Fla. Stat. § 768.79

Section 768.79(3) requires a settlement proposal to be served and permits filing only if it is accepted or filing is necessary to enforce the statute or rule.

Browning v. Scott · filed 2004-08-18(3)

Section 768.79(3), Florida Statutes (2000), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(d) state that an offer of judgment or a proposal for settlement shall be served on the opposing party but shall not be filed unless accepted or unless filing is necessary to enforce the statute or the rule. As Mr. Scott admitted below and on appeal, his proposal for settlement was filed prematurely, in violation of the express requirements of the statute and rule.

Section 768.79 permits a plaintiff to make separate, unequal settlement offers to an active tortfeasor and a defendant liable only vicariously.

Hess v. Walton · filed 2005-03-16(2)

While we agree with FOI that such offers may often, if not always, be contrary to the public policies that caused the legislature to create these fee-shifting provisions, they are permitted by the language of both the statute and the rule.

An offer of judgment conditioned on a nonparty’s participation is invalid and cannot support an attorney’s fee award under section 768.79.

McHale v. Grobowsky · filed 2005-11-23

The circuit court found that the appellees were entitled to fees based on an offer of judgment pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1987), and the parties stipulated to the reasonableness of the fees claimed. However, the underlying basis for the award, the offer of judgment, was invalid because it contained a condition that required the participation of a nonparty.

Section 768.79 allows an otherwise eligible defendant to recover attorney's fees and costs even if a settlement proposal was served prematurely under Rule 1.442.

Shoppes of Liberty City, LLC v. Sotolongo · filed 2006-06-07

Even if this were not true, we have squarely held in Kuvin v. Keller Ladders, Inc., 797 So.2d 611 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001), that a mere prematurity of a defendant's proposal for settlement does not disentitle it to recovery under the pertinent rule. ... Accordingly, the order under review is reversed with directions to award the appellant attorney's fees and costs under the statute and rule.

Section 768.79 permits an attorney’s fee award based on a settlement proposal whose terms clearly identify the claims being settled.

Kee v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. · filed 2007-10-03

We are mindful of the requirements which must be satisfied for a proposal for settlement to be valid in accordance with section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2001), and rule 1.442, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. ... We thus conclude that the language of the settlement proposal limited recovery against Baptist Hospital to claims arising in relation to this case, and in no way interfered with the Kees' ability to raise and recover as against any third party. Accordingly, the Proposal for Settlement was not too ambiguous.

Section 768.79 does not support attorney’s fees when conflicting terms leave unclear which claims a settlement proposal would resolve.

Saenz v. Campos · filed 2007-11-14

Section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2006), provides the substantive law concerning proposals for settlement while Rule 1.442, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, provides its procedural mechanism. ... No one can claim that paragraphs 3 and 5 say the same thing. They simply don't. That conflict in the wording created the ambiguity that supported the trial court's striking of the proposal.

Section 768.79(3) does not bar attorney's fees merely because a timely served settlement proposal was filed prematurely when the filing was immaterial and caused no prejudice.

Mills v. Martinez · filed 2005-07-08(3)

We find that analysis to be compelling here, because it furthers, not frustrates, the purpose of the rule and statute. We believe Mills's violation of rule 1.442(d) was immaterial and certainly not prejudicial.

Section 768.79(8) makes a rejected offer of judgment inadmissible when the plaintiff’s recovery is not at least 25% below the offer.

Hamilton v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2006-09-01(8)

The defendant offered the plaintiffs $100,000. The jury awarded them $76,240. This rendered the offer of judgment inadmissible. § 768.79(8), Fla. Stat. (2002).

Section 768.79 permits attorney's fees based on separate, unambiguous offers to settle individual claims that can be accepted independently.

Miami-Dade County v. Ferrer · filed 2006-11-29

Here, the County's offers of judgment are clear and unambiguous. Ferrer would receive $1,000 if he dismissed with prejudice his claim for false imprisonment, and $1,000 if he dismissed with prejudice his claim for battery. The two claims are not conditioned on each other, and Ferrer could have settled one claim and proceeded to trial on the other. ... Therefore, the County's settlement proposals are unambiguous and satisfy the statute and the rule.

Section 768.79 must be strictly construed because it derogates from the common law.

Oasis v. Espinoza · filed 2007-02-21

Both rule 1.442(c)(3) and section 768.79 must be strictly construed because they are in derogation of the common law.

Section 768.79 does not require a settlement proposal to expressly state that the claimant will dismiss all claims.

Palm Beach Polo v. MADSEN, SAPP, MENA · filed 2007-04-25(2)

There is no language in section 768.79 or rule 1.442 requiring that there must be language expressing a willingness to dismiss all claims in a proposal for settlement.

Section 768.79(2)(a) requires a settlement offer to state that it is made under the section.

Campbell v. Goldman · filed 2007-06-14(2)(a)

Based on the plain language of section 768.79, an offer of settlement must state the statute on which it is based.

A correct citation to section 768.79 in the notice of a settlement proposal cures an erroneous statutory citation in the proposal.

Jefferson v. City of Lake City · filed 2007-08-10(2)(a)

Although the proposal in this case cites a nonexistent statute as its basis, the notice of proposal for settlement cites to the correct statute number. In our view, the correct citation in the notice to the statute governing settlement offers cures the defect in the proposal.

Section 768.79 does not authorize attorney's fees based on an offer of judgment whose ambiguous release fails to state its nonmonetary terms with particularity.

Sparklin v. SOUTHERN INDUS. ASSOCIATES · filed 2007-07-20

Given the ambiguities contained in the release, it appears to us that the particularity requirement of rule 1.442 is offended by this offer of judgment. As lack of particularity is held against the offeror, we can only conclude that the offer of judgment is unenforceable. ... If the nonmonetary terms are not spelled out with precision, the receiving party is left in an untenable position. [1] Neither section 768.79, nor rule 1.442 was intended to effect that result.

Section 768.79(4) gives the court full jurisdiction to enforce a settlement once the offer and acceptance are filed.

Dufresne v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. · filed 2008-02-08(4)

Although the trial court here did not enter an order explicitly retaining jurisdiction, a settlement agreement entered into pursuant to an offer of judgment is nevertheless judicially enforceable because the offer of judgment statute states that "[u]pon filing of both the offer and acceptance, the court has full jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement." See § 768.79(4).

Section 768.79 does not require a settlement proposal to resolve every claim or include every party.

Jacksonville Golfair, Inc. v. Grover · filed 2008-08-21

Section 768.79 and rule 1.442 do not require that a settlement proposal cover all claims between all parties involved, or that it settle all claims between the parties to the proposal.

Section 768.79 allows attorney’s fees when a settlement proposal is unambiguous.

Harris Specialty Chemicals, Inc. v. Punto Azul S.A. de C.V. · filed 2009-05-13

Harris Specialty Chemicals, Inc., together with other defendants (collectively “Harris”) appeal the trial court’s order denying them motion for attorney’s fees under section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2007), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442, the offer of judgment statute and rule, in favor of plaintiff, Punto Azul S.A. de C.V. (“Punto Azul”). ... We agree with Harris and determine that upon de novo review, the settlement proposal is unambiguous, and thus, attorney’s fees should have been granted pursuant to the proposal.

Section 768.79 does not support an attorney's fee award when an extrinsic fact makes a settlement proposal ambiguous about which claims it covers.

Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Pollinger · filed 2010-08-18

Similar to Nichols, an extraneous fact in this case rendered Nationwide's proposal ambiguous, so that it could not support an award of attorney's fees under section 768.79.

Section 768.79(4)’s provision for enforcing a settlement does not itself constitute court approval of the settlement or an affirmative retention of jurisdiction to enforce it.

Mady v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. · filed 2008-03-26(4)

We find that section 768.79(4)⅛ provision for enforcement is not the same as the required affirmative court action that either approves of the terms of a settlement or affirmatively retains jurisdiction for enforcement.

Section 768.79 permits a fee award based on one party’s settlement proposal even when the proposal requires dismissal of claims against another party.

Alioto-Alexander v. Toll Bros., Inc. · filed 2009-07-08

By its own terms, the proposal for settlement was made by Toll Brothers and Toll Brothers alone was offering to pay the sum of $5,000. The dismissal of the entire suit, including the claims against Barr, was simply a condition of the proposal and did not serve to transform the proposal for settlement into one made by multiple of-ferors.

A demand directed to multiple parties must specify the amount attributable to each party to support attorney’s fees under section 768.79.

Brower-Eger v. Noon · filed 2008-11-19

When an offer is made to or from two or more parties, it must specify the amount attributable to each of them. Lamb v. Matetzschk, 906 So.2d 1037, 1040-41 (Fla.2005); Willis Shaw Express Inc., 849 So.2d at 279; Allstate Indem. Co. v. Hingson, 808 So.2d 197, 199 (Fla.2002). The offer in this case failed to do so and is therefore invalid as the basis for an award of attorney's fees.

Section 768.79(2) requires a settlement offer to identify the party making it; naming another party in the proposal does not make that party an offeror.

Eastern Atlantic Realty & Investment Inc. v. GSOMR LLC · filed 2009-06-24(2)

While both BJV and GSOMR are identified in the proposal, the proposal explicitly states that BJV was the party making the offer to pay Eastern $20,000.

An offer of judgment under section 768.79 is not impermissibly vague when it limits settlement to claims arising from the lawsuit’s subject matter.

Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance v. Lewis · filed 2009-06-30

Contrary to Appellee’s assertion below and on appeal, Appellant’s offer of judgment was not so vague that it could be construed as requiring Appellee to relinquish her right to bring suit for future causes of action unrelated to the subject matter of the instant case.

Appellate courts review de novo whether a proposal for settlement complies with section 768.79.

Jessla Construction Corp. v. Miami-Dade County School Board · filed 2010-11-17

In reviewing a trial court’s determination as to whether a proposal for settlement comports with the requirements of section 768.79 and rule 1.442, appellate courts apply the de novo standard of review.

Section 768.79(6)(b) does not support a fee award based on a facially invalid settlement proposal, even when the judgment exceeds the unaccepted offer by at least 25 percent.

Joseph v. Niosi · filed 2010-12-14(6)(b)

Section 768.79(6)(b), Florida Statutes (2007), states that “[i]f a plaintiff serves an offer which is not accepted by the defendant, and if the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25 percent more than the amount of the offer, the plaintiff shall be awarded reasonable costs ... and attorney’s fees....” The amount of the verdict in favor of Mrs. Niosi is at least 25 percent more than the amount of the offer; the same is true of the offer served by Mr. Niosi. ... The appellees do not (and cannot) meaningfully distinguish the holding in Easters to somehow justify the award of trial attorney’s fees based on the facially invalid proposals for settlement.

Section 768.79(2)(b) requires an offer to name the party making it and the party receiving it; an offer need not expressly say who will pay when the context makes that clear.

Land & Sea Petroleum, Inc. v. Business Specialists, Inc. · filed 2011-01-19(2)(b)

Applying those principles here, we find that the absence of language stating which side would pay the $500 did not make the proposals for settlement ambiguous. The seller complied with rule 1.442(c)(2)(A) and section 768.79(2)(b) by naming itself as “the party ... making the proposal” and naming the brokers as “the parties to whom the proposal is being made.”

Section 768.79(4) gives the court full jurisdiction to enforce a settlement reached through an accepted offer of judgment, making the settlement tantamount to a consent judgment.

Mady v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. · filed 2011-03-24(4)

A settlement produced pursuant to Florida’s offer of judgment statute, section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2005), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 is under the auspices of the court in which the dispute is being processed and is tantamount to a consent judgment.

Section 768.79 does not support an attorney’s fee award when a settlement proposal leaves the terms of a required release reasonably ambiguous.

Mix v. ADVENTIST HEALTH SYSTEM/SUNBELT, INC. · filed 2011-04-01

Because the offer of judgment statute and related rule must be strictly construed, an ambiguous proposal is not enforceable.

Section 768.79 does not authorize attorney’s fees based on a settlement proposal that requires the offeree to satisfy a condition beyond his control.

Gonzalez v. Claywell · filed 2011-08-15

Because the proposal contained a condition that Gonzalez could not possibly perform, and divested him “of independent control of the decision to settle,” it was invalid and unenforceable.

Section 768.79 does not authorize attorney’s fees based on an invalid proposal for settlement.

Boesch v. Bradenton 64, Inc. · filed 2011-12-07

Mr. Boesch also appeals the denial of his motion for attorney’s fees based on a proposal for settlement in accordance with section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2007), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442. ... However, Mr. Boesch’s proposal for settlement was invalid and unenforceable. ... The trial court properly denied his motion for attorney’s fees based on the invalid proposal.

Section 768.79 does not support an attorney’s fee award when a settlement proposal conflicts with its attached notice of voluntary dismissal and leaves the terms of settlement ambiguous.

Tran v. Anvil Iron Works, Inc. · filed 2013-02-15(1)

Because the documents are in conflict, we agree with the trial court that they are ambiguous. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s order insofar as it denies Tran’s motion for attorney’s fees.

Section 768.79(2)(b) requires an offer of judgment to name the party making it and the party receiving it; an offer made to one plaintiff does not bind another plaintiff with independent claims.

Portuondo-Tarajano International Corp. v. Farm Stores Grocery, Inc. · filed 2011-10-05(2)(b)

Section 768.79(2)(b) provides, in part, that “[a]n offer must ... [njame the party making it and the party to whom it is being made,” and rule 1.442(2)(A) utilizes similar language: “A proposal shall ... name the party or parties making the proposal and the party or parties to whom the proposal is being made.” ... Here, a review of the Offer demonstrates that it was made only to Portuondo, and therefore, PTI is not bound by the Offer.

Section 768.79 permits fees based on a proposal for settlement only for work on the claim the proposal covers, excluding work on a separate counterclaim.

Rodriguez v. Government Employees Insurance · filed 2011-12-21

GEICO’s proposal for settlement was strictly limited to Rodriguez’s original complaint concerning insurance coverage. Conversely, Rodriguez’s claim for fees was for successfully defending GEICO’s counterclaim for fraud. ... Those hours appear to include time pursuing its claim of fraud against Rodriguez, which would be inappropriate.

Section 768.79 does not support an attorney’s fee award based on an offer that requires the plaintiff to release independent claims against other defendants whose liability remains disputed.

Duplantis v. BROCK SPECIALTY SERVICES, LTD. · filed 2012-04-27

While it would be convenient to articulate a bright-line rule, a plaintiff in Duplantis’ position should not be required to compromise legitimate claims against defendants whose liability is independent of the offeror to avoid an award of attorney’s fees. This defeats the intent of the offer of judgment statute and rule.

Section 768.79 permits an unapportioned offer made on behalf of a single hospital entity, even when the proposal names two companies associated with it.

Pratt v. Weiss · filed 2012-05-02

In sum, we find the defendants’ failure to apportion the offer did not run afoul of section 768.79, rule 1.442, or any case law interpreting those provisions.

Orders concerning section 768.79 are reviewed de novo.

Lyons v. Chamoun · filed 2012-08-29

We have de novo review of orders concerning section 768.79 and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442.

Section 768.79(1) entitles defendants to attorney’s fees when a plaintiff rejects a valid offer and obtains a judgment at least 25 percent below it.

Wolfe v. Culpepper Constructors, Inc. · filed 2012-11-28(1)

The trial court erred in concluding that the Wolfes’ offer was invalid per se because it was a joint offer conditioned on dismissing charges against both offerors. The Wolfes’ joint offer met all statutory and rule requirements to be valid.

Section 768.79 does not support an attorney’s fee award based on an ambiguous offer of judgment.

Bradshaw v. Boynton-JCP Associates, Ltd. · filed 2013-04-10

We reverse a final judgment awarding attorney’s fees pursuant to an offer of judgment because ambiguities in the offer prevent its enforceability. See § 768.79, Fla. Stat. (2007); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442.

Section 768.79’s fee entitlement is strictly construed with rule 1.442, so a proposal served before the rule’s ninety-day waiting period is invalid.

Design Home Remodeling Corp. v. Santana · filed 2014-09-03

Regardless of the logic underlying the decisions in Kuvin and Shoppes, the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Campbell plainly and unambiguously rejects the notion that a failure to comply with the requirements of rule 1.442 and section 768.79 can be considered a “mere technical violation” thus preserving the validity of a proposal for settlement.

Section 768.79 does not allow attorney’s fees based on a demand for judgment that leaves unclear whose claims it would settle.

Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Anderson · filed 2014-12-19

Because the statute must be strictly construed, a proposal that is ambiguous will be held to be unenforceable.

Section 768.79’s particularity requirement is satisfied when a settlement proposal clearly states the payment, claims resolved, required dismissal, and responsibility for attorney’s fees.

Miley v. Nash · filed 2015-04-29

Next, the proposal did not fail to meet the particularity requirement under the statute and the rule. The relevant conditions of the proposal were included and sufficiently described: the exact amount Kyle Miley would pay; the exact claims the proposal would resolve; the exact action to be taken by Martha Nash, namely dismissal; the condition that each party would pay its own attorney's fees; and the additional condition that Glenn Miley would also be dismissed from the suit, as to Martha Nash.

A proposal stating that the trial court would retain jurisdiction to enforce an accepted settlement is not ambiguous under section 768.79.

Ekonomides v. Sharaka · filed 2014-03-05(4)

We agree with Ekonomides that paragraph four is not ambiguous and that the trial court would have continuing jurisdiction to enforce the settlement, had the proposal been accepted.

Section 768.79(2)(c) requires an offer covering a punitive damages claim to state with particularity the amount offered to settle that claim; an unallocated lump sum does not satisfy the requirement.

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco v. Ward · filed 2014-06-24(2)(c)

But neither of the provisions considered in Nichols required, as both the rule and statutory subsection at issue here plainly do, that an “amount” be stated.

Section 768.79 requires an offer to be served on its recipient but does not require a certificate of service.

Floyd v. Stacy L. Smith, Jason Owen Smith · filed 2015-04-16

Section 768.79 does not specify that a certificate of service is required, but merely requires the offer to “be served upon the party to whom it is made.”

Section 768.79 and the settlement proposal requirements of rule 1.442 must be strictly construed when deciding entitlement to attorney’s fees.

Jan Colvin and Wade Colvin v. Clements and Ashmore, P.A d/b/a North Florida etc. · filed 2016-01-14

While Bennett seems like a very logical approach, we are mindful of this Court’s recent decision in Borden Dairy Co. v. Kuhajda, 171 So. 3d 242, 243 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), which reaffirmed the holding that rule 1.442 and section 768.79 must be strictly construed. In light of Borden, we affirm.

Section 768.79 requires strict compliance with the rules for proposals for settlement; ambiguity about attorney’s fees and costs can invalidate a proposal and defeat a fee award.

Andrew Maines and Kenneth Maines v. Fox · filed 2016-05-03

Section 768.79 and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 govern the form and content of proposals for settlement. Strict adherence to section 768.79 and rule 1.442 is required of proposals for settlement. ... Because of their patent ambiguities as to attorney’s fees and costs, we find the October 2013 proposals for settlement invalid and therefore vacate attorney’s fees based on those proposals awarded by the trial court; however, we vacate without prejudice for the trial court to evaluate any other proposals for settlement that were presented to appellants by appellee.

Section 768.79 does not require a settlement proposal to include terms describing a release.

Manuel Diaz Farms, Inc. v. Delgado · filed 2016-05-11

The analysis in Jacksonville Golfair and in Palm Beach Polo Holdings is applicable to the proposal for settlement filed in the present case. The inclusion of terms regarding a release—the very mention (and form) of which has engendered sufficient quibbling to jeopardize the efficacy of the fee-shifting rule and statute—is not required.

Section 768.79 does not permit an attorney’s fee award based on an ambiguous proposal for settlement that could reasonably affect the offeree’s decision to accept it.

Nunez v. Allen · filed 2016-06-24

Because the statute must be strictly construed, a proposal that is ambiguous will be held to be unenforceable. ... Accordingly, because we find that the proposals for settlement in this case were ambiguous and therefore invalid, we reverse the final judgment on appeal in its entirety.

Section 768.79(2) does not automatically invalidate a proposal that uses “claims” instead of “damages” when the proposal clearly offers a full settlement.

American Home Assurance Co. v. D'Agostino · filed 2017-01-04(2)

Although we would expect any post-amendment proposal for settlement would use the post-amendment word “damages” instead of the pre-amendment word “claims”, we do not construe the amendment as suggesting that any post-amendment proposal for settlement which uses the word “claims” instead of “damages” automatically invalidates the proposal or renders it ambiguous. Moreover, the defendant here plainly did not offer a partial proposal for settlement, and thus the rationale supporting the 2014 amendment was not jeopardized.

A proposal for settlement must comply with rule 1.442’s particularity requirement to support an attorney fee award under section 768.79.

Diecidue v. Lewis · filed 2017-02-10

Because a valid proposal for settlement must comply with both rule 1.442 and section 768.79, the trial court erred in awarding Allstate attorneys' fees on the basis of Allstate's proposal for settlement.

Section 768.79(3) requires service of a proposal for settlement but does not require e-mail; service by certified mail with a certificate of service can comply.

Boatright v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. · filed 2017-04-12(3)

The mandatory e-mail service requirement in rule 2.516(b)(1) does not apply to pretrial proposals for settlement. The Boatrights strictly complied with the statute and corresponding procedural rules governing the service of proposals for settlement by: (1) serving their proposals via U.S. Certified Mail; and (2) attaching to each of their proposals a certificate of service.

Section 768.79(3) requires a proposal for settlement to be served on the receiving party but does not specify how it must be served.

Oldcastle Southern Group, Inc. v. Railworks Track System Inc. · filed 2017-12-21(3)

Section 768.79(3), Florida Statutes (2014), requires service of the proposal, without specifying the manner of service, “upon the party to whom it is made, but it shall not be filed unless it is accepted or unless filing is necessary to enforce the provisions of this section,” ... We agree with McCoy and Boatright that since the proposal for settlement is not to be filed when it is served, the proposal is not included in the clause “every other document filed in any court proceeding.”

Section 768.79 does not authorize attorney’s fees when an offer of judgment is ambiguous about which claims its release covers.

De Iraola v. El Cartel Records, Inc. · filed 2018-02-14

Therefore, the district court was correct in determining that the offer was invalid and that De Iraola was not entitled to attorney’s fees under the Florida offer of judgment statute.

A proposal under section 768.79 is sufficiently clear when, read as a whole, it identifies the offeree and the claims to be resolved without an ambiguity that could reasonably affect the offeree's decision.

BRIGHT HOUSE NETWORKS, L L C v. CASSIDY · filed 2018-03-23

Proposals made under the offer of judgment statute must strictly conform to the requirements of the statute and rule because the statutory award of attorney's fees is in derogation of the common law that usually provides for each party to pay its own fees. ... When read as a whole, there is no ambiguity that would reasonably affect Albert B. Cassidy's decision.

Section 768.79(2) requires an offer of judgment to be construed as including all damages that may be awarded in a final judgment.

Primo v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2016-09-29(2)

In fact, Fla. Stat. § 768.79(2) states that “[t]he offer shall be construed as including all damages which may be awarded in a final judgment.” In light of that language, we construe the Proposal for Settlement as including all damages.

Section 768.79(3) prohibits filing a proposal for settlement when it is served; it may be filed if accepted or if filing is necessary for enforcement.

Wheaton v. Wheaton · filed 2017-02-15(3)

It is true, of course, that both the proposal for settlement statute (section 768.79, Florida Statutes) and the proposal for settlement rule (Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442) prohibit counsel from filing a proposal for settlement contemporaneously with service of the proposal.

Section 768.79(3) permits a settlement proposal to be filed after a motion for attorney’s fees, so long as it is filed when necessary to enforce the statute.

Haas Automation, Inc. v. Fox · filed 2018-04-04(3)

Plainly, neither the rule nor the statute require that the proposal for settlement be filed either before moving for fees or when moving for fees. Both simply require that the movant file the proposal for settlement when “necessary” to enforce provisions of the rule and the statute.

Section 768.79 permits attorney’s fees on a settlement proposal to multiple defendants when each can independently decide whether to accept it.

Atlantic Civil, Inc. v. Swift III · filed 2017-03-01

Looking at the complete language of the Proposal for Settlement and the attached general release form to be signed by Swift and Key Haven, we find no requirement that both defendants must agree in order to effectuate the settlement.

Section 768.79(2)(c) does not require a settlement offer to specify an amount for punitive damages when the complaint does not seek them.

Aguado v. Miller · filed 2017-05-16(2)(c)

Accordingly, although there would have been no harm in Appellant including a ... statement in his proposal for settlement indicating that no portion of the amount offered was for punitive damages, the absence of such a statement does not render the otherwise unambiguous proposal invalid.

Section 768.79(3) requires an offer of judgment to be served on its recipient and prohibits filing it unless it is accepted or filing is needed to enforce the section.

JOHN MCCOY v. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY · filed 2017-10-25(3)

The focus of the statute is on actual notice — an offer of judgment is required to be “served upon the party to whom it is made, but it shall not be filed unless it is accepted or unless filing is necessary to enforce the provisions of this section.” § 768.79(3), Fla. Stat. (2014).

Section 768.79(2) requires a written offer that identifies the parties, states the total amount, and includes all damages that may be awarded in a final judgment.

Castillo v. Costco Wholesale Corp. · filed 2018-02-21(2)

The terms regarding Ms. Castillo’s offer were sufficient under section 768.79. The offer was in writing, stated that it was being made pursuant to the statute, named the party making the offer and the party to whom the offer was made, stated its total amount, and was to be construed “as including all damages which may be awarded in a final judgment.” § 768.79(2), Fla. Stat. (2016).

Section 768.79(4) allows a trial court to enforce a settlement formed by a compliant proposal and acceptance as a consent judgment.

RENNY v. BERTOLOTI · filed 2018-07-25(4)

As a preliminary matter, we conclude that Bertoloti’s proposal and appellant’s acceptance complied with section 768.79, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442, creating a settlement agreement tantamount to a consent judgment that the trial court had continuing jurisdiction to enforce under section 768.79(4).

Section 768.79 permits an award of attorney's fees only when a settlement proposal strictly complies with the statute and Rule 1.442.

Allen v. Nunez · filed 2018-10-04

Proposals under the offer of judgment statute must strictly conform to these statutory and procedural requirements to entitle the offeror to attorney's fees because the statute is in derogation of the common law that ordinarily requires each party to pay for its own attorney's fees.

Section 768.79(1) does not authorize attorney’s fees and costs when a settlement proposal’s release fails the particularity requirement of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442.

Espinoza v. Target Corporation · filed 2021-08-11(1)

As the Release does not meet the particularity requirement set out in Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442, Plaintiff has no obligation under Fla. Stat. § 768.79 to pay the attorneys’ fees and costs sought by Defendant in its Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Reasonable Costs [DE 64].

Section 768.79 does not support an attorney fee award when a settlement proposal leaves the insurer to be released unnamed and creates reasonable uncertainty about whether an outstanding claim would be extinguished.

THE ANDERSEN FIRM, PC v. SCOTT A. BROWN · filed 2021-11-10

As a result, the trial court did not err in finding that the proposal was ambiguous and not able to support an award of attorney fees under section 768.79.

Section 768.79(3) requires service of a settlement offer on its recipient but does not require service by email.

Wheaton v. Wheaton · filed 2019-01-04(3)

The statute only requires that the offer be served on the party to whom it is directed and not be filed with the court but does not require service by email.

Section 768.79(6)(b) provides for attorney’s fees when a plaintiff’s rejected offer is exceeded by the judgment by more than 25%; a later nonmaterial amendment to the complaint does not make the offer ambiguous.

Steak 'n Shake Operations, Inc. v. Davis · filed 2019-02-27(6)(b)

SNS never accepted, and the judgment was well over twenty-five percent of the offer. See § 768.79(6)(b), Fla. Stat. This denial and subsequent recovery would ordinarily require an award of attorney’s fees. ... We reject this argument and conclude that the nonmaterial amendment to the complaint did not render the earlier offer ambiguous. We therefore reverse and remand for entry of an order awarding fees.

Section 768.79 does not authorize attorney’s fees when an offer’s release is too unclear for the recipient to evaluate.

Fonseca v. Wal-Mart Stores, East, LP · filed 2020-09-02(1)

Because the release did not permit Fonseca to (meaningfully) value Wal-Mart’s offer, the Offer of Judgment was invalid. Fonseca thus has no obligation to pay fees or costs under Florida Statutes § 768.79 and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442.

Section 768.79 permits a defendant to recover attorney’s fees on a qualifying unaccepted offer that resolves only the named plaintiff’s claims, even when that plaintiff’s case was consolidated with another for discovery and trial.

WEINER v. MAULDEN · filed 2019-04-10(1), (2)

Therefore, we conclude that Appellant’s proposal for settlement served upon Maulden was proper under sections 768.79(1) and (2) and rule 1.442(c).

Section 768.79 permits attorney’s fees under a proposal that clearly limits settlement to claims in the lawsuit, even if it refers to all claims that could be included in a final judgment.

EHLERT v. CASTRO · filed 2021-11-03

Section 768.79, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 govern proposals for settlement. ... Thus, it is clear that the PFS addressed only claims made in the case which could be satisfied in a final judgment. ... We thus reverse the order denying entitlement to fees pursuant to the PFS and remand for the court to determine the amount of the fee.

Section 768.79 does not require an offer to quantify and include the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and costs when the offer is served to be valid.

SAFEPOINT INSURANCE COMPANY v. WILLIAMS · filed 2021-11-10(2)(d)

Neither section 768.79, rule 1.442, nor the White formula specifically require that the amount of attorneys’ fees and costs be quantified and included at the time the PFS is served in order to create a valid offer.

Section 768.79 requires an offer to state an amount for punitive damages only when a punitive damages claim is pending.

TOWER HILL SIGNATURE INSURANCE COMPANY v. KUSHCH · filed 2022-02-16(2)(d)

Section 768.79 also states this requirement. However, this applies to actual pending claims for punitive damages.

Section 768.79 contemplates monetary settlement offers and does not provide for nonmonetary terms in a proposal for settlement.

In Re: Amendments to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 · filed 2022-05-26

Section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2021), does not provide for the inclusion of nonmonetary terms in a proposal for settlement.

Section 768.79(2) requires settlement proposals to meet its strict requirements to be enforceable.

GONZALEZ v. NOBREGAS · filed 2023-01-18(2)

The proposals considered by the trial court contain multiple deviations from the strict requirements of the statute and rule. ... Accordingly, none of proposals proffered under the offer of judgment statute satisfy the strict requirements of the relevant statute and rule, and the trial court correctly declined to enforce them.

A court determines whether section 768.79 applies to a proposal for settlement after entering judgment on the merits.

The Peninsula at St. John's Center Condominium Association, Inc. v. Amerisure Insurance Company · filed 2024-04-11

While the Court may need to analyze the third-party complaint to determine whether it is a civil action for damages that would make section 768.79 applicable to determine attorneys’ fees, such analysis is appropriate only after this Court enters a judgment on the merits of the third-party complaint.

Section 768.79 permits attorney’s fees based on a rejected settlement proposal that clearly identifies the claims it resolves; reserving defenses to future claims does not make the proposal ambiguous.

Infinity Auto Insurance Company v. Miami Open MRI, LLC, A/A/O Rolando Amador · filed 2025-06-04

While one may question the need for what appears to be a “belt and suspenders” provision in Paragraph Eight of the proposal for settlement, we hold that the language at issue, when read as a whole and particularly in conjunction with Paragraph Four of the proposal for settlement, is not ambiguous, nor does it require that future claims be extinguished.

Section 768.79 places the burden of making a legally valid offer on the offeror; the offeree need not identify defects before rejecting it.

Stevens, Stevens v. Florida Peninsula Insurance Company · filed 2025-08-29

But the law places the burden to comply with the legal requirements to make a valid offer squarely upon the offeror; it is not the responsibility of the offeree to assist the offeror in meeting the offeror's own burden to make a legally compliant offer.

Section 768.79(2) treats an offer as covering all damages that could be awarded in a final judgment; acceptance of the offer does not itself authorize entry of a judgment.

MORRIS v. BOYER · filed 2024-03-08(2)

Instead, section 768.79(2) provides that an offer made under the statute “shall be construed as including all damages which may be awarded in a final judgment.” ... The trial court had no legal basis to enter a judgment in Mrs. Boyer’s favor after she accepted Morris’ proposal for settlement.

Section 768.79 does not require a proposal for settlement to state whether it includes or excludes setoffs.

United Cab of Broward, LLC and Ernsault Maurice v. Muller · filed 2024-11-13(2)

But nothing in section 768.79 or rule 1.442 requires a PFS to address setoffs. Adding such a requirement impermissibly reads terms into the statute that the Legislature did not include.

Section 768.79(5) permits withdrawal of a settlement proposal only in writing before a written acceptance is filed.

Neeld v. Combs · filed 2025-02-14(5)

For example, under the settlement statute and rule there is one mechanism for a party to withdraw a PFS—that is, in writing before the written notice of acceptance is filed.

Section 768.79 does not allow attorney’s fees when a settlement proposal omits a claim for monetary relief between the parties.

Liberty Surplus Insurance Corporation v. Kaufman Lynn Construction, Inc. · filed 2025-03-05(1)

By not including its own claim for declaratory relief in the pro- posal, Liberty failed to comply with the requirements of § 768.79 and Rule 1.442(c)(2)(B).

Section 768.79 does not allow recovery of fees or costs based on defective proposals for settlement.

Benavides · filed 2025-12-19

Because Plaintiffs have conceded that their Proposals for Settlement were defective, they are precluded from recovering both costs and fees under Fla. Stat. 768.79.

Section 768.79 allows attorney’s fees based on an unaccepted settlement proposal that, read as a whole, is clear enough for the recipient to evaluate.

SECURITY FIRST INSURANCE COMPANY D/B/A SECURITY FIRST FLORIDA v. DOMINICK CINCOTTA and DOMINICK CINCOTTA O/B/O AUREA CIN · filed 2025-12-23

For these reasons, we conclude that, the PFS, when read in its entirety and in context, was “sufficiently clear and free of ambiguity” to inform the Cincottas that it did not require the release of their claims against Cochran. Therefore, we reverse the order denying Security First’s entitlement to attorney’s fees pursuant to section 768.79 and rule 1.442, and remand to the trial court to determine the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees to be awarded to Security First.

Section 768.79 permits a qualifying settlement proposal to identify an insurer’s claims agent as the payor without invalidating the proposal.

Town of Jupiter v. Armes · filed 2026-03-25(2)

Thus, in terms of the ordinary meaning of “monetary” and “nonmonetary,” we construe a provision of a PFS identifying who will pay a settlement sum as a monetary term, rather than a nonmonetary term. ... The motion was based on a proposal for settlement that complied with section 768.79 and rule 1.442, and was rejected by the plaintiff, followed by a jury verdict in the defendant’s favor.

Section 768.79(5) permits withdrawal of a settlement proposal after a change in circumstances.

Javier v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc. · filed 2002-02-06(5)

Javier’s attorney could have withdrawn the second offer as soon as Javier became aware of the change in her circumstances. See section 768.79(5), Fla. Stat. (2000); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442(e). He never did this.

Section 768.79 does not authorize attorney’s fees based on a settlement proposal that purports to make the offeree’s counsel responsible for an undefined category of third-party claims.

Florida Peninsula Insurance Co. v. Brunner · filed 2016-06-08

Because the proposal for settlement purported to impose liability for an indeterminate category of “other claims of third parties” on the appellee’s counsel, a non-party, we affirm the trial court ruling.

Section 768.79(2) treats an offer to settle as including all damages that could be awarded in a final judgment.

In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure · filed 2013-11-14(2)

The majority of the Committee determined that the amendment was needed to curtail partial proposals for settlement and to comport with section 768.79(2), Florida Statutes (2012), which states, in pertinent part, that “[t]he offer [to settle] shall be construed as including all damages which could be awarded in a final judgment.” Although the Committee reported that a minority of its members are of the view that the rule should not be changed without clarification from the Legislature or the courts, we defer to the majority view and amend the rule as proposed.

Section 768.79 does not require an offer of judgment to be served by email.

Barbeque Integrated, Inc. v. Win-Development, LLC · filed 2019-04-05

... holding that the plain language of section 768.79, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 does not require service by email and thus the email service provisions of Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516 do not apply. ... Accordingly, we reverse the order denying BBI's motion for attorney's fees and remand for further proceedings.

Section 768.79 permits a fee award after rejection of an otherwise valid offer of judgment conditioned on a general release of existing claims.

USAA Casualty Insurance v. Auffant (In Re Auffant) · filed 2002-03-11

In this case, conditioning the offer of judgment on the receipt of a general release as to all claims that the Debtor had against USAA at the time was entirely consistent with the purpose of ending all disputes and terminating the litigation between USAA and the Debtor. ... It is the Court’s conclusion, therefore, that the offer of judgment made by USAA in the State Court Case was proper under the Florida Offer of Judgment Law. Accordingly, since the judgment in the State Court Action was adverse to the Debtor, USAA is entitled to the full amount of the Fee Award.

Section 768.79 requires a joint offer to be specific enough to determine whether the judgment against an individual defendant is at least twenty-five percent less than the offer made on that defendant’s behalf.

Twiddy v. Guttenplan · filed 1996-08-21

Even so, we are required to reverse because the joint offer of judgment was not specific enough to enable the trial judge to determine that the $2,100 verdict against Guttenplan was at least twenty-five percent less than the offer made on her behalf.

Under section 768.79, a joint settlement offer remains eligible for attorney's fees without allocating the amount each offeror will contribute.

FLIGHT EXP., INC. v. Robinson · filed 1999-07-14

Thus, the lack of "apportionment" in the unaccepted offer should not, and we therefore hold that it does not, impair the ability of the defendants here to recover under section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1995).

Section 768.79 permits attorney's fees based on an unaccepted joint offer that does not allocate amounts between defendants when one defendant is liable only vicariously for the other and the lack of allocation does not impair the offeree's ability to evaluate the offer.

DANNER CONST. COMPANY, INC. v. Reynolds Metals Co. · filed 2000-04-12

In this circumstance, Reynolds' ability to evaluate the offer made by Danner and TMC was not impaired by the lack of apportionment between the two defendants. Who would pay what portion of the offer made on behalf of Danner and TMC had no bearing on the amount Reynolds would have received had it accepted the offer. Therefore, because TMC was vicariously liable for the negligence of Danner, we hold that the joint offer of judgment was enforceable and the trial court erred by denying Danner's motion for attorney's fees.

Section 768.79 permitted a joint offer served before the January 1, 1997 rule amendment to trigger fee sanctions without specifying the amount offered to each plaintiff.

Herzog v. K-Mart Corp. · filed 2000-06-14

On the authority of these cases we agree with K-Mart's argument that its offer of judgment, served prior to the amendment to the rule, was not rendered ineffective to trigger the sanctions of the statute merely because it was a joint offer which failed to specify the amount attributable to each plaintiff.

Section 768.79's attorney-fee sanctions are unenforceable when a joint settlement proposal fails to state the amount attributable to each party.

Stern v. Zamudio · filed 2001-01-12

Therefore, the undifferentiated lump sum offer in this case was defective, and the sanctions of section 768.79 were not enforceable against the Sterns.

Section 768.79 does not support an attorney's fee award based on a joint settlement proposal by two offerors unless the proposal states the amount and terms attributable to each offeror.

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Materiale · filed 2001-05-11

We conclude that the converse is also true. When two offerors make a proposal for settlement to one offeree, the offeree is entitled to know the amount and terms of the offer that are attributable to each offeror in order to evaluate the offer as it pertains to that party.

Section 768.79(2)(b) requires a joint offer to specify the amount attributable to each individual party.

Allstate Indem. Co. v. Hingson · filed 2002-01-17(2)(b)

Moreover, the plain language of section 768.79 supports the C & S court's holding. In subsection (2)(b), the statute refers to "party" in the singular. This, we believe, indicates the Legislature's intent that an offer specify the amount attributable to each individual party.

Section 768.79 does not support an attorney’s fee award based on a joint settlement offer by multiple plaintiffs unless the offer states the amount attributable to each plaintiff.

Hilyer Sod, Inc. v. Willis Shaw Exp., Inc. · filed 2002-06-06

The statute and rule must be consistently applied to facilitate predictability. In the case of proposals by multiple plaintiffs, we opt for the approach already taken with offers to multiple plaintiffs. We hold that an offer of settlement made jointly by multiple plaintiffs must apportion amounts "attributable to each party." Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442(c)(3).

Section 768.79, as implemented by rule 1.442(c)(3), requires multiple plaintiffs making a joint settlement offer to apportion the offer among themselves.

Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc. · filed 2003-03-13

Section 768.79 is implemented by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 ("Proposals for Settlement"). ... We therefore hold that under the plain language of rule 1.442(c)(3), an offer from multiple plaintiffs must apportion the offer among the plaintiffs.

Section 768.79 permits a joint settlement offer by a manufacturer and a strictly liable retailer when the retailer is accused of no independent negligent act.

Barnes v. the Kellogg Co. · filed 2003-04-25

Under these circumstances, we see nothing improper with a joint offer. If anything, authorizing joint offers in such cases will facilitate settlements, which is the intended purpose of section 768.79.

Section 768.79 requires a joint offer of judgment to specify the amount attributable to each plaintiff.

Moran v. Florida Security Electronics, Inc. · filed 2003-10-01

We agree. The offer could be construed as a joint offer and failed to properly specify the amount attributable to each plaintiff.

Section 768.79 does not provide attorney's fees and costs for a joint settlement proposal that fails to apportion damages between plaintiffs.

D'ANGELO v. Fitzmaurice · filed 2003-11-26

This Court held in Willis Shaw that a joint proposal of settlement which did not specifically apportion damages between plaintiffs was invalid and that the plaintiffs were, therefore, not entitled to attorney's fees and costs under section 768.79, Florida Statutes. Accordingly, we approve the holding of the Second District Court of Appeal on this issue.

Section 768.79 requires a joint settlement proposal to state the amount attributable to each party; a proposal that fails to do so is void.

Meyer v. Hutchinson · filed 2003-12-05

Complying with Willis Shaw Express, Inc., we must find that the two Hutchinson proposals for settlement were void for clearly failing to apportion the proposal amount between the parties to whom they were directed. The Hutchinsons could have avoided having their proposals declared void by simply including in each proposal for settlement that portion of the total amount of their settlement proposal attributable to each of the two parties as is required by section 768.79, Florida Statutes, rule 1.442(c)(3), and Willis Shaw Express, Inc.

Section 768.79 requires an offer from multiple plaintiffs to apportion the total amount among them to support an attorney's fee award.

Tiede v. Satterfield · filed 2004-03-24

However, the Florida Supreme Court subsequently determined that for an offer from multiple plaintiffs to invoke the provisions of the offer of judgment statute, the offer must apportion the total amount of the offer among the plaintiffs to allow the offeree the benefit of considering settlement with the individual offerors. ... We conclude that an exercise of our jurisdiction to alter the law of the case and apply the Willis Shaw Express ruling is justified in this case. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's finding that the Satterfields are entitled to attorney's fees based on the offer of judgment statute.

Section 768.79, as implemented by Rule 1.442, requires a joint settlement proposal to state the amount and terms attributable to each party, including when one defendant is allegedly liable only vicariously.

Matetzschk v. Lamb · filed 2003-07-18

Therein, the opinion of Justice Wells emphasized the language of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(c)(3), which implements section 768.79: "A joint proposal shall state the amount and terms attributable to each party." We believe the language of Willis Shaw is applicable whether the offer emanates from joint plaintiffs or is directed to joint defendants. ... We thus reverse the attorney fee award below and remand for a determination based upon the third offer of judgment dated August 16, 2000.

Section 768.79 requires an offer of judgment to be served by the party plaintiff; in a wrongful death action brought by joint personal representatives, an offer from only one is invalid.

Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc. v. Reid · filed 2004-11-24

A valid offer of judgment must be served by the party plaintiff. § 768.79, Fla. Stat. (2004); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442(c)(3). ... Therefore, the offer of judgment filed by Reid as a co-personal representative and individual survivor is an invalid, non-binding offer of judgment.

Section 768.79 does not provide fees and costs on a joint offer of judgment that fails to state the amount attributable to each offeror.

1 Nation Technology Corp. v. A1 TELETRONICS · filed 2005-10-19

Rule 1.442 implements section 768.79, which authorizes an award of attorney's fees and costs when a defendant files an offer of judgment that is not accepted by a plaintiff and the final judgment is of no liability or an amount at least twenty-five percent less than the offer. ... However, because the offer failed to differentiate the amounts attributable to each offeror under subsection 1.442(c)(3) sufficiently to satisfy the Florida Supreme Court's recent pronouncements in Lamb, the defendants are not entitled to an award of their reasonable attorney's fees and costs based on their offer of judgment.

Section 768.79's attorney fee remedy is unavailable when a joint settlement proposal fails to state the amount attributable to each defendant, even if one defendant is only vicariously liable.

DAB Constructors, Inc. v. Oliver · filed 2005-10-21

Section 768.79, Florida's offer of judgment statute, is implemented by rule 1.442. ... Based on the emphasized language above, it appears that a joint proposal for settlement must differentiate between the defendants even when one defendant's liability is vicarious only.

Section 768.79 does not award attorney’s fees or costs when a joint settlement proposal fails to differentiate between the offerors.

KMS Restaurant Corp. v. Wendy's International, Inc. · filed 2006-08-09

We therefore conclude that KMS’ joint proposal for settlement was facially invalid and void because it did not differentiate between the parties.6 Hence, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying KMS’ request for attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 768.79.

Section 768.79 does not authorize attorney’s fees based on a joint settlement offer that fails to specify the amount attributable to each party, even when their claims are indistinguishable.

Cano v. Hyundai Motor America, Inc. · filed 2009-03-18

If a proposed settlement does not comport with the strict requirements of rule 1.442,an award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 768.79 is improper. ... Given the bright line application of rule 1.442, we reverse the award of attorney’s fees and costs against Daila because the joint proposal failed to meet rule 1.442’s strict requirement of specifying the amount attributable to each party.

Section 768.79 permits attorney’s fees based on a rejected joint offer when the offer states each defendant’s contribution and the sole plaintiff can accept it independently.

Rossmore v. Smith · filed 2011-02-25

The basis for the award was Rossmore’s rejection of the defendants’ two offers of judgment, which they made pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(c)(3). ... The amount attributable to Smith and Laughlin individually was clearly set forth in the offer of judgment. This was not an undifferentiated offer of settlement or otherwise improper. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the offer of judgment in this case was valid and the award of attorney’s fees was appropriate.

Section 768.79 does not treat a dismissed defendant as a party whose inclusion in a release makes a settlement proposal joint or requires apportionment.

CAREY-ALL TRANSPORT, INC. v. Newby · filed 2008-08-13

Even after strictly constructing rule 1.442, as we are required to do because the rule and the offer of judgment statute are in derogation of common law, Willis Shaw Express, Inc., 849 So.2d at 278, we cannot conclude that an entity or individual who has been dismissed from a lawsuit is a "party" for purposes of rule 1.442 and section 768.79.

Section 768.79 does not authorize fees based on a joint settlement proposal that requires every offeree to accept, because each offeree must be able to settle independently.

ATTORNEYS'TITLE INS. FUND, INC. v. Gorka · filed 2008-09-03(1)

Although the proposal specifies the amounts to be individually paid to Gorka and to Larson, it is invalid because it is conditioned upon both of them accepting the amounts offered and specifies that neither of them may independently accept the amount offered. By so conditioning the proposal, neither Gorka nor Larson could independently settle his or her respective claim by accepting the proposal. If one wished to accept but the other elected not to accept, the acceptance would not be effective. In this scenario, the offeree who wished to accept would be exposed to the fee sanction under section 768.79 and rule 1.442 due to the conduct of the other offeree rather than as a result of his or her independent decision to reject the proposal. Thus, because of the penal nature of section 768.79 and the strict construction that we must apply, the proposal for settlement is invalid to impose an award of fees against Gorka and Larson.

Section 768.79 does not authorize attorney’s fees based on a settlement proposal conditioned on joint acceptance by two offerees.

Three Keys, Ltd. v. Kennedy Funding, Inc. · filed 2009-11-20

The trial court denied the Lead’s request for attorneys’ fees based upon an offer of judgment conditioned upon a joint acceptance by both Three Keys and the Muller Trust. ... we agree with the trial court that the Lead’s proposal for settlement was invalid and unenforceable for the purpose of imposing fees against the Participant.

Section 768.79 does not permit a joint offer conditioned on every offeree accepting it, because each offeree must be able to settle independently.

Attorneys' Title Insurance Fund, Inc. v. Gorka · filed 2010-04-01

We hold that this type of joint offer is invalid and unenforceable because it is conditioned such that neither offeree can independently evaluate or settle his or her respective claim by accepting the proposal.

Section 768.79 does not permit attorney’s fees against a party who was not served with the offer or named and apportioned an amount in it.

Abu-Ghazaleh v. Chaul · filed 2009-12-02

The statute provides that “the offer shall be served upon the party to whom it is made.” § 768.79, Fla. Stat. (2007). Here, Abu-Ghazaleh made an offer to the named plaintiffs, but never served Van Diepen or CSI with the offer. Neither Van Diepen nor CSI were named or apportioned an amount in the offer of settlement as the statute prescribes. For these reasons, we find that Abu-Ghazaleh did not comply with the requirements of section 768.79 and cannot collect attorney’s fees under this section.

Section 768.79(1) does not support a fees award based on a joint settlement proposal conditioned on both plaintiffs accepting, even if the offer apportions the amounts among them.

Schantz v. Sekine · filed 2011-03-22(1)

Although not as direct as the wording of the settlement offer in Gorka, the highlighted language above— particularly that in paragraph 7 of the proposal — conditions settlement on Appellants’ mutual acceptance of the offer and joint action in accordance with its terms. ... But the new rule announced in Gorka renders Appellees’ proposal invalid and, we believe, “effectively eliminates the ability to make joint offers.” Gorka 36 So.3d at 654 (Polston, J., dissenting).

A proposal under section 768.79 conditioned on joint acceptance is invalid and cannot support an attorney’s fee award when rejected.

Chastain v. Chastain · filed 2013-08-23

As such, the proposal was invalid, and the attorney’s fee award to Appellees/Cross-Appellants that was based upon rejection of the proposal must be reversed.

Section 768.79 permits multiple claimants to make an apportioned all-or-nothing settlement proposal to a single offeree.

Duong v. Ziadie · filed 2014-12-17(1)

We also conclude that the all or nothing proposal made by multiple offerors to a single offeree is an acceptable proposal for settlement.

Section 768.79 permits an apportioned all-or-nothing proposal by multiple claimants to one offeree, but each claimant’s award must exceed that claimant’s proposed amount by twenty-five percent to recover fees under the proposal.

Duong v. Ziadie · filed 2014-12-17(1)

Further, because it was an “all or nothing” joint proposal, if the verdict for any of the claimants was not twenty-five percent higher than the amount of that claim in the settlement proposal, then none of the claimants could obtain attorney’s fees under its terms. In other words, it was not enough that the total amount of the verdict exceed the total amount of the offer by twenty-five percent; the individual amounts awarded to each claimant in the verdict must also exceed the individual amounts set forth in the proposal for settlement for that claimant by twenty-five percent, or no attorney’s fees could be claimed based upon the proposal for settlement.

Section 768.79 requires apportionment when a settlement proposal resolves claims involving additional parties, even if it names only one offeror and one offeree.

Audiffred v. Arnold · filed 2015-04-16

We hold that when a single offeror submits a settlement proposal to a single offeree pursuant to section 768.79 and rule 1.442, and the offer resolves pending claims by or against additional parties who are neither offerors nor offerees, it constitutes a joint proposal that is subject to the apportionment requirement in subdivision (c)(3) of the rule. We conclude that the statute and the rule mandate apportionment under such circumstances to eliminate any ambiguity with regard to the resolution of claims by nonofferor/nonofferee parties.

A settlement proposal sufficiently identifies the offeree when it names a minor who is the sole plaintiff through her mother as guardian; the offer need not apportion an amount to the mother.

DFC Tamarac, Inc. v. Jackson · filed 2014-11-12(2)(b)

Appellant used the exact same language from the complaint in the proposal for settlement. As such, the proposal of settlement was not ambiguous in its offer of settlement to appellee, and appellant was not required to apportion the settlement offer between appellee and the mother.

Section 768.79(2)(b) does not require a settlement offer to apportion an amount to a minor plaintiff’s guardian when the guardian has no separate claim.

DFC Tamarac, Inc. v. Jackson ex rel. Jackson · filed 2014-11-12(2)(b)

As such, the proposal of settlement was not ambiguous in its offer of settlement to appellee, and appellant was not required to apportion the settlement offer between appellee and the mother. The trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion for attorney’s fees, and we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand with instructions to award appropriate attorney’s fees to appellant.

Section 768.79 does not support an attorney’s fee award based on a joint settlement proposal that fails to apportion the amount between multiple offerors.

Ancel Pratt, Jr. v. Michael C. Weiss, D.O. · filed 2015-04-16

Accordingly, under section 768.79 and rule 1.442 the proposal was invalid because it failed to apportion the settlement amount between FMC Hospital and FMC Medical.

Section 768.79 does not allow an attorney’s fee award based on a joint settlement proposal that prevents each offeree from independently accepting it.

Pacheco v. Gonzalez · filed 2018-05-16

Appellants, Ramon Pachecho (“Pacheco”) and Ramon Pacheco and Associates, Inc. (the “Corporation”), appeal the trial court’s final judgment for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $232,440 in favor of appellee, R. Randy Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”), based upon a Proposal for Settlement (the “Proposal”) served pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2011), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442. Because the conditional nature of the Proposal divested Pacheco and the Corporation of their ability to independently evaluate and accept the Proposal irrespective of the other party’s decision, we hold that the Proposal was invalid under Attorneys’ Title Insurance Fund, Inc. v. Gorka, 36 So. 3d 646 (Fla. 2010), and reverse.

Section 768.79 does not allow attorney’s fees based on a joint settlement proposal that prevents each offeree from independently accepting it.

Atlantic Civil v. Swift III · filed 2018-10-03

Because the Proposal deprived Swift and Key Haven of the ability to independently evaluate and accept Atlantic Civil’s offer to settle its claims, we hold that the Proposal is invalid under the dictates of Gorka.

Section 768.79 permits an otherwise valid joint settlement proposal to support attorney’s fees even when an indemnified offeror contributes nothing to the settlement amount.

SDG Dadeland Associates, Inc. v. Kenny Arias · filed 2024-01-17

Indemnified parties should not have to waive their entitlement to indemnification in order to avail themselves of the substantive rights provided to litigants under section 768.79. We, therefore, decline to adopt Arias’s argument that, as a matter of law, a joint offer accurately reflecting that an indemnified offeror is not contributing to the joint settlement offer is invalid.

Section 768.79 requires a joint settlement proposal to specify the amount and terms attributable to each party.

Watkins v. Corbett, Corbett · filed 2026-03-25(2)(b)

Thus, the language of rule 1.442(c)(3) directing that "[a] joint proposal must state the amount and terms attributable to each party" implements a substantive—and important—requirement of section 768.79. As such, it must be strictly complied with.

Section 768.79(1)'s response period is not tolled by court-ordered mediation because the statutory tolling provision was held unconstitutional.

Ong v. Mike Guido Properties · filed 1996-03-01(1)

The facts of the instant case demonstrate that, when a defendant fails to respond to the demand after the lawsuit is referred to mediation, there is an apparent inconsistency between the tolling provision of section 44.102(6)(a) and the timing provision of section 768.79(1). ... Therefore, we strike this provision as an unconstitutional infringement of the separation of powers doctrine. ... Accordingly, the order denying Guido's motion for appellate attorney's fees is vacated, the motion for appellate attorney's fees is granted, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Section 768.79's time requirements apply to an offer of judgment made after unsuccessful mediation.

Knealing v. Puleo · filed 1996-06-20(1)(a)

Based on our conclusion that section 44.102(6) is unconstitutional, we hold that an offer of judgment made after an unsuccessful mediation must still comply with the time requirements of section 768.79 as incorporated into Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442.

A motion for fees under section 768.79 must be filed within thirty days of the trial court’s final judgment.

Bradley Construction Co. v. Westburne Supply, Inc. · filed 1996-06-26

We agree with the appellant that waiting until after the appeal was resolved before moving for fees pursuant to this statute was untimely. The appellee should have filed its motion for fees within thirty days of the rendition of the final judgment in the trial court.

Section 768.79’s deadline for seeking attorney fees can be extended by a timely reservation of jurisdiction in the final judgment; absent a reservation or relief for excusable neglect, missing the deadline waives entitlement to fees.

Gulliver Academy, Inc. v. Bodek · filed 1997-02-06(6)

Of course, absent a reservation of jurisdiction, a motion for attorney fees based upon the statutes must be filed within thirty days as provided in the rule, [5] or the entitlement to attorney fees on the basis set forth in section 768.79 is waived unless there is a basis for relief under rule 1.090(b)(2).

An offer of judgment made less than 30 days before trial cannot support an award of attorney's fees under § 768.79.

Hanzelik v. GROTTOLI AND HUDON INVEST. · filed 1997-02-19(1)

We find that Grottoli & Hudon's offer of judgment, made less than thirty days before the commencement of trial, is insufficient to support an award of fees pursuant to section 768.79.