Fla. Stat. § 768.79

Section 768.79 permits a court to deny fees and costs on good faith grounds only if it finds that the qualifying offer was not made in good faith.

Key West Seaside, LLC v. Certified Lower Keys Plumbing, Inc. · filed 2015-09-02(7)(a)

Because the trial court did not find that Seaside’s offer of judgment was made in bad faith and Seaside’s offer of judgment met the statutory requirement for entitlement to fees, we find that the trial court erred in denying fees and costs.

Section 768.79(7)(a) permits a court to deny attorney’s fees when an offer was not made in good faith; a favorable verdict is relevant but does not establish good faith.

Pickett ex rel. Estate of Pickett v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. · filed 2013-06-04(7)(a)

As to the take-nothing verdict, if the Court accepted Defendant’s proposition that a verdict in one’s favor proves a low settlement offer reasonable, the Court would be forced to read the good-faith requirement completely out of the statute. Hindsight is 20/20, and while the verdict is one factor to consider, it is not dispositive. ... Plaintiff has therefore demonstrated that Defendant’s $10,000 offer, made on the eve of trial after a great deal of expensive and drawn-out motion practice, was not made with the subjective good faith intent to settle this claim.

Section 768.79 permits an attorney’s fee award based on a nominal settlement offer when the offeror had a reasonable basis to believe its exposure was nominal.

State Farm Florida Insurance Co. v. Laughlin-Alfonso · filed 2013-07-31

We thus conclude that State Farm had a reasonable basis to believe that its exposure was nominal and did not act in bad faith when it made the settlement offer to Laughlin-Alfonso. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order denying State Farm’s motion for attorney’s fees, and remand with instructions to enter an attorney’s fee award in State Farm’s favor.

Section 768.79 allows an award of attorney’s fees and costs based on a qualifying settlement proposal; a nominal offer does not necessarily show bad faith.

State Farm Insurance Co. v. Reyes · filed 2014-03-26

Finding no proof of bad faith in State Farm’s proposals to the appellees in this case, and no determination of bad faith by the trial court on the record of these particular proposals for settlement, we reverse the order below and remand with directions to grant the motion and to award State Farm its reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in conformance with the cited statute and rule. Nominal offers are not necessarily indicative of bad faith.

Under subsection (7)(a), a nominal settlement offer can be made in good faith when the offeror has a reasonable basis to conclude its exposure is nominal.

Citizens Property Insurance Corp. v. Perez · filed 2014-06-18(7)(a)

Likewise, we conclude that requiring a party to face “no exposure” in a case in order to make a nominal offer in good faith is too onerous a standard; the standard used by this court requires only that a party’s “exposure [i]s nominal.”

Section 768.79(7)(a) permits a court to disallow fees for an offer made without good faith, which the court determines using objective criteria without requiring privileged communications.

Butler v. Harter · filed 2014-12-01(7)(a)

However, as discussed above, whether or not an offer was made in good faith does not require privileged communications. That determination is made based on objective criteria.

Section 768.79(7)(a) allows a court to deny attorney’s fees when a settlement offer was not made in good faith.

Mootry v. Bethune-Cookman University, Inc. · filed 2016-01-08(7)(a)

Based upon our careful review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse' its discretion in finding that the July 2, 2012 proposals for-settlement were not made in good faith at the time they were served.

Section 768.79(7)(b) does not make lack of good faith a factor in fixing the amount of fees and costs, so an offeree must raise that objection before the amount hearing.

Arce v. Wackenhut Corp. · filed 2014-09-10(7)(b)

It is evident from a plain reading of the statute and the rule that the issue of good faith is not a factor to be considered by the court in determining the amount ... and reasonableness of the fees and costs to be awarded. The statute and rule enumerate six factors which the court may consider; lack of good faith is not among them.

Section 768.79(7)(a) makes the offeror’s good faith relevant to fee entitlement; whether the offeree reasonably rejected the offer does not determine entitlement.

Cacciamani v. Target Corporation · filed 2016-10-21(7)(a)

With respect to Mr. Cacciamani, the district court properly examined only whether Target made its settlement offer in good faith and not whether it was reasonable for Mr. Cacciamani to reject the offer. ... In light of these circumstances, and without any contrary evidence, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred in finding that Target acted in good faith and is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under Florida’s “shall” rule in § 768.79.

Section 768.79(7)(a) permits a nominal offer made in good faith when the offeror has a reasonable basis to believe its liability exposure is minimal.

Taylor Engineering, Inc. and Robert J. Wagner, P.E. v. Dickerson Florida, Inc., a Florida corporation · filed 2017-05-31(7)(a)

While we find that the case law is not inconsistent, we reiterate that, for purposes of the offer of judgment statute, a nominal offer is made in good faith where the offeror has a reasonable basis to believe that its exposure to liability is minimal.

Section 768.79 permits a nominal settlement offer when the offeror has a reasonable basis to conclude that its exposure is nominal; the offeror need not show that it has no exposure.

United Automobile Ins. Co. v. Partners in Health Chiropractic Center · filed 2017-12-06

United Auto was not required to show that it had no exposure in the case at the time the proposal for settlement was made—it was only required to demonstrate that at the time of its offer, it possessed a reasonable basis to conclude that its exposure was nominal.

Section 768.79(7)(a) permits fees based on a nominal settlement offer when the offeror had a reasonable basis to conclude that its exposure was nominal.

Mt. Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. New Moon Management, Inc. · filed 2018-02-14(7)(a)

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Mount Vernon’s amended motion for entitlement based on the determination that the nominal proposal for settlement was not made in good faith.

Section 768.79 permits denial of fees for an otherwise qualifying offer only if the court finds that the offer was not made in good faith.

Ruiz v. Policlinica Metropolitana, C.A. · filed 2018-09-26(7)(a)

The only basis for denying entitlement to attorney's fees is a finding by the trial court that Ruiz, Premium, or Corvaia did not make their offers in good faith or that they made them in bad faith. Because the trial court made neither a finding of bad faith nor a finding that the offers were not made in good faith, its denial of attorney's fees to Ruiz, Premium, and Corvaia was error.

Section 768.79 does not require an attorney’s fee award for a nominal settlement offer when the offeror lacked a reasonable basis to conclude that its liability exposure was nominal.

Hayes Robertson Group v. Cherry · filed 2018-12-12

Here, as in Event Services America, Inc. v. Ragusa, 917 So. 2d 882, 884 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005), we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s assessment of the nominal offers and the prospect that, at the time of the offers, the defendant “had at least some exposure.”

A nominal settlement offer can satisfy section 768.79’s good faith requirement when the offeror has a reasonable basis to believe its exposure is nominal.

MATRISCIANI v. GARRISON PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY · filed 2020-06-10(7)(a)

Therefore, we agree with the trial court that Garrison’s $1,000 proposal was made in good faith.

Section 768.79 permits a court to deny attorney’s fees when a settlement offer was not made in good faith; a nominal offer must reflect a realistic assessment of liability and potential damages.

Baranowski v. GEICO General Insurance Company · filed 2020-08-05(7)(a)

Baranowski is correct that Geico’s nominal proposal for settlement was not made in good faith because it did not bear a reasonable relationship to the amount of potential damages and was not a realistic assessment of liability.

Section 768.79(7)(a) allows a court to deny fees for a bad-faith offer, but an offer's nominal amount alone does not establish bad faith.

CITY OF MIAMI v. CHARLES J. BENCOMO AND STACY BENCOMO · filed 2022-01-19(7)(a)

Further, a finding of bad faith cannot be made merely because the offer was nominal.

Section 768.79(7)(a) gives the trial court discretion to determine whether a settlement offer was made in good faith; its determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

ESJ JI OPERATIONS, LLC v. DOMECK · filed 2020-11-04(7)(a)

Accordingly, and because the record lacks any demonstration that the lower tribunal abused its discretion in adjudicating the issue of good faith, we affirm the judgment under review.

Section 768.79(1)(a) permits a defendant to recover qualifying costs and attorney's fees even when the defendant's liability insurer pays them.

Royster v. Van Der Meulen · filed 1990-07-25(1)(a)

The appellee asserts that the appellant cannot recover costs and fees because the language of both the rule and the statute limit recovery to a party who has incurred the costs and fees, thus disqualifying appellant inasmuch as the latter's liability insurance carrier was obligated under the terms of the insurance contract to pay such costs and fees. We reject such strained interpretation of the statute and rule.

Section 768.79 permits a qualifying plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney’s fees even when they exceed the amount payable under a contingent fee contract.

Goodpaster v. Evans · filed 1990-10-17(1)(a)

As to the cross-appeal, the Evanses argue that the court should award them the $10,000 it found to be reasonable, irrespective of the amount actually recovered. Countering this, Goodpaster contends that the court correctly limited the Evanses to recovering $4,500 because of the contingent fee contract. We think the Evanses are correct. Clearly they are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to be added to their judgment against Goodpaster, and the record supports the trial court’s finding that $10,000 was reasonable.

Section 768.79(7)(b) directs courts to consider its listed factors when setting the amount of attorney's fees, but does not authorize them to deny fees to an otherwise qualifying offeror.

Schmidt v. Fortner · filed 1993-12-29(7)(b)

Under subsection (7)(b), the court's discretion is directed by the statutory text solely to determining the reasonability of the amount of fees awarded; and that discretion is informed, at least partially, by the 6 factors thereafter listed in that subsection.

Section 768.79(7)(b) directs courts to consider its factors when deciding the reasonable amount of attorney fees, not whether a party is entitled to fees.

In Re Amend. to Fla. Rules of Civ. Proc. · filed 1996-10-31(7)(b)

This recommendation, by including the words "the entitlement to," is at variance with section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1995), which states in subdivision (7)(b): When determining the reasonableness of an award of attorney's fees pursuant to this section, the court shall consider, along with all other relevant criteria, the following additional factors: The statute also does not include the recommended factor (A). ... Based upon these conclusions, we cannot accept the recommendation to include the words "the entitlement to" or the additional factor (A) in the rule because we conclude we must respect the legislative prerogative to enact substantive law.

When its offer-of-judgment conditions are met, section 768.79 controls over section 57.041 and prevents the offeree from recovering costs incurred after the offer.

Goode v. Udhwani · filed 1994-12-28

With respect to the costs assessed in favor of appellee, we reverse as to the costs incurred after the offer was filed. Although appellee recovered a judgment in her favor, we hold that § 768.79 controls over § 57.041, Florida Statutes (1991), which allows the taxation of costs by a party recovering a judgment.

Section 768.79 allows recovery of fees and costs incurred after an offer of judgment is filed, but not those incurred before filing.

Luciano v. City of Naples · filed 1996-03-15

Section 768.79 provides for the award of fees and costs incurred subsequent to the date of the filing of an offer of judgment. The statute does not provide for the recovery of fees and costs incurred prior to the date of the filing of an offer of judgment.

Section 768.79 permits a court to consider a contingency risk factor when determining a reasonable attorney's fee.

Collins v. Wilkins · filed 1995-11-08(7)(b)

Therefore, we conclude that the legislature authorized a trial court to consider the application of a contingency risk factor as one criterion which may be applied in determining a reasonable fee under section 768.79.

Section 768.79 permits a qualifying party to recover attorney's fees and costs incurred from the date the offer was served.

Jordan v. Food Lion, Inc. · filed 1996-03-20(1)

Thus, we construe the statute to permit an otherwise qualifying party to receive an award of attorney's fees and costs incurred from the date of the service of the offer.

Section 768.79(1) permits a defendant to recover attorney’s fees incurred on the defendant’s behalf under a liability insurance policy, including fees for the insurer’s salaried staff counsel.

Bailey v. Chamblee · filed 1997-08-06(1)

Section 768.79(1) specifically contemplates that an insurance carrier might represent a defendant: In any civil action for damages filed in the courts of this state, if a defendant files an offer of judgment which is not accepted by the plaintiff within 30 days, the defendant shall be entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney’s fees incurred by him or on his behalf pursuant to a policy of liability insurance or other contract from the date of filing of the offer if the judgment is one of no liability or the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25 percent less than such offer, and the court shall set off such costs and attorney’s fees against the award.

Section 768.79’s cost rules do not displace a prevailing plaintiff’s right to costs when the defendant’s offer of judgment is unsuccessful.

Dozier v. City of St. Petersburg · filed 1997-12-03(6)

The trial court mistakenly concluded that the offer of judgment statute, section 768.79(6), Florida Statutes (1995), precluded the plaintiff from recovering costs as the prevailing party under section 57.041, Florida Statutes (1995). ... Dozier’s recovery was greater than the defendant’s offer.

Section 768.79(6)(a) requires fees and costs to be calculated from the date the offer was served.

Cooper v. Brickell Bayview Real Estate, Inc. · filed 1998-06-03(6)(a)

Since we are not permitted, much less obliged, to interpret a statute in such a manner, Jordan, 670 So.2d at 140; State Dep't of Public Welfare v. Bland, 66 So.2d 59, 61 (Fla.1953); Curry v. Lehman, 55 Fla. 847, 855, 47 So. 18, 21 (1908); State v. Brigham, 694 So.2d 793 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), the order under review is reversed and the cause remanded to award fees and costs from the "date the offer was served." § 768.79(6)(a).

Section 768.79(6)(b) permits an award of travel costs connected with a deposition when supported by specific findings.

Beyel Bros., Inc. v. Lemenze · filed 1998-09-02(6)(b)

On the remaining issues, we affirm the attorney's fee award pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1997). Under that statute, in light of the specific findings made by the trial court, we also affirm the award of travel costs in connection with a deposition.

Section 768.79(1) permits an attorney’s fee award under the offer of judgment statute, but a contingency risk multiplier is improper when payment depends on the outcome of a different case.

Worobec v. Morse · filed 1998-11-06(1)

Robert Worobec appeals a final judgment awarding appellee Frances Morse attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 768.79(1), Florida Statutes (1991), the offer of judgment statute. We find that the trial court properly awarded fees under the statute, but erred in using a contingency risk multiplier of 1.5 to calculate a reasonable fee. ... Payment of the fee did not depend on Morse prevailing in the promissory note action, but on her prevailing in the partition suit. Thus, the fee for this case was not contingent upon the outcome of this ease. ... As such, use of a contingency risk multiplier to calculate a reasonable fee was error.

Section 768.79 does not permit recovery of nontaxable costs.

C & S CHEMICALS, INC. v. McDougald · filed 2000-03-29

We agree with the First and Third Districts, and hold that nontaxable costs are not recoverable pursuant to section 768.79.

Section 768.79 limits an award of attorney fees to fees incurred after the offer was made.

Dictiomatic, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · filed 1999-06-15(1)

An award of fees pursuant to this statute, however, is limited to those fees incurred after the offer was made.

Section 768.79 permits recovery of reasonable attorney fees incurred after an offer of judgment when the defendant is entitled to an award.

University Creek Associates II, Ltd. v. Boston American Financial Group, Inc. · filed 2000-05-31

Upon examination of the disputed fees and costs, the Court overrules University’s objections. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Boston defendants are entitled to recover $27,448.75 as attorneys’ fees, pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 768.79, and $5,454.25 as costs, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920.

Section 768.79 does not authorize contingency risk multipliers when calculating attorney's fees awarded under the offer of judgment statute.

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sarkis · filed 2001-12-07

We adopt the view of Judge Casanueva dissenting in Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. v. Jensen, 752 So.2d 1275 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (Casanueva, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), rev. dismissed, 777 So.2d 973 (Fla.2001) that neither Quanstrom nor section 768.79 authorizes the use of contingency risk multipliers in calculating attorney's fees awarded under the offer of judgment statute.

A trial attorney's fee award under section 768.79 can be limited to the lodestar without a contingency risk multiplier.

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Carter · filed 2003-06-26

Based on the unpublished order in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Carter, Case No. SC-94,797 (Fla. Dec. 13, 2002), we affirm the trial court's application of section 768.79, Florida Statutes, but reverse the application of the contingency fee multiplier. Accordingly, we remand to the trial court to enter an award of trial attorney's fees of $707,000.00.

Attorney fees awarded under section 768.79 are not subject to a contingency risk multiplier.

Marriott International, Inc. v. Perez-Melendez · filed 2003-09-26

As to the issue raised by Perez-Melendez in her cross-appeal regarding the trial court's refusal to apply a contingency risk multiplier to the fee awarded her pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes, we affirm based on our decision in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sarkis, 809 So.2d 6 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), review granted, 826 So.2d 992 (Fla.2002).

Section 768.79 does not permit a contingency risk multiplier in an attorney’s fee award.

Francis v. Akerley · filed 2004-10-06

However, the Supreme Court of Florida subsequently overruled Island Hoppers, and held a contingency risk multiplier cannot be applied to fees awarded under the offer of judgment statute. See Sarkis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 863 So.2d at 210. We therefore reverse the fee award.

Section 768.79 does not authorize a contingency risk multiplier when calculating attorney fees awarded after rejection of an offer of judgment.

Sarkis v. Allstate Ins. Co. · filed 2003-10-02

Neither section 768.79 nor rule 1.442 authorizes the use of a multiplier in determining the amount of attorney fees as a sanction for the rejection of an offer.

A fee award under section 768.79 cannot be increased by a contingency multiplier.

Matalon v. Lee · filed 2003-11-19

The Florida Supreme Court has now issued its opinion, holding that a contingency multiplier may not be applied to a fee award pursuant to section 768.79. ... Consequently, we hereby affirm Lee’s cross-appeal.

Section 768.79 does not permit a contingency fee multiplier on a fee award under its offer of judgment provision.

Kawaguchi v. Bentle · filed 2004-01-14

We reverse, however, the trial court’s award of a contingency fee multiplier in light of the supreme court’s holding in Sarkis v. Allstate Insurance Co., 863 So.2d 210, 2003 WL 22250352 (Fla. Oct. 2, 2003) (holding that a contingency multiplier may not be applied to a fee award pursuant to section 768.79).

Section 768.79 does not permit a multiplier in an attorney’s fee award based on a proposal for settlement.

Allstate Insurance Co. v. Maytin · filed 2004-08-11

Subsequently the Florida Supreme Court announced Sarkis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 863 So.2d 210 (Fla.2003), which prohibited the use of a multiplier in awarding attorney’s fees under section 768.79, Florida Statutes or Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442. 863 So.2d at 223. The plaintiff confesses error on this point, conceding that the Sarkis decision applies to this case and requires elimination of the multiplier. We therefore reverse the attorney’s fee judgment and remand it for recalculation without the multiplier.

Section 768.79(1) allows a recovering plaintiff to recover reasonable costs and attorney’s fees incurred from the date of the settlement demand.

Walgreen Co. v. Sklandis · filed 2005-02-23(1)

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s determination that Sklandis is entitled to an award of fees and costs, including the expert witness fee awarded, but remand with directions to reduce the fee and cost judgment to award fees and costs incurred only after January 8, 2003. See § 768.79(1), Fla. Stat. (2000)(stating that a recovering plaintiff should recover “reasonable costs and attorney’s fees incurred from the date of the filing of the demand”).

Section 768.79 allows a plaintiff whose judgment exceeds a rejected offer by at least 25 percent to recover attorney's fees from the date of a valid offer.

Lamb v. Matetzschk · filed 2005-06-23(6)(b)

Since this verdict exceeded any of the settlement proposals by more than twenty-five percent, Lamb was entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1999). ... Consequently, the Fifth District properly awarded Lamb attorney's fees based upon the date of the last offer, August 16, 2000.

Section 768.79 requires an attorney's fee award when its statutory requirements are met.

Williams v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2007-05-02

As to the County's cross-appeal we reverse that portion of the order which denied an attorney's fee award to the County notwithstanding that the County fully complied with the requirements of section 768.79, for an award of attorney's fees.

Section 768.79 permits recovery of fees incurred pursuing a punitive damages claim under an offer of judgment when those fees do not duplicate fees awarded under deed restrictions.

Parton v. PALOMINO LAKES PROPERTY OWNERS · filed 2006-04-28

However, their offer of judgment allows them to recover fees incurred in pursuing their claim for punitive damages, which are not duplicative of fees awarded pursuant to the deed restrictions.

Section 768.79 permits fees based on an offer of judgment only for work on claims covered by the offer.

Chodorow v. Moore · filed 2007-01-03

The Chodorows' offer of judgment was limited to "all of Moore's claims against the Chodorows." Consequently, the proposal could only provide a basis for the award of those fees the Chodorows incurred in defending themselves against the claims brought by Moore—not all the fees they incurred after September 1, 2004, and, particularly, not those fees incurred in prosecuting their counterclaims.

Section 768.79 does not permit a contingency risk multiplier on an attorney’s fee award.

Explorer Insurance Co. v. Bockel · filed 2007-01-31

Because Van Bockel was not entitled to a multiplier under either section 768.79 or 624.155 as a matter of law, the trial court erred in awarding a multiplier as part of the attorney’s fee award.

Section 768.79 allows courts to consider other relevant criteria when setting a reasonable attorney's fee award, but a contingency risk multiplier does not apply.

Liggett Group, Inc. v. Davis · filed 2008-03-19

We read Sarkis to hold that a contingency risk multiplier is not applicable to an award of fees under 768.79, and not to eliminate consideration of "other relevant criteria."

Section 768.79(7)(b) allows courts to consider reasonableness factors when setting the amount of attorney’s fees, but those factors cannot eliminate an established entitlement to fees.

Braaksma v. Pratt · filed 2012-11-02(7)(b)

Thus, a trial court is not permitted to use the enumerated factors in section 768.79(7)(b) to decline to award fees altogether.

Section 768.79 does not allow recovery of nontaxable costs in an offer of judgment award.

Delmonico v. Crespo · filed 2012-12-05

Contrary to section 768.79, the trial court included nontaxable costs as components of the $25,000 award.

Section 768.79 permits fees for litigating entitlement to attorney’s fees but not for litigating the amount of fees.

Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. · filed 2014-01-08

Although fees incurred in litigating entitlement to attorneys’ fees under section 768.79 are authorized, fees incurred in litigating the amount of fees are not recoverable.

Section 768.79 allows an attorney’s fee award to include time spent on an unsuccessful claim when that claim is inextricably intertwined with successful claims.

22ND Century Properties, LLC and David F. Damerau v. FPH Properties, LLC · filed 2015-04-01

Because the accounting was inextricably intertwined with establishing damages on the actions at law, the trial court did not err in failing to eliminate time spent on the accounting from the attorney’s fee award.

Section 768.79(6)(a) assigns liability for fees and costs awarded solely under the statute to the plaintiff, not the plaintiff’s attorney.

Danubis Group, LLC v. Landmark American Insurance Company · filed 2017-04-17(6)(a)

Yet the district court determined that Ambler was liable for fees and costs arising after August 28, 2014 that had nothing to do with either the motion to dismiss or the motions to compel and could only have been awarded pursuant to § 768.79. Consequently, the district court committed legal error by assigning Ambler liability for fees and costs that, pursuant to the relevant statute, should have been assigned solely to Danubis.

Section 768.79(6)(a) awards fees to the plaintiff who made the offer, not personally to the plaintiff’s attorney.

VAN DER VLIET v. CALVO · filed 2018-07-25(6)(a)

Appellee was the plaintiff in the case, not his attorney. Therefore, a plain reading of the statute compels us to conclude that Appellee’s attorney cannot personally be awarded fees under section 768.79(6)(a).

Section 768.79(1) allows a defendant to recover attorney’s fees incurred on the defendant’s behalf under a contract, even if the defendant did not personally owe those fees.

JAIN v. BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC, etc. · filed 2021-12-01(1)

Thus, the fact that the Firm was contractually obligated to indemnify Morgan and to pay for the legal services provided by White & Case on behalf of Morgan means that those expenses were incurred by the Firm “on behalf of Morgan” as required under section 768.79(1).

Section 768.79 requires courts to reduce a reasonable fee award to avoid reimbursing litigation expenses already paid by settling parties.

PHILIP MORRIS USA INC. v. ROBERT A. GORE, SR., Individually and as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF GLORIA H. GO · filed 2022-04-13(6)(b)

Though section 768.79 does not specifically address this scenario, nothing in the statute’s wording supports the premise that the Legislature intended for the same litigation expenses to be paid multiple times by separate parties—even as a sanction.

Section 768.79 permits reasonable attorney’s fees when a plaintiff rejects a defendant’s offer of judgment and the ensuing judgment finds no liability; it also permits recovery of mediation costs.

el Camino v. Scottsdale Insurance Company · filed 2022-10-06

In her Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Louis concludes that: (1) because Defendant has satisfied both the elements of Florida’s offer of judgment statute (which permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees where “a plaintiff refuses to accept an offer of judgment from the defendant and the ensuing judgment is one of no liability on the part of the defendant,” see R&R at 3 (citing B & D Nutritional Ingredients, Inc. v. Unique Bio Ingredients, LLC, 855 F. App’x 503, 506 (11th Cir. 2021))), and the elements of the settlement proposal guidance set forth by Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442, Defendant is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees incurred since December 23, 2021, see R&R at 4; (2) Defendant is entitled to a reduced sum of $4,649.00 in attorney’s fees, see R&R at 6; and (3) Defendant is also entitled to costs under Florida offer of judgment statute in the amount of $450.00 for mediation costs. This Court agrees.

Section 768.79(7)(b) provides factors for determining whether an attorney’s fee award is reasonable.

MICCOSUKEE TRIBE OF INDIANS OF FLORIDA v. LEWIS TEIN, P.L. · filed 2023-06-07(7)(b)

Despite appellant’s contention to the contrary, the record reveals the trial court carefully considered each factor contained within section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2017), along with the chronology of the case and other relevant criteria, in arriving at the award.

Attorney fees awarded under Section 768.79 are calculated using the lodestar method.

Grayson v. No Labels, Inc. · filed 2024-02-29

This includes applying the lodestar method to calculating fees awarded under Florida’s offer-of-judgment statute, Fla. Stat. § 768.79.

Section 768.79 requires a reasonable attorney’s fee award for a qualifying defendant; an alternative fee recovery agreement does not cap that award at a lower initial retainer.

USAA Casualty Insurance Company v. Health Diagnostics of Fort Lauderdale, LLC, etc. · filed 2024-04-17(1)

Finally, awarding USAA less than one thirteenth of the fees it sought produces the net effect of requiring USAA to absorb the enhanced hourly rate promised under the alternative fee recovery provision of the MEA. This shields Health Diagnostics and distorts the punitive objective of the statute.

Section 768.79 entitles a party to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs when its offer of judgment meets the section’s requirements and the resulting judgment qualifies.

T.T. International Co., LTD v. BMP International, Inc. · filed 2024-10-24

Accordingly, having reviewed Plaintiff’s filings and the offers of judgment incorporated therein, this Court finds that the offers of judgement meet the requirements of Section 768.79, and Plaintiff is entitled to the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs expended during the course of this litigation.

Section 768.79 permits an award of expert witness fees as costs.

AM CRESPI MIAMI, LLC v. Century Surety Company · filed 2024-06-13

Defendant is awarded $12,969.00 in costs for expert witness fees under Fla. Stat. § 768.79 and $2,493.76 in costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 plus post- judgment interest at an annual rate of 5.44%.

Section 768.79 permits recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees under flat-fee or hybrid billing arrangements when the evidence supports a reliable lodestar determination.

RM & Associates Consulting, Inc., A/A/O Quame McKinnon v. People's Trust Insurance Company · filed 2026-06-17

Nor do we hold that a flat-fee or hybrid billing arrangement precludes recovery under section 768.79. Florida law permits recovery of reasonable fees, regardless of the fees agreement’s structure, so long as the evidence permits a reliable lodestar determination.

Section 768.79(1)(a) measures the judgment obtained by the plaintiff using the damages award, excluding taxable costs and attorney's fees.

Williams v. Brochu · filed 1991-04-25(1)(a)

WE HOLD (1) that the statutory term "judgment obtained" means the amount of the judgment for damages awarded by the jury for the cause of action being tried and does not include taxable costs or attorney's fees provided by statutes and rules which are taxable by the court incidental to the jury's consideration of an award for damages.

Section 768.79 includes prejudgment interest in the judgment amount used to determine whether an offer triggers attorney's fees and costs.

Phillips v. Parrish · filed 1991-08-27

Since prejudgment interest is merely another element of damages, it is properly included in determining whether a judgment is so deficient as to activate the provisions of section 768.79, Florida Statutes. If this amount is utilized, the judgment in the instant case was not more than 25 percent less than the offer of $4,546.52 and, thus, attorney's fees and costs are not awardable pursuant to that statute.

Section 768.79 does not require an offer of judgment to state claimed costs in a specific dollar amount.

Hellmann v. City of Orlando · filed 1992-12-18(2)(d)

We held in Williams that the "judgment obtained" language in the statute does not include taxable costs which are incidental to a jury's consideration of a damage award; therefore, we now hold that the failure to state claimed cost in a dollar amount does not invalidate an otherwise valid offer of judgment.

Under section 768.79, the value of converted property is not deducted from the judgment when applying the 25% threshold, and an offer need not provide for title transfer when title passes upon satisfaction of the judgment.

Mullenmaster v. Newbern · filed 1996-05-29

The value of the boat should not be deducted from the judgment, because the boat has already been converted by the appellant. Similarly, the offer did not have to include the transfer of title to the boat and trailer, because transfer would occur as a matter of law upon the satisfaction of the judgment. ... We therefore reverse the trial court’s order denying fees and remand for the assessment of attorney’s fees under section 768.79, Florida Statutes.

Section 768.79 requires an offer to state its total amount; when that offer is accepted, costs incurred before acceptance cannot be added to the agreed amount.

Douglas v. Ganatra · filed 1995-03-29(2)(d)

Such award for costs was erroneous. ... The offer and acceptance in this case were both certain in reciting the total amount.

Section 768.79(1)(a) excludes taxable costs from the judgment used to determine whether a plaintiff recovered at least 25 percent less than a defendant’s offer.

Mincin v. Short · filed 1995-11-03(1)(a)

We adopt this construction of the statute and reverse the trial court's order denying Short's motion for fees and costs because of the improper addition of taxable costs to the jury's award in determining the amount of the "judgment obtained" by Mincin.

A fee award under section 768.79 must be reversed when the underlying damages award is reduced.

Horton v. Channing · filed 1997-07-16

We also determine that reversal is required as to the granting of attorney's fees pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes, in light of our decisions requiring reduction of the economic damages.

A fee award under § 768.79 depends on the judgment obtained by the plaintiff and must be reversed when that judgment is reversed.

Nathanson v. Houss · filed 1998-09-09

Having reversed the underlying judgment, we also reverse the trial court's award of attorney's fees to appellees since the statutory basis for the award of fees is dependent on the judgment obtained by the plaintiff. See § 768.79, Fla. Stat. (1990); see also, Emory v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, 687 So.2d 846 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).

Section 768.79(6)(b) includes a prevailing plaintiff's pre-demand costs in the net judgment used to determine eligibility for attorney's fees.

Perez v. Circuit City Stores, Inc. · filed 1998-11-25(6)(b)

We, therefore, interpret the statutory term "the net judgment entered" to include a prevailing plaintiff's pre-demand costs.

Section 768.79(6)(a) requires postoffer PIP benefits to be added to the net judgment when determining entitlement to offer-of-judgment costs and fees.

Daigle v. Booth · filed 1998-12-11(6)(a)

It is not reasonable to argue that PIP benefits are not “collateral source payments” under the statute. Section 768.79(6)(a) requires the addition of collateral source payments made “postoffer” but before the judgment to the net judgment to reach the “judgment obtained” for the purpose of considering offer of judgment costs and fees.

An award of fees and costs under section 768.79 must be reversed when the damages judgment is reversed for a new trial.

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mazzorana · filed 1999-04-21

Because we have reversed this case for a new trial on the issue of damages, we necessarily reverse the final judgment for attorney's and expert witness fees and costs awarded in favor of Mazzorana. See § 768.79, Fla. Stat. (1997); Nathanson v. Houss, 717 So.2d 114 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).

An offer-of-judgment fee and cost award must be reconsidered when the underlying damages award is reversed and the amount of damages is retried.

Carmona v. Carrion · filed 2000-02-02

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs to Aida Carrion, and remand for reconsideration of that issue after the new trial on damages.

For offer-of-judgment fee entitlement, the judgment obtained reflects a reduction of PIP setoffs by the cost of PIP coverage, but not by the cost of collision or liability insurance.

McKenna v. Carlson · filed 2000-09-15(1)

However, we deal in this case with the issue of the entitlement, vel non, to attorney fees under section 768.79, Florida Statutes. Subsection 768.76(1) is therefore implicated to the extent it would allow a reduction from the setoffs for the plaintiffs cost of obtaining PIP coverage in determining the amount of the "judgment obtained." This cost, however, is limited to the cost of obtaining the PIP coverage, not the cost of obtaining collision and/or liability insurance.

A fee award under section 768.79 cannot stand when the damages judgment supporting it is reversed.

State, Department of Corrections v. C & W Food Service, Inc. · filed 2000-09-25

Because of DOC’s rejection of its previous offer of settlement and the damages awarded by the trial court, C & W sought attorney’s fees pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442 and section 768.79, Florida Statutes. ... Accordingly, the basis for the award of attorney’s fees to C & W below no longer exists, and we reverse the trial court’s order here appealed.

Section 768.79 counts all economic damages for which a defendant is jointly and severally liable when determining whether the judgment exceeds the plaintiff's settlement offer by 25%.

Labaton v. Mellert · filed 2000-12-13(1)

First, he claims that appellees were not entitled to fees, because their judgment was not 25% more than the offer. We reject this, because appellant ignores the fact that although the jury assessed him with only 40% of the damages, he is in fact jointly and severally liable for all economic damages, which would be part of the judgment obtained as used in Schmidt.

Section 768.79 uses the final judgment, rather than the jury verdict, to determine whether a plaintiff’s recovery exceeds a rejected demand by 25%.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Kujawa · filed 2001-04-25(6)

We conclude that it was error to use the jury verdict figure to determine entitlement to section 768.79 attorney’s fees.

Section 768.79(6) includes postoffer collateral source payments in the judgment obtained only if they were received or due by the date of judgment.

Gulf Coast Transp., Inc. v. Padron · filed 2001-03-21(6)

Thus, only collateral source payments that were received or due as of the date of the judgment are to be added to the verdict to determine the judgment obtained.

Section 768.79 includes pre-offer taxable costs and, where applicable, pre-offer attorney fees in the “judgment obtained” used to determine entitlement to fees.

White v. Steak and Ale of Florida, Inc. · filed 2002-04-18(6)

In summary, we conclude that the "judgment obtained" pursuant to section 768.79 includes the net judgment for damages and any attorneys' fees and taxable costs that could have been included in a final judgment if such final judgment was entered on the date of the offer. Thus, in calculating the "judgment obtained" for purposes of determining whether the party who made the offer is entitled to attorneys' fees, the court must determine the total net judgment, which includes the plaintiff's taxable costs up to the date of the offer and, where applicable, the plaintiff's attorneys' fees up to the date of the offer.

Under section 768.79(6)(a), a defendant's entitlement to fees and costs is measured against the plaintiff's net judgment after applicable setoffs, rather than the jury's verdict.

Anderson v. King · filed 2002-06-14(6)(a)

The trial court should have determined Anderson's entitlement to fees and costs based on the net judgment entered in favor of King, not the amount of the verdict before it was reduced by the amount King received from the sale of the boat. After the verdict was reduced by the proceeds from the sale of the boat, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of King for zero dollars, which is 25 percent less than Anderson's offer. Accordingly, Anderson was entitled to recover his attorney's fees and costs, and the trial court should have entered judgment for Anderson in the amount of those fees and costs.

Section 768.79 uses the judgment entered, rather than the verdict, to measure a plaintiff’s recovery for attorney’s fee entitlement.

Arraras v. Johnson · filed 2002-10-30

The statute speaks in terms of “judgment” and the case law construing the statute holds that for the purpose of measuring a damage recovery under the statute, courts are to look to the judgment entered rather than the verdict.

Section 768.79 does not entitle a claimant to attorney’s fees when the amount recovered is not 25 percent more than the demand for judgment.

Palm Beach Gardens Police Pension Fund Board of Trustees v. Mitchell J. Beers, P.A. · filed 2003-03-05

Based upon our decision herein, the amount to which Beers is entitled is not 25 percent more than his demand for judgment. As a result, Beers is not entitled to fees under section 768.79.

Section 768.79 excludes post-demand costs when calculating whether a plaintiff's judgment exceeds a demand by 25% for attorney's fees.

Amador v. Walker · filed 2003-12-05

What White requires is an "apples to apples" comparison between the proposal and the ultimate result to determine whether the proposal was bettered. Here, clearly, Plaintiff ended up worse off than her proposal. Although the judgment was higher, her net recovery was lower.

Section 768.79(1)’s 25% threshold excludes attorney’s fees that had not accrued when the settlement offer was made.

Segui v. Margrill · filed 2004-01-09(1)

Margrill’s claim for attorney’s fees was based solely upon the offer of settlement, not on any contract or other statute. Thus, if the lower court had awarded a final judgment as of the date of the offer of settlement, that award would not have included any attorney’s fees. Accordingly, the $7,500 award of attorney’s fees should not have been included in calculating the amount of the judgment obtained for purposes of determining whether to award attorney’s fees.

Section 768.79(6) includes the plaintiff’s pre-proposal costs in the judgment when comparing it with a settlement offer.

Frost v. Boss · filed 2005-05-18(6)

We affirm the trial court’s order denying appellant Frost’s motion to tax costs and fees pursuant to a proposal for settlement, as we agree that Frost’s offer of settlement was not 25% greater than the judgment when appellee Boss’s pre-proposal costs were included.

A party seeking fees and costs under § 768.79 on a no-liability theory must obtain a no-liability judgment with prejudice.

Ambrosia Coal & Construction Co. v. Pages Morales · filed 2008-11-07

We conclude that the court properly read the case law interpreting § 768.79 and rightly concluded that appellants failed to satisfy its no-liability judgment with prejudice requirement.

Section 768.79 counts only costs incurred before the settlement demand when determining whether a plaintiff’s judgment meets the threshold for attorney’s fees.

NILO v. Fugate · filed 2010-03-17

Only those costs incurred pre-demand may be considered in determining whether the total judgment meets the statutory threshold. ... As the judgment did not exceed $500,000, we REVERSE the award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 768.79.

Section 768.79 includes the plaintiff’s taxable costs and, where applicable, attorney fees incurred before the offer in the “judgment obtained” used to determine entitlement to fees.

Shands Teaching Hospital & Clinic, Inc. v. Mercury Insurance Co. of Florida · filed 2012-06-07(6)

We have interpreted the “judgment obtained” under section 768.79 to include “the total net judgment, which includes the plaintiffs taxable costs up to the date of the offer and, where applicable, the plaintiffs attorneys’ fees up to the date of the offer.”

Section 768.79 requires applicable attorney’s fees and taxable costs incurred before an offer to be included in the net judgment used to evaluate the offer.

Leon F. Cohn, M.D., P.A. v. Visual Health & Surgical Center, Inc. · filed 2013-04-10(6)

Because Cohn prevailed on the breach of contract claim and the contract contained a provision awarding attorney’s fees to the prevailing party, we reverse and remand for the trial court to reconsider the issue of Cohn’s entitlement to fees after conducting an evidentiary hearing to determine the total net judgment, which shall include the amount of fees and taxable costs incurred by Cohn in litigating the breach of contract claim up to the date of the offer.

Section 768.79 permits denial of fees when the judgment reaches the 125% threshold only through damages the defendant was not told about before the settlement offer expired.

Florida Diversified Films, Inc. v. Simon Roofing & Sheet Metal Corp. · filed 2013-07-17(7)(b)

We also agree with Judge Platzer, who conducted the bench trial, that “[ajbsent damages associated with destruction of business damages, FDF’s proposal for settlement would not have reached the 125% threshold required for entitlement to fees” pursuant to section 768.79 or rule 1.442. Therefore, under these circumstances, Judge Platzer did not abuse her discretion by determining that FDF was not entitled to attorney’s fees because requiring Simon Roofing to “pay attorney’s fees as a sanction for ‘unreasonably’ rejecting [FDF’s] proposal for settlement would penalize [Simon Roofing] for damages not pled nor proven until after the proposal for settlement was rejected and permit [FDF] to benefit from the changing nature of [its] claim after the proposal for settlement expired.”

Section 768.79(6)(b) measures entitlement to fees and costs by the judgment obtained, rather than the jury verdict.

UCF Athletics Ass'n v. Plancher · filed 2013-08-16(6)(b)

It is the judgment obtained, not the verdict, that controls whether fees can be awarded in this case.

Section 768.79(6)(b) requires separate settlement offers to be compared individually with the judgment obtained when determining entitlement to attorney’s fees.

Anderson v. Hilton Hotels Corporation, etc. · filed 2016-11-03(6)(b)

The only way that these offers could not satisfy the statutory requirement would be if the offers were to be aggregated, which cannot be tolerated under a strict ... construction of section 768.79.

Section 768.79(6)(b) uses the enforceable net judgment to assess fee entitlement, which must await resolution of pending first-party bad faith claims when execution above policy limits is stayed.

21ST CENTURY CENTENNIAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. DWAYNE WALKER · filed 2018-08-29(6)(b)

Thus, Fridman compels us to adopt another “preferable approach” in the context of first-party bad faith litigation: waiting until a determination is made on whether the plaintiff proved bad faith claims against an insurer before determining entitlement to an award of attorney’s fees and costs against an insurer under section 768.79.

Section 768.79(6)(b) excludes punitive damages from the judgment obtained when punitive damages were not part of the case on the date of the settlement offer.

Palmentere Bros. Cartage Service, Inc. v. Heather Copeland and Phillip Copeland, her husband · filed 2019-07-29(6)(b)

Because punitive damages were not part of the case on the date of the offer of settlement, the calculation of the “net judgment” and “judgment obtained” required in section 768.79(6)(b), could not include the amount of the punitive damages verdict.

Section 768.79 excludes post-offer prejudgment interest from the judgment obtained when determining entitlement to attorney’s fees.

CCM Condominium Association, Inc., etc. v. Petri Positive Pest Control, Inc., etc. · filed 2021-09-09(6)(b)

Based upon this Court’s precedent from which we decline to recede, we hold that post-offer prejudgment interest is excluded from the “judgment obtained” that is compared to a rejected settlement offer when determining entitlement to attorneys’ fees under section 768.79.

Section 768.79 counts only prejudgment interest accrued before the offer when calculating whether a plaintiff’s judgment meets the threshold for attorney’s fees.

PETRI POSITIVE PEST CONTROL, INC. v. CCM CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. d/b/a COUNTRY CLUB MANOR CONDOMINIUM ASSOC. · filed 2019-05-01(6)(b)

Our opinion, that prejudgment interest may only be included in the White formula up to the time of the offer, is based on our tenuous conclusion that Shands allows for inclusion of only pre-offer prejudgment interest in the threshold calculation for purposes of section 768.79.

Section 768.79(6)(b)'s attorney-fee threshold counts only costs taxable when the proposal for settlement was served; costs for non-testifying experts do not count.

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Lewis · filed 2019-06-14(6)(b)

Therefore, those costs cannot be included in the calculations for determining whether Lewis was entitled to attorney's fees, and the trial court erred by including the non-testifying experts' costs in its calculations.

Section 768.79(6) includes a co-defendant’s settlement in the judgment obtained when the settlement occurs after service of the offer and reduces the verdict.

Wilcox v. Neville · filed 2019-10-30(6)

Thus, the clear and unambiguous language of section 768.79(6) requires the judgment obtained to include the amount of any settlement by a co-defendant after the date of service of the offer on the defendant by which the verdict was reduced.

Section 768.79(7) includes pre-offer costs and attorney’s fees, when part of the claim, in the “judgment obtained” used to determine whether a defendant may recover fees after a rejected offer.

Sfr Services, LLC, A/A/O John & Rose Zapisek v. Florida Department of Financial Services, O/B/O Avatar Property and Casu · filed 2025-05-16(7)

Per White, pre-offer costs and attorney’s fees (when part of the claim) must be included to derive the threshold “judgment obtained.”

Section 768.79 includes a plaintiff’s taxable costs up to the offer date when calculating the “judgment obtained” for attorney’s fees.

Hastings v. Skipper & Day · filed 2002-09-20

The court in White v. Steak & Ale of Florida, Inc., 816 So.2d 546 (Fla.2002), concluded that a “judgment obtained” pursuant to section 768.79 includes the plaintiffs taxable costs up to the date of the offer. We have considered both of these decisions and find no error in the trial court’s determination that attorney’s fees should not be awarded..

Section 768.79 does not permit conditions on an offer of judgment; an offer requiring a release, hold harmless affidavit, and dismissal is invalid.

Martin v. Brousseau · filed 1990-07-18

Neither the rule nor the statute provide for conditions upon an offer to allow a judgment to be taken against the party making the offer, and we find no such authority elsewhere.

Section 768.79 requires compliance with its procedural rules for a demand for judgment before attorney’s fees may be awarded under it.

E & A Restaurants of the Keys, Inc. v. Bernreuter · filed 1991-11-19

The order awarding the plaintiffs attorney’s fees purportedly pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1989), is reversed. It is clear that the proceedings below with respect to the demand for judgment and its rejection did not comply with the procedural requirements of the then-applicable statute, which were, in any event, declared invalid in The Florida Bar re: Amendment to Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1.442, 550 So.2d 442 (Fla.1989).

Section 768.79 contains procedural provisions governing offers and demands of judgment that the Florida Supreme Court adopted as a court rule.

Timmons v. Combs · filed 1992-10-22

Because the statute does contain procedural aspects which are subject to our rule-making authority, we hereby adopt the procedural portion of section 768.79 as a rule of this Court effective as of the date of this opinion.

Section 768.79(2)(a) requires an offer to state that it is made pursuant to that section; a general reference to another applicable statute or rule is insufficient.

Pippin v. Latosynski · filed 1993-08-04(2)(a)

Section 768.79 clearly mandates that offers made pursuant to this section must state so. Hence, we are compelled to find that Latosynski never made a valid offer pursuant to section 768.79. We reject Latosynski's contention that the language of the offer, to wit, "or such other pre-existing statute or rule," by implication included section 768.79. Such language failed to adequately place defendants on notice that Latosynski was traveling under section 768.79 in addition to the rule.

An offer of judgment under section 768.79(4) is invalid if its conditions prevent immediate enforcement upon acceptance.

Bush Leasing, Inc. v. Gallo · filed 1994-03-24(4)

Section 768.79(4), Florida Statutes, states that immediately upon filing of an offer and acceptance, "the court has full jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement." An offer of judgment that contains conditions not permitted by the statute and which will not allow immediate enforcement upon acceptance is invalid.

Section 768.79 keeps an offer open for 30 days despite a counteroffer unless the offeror serves a written withdrawal before written acceptance is filed.

Scope v. Fannelli · filed 1994-07-01(5)

Contrary to Scope’s assertion that Fannelli’s counteroffer automatically terminated her offer to settle, if an offer is irrevocable by statute for a period of time, the offeree’s counteroffer does not terminate the offeree’s power of acceptance. ... Under section 768.79, an offer is irrevocable for a period of 30 days unless the offeror in writing serves a notice of withdrawal to the offeree before the offeree’s written acceptance is filed.

Section 768.79 requires an offer of judgment to give the offeree 30 days to accept; an offer that gives less time cannot support an award of costs or attorney's fees.

Wright v. Caruana · filed 1994-08-02(1)

Therefore, we hold that an offer of judgment must be made so that the offeree has 30 days in which to timely accept it. An offer that does not comply with this requirement may not serve as the basis for an award of costs or attorney's fees.

Section 768.79(5)’s written-withdrawal requirement is satisfied when the withdrawal is transcribed in a deposition and a copy is furnished to the offeree.

Hamilton v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. · filed 1995-07-19(5)

Because the deposition, specifically including the withdrawal, was transcribed and a copy furnished the defendant, the prerequisite was clearly established and the trial court’s conclusion to the contrary was just as clearly incorrect.

Section 768.79(5), as incorporated into rule 1.442, requires an offer of judgment to be withdrawn in writing.

Dynasty Express Corp. v. Weiss · filed 1996-06-19(5)

Thus, the procedures of section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1991), as incorporated by rule 1.442, governed and required that the withdrawal be in writing.

Section 768.79 requires an unambiguous offer of judgment; an ambiguous offer is void and cannot support an award of attorney's fees.

Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Silverman · filed 1997-02-12

The purposes of section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1993) include the early elimination of litigation by encouraging realistic views of the claims made. The making of an ambiguous offer fails to carry out that purpose as it will inevitably lead only to further litigation over the ambiguities. As a consequence, the insurer's ambiguous offer fails to comply with section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1993), and thus is void.

Section 768.79 supplied the procedural rules for offers of judgment after those rules were adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in Timmons.

State, Department of Transportation v. Daystar, Inc. · filed 1996-03-20

However, Tim-mons, in effect at the time of the offer, resolves any such ambiguity, as Timmons directs application of the procedure in section 768.79.

Section 768.79 gives a party thirty days to accept an offer of judgment; an offer made five days before trial and deemed rejected when trial begins is untimely and cannot support an award of attorney’s fees and costs.

Hedergott v. Moon · filed 1996-08-09

The Moons assert that while an offer under section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1989), allowed a party thirty days to accept the offer, no such time limitation appears in section 44.102, Florida Statutes (1993). ... Accordingly, the award of attorney’s fees and costs to the Moons is reversed and the matter remanded to grant Hedergott’s motion to tax costs, as the Moons’ offer was untimely and a verdict was entered in Hedergott’s favor.

Section 768.79(2)(b) requires an offer of judgment to identify the offeror and offeree; an accepted offer binds only the parties who made and accepted it.

Security Professionals, Inc. v. Segall · filed 1997-01-08(2)(b)

Subsection 768.79(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), provides that an offer must "[n]ame the party making it and the party to whom it is being made." ... We conclude that the only parties bound by the offer of judgment were the parties who made the offer and the parties who accepted the offer.

Section 768.79(2)(a) requires a written offer to state that it is made pursuant to section 768.79.

Murphy v. Tucker · filed 1997-03-05(2)(a)

Section 768.79 requires that an offer be in writing and " state that it is being made pursuant to this section. " § 768.79(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995) (emphasis supplied). Ms. Tucker's offer does not contain this statement.

An offer of judgment must state that it is made pursuant to section 768.79.

McMULLEN OIL v. ISS INTERN. SERVICE · filed 1997-08-22(2)(a)

Section 768.79(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), provides that an offer of judgment must "[b]e in writing and state that it is being made pursuant to this section." McMullen's offer of judgment lacked the specificity required by the statute. It referred merely to "all applicable Florida statutes and the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure." This was not sufficient.

Section 768.79 permits a subsequent offer without voiding an earlier rejected offer; the earlier offer may still support attorney's fees and costs.

Kaufman v. Smith · filed 1997-05-14(2)

It would have been a simple matter for the legislature to have also provided that a subsequent offer makes a prior offer void. It did not, however, and we cannot read that into the statute. We therefore follow Williams and conclude that where, as here, plaintiff rejects both offers, the first offer remains in effect.

Section 768.79 affects an attorney’s fee award for a rejected settlement offer only if the offer complies with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442.

American Sign Co. v. Falconer · filed 1997-07-02

Furthermore, a party’s refusal of an offer of settlement has no effect upon the potential award of fees unless the offer is within rule 1.442. § 768.79, Fla. Stat. (1991).

Section 768.79 does not require a plaintiff's demand for judgment to specify a sum certain for taxable costs or attorney's fees otherwise taxable against the defendant.

Siedlecki v. Arabia · filed 1997-10-08

When Arabia moved for fees pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1995), Florida's demand-for-judgment statute, the trial court ruled that the demands were not valid because they failed to specify a sum certain for costs, including attorney's fees. This was error, as a plaintiff need not include taxable costs or attorney's fees otherwise provided by statute and rule that the court would tax against a defendant incidental to the jury's damage award.

Section 768.79 measures the fee threshold by the final judgment, rather than the jury verdict; an insurer’s policy limits cap that judgment unless a court finds bad faith.

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sutton · filed 1998-01-09

For the purposes of a statute such as section 768.79, the damages that trigger the attorneys' fee portion are measured by the judgment rather than by the jury verdict, see Stewart v. Progressive American Insurance Co., 595 So.2d 272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), and the final judgment must be modified to limit the insurer's liability to the amount of its policy limits, see Dixie Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 484 So.2d 89 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). An exception exists in the case of a judicial finding of bad faith on the part of the carrier.

Section 768.79(2) treats an offer as encompassing all damages that may be awarded in the final judgment, so an offer need not expressly mention a counterclaim to be valid.

MGR EQUIPMENT v. Wilson Ice Enterprises · filed 1998-02-13(2)

We find that the August 26th offer meets the requirements of the statute because even though it does not specifically mention the fate of Wilson's counterclaim, the statute and court decisions, including one from this court, require that offers be read as encompassing "all damages which might be awarded in the final judgment." § 768.79(2), Fla. Stat. (1995); Security Professionals, Inc. v. Segall, 685 So.2d 1381 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 700 So.2d 687 (Fla.1997); Hellmann v. City of Orlando, 610 So.2d 103 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).

An offer that leaves both parties’ rights to attorney fees for the court to determine after acceptance is too indefinite to support fees under § 768.79(2).

CLINICA LOURDES INC. v. Miro · filed 1998-07-08(2)

While the plaintiff's recovery was less than the dollar amount of the defendants' unaccepted offer of settlement, the trial court ruled that the following provision of the "offer" rendered it unenforceably indefinite: All issues relating to both parties' right to attorneys' fees shall be submitted to and determined by the Court if the offer is accepted. We affirm on the controlling authority of State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Bass, 605 So.2d 908 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).

Section 768.79(2) does not authorize an offer of judgment that would resolve less than all monetary claims if accepted.

Bayley Products, Inc. v. Cole · filed 1998-08-12(2)

The statute in its present form does not authorize offers which, if accepted, would resolve less than all monetary claims.

Section 768.79(2) treats an unqualified offer of judgment as covering all pending claims, including a counterclaim the offer does not mention.

MGR EQUIP. v. Wilson Ice Enterprises · filed 1999-03-25(2)

Furthermore, because the offer was not qualified, it would have disposed of all pending claims in the litigation including the counterclaim.

Section 768.79 must be strictly construed because its offer-of-judgment sanctions are punitive and depart from the common law.

Schussel v. Ladd Hairdressers, Inc. · filed 1999-07-07

Since section 768.79 and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 are punitive in nature in that they impose sanctions upon the losing party and are in derogation of the common law, they must be strictly construed.

Section 768.79(2) treats a qualifying settlement offer as covering all damages for later attorney fee calculations but does not entitle an accepting party to a final judgment.

Abbott & Purdy Group Inc. v. Bell · filed 1999-08-18(2)

We find that the language in section 768.79(2), providing that the "offer shall be construed as including all damages which may be awarded in a final judgment," does not establish a substantive right to a final judgment, but merely declares that, so long as the offer satisfies the statutory requirements as to form and content, the offer must be read as encompassing all damages which may ultimately be awarded in the final judgment for purposes of later determining entitlement to attorneys fees under section 768.79.

Section 768.79 does not support an attorney’s fee award based on an offer that fails to allocate amounts between an injured person’s claim and a spouse’s consortium claim.

Allstate Indemnity Co. v. Hingson · filed 2000-10-11

Appellant's offer was for $30,000 and was not differentiated between the amount offered for Mr. Hingson's injuries in an automobile accident and Mrs. Hingson's resulting consortium claim. The trial judge denied appellant's motion for attorney's fees citing the policy considerations regarding undifferentiated offers of judgment enunciated in section 768.79, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442, and USAA v. Behar, 752 So.2d 663 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Even though Behar can be distinguished because appellant's offer was made prior to the latest amendment to rule 1.442, we nevertheless affirm on the authority of C & S Chemicals, Inc. v. McDougald, 754 So.2d 795 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).

Section 768.79(2) does not authorize attorney’s fees based on a proposal that offers one undivided sum to settle two plaintiffs’ separate claims.

Dudley v. McCormick · filed 2001-11-16(2)

Because Ms. McCormick's proposal for settlement did not specify separate amounts for mother and son (or designate only one plaintiff the offeree) as required by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(c)(3), we reverse the award of attorney's fees as unauthorized either by the rule or by section 768.79(2), Florida Statutes (1997).

Section 768.79 does not authorize attorney's fees for an untimely demand for judgment, even as a discovery sanction.

Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Robinson · filed 2003-08-13

Because the demand for judgment in this case was untimely, it was void from its inception and could not become valid at any time thereafter. See Schussel, 736 So.2d at 778. Thus, notwithstanding the trial court's finding that Nationwide's conduct during discovery warranted sanctions, an award of attorney's fees under section 768.79 was not a viable sanction.

Section 768.79(2) does not require an offer of judgment to state whether it includes attorney’s fees.

Bennett v. American Learning Systems of Boca Delray, Inc. · filed 2003-10-29(2)

What is immediately apparent is that the statute does not require the offer to include whether it contains attorney’s fees, while the rule does.

Section 768.79 does not require an offeree to object to a defective settlement proposal or seek a hearing before trial.

McElroy v. Whittington · filed 2004-03-17

Nothing in section 768.79 or rule 1.442 requires that an offeree object to a defective settlement proposal, or set the issue for hearing prior to trial.

Section 768.79 does not require a settlement proposal to mirror the final judgment.

Morgan v. Beekie · filed 2004-08-06

We find nothing in the statute or rules that requires a proposal to be a mirror of the final judgment.