Fla. Stat. § 768.28

Section 768.28(7) requires service of process on the Department of Insurance; without that service, the governmental defendant remains immune from suit.

Miami-Dade County v. Meyers · filed 1999-05-19(7)

Section 768.28(7) of the Florida Statutes provides that "[I]n actions brought pursuant to this section, process shall be served upon the head of the agency concerned and also ... upon the Department of Insurance ...." (emphasis added). ... Because the plaintiff did not serve process on the Department of Insurance, the County was immune from suit, and the trial court erred in denying the County's motion for a directed verdict.

Section 768.28(6)'s presuit notice objection can be waived by an untimely, nonspecific denial, and timely sworn interrogatory answers detailing a consortium claim can satisfy the notice requirement.

VonDrasek v. City of St. Petersburg · filed 2000-09-01(6)

It is well established that the notice requirement in section 768.28(6) does not affect the jurisdiction of the court, but rather is a condition precedent to the lawsuit. ... Given that the City had all of the factual information it needed to assess this legal issue when it filed its answer, the City waived this legal issue when it failed to provide a timely, specific denial. ... By submitting the interrogatories to Mrs. VonDrasek, the City received her written answers, providing detailed information about her consortium claim, within the three-year period for her claim. See § 768.28(6)(a). The sworn information provided in the answers is more than sufficient to satisfy the statutory notice requirements.

Service on the Department of Insurance under section 768.28(7) may occur after 120 days without requiring dismissal when the state agency was served within that period.

McMillian v. Brown · filed 1995-09-13(7)

Sub judice, having declared essentially in Platt that service of process on the Department may be accomplished beyond the 120-day requirement in Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.070(i), without the harsh result of dismissal where the state agency is served within 120 days, we now conclude that the issue of service of process on the Department is a matter of timeliness.

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires timely notice to the Department of Insurance before a claimant may sue a governmental entity; failure to give that notice bars the claim.

BROWARD CTY. SCH. BD. v. Joseph · filed 2000-04-19(6)(a)

Failure to provide notice to the Department of Insurance is fatal to Joseph's claim because he can never satisfy the conditions precedent to filing suit against the School Board.

Section 768.28(6)(a)'s notice requirement is not satisfied by filing notice only with the City of Miami when suing Metropolitan Dade County.

Reddie v. Metropolitan Dade County · filed 2001-04-04(6)(a)

We affirm the summary judgment entered in favor of Metropolitan Dade County because the plaintiffs/appellants failed to comply with the notice requirements of section 768.28(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), by having filed its notice only with the City of Miami.

Failure to comply with section 768.28(6)’s notice requirements warrants dismissal, but a plaintiff should have an opportunity to amend after complying if the limitations period has not run.

Mason v. Highlands County Board of County Commissioners · filed 2001-07-06(6)

Although the trial court was correct in dismissing appellant’s complaint due to his failure to comply with section 768.28(6), the trial court improperly dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Since the statute of limitations had not yet run at the time of dismissal, appellant should have been given the opportunity to file an amended complaint after compliance with the statute.

Section 768.28(7) requires a notice of claim against a school board to be served on the board as the head of the agency, rather than on the superintendent.

Patel v. School Bd. of Volusia County · filed 2002-03-08(7)

In addition, the notice was served upon the Superintendent of Schools, not the "head of the agency," in this case the School Board, as is required by section 768.28(7).

Failure to satisfy section 768.28(6)(a)’s prerequisites supports dismissal, but does not require dismissal with prejudice.

Figueredo v. Jenne · filed 2002-06-12(6)(a)

While we agree with the trial court’s finding that Figueredo’s failure to satisfy the statutory prerequisites of section 768.28(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), supports dismissal, we do not maintain that such failure mandates dismissal with prejudice.

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires presuit notice to the Department of Insurance of the claim against the state agency; failure to give that notice precludes the negligence action.

Maynard v. State, Department of Corrections · filed 2004-01-29(6)(a)

The appellant completely failed to notify the Department of Insurance of any claim against the Department of Corrections. As in Lopez v. Prager, 625 So.2d 1240 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), rev. denied, 634 So.2d 625 (Fla.1994), this failure to comply with the presuit notice requirement of section 768.28(6)(a) precludes the negligence action which the appellant filed against the Department of Corrections.

Section 768.28(7) requires service of process on the designated state department; when a county pleads and proves lack of service, it is entitled to judgment at the close of the plaintiff's case, and service after the verdict is too late.

Metropolitan Dade County v. Lopez · filed 2004-12-08(7)

At the time the jury rendered its verdict in this case, Lopez still had not complied with section 768.28(7). Thus, as in Meyers and Braude, defendants were entitled to judgment at end of plaintiff's case, it having been pleaded affirmatively and proven that notice was not given. After the jury had returned a verdict, it was too late to turn back the clock.

Section 768.28(7) requires plaintiffs suing the state or its subdivisions for negligence to prove compliance with its process service requirements.

Williams v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2007-05-02(7)

We affirm the order granting the directed verdict as Williams did not prove compliance with section 768.28, which requires plaintiffs in negligence suits against the state, its agencies, and subdivisions to follow strict procedures in order to take advantage of the State's waiver of sovereign immunity for tort liability. Specifically, Williams failed to prove compliance with the process service requirements of section 768.28(7). This is fatal to his action.

Section 768.28(6)'s presuit notice requirement applies to common law tort claims covered by the sovereign immunity waiver, but not to statutory workers' compensation retaliation claims under section 440.205.

Bifulco v. PATIENT BUSINESS & FIN. SERVS. · filed 2009-01-02(6)

The condition precedent of presuit notice, created by section 768.28, was only intended to apply to suits for which immunity was waived by enactment of the statute, to wit: common law torts. A claim for violation of section 440.205, although perhaps tort-like in nature, is not a claim sounding in common law tort.

Section 768.28(6)’s presuit notice requirements do not apply to workers’ compensation retaliatory discharge actions against the State under section 440.205.

Bifulco v. Patient Business & Financial Services, Inc. · filed 2010-06-24(6)

Because chapter 440 contains a waiver of sovereign immunity independent of the waiver contained in section 768.28, we hold that the presuit notice requirements of section 768.28(6) do not apply to retaliatory discharge actions brought against the State under section 440.205.

Section 768.28(7)'s service requirement was satisfied when the plaintiff served the Department of Financial Services before the court ruled on the hospital's directed-verdict motion.

Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County v. Acanda · filed 2009-09-02(7)

Even if we were to conclude that the Plaintiff had rested her case when the hospital was permitted to argue its motion for directed verdict, the notice requirement at issue had been satisfied by the following morning before a ruling on either the “reserved” evidentiary matter or the hospital’s motion for directed verdict. This satisfied both the requirements of section 768.28(7), and this Court’s prior precedents.

Proof of service on the Department of Financial Services under section 768.28(7) is neither an element of a negligence action nor a condition precedent to maintaining it.

Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County v. Acanda · filed 2011-06-23(7)

Proof of service of process under section 768.28(7) is not an element of a negligence cause of action and is not a condition precedent to maintaining the cause of action.

Section 768.28(6)(b) makes notice a condition precedent to a tort action, and the complaint must allege compliance.

Nelson v. Hillsborough County, Florida · filed 2016-04-15(6)(b)

The notice requirement is a condition precedent to maintaining the action, § 768.28(6)(b), and compliance must be alleged in the complaint.

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires presuit notice within three years after a claim accrues.

Nelson v. Gualtieri · filed 2020-03-10(6)(a)

The statute requires the pre-suit notice to be provided within three years of the claim accruing. ... This notice was mailed within the two-year limitations period and within the three-year pre-suit notice period.

Section 768.28(6) requires the agency or subdivision to receive a claimant’s written notice within three years of accrual; mailing it by the deadline is insufficient.

SIMMONS v. PUBLIC HEALTH TRUST OF MIAMI-DADE COUNTY · filed 2022-05-04(6)

Thus, a claimant “presents” his notice of claim under section 768.28(6) on the date the state agency or subdivision receives, in hand, the notice of claim, not on the date that the claimant mails his notice of claim to the agency or subdivision.

Section 768.28(6) requires written notice of a tort claim and denial of the claim before a claimant may maintain an action against the state or its agent.

Fox v. Montoya · filed 2021-03-29(6)(a), (6)(b)

Notably, “the requirements of notice to the agency and denial of the claim pursuant to paragraph (a) are conditions precedent to maintaining an action[.]” § 768.28(6)(b), Fla. Stat. ... Here, Fox has failed to allege, generally or otherwise, that he satisfied the condition precedent for filing a tort action against Montoya, an agent of a State agency. In light of Fox’s failure to allege satisfaction of this condition precedent and Fox’s concession that he failed to comply, which the Court has no authority to ignore, the Motion is due to be granted as to this claim.

Section 768.28(6) requires a claimant to plead compliance with its presuit notice requirement to maintain a negligence action against a Florida municipality.

Saunders v. City of Lakeland, Florida · filed 2024-06-03(6)

... Plaintiff fails to allege that she exhausted administrative remedies within the meaning of § 768.28(6), as required. For this reason, Plaintiff’s negligence claim must be dismissed without prejudice.

A general allegation that all conditions precedent were satisfied or waived sufficiently pleads compliance with § 768.28(6)(a)’s presuit notice requirement at the dismissal stage.

Doe v. Campbell Drive K-8 Center · filed 2024-12-19(6)(a)

Defendant is correct that the statute requires strict compliance; plaintiffs must provide notice to the state agency of the action. ... Nevertheless, a general statement in a complaint that a plaintiff “performed all conditions precedent prior to bringing” the action is sufficient to avoid dismissal.

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires a written claim that asserts a demand for compensation.

Rick Staly, as Sheriff of Flagler County, Florida v. Izotova · filed 2024-12-20(6)(a)

In order to strictly comply with section 768.28(6)(a), the claim must be in writing and it must assert a claim for compensation.

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires presuit notice for a county tort claim; failure to comply warrants dismissal with prejudice once the notice period has expired.

Holt v. Hillsborough County · filed 2025-01-21(6)(a)

Further, over three years have passed since Holt’s claim accrued, meaning that she can longer satisfy § 768.28(6)(a)’s requirements. ... Because there is no dispute that Holt failed to comply with § 768.28(6)(a), both state law claims must be dismissed with prejudice.

If a complaint omits an allegation of compliance with § 768.28(6)’s pre-suit notice requirement but compliance may still be shown, the court should dismiss with leave to amend.

Percival v. Leduc · filed 2024-03-08(6)

When a complaint fails to allege compliance with § 768.28(6) but the possibility of demonstrating compliance remains an option, courts should dismiss with leave to amend.

Section 768.28(6) requires a wrongful death claimant to give the appropriate agency written pre-suit notice, even when the claimant has notified the Department of Financial Services.

Anderson v. the School Board of Escambia County · filed 2025-07-23(6)

Based on the plain language of the statute, we hold that section 768.28, Florida Statutes, required the Appellants to provide the School Board—as the “appropriate agency”—with pre-suit notice before filing their wrongful death claim.

Section 768.28(9)(a) permits personal tort liability for a city employee acting within the scope of employment only if the employee acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Safety Harbor Powersports, LLC v. City of Safety Harbor, Florida · filed 2024-07-12(9)(a)

Pursuant to Florida law, Bushee can only be held personally liable in tort “as a result of any act, event, or omission of action in the scope of . . . his employment or function” if he “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” ... However, Plaintiff does not include any allegations that, when issuing this violation, Bushee acted outside the scope of his employment, in bad faith, or in another way that would subject him to personal liability. As such, Plaintiff has not made allegations that plausibly state a claim against Bushee.

Section 768.28(9)(a) protects state employees from tort liability unless the plaintiff presents sufficient evidence to overcome employee immunity.

Valdes v. Crosby · filed 2005-03-31(9)(a)

Thus, for the same reasons the Court finds plaintiff has failed to create a triable issue of fact as to whether Giebeig, A.D. Thornton, McEachern, and Burger are liable under § 1983, the Court also finds plaintiff has failed to marshal sufficient evidence to overcome the protection afforded these four defendants under Florida’s Sovereign Immunity Act.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields government employees from personal tort liability for acts within their job duties unless they act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard.

Sharp v. City of Palatka · filed 2007-12-20(9)(a)

Irrespective of whether Plaintiff Sharp could establish a prima facie case for malicious prosecution, the Court finds Defendants Getchell and Griffith are entitled to qualified immunity under both common law and Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a) (2006).

Section 768.28(9)(a) gives government employees individual immunity from tort claims unless facts show bad faith, malicious purpose, or wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Navarro v. City of Riviera Beach · filed 2016-06-29(9)(a)

For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to allege conduct by Chief Williams sufficient to establish the bad faith element required to remove the individual immunity that he is afforded under § 768.28(9).

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields state employees from personal tort liability for acts within the scope of employment unless they act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard.

Brown v. Florida Gulf Coast University Board of Trustees · filed 2019-11-21(9)(a)

Such allegations do not state a claim of actual malice sufficient to overcome the statutory immunity provided for by Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28(9)(a) immunizes state employees from tort actions unless they act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Gallashaw v. Moody · filed 2021-06-10(9)(a)

Florida’s sovereign immunity statute grants immunity to state employees for tort actions unless they “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” See Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields state employees from tort claims unless they act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Swenson v. Palacek · filed 2021-07-12(9)(a)

Florida’s sovereign immunity statute grants immunity to state employees for tort actions unless they “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” See Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields a government employee from personal tort liability unless the employee acts in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Banuchi v. City of Homestead · filed 2022-06-17(9)(a)

Ultimately, Banuchi does not identify any action taken by Green that would amount to bad faith, malice, or wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property. Accordingly, Green is immune from suit under Florida Statutes section 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28(9)(a) immunizes an employee from a tort claim based on ordinary negligence within the scope of employment.

Bowman v. Hunter · filed 2023-03-17(9)(a)

To the extent Bowman alleges that Harvey was merely negligent, Harvey is entitled to statutory immunity.

Section 768.28 does not immunize government employees from state tort claims when the alleged conduct supports bad faith, malicious purpose, or willful and wanton disregard.

Bowden v. Snider · filed 2023-11-15(9)(a)

Accepting Bowden’s allegations as true, Bennett’s and Frost’s conduct was willful and wanton, and the Court can reasonably infer that they acted in bad faith and with a malicious purpose. Thus, the Court does not find Frost and Bennett immune under Fla. Stat. § 768.28 at this stage of the case.

Section 768.28(9)(a) immunizes state employees from individual liability for ordinary negligence committed within the scope of employment.

Reed v. Waters · filed 2024-10-18(9)(a)

To the extent Reed alleges that the Officers were merely negligent, the Officers are entitled to statutory immunity.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields public employees from personal liability for acts within the scope of employment unless they act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard.

Lopez v. City of Opa-Locka · filed 2025-06-25(9)(a)

That provision shields public employees from personal liability for actions within the scope of their employment unless they acted “in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.”

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not entitle a state employee to summary judgment on immunity when a reasonable factfinder could find willful and wanton conduct.

Aguirre-Jarquin v. Hemmert · filed 2025-11-04(9)(a)

For this reason, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a) entitles Hemmert and Grossi to state-law immunity as to Count VII of Aguirre’s complaint.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields officers from personal tort liability for acts within the scope of employment unless they act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of rights or safety.

Castro-Reyes v. Bosque · filed 2026-02-06(9)(a)

Under Florida law, a police officer “may not be held personally liable in tort or named as a party defendant in any action for any injury or damage suffered as a result of any act, event, or omission of action in the scope of her or his employment or function,” except if the officer “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28(9)(a) generally shields state officers, employees, and agents from personal liability for acts within the scope of their employment unless they act in bad faith or with a malicious purpose.

Jarvis v. City of Daytona Beach · filed 2026-02-06(9)(a)

Florida law provides that officers, employees, and agents of the State generally may not be held personally liable for actions within the scope of their employment, so long as they did not act in bad faith or with a malicious purpose. Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28(9)(a) makes an action against the governmental entity or an official in an official capacity the exclusive remedy for an officer’s acts within the scope of employment, absent bad faith, malicious purpose, or wanton and willful disregard.

Hernandez v. Pasco County Sheriff's Department · filed 2021-02-16(9)(a)

Section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes, clearly provides that the exclusive remedy for injury or damage suffered from an act, event, or omission of an officer of the state or any of its subdivisions or constitutional agents is an action “against the governmental entity, or the head of such entity in her or his official capacity, or the constitutional officer of which the officer, employee, or agent is an employee . . . .” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28(9)(a) makes an action against the governmental entity or an official-capacity defendant the exclusive remedy for injury caused by an officer’s acts within the scope of employment, absent bad faith, malicious purpose, or wanton and willful disregard.

Verde v. Pasco County Sheriff's Department · filed 2021-02-16(9)(a)

As Plaintiff alleges that these defendants did not act in bad faith or with malicious purpose, the avenue for pursuing such would be an official capacity lawsuit against the governmental entity.

Section 768.28’s employee-immunity amendment cannot retroactively take away an injured person’s existing right to recover damages from a negligent public employee.

State, Dept. of Transp. v. Knowles · filed 1981-06-25

The statute effects an abrogation of Knowles' right to his full tort recovery,[11] not merely a procedural adjustment of his remedies.[12] That abrogation clearly outweighs the public's interest in the 1980 legislation.

Under the 1977 version of Section 768.28(9), public employees could be sued for negligence within the scope of their employment, but were entitled to indemnification.

Meli v. Admiral Insurance · filed 1982-04-27(9)

Under the provisions of Section 768.28(9), Florida Statutes (1977), it was clear that a public employee was not immune from suit for negligent acts occurring within the scope of his employment, although he was entitled to indemnification.

Section 768.28(9) makes a government employee acting within the scope of employment personally immune from an ordinary negligence suit and permits the claim against the governmental entity.

White v. HILLSBOROUGH CTY. HOSP. AUTH. · filed 1983-07-15(9)

We hold that under section 768.28(9), which became effective June 30, 1980, Dr. Vanderschliden is personally immune from suit for ordinary negligence in performance of his governmental employment, and appellant's action may be maintained only against the governmental entity. We affirm the trial court's holding that section 768.28(9) is constitutional.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields state and subdivision employees from personal tort liability for ordinary negligence within the scope of employment, but permits personal liability for conduct outside that scope or for bad faith, malice, or willful and wanton disregard.

Bryant v. DUVAL CTY. HOSPITAL AUTHORITY · filed 1984-11-28(9)(a)

Section 768.28(9)(a) provides that no employee of the state or its subdivisions is personally liable in tort for ordinary negligence in the scope of his employment. A state employee is personally liable for actions outside the scope of his employment or for actions in bad faith, with malice or with willful and wanton disregard of human rights, safety or property.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields an officer acting within the scope of employment from personal tort liability unless the officer acted in bad faith, with malicious intent, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Everton v. Willard · filed 1983-01-05(9)(a)

Section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), protects such an officer from being personally liable or from being named as a party defendant unless the officer acted in bad faith, with malicious intent, or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property. Appellant Trinko's complaint contains no such allegations regarding Deputy Parker and those counts of the complaint seeking damages from him should have been dismissed pursuant to section 768.28(9)(a).

Only the legislature may waive a state employee’s immunity under Section 768.28(9)(a) to the extent of available liability insurance coverage.

Wilson ex rel. Wilson v. Duval County School Board · filed 1983-07-22(9)(a)

Waiver of such statutory immunity to the extent of available liability insurance coverage is solely within the power of the legislature to grant or deny.

Section 768.28(9) requires facts establishing a defendant’s relationship to the state before sovereign immunity can support summary judgment; conclusory affidavits are insufficient.

Testa v. Pfaff · filed 1985-02-20(9)

The affirmative defense of sovereign immunity in this case requires determination of the relationship(s) of the defendants to the Board of Regents of Florida. The affidavits filed are insufficient since they are based on ultimate facts[2] or factual conclusions and are without statement of the underlying facts which give rise to such conclusions.

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not treat a county supervisor of elections as a city employee merely because she acts on the city's behalf in her official capacity.

Krivanek v. Pasternack · filed 1986-07-02(9)(a)

While the provisions of chapter 79-573 empower the Supervisor of Elections of Hillsborough County to act on behalf of the City of Tampa, it does not transform the Supervisor of Elections, while acting in her official capacity, into an employee of the City of Tampa for the purposes of the exemption found in section 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields government agents acting within the scope of their duties, but their immunity does not extend to a separate private principal.

Jaar v. University of Miami · filed 1985-02-12(9)(a)

On the other hand, the immunity which attaches to an agent does not revert to its principal. The University receives no sovereign immunity protection from the doctors' relationships to the Trust.

Resident physicians controlled and supervised by a state university qualify for state employee immunity under section 768.28(9), even when private patient fees fund their services and insurance.

DeRosa v. Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. · filed 1987-03-16(9)(a)

The record here therefore establishes that appellees were employee-agents of the state and, as such, entitled to sovereign immunity under section 768.28(9), Florida Statutes. We are presented with no compelling authority or rationale by which that entitlement can be denied because the funds Shands uses to pay for resident physicians' services, and health and professional liability insurance coverage, are derived from private patient fees.

Section 768.28(9)(a) affords government employees immunity from personal tort liability, and privately purchased liability insurance does not waive that immunity.

Atwater v. Broward County · filed 1990-01-24(9)(a)

No provision exists in the statute that can be interpreted as applicable to the purchase of insurance by an employee or as waiving the employee immunity afforded by section 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28(9)(a) requires willful and wanton behavior to waive a state employee's sovereign immunity in a suit against a coemployee.

McClelland v. Cool · filed 1989-07-28(9)(a)

We therefore conclude that section 768.28(9)(a), covering officers, employees and agents of the state, is the more specific statute.

Section 768.28(9)(a) gives state coemployees immunity for gross negligence unless they act with bad faith, malicious purpose, or wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Elliott v. Dugger · filed 1991-05-13(9)(a)

Finally, concerning Elliott's contention that he could sue Dugger for coemployee Winslow's gross negligence, section 768.28(9)(a) grants sovereign immunity to coemployees who work for the state or any of its subdivisions, unless the employee acts with bad faith, malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety or property. Thus, although section 440.11 permits suit against a coemployee who acts with gross negligence, section 768.28(9)(a) grants immunity to a state coemployee who merely acts with gross negligence and not the greater degree of culpability set forth in the statute.

Section 768.28(9)(c) applies sovereign immunity to an employee's acts within the scope of the employee's employment or function.

Martin v. Drylie · filed 1990-04-25(9)(c)

With respect to the sovereign immunity issue, we perceive the question involved to be whether, at the time of the negligent act alleged, Dr. Drylie was acting "in the scope of his employment or function" pursuant to section 768.28(9)(c), Florida Statutes, i.e., in his state employment on the faculty of the College of Medicine. ... We hold only that, under the circumstances of this case, a factual issue was presented as to his function when he operated on Ms. Martin.

Section 768.28(9)(a) makes a governmental entity liable for an employee's tort unless the employee acted outside the course and scope of employment, in bad faith, with a malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard for human rights, safety, or property.

DUYSER BY DUYSER v. School Bd. of Broward County · filed 1991-01-09(9)(a)

The purpose of his acts was clearly self-serving, in bad faith and outside any conceivable course and scope of employment so as to immunize the school board from liability under section 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28 waives sovereign immunity for torts caused by an employee's negligence only when the employee acts within the scope of employment.

Frawley v. City of Lake Worth · filed 1992-08-12

The Village of Palm Springs enjoys sovereign immunity in tort, which immunity is waived only when the negligence of its employee occurs while the employee is acting within the scope of his employment. ... We hold, as did the trial court, that Lieutenant Smith did not have a duty to stop and render aid or assistance. When he did so, he was acting in his individual capacity and not within the scope of his employment as a police officer of the Village of Palm Springs.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields state employees from personal liability for negligence within the scope of their employment; disputed facts about that scope present a jury question.

Gardner v. Holifield · filed 1994-07-05(9)(a)

State employees, including medical doctors, enjoy immunity from liability for negligence committed within the scope and course of their state employment. § 768.28(9)(a), Fla. Stat.[3] Sovereign immunity does not, however, protect state employees from liability for negligent acts committed outside the course and scope of their state employment. ... The question of scope of state employment presents a jury issue when it arises upon disputed facts.

Section 768.28 does not make a county liable for an employee’s alleged battery merely because the employee was on duty and the injured person was in custody.

McGhee v. Volusia County · filed 1995-04-07

The facts relied upon by the appellant— Hernlen was on duty at the time of the incident and McGhee was in custody — cannot, standing alone, create a jury issue as to scope of employment under the waiver of sovereign immunity statute, section 768.28, Florida Statutes.

Section 768.28(9)(a) protects CMS employees and agents from liability, but a physician consultant’s immunity cannot be decided on summary judgment when the consultant’s relationship with CMS remains disputed.

Noel ex rel. Noel v. North Broward Hospital District · filed 1995-09-27(9)(a)

Employees or agents of CMS would be protected under section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes (1993). ... Although appellees are providing a great service for the community, we cannot state that they are immune from liability without defining their relationship with CMS.

Section 768.28(9)(a) requires proof of bad faith or malicious purpose to overcome sovereign immunity for government employees sued in their individual capacities.

Harris v. Monds · filed 1997-07-02(9)(a)

Appellant also alleges that appellees, by failing to take action to protect him from this known danger, acted in bad faith and with malicious purpose. Because appellees have been sued in their individual capacities, this additional allegation must be proved in order to exempt them from the protective cloak of sovereign immunity.[1]See § 768.28(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995).

A school board employee’s immunity under section 768.28(9)(a) can be overcome by allegations that the employee acted with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety or property.

Shell v. Strachan · filed 1997-10-15(9)(a)

Viewed in the light most favorable to appellant, we find that his amended complaint stated a claim for battery on his son in compliance with the requirement that to overcome the immunity provided to a school *176board employee by subsection 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), the employee must have acted “in a manner exhibiting a wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety or property.”

Section 768.28(9)(a) gives governmental employees individual immunity from tort liability unless they act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with willful and wanton disregard of human rights or safety.

Castellano v. Raynor · filed 1999-01-06(9)(a)

Section 768.28(9)(a) clothes governmental employees with individual immunity that is lost only as to torts committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights and safety. ... The trial judge correctly recognized that appellee's act of tossing a football to appellant, while perhaps negligent or foolish, did not rise to the level of culpability necessary to avoid immunity.

Section 768.28(9)(a) gives a government employee qualified immunity from a malicious prosecution claim, but does not protect actions taken with malicious purpose.

Johnson v. Sackett · filed 2001-03-28(9)(a)

Because Ms. Sackett is not entitled to absolute immunity from malicious prosecution by our state's common law, she may claim only the benefit of the qualified immunity provided to her by section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes (1987).[4] This immunity does not protect her if her actions were taken with "malicious purpose."

Section 768.28(9)(a) immunizes an on-duty police officer from ordinary-negligence liability when a permitted trip outside his jurisdiction and actions to protect himself remain within the scope of employment.

Ryan v. Roy · filed 2001-12-05(9)(a)

Under section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), employees of the state or its subdivisions are immune from tort liability for conduct within the scope of employment unless they act maliciously or wantonly and willfully. ... An on-duty police officer in a patrol car, or on the beat, must occasionally go outside the jurisdiction to purchase food or use a restroom. It is inherent in the nature of the employment and anticipated by the employer. And, as we noted earlier, this officer's actions in protecting himself from being injured by the attacking dogs benefitted his employer. We therefore affirm the summary judgment.

Section 768.28’s tort immunity does not apply to a statutory private-sector whistleblower claim.

Dahl v. Eckerd Family Youth Alternatives, Inc. · filed 2003-04-16(9)(a)

Provided certain conditions are met, this statute provides Eckerd, its employees, and its agents with immunity from personal liability in tort under section 768.28(9)(a). However, it has no application in this context, because Ms. Dahl is exercising a right of action under statute; she is not suing in tort.

When public employees act within their authority, whether their conduct meets section 768.28(9)(a)'s conditions for employer immunity may be a question for the fact-finder.

Carestio v. School Bd. of Broward County · filed 2004-02-18(9)(a)

Therefore the employees were acting within the scope of their authority. Under McGhee, the question should be put *757 to the fact-finder whether the employees' actions fall within the language of section 768.28(9)(a), making the School Board immune from liability.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields an officer acting within the scope of employment from personal tort liability when an accident does not involve willful and wanton disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Simon v. Murphy · filed 2005-03-02(9)(a)

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Simons, the incident giving rise to the instant action was a mere traffic accident which did not rise to the level of willful and wanton disregard necessary to strip Murphy, as an officer of the State, of immunity from suit as a matter of law pursuant to Florida Statutes section 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28(9)(a) protects government employees from personal tort liability for acts within their duties unless they acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Drudge v. City of Kissimmee · filed 2008-09-25(9)(a)

The record evidence does not reveal any issue of material fact as to whether Sergeant Lanphere acted “in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property” as required for his immunity to be stripped.

Section 768.28(9)(a) permits a claim against a public employee to proceed when a reasonable jury could find that the employee acted with willful and wanton disregard for human rights or safety.

Lemay v. Kondrk · filed 2006-03-10(9)(a)

We fully recognize that the immunity provided by section 768.28(9)(a) is both an immunity from suit and an immunity from liability, and we recognize that an entitlement is effectively lost if the case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. ... We think the gate opens when, as here, a reasonable jury could determine that there was willful and wanton conduct.

Section 768.28(9)(a) gives covered government officers and employees immunity from both personal tort liability and suit.

Willingham v. City of Orlando · filed 2006-05-12(9)(a)

Importantly, the immunity provided by section 768.28(9)(a) is both an immunity from liability and an immunity from suit, and the benefit of this immunity is effectively lost if the person entitled to assert it is required to go to trial.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields public employees from personal liability for negligence and requires such claims to be brought against their governmental employer.

Aravena v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2006-04-06(9)(a)

In cases where the employer is a governmental entity such as a county, the coemployee tortfeasor is immune from personal liability for torts under section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), which requires that any civil action for the employee's negligence be maintained against the governmental entity. Under this provision, any negligence claim arising under the unrelated works exception against a public coemployee must be brought against the governmental entity employer.

Section 768.28(9)(a) immunizes the State and its agencies from malicious prosecution claims based on employees’ malicious acts within the scope of employment.

DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION v. Green · filed 2007-02-21(9)(a)

Because "malice" is a necessary element of malicious prosecution and section 768.28(9)(a) immunizes the State and its agencies from "malicious" acts of its employees while they are acting within the scope of their employment, Green is barred from bringing a malicious prosecution claim against FDEP.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields an officer from personal tort liability for acts within the scope of employment unless the officer acts in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in a willful and wanton manner.

Pace v. City of Palmetto · filed 2007-06-12(9)(a)

Accordingly, in order for an officer to be held personally liable for an injury resulting from an act the officer committed in the scope of his employment, the officer must have acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in a willful and wanton manner.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields a state officer from personal liability for state tort claims arising from acts within the scope of official duties.

Spechler v. Tobin · filed 2008-12-10(9)(a)

As the Court previously held, Chief Judge Tobin was acting within the scope of his authority and pursuant to the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration when he reassigned Plaintiff to a satellite courthouse. Accordingly, this provision of sovereign immunity attaches and the state law claims must be dismissed.

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not entitle an officer to summary judgment on personal tort liability when disputed facts could show wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Swofford v. Eslinger · filed 2009-11-30(9)(a)

The Court cannot say as a matter of law that Defendants did not act with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property or that Defendants acted reasonably if Mr. Swofford’s version of the facts is accepted.

Section 768.28(9)(a) allows a personal-capacity tort claim against a government employee when the complaint generally alleges malice as an exception to employee immunity.

Kist v. Hubbard · filed 2012-07-13(9)(a)

In order to adequately assert a cause of action against Hubbard in his personal capacity, Kist’s complaint must allege one of the identified exceptions to the employee immunity statute. ... Like the plaintiff in Gangelhoff, Kist’s general allegations of malice are sufficient.

Section 768.28(9)(a) can shield Department of Corrections employees from suit on a tort complaint.

Rivers v. Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2014-12-11(9)(a)

We affirm the dismissal of the complaint against appellee’s employees because they were immune from suit under section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes.

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not extend immunity for state officers and employees to non-tort actions.

Florida Carry, Inc. v. University of Florida · filed 2015-10-30(9)(a)

We agree with Appellant that the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss on the basis of section 768.28(9)(a). ... While the trial court relied upon the language “or named as a party defendant in any action for any injury or damage” in reaching its conclusion, that provision does not extend the immunity provided in the statute to non-tort actions.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields employees of Lee Memorial Health Systems from personal liability.

Edwards v. Rosen · filed 2016-01-29(9)(a)

Dr. Scott and Dr. Juda were immune from personal liability since they were employed by Lee Memorial Health Systems. See § 768.28(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007).

A complaint can overcome section 768.28(9)(a) employee immunity at the dismissal stage if its allegations, taken as true, would permit a reasonable factfinder to find bad faith, malicious purpose, or wanton and willful disregard of human rights or safety.

PETERSON v. POLLACK · filed 2019-12-18(9)(a)

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the parents’ allegations regarding the deputy’s conduct, taken as true as we are required to do in this review, would be sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the deputy acted “in bad faith,” “with malicious purpose,” or “in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights [or] safety,” as we have interpreted those phrases under Florida law. Thus, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of the deputy’s motion to dismiss the parents’ suit against him based on section 768.28(9)(a) immunity.

Section 768.28(9)(a) permits a claim against a state employee to survive a motion to dismiss when the complaint sufficiently alleges bad faith or malicious purpose.

DOUGLAS A. HARRISON and LAURA RAYBIN MILLER v. STRATOS · filed 2021-08-04(9)(a)

We agree that the allegations of bad faith and malicious purpose were sufficiently pled to survive the motion to dismiss.

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not bar a tort claim against a state employee at the dismissal stage when the complaint sufficiently alleges wanton and willful disregard of human safety.

MEDINA v. POLLACK · filed 2020-07-01(9)(a)

While further fact development may ultimately convince a trier-of-fact that Medina’s actions, or lack thereof, were not wanton and willful, the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to prevent dismissal of the complaint against Medina based upon section 768.28(9), Florida Statutes.

Section 768.28(9)(a) gives an individual state agent absolute immunity unless the agent acts in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard for human rights and safety; it does not give a corporate agent absolute immunity.

KELLIANNE NASO, as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF ALLAN DWOSKIN v. RONALD HALL, G4S SECURE SOLUTIONS (USA) INC. · filed 2022-05-04(9)(a)

As discussed above, section 768.28(9) does not apply to G4S because it is a corporation. Rather, section 768.28(9) applies only to Hall, an individual. Pursuant to this statute, Hall is entitled to absolute immunity unless he acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights and safety.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields state employees from personal tort liability for acts within the scope of employment unless they act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Ioannis Zisis, Ph.D. v. Signal Safe, Inc., etc. · filed 2024-01-17(9)(a)

The net effect of these two provisions is to insulate state employees from personal liability for torts committed within the scope of employment, absent the required scienter findings, while simultaneously allowing recourse against the State.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields government employees from personal liability for acts within the scope of employment unless they act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Smith v. Slimak · filed 2025-01-29(9)(a)

Further still, even if Plaintiff articulated facts sufficient to state a viable IIED claim, Slimak would be immune to that claim under Section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes. See id. Section 768.28(9)(a) prevents government officials from being named as party defendants or being personally liable in any action stemming from injuries “suffered as a result of any act. . . in the [official’s] scope of . . . employment” unless the official “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” Id. (alterations added). Plaintiff makes no attempt to state facts showing bad faith, malicious purpose, or wanton and willful behavior. (See generally SAC).

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields officers from personal liability for torts committed within the scope of their employment unless they acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Thomas v. Beebe · filed 2024-07-18(9)(a)

Defendants acted within the scope of their employment when they entered Plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff alleges no facts to support a finding of bad faith, malicious purpose, or a wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property. Accordingly, sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff’s state law trespass claims, and they must be DISMISSED.

Section 768.28(9)(a) requires a plaintiff suing officers for trespass within the scope of their employment to allege bad faith, malicious purpose, or wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Thomas v. Beebe · filed 2024-08-08(9)(a)

Consequently, Plaintiff may only state a claim for trespass against Defendants if he shows Defendants acted in bad faith, with a malicious purpose, or with a wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property. See § 768.28(9)(a), Fla. Stat. Plaintiff alleges no facts to show Defendants acted in bad faith in the Amended Complaint.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields public officers and employees from personal liability for ordinary negligence within the scope of their employment unless they act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard.

Gautam v. City of Sunrise, Florida · filed 2025-08-21(9)(a)

Gautam fails to allege that Defendants Lawrence, Lopez, Bush, Cason, and Jones “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” Again, Gautam has at best merely alleged simple negligence.

Section 768.28 protects state employees from personal tort liability for acts within the scope of employment unless they act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard.

Peter Irwin, Ph.D. v. Signal Safe, Inc., etc. · filed 2024-01-17(9)(a)

The net effect of these two provisions is to insulate state employees from personal liability for torts committed within the scope of employment, absent the required scienter findings, while simultaneously allowing recourse against the State.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields public employees from tort claims arising from actions in the course of employment unless they act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Langbehn v. PUBLIC HEALTH TRUST OF MIAMI-DADE · filed 2009-10-02(9)(a)

I agree with this concession, for under Florida law public employees are statutorily immune from tort claims arising out of actions in the course of their employment, unless the employee “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.”

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields an officer acting within the scope of employment from personal tort liability unless the officer acts in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of rights, safety, or property.

King v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2024-03-25(9)(a)

“Florida law shields an officer from personal liability for acts within the scope of his employment unless he ‘acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.’” Land, 85 F.4th at 1130 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a)). ... And Plaintiff raises no genuine issue of material fact that would support a finding that Pinero acted with wanton and willful disregard to her rights.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields an officer acting within the scope of employment from tort liability unless the officer acts in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

RIVERO v. MONROE COUNTRY SHERIFFS OFFICE · filed 2024-05-14(9)(a)

Florida Statute § 768.28, Florida’s codified waiver of sovereign liability in certain situations, prohibits liability when an officer acts within the scope of their employment or function “unless such officer . . . acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28 (9)(a).

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not shield an officer from personal tort liability when the allegations state a valid claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Sylvan Plowright v. Miami Dade County · filed 2024-06-05(9)(a)

By their very nature, then, allegations that state a valid claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress are sufficient to overcome an officer’s state-level immunity.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields state officers from personal liability for acts within the scope of employment unless they act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Barr v. Denmark · filed 2024-12-04(9)(a)

But even if we were wrong about these elements of state- law false arrest and malicious prosecution, Florida’s sovereign im- munity statute provides, in relevant part, that “[a]n officer, em- ployee, or agent of the state” may not be held personally liable “for any injury or damage suffered as a result of any act, event, or omis- sion of action in the scope of [his] employment” unless he “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). ... And noth- ing in Barr’s amended complaint suggests that the detectives acted with actual malice.

Section 768.28(9)(a) provides tort immunity to qualifying individual officers, employees, and agents, but not to cities or municipalities.

Samuel Scott, Jr. v. City of Miami · filed 2025-06-11(9)(a)

Only individuals, not cities or municipalities, may receive immunity un- der the statute.

Section 768.28(9)(a) bars personal tort liability for a state officer acting within the scope of employment unless the officer acts in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of rights or safety.

Ortega v. Schramm · filed 1991-01-28(9)(a)

The Florida statute governing waiver of sovereign immunity provides that a state officer cannot be held personally liable in tort unless such officer acted in bad faith. Fla.Stat. § 768.28(9)(a) (1985). Defendant Schramm cannot be held personally liable for malicious prosecution under state law, therefore, absent a finding of bad faith.

A tort claim under § 768.28 against a sheriff for a deputy’s conduct requires allegations that the sheriff was personally responsible for the deputy’s acts.

Lucas v. Cannon · filed 1994-03-29(9)(a)

After careful review, this Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action under § 768.28 against Defendant Cannon. The complaint names Defendant Lee Cannon, not Deputy Ferguson. Absent allegations that Defendant Cannon had any personal responsibility in the acts of Deputy Ferguson, Count I of Plaintiffs complaint fails as to Defendant Cannon.

Section 768.28(9)(a) protects a municipal officer from tort liability for acts within the scope of employment; the officer does not lose that immunity by filing a negligence suit.

Smith v. City of Plantation · filed 1998-08-11(9)(a)

However, this statute, on its face, clearly applies only to the state and its subdivisions. Smith has not established that, as a matter of law, Fla.Stat. § 768.14 applies to officers of the state and its subdivisions. Therefore, the Court finds that, as a matter of law, Officer Alu is immune pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 768.28(9).

Section 768.28(9)(a) requires a plaintiff seeking to hold an officer personally liable for wrongful death to show bad faith, malicious purpose, or wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Salgado v. City of West Miami · filed 2015-02-04(9)(a)

For the same reasons, Plaintiffs have failed to show, as they must under Florida's Wrongful Death Act, that Lopez “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). Therefore, Lopez is entitled to summary judgment on Count IV of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint.

Section 768.28(9)(a) protects an officer from personal tort liability for acts within the scope of employment unless the officer acts in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Claridy v. Golub · filed 2015-11-30(9)(a)

As quoted above, § 768.28(9)(a) protects an officer from personal liability for acts within the scope of his employment, unless the officer “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.”

Section 768.28(9)(a) gives officers immunity from personal tort liability absent bad faith, malicious purpose, or wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Gurrera v. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office · filed 2016-08-01(9)(a)

Thus, absent a showing of bad faith, malicious purpose, or wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property, Cardascia and Spirn are entitled to immunity.

Section 768.28(9)(a) grants law enforcement personnel immunity for actions taken in their duties unless they act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Penley v. Eslinger · filed 2010-05-03(9)(a)

Florida law also provides sovereign immunity to law enforcement personnel carrying out their duties, unless their actions were committed “in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). ... The Penleys have presented no evidence that Lieutenant Weippert’s actions were committed in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields public officers and employees from personal tort liability when a complaint merely recites bad faith, malice, or wanton and willful disregard without supporting facts.

O'Boyle v. Thrasher · filed 2016-01-14(9)(a)

Since O’Boyle pled nothing more than the “bare elements” of malice, bad faith, and wanton and willful disregard, his state law claims do not sufficiently overcome § 768.28(9)(a) immunity.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields state officers, employees, and agents from personal liability for conduct within the scope of their duties unless they act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Harris v. DeBellis · filed 2016-08-10(9)(a)

Under Section 768.28(9)(a), an officer, employee, or agent of the state may not be held personally liable for conduct in the scope of his or her employment or function unless he or she “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28(9)(a) immunizes Florida police officers from suit unless they act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property; conclusory allegations of malice and bad faith do not overcome that immunity at the pleading stage.

Brivik v. Law · filed 2013-10-16(9)(a)

But in Florida, police officers are immune from suit unless they “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). Brivik’s allegation that Officer Law acted maliciously and in bad faith is conclusory and therefore insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not deprive an officer of immunity merely because an arrest lacked probable cause.

Eiras v. Florida Department of Business & Professional Regulation Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco · filed 2017-03-07(9)(a)

Consistent with this authority, it appears that under Florida law, the absence of probable cause standing alone will not deprive an officer of immunity under section 768.28. Therefore, Eiras’s threadbare allegations that Baker acted “without lawful authority” and “without probable cause” are insufficient to pierce Baker’s statutory immunity.

Section 768.28(9)(a) gives a government officer immunity from state law claims when arguable probable cause for an arrest defeats a claim of bad faith.

Cottam v. Pelton · filed 2018-09-10(9)(a)

Furthermore, because Pelton had arguable probable cause to arrest Cottam, Pelton is again entitled to immunity under Florida law. See Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28 protects Florida officers acting within the scope of their employment from negligence claims unless they act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard.

Pena v. Marcus · filed 2017-11-06

By its own terms, § 768.28 protects officers from negligence-based claims.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields officers acting within the scope of their employment from personal tort liability unless they act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights or safety.

Waters v. City of Sunrise · filed 2023-01-05(9)(a)

As such, even assuming a tort was committed, the undisputed facts do not establish that the Defendant officers acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights or safety. See Fla. Stat. §768.28(9)(a). The Court therefore concludes that Plunske and Walker are entitled to statutory immunity on Count V.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields police officers from tort liability unless they act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Wooden v. The Town of Eatonville · filed 2023-08-09(9)(a)

Florida’s sovereign immunity statute grants immunity to police officers unless they “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). ... And Wooden has not shown that the district court plainly erred in granting the partial motions to dismiss because the officers were shielded by sovereign immunity.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields an officer acting within the scope of employment from state tort liability unless the officer acts in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard.

BAXTER v. ROBERTS · filed 2021-03-28(9)(a)

Because Lee did not display the type of repeated or prolonged physical contact that could be considered reprehensible, he is shielded from state law liability under Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28(9)(a) protects an officer from personal tort liability for acts within the scope of employment unless the officer acts in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Avant v. Bates · filed 2023-09-25(9)(a)

Because Defendant’s actions were reasonable, as discussed above, he did not act with the requisite bad faith, malicious purpose, or wanton and willful disregard for Plaintiff’s human rights, safety, or property. So Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims of assault and battery, intentional infliction of mental and emotional distress, and gross negligence.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields police officers from personal tort liability unless they act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Scott v. City of Miami · filed 2022-09-15(9)(a)

Florida law provides police officers with immunity from personal tort liability unless the officers “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). ... To summarize, Defendants are not entitled to immunity under Florida law because the Complaint alleges enough for a jury to reasonably find that the officers acted with malice or in bad faith when they arrested, incarcerated, and prosecuted Scott.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields an officer from personal liability for an on-the-job tort unless the officer acted in bad faith, maliciously, or wantonly.

Baxter v. Louis Roberts, III · filed 2022-11-30(9)(a)

Florida’s immunity scheme shields an officer from individual liability for on-the-job torts as long as the officer did not commit the tort in bad faith, maliciously, or wantonly. See Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). On this record, we think a reasonable jury could find that Deputy Lee falsely imprisoned Baxter with malice.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields officers from personal tort liability for acts within the scope of employment unless they acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Roldan v. City of Hallandale Beach · filed 2023-07-11(9)(a)

On this record, Plaintiff has failed to overcome statutory immunity and hold that the individual Defendants are entitled to statutory immunity under § 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28(9)(a) immunizes officers from personal liability for state-law tort claims when the allegations fail to establish actual malice.

Barr v. Denmark · filed 2024-05-28(9)(a)

Because the allegations in the Amended Complaint fail to establish that Defendants acted with actual malice, they are entitled to immunity from Plaintiff’s claims under Florida law for false arrest and malicious prosecution.

Section 768.28(9)(a) permits personal tort liability for an officer acting within the scope of employment if the officer acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Portes v. City of Doral · filed 2025-07-03(9)(a)

As the plain language of the § 768.28 indicates, an officer who is acting “in the scope of her or his employment or function” is nevertheless liable for his or her misconduct if he or she “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.”

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields officers from personal liability for acts within the scope of employment unless they act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Scott v. White · filed 2025-08-14(9)(a)

However, under Florida’s sovereign immunity statute, an officer is immune from personal liability “for any injury or damage suffered as a result of any act, event, or omission of action in the scope of her or his employment or function,” unless the officer “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28(9)(d) protects a law enforcement agency from liability for injuries caused by a fleeing driver only when all three statutory pursuit requirements are met; disputed facts about those requirements can prevent summary judgment.

City of Tampa v. Foottit, Foottit · filed 2024-10-16(9)(d)

We recently examined the statutory text in City of New Port Richey v. Lamko, 359 So. 3d 840 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023), where we observed, "Because the statute is written in the conjunctive, all three requirements must be met in order for the employing agency to assert sovereign immunity from liability." Id. at 844. Turning, then, to each of the three requirements, we readily agree with the circuit court that the City fell short of its burden for summary judgment.

A private corporation qualifies as a state agent for sovereign immunity only if a governmental entity exercises sufficient control over the corporation.

Johnson Bros. Corp. v. WSP USA, Inc. · filed 2024-07-02(9)(a)

CDM is not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of sovereign immunity under section 768.28(9)(a) because the record evidence does not show that the County controlled CDM’s operations to such an extent that CDM primarily acted as an instrumentality of the state rather than as an autonomous and self-sufficient entity.

Section 768.28(10)(e) limits immunity for qualifying professional firms to those contracting with the Department of Transportation.

Posen Construction, Inc. v. Lee County · filed 2013-01-31(10)(e)

The inquiry ends by simply adhering to the clear language of the statute that limits the application of § 768.28(10)(e) to firms contracting specifically with the Department of Transportation.

Immunity under § 768.28(9)(a) cannot support dismissal on the pleadings unless the complaint conclusively establishes its applicability.

RASHADA v. HATHCOCK · filed 2025-04-08(9)(a)

Under Florida law, “[s]overeign immunity is an affirmative defense that is not properly asserted in a motion to dismiss unless ‘the complaint itself conclusively establishes its applicability.’” City of Tampa v. Fredrick, 369 So.3d 1197, 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) (quoting Sierra v. Associated Marine Insts., Inc., 850 So.2d 582, 590 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)). The Amended Complaint alone does not establish that sovereign immunity is at play here—and certainly does not do so conclusively.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields an officer from personal tort liability for acts within the scope of employment unless the officer acts in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard; probable cause negates an inference of bad faith or malice in a false arrest claim.

Gould v. Guerriero · filed 2025-05-05(9)(a)

The existence of probable cause negates any inference of malicious intent or bad faith and “constitutes an absolute bar to both state and § 1983 claims alleging false arrest.”

Section 768.28(9)(a) requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a public employee liable for battery to plausibly allege bad faith, malicious purpose, or wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Gilliam v. Fort Myers Police Department (Chief of Police) · filed 2025-08-14(9)(a)

For her battery claim, Plaintiff had to plausibly allege that Officer Greene searched her “in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). ... But the facts, as alleged in the third amended complaint and shown in the body camera videos, do not come close to showing bad faith, malicious purpose, wanton and willful disregard, or outrageous conduct.

Section 768.28(9)(a) permits personal tort liability for a public employee acting within the scope of employment if the employee acts in bad faith or with malicious purpose.

Blackshear v. City of Miami Beach · filed 2011-07-26(9)(a)

Thus, the statute offers no protection for Defendant because an officer acting within the scope of his employment can be held personally liable only if such officer “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose.... ”

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not shield state employees from a tort claim when the alleged facts reasonably support bad faith, malicious purpose, or wanton and willful disregard of human rights or safety.

Rice v. Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2021-06-15(9)(a)

Plaintiff alleges facts that, accepted as true, permit the reasonable inference Defendants Miller, Creamer, McCoy, Hancock, Hardee, and Yetton “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” See Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28(9)(a) withholds immunity from officers who act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property; deliberate indifference can satisfy the last exception.

Donald E. Turner, Jr. v. Phillips · filed 2022-02-15(9)(a)

Florida protects its officers from suit unless they “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). This statute’s language might differ from the relevant federal standards, but it offers no further protection. The federal standard for deliberate indifference amounts to recklessness, and so does the standard of “wanton and willful” conduct under Florida law.

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not immunize an officer from a tort claim when the complaint plausibly alleges bad faith, malicious purpose, or wanton and willful disregard of safety.

Jones, Sr. v. City of Palm Beach Gardens · filed 2022-06-16(9)(a)

Therefore, the Court denies Raja’s motion to dismiss, as the Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Raja has no claim to section 768.28(9)(a)’s statutory immunity.

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not immunize an officer from a battery claim when the complaint plausibly alleges malice or wanton and willful disregard of a person’s rights or safety.

Sullivan v. Nassau County · filed 2023-03-07(9)(a)

Ms. Sullivan thus plausibly alleges that Swanson acted with malice or wanton and willful disregard of Mr. Sullivan’s rights or safety.

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not categorically bar negligence claims against officers.

Ratlieff v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Florida · filed 2023-06-01(9)(a)

In light of this recent authority, the Court concludes that section 768.28(9)(a) does not categorically bar negligence claims against officers.

Section 768.28(9)(a) permits personal tort liability for a state employee acting within the scope of employment when the employee acts with malicious purpose or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights or safety.

Moss v. Inch · filed 2023-05-26(9)(a)

Considering Moss’s allegations overall, the Court finds that she has alleged the NIED was committed with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of Ridley’s rights and safety.

Section 768.28(9)(a) permits personal tort liability for an officer acting within the scope of employment if the officer acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights or safety.

Richmond v. Badia · filed 2022-08-22(9)(a)

Here, a reasonable jury could conclude that Badia acted ma- liciously, in bad faith, or with wanton and willful disregard of Rich- mond’s rights. As explained above, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Richmond, Badia’s use of force against Richmond was clearly excessive. Consequently, the district court erred in conclud- ing that Badia was entitled to statutory immunity on Richmond’s battery claim.

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not entitle a deputy to statutory immunity on summary judgment when a reasonable jury could find that the deputy acted with willful and wanton disregard for a person’s rights.

Chambliss v. Brevard County Sheriff's Office · filed 2023-08-17(9)(a)

Here, a reasonable jury could find that Deputy Harrell delivered the blow to the back of Chambliss’s head with willful and wanton disregard for his rights. ... Deputy Harrell therefore cannot establish that he must be afforded statutory immunity on summary judgment.

Section 768.28(9)(a) cannot support dismissal when the record lacks sufficient evidence to determine sovereign immunity.

Ragoonanan v. Assocs. in Obstetrics & Gynecology · filed 1993-06-11(9)(a)

At the outset, we note that there is insufficient evidence in the record at this stage of the proceedings to determine the issue of sovereign immunity. See Testa v. Pfaff, 464 So.2d 220 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Thus, dismissal on that basis was premature.

Section 768.28(9)(a) allows a governmental employer to avoid tort liability for specified employee conduct and must be pleaded as an affirmative defense.

City of Fort Lauderdale v. Todaro · filed 1994-02-16(9)(a)

Ordinarily, since this section permits an employer to avoid liability for its employee’s actions, it should be pleaded as an affirmative defense.

Section 768.28(9)(a) did not entitle these medical malpractice defendants to dismissal with prejudice based on the pleadings.

Ragoonanan ex rel. Ragoonanan v. Associates in Obstetrics & Gynecology · filed 1994-07-22(9)(a)

The trial court dismissed the complaint in the instant appeal on a finding that the pleadings entitled Associates to sovereign immunity pursuant to section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes (1991). We continue to adhere to our prior holding that this issue is controlled by Testa v. Pfaff, 464 So.2d 220 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Accordingly, we reverse the order dismissing Associates with prejudice and remand for further proceedings.

Section 768.28 does not support dismissal on governmental immunity grounds when the complaint does not establish that the defendants were state employees or agents.

Roberts v. Children's Medical Services · filed 2000-01-12

The trial court held that the parents were barred from bringing the present action against Interim and the foster parents by the governmental immunity provisions of section 768.28. The amended complaint was dismissed with prejudice. We conclude that this was error. ... Because we are unable at this time to determine the likelihood of success by Interim or the foster parents on the issue of governmental immunity, the trial court was equally unable to reach the conclusion it did.

Section 768.28(9)(a) permits dismissal on employee-misconduct grounds only when the complaint alleges conduct outside the scope of employment, bad faith, malicious purpose, or wanton and wilful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Randles v. Moore · filed 2001-01-12(9)(a)

For the court to dismiss the complaint based on section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), the complaint must allege that the acts were taken by the employee (1) while acting outside the scope of his employment; (2) in bad faith; (3) with malicious purpose; or (4) in a manner exhibiting wanton and wilful disregard of human rights, safety, or property. A review of this complaint does not show any of these allegations.

Section 768.28(9)(a) allows a claim seeking individual liability against government officers, agents, or employees when the complaint sufficiently alleges bad faith or malicious purpose.

Palazzo v. City of Fort Lauderdale · filed 2007-10-17(9)(a)

We have reviewed the complaint's allegations and find them minimally sufficient to allege the kind of bad faith and malicious purpose necessary to seek to impose individual liability.

Section 768.28(9)(a) waives a city commissioner’s immunity for conduct within the scope of office if the commissioner acts in bad faith or with malicious purpose; conclusory allegations do not establish that exception.

COMMISSIONER JOE CAROLLO v. PLATINUM ADVISORS, LLC · filed 2021-02-10(9)(a)

Section 768.28(9)(a) waives a city commissioner’s absolute legislative immunity or qualified immunity if the city commissioner acts, in the scope of his or her governmental function, “in bad faith or with malicious purpose.”

Section 768.28(9)(a)’s wanton and willful exception requires more than negligence.

HNTB CORPORATION v. CAITLIN MILSTEAD, etc. · filed 2023-08-16(9)(a)

HNTB’s alleged acts or omissions may be characterized as negligence, but they do not rise to the level of “willful and wanton,” and are remote from the circumstances that led to Stinson’s tragic accident.

Section 768.28(9)(a)’s willful and wanton exception cannot rest on a finding that board members lacked authority to act when the board had that authority.

Douglas H. Harrison, Laura Raybin-Miller, and South Broward Hospital District d/b/a Memorial Healthcare System v. Stratos · filed 2023-11-08(9)(a)

The trial court also erred in concluding that Defendants acted willfully and wantonly under section 768.28(9)(a). The court premised this ruling on its mistaken belief that the Board did not have authority to terminate Stratos.

A county cannot obtain summary judgment based on immunity under section 768.28(9)(a) when a genuine dispute remains over whether its employee acted with wanton and willful disregard of a person’s rights or safety.

Miami-Dade County v. Polanco · filed 2024-01-10(9)(a)

we affirm the trial court’s order denying the ... County’s motion for summary judgment and correctly concluding that there remains a genuine dispute whether the bus driver acted in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of Polanco’s rights or safety.

Section 768.28(9) directs claims for injuries caused by state officers or employees against the governmental entity or its head in an official capacity; a sheriff’s office that is not a legal entity cannot be sued.

Morales · filed 2025-11-18(9)

Because HCSO is not an “agency” under Florida law or a “subdivision” of the State of Florida, it is not a legal entity that can be sued.

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not make a tort action against the governmental entity or its head the exclusive remedy when the complaint alleges malicious purpose or bad faith.

Lloyd v. Hines · filed 1985-08-13(9)(a)

Initially we observe that because appellant alleged that Davis had acted with a malicious purpose or in bad faith, a tort action against the appropriate governmental entity or the head of such entity was not appellant's exclusive remedy. § 768.28(9)(a), Fla. Stat.

The statute makes the governmental entity or its head in an official capacity the exclusive defendant for covered injuries caused by a state officer, employee, or agent.

Searer v. Wells · filed 1993-11-18(9)(a)

Under § 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes, the exclusive remedy for an injury that occurred as a result of the actions' or omissions of an officer, employee or agent of the state is an action against the governmental entity, or the head of that entity, in his official capacity.