Fla. Stat. § 768.79

Section 768.79 does not authorize attorney’s fees and costs based on an untimely offer of judgment.

McInnis v. Ramasami · filed 1997-04-30

It is undisputed that the trial court erred by awarding attorney’s fees and costs to Appellees, as their offer of judgment was not timely filed under section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1995).

Section 768.79 requires a joint offer to identify the amount attributable to each offeror and claim so the statutory comparison can be made.

Di Paola v. Beach Terrace Ass'n, Inc. · filed 1998-10-14

First, the joint offer was not specific enough to enable the circuit court to determine the amount attributable to which offeror for which claim. ... The calculation necessary to determine the applicability of section 768.79 is impossible to perform with any certainty. Consequently, the offer could not support an award of fees.

Section 768.79 does not allow a party to accept an offer of judgment after trial, even if the thirty-day acceptance period has not expired.

O'Brien v. Russell · filed 1997-09-03

Immediately following a defense verdict for Sheila Russell, O’Brien formally accepted Russell’s offer of judgment made twelve days before trial. O’Brien contends that section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1993), allows him a full thirty days to accept such an offer, trial notwithstanding. We reject such an interpretation.

Section 768.79 treats an offer unaccepted within 30 days as rejected, making a purported withdrawal after that period ineffective.

Crowley v. Sunny's Plants, Inc. · filed 1998-05-06

According to statute, since the offers were not accepted within 30 days they were considered rejected. See § 768.79, Fla. Stat. (1995). ... Thus, any purported withdrawal of an offer after the expiration of the 30 days was a legal nullity and an event not contemplated by section 768.79.

Section 768.79 permits an award of attorney’s fees based on a timely offer of judgment in proper form under Rule 1.442.

Subramanian v. Health Foundation Support Services of South Florida, Inc. · filed 1999-05-05

The offer of judgment filed by Dr. Su-bramanian was timely filed and in proper form consistent with Rule 1.442, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, Dr. Subramanian is entitled to his attorney’s fees pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes.

Section 768.79 does not entitle a party to appellate attorney's fees based on an offer served after the first trial concluded, even if the offer preceded the notice of appeal.

Glanzberg v. Kauffman · filed 2000-10-18

Nothing in section 768.79, however, entitles her to fees on this appeal from the first trial.

Section 768.79(6)(a)'s deadline for seeking attorney's fees yields to a conflicting deadline in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.

Spencer v. Barrow · filed 2000-03-08(6)(a)

However, the time periods prescribed in statutes such as section 768.79 have long and clearly been held to be procedural. They are, therefore, subject to and governed by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and not by the statutory time requirements where the statute and pertinent rules of procedure are in conflict.

Section 768.79 permits a demand served after dismissal but before appeal to remain effective through verdict and support fees from the date of service when the judgment exceeds the demand by at least 25 percent.

AMISUB (AMERICAN HOSP.) INC. v. Hernandez · filed 2002-06-19

Here, following the dismissal but prior to the appeal, Hernandez served the demand for judgment, offering the hospital an opportunity to settle without an appeal or further litigation. ... Therefore, because Hernandez met the statute's time requirements, and because the jury's damage award was thirty-six percent greater than the $75,000.00 demand, Hernandez is entitled to attorney's fees from the date he served the demand.

Section 768.79(6)'s 30-day period for seeking fees begins when a new final judgment is entered after reversal and remand.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Horkheimer · filed 2005-05-04(6)

This required the trial court to enter a new final judgment upon remand. Until entry of the new final judgment, the thirty (30) day period did not begin to run. Thus, the plaintiffs failure to plead and move for attorney’s fees within thirty (30) days of the jury verdict does not dictate the result.

Section 768.79(3) does not require denial of attorney fees because a proposal for settlement was filed before judgment; an unnecessarily filed proposal may be stricken with leave to refile.

Frosti v. Creel · filed 2008-03-20(3)

After reviewing rule 1.442 and section 768.79, we find no basis to deny a party's motion for attorney fees and costs because the underlying proposal for settlement was filed before judgment was entered. Neither the rule nor the statute states that a proposal for settlement may not be filed prior to judgment or unambiguously defines when a proposal for settlement should be filed. Any grievance with the timing of the filing of a proposal for settlement can be addressed by filing a motion to strike, and the proper remedy where a court finds that a proposal is filed unnecessarily is to strike the proposal from the record, with leave to refile the proposal if and when it becomes necessary to enforce an entitlement to attorney fees and costs.

Section 768.79 does not prevent acceptance of an untimely settlement offer, but that offer cannot later support an award of costs and attorney’s fees under the statute.

Baratta v. Bradford Electric, Inc. · filed 2009-04-15

As noted in Wright v. Caruana, 640 So.2d 197 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), neither section 768.79 nor rule 1.442 prevents an offeree from actually accepting an untimely offer and avoiding trial. Rather, it merely prevents the offer from later serving as a basis for an award of costs and attorney’s fees under the statute.

Section 768.79’s thirty-day acceptance period does not permit acceptance of a pending offer after final summary judgment terminates it.

Kroener v. Florida Insurance Guaranty Ass'n · filed 2011-06-22(4)

We therefore hold that the trial court’s grant of final summary judgment in favor of FIGA terminated FIGA’s pending offer of judgment and precluded the Kroeners’ ability to accept it.

A claim for fees and costs under section 768.79 is premature while an underlying claim remains outstanding.

Gabriel v. Disney Cruise Line · filed 2012-12-14

The ruling in the companion case controls this case. Because of the outstanding claim, DCL’s claim for fees and costs is premature.

Section 768.79 does not set deadlines for serving offers of judgment; Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 governs their timing.

Regions Bank v. Rhodes · filed 2013-11-20(1)

The statute does not provide time frames for service of offers of judgment because such timing requirements are procedural and governed by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442.

Section 768.79 does not permit a fee award based on an offer that prevents the offeree from independently evaluating and resolving the claim.

saritha reddy Paduru and Ravi Anugu v. Klinkenberg · filed 2014-12-16

Nevertheless, because the proposal in this case deprived Paduru of the ability to evaluate and independently act to resolve the case against her, we conclude that the proposal is invalid, unenforceable, and may not form the basis of an award of attorney’s fees and costs under section 768.79.

Section 768.79’s thirty-day deadline for seeking fees is procedural, so a federal court sitting in diversity applies its local filing deadline.

Chang v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. · filed 2015-09-25(6)

The Supreme Court of Florida has interpreted the thirty-day time period of Section 768.79 as procedural. ... Under Erie, then, the Court’s local rules govern this dispute over attorney’s fees and costs.

A settlement offer served before Rule 1.442(b)’s 90-day waiting period does not support attorney’s fees under § 768.79 in federal court.

Divine Motel Group, LLC v. Rockhill Insurance Company · filed 2018-01-12

The parties agree that Rockhill did not comply with the 90-day waiting period found in Rule 1.442(b). Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding that Rockhill was not entitled to attorneys’ fees under § 768.79, and we affirm.

Section 768.79(6) requires a party seeking fees based on an offer of judgment to move for fees within 30 days after judgment or dismissal.

JOHN A. CATALO and CATALO APPRAISAL & REALTY, INC. v. LLANO FINANCING GROUP, LLC · filed 2018-02-14(6)

Additionally, section 768.79, Florida Statutes, requires the party seeking fees pursuant to an offer of judgment to file its motion for attorneys’ fees within 30 days after the entry of judgment or after voluntary or involuntary dismissal.

Section 768.79’s time to accept a settlement offer is not tolled by filing a motion to enlarge under rule 1.090.

Koppel v. Ochoa · filed 2018-05-17(1)

The Second District was correct in its conclusion that the filing of a motion to enlarge pursuant to rule 1.090 does not toll the time to accept an offer of settlement made under section 768.79.

Section 768.79 requires a timely offer of judgment to recover attorney's fees.

Smith v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. · filed 2019-03-29

As noted earlier, Judge Toomey recommends that the Court deny the motion because Plaintiff failed to make an offer of judgment within the timeframe required by Section 768.79, Fla. Statutes. ... The Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (Doc. 288) as the opinion of the Court.

A partial summary judgment that leaves a claim pending does not end the 30-day period for accepting an offer under section 768.79.

INSPIRED PRODUCTS GROUP, LLC d/b/a KIDSEMBRACE, LLC v. INSPIRED DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC · filed 2021-11-17(1)

We agree with KidsEmbrace that the trial court’s summary judgment order did not terminate IDG’s thirty-day window for accepting KidsEmbrace’s proposal for settlement.

A proposal requiring payment within the 30-day period does not shorten section 768.79(4)'s acceptance period when payment and written acceptance can occur simultaneously.

ALBERT GHAZZAWIEH AND INSTALLATION CORP. & CONSTRUCTION, LLC vs IGLESIAS · filed 2022-04-08(4)

Specifically, Appellants contend that the proposals for settlement improperly shortened the 30–day time period for acceptance of a proposal for settlement provided in section 768.79(4), Florida Statutes (2017), and rule 1.442(f)(1). We reject that argument. As Iglesias correctly observes, a tender of payment and a written acceptance of the proposal for settlement could have been made simultaneously. Thus, we conclude that the proposals for settlement served below did not shorten the time period for acceptance.

Section 768.79(6)'s deadline for seeking fees and costs yields to the procedural deadline in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(g).

Oglesby-Dorminey v. Lucy Ho's Restaurant · filed 2002-05-07(6)

More than two years before the present case was tried, the Florida Supreme Court decided the Gulliver Academy case, establishing beyond peradventure that the time limit then ... set forth in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(g) controlled, rather than any statutory provision.

Section 768.79 permits a defendant to recover attorney's fees after a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses its claim only if the dismissal is with prejudice.

Gammie v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. · filed 1998-11-25

In order for a defendant to recover attorney's fees under the offer of judgment statute following a plaintiff's voluntary dismissal of its claim, the dismissal must be with prejudice.

Section 768.79 fee awards bear interest only from the entry of the judgment determining entitlement to fees.

Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co. v. TB & Associates, Inc. · filed 1997-05-16

Entitlement to attorney’s fees based on an offer of judgment pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1995) is not determined for the purpose of assessing interest on the fees until the entry of the judgment making the determination of the entitlement to such fees.

Section 768.79(1), together with section 59.46, supports an award of appellate attorney’s fees.

Lantigua v. Lopes · filed 1997-07-09(1)

With regard to the appellees’ motion for appellate attorney’s fees, pursuant to sections 768.79(1) and 59.46, Florida Statutes (1995), the fees sought are granted.

Section 768.79 permits attorney's fees when the verdict is 25% greater than the offer of judgment.

Pizzarelli v. Rollins · filed 1997-12-19

Appellant's motion for attorney's fees under section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1991), is granted inasmuch as the reinstatement makes the verdict 25% greater than the offer of judgment.

Under section 768.79, reasonable attorney's fees accrued before a fee-inclusive offer must be accounted for when determining whether the judgment is more than 25% below the offer.

Stephenson v. Holiday Rambler Corp. · filed 1998-03-18

However, we conclude that where an offer is made inclusive of fees, in good faith as found here, the offeror also has a burden to demonstrate that the 25% required disparity exists within the offer exclusive of a reasonable fee. ... On remand, the court should calculate Plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees up to the time of the offer, and then add this amount to the final judgment. If this amount is more that 25% less than the offer, then Defendant should be awarded attorney's fees under § 768.79, assuming the trial court finds that this offer was made in good faith.

Section 768.79 makes a fee award mandatory when its requirements are met, unless the offer was not made in good faith; close factual and legal questions do not justify denying fees.

Hartley v. Guetzloe · filed 1998-07-02(1)

An award of attorney's fees is mandatory under section 768.79, where the requirements of the statute are met, unless the trial court determines the offer was not made in good faith. ... Instead, the reason for the denial of the motion for attorney's fees was because the questions of fact and law were extremely close. We find this an improper basis on which to deny the motion for attorney fees.

Section 768.79 permits appellate attorney's fees, but the party seeking them must file a motion in the appellate court under rule 9.400(b).

Respiratory Care v. Murray D. Shear, Pa · filed 1998-07-31

The holding in Williams, that appellate fees are recoverable under section 768,79, is correctly interpreted to mean only that upon proper motion to the appellate court, section 768.79 provides a basis for attorney's fees. It in no way states or implies that section 768.79 supersedes the procedural requirements of rule 9.400(b).

Section 768.79(6) allows a defendant to recover offer-of-judgment attorney fees after a dismissal only if the dismissal is with prejudice, including a second voluntary dismissal.

MX INVESTMENTS INC. v. Crawford · filed 1997-09-04(6)

We construe the terms "voluntary dismissal" and "involuntary dismissal" in section 768.79(6), Florida Statutes (1991), to mean a dismissal with prejudice so that the dismissal is the basis for a judgment of no liability as contemplated in section 768.79(1), Florida Statutes (1991). Thus, only when a plaintiff's voluntarily dismissal is with prejudice or is a second voluntary dismissal is the defendant entitled to attorney fees in accord with section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1991).

Section 768.79 provides no entitlement to attorney’s fees unless the case is dismissed with prejudice.

Association Employers Insurance Co. v. American Excavating & PSI, Inc. · filed 1997-10-03

At the time the trial court entered its judgment, it did not have the benefit of the supreme court’s opinion in MX Investments, Inc. v. Crawford, 700 So.2d 640 (Fla.1997), which clarifies that no entitlement to attorney’s fees arises under section 768.79 unless the ease is dismissed with prejudice. Accordingly, we reverse.

Section 768.79 does not authorize attorney’s fees after a voluntary dismissal without prejudice.

Aero Toy Store, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co. · filed 1999-02-10

Further, since Aero’s voluntary dismissal should have been without prejudice, an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to Section 768.79, Florida Statutes was improper.

Section 768.79 does not authorize attorney fees when an action is voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.

Hornaday v. Graden · filed 1999-02-24

The co-representatives and Allstate correctly concede that MX mandates a reversal of any fees imposed under section 768.79. We therefore reverse those portions of the subject orders, which award fees pursuant to that statutory provision.

Section 768.79(6)(a) does not authorize offer-of-judgment fees after a voluntary dismissal without prejudice or an involuntary dismissal for failure to join an indispensable party.

Tucker v. Ohren · filed 1999-09-01(6)(a)

The attorney's fees awards were also erroneously based on offers of judgment. The supreme court has interpreted section 768.79(6)(a), Florida Statutes, as limiting attorney's fees on an offer of judgment after voluntary dismissal to those cases where the voluntary dismissal is with prejudice. ... Similarly, as to the award against Tucker, the involuntary dismissal was not an adjudication on the merits because it was based on the failure to join an indispensable party.

Section 768.79 does not authorize attorney's fees after a plaintiff's first voluntary dismissal without prejudice.

Commonwealth Property Associates, Inc. v. Suntrust Bank · filed 2002-12-20

Because Commonwealth and S.W. Enterprise dismissed their claims without prejudice, and it was their first voluntary dismissal of the claims, SunTrust was not entitled to recover attorney's fees pursuant to the offers of judgment that it had made in the consolidated case.

Section 768.79 does not authorize fees based on a dismissal with prejudice when the offeror knowingly benefited from another defendant’s payment to settle and release the claim.

Central Motor Co. v. Shaw · filed 2009-01-14

Because Shaw agreed to the dismissal with prejudice against both defendants as part of the terms of the settlement, and since Central Motor knowingly benefitted from the $10,000.00 payment on its behalf to secure, not only Hyundai Finance's, but Central Motor's release from litigation, the dismissal with prejudice here should not be considered a basis for an award of attorney's fees and costs within the meaning of the offer of judgment statute.

Section 768.79 does not authorize fees and costs based on a plaintiff’s first voluntary dismissal without prejudice because it is not an adjudication on the merits.

Smith v. Loews Miami Beach Hotel Operating Co. · filed 2010-05-12

Similarly, in the instant case, the Hotel is not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and costs because Smith’s voluntary dismissal was her first notice of dismissal, her voluntary dismissal was without prejudice, and her voluntary dismissal did not operate as an adjudication on the merits.

Section 768.79 does not authorize appellate attorney’s fees when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the case without prejudice.

Mejia v. United Automobile Insurance Co. · filed 2012-02-15

United Auto is not entitled to an award of appellate attorney’s fees pursuant to section 768.79, because Mejia’s voluntary dismissal of his case was without prejudice.

Section 768.79 does not authorize attorney’s fees for defending a claim voluntarily dismissed without prejudice, even when another claim remains.

Scherer Construction & Engineering of Central Florida, LLC v. Scott Partnership Architecture, Inc. · filed 2014-11-07

Because attorney’s fees for the defense of a claim voluntarily dismissed without prejudice are not recoverable pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2013), we reverse that portion of the Final Judgment on Fees awarding fees relative to the voluntarily dismissed indemnification count. ... Although the cited case law discusses the impact of the voluntary dismissal of an entire case, the analysis is equally applicable where, as here, the voluntary dismissal was as to one of two claims.

Section 768.79 does not entitle a defendant to attorney’s fees after a dismissal without prejudice that leaves no judgment of no liability or adjudication on the merits.

JOHN ANNESSER v. INNOVATIVE SERVICE TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. · filed 2022-08-17

Nothing on the record constitutes a dismissal with prejudice or final judgment or adjudication on the merits in favor of Annesser.

Section 768.79 permits attorney fees for claims adjudicated on the merits even when another claim in the same action is voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.

CodeVentures, LLC v. Vital Motion Inc. · filed 2023-03-27(1)

So, under the prevailing Florida caselaw, the district court was authorized to award fees to the O&D Defendants for the counts that were adjudicated on the merits.

Section 768.79(6) allows fees and costs after an unaccepted offer when an involuntary dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits.

Creative Hardscapes, LLC v. Prawdzik · filed 2024-11-08(6)

The proposal for settlement is included in the record on appeal, and since Demonico concedes that Creative served a demand or offer of judgment under section 768.79, and since the motion for fees was timely filed and the second dismissal order acted as an adjudication on the merits, Creative is entitled to attorney’s fees and costs.

Section 768.79 does not provide a basis for attorney’s fees in this post-dissolution asset ownership dispute.

Cleary v. Hough · filed 1990-10-10

Since section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1987), is not a proper basis for an award of attorney’s fees in this case, the trial court also erred by awarding attorney’s fees to the appellee.

Section 768.79 applies to an interpleader action when the underlying claim seeks damages for breach of contract.

VIP Real Estate v. Florida Ex. Realty · filed 1995-02-15

Finally, appellants contend that section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1993), applies only to actions for damages. We accept that proposition for present purposes. We do not, however, accept appellants' extension of that reasoning to a rule that the statute could never apply to an action of interpleader. The real issue in this case is entitlement to a real estate commission. In essence, what was sought was damages for breach of contract. The fact that the procedural device employed was an interpleader action does not make it any less an action for damages.

Section 768.79 applies to an interpleader action involving competing creditors’ claims to a fund when the essential dispute is over money.

Burtman v. Porchester Holdings, Inc. · filed 1996-10-16

Although the connection between the specific interplead funds and the competing claims is more tenuous in this case, there is no basis to conclude that the legislature did not intend the statute to apply to competing creditor’s claims against a fund where the essential issue is clearly a dispute over money.

Section 768.79 does not apply to an offer of judgment made during an appeal concerning only the amount of taxed costs.

DELEUW, CATHER & COMPANY v. Grogis · filed 1995-09-20

Since this proceeding only involves the correctness of the amount of costs taxed by the trial court, section 768.79 is inapplicable. We therefore grant appellant's motion to strike the offer of judgment and the motions pertaining thereto.

Section 768.79 applies to civil actions seeking money damages, including claims for breach of contract and on the common counts.

BEYEL BROS. CRANE & RIGGING v. Ace Transp. · filed 1995-12-13

Because an action for damages for breach of contract and on the common counts is indisputably "a civil action for damages," there can be no doubt that the action below was within section 768.79.

Section 768.79 applies to an action seeking a real estate commission as damages, even when the action also seeks declaratory relief.

Coast to Coast Real Estate v. Waterfront · filed 1996-02-28

Similarly, the real issue in this case centered on entitlement to a real estate commission and Coast's claim for damages for breach of contract. The trial court awarded damages to Coast based on its entitlement to a commission for the sale of the Soukup property. Therefore, we hold, as this court did in V.I.P., this case was for damages and section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1993) applies to this action.

Section 768.79 applies to an interpleader action when the essential dispute is over money.

Duncan v. Prudential Ins. Co. · filed 1997-04-01

In case no. 96-3450, Margaret appeals an award of attorney's fees in Carmen's favor, based on the offer of judgment statute, section 768.79, Fla. Stat., contending that the statute was not applicable to the previous interpleader action because it was an equitable action, the offer was not made in good faith, and Carmen was not the prevailing party. We disagree. The statute applies to any civil action for damages, see, e.g., Burtman v. Porchester Holdings, Inc., 680 So.2d 631 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)(essential issue clearly a dispute over money), insofar as this record shows, the good faith issue was not raised below, and Carmen was the prevailing party in that action.

Section 768.79 permits an underinsured motorist carrier joined as a defendant to make an offer of judgment independently of the tortfeasor.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marko · filed 1997-06-20

We reject that position and conclude that State Farm as the underinsured liability carrier could make an offer of judgment under section 768.79 independent of any offer, or lack of offer, by the tortfeasor, Mayer.

Section 768.79's attorney fee remedy is subject to section 768.28(8)'s 25% cap on fees awarded against a sovereign in tort cases.

City of Live Oak v. Harris · filed 1997-12-08(1)

Therefore section 768.28(8) controls over section 768.79.

Section 768.79 does not support an attorney’s fee award against an insurer when the demand for judgment was made only against its insured.

Feltzin v. Bernard · filed 1998-08-05

Prior to trial Bernard served a demand for judgment upon defendant Feltzin for the sum of $10,000, pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1995). No demand for judgment was made against Oak Casualty, Felt-zin’s liability insurance carrier. In fact, counsel for Bernard acknowledged during the motion for attorney’s fees that Oak Casualty was not a party to the motion for attorney’s fees against Feltzin. Accordingly, we conclude that the order granting attorney’s fees against Oak Casualty must be reversed.

Section 768.79 applies to both conventional and legal subrogation claims seeking monetary remedies.

Stewart v. Tasnet, Inc. · filed 1998-04-15(1)

Nevertheless, we conclude section 768.79 applies to all claims for subrogation. Subrogation claims are civil actions seeking monetary remedies on the theory that the plaintiff was damaged by being required to pay the debt of another.

Section 768.79 applies to class actions because its offer of judgment provisions cover any civil action for damages.

Oruga Corp. v. AT&T WIRELESS OF FLORIDA · filed 1998-06-10(1)

Nevertheless, we conclude that we cannot, by judicial fiat, exempt class actions from section 768.79 whose plain and unambiguous language states that it is applicable to any civil action for damages.

Section 768.79 does not authorize attorney's fees against a nonparty insurer that was neither named in nor served with the plaintiff's demand for judgment.

Sparks v. Barnes · filed 1999-09-10(2)(b), (3)

Both statute and rule speak clearly and only in terms of offers by "plaintiffs" to "defendants" and proposals to be made to a "party" or "parties." Both statute and rule require that the offer or proposal be served upon that party to whom it is made. Oak Casualty was not a "party" or "defendant" to Barnes's action against Sparks and was not served with the offer made by Barnes to Sparks.

Section 768.79 does not authorize an offer-of-judgment fee award against an unsuccessful FDCPA plaintiff because the FDCPA preempts that remedy.

Clayton v. Bryan · filed 2000-02-25

We conclude that the trial court correctly denied an award of attorney's fees to C & M based on its finding that the offer of judgment statute is preempted by the FDCPA.

Section 768.79 applies to personal injury protection claims, allowing an insurer to seek attorney's fees through an offer of judgment.

US SEC. Ins. Co. v. Cahuasqui · filed 2000-07-05(1)

Because we find the offer of judgment statute, section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1997), to be applicable to PIP claims, we answer the certified question in the affirmative.

Section 768.79 applies only to actions for damages, so an offer of judgment in a proceeding to revoke a will does not support attorney's fees.

Miller v. Hayman · filed 2000-08-16

The offer of judgment statute, section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1997), is limited to actions "for damages," and accordingly, notwithstanding appellees' argument that this case was "at all times, about money," the offer of judgment under this statute was not valid in this action seeking to revoke a will.

Section 768.79 does not permit recovery of offer-of-judgment attorney’s fees from a liability insurer that was not a party.

Meyer v. Alexandre · filed 2000-12-13

Under similar circumstances, the Second District Court of Appeal concluded that the plaintiff could not recover attorney’s fees against a liability insurer, which was not a party, under the offer of judgment statute. ... We agree with the reasoning of Sparks and affirm.

Section 768.79 permits a defendant to recover reasonable attorney's fees after a rejected offer of judgment and a defense verdict in a nursing home damages action; section 400.023 does not displace that entitlement.

NATIONAL HEALTHCORP v. Close · filed 2001-01-17(1)

The legislative purpose of section 768.79 is to encourage the early settlement and termination of litigation in civil cases generally. ... By ruling that the legislature intended to exclude a defendant's entitlement to attorney's fees under section 400.023, the trial court improperly eliminated the role of the offer of judgment statute and rules of procedure appertaining. On remand the trial court shall award the defendant's attorneys a reasonable fee.

Section 768.79 does not apply to a declaratory action whose real issue is insurance coverage when the suit does not directly request money damages or payment of money.

National Indem. Co. v. CONSOLIDATED INS. · filed 2001-01-24

In its second point, NIC argues that the trial court erred in striking its offer of settlement made pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1999). The trial court determined that the declaratory judgment was not a civil action for damages within the meaning of the statute. We agree. We have looked to whether the "real issue" is one for damages or declaratory relief. See Nelson v. Marine Group of Palm Beach, Inc., 677 So.2d 998 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). The "real issue" in this case is insurance coverage for an underlying tort action. No money damages or payment of money is directly requested in this suit, as it was in Nelson, and we conclude that the trial court's ruling was correct.

Section 768.79(1) cannot support an attorney's fee award to a prevailing defendant in a section 1983 action because 42 U.S.C. § 1988 preempts it.

Chapman v. Laitner · filed 2002-02-06(1)

Chapman also appeals from the award of attorney's fees. We reverse based on the factually indistinguishable case of Moran v. City of Lakeland, 694 So.2d 886 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). In Moran, the Second District held that section 768.79(1) is preempted by 42 U.S.C. § 1988 "because section 1988 allows the award of attorney's fees to prevailing defendants in a much more limited context than does section 768.79(1)." Moran, 694 So.2d at 887.

Section 768.79(6)(a) does not treat wrongful death survivors as having rejected an offer that only the personal representative could accept.

Thompson v. Hodson · filed 2002-05-09(6)(a)

Accordingly, we do not perceive that the survivors, out of whose share of the recovery an attorney's fee would ultimately be paid to Dr. Hodson, can be fairly said to have not accepted the offer of settlement.

Section 768.79(1) does not authorize attorney's fees in an in rem forfeiture proceeding because it is not a civil action for damages.

Rosado v. Bieluch · filed 2002-10-16(1)

As an in rem proceeding, a forfeiture action is not a "civil action for damages."

Section 768.79 permits an award of offer-of-judgment fees and costs in a wrongful death action against the personal representative and estate, but not against the survivors or their recovery.

Walker v. Bozeman · filed 2003-02-11

In short, on any fair reading of Thompson, fees and costs based on the offer of judgment can be awarded only against the personal representative and can be recovered only as claims against the estate; the fees and costs cannot be recovered from the survivors or offset against the judgment rendered for their benefit.

Section 768.79 permits an insurer to recover attorney's fees through a valid offer of judgment in an insured's action for personal injury protection benefits.

Nichols v. State Farm Mut. · filed 2003-06-13

May an insurer recover attorney's fees under rule 1.442, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, and section 768.79, Florida Statutes, in an action brought by its insured to recover under a personal injury protection policy? We answer the question in the affirmative.

Section 768.79 applies to offers of judgment in actions brought by insureds to recover PIP benefits.

Gurney v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. · filed 2004-11-19

The first certified question regarding the applicability of the proposal for settlement in PIP cases is answered in the affirmative in accordance with Nichols.

Section 768.79 applies when an action is for damages, even if it is framed as a foreclosure.

Novastar Mortgage, Inc. v. Strassburger · filed 2003-07-30

We affirm, however, because the Strassburgers were entitled to fees under our offer of judgment statute, section 768.79. ... We agree with the Strassburgers that this was in fact an action for damages and that the offer of judgment statute accordingly applies.

Section 768.79 applies to cases brought under section 627.736 and to cases pending in small claims court.

Tran v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. · filed 2003-10-28

Section 768.79, Florida Statutes, applies to cases brought pursuant to section 627.736, Florida Statutes, and to cases pending in small claims court.

Section 768.79 applies to civil actions for damages and has no counterpart in dissolution of marriage proceedings.

Levy v. Levy · filed 2005-04-29

In fact, the statute concerning offers of judgment, section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2002), is limited by its own terms to civil actions for damages and has no counterpart in proceedings for dissolution of marriage.

Section 768.79(1) applies to a declaratory judgment action when the real issue is entitlement to money damages.

DiPompeo Construction Corp. v. Kimmel & Associates, Inc. · filed 2005-11-02(1)

Here the real issue in the case involved damages — whether DiPompeo owed the $20,000 commission to Kimmel — so that the offer of judgment statute applied.

Section 768.79’s mandatory attorney’s fee award cannot apply in a federal-question case when it conflicts with the fee standard for Title VII claims.

Keesee v. Bank of America, NA · filed 2005-06-01(1)

Regardless of how an Erie analysis would turn out, the beginning and end of the analysis in this federal-question case is whether Section 768.79 is inconsistent with federal law. Section 768.79, as discussed, is inconsistent and must yield.

Section 768.79(1) allows a defendant to recover attorney's fees after a qualifying rejected offer of judgment in a Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act suit because the federal Act does not preempt it.

Marcy v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. · filed 2006-02-24(1)

We are persuaded by the logic of these opinions that the MMWA is not in conflict with either section 768.79 or rule 1.442. We are likewise convinced that the MMWA does not preempt Florida law in connection with the issue of attorneys' fees, and that the enforcement of section 768.79 and rule 1.442 does not undermine the policies and purposes of the MMWA.

Section 768.79(1) permits a defendant to recover attorney's fees after a rejected offer of judgment and a judgment of no liability in a Magnuson-Moss Act suit; the federal Act does not preempt that remedy.

Talbott v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. · filed 2006-08-02(1)

Because section 768.79 and the Magnuson-Moss Act do not conflict either in language or in purpose, we conclude that section 768.79 is not preempted by the federal statute.

Section 768.79 permits an award of attorney’s fees to a defendant despite the FMLA because the FMLA does not preempt the award.

Bright v. Department of Education · filed 2007-11-30

We find the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 does not preempt the award of attorney’s fees to a defendant pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2006), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442.

In a wrongful death action with joint personal representatives, a valid demand for judgment must be served by both representatives acting in that capacity.

Martinez v. Ipox · filed 2006-04-07

Because the proposal for settlement that served as the basis for the award of attorneys' fees in this case was not served by both the Ipoxes as joint personal representatives, the trial court erred in relying on it.

Section 768.79 applies to suits seeking damages for breach of a personal injury protection insurance contract.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nichols · filed 2006-06-01(1)

The phrase "any civil action for damages" unambiguously includes suits to recover damages for breach of a PIP insurance contract. We therefore conclude that the offer of judgment statute encompasses such cases.

Section 768.79 does not authorize offer-of-judgment fees for a prevailing FCRA defendant when section 760.11(5) precludes a fee award.

Yoder Bros., Inc. v. Weygant · filed 2008-01-25

We agree with Weygant that by incorporating the federal case law governing awards of attorney's fees under Title VII into section 760.11(5), the legislature has limited when a prevailing defendant may obtain an award of fees. Thus, permitting a defendant to obtain an award of attorney's fees pursuant to the offer of judgment statute when it would be precluded from doing so under section 760.11(5) seems to us to be inconsistent with what the legislature intended when it expressly adopted federal case law governing awards of attorney's fees under Title VII.

Section 768.79 applies to Florida-law claims in bankruptcy proceedings and is not preempted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68.

Menchise v. Senterfitt · filed 2008-07-02

Section 768.79 applies in this bankruptcy proceeding, cannot be interpreted to discriminate against a federal forum, and is not preempted by Rule 68.

Section 768.79 applies only to Florida law claims and does not authorize fees when a federal court resolves the federal claims but dismisses the Florida claims without deciding them.

Design Pallets, Inc. v. Gray Robinson, P.A. · filed 2008-10-07(1)

Where the Court has both a federal question and supplemental or diversity jurisdiction over Florida claims, § 768.79 applies only to the Florida claims. However, should the Court dispose of all the federal claims, not address the Florida claims by declining to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction, and then dismiss the Florida claims without prejudice, § 768.79 is not triggered because the defendant was not a prevailing party with respect to any of the State claims.

Section 768.79 does not authorize attorney’s fees based on a general settlement proposal covering both damages claims and independent claims for nonmonetary relief.

Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc. v. Equestrian Club Estates Property Owners Ass'n · filed 2009-11-18

Because the proposals for settlement addressed a complaint that included non-damages claims, they do not comply with the statute, and we find them invalid and reverse the trial court’s order awarding fees.

Section 768.79 does not permit attorney’s fees on nonfrivolous civil rights claims arising from the same facts, even after an offer of judgment.

Alansari v. Tropic Star Seafood Inc. · filed 2010-09-09(1)

Thus, because Florida law prevents awards ... of attorneys’ fees, even after an offer of judgment, in state and federal civil rights cases absent a showing of frivolity, the court did not err in declining to award fees under section 768.79.

Section 768.79 does not authorize attorney’s fees for an action that is, at its heart, for declaratory relief rather than damages.

Hon Realty Corp. v. First American Title Insurance · filed 2010-11-18

Under Florida law, an offer of judgment is unenforceable for taxing attorneys’ fees and costs if the case is not a civil action for damages. ... Because this case is, at its heart, a declaratory action and not a civil action for damages as First American argues, we affirm.

Section 768.79 cannot support an award of appellate attorney’s fees in a section 1983 action because section 1988(b) preempts it.

City National Bank of Florida v. City of Tampa · filed 2011-04-06

We also hold that the City is not entitled to appellate attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 768.79 because section 1988(b) preempts section 768,79.

Section 768.79 does not apply when a plaintiff seeks both monetary damages and injunctive relief as part of the same claim.

Winter Park Imports, Inc. v. JM Family Enterprises · filed 2011-07-01

Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks both monetary damages and injunctive relief as part of the same claim(s), section 768.79, Florida Statutes, does not apply.

Section 768.79 is substantive for Erie purposes and applies in federal diversity court.

Horowitch v. DIAMOND AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES, INC. · filed 2011-07-07

Accordingly, we conclude that the offer of judgment statute is substantive as a matter of this Court’s precedent.

Section 768.79 creates a substantive right to costs and attorney’s fees but does not apply when the parties agree to be governed by another jurisdiction’s substantive law.

Southeast Floating Docks, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co. · filed 2012-02-02(1)

Florida’s offer of judgment statute, set forth in section 768.79, creates a substantive right to costs and attorney’s fees upon the satisfaction of certain conditions. Accordingly, under a conflict of law analysis, when parties have agreed to be bound by the substantive law of another jurisdiction, section 768.79 simply does not apply.

Section 768.79 is substantive for choice of law purposes and does not apply when the parties choose another jurisdiction’s substantive law to govern their contract.

Auto-Owners Insurance Company v. Southeast Floating Docks, Inc. · filed 2012-04-05

The Supreme Court of Florida answered the certified question in the negative, holding that §768.79 is substantive in nature for conflict of laws purposes, that no sufficient public policy concerns override the parties’ right to choose the law of a particular forum that governs the substantive portions ... of their contract, and thus that §768.79 simply does not apply. ... we affirm on the ground articulated by the Supreme Court of Florida.

Section 768.79 did not support an award of attorney’s fees after Minnesota law was applied to the first-party bad faith claim.

Higgins v. West Bend Mutual Insurance · filed 2012-03-30

West Bend’s motion for attorney’s fees under section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2007), is denied.

Section 768.79 does not authorize fees on a general offer resolving all claims when the action seeks both damages and equitable relief, even if the equitable claim lacks serious merit.

Diamond Aircraft Industries, Inc. v. Horowitch · filed 2013-01-10(1)

We hold that section 768.79 does not apply to an action in which a plaintiff seeks both damages and equitable relief, and in which the defendant has served a general offer of judgment that seeks release of all claims. We further conclude that there is no basis to establish an exception for instances in which the equitable claim lacks serious merit.

Section 768.79’s settlement enforcement provision does not give a federal court continuing jurisdiction after dismissal when the court has not retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement.

De Varona v. Discount Auto Parts, LLC · filed 2013-03-21(4)

Plaintiff cannot, therefore, rely on a Florida substantive provision, section 768.79, to get around the effective application of Rule 41.

Section 768.79 does not apply to a general offer seeking release of both equitable and monetary claims.

Bull Motors, LLC v. Borders · filed 2013-12-26

The offer of judgment statute, section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2007), does not apply to cases that, as here, involve a general offer seeking release of all claims in the case, both equitable and monetary.

Section 768.79 applies when Florida law governs claims on which the offeror prevailed, even if other claims may be governed by another state’s law.

American Home Assurance Co. v. Weaver Aggregate Transport, Inc. · filed 2015-02-26

And, despite Weaver’s arguments to the contrary, it is clear from the facts and evidence adduced at trial and this Court’s jury instructions that Florida law applied at least to American Home’s fraudulent inducement and unjust enrichment claims — claims that American Home prevailed on, and in which the jury awarded damages in the amount of $404,013.00 (Doc. 232) — thereby rendering Fla. Stat. § 768.79 applicable.

Section 768.79 permits an offer of judgment to support attorney’s fees when the plaintiff pursues only money damages, even if the complaint also requests an injunction.

MYD Marine Distributor, Inc. v. International Paint Ltd. · filed 2016-04-13(1)

By its own terms, section 768.79 applies only to “civil action[s] for damages.” ... Specifically, the trial court found that MYD did not actually pursue any nonmonetary relief during the course of the litigation and instead only sought money damages. In this scenario, it correctly concluded that International Paint’s offers of judgment were enforceable.

Section 768.79 does not apply in dissolution of marriage proceedings.

Nancy Palmer, n/k/a Nancy Walgis v. Palmer · filed 2016-08-09

Neither section 45.061(4), Florida Statutes, the statute entitled “Offers of Settlement,” nor section 768.79, Florida Statutes, the statute regarding offers and demands of judgment in civil actions for damages, applies in dissolution of marriage proceedings.

Section 768.79(1) applies when the real issue is damages, even if the complaint makes a passing reference to equitable relief.

Faith Freight Forwarding Corp. v. Anias · filed 2016-09-07(1)

The Employee’s passing reference to “equitable relief” in the operative complaint does not change our conclusion, particularly where, as here, the Employer could not identify any equitable relief that was ever at issue in the discovery or trial of this matter.

Section 768.79(1) applies to an action for damages despite a passing reference to equitable relief when no equitable relief was actually at issue.

Faith Freight Forwarding Corp. v. Anias · filed 2016-09-28(1)

The Employee’s passing reference to “equitable relief” in the operative complaint does not change our conclusion, particularly where, as here, the Employer could not identify any equitable relief that was ever at issue in the discovery or trial of this matter.

Section 768.79 allows attorney’s fees when the essence of the suit is an action for damages.

Baldwin v. Idoni · filed 2017-01-23

We disagree. The essence of the suit was an action for damages.

Section 768.79 applies when a complaint seeks damages, even if it labels a count as declaratory relief.

Polk County v. Highlands-In-The-Woods, L.L.C. · filed 2017-05-19

Because Polk County's proposal for settlement satisfied the requirements of rule 1.442 and Highlands' complaint alleged an action for damages, not equitable relief, we reverse and remand for the trial court to grant Polk County's attorney fee motion and to determine the amount of reasonable attorney fees.

Section 768.79(1) applies when the true relief sought is money damages, even if the complaint includes declaratory judgment counts.

Tower Hill Signature Ins. Co. v. Javellana · filed 2017-12-13(1)

Therefore, reading Diamond Aircraft in tandem with Nelson and DiPompeo, we conclude that this case is an “action for damages,” within the meaning of section 768.79(1), because it is plain that the true relief sought by the Javellanas was money damages for a breach of contract, rather than equitable relief.

Section 768.79 does not authorize attorney fees in an action seeking both monetary damages and equitable relief, even if the equitable claim fails as a matter of law.

Davenport v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc. · filed 2016-10-04

Because the Florida Supreme Court has clearly held that the Florida offer of judgment statute, Fla. Stat. § 768.79, does not apply to actions seeking both monetary damages and equitable relief, Thor is not entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs.

Section 768.79 does not provide attorney’s fees when the parties agree that another jurisdiction’s substantive law governs the case.

Heartland Express, Inc. of Iowa v. Farber · filed 2017-09-29

The supreme court held that “because an award of attorney’s fees under Florida’s offer of judgment statute is a substantive right, section 768.79' will not apply in instances where the parties have agreed to be governed by the substantive law of another jurisdiction.” ... Based upon such, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Cross-Appellant’s attorney’s fee motio.n.

Section 768.79 does not authorize attorney’s fees for a general offer settling both equitable and monetary claims.

Highland Holdings, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Casualty Company · filed 2018-03-12(1)

The district court did not err by denying the motion of Mid-Continent to recover its attorney’s fees under section 768.79. Mid-Continent made a general offer of judgment to settle “all claims” in the amended complaint, and that pleading sought both equitable relief and a monetary judgment.

Section 768.79 does not authorize attorney’s fees based on a general offer to settle both damages and equitable claims.

SOUTHERN SPECIALTIES, INC. v. FARMHOUSE TOMATOES, INC · filed 2018-11-21(1)

With respect to the order granting attorney’s fees under section 768.79, Florida Statutes, we reverse. Farmhouse’s offer of judgment stated that it would resolve “all claims” by either party against the other. Based upon Southern’s complaint, those claims included both monetary and equitable claims, including its claim for injunctive relief. Because the offer was directed at all claims made by Southern, it was invalid.

Section 768.79 does not authorize attorney’s fees when a plaintiff seeks both damages and equitable relief and a defendant’s offer seeks to settle all claims.

B&D Nutritional Ingredients, Inc. v. Unique Bio Ingredients, LLC · filed 2021-04-06(1)

In sum, and for the reasons we have explained, Sudha and Unique India cannot recover attorney’s fees under § 768.79 because B&D sought both damages and equitable relief, and the defendants served general offers of judgment that sought the release of all claims.

Section 768.79 does not authorize offer-of-judgment fees for a claim decided under California law when Florida law governs none of its issues.

Lawrence v. Ace American Insurance Company · filed 2019-11-13

Accordingly, the Court agrees with ACE that Florida’s Offer of Judgment rule is not applicable to Lawrence’s claim, which was decided under California law.

Section 768.79 does not authorize attorney’s fees for an offer of judgment when all claims are brought under federal law in federal court.

Rivas v. Pollack and Rosen, P.A. · filed 2020-03-17

Additionally, the Motion’s representation that Defendants are entitled to an award based on Fla. Stat. § 768.79 is entirely misplaced. That statute has no bearing in this action. All of Plaintiff’s claims were brought in federal court and pursuant to federal law.

Section 768.79 applies only to Florida state law claims, not federal claims.

OJ Commerce LLC v. KidKraft, Inc. · filed 2022-03-17

It is true that Fla. Stat. § 768.79 applies only to the Florida state law claims—not Plaintiffs’ federal claims.

Section 768.79 applies when an offer or demand for judgment targets only damages claims, even if the action also includes claims for equitable relief.

Raymond Devindra Bhairo · filed 2021-07-15

Because the reasoning of Diamond Aircraft does not extend to cases like this one, this Court concludes that section 768.79, Florida Statutes, does apply to an action involving claims for damages and equitable relief when an offer or demand for judgment is directed only to the damages claims.

Section 768.79 applies to a suit that includes a declaratory judgment claim when the true relief sought is monetary.

Wickboldt v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company · filed 2021-09-28(1)

The statute applies here because the “true relief” sought by Plaintiff was monetary rather than nonmonetary.

Section 768.79 applies when the relief actually sought is money damages, even if the complaint also makes a nominal request for nonmonetary relief.

Illoominate Media, Inc. v. Cair Florida, Inc. · filed 2022-09-30(1)

Florida state courts interpret Diamond Aircraft by looking beyond the procedural posture of a complaint to assess the “true relief” a party seeks, and apply section 768.79 if it is damages. ... Viewed through this prism, the lower courts appropriately applied the statute here.

Section 768.79 applies to shareholder derivative suits because they are civil actions for damages.

MARK SPANAKOS v. HAWK SYSTEMS, INC. · filed 2023-04-19(1)

Derivative lawsuits are not exempt from section 768.79. By its plain terms, section 768.79 applies to “any civil action for damages” and does not contain an exception for shareholder derivative suits.

Section 768.79 can apply to bankruptcy proceedings for money damages governed by Florida law, but not to proceedings governed by federal law.

Straub v. 160 Royal Palm, LLC · filed 2023-08-14

However, Florida’s Offer of Judgment Statute does not apply to bankruptcy proceedings governed by federal law.

Section 768.79 does not authorize a separate award of attorney’s fees or non-taxable costs against the United States in an FTCA action without a federal waiver of sovereign immunity.

Porras v. United States · filed 2023-12-08

The court thus finds that Defendant has not waived its sovereign immunity under either the FTCA or the EAJA sufficient to permit a separate award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 768.79of the Florida Statutes and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442.

Section 768.79 applies to a suit seeking both damages and equitable relief when the plaintiff’s true relief sought is monetary.

Grayson v. No Labels, Inc. · filed 2025-01-15

The district court did not err in ruling that section 768.79 applied because the “true relief ” Grayson sought was not equitable relief but damages.

Section 768.79 does not provide attorney’s fees when lex loci contractus makes another state’s substantive law govern the underlying claims.

Diamond v. U.S. Bank National Association · filed 2025-08-06

We agree with Southeast, Higgins and Canon Latin America, Inc., and hold that attorney’s fees are not available under section 768.79 in cases where the choice of substantive law is determined under the lex loci contractus doctrine.

Section 768.79 does not authorize offer of judgment fees in an action seeking both damages and equitable relief, even when the offer addresses only the damages claim.

Cornelius v. Arnetta Haywood, Individually · filed 2025-10-15(1)

We conclude that, even though the proposal in the present case did not attempt to settle the equitable claim, the reach of section 768.79 does not extend to a pending case where the parties seek both monetary and equitable damages.

Section 768.79(1) does not authorize attorney’s fees for an offer of judgment in an ancillary proceeding to enforce an equitable attorney charging lien.

MASSEY CONSTRUCTION GROUP, INC. A/A/O ARTHUR CARLSON and CAROL CARLSON v. ALEX FINCH, P.A. D/B/A FINCH LAW FIRM and FROM · filed 2025-11-14(1)

Because an ancillary charging lien proceeding is an equitable action that does not seek damages, Massey Construction cannot rely on section 768.79(1) as a basis to recover the fees it incurred therein.

Section 768.79 does not authorize fees for a rejected settlement proposal when another state’s substantive law governed the dispute when the proposal was served.

Kuehne + Nagel, Inc. v. OJ Commerce, LLC · filed 2026-05-27

Since New York law applied to the substantive issues in the case at the time OJC served the proposal for settlement, OJC had to establish that New York law provides a basis for OJC to recover fees based upon K+N’s rejection of the proposal for settlement. OJC did not do so. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in awarding OJC attorneys’ fees and costs based upon K+N’s failure to accept the proposal for settlement under section 768.79.

Section 768.79 authorizes fees after a qualifying rejected offer of judgment, but a county’s payment of those fees remains subject to the sovereign immunity limit.

PINELLAS BD. OF COM'RS v. Bettis · filed 1995-09-08

The trial court awarded attorney's fees to the plaintiff pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1989), which provides for the award of attorney's fees when an offer of judgment is made by the plaintiff, rejected by the defendant, and the subsequent judgment is at least 25% more than the offer. ... The trial court may enter judgments for damages, costs and fees, and post-judgment interest which exceed $200,000.00, but the County is liable for payment of $200,000.00 only.

Section 768.79's offer-of-judgment fee remedy may apply to a Jones Act claim in Florida state court because it does not conflict with federal maritime law.

Royal Caribbean Corp. v. Modesto · filed 1992-12-08

On plaintiff's cross-appeal of the denial of attorney's fees, we reverse. We do not address the constitutionality of section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1989), as the Florida Supreme Court, when given the opportunity to declare section 768.79 an unconstitutional infringement on its rulemaking authority, expressly declined to do so. ... Moreover, in accordance with the principles of law announced in this case, we find no conflict between Florida's rules of law regarding offers of judgment and federal maritime law. ... Because Florida's rules relating to offers of judgment are an integral part of this state's management of its courts' proceedings and do not conflict with federal admiralty law, we reverse the order denying attorney's fees and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

Section 768.79 creates a substantive entitlement to fees after an offer of judgment, but federal admiralty law bars an award under it in maritime cases.

Nicoll v. Magical Cruise Co. · filed 2013-03-15

Accordingly, applying federal law, we deny the motion for attorneys’ fees, notwithstanding Appellee’s entitlement to fees under state law. ... Appellee seeks attorneys’ fees on appeal pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2012). Entitlement to attorneys’ fees under this statute is a substantive right.

Section 768.79 cannot support an attorney’s fee award in a maritime case because it conflicts with federal maritime law.

Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. v. Cox · filed 2014-04-09

Based on the above-cited cases, we agree that Florida’s offer of judgment statute conflicts with the general rule of federal maritime law that parties pay their own fees absent an exception, not applicable here.

Section 768.79 cannot support an award of attorneys' fees in a maritime case when no exception to maritime law's American Rule applies.

MARCO MARINE CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. KOPRAS · filed 2019-04-17

Thus because the American Rule generally bars an award of attorneys' fees in a maritime case absent one of those exceptions, an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to section 768.79 in such a case "violates the important maritime principle of uniformity." Cox, 137 So. 3d at 1160.

Section 768.79 does not apply in admiralty cases and cannot support an attorney’s fee award in those cases.

Schmieder v. NCL America, Inc. · filed 2014-12-10

NCL America, Inc., however, has conceded error in the award of attorney’s fees and costs predicated upon section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2013), which this Court has ruled inapplicable in admiralty cases. ... Accordingly, we reverse the judgment awarding attorney’s fees and remand the award of costs to the trial court for reconsideration.