Fla. Stat. § 768.28

Section 768.28(9) shields a governmental entity from employee torts committed outside the scope of employment, in bad faith and with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety or property; conversion alone does not establish those conditions.

Strickland v. Dept. of Agr. · filed 1987-11-19(9)

Finally, we reject the defendants' argument that section 768.28(9), Florida Statutes, entitled them to immunity for any conversion committed by its employees. That section of the statute protects the state or its subdivisions from liability in tort for the acts or omissions of an employee or agent committed while acting outside the scope of their employment, or committed in bad faith and with malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety or property.

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not automatically make an on-call staff physician a hospital agent; agency depends on the hospital’s degree of control over the physician.

Baldwin v. Dellerson · filed 1989-04-19(9)(a)

Likewise, there are genuine issues of material fact relative to Dr. Tomback’s relationship to the hospital, i.e., as agent or independent contractor. The fact that, as a staff member, he was required to be “on call” on this particular evening and care for whosoever appeared at the hospital in need does not ipso facto make Tomback the hospital’s agent. As is usually the case, the question of agency turns upon the degree of control exercised by the hospital over the doctor.

Section 768.28(10)(a) treats contracted health care providers as state agents while acting within the contract’s scope and guidelines.

Mingo v. Ara Health Services, Inc. · filed 1994-03-18(10)(a)

The legislature has addressed the issue of the status of health care providers contracting with the Department of Corrections in section 768.28(10)(a), Florida Statutes (1989). We interpret this section to mean that the legislature found it necessary to create state agency status for such health care providers by specific statutory enactment. It could have bestowed the same status on the operators of county jails, which are not within the Department of Corrections, but it chose not to do so. When a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, it should be construed as excluding from its operation things of the same class or category which it does not mention.

Section 768.28 treats PRIDE as an instrumentality of the state, requiring service on the Department of Insurance in a tort action against it.

Prison Rehabilitative Industries v. Betterson · filed 1994-12-20(2)

Accordingly, the trial court erred in ruling that PRIDE was not an instrumentality of the state within the meaning of section 768.28 so as to require service on the Department of Insurance.

Section 768.28(9)(a) makes the governmental entity the surrogate defendant for a public employee’s negligence when an injured fellow public employee has a claim arising from unrelated work.

Holmes County School Bd. v. Duffell · filed 1995-03-09(9)(a)

The School Board is not being sued in its capacity as Duffell's employer. Instead, pursuant to section 768.28(9)(a), it is being sued as a surrogate defendant based on the negligent acts of Lewis, a fellow public employee.

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not give independent school bus contractors immunity merely because they transport students for a school board.

Dixon v. Whitfield · filed 1995-05-09(9)(a)

Appellants claim the trial court erred in finding they were not entitled to immunity under section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1987). ... Review of the undisputed facts in the record reveals competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that appellants were independent contractors rather than employees of the School Board. ... In short, the parties cite no controlling Florida authority, and we could find none in our own research, for the proposition that the safe transportation of public school students is a nondelegable duty. ... Accordingly, we reject appellants' arguments in this regard and affirm.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields a governmental agency from tort liability when its employee acts outside the scope of employment; an abuse of lawful authority can present a jury question about that scope.

McGhee v. Volusia County · filed 1996-07-03(9)(a)

Under Swenson, a jury question as to the sheriff or employing agency's liability exists for acts of officers that can be described as abuses of lawful power. The employing agency is immune as a matter of law only if the acts are so extreme as to constitute a clearly unlawful usurpation of authority the deputy does not rightfully possess, Swenson, or if there is not even a pretense of lawful right in the performance of the acts.

Independent contractor physicians may qualify for state agent immunity under section 768.28(9)(a) when the state retains or exercises sufficient control over their work.

Stoll v. Noel · filed 1997-04-10(9)(a)

Whether CMS physician consultants are agents of the state turns on the degree of control retained or exercised by CMS. ... We find that the record supports summary judgment in favor of the physicians and their professional associations.

Section 768.28 uses a broader definition of agency than the Administrative Procedure Act.

Eckert v. BD OF COM'RS, N. BROWARD HOSP. · filed 1998-11-18

Rubinstein opined that this court's decision in Lee did not support the decision in Horgan, because Lee evaluated whether the hospital district was a state agency for purposes of the sovereign immunity statute, "a statute envisioning a much broader definition of agency than the APA." Rubinstein, 498 So.2d at 1013. We agree with this analysis in Rubinstein.

Whether a physician is an agent of the state entitled to sovereign immunity under section 768.28(9)(a) may be a question of fact that cannot be resolved on summary judgment.

Theodore Ex Rel. Theodore v. Graham · filed 1999-03-10(9)(a)

For these reasons, we hold that the issue of whether Graham is an "agent" of the state entitled to the section 768.28(9)(a) defense of sovereign immunity is a question of fact that cannot be resolved by summary judgment.

Section 768.28(2) includes the Florida Parole Commission as a state agency and proper party to a tort action.

Adlington v. Spooner · filed 1999-11-03(2)

Under the foregoing definitions the FPC is a state agency and a proper party to this action.

Section 768.28(18) permits one government entity to indemnify another for the indemnifying entity's own negligence, but prohibits indemnity for the other entity's negligence.

Fla. Dept. of Natural Resources v. Garcia · filed 2000-02-10(18)

Although no courts have construed this provision, a plain reading of the statutory language reveals that government entities are only prohibited from entering into agreements to indemnify another government entity for the other entity's negligence, or to assume any liability for the other entity's negligence. In contrast, the agreement in this case was for the City to indemnify the State for the City's own negligence. Thus, an indemnification agreement is not prohibited by this statute.

Section 768.28(9)(a) makes a physician’s agency relationship with a governmental entity relevant to whether the physician receives sovereign immunity for tort claims.

Robinson v. Linzer · filed 2000-04-26(9)(a)

It appears that the Hospital District and Coastal were, by their contract, attempting to create an agency status. The actual relationship, however, not the label, determines whether there is an agency. ... This case is closer factually to Theodore than to Stoll, and we accordingly find, as we did in Theodore, issues of fact precluding summary judgment.

Section 768.28(9)(a) extends sovereign immunity to a private contractor only if the contractor is a state agent; agency depends on the state's degree of control.

Agner v. APAC-Florida, Inc. · filed 2002-06-12(9)(a)

This immunity extends to certain private parties who are involved in contractual relationships with the State, provided that such parties are agents of the State. ... These cases suggest that even where a contract exists, the court must look carefully to the degree of control exercised by the State. ... The plaintiff's complaint should not have been dismissed with prejudice on a theory of sovereign immunity.

Section 768.28 does not limit the unrelated works exception to workers' compensation immunity for public employees.

Kite v. Escambia County · filed 2002-11-25

An employee covered by workers' compensation insurance can sue an employer for the negligent acts of a fellow employee when such employee "is assigned primarily to unrelated works within private or public employment." See § 440.11(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). This provision is not limited by section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1995), when applied to public employees.

Section 768.28(11)(a) gives a contracted juvenile services provider state agent status only when it acts within the scope of and pursuant to guidelines established by contract or rule.

Sierra v. Associated Marine Institutes, Inc. · filed 2003-06-18(11)(a)

It is not enough, however, to demonstrate simply that the provider contracted to act on behalf of the state in the furnishing of the mentioned services. Rather, to enjoy agent's status under the statute, the provider must have acted "within the scope of and pursuant to guidelines established in the contract or by rule." § 768.28(11)(a).

Section 768.28(9)(a) extends immunity to a private contractor only if it is a state agent, which depends on the degree of control the state retains or exercises.

MS v. Nova Southeastern University Inc. · filed 2004-07-21(9)(a)

The immunity in section 768.28(9)(a) extends to certain private parties who are involved in contractual relationships with the state, provided that such parties are "agents" of the state. ... Whether the party being contracted with is an agent of the state turns on the degree of control retained or exercised by the state agency. ... Based on the agreement between the parties and the affidavits submitted by all parties, we conclude that the trial court's determination that there were no material issues of fact as to whether Nova was an agent of the School Board is erroneous.

Section 768.28(2) permits sovereign immunity for a corporation acting as a governmental instrumentality; the court affirmed that protection for First Physicians Group and its physician only as to the Pagans' claim.

Pagan v. SARASOTA COUNTY PUBLIC HOSP. BD. · filed 2004-08-13(2)

The Hospital Board and First Physicians Group sought a legal ruling that First Physicians Group and the doctors who practiced medicine through this nonprofit corporation were entitled to all the benefits of sovereign immunity. See § 768.28, Fla. Stat. (2001). The trial court's judgment so rules as to the Pagans' claim. We conclude that the Pagans have not demonstrated a basis that entitles them to receive a reversal of this judgment. ... The trial court's ruling is restricted to the claim between the Pagans and Dr. Michael M. Shroder and First Physicians Group as Dr. Shroder's employer.

Section 768.28 affords sovereign immunity to a hospital board’s controlled nonprofit physician group and its physician on the malpractice claim decided here; the ruling does not establish immunity for every physician or claim involving the group.

Pagan v. Sarasota County Public Hospital Board · filed 2004-08-13(2)

The Hospital Board and First Physicians Group sought a legal ruling that First Physicians Group and the doctors who practiced medicine through this nonprofit corporation were entitled to all the benefits of sovereign immunity. See § 768.28, Fla. Stat. (2001). ... Accordingly, while we affirm the trial court’s ruling as it affects these parties on the basis of this limited record and based on the specific issues preserved for review by this court, the trial court was not authorized to make a broader legal holding, nor does this appellate court have a record or adequate arguments upon which it could announce any broader rule of law.

Section 768.28(1) does not impose tort liability on the state, its agencies, or subdivisions for the acts of independent contractors.

Duval County School Bd. v. Kebert · filed 2005-08-23(1)

There is nothing in section 768.28 to impose liability against the state, its agencies, or subdivisions for the acts of independent contractors. Because the owner and driver were independent contractors, the school board has no liability under section 768.28.

Section 768.28(1) waives sovereign immunity for an employee’s tort only when the employee acts within the scope of employment; driving a marked police vehicle to work in uniform while required to take police action may meet that condition.

Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. City of Hollywood · filed 2007-02-21(1)

Section 768.28(1) specifically provides that a waiver of immunity occurs only if the employee is “acting within the scope of [his or her] office or employment. ...” Curtis v. Bulldog Leasing Co., 513 So.2d 238, 239 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). ... Driving from home to work in a marked police vehicle, while in uniform, and subject to the requirement that he take police action if necessary, qualifies as the type of conduct he was required to perform.

Section 768.28(1) does not make a city liable for an officer's accident while commuting in a city vehicle before his shift for the personal purpose of studying for an exam.

Garcia v. City of Hollywood · filed 2007-06-06(1)

He was not furthering any interest of his employer or performing any duties of his employment. He was simply in transit to the police station an hour before he was required to report for work for the personal *8 reason of studying for the Lieutenant's exam.

Section 768.28(9)(a) permits personal tort liability for deputies who act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard; otherwise, the sheriff may be vicariously liable for their actions.

Burks v. Beary · filed 2010-04-29(9)(a)

Under section 768.28(9)(a), the deputies may be held personally liable if they “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” If the deputies acted without such purpose, however, they cannot be held liable on the wrongful death claim but the Sheriff can be held vicariously liable for their actions.

Section 768.28(9)(a) makes agency status material to immunity from personal tort liability; a genuine dispute over that status precludes summary judgment.

Florida Atlantic University Board of Trustees v. Lindsey · filed 2010-12-22(9)(a)

Our review of the record reveals that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether an agency relationship existed between FAU and Lindsey that should be resolved by the trier of fact. We, therefore, reverse the entry of summary judgment in favor of Lindsey and remand for further proceedings.

Under section 768.28(11)(a), a Department of Juvenile Justice contractor’s agreement alone does not establish sovereign immunity; dismissal requires the complaint to conclusively show that the contractor acted within the scope of and pursuant to contract or rule guidelines at the time of the alleged negligence.

Peak v. Outward Bound, Inc. · filed 2011-04-13(11)(a)

Although the complaint against Outward Bound establishes a contractual relationship between Outward Bound and the Department, it fails to conclusively demonstrate that at the time of the alleged negligence, Outward Bound was “acting within the scope of and pursuant to guidelines established in the contract or by rule.”

Section 768.28(2) extends limited sovereign immunity to a corporation that functions primarily as an instrumentality of a state university.

UCF Athletics Ass'n v. Plancher · filed 2013-08-16(2)

Accordingly, we conclude that UCFAA is entitled to limited sovereign immunity under section 768.28(2), as it functions primarily as an instrumentality of UCF.

Section 768.28 gives a university support corporation limited sovereign immunity when it acts primarily as a state instrumentality, and subsection (5) limits payment without reducing the damages judgment.

& SC13-1874 Enock Plancher, etc. v. UCF Athletics Association, Inc. and Enock Plancher, etc. v. UCF Athletics Association, Inc. · filed 2015-05-28

Accordingly, UCFAA is primarily acting as an instrumentality of the state and thus is entitled to limited sovereign immunity under section 768.28. ... Rather than requiring a reduction of the judgment, we remand for entry of a judgment corresponding to the jury’s award of damages but limiting UCFAA’s liability for payment to $200,000 pursuant to section 768.28(5).

Section 768.28 extends limited sovereign immunity to private contractors acting as agents of the state; agency depends on the degree of control the state retains or exercises.

G4S Secure Solutions (USA), Inc. v. Morrow · filed 2016-09-02(9)(a)

Thus, limited sovereign immunity is available for private parties involved in contractual relationships with the state if those parties are determined to be acting as agents of the state. ... The determinative factor is the degree of control retained or exercised by the state agency.

Section 768.28’s limited sovereign immunity extends to a fair association that acts as an instrumentality of the state.

SOUTH FLORIDA FAIR AND PALM BEACH COUNTY EXPOSITIONS, INC v. JOSEPH · filed 2018-09-05(2)

In conclusion, the South Florida Fair is entitled to the limited sovereign immunity afforded by section 768.28, Florida Statutes (2007).

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields a city from tort liability for an officer’s acts committed in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights.

Bright v. City of Tampa · filed 2020-05-27(9)(a)

Because Bright alleges facts that establish that the officers committed a tort “in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights,” Bright’s battery claim against Tampa — a “subdivision” of the state — requires dismissal because Tampa is entitled to sovereign immunity.

Section 768.28(9)(a) bars tort liability against a sheriff for a deputy’s acts committed in bad faith, with malice, or with wanton and willful disregard of a person’s rights or safety.

Taylor v. Wagner · filed 2022-02-11(9)(a)

This evidence can only equate with the kind of intentional, malicious misconduct by an employee that does not give rise to liability against the employer under Florida’s waiver of sovereign immunity statute.

Section 768.28(9)(a) makes the state immune from tort claims based on an employee acting in bad faith or with a malicious purpose.

Ricky D. Dixon, Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections v. Stacy Antonio Scott, Jr., Leah James Frame · filed 2024-02-21(9)(a)

The state is immune from tort claims that are based on an employee acting in bad faith or with a malicious purpose.

Section 768.28(9)(a) bars malicious prosecution claims against a city because the tort necessarily requires malice.

Wojciechowski v. City of New Port Richey, Florida · filed 2024-04-25(9)(a)

Because malicious prosecution necessarily re- quires malice by the defendant, Section 768.28(9)(a) permits against a city no claim for malicious prosecution.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields the state from tort liability when the pleaded facts could establish that its employee acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights or safety.

Florida Department of Corrections v. Eddie Wright · filed 2025-07-16(9)(a)

We conclude that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the correctional officer’s conduct, taken as true as we are required to do, would be sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude the correctional officer acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or wanton and willful disregard of human rights or safety. ... Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in denying DOC’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Section 768.28(9)(a) bars municipal liability for an employee’s bad-faith or malicious acts, even if the employee acted within the scope of employment.

City of Miami v. Alvarez · filed 2025-10-01(9)(a)

The allegations need trigger only one of the disjunctive prohibitions. Here, the allegations of bad faith, and the malicious, willful, conspiratorial acts of Mendez and other City employees in disregard of Alvarez’s property rights trigger two or more of the statutory prohibitions on municipal liability.

Section 768.28(9)(a) makes an officer’s subjective intent key to determining whether the employing agency has sovereign immunity for the officer’s tort.

Paige Laine Khyel Taylor v. Sheriff, Pinellas County FL · filed 2023-12-04(9)(a)

Thus it is clear that the officer’s subjective intent is key in determining the availability of sovereign immunity.

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not shield an officer from tort liability for acts committed with malice in the course of duty.

Mendez v. St. Johns County · filed 2025-05-14(9)(a)

Aguilar Mendez also adequately alleges that Kunovich knowingly escalated this seizure into a false arrest for a malicious purpose, that is, to cover up the initial unconstitutional stop and with disregard for the arrest’s unconstitutionality, Compl. ¶ 135, overcoming the statutory immunity bar on tort actions based on non-malicious acts done in the course of an officer’s duty, ... (citation omitted)).

Section 768.28(9)(a) requires a plaintiff suing a state or local officer individually in tort to show bad faith, malicious purpose, or wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Thomas v. City of Jacksonville · filed 2018-04-23(9)(a)

But where, as here, a plaintiff sues an “officer, employee, or agent of the state or any of its subdivisions” in tort, more is required; the plaintiff must not only satisfy the tort’s standard elements, but must also show that the “officer, employee, or agent acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). As with many of their other arguments, Plaintiffs point to no record evidence supporting an essential element of their allegation, and the claim therefore cannot survive.

Section 768.28(9) makes a public employee personally liable for a tort only if the employee acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

ANDERSON v. CREWS · filed 2019-06-16(9)

There is, however, an exception: the employee is liable—the public employer is not—if the employee acted “in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” Id. § 768.28(9). ... Under all the circumstances, no reasonable jury could find that these deputies acted “in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” The deputies are entitled to summary judgment on the state-law claim.

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not shield a public officer from a false imprisonment claim at the pleading stage when deliberate indifference is plausibly alleged and the officer identifies no material difference between that standard and the statute’s bad faith standard.

Cruz v. Green · filed 2019-01-07(9)(a)

The Court holds that, at this early stage, Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a), precluding public officers from liability for official acts done in "bad faith" or "a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights..." does not shield Captain Green from liability for false imprisonment.

Section 768.28(9)(a) permits personal tort liability for a public employee who acts in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of rights or safety.

Davis v. Bradshaw · filed 2020-09-25(9)(a)

For the same reasons that there exist genuine issues for trial on the § 1983 claims against Deputy Tompkins, there exist genuine issues as to whether he “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.”

Section 768.28(9)(a) allows a state official’s personal immunity to be overcome by allegations that the official acted outside the scope of employment or in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of others’ rights or safety.

C H v. ASHLEY · filed 2019-09-30(9)(a)

This statutory immunity may be pierced only where a state official either: (1) acts outside the scope of his employment; or (2) acts “in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.”

Section 768.28(9)(a) allows factually supported allegations of bad faith to overcome a public employee’s official immunity at the pleading stage.

N R v. SCHOOL BOARD OF OKALOOSA COUNTY · filed 2019-09-30(9)(a)

The Court thus finds that N.R. has pled sufficient facts to overcome statutory immunity at this stage.

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not entitle an officer to summary judgment on a tort claim when the evidence could support a finding that the officer acted willfully or with malice.

Alexandre v. Ortiz · filed 2019-10-10(9)(a)

Conversely, there is sufficient evidence to raise a question of fact as to whether Herrera and Perez acted willfully or with malice in allegedly hitting and striking Alexandre once he was on the ground and allegedly not resisting arrest. Accordingly, Herrera and Perez are not entitled to summary judgment on the state law claims based on immunity provided by § 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields a public officer from personal liability for a tort committed within the scope of employment unless the officer acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Rodriguez v. Quinones · filed 2020-12-20(9)(a)

However, given that there is no indication whatsoever that Chief Quifiones personally acted “in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property,” she may not be held “personally liable” for the trespassing claim.

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not shield a public officer from tort liability when the evidence could support a finding of willful and wanton conduct.

Kastritis v. City of Daytona Beach Shores · filed 2011-05-18(9)(a)

These facts, along with the record evidence that the scope and intrusiveness of the strip search may have been decided by Defendant Williams without the input of any superior officer, could support a finding of willful/purposeful and wanton conduct on the part of the officer. Thus, Defendant Williams is not entitled to immunity under Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a), and her Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Section 768.28 permits personal tort liability for an officer who acts with wanton and willful disregard of human rights.

Gomez v. Lozano · filed 2012-03-13(9)(a)

Yet this argument ignores the language of the statute, which allows an officer to “be held personally liable in tort” for actions taken “in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights.”

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not give an officer statutory immunity from a battery claim if the officer acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

McCroden v. Joel v. Bressett · filed 2016-09-01(9)(a)

Additionally, the district court properly denied summary judgment on the state law battery claim because, under Florida law, an officer is not entitled to statutory ... immunity if he “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28(9)(a) gives police officers limited immunity from personal liability for state tort claims, but allegations of bad faith or willful and wanton disregard for human rights or safety can defeat dismissal.

Montanez v. Celaya · filed 2014-09-08(9)(a)

Florida Statute § 768.28(9)(a) provides limited statutory immunity to police officers for state tort claims as follows: ... However, at this stage of the proceedings, and evaluating the facts in the light most favorable to Montanez, the Court determines that the Amended Complaint contains allegations rising to the level of bad faith or willful and wanton disregard for Montanez’s safety and human rights.

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not immunize an officer from state law tort claims when the officer acts with wanton and willful disregard of human rights.

Haberski v. Bufano · filed 2018-03-13(9)(a)

Under Florida law, an officer cannot be held liable for acts committed within the scope of his employment unless he “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). ... We are also persuaded that Deputy Bufano’s conduct evidences sufficiently that he acted with a wanton and willful disregard of human rights. ... At this stage in the proceedings, we agree with the district court’s determination that Deputy Bufano is unentitled to immunity on Plaintiff’s state law claims.

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not give an officer statutory immunity when a genuine factual dispute exists over whether the officer acted with a malicious purpose.

Robinson v. Lambert · filed 2018-10-22(9)(a)

For the reasons discussed in part II.B., we find that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Lambert acted with a malicious purpose. If Lambert acted “maliciously or sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,” Bozeman, 422 F.3d at 1271, then it must be true that he acted with a malicious purpose. Therefore, Lambert is not entitled to statutory immunity.

Section 768.28(9)(a) denies officers tort immunity for conduct showing wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property; a genuine fact dispute about that conduct precludes summary judgment on immunity.

Greer v. Ivey · filed 2019-03-25(9)(a)

These counts also include state tort law claims dismissed on statutory immunity grounds, because there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether the deputies exhibited “wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.”

Section 768.28(9)(a) permits a suit against an officer for conduct within the scope of employment when the officer acts in bad faith, maliciously, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights or safety.

Gallashaw v. Moody · filed 2020-09-17(9)(a)

Similarly, accepting as true that Defendant Moody knew Defendant Faltz intended to attack Antonio for no reason and stood by while the attack occurred, a reasonable person could conclude he did so with the requisite intent under section 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields an officer from personal liability for negligence, but a factual dispute about conscious and reckless disregard of a known risk can prevent summary judgment on immunity.

Waldron v. Spicher · filed 2018-10-05(9)(a)

Therefore, if Spicher was only negligent, then he is immune under § 768.28, but Woods, as the Sheriff of Marion County, would face liability. A genuine dispute of material fact exists whether Spicher consciously and recklessly disregarded a known risk of serious injury-making statutory immunity unavailable at this stage of the litigation.

Section 768.28(9) does not entitle an officer to personal immunity at summary judgment when disputed facts could show willful and wanton conduct.

Harris v. Wingo · filed 2019-11-05(9)

Given the issues of fact concerning Deputy Pepin’s use of force, the Court cannot conclude that Deputy Pepin is entitled to state-law immunity pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9).

Section 768.28(9)(a) requires a factual determination of an officer’s bad faith, malicious purpose, or wanton or willful disregard before the officer can be held personally liable for malicious prosecution.

Saint-Vil v. City of Miami Beach · filed 2022-05-19(9)(a)

In addition, the question of whether Mr. Saint-Vil can sue Officer Rodriguez for malicious prosecution under section 768.28(9)(a) requires a jury’s determination as to whether he acted “in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting wanton or willful disregard for human rights, safety, or property.” McGhee, 679 So. 2d at 733. As such, Mr. Saint-Vil’s false arrest and malicious prosecution claims must be resolved at trial.

Section 768.28(9)(a) retains sovereign immunity for a governmental entity when an officer acts in bad faith, maliciously, or with wanton and willful disregard for human life.

Jones, Sr. v. City of Palm Beach Gardens · filed 2022-11-07(9)(a)

Suffice it to say, Raja’s conduct plainly falls within Florida’s statutory carve-out retaining sovereign immunity where officers act in bad faith, maliciously, or with “wanton and willful disregard” for human life. Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields a government subdivision from tort liability for an employee’s acts committed in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Guirola v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2022-05-25(9)(a)

Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court cannot construe these allegations as describing anything less than acts “committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” Fla. Sta. § 768.28(9)(a); ... As such, Defendant’s argument is persuasive, and dismissal of Count III is warranted.

An arrest without probable cause alone does not establish actual malice sufficient to overcome an officer’s immunity under § 768.28(9)(a).

Coleman v. Riccardo · filed 2022-07-22(9)(a)

The district court erred in this case when it applied the legal malice standard — instead of the actual malice standard — and determined that an arrest without probable cause by itself establishes that the officers acted with malice for purposes of § 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28(9)(a) bars malicious prosecution claims against state agencies and officials in their official capacities because those claims require malice.

Denson, Jr. v. Kinney · filed 2022-09-21(9)(a)

Because there can be no claim for malicious prosecution without a showing of malice, and because Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a) bars claims against the entity or officials acting in their official capacities for conduct committed with malice, Florida law is also clear that there can be no claim for malicious prosecution against state agencies or subdivisions.

Section 768.28(9)(a) makes sovereign immunity for a sheriff’s vicarious liability depend on whether the officer acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose.

Taylor v. Wagner · filed 2023-01-20(9)(a)

Sovereign immunity only attaches to those acts that were committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose. Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). Accordingly, sovereign immunity would not protect Sheriff Gualtieri from liability in this scenario.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields state employees acting within the scope of employment from personal tort liability unless they act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of rights, safety, or property.

Betterson v. Town of Cutler Bay · filed 2026-02-06(9)(a)

State officers, employees, and agents acting within the scope of their employment are shielded from personal liability unless the employee “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” § 768.28(9)(a). ... Betterson’s allegations that Romero participated in her arrest and failed to arrest her boyfriend did not show that Romero acted with an evil intent or more than gross negligence because there was probable cause for Betterson’s arrest.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields officers from liability for torts committed within the scope of employment unless they act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of rights or safety.

Henry · filed 2026-01-28(9)(a)

Under an exception to that rule, however, if an officer “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property,” then sovereign immunity will not attach.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields a political subdivision from liability for malicious prosecution.

Craven v. Metropolitan Dade County · filed 1989-05-23(9)(a)

As a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Dade County is immune from liability for malicious prosecution.

Section 768.28 does not waive sovereign immunity for torts involving malice.

Metropolitan Dade County v. Norton · filed 1989-05-30

Section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1985), does not waive sovereign immunity for torts involving malice.

Section 768.28(9)(a) preserves sovereign immunity for torts by state or subdivision officers, employees, or agents acting outside their employment scope, in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard.

Kirker v. Orange County · filed 1988-01-28(9)(a)

The very need to allege and prove willful, wanton or malicious conduct to sustain an action against the medical examiner makes the case non-actionable against the county because of the statute which continues to surround governmental units with *685 the shield of sovereign immunity in the face of such conduct, viz, The state or its subdivisions shall not be liable in tort for the acts or omissions of an officer, employee, or agent committed while acting outside the course and scope of his employment or committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property. § 768.28(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (1985).

Section 768.28(9)(b) preserves sovereign immunity for a state subdivision when its employee acts in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with willful and wanton disregard of another's rights.

Ford v. Rowland · filed 1990-05-03(9)(b)

But, pursuant to section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1985), the Port Authority has sovereign immunity for actions of employees done in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in willful and wanton disregard of another's rights.

Section 768.28(9)(a) excludes the state and its subdivisions from tort liability for acts or omissions by an officer, employee, or agent outside the scope of employment or involving specified culpability.

Craft v. John Sirounis and Sons, Inc. · filed 1991-03-13(9)(a)

The sovereign immunity statute precludes such action in section 768.28(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (1989) which provides: The state or its subdivision shall not be liable in tort for the acts or omissions of an officer, employee, or agent committed while acting outside the course and scope of his employment or committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety or property.

Section 768.28(9)(a) makes a governmental entity immune from liability for an employee's common law torts alleged to have been committed with malice and bad faith.

Kohn v. City of Miami Beach · filed 1992-12-08(9)(a)

Kohn has failed in four attempts to cure the defects in his complaint correctly urged by the defendants below, including: a) the city and county are rendered immune from liability because the alleged common law torts of their employees are claimed to have been committed with malice and bad faith, see § 768.28(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991); b) the civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (1991) fail because no invalid governmental policy of custom is alleged, see Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); and c) it appears that the county employee named as a defendant is not liable for the damages complained of.

Section 768.28(9)(a) allows sovereign immunity to bar claims against governmental entities when the employee's conduct is reckless because recklessness is equivalent to willful and wanton conduct.

Williams v. City of Minneola · filed 1993-04-30(9)(a)

Thus, we conclude that, if the jury found that the appellees' conduct supported a claim for outrageous infliction of emotional distress by reckless conduct, this conduct would at least constitute willful and wanton conduct under section 768.28(9); therefore, the doctrine of sovereign immunity would bar the instant action from being maintained against appellees.

Section 768.28(9)(a) permits a subdivision to assert sovereign immunity when an officer’s conduct exhibits wanton and willful disregard of human safety; whether the conduct meets that standard may require a factual determination.

The DISTRICT BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF FLORIDA KEYS COMMUNITY COLLEGE v. Martin · filed 1994-09-21(9)(a)

In the event a jury concludes that the officer's conduct had been prohibited by his superiors, it might also determine that the deliberate act by Hiller of failing to follow those instructions and employing a handgun at close range, constituted an act exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human safety. Such a conclusion would support the sovereign immunity defense posed by the college.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields a county-owned hospital from liability for a claim based on an employee’s willful, wanton, or malicious conduct.

Gonzalez v. Metro. Dade Cty. Health Trust · filed 1995-03-02(9)(a)

However, even assuming that the hospital's actions were willful, Jackson Memorial Hospital, as a county-owned hospital, is immune from liability for a willful, wanton or malicious conduct claim against one of its employees. See § 768.28(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1988).

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields a public hospital from liability for the willful, wanton, or malicious conduct of its employees.

Vause v. Bay Medical Center · filed 1996-12-30(9)(a)

It is not disputed that BMC is a public hospital vested with sovereign immunity; therefore, BMC is not liable for the willful, wanton, or malicious conduct of its employees.

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not waive sovereign immunity for acts done maliciously or in bad faith.

Smith v. State, Board of Regents ex rel. Florida A & M University · filed 1997-06-25(9)(a)

Florida has not waived *350its original sovereign immunity as to acts done maliciously or in bad faith, as alleged in the complaint here on review. See § 768.28(9)(a), Fla.Stat.

Section 768.28(9)(a) bars malicious prosecution claims against the state or its subdivisions arising from employees’ malicious acts.

Johnson v. STATE HRS · filed 1997-06-27(9)(a)

Section 768.28(9)(a) bars an action for malicious prosecution against the state or its subdivisions arising from the malicious acts of their employees.

Section 768.28(9)(a) bars state liability for an employee's fraudulent misrepresentation because fraud necessarily entails bad faith, even without actual knowledge that the representation was false.

Parker v. STATE OF FLORIDA BD. OF REGENTS · filed 1998-12-28(9)(a)

Under section 768.28(9)(a), the state is liable for the actions of Dean Cnudde within the scope of his employment unless he was acting in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety or property. Because Dr. Parker's action for fraudulent misrepresentation per se contains the element of bad faith, Ablanedo, 511 So.2d at 539, the state cannot be liable for the fraudulent acts of Dean Cnudde even if the dean did not have actual knowledge of the falsity of these statements.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields a municipality from tort liability when its employee is alleged to have acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights.

Geidel v. City of Bradenton Beach · filed 1999-06-09(9)(a)

Plaintiffs have specifically alleged in Count III and Count IV that Defendants Klemkosky and Sloan “acted in bad faith and/or with malicious purpose and/or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of the human rights” of Plaintiffs Geidel and Stevens (Dkt.l). In light of this specific allegation by Plaintiffs, Defendant, City of Bradenton Beach, is immunized from liability pursuant to § 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28(9) bars malicious prosecution claims against a city under sovereign immunity.

Irani v. City of Hallandale · filed 1999-08-04(9)

We write only to note the trial court correctly dismissed Irani's malicious prosecution count as barred by section 768.28(9), Florida Statutes (1997).

Section 768.28(9)(a) protects a state official sued in an official capacity when the employee’s alleged conduct was in bad faith or with a malicious purpose.

Swope v. Krischer · filed 2001-04-18(9)(a)

Finally, the State Attorney Barry Krischer, in his official capacity, is protected by sovereign immunity where a state employee acts in bad faith or with a malicious purpose, as is alleged in this complaint.

Section 768.28(9)(a) precludes recovery against a city for intentional infliction of emotional distress or malicious prosecution because those torts necessarily involve bad faith, malicious purpose, or wanton and willful disregard.

Nelson v. City of Panama City, Florida · filed 2001-12-03(9)(a)

By definition, any conduct sufficient to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress, or to constitute malicious prosecution, is also sufficient to demonstrate bad faith, malicious purpose, or wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety or property, thus precluding recovery against the City on these theories.

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not shield government officers from individual liability when they act with wanton and willful disregard of human rights or safety; a genuine factual dispute on that issue precludes summary judgment based on statutory immunity.

Thompson v. Douds · filed 2003-07-18(9)(a)

However, an exception to this statutory immunity applies when the governmental official "acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property." § 768.28(9)(a). Here, while there is no evidence that the individual officers acted in bad faith or with a malicious purpose, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the individual officers' actions constituted a wanton and willful disregard of human rights. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting final summary judgment on this basis.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields officers from personal tort liability for acts within the scope of employment unless they act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Fernander v. Bonis · filed 2007-01-03(9)(a)

In addition, the allegations of Fernander's complaint failed to satisfy section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes. That statute provides that an officer may not be liable in tort for actions taken in the scope of their employment unless the officer "acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property." § 768.28(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005). Fernander's factual allegations did not establish that Captain Bonis acted outside the scope of his employment or with wanton or willful disregard of Fernander's rights.

Section 768.28(9)(a) provides statutory immunity to an officer against a state tort claim when the officer did not act maliciously or in bad faith.

Pace v. City of Palmetto · filed 2008-06-20(9)(a)

The state tort claim similarly fails because officer Ahler did not act maliciously or in bad faith.

Section 768.28 does not waive a government agency’s sovereign immunity for fraud claims because fraud requires bad faith.

Financial Healthcare Associates, Inc. v. Public Health Trust · filed 2007-05-18(9)(a)

Because bad faith is a necessary component of any fraud claim, the Trust argues that sovereign immunity bars FHA’s suit for fraud against the Trust. Such is the law in Florida.

Section 768.28(9)(a) provides immunity from suit when there is no evidence of bad faith, malicious purpose, or wanton and willful disregard of human rights or safety.

Furtado v. Yun Chung Law · filed 2011-02-02(9)(a)

In fulfilling this obligation, “the trial judge should ask whether a reasonable trier of fact could possibly conclude that the conduct was willful and wanton, or would otherwise fall within the exceptions to the statute.” Id. Here, there was no evidence of bad faith, malicious purpose, or a wanton and willful disregard of human rights or safety. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment on this claim.

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not immunize a public official from a tort claim when the complaint sufficiently alleges malicious purpose.

Burge v. Ferguson · filed 2008-12-16(9)(a)

Ferguson argues that he enjoys immunity under Section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes, which provides sovereign immunity to a public official acting within the scope of his duty “unless such officer ... acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” ... However, the complaint sufficiently alleges malicious purpose.

Section 768.28(9)(a) excepts state employees who act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property from its exclusive-remedy rule.

Hardin v. Jones · filed 2020-01-21(9)(a)

However, a review of section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes, reveals that Defendants omitted a material phrase of the statute’s language. The last sentence of Defendants’ quote should include the following exception: “unless such officer, employee, or agent acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.”

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not bar a suit against a state officer when the complaint’s allegations could allow a reasonable factfinder to find bad faith, malicious purpose, or wanton and willful disregard of human rights or safety.

PETERSON v. POLLACK · filed 2020-02-12(9)(a)

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the parents’ allegations regarding the deputy’s conduct, taken as true as we are required to do in this review, would be sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the deputy acted “in bad faith,” “with malicious purpose,” or “in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights [or] safety,” as we have interpreted those phrases under Florida law. Thus, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of the deputy’s motion to dismiss the parents’ suit against him based on section 768.28(9)(a) immunity.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields an officer from personal tort liability for acts within the scope of employment unless the officer acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Hall v. Rhoden · filed 2025-05-27(9)(a)

An officer cannot be held personally liable for acts committed in “the scope of her or his employment or function” unless he “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” § 768.28 (9)(a), Fla. Stat. ... But, these conclusory allegations are insufficient; and Hall has identified no facts to pierce the sovereign immunity conferred on Thames or Reeder. Thus, they are protected by Florida sovereign immunity.

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not shield a state officer from personal tort liability when the officer acts in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights or safety; factual disputes about those exceptions can preclude summary judgment.

Thomas v. Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2025-06-06(9)(a)

Under the circumstances of this case, there remain jury issues as to whether Defendant committed assault or battery on Plaintiff and whether Defendant acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights or safety.

Section 768.28 bars suit against a county until six months have passed or the claim has been denied, whichever comes first.

Usategui v. Delta Air Lines, Inc · filed 2024-01-04

As discussed, under Florida Statute § 768.28 Plaintiff could not file suit against Miami-Dade County prior to the passage of six months or the denial of her claim, whichever came sooner.

Section 768.28(6) requires written notice to the agency and a written denial of the claim before a claimant may maintain a tort suit against a municipality.

Henry v. Iannone · filed 2024-07-22(6)(a)–(b)

As relevant here, Section 768.28(6)(a) creates two necessary preconditions to maintaining a suit against a state agency or subdivision: (1) the claimant must give written notice to the agency; and (2) the respective entities must deny the claim in writing.

Section 768.28(6)(c) requires a claimant’s presuit notice to include the claimant’s date and place of birth and social security number.

King v. Lee County · filed 2025-03-03(6)(c)

However, Plaintiff’s date of birth, place of birth, and social security number are all absent from the Notice of Intent to Sue. ... In short, Plaintiff failed to provide these mandatory components required by Section 768.28(6)(c).

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires a tort claimant to plead that written notice was given to both the appropriate state agency and the Department of Financial Services within three years after the claim accrued.

Rose v. Harris · filed 2025-07-07(6)(a)

The pre-suit requirement explicitly requires, however, that the claimant presents the claim in writing to both the appropriate agency and the Department of Financial Services within three years after the claim accrues.

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires written pre-suit notice that reasonably identifies the claim against the county before its sovereign immunity is waived.

Harmatz · filed 2026-01-22(6)(a)

First, it is unclear whether the communication was in writing, as required by § 768.28(6)(a). Second, Plaintiff’s purported notice does not specify that he intended to sue Charlotte County. Therefore, Charlotte County was not “reasonably” on notice of the claim against it.

Section 768.28(6)'s claim presentation requirement applies to governmental units, not individual defendants.

Hambrick v. Beard · filed 1978-12-08(6)

According to the plain and obvious meaning of Section 768.28(6) it does not apply to individuals. It is clear that only governmental units are included in this section of the statute.

Section 768.28(6) does not require administrative exhaustion for state tort claims against an individual officer.

Meeker v. Addison · filed 1984-07-06(6)

Exhaustion under Fla.Stat. § 768.28 is not required where the Defendant is an individual officer, as opposed to the state or a state agency.

Section 768.28(6) requires notice before bringing state-law claims against Florida or its political subdivisions, but its notice requirement is preempted in federal civil rights suits.

Brennan v. City of Minneola, Fla. · filed 1989-03-13(6)

Defendants’ third assertion is grounded in Fla. Stat. § 768.28(6), a notice of claim statute. However, this statute also does not apply to this suit. ... Because the statute therefore “conditions [the] right of recovery upon compliance with a rule designed to minimize governmental liability, and that directs injured persons to seek redress from the very targets of the federal legislation,” the procedure is preempted by the federal civil rights acts.

Section 768.28(6) makes notice a condition precedent to a tort suit against a Florida municipality or an official in an official capacity, and the complaint must allege that notice was given.

Diversified Numismatics, Inc. v. City of Orlando, Fla. · filed 1990-09-06(6)

Satisfaction of the Florida notice requirements is a condition precedent to maintaining a lawsuit, and the complaint must contain an allegation that such notice was given.

Section 768.28 requires compliance with its notice-of-claim conditions for state-law claims against Florida agencies.

White v. Fl. Hwy. Patrol, Div. of Fl. Dept. of Hwy. · filed 1996-06-10(6)(a)

Section 768.28 of the Florida Code contains a limited waiver of sovereign immunity applicable to Plaintiffs complaint against Defendants. ... This Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff has failed to comply with Fla.Stat. § 768.28.

Section 768.28 requires plaintiffs to present claims to the municipal or state agency in writing within three years of accrual to obtain a waiver of sovereign immunity.

Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale · filed 1998-05-06

Specifically, that section requires that plaintiffs present their claims to the municipal or state agencies in writing within three years of their accrual. ... This, failure alone requires the dismissal of Counts VI and VII for failure to seek a timely waiver of sovereign immunity.

Section 768.28 requires compliance with statutory notice requirements before filing state tort claims against a county.

Davis v. Miami-Dade County Board of County Commissioners · filed 2006-10-24

And, as further grounds, Defendants had argued convincingly that Plaintiff failed to comply with the statutory notice requirements pri- or to filing this action. Fla. Stat. § 768.28.

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires written presuit notice to the Department of Financial Services before a tort claim against a state agency or subdivision may proceed.

Washington v. School Board of Hillsborough County · filed 2010-08-03(6)(a)

There is yet an equally compelling reason to grant summary judgment in Defendant’s favor as to the tortious interference claim, that is, because Plaintiff failed to notify the Florida Department of Financial Services of his tortious interference claim against Defendant as mandated by Florida Statute Section 768.28(6).

Section 768.28(6) requires timely written notice of a state tort claim against a county, and the complaint must allege compliance.

Bloom v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2011-09-16(6)

The complaint does not plead that Plaintiff complied with the notice provisions of Florida’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity, Fla. Stat. § 768.28, within the appropriate time period, and Plaintiffs’ implicit acknowledgment — in their response brief — that notice was untimely reveals the weakness of Plaintiffs’ position. As discussed above, with respect to the claims against the State Commission, the failure to plead compliance with this statute- — and the impossibility of timely compliance at this stage — render Plaintiffs’ claims fatally flawed.

Section 768.28 requires notice before filing a tort action against a state agency, and the complaint must allege prior compliance.

Woodburn v. Florida Department of Children & Family Services · filed 2011-12-01(6)(a)

However, the statute clearly forbids the institution of an action without prior notice, and the Complaint does not allege prior compliance with the notice provisions.

Section 768.28(6)'s presuit notice requirement applies only to state-law tort claims, not federal ADA claims.

Schaeffer v. School Board of Broward County · filed 2014-11-10(6)

Pursuant to this language, the notification requirement applies solely to state-law tort claims.

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires timely written notice to obtain a waiver of sovereign immunity for a tort claim.

Williams v. Florida State University · filed 2015-06-26(6)(a)

Williams failed to comply with the condition prerequisite to give timely notice to obtain a waiver by the State of its sovereign immunity from damages allegedly attributable to officials of the University.

Section 768.28(6) requires notice to the state agency and a denial or six months without a final decision before suit.

Bank of America, N.A. v. United States Internal Revenue Service · filed 2009-07-10(6)

Therefore, because Plaintiff Bank has failed to satisfy the regulations of § 768.28 by giving the State the allotted time to make a final decision on its claim, the current claims are procedurally barred.

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires notice to the agency and the Department of Financial Services within three years after a tort claim accrues; failure to give timely notice leaves the government immune.

Bloom v. Peacock · filed 2012-11-19(6)(a)

Florida has codified a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, requiring notice be provided to the state agency and the Department of Financial Services (“DFS”) within three years after such claim accrues. Fla. Stat. § 768.28(6)(a) (2003). ... The County is therefore entitled to sovereign immunity, and the state tort claims must be dismissed.

Section 768.28(6) requires presuit notice for a tort suit against an entity with sovereign immunity; failure to give that notice is fatal to the suit.

Fluid Dynamics Holdings, LLC v. Jacksonville Electric Authority · filed 2018-11-05(6)

However, Fluid Dynamics has conceded that it did not satisfy the pre-suit notice requirements set out in § 768.28(6). Failure to provide the required notice is “fatal” to a tort suit against an entity with sovereign immunity.

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires presuit notice before state-law tort claims against a government entity may proceed; failure to comply bars those claims.

Oniasse v. Hernandez · filed 2018-12-03(6)(a)

Thus, the record establishes that Pastor Oniasse did not comply with Florida's presuit notice requirement, contrary to her allegations. The Court cannot ignore such evidence, which bars both state-law claims from proceeding.

A missing denial letter does not, by itself, disprove a complaint’s allegation that section 768.28(6)’s presuit conditions were satisfied or waived.

Leyva v. Host International Inc. · filed 2021-04-19(6)(a)

Defendants correctly note that Plaintiff failed to attach a denial letter. However, this does not disprove the allegations in her complaint that conditions precedent to suit have been satisfied or waived.

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires the appropriate agency to receive written notice of the claim by the deadline as a condition precedent to suit.

Funderburk v. Snyder · filed 2023-05-24(6)(a)

As the Report makes clear, the act of “present[ing] the claim in writing” to the appropriate agency under Fla. Stat. § 768.28(6)(a) means that a plaintiff must send the claim to the appropriate agency in writing and that the agency must receive the claim “in hand” by the appropriate deadline [ECF No. 70 p. 5 (citing Simmons v. Pub. Health Tr. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 338 So. 3d 1057, 1065 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022))].

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires presuit notice for a tort claim against a county; a claim is barred when the plaintiff fails to give notice before the deadline expires.

Windom v. Orange County, Florida · filed 2024-01-31(6)(a)

Given Plaintiffs failure to satisfy the pre-suit notice requirement of Florida Statute § 768.28(6)(a) and his inability to do so at this stage, his negligent supervision claim is barred.

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires timely presuit notice of a tort claim against a municipality; when the notice period has expired, the claim is dismissed with prejudice.

Gaston v. City of Leesburg · filed 2025-09-12(6)(a)

Plaintiff failed to timely comply with Section 768.28. ... Here, the time to give notice has expired such that Plaintiff cannot fulfill the notice requirement. Therefore, his state tort claims against the City of Leesburg are not amenable to cure and are dismissed with prejudice.

Section 768.28(6) makes compliance with its presuit claim process a condition precedent to maintaining suit, and the complaint must allege compliance.

Keith v. Dykes · filed 1983-04-12(6)

However, since compliance with Section 768.28(6), Florida *503 Statutes (1981),[1] is a condition precedent to maintaining a suit and performance of this condition should be alleged in the complaint in accordance with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.120(c), Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So.2d 1010, 1022-1023 (Fla. 1979), appellees could not institute suit on their cause of action until December 11, 1981, when they were notified by the Department of Insurance that their claim was denied.

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires a claimant to wait for written denial of a claim, or for six months without a final disposition, before suing a state agency.

Thigpin v. Sun Bank of Ocala · filed 1984-09-20(6)(a)

It is apparent, however, that the plaintiff instituted this action against the clerk, a state agency, prior to any denial of its written claim as required by the foregoing statute. There was no written denial and six months from filing of the claim had not elapsed at the time suit was filed.

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires notice before suit; a complaint filed without that notice should be dismissed without prejudice when the claimant still has time to comply.

Wemett v. Duval County · filed 1986-04-01(6)(a)

However, it was error to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. Since the case has not been decided on the merits, and since the statute of limitations had not yet run at the time of dismissal, the dismissal should not have been with prejudice. It was still possible at the time of the dismissal for appellant to comply with the notice requirements of Section 768.28(6)(a), Florida Statutes, before the statute of limitations ran out.

A claimant must allege compliance with section 768.28(6), but failure to do so does not affect subject matter jurisdiction; the state waives that defense if it first raises it after final judgment.

State ex rel. Manatee County ex rel. Manatee County Sheriff's Department v. Kruysman · filed 1985-09-20(6)

While a claimant must allege compliance with section 768.28(6) in order to state a cause of action, the failure to do so does not affect subject matter jurisdiction. ... Here, the state waived the defense by failing to raise it until after final judgment.

Section 768.28(6) requires notice; when the time to provide it has expired and the plaintiff cannot allege compliance, dismissal with prejudice is proper.

Halpin v. Short · filed 1986-05-16(6)

By the time the dismissal was entered, the limitations period for providing such notice had expired. Thus, dismissal with prejudice was proper since appellant was unable to furnish the required notice and amend his complaint to allege compliance with section 768.28(6).

Section 768.28(6)'s notice requirements do not apply to claims against government officials in their individual capacities.

Lloyd v. Ellis · filed 1988-01-27(6)

The notice requirements in section 768.28(6), however, are not applicable to Lloyd's cause of action against Ellis and Hayward in their individual capacities.

Section 768.28(6) requires notice to the Department of Insurance before suit, and a defending agency may raise failure to give that notice before or at trial despite its earlier participation in the case.

Menendez v. North Broward Hosp. Dist. · filed 1988-12-15(6)

Under our ruling in Levine and the facts presented here, the hospital raised a viable and timely defense which could be asserted by motion any time prior to or at the trial on the merits. The time for filing a proper claim having expired, the Menendezes' failure to notify the Department is fatal to their complaint. Because this failure was present from the beginning and cannot be attributed to the hospital's conduct, the doctrine of estoppel is inapplicable.

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires a plaintiff to present a written claim and obtain the agency’s denial before filing a state claim against a municipality.

Eddy v. City of Miami · filed 1989-05-16(6)(a)

Florida Statute § 768.28(6)(a) provides that a plaintiff must present the claim in writing to the appropriate agent and municipality, and that agency must deny the claim.

Section 768.28(6)'s waiting period does not apply to claims under the Whistle-blower's Act.

City of Miami v. Coll · filed 1989-07-18(6)

We also reject the City's argument that Coll was required to observe the waiting period of subsection 768.28(6), Florida Statutes (1987). The City's proposed construction is at odds with the plain language of the Whistle-blower's Act. See § 112.3187(8), Fla. Stat. (1987).

Section 768.28 requires the presuit notice to include the claimant's tort claims.

Mitchell v. School Board of Dade County · filed 1990-05-08

Assuming the Mitchells' notification under section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1989), could be read broadly enough to encompass the tort claims at issue here, the notice did not include claims on behalf of the daughter, Mary Mitchell, and all counts were properly dismissed as to her.

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires written notice to the appropriate agency and, except for claims against municipalities, the Department of Insurance before suit, but the notice requirement may be waived.

Bryant v. Duval County Hosp. Authority · filed 1986-12-31(6)(a)

We conclude, therefore, that the DCHA's conduct in failing to plead the notice requirement as a defense while at the same time affirmatively asserting entitlement to the section 768.28 limitation of liability, constitutes a waiver of the intention to rely on the notice provision applicable to the Department of Insurance.

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires written notice to the Department of Insurance.

Myers v. Charlotte County · filed 1990-01-26(6)(a)

This controversy concerns whether or not the appellants gave written notice to the Department of Insurance as is required by section 768.28(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1987). ... This conflicting evidence must be resolved by the trier of fact, in this case the jury, and summary judgment was improper.

Section 768.28's notice requirement cannot be imposed on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim when it effectively shortens the federal limitations period.

BROOKS BY AND THROUGH McCOOK v. Elliott · filed 1992-02-21

Thus, federal law preempts Florida from imposing a notice-of-claim requirement on appellant that effectively shortens to three years the four-year statute of limitations. The trial court erred in dismissing appellant's complaint based upon alleged noncompliance with the notice requirements of section 768.28, Florida Statutes.

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires timely written notice to the Department of Insurance before an action against a state agency may be instituted.

Wright v. POLK CTY. PUBLIC HEALTH UNIT · filed 1992-07-08(6)(a)

Thus, in order to state a cause of action against a state agency, a complaint must specifically allege that timely written notice has been given to the Department of Insurance in compliance with section 768.28(6)(a).

Section 768.28(7) requires service on both the state agency and the Department of Insurance to obtain jurisdiction over the state agency.

Austin v. Gaylord · filed 1992-07-29(7)

We do not, therefore, consider those cases controlling on the issue of our jurisdiction to review the present order because Plaintiff's admitted noncompliance with the statutory requirement of service on the Department of Insurance to obtain jurisdiction over Austin as state attorney involves the legality of the service of process itself as distinguished from the mere timeliness of such service already accomplished.

Section 768.28(6) does not require a written claim upon the state or its agencies for individual claims alleging intentional acts with malicious purpose.

Witmer v. University of Florida Police Dept. · filed 1992-12-14(6)

Similarly, insofar as the complaint in Counts III-V alleges that the defendant officers acted intentionally and with malicious purpose, it stated a cause of action against those defendants individually, for which section 768.28(6) does not require a written claim upon the state or its agencies.

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires written notice to the appropriate agency and, generally, the Department of Insurance before bringing a tort action against a state agency or subdivision.

Lopez v. Prager · filed 1993-08-31(6)(a)

Neither the Department of Insurance nor Dade County waived the notice requirement of Florida Statutes Section 768.28(6). Waiver of notification to the Department of Insurance cannot be interpreted from the action of Dade County's claims adjuster because no representation was made with respect to any communication between plaintiff's counsel and the state.

Section 768.28(7) requires service of process on the Department of Insurance, but its service requirement is not subject to the 120-day deadline for serving a defendant.

Turner v. Gallagher · filed 1994-07-22(7)

There is no incongruity in applying the 120-day rule to the defendant but not applying it to the Department of Insurance. The burden of complying with the statute in order to obtain a judgment is still on the plaintiff.

Section 768.28(7) requires service on the Department of Insurance, but failure to serve it within 120 days may warrant abatement and does not invalidate service on the defendant.

Cannon v. Yager · filed 1995-07-07(7)

The Department of Insurance in this case is not a "defendant" for purposes of Rule 1.070(i); therefore, compliance with the 120-day requirement in Rule 1.070(i) was not essential to acquiring jurisdiction over Sheriff Cannon. Accordingly, we conclude, as did the Fifth District, that failure to comply with the provisions of section 768.28(7) might warrant abatement of the lawsuit until the Department of Insurance is served. However, contrary to the First District's conclusion in Austin, we conclude that it does not affect the validity of the service of process.

Section 768.28(7)’s requirement to serve the Department of Insurance is not subject to Rule 1.070(i)’s 120-day deadline in actions against state agencies.

West v. State, Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services · filed 1996-02-07(7)

Shortly after rendition of the trial court’s order, this court receded from Austin in Platt v. Florida Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 659 So.2d 1251 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), and held that Rule 1.070(i) is not implicated in actions against a state agency pursuant to section 768.28, Florida Statutes, by failure to serve the Department of Insurance within the time prescribed by that rule. Platt controls disposition of this appeal, and in accordance therewith, we reverse the order of dismissal and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings.

Section 768.28(7) sets no deadline for serving the Department of Insurance when it is a nonparty, and a governmental defendant waives an objection to that service by failing to raise it in a responsive motion or answer.

Lemonik v. Metropolitan Dade County · filed 1996-05-08(7)

Indeed, the legislature did not prescribe any time frame whatsoever in section 768.28(7) for a plaintiff to effectuate service upon the Department when the Department is not otherwise a party to the action. ... By neglecting to assert Lemonik’s failure to serve the Department in its responsive motion and/or answer to the complaint (and indeed for more than three years after the commencement of this action), we are compelled to find that the County waived its right to raise this issue, particularly where service was ultimately made upon the Department prior to the filing of the County’s motion for summary judgment on this issue.

Section 768.28(7) does not require service of process on the Department of Insurance for a federal civil rights claim.

Matthews v. Wells · filed 1994-08-19(7)

The trial court directed a verdict because Mr. Matthews had failed to serve process on the Department of Insurance, pursuant to section 768.28(7), Florida Statutes (1989). We reverse because such service of process is not required for a federal civil rights claim.

Section 768.28(6) requires compliance before a complaint can proceed, but a plaintiff may amend after complying if the limitations period has not run.

Lane v. Eckert · filed 1995-04-07(6)

Because the appellant failed to comply with the requirements of section 768.28(6), Florida Statutes (1991), the trial court properly dismissed his complaint. Since, however, the statute of limitations had not yet run at the time of dismissal, the appellant shall have the opportunity to file an amended complaint after compliance with the statute.

Section 768.28(6) permits a letter identifying the claimant, his injuries, and his claim to satisfy the presuit notice requirement when a copy is sent to the appropriate agency.

Brower v. State Dept. of Natural Res. · filed 1997-07-18(6)

A copy of the letter was sent to DNR, the "appropriate agency," as required under section 768.28(6). This letter was not a model of how to give notice of a claim to a state agency, but it met the minimum requirements of Smart. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment against Mr. Brower for failure to provide DNR with the required presuit notice.

Section 768.28(6)(a)'s presuit notice requirement creates a temporary procedural bar to a lawsuit against the State or one of its subdivisions.

Widmer v. Caldwell · filed 1998-07-15(6)(a)

Nevertheless, failure to provide the required presuit notice is viewed by the courts as a temporary procedural bar to a lawsuit against the State or one of its subdivisions.

Section 768.28(6) does not require dismissal solely because a claimant filed suit before waiting six months after giving notice.

Williams v. Henderson · filed 1996-12-18(6)

Both cases have held, and we agree, that failure to wait six months to file suit after giving notice does not mandate a dismissal.

Section 768.28 requires notice to the Florida Department of Insurance; failure to give notice supports summary judgment when the department lacks actual knowledge of the litigation.

Glisson v. Jacksonville Transportation Authority · filed 1997-08-07

There was no factual dispute in this case regarding appellant’s failure to provide notice of this action to the Florida Department of Insurance pursuant to section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1995). Because the record indicates that the department did not have actual knowledge of this litigation as it did in Brown v. Department of Corrections, 697 So.2d 210 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), we affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of appellee on the authority of Menendez v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 537 So.2d 89 (Fla.1988).

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires a plaintiff suing a Florida political subdivision to give written notice to the Department of Insurance within three years after the claim arises and to allege that notice in the complaint.

Hazel v. School Bd. of Dade County, Fla. · filed 1998-05-08(6)(a)

Florida law requires that a plaintiff who sues a political subdivision of the state of Florida give written notice to the Department of Insurance within three years after a claim arises. Section 768.28(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996). Hazel’s complaint has failed to allege that it has given such notice.

Section 768.28(6)’s notice requirement does not warrant dismissal when the complaint and prayer for relief seek no damages.

Lamar Advertising of Mobile, Inc. v. CITY OF LAKELAND, FL · filed 1997-09-30(6)

Additionally, Defendants’ contention that Plaintiffs’ complaint asserts a state claim for damages is without merit since neither Plaintiffs’ Complaint nor prayer for relief seeks damages.

A claimant who adequately alleges waiver or estoppel of the three-year notice requirement can withstand dismissal for failure to comply with subsection (6)(a).

Brown v. State, Dept. of Corrections · filed 1997-11-26(6)(a)

Although Rabinowitz involved a claim presentation requirement of a municipal charter, we believe its holding is equally applicable to the three-year presentation requirement of section 768.28(6)(a). Thus, if a claimant alleges waiver or estoppel sufficient to comply with Rabinowitz, a suit brought on behalf of such claimant would be able to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with section 768.28(6)(a).

Section 768.28(6)(b) makes notice to the Department of Insurance a condition precedent to maintaining a claim against a subdivision of state government.

Clark v. Sarasota County Public Hospital Board · filed 1998-08-31(6)(b)

Providing the Department with notice of the claim is a condition precedent to maintaining a cause of action against a subdivision of state government.

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires a written claim to be presented to the Department of Insurance within three years after it accrues.

Rubin v. State, Department of Transportation · filed 1998-09-02(6)(a)

While Cannon stated service of the claim upon the Depart*1177ment of Insurance was required, section 768.28(6)(a) sets out the only time requirement in that it requires that the claim be presented in writing to the Department of Insurance within three years after the claim accrues.

Section 768.28(6) requires notice to the Department of Insurance to state a cause of action, and failure to give that notice may be raised by motion any time before trial.

Wall v. Palm Beach County · filed 1999-08-04(6)

Moreover, because notice to the Department of Insurance as well as the agency is essential to state a cause of action, the failure to give notice may be raised by motion at any time prior to trial.

Section 768.28(6)(a)'s notice requirement is satisfied when the Department of Insurance timely receives a corrected notice identifying the responsible agency, even if the initial notice named the wrong agency.

Morhaim v. State, Department of Transportation · filed 1999-08-04(6)(a)

We think that the DOI’s timely receipt of Fannie Morhaim’s corrected notice of claim dated September 26, 1995 identifying the DOT as the responsible agency for her injuries was sufficient to preserve her rights to file the instant suit against the DOT.