(f)(2)

But Hughes did not file his petition under 60-1507 and he makes no collateral attack on either his conviction or sentence. The manifest injustice provision of 60-1507(f) does not apply to him.

For a motion filed before July 1, 2016, the manifest injustice exception to § 60-1507’s one-year deadline requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances under the three Vontress factors.

Gonzalez v. State · filed 2018-08-10(f)(2)

Moreover, a remand is also necessary to afford the district court an opportunity, after assessing the second Vontress factor, to consider the totality of circumstances and determine whether it would constitute a manifest injustice to not extend the statutory time to consider the motion.

Section 60-1507(f)(2) permits review of an untimely motion to prevent manifest injustice, but an actual-innocence claim used to invoke that exception requires new evidence not presented at trial.

Hartfield v. State · filed 2018-11-30(f)(2)

Still, courts may review an untimely K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, extending the one-year time limitation, to prevent manifest injustice. ... Most important here, the inmate must establish actual innocence through new evidence, i.e., evidence not presented at trial. ... Given Hartfield's failure to establish manifest injustice, we agree with the district court's dismissal of his motion as untimely.

Section 60-1507(f) bars motions filed after its one-year deadline unless an extension is needed to prevent manifest injustice.

State v. McCloud · filed 2018-12-07(f)

McCloud's present motions were filed in 2017, more than 10 years after the deadline, and are thus untimely. McCloud has not argued any circumstances that justify extension of the deadline to prevent a manifest injustice. Thus, to the extent that McCloud's motions could have been construed as K.S.A. 60-1507 motions, they were untimely and procedurally barred.

A movant who files a § 60-1507 motion after the one-year deadline must establish manifest injustice to obtain relief.

Brown v. State · filed 2019-02-15(f)(2)

As a result, he must establish manifest injustice as stated under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2) to successfully move for relief.

For motions filed before July 1, 2016, manifest injustice may be assessed under all three Vontress factors, including whether the claim raises a substantial issue of law or fact.

Taylor v. State · filed 2019-03-01(f)

Taylor filed his motion in June 2014, so the 2016 amendments do not apply to it. As a result, we consider all three Vontress factors, as did the district court, to determine whether Taylor established manifest injustice by a preponderance of the evidence.

For § 60-1507 motions filed before July 1, 2016, courts apply the three Vontress factors to decide whether manifest injustice warrants extending the one-year filing limit.

Mendoza-Hernandez v. State · filed 2019-02-15(f)(2)

Hernandez filed his motion before July 1, 2016. Therefore, this court must determine whether Hernandez established that manifest injustice would have existed under the three Vontress factors. ... In conclusion, Hernandez failed to show that, under any Vontress factor, manifest injustice exists and that the one-year time limitation should be extended.

A prisoner's lack of legal knowledge and skill alone does not establish manifest injustice excusing an untimely § 60-1507 motion.

Little v. State · filed 2019-03-01(f)(2)(A)

Thus, Little's claim that he is a layperson with no legal skill and knowledge alone does not meet the manifest injustice standard.

A motion under § 60-1507 must be filed within one year unless an extension is needed to prevent manifest injustice; a late movant who does not affirmatively assert manifest injustice is barred from maintaining the action.

State v. Voth · filed 2019-03-29(f)(1)

Voth had one year to file a motion attacking his sentence. See K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-1507(f)(1). The one-year time limitation may be extended only to prevent manifest injustice. K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2). A defendant who files a 1507 motion outside the one-year time limitation and fails to affirmatively assert manifest injustice is procedurally barred from maintaining the action.

For motions filed before July 1, 2016, a court assesses manifest injustice under the nonexhaustive Vontress factors when deciding whether to extend the one-year filing limit.

Olga v. State · filed 2019-03-29(f)(2)

In determining whether manifest injustice exists in motions filed prior to July 1, 2016, the court should consider this nonexhaustive list of factors: (1) whether the movant provides persuasive reasons or circumstances that prevented him or her from filing the 60-1507 motion within the time limitation; (2) whether the merits of the movant's claims raise substantial issues of law or fact deserving the district court's consideration; and (3) whether the movant sets forth a colorable claim of actual innocence, i.e., factual, not legal, innocence.

A prisoner's ignorance of § 60-1507's one-year filing deadline is not a persuasive reason to extend the deadline to prevent manifest injustice.

Livingston v. State · filed 2019-05-24(f)(2)

In keeping with Tolen's precedent, Livingston's claim of ignorance of the law is not a persuasive reason for the delay in filing his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

Section 60-1507(f) gives a movant one year after the direct appeal becomes final to file, unless the court extends the deadline to prevent manifest injustice.

Thuko v. State · filed 2019-07-12(f)

K.S.A. 60-1507(f) places a time limit on filing an action under that statute of one year from the date the movant's direct appeal becomes final, unless the time limitation is extended by the court to prevent a manifest injustice.

For a motion filed before July 1, 2016, a court considers all three Vontress factors when deciding whether manifest injustice warrants extending the one-year filing deadline.

State v. Phoenix · filed 2019-04-19(f)(2)

Under the holding in White then, we must consider all three Vontress factors to determine whether manifest injustice warrants an extension of the one-year time limitation for filing the habeas petition in this case.

Limited access to a law library does not establish manifest injustice to extend the one-year deadline for filing a post-conviction motion.

Milton v. State · filed 2019-06-21(f)(2)

In any event, this court has consistently held that limited access to a law library cannot establish manifest injustice.

A movant seeking to extend Section 60-1507’s filing deadline must establish why the manifest injustice exception applies; asking to argue it on remand is insufficient.

State v. Roberts · filed 2019-07-12(f)(2)

That strategy is simply unavailing. It was incumbent on appellant to show why the district court erred in not applying the manifest injustice exception to extend the time limit on his 60-1507 motion.

The one-year filing limit for a § 60-1507 motion may be extended only to prevent manifest injustice.

Reyna v. State · filed 2019-11-22(f)(2)

This one-year time limitation for bringing an action may be extended by the district court only to prevent a manifest injustice.

Ignorance of the law does not establish manifest injustice excusing an untimely motion under § 60-1507.

Morales v. State · filed 2019-11-01(f)(2)(A)

But Kansas caselaw recognizes that ignorance of the law is not a valid reason for failing to file a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion within the one-year time limitation.

A motion filed after the § 60-1507 deadline is barred when the movant asserts manifest injustice without facts supporting an extension.

Ballard v. State · filed 2019-11-01(f)(2)

In sum, Ballard has asserted no facts supporting his general claim that the district court should consider his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion to prevent a manifest injustice. As a result, his motion is barred as untimely filed under K.S.A. 60-1507(f).

Section 60-1507(f)(2)(A) allows review of an untimely motion to prevent manifest injustice when new evidence makes it more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted the prisoner.

Sundgren v. State · filed 2019-12-13(f)(2)(A)

The law does permit a court to review motions filed over the one-year limit to prevent manifest injustice. Manifest injustice can be shown in cases where a prisoner makes a colorable claim of actual innocence. The statute, K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60- 1507(f)(2)(A), states the term "actual innocence" requires the prisoner to show it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted the prisoner in light of new evidence.

A movant's lack of knowledge about legal issues does not establish manifest injustice to excuse an untimely motion under § 60-1507(f)(2).

Loggins v. State · filed 2020-01-24(f)(2)

Even assuming Loggins' argument is true, a K.S.A. 60-1507 movant's lack of knowledge on legal issues does not amount to manifest injustice.

Section 60-1507 imposes a one-year time limit on habeas motions, subject to an extension necessary to prevent manifest injustice.

State v. Davidson · filed 2020-04-24(f)(1), (f)(2)

Even if the district court had treated Davidson's motion as a request for habeas relief, the motion would have been untimely under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-1507(f)(1). And Davidson did not argue—nor is there anything in the record to support a finding—that an extension of the one-year time limit under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2) was necessary to prevent a manifest injustice.

An untimely motion under § 60-1507 is procedurally barred unless the movant affirmatively asserts manifest injustice.

Harris v. State · filed 2020-03-27(f)

A defendant who files a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion outside the one-year time limitation in K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-1507(f) and fails to affirmatively assert manifest injustice is procedurally barred from maintaining the action.

Section 60-1507(f) bars an untimely motion unless the movant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that extending the filing deadline is required to prevent manifest injustice.

O'Quinn v. State · filed 2020-07-31(f)(2)

Because O'Quinn did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that extension of the time to file his motion was required to prevent a manifest injustice, K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-1507(f) bars his motion as untimely filed.

A movant’s lack of legal knowledge does not establish manifest injustice excusing an untimely § 60-1507 motion.

Johnson v. State · filed 2020-06-12(f)(2)

Accordingly, we find Johnson's lack of legal knowledge does not amount to manifest injustice.

Section 60-1507(f)(3) requires summary dismissal of an untimely motion if the movant fails to establish manifest injustice.

Cooper v. State · filed 2020-07-24(f)(3)

Simply put, K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-1507(f)(3) requires a district court to summarily dismiss an action as untimely filed if a movant fails to establish manifest injustice.

An unsupported allegation of prior postconviction counsel’s ineffectiveness does not establish manifest injustice to excuse an untimely § 60-1507 motion.

Gibson v. State · filed 2020-07-31(f)(2)

Because Gibson's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is conclusory, and without any apparent factual or evidentiary basis in the record, he has failed to show the manifest injustice or exceptional circumstances necessary to justify consideration of his untimely and successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

The one-year filing limit under § 60-1507(f)(2) may be extended to prevent manifest injustice when a retroactive change in law first makes relief viable and the prisoner files within a year of that change under rare and extraordinary circumstances.

Williams v. State · filed 2020-10-09(f)(2)

Williams claims his motion must be considered on the merits to prevent a manifest injustice because he filed it less than one year after relief on his claim became a viable option. We agree and find the facts here present the rare and extraordinary circumstances that justify extending the one-year time limit to prevent a manifest injustice.

Section 60-1507(f)(2) permits extending the one-year filing deadline to prevent manifest injustice when a prisoner promptly files a second motion challenging counsel’s performance in the first habeas proceeding.

Logan v. State · filed 2020-10-16(f)(2)

Even though Logan's second K.S.A. 60-1507 motion was not filed within one year after his direct appeal was final, a timely collateral attack alleging ineffective assistance of habeas corpus counsel might constitute manifest injustice and serve as a basis for tolling the one-year time limitation for filing a habeas corpus motion. ... Here, it is unclear when Logan delivered his motion to prison authorities for mailing, but he did sign the motion on April 29, 2019. Under these circumstances, we find that extension of the one-year time limit is necessary to prevent a manifest injustice.

An untimely § 60-1507 movant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that extending the one-year filing deadline is necessary to prevent manifest injustice.

Gillespie v. State · filed 2020-10-09(f)(2)

Because Gillespie failed to timely file his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, he had the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that an extension of the one-year time limit was necessary to prevent a manifest injustice.

A prisoner's lack of legal knowledge, training, or familiarity with procedure does not establish manifest injustice excusing § 60-1507's one-year filing deadline.

Dotson v. State · filed 2020-11-25(f)(2)

But a prisoner's lack of legal knowledge, training, and familiarity with the rules of procedure is not a valid excuse for failing to meet the one-year deadline under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-1507(f).

Ignorance of the law does not establish manifest injustice excusing an untimely § 60-1507 motion.

Jones v. State · filed 2021-03-12(f)(2)(A)

More generally, ignorance of the law does not equate to manifest injustice triggering the exception to the one-year time limit.

A movant seeking to extend Section 60-1507’s one-year filing deadline must show that the extension would prevent manifest injustice.

Longbine v. State · filed 2021-05-07(f)(2)

Given Longbine offered no substantive evidence why he did not timely file his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, he did not meet his burden of proving the extension of the one-year deadline would prevent manifest injustice.

A prisoner seeking to extend the one-year filing deadline to prevent manifest injustice must provide a plausible explanation for the delay in filing.

Trester v. State · filed 2021-05-14(f)(2)(A)

To establish manifest injustice as meant under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2)(A) Trester needed to provide a plausible explanation why it took him more than 17 months following the district court's denial of his time-extension motion to file his motion.

The seriousness of a movant’s substantive claims alone does not establish manifest injustice that permits an extension of the one-year filing deadline.

Kelley v. State · filed 2021-07-30(f)(2)(A)

Thus, consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in White, the validity or seriousness of Kelley's claims in the Second 60-1507 Motion do not alone create "manifest injustice" for the purpose of extending the timeline to file a motion pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1507.