Fla. Stat. § 768.28

Section 768.28(6) requires a claim against a government entity to be presented within three years after it accrues.

Sellers v. Miami-Dade County School Board · filed 2001-06-13(6)

We affirm because Kenneth Sellers failed to comply in a timely manner with the notice of claim requirement contained in section 768.28(6), Florida Statutes (1996).

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires proper, timely notice to the Department of Insurance and the agency involved.

Walker v. Florida Department of Law Enforcement · filed 2003-05-21(6)(a)

In the first place the defendant has failed to comply with the notice provisions of Section 768.28(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2002), requiring proper, timely notification to the Department of Insurance as well as the Department • of Law Enforcement.

Section 768.28(6) requires a claimant to give timely notice of a tort claim against a governmental entity and plead compliance with that requirement.

Wagatha v. City of Satellite Beach · filed 2004-01-23(6)

In this instance, appellant alleged that the incident occurred in 1997. Under the statute, appellant had until October 2000 to give notice under the statute. Appellant has not demonstrated that she has fulfilled this requirement or alleged in her complaint that she has given notice.[3] Thus, the trial court's dismissal of Count II of appellant's complaint is sustainable on that basis alone.

Section 768.28(6) requires written notice to the governmental agency and the Department of Insurance within three years after a tort claim accrues.

Motor v. CITRUS COUNTY SCHOOL BD. · filed 2003-10-03(6)

Under section 768.28, Florida Statutes (2001), a person who sues a county or other state "agency" must give written notice of the claim to the agency and to the Department of Insurance within three years after the claim accrues.

Section 768.28(6) requires notice that sufficiently identifies a claim against a state agency or subdivision; serving papers concerning a co-defendant on the department does not satisfy that requirement.

LaRiviere v. South Broward Hosp. Dist. · filed 2004-12-22(6)

The notice must advise the department that a claim is made against a state agency or subdivision. ... Here, the purely coincidental service of the notice and the complaint on the department as agent for service for BCBS is clearly not notice to the department regarding a claim against a state subdivision.

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires written notice of a negligence claim to the Department of Insurance within three years.

Pangilinan v. Broward County · filed 2005-11-30(6)(a)

Here, on summary judgment, the County submitted an affidavit demonstrating *1098 that the plaintiff failed to present written notice of her negligence claims to the Department of Insurance within the three-year period as required by section 768.28(6)(a), Florida Statutes.

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires notice of a tort claim against a state agency within three years; the longer period for intentional torts based on abuse does not extend that deadline for negligence claims against the agency.

Doe ex rel. Doe's Mother v. Sinrod · filed 2012-05-30(6)(a)

Chapter 95 expressly states that its time limitations are secondary to other times prescribed in the Florida Statutes. Therefore, the time restraints set forth in chapter 768 take precedence. We hold that Doe did not comply with the requirements set forth under section 768.28(6)(a) when she did not notify the School Board or the Department of Financial Services of her claims within the statutory three-year period.

Section 768.28(6)(a) permits a notice that misidentifies the type of accident if it still gives the agency enough information to investigate the claim.

Aitcheson v. Florida Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles · filed 2013-07-10(6)(a)

Although the notices provided to the FDHSMV and the Department of Financial Services state that the injury was suffered in an automobile accident, rather than a slip and fall, we find that the notices nevertheless provided sufficient information for the agencies to investigate the claim, satisfying the purpose of section 768.28(6)(a).

Section 768.28(6)(a) permits a written claim that describes the accident, injuries, medical bills, and demand sufficiently to let the municipality investigate.

Vargas v. City of Fort Myers · filed 2014-01-17(6)(a)

Here, the letter sent on March 9, 2007, described the accident, Vargas’s injuries, the amount of her medical bills, and that a demand was being made. Fort Myers was placed on adequate notice and was able to investigate the claim based on the information provided in the letter. As such, Vargas’s letter satisfied the notice requirement set forth in section 768.28(6)(a).

Section 768.28(6) does not strictly require notice to the Department of Financial Services before a complaint is filed; giving notice afterward is not an incurable defect.

Allen v. Crews · filed 2014-04-16(6)

But prior notice has not been strictly required. The fact that Appellant apparently gave notice after the filing of the complaint1 was not an incurable defect.

Section 768.28(6)(a)’s three-year period for presenting a claim begins when the claim accrues, which may be later than the underlying incident.

Exposito v. Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County · filed 2014-06-18(6)(a)

We next reject the defendants’ argument that the three-year time period in section 768.28(6) runs from the date of Stephanie’s birth—the “incident,” according to the defendants. The plain language of that section states that the three years begins from the date “such claim accrues,” and “accrual” can be a mixed factual and legal conclusion.

Section 768.28(6) requires presuit notice of tort claims against a city; notice of earlier incidents does not cover claims that accrue later.

Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach · filed 2014-08-19(6)

The court shall grant Lozman’s request to amend his complaint by interlineation to allege the giving of pre-suit notice as to the November 2006 false arrest and battery claims, which are fairly identified in Attorney Bowling’s notice of claim. However, this notice cannot be read to cover claims which accrued after that point in time, such as the alleged battery arising from the October 2009 incident or the conversion claim arising from the City’s arrest and seizure of Lozman’s floating home in November 2009.

Section 768.28 requires written notice of a wrongful-death claim to the Department of Financial Services within two years after accrual; chapter 766 presuit tolling does not extend that deadline.

Fagan v. Jackson County Hospital District, Jackson Hospital · filed 2024-02-14(6)(a)2.

Unlike chapter 766, section 768.28 does not allow for delayed notice to DFS.

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires notice to the Department of Financial Services; failure to provide it entitles a public school district to summary judgment on sovereign immunity.

Duval County Public Schools and Lewis James v. Jowanda Jackson, as Legal Guardian of Kyesha Johnson, A Child and Kyesha Johnson · filed 2024-07-12(6)(a)

On appeal, DCPS argues that, based on the summary judgment evidence, it was immune from suit because Appellees failed to provide notice to the Department of Financial Services as required by section 768.28(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2023). On our record, we agree. As such, DCPS is entitled to summary judgment on its claim of sovereign immunity.

Section 768.28(6)'s three-year notice period invalidates a conflicting county requirement to give notice of a tort claim within 60 days.

Perez v. Miami Dade Water & Sewer Authority · filed 1979-06-19(6)

In our recent opinion in Scavella v. Fernandez, 371 So.2d 535 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), this court reasoned that the 60 day notice provision of Section 2-2 of the Code is in conflict with the three year notice period provided by Section 768.28(6). Based upon such conflict, this court held the 60 day notice provision of Section 2-2 to be invalid. Because the Scavello case is on point with the issue presented by this appeal, the order entered by the trial court dismissing appellants’ complaint with prejudice must be reversed.

Section 768.28(6) does not require dismissal of an action filed before the six-month notice period expires when that period has elapsed before the court rules and the notified agency had time to respond.

Thomas "Jack" Fitzgerald v. John P. McDaniel and Wayne "Cowboy" Morris, as Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff of Jackson County, Florida, Respectively · filed 1987-12-15(6)

Although Fitzgerald failed to wait six months to file this action, more than six months elapsed before the district court finally disposed of the issue. Since Sheriff McDaniel was duly notified of Fitzgerald’s claims and had time to respond, the purpose underlying section 768.28(6) was adequately served.

Section 768.28(6) requires presuit notice before suing a political subdivision; failure to plead compliance warrants dismissal without prejudice and leave to amend.

Redner v. Citrus County, Fla. · filed 1989-02-13(6)

However, under Florida precedent, failure to plead the presuit notice requirement should result in dismissal without prejudice and with leave to amend.

Section 768.28(6)(a)'s six-month waiting requirement may be satisfied before trial even if the plaintiff filed suit before the waiting period expired.

Hattaway v. McMillian · filed 1990-06-25(6)(a)

We note that this holding is based upon our conclusion that state law allows the plaintiff to meet her burden under section 768.28(6) if the initial non-compliance with the section is cured before trial.

Noncompliance with § 768.28(6)’s notice requirements can be cured before trial by sending the required notices and allowing the six-month period to expire.

Farabee v. Rider · filed 1998-02-13(6)

Plaintiff sent the required notification letters to the appropriate agencies on March 31, 1997. The six month period required to make a final disposition of this claim expired on November 1, 1997. This matter has not yet gone to trial. Therefore, Plaintiff’s non-compliance with Fla.Stat. § 768.28(6) has been cured, making this issue moot.

Section 768.28(6) permits a tort suit against a Florida state entity to proceed despite premature filing when the required entities have received notice and the six-month waiting period has elapsed.

Rumler v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, FLORIDA · filed 2008-04-25(6)

Even viewing Plaintiffs allegations in the most liberal manner, the only reasonable inference to be drawn is that Plaintiff did not strictly comply with the requirements of section 768.28(6)(d) prior to filing suit. ... The undersigned finds that it would serve no useful purpose to dismiss Count III of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, based upon her initial failure to strictly comply with the statutory requirements. As the Court has determined for purposes of this Order that Rumler notified the appropriate entities and the requisite six-month period has elapsed, such a dismissal would be futile, as it clearly must be without prejudice and with leave to amend.

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires a claimant suing a municipality in tort to plead compliance with its notice requirement; a claim with no notice allegation must be dismissed.

Fletcher v. City of Miami · filed 2008-07-11(6)(a)

The SAC does not cite Section 768.28(6)(a) or otherwise reference any attempt to provide the required statutory notice. Count Nine, therefore, must be dismissed on this basis.

Compliance with Section 768.28’s presuit notice requirement may be pleaded through a general allegation that all conditions precedent, including applicable notice provisions, have been satisfied, complied with, or waived.

Smith v. Rainey · filed 2010-09-30(6)(a)

Although the Amended Complaint does not expressly cite § 768.28(6)(a), it alleges that “[a]ll conditions precedent have been satisfied, complied with or waived, including but not limited to applicable notice provisions.” (Dkt. 38 ¶ 12) (emphasis added). This allegation is sufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements of both Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.120(c) and Fed. R.Civ.P. 8(a).

Section 768.28(6)(a)’s presuit notice condition can be pleaded by generally alleging that all conditions precedent have occurred, been performed, or been waived.

Davis v. Bradshaw · filed 2019-12-02(6)(a)

Plaintiff’s allegation in the Second Amended Complaint that “[a]ll conditions precedent to bringing the causes of action asserted herein have been performed, have occurred, or have been waived” is sufficient to plead compliance with § 768.28(6)(a).

A complaint that fails to allege compliance with § 768.28’s presuit notice requirement should be allowed amendment rather than dismissed with prejudice.

Datto v. Florida International University Board of Trustees · filed 2020-11-06(6)(a)

In any event, leave to amend rather than dismissal with prejudice is proper where a complaint fails to allege compliance with the notice requirement.

Section 768.28(6)(c) allows notice that omits a claimant’s birth date or social security number when it sufficiently describes the occurrence for the agency to investigate.

Howarth v. City of New Port Richey · filed 2019-08-20(6)(c)

Therefore, the lack of Mr. Howarth’s birth date or social security number is not fatal to his claim.

Section 768.28(6)’s notice requirement does not apply to a Fourth Amendment claim that asserts no state-law cause of action.

Gary v. Fort Myers Police Department · filed 2019-12-31(6)

There is no allegation in the Complaint that notice was provided, or that plaintiff complied with the statutory notice requirement under Fla. Stat. § 768.28. However, there is no reference to a state law cause of action in Count I, and a specific reference to the Fourth Amendment and an illegal search and seizure. Therefore, the motion will be denied on this basis.

Section 768.28(6) requires a tort complaint against a governmental appellee to allege that proper notice was given.

Beauregard v. City of Miami · filed 1979-05-29(6)

Save for the failure to allege proper notice to the appellee pursuant to Section 768.28(6), Florida Statutes (1977), which omission could be cured upon proper amendment, it is our view that the complaint herein states a proper cause of action sounding in negligence against the appellee.

Section 768.28(6) requires a plaintiff to plead and prove that the municipality received the required notice to recover negligence damages.

City of Miami v. Sinquefield · filed 1983-08-09(6)

The trial court erred in not directing a verdict for the defendant municipality in a negligence action seeking a recovery of damages for injuries allegedly incurred when an automobile struck a “pothole” in a street. It was never pled nor proved that the plaintiff gave the municipality the required notice under Section 768.28(6) Florida Statutes (1976).

Failure to allege compliance with Section 768.28(6)'s notice provision does not deprive the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction over a tort suit against a municipality.

City of Pembroke Pines v. Atlas · filed 1985-01-04(6)

Appellant's contention that a plaintiff must allege compliance with the notice provision of section 768.28(6), Florida Statutes (1983) in order to vest the circuit court with subject matter jurisdiction of a tort suit against a municipality is without merit. ... We hold that appellee's failure to allege compliance with the statutory notice provision did not deprive the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction because such an allegation is not an element necessary to the existence of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 768.28(6) makes compliance with its notice requirements a condition precedent to a tort action, and a general allegation of compliance is sufficient in the complaint.

Glace v. Lower Florida Keys Hospital District · filed 1985-12-24(6)

Plainly, it is a condition precedent to bringing the tort action herein that the notice requirements of Section 768.28(6), Florida Statutes (1983), have been complied with — and, accordingly, a general allegation to that effect is all that must be pled in the complaint.

A government defendant waives the section 768.28(6) notice defense if it fails to plead that the claimant did not satisfy the notice condition precedent.

Dickerson v. Escambia County Board of County Commissioners · filed 1988-11-07(6)

By failing to plead that Dickerson had not performed a condition precedent to the suit by presenting the claim to the Department of Insurance, the County waived this defense.

A claimant’s allegation of notice to the Department of Insurance and evidence of routine office practices can create a factual issue about compliance with the notice requirement.

Robinson v. Hillsborough Area Regional Transit Authority · filed 1989-06-21(6)(a)

The amended complaint and the response to request for admissions created a genuine issue of material fact of whether Robinson notified the Department of Insurance. ... HART failed to negate under oath the allegation that Robinson notified the Department of Insurance of his claim. Robinson could prove the notification by offering evidence of the routine office practices of the law offices.

Compliance with section 768.28's presuit notice condition may be pleaded by generally alleging that all statutory conditions precedent have been satisfied.

Bailey v. Florida Dept. of Corrections · filed 2007-05-23(6)(a)

Under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.120(c), it is sufficient to generally aver the performance or occurrence of the conditions precedent to suit. This rule applies to the presuit notice conditions of section 768.28.

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires presuit notice; if the notice deadline and statute of limitations have not expired, failure to give notice warrants dismissal without prejudice.

Villa Maria Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, Inc. v. South Broward Hospital District · filed 2009-04-08(6)(a)

Compliance with the notice requirement of section 768.28 was a condition precedent to this lawsuit against the hospital. ... Another appropriate response to a motion raising a plaintiffs failure to comply with the statute is to dismiss the case without prejudice, where the applicable statute of limitations has not run at the time of dismissal and it is therefore possible to give the statutory notice prior to the case being barred by the statute of limitations.

A challenge to the timeliness of notice under section 768.28(6)(a) should be raised by answer or judgment on the pleadings.

Cabral v. City of Miami Beach · filed 2011-10-26(6)(a)

Where the question is whether notice under section 768.28(6)(a) was timely given, the issue of proper notice should be raised by answer or judgment on the pleadings.

A general allegation of compliance with section 768.28(6)(a) sufficiently pleads the presuit notice condition.

Williams v. The City of Jacksonville (County of Duval) · filed 2016-05-06(6)(a)

Our review of the complaint shows that the general allegations of compliance with sections 95.11(3)(a) and 768.28(6)(a), Florida Statutes, were sufficient to allege compliance with the conditions precedent to the lawsuit.

Section 768.28 makes the state and its agencies liable for tort claims like private individuals under like circumstances, but does not eliminate longstanding venue rules for state agencies.

Game & Fresh Water Fish Com'n v. Carlile · filed 1977-01-07

However, we do not consider that the above quoted portion of the statute which modified the doctrine of sovereign immunity is sufficiently broad to eliminate the long standing venue rules pertaining to state agencies, in view of the reasons underlying those rules and in the absence of any specific statutory change.

Subsection (5) makes the state and its agencies liable for tort claims in the same manner as private individuals, allowing general venue statutes to apply.

State, Department of Transportation v. Chothen · filed 1976-03-09(5)

Our interpretation of this statute subjecting state agencies to liability in the same manner as private individuals, is that it allows the general venue statutes to apply to such cases.

Section 768.28 does not waive the state's common-law privilege to be sued in the county of its principal headquarters.

Carlile v. GAME AND FRESH WATER FISH COM'N · filed 1977-11-30

We now hold that the Legislature did not intend to waive the common law privilege of bring sued in Leon County with the enactment of Section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1975).

Section 768.28(14) limits the venue option in subsection (1) to causes of action accruing on or after October 1, 1981; earlier claims remain subject to the State's venue privilege.

Florida Dept. of Transp. v. Lopez · filed 1982-06-15(14)

Section 768.28(1), Florida Statutes (1981) provides, subject to some limitation, that an action for negligence against an agency of the state may be brought where the cause of action accrued. It is apparent that the trial court applied this section without having its attention called to Section 768.28(14). The latter section limits the application of the prior section to a cause of action which accrues on or after October 1, 1981. Actions prior to that date are subject to the State's venue privilege as set forth in Florida Public Service Commission v. Triple "A" Enterprises, Inc., 387 So.2d 940 (Fla. 1980).

Section 768.28(14) limits the venue exception in subsection (1) to causes of action accruing after October 1, 1981.

Schultz v. Brevard County · filed 1983-04-13(14)

The legislature has created such an exception in section 768.28(1), Florida Statutes (1981), which permits a claimant to sue a state agency or subdivision in the county where the cause of action accrues if the agency or subdivision maintains an office in that county for the transaction of its customary business. Unfortunately, this statute applies only to causes of action accruing after October 1, 1981. § 768.-28(14), Fla.Stat. (1981).

Section 768.28’s amendment allowing suit against a state agency in the county where the cause of action accrued applies only to causes of action accruing on or after October 1, 1981.

City of Panama City v. Florida Department of Transportation · filed 1985-10-18(14)

But this amendment, effected by Chapter 81-317, Laws of Florida, was expressly made applicable only to causes of action accruing on or after October 1, 1981. See § 768.28(14) (1981). In the present case the decedent’s death was alleged to have occurred "on or about August 13, 1981,” and the cause of action thus accrued prior to October 1.

Section 768.28 requires compliance with its venue and written notice and denial provisions; failure to comply permits dismissal without prejudice to refiling.

Faust v. City of North Port · filed 1986-10-10(1), (6)(a)

A review of the record indicates that appellants did not comply with the venue requirements of section 768.28(1) and the written notice and denial provisions of section 768.28(6)(a). We, therefore, affirm the dismissal without prejudice to appellants’ right to refile their cause of action in compliance with the requirements of section 768.28.

Section 768.28(6) requires notice even when the sheriff has liability insurance.

Jozwiak v. Leonard · filed 1986-11-13(6)

We agree with appellee that compliance with the notice requirements of section 768.28(6) is required regardless of whether the appellant is covered by liability insurance.

Section 768.28(1) allows venue in the county where the cause of action accrued if the state agency maintains an office there for its customary business.

State v. Jackson · filed 1998-08-31(1)

In an action such as this, venue is proper either in the county where the state agency maintains its headquarters, Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Commission, 354 So.2d 362 (Fla.1977); or in the county where the cause of action accrued, provided that the agency maintains “an office in [that] county for the transaction of its customary business.” § 768.28(1), Fla. Stat. (1995).

Section 768.28(1) permits an action against a state university board of trustees outside the county of its main campus when the cause of action accrued there and the university maintains a substantial presence there for its customary business.

University of Florida Board of Trustees v. Morris · filed 2007-07-27(1)

Pursuant to section 768.28(1), an action brought against UFBOT can only be brought outside Alachua County— where the university’s main campus is located — if (1) the action is brought in the county where the cause of action accrued and (2) the university maintains a “substantial presence for the transaction of its customary business” in that county.

Section 768.28(1) permits a suit against a state university board in the county where the claim accrued when the university has a substantial local presence for its customary business; substantial presence is assessed by its significance to that community.

UNIV. OF FLA. BD. OF TRUSTEES v. Morris · filed 2007-07-27(1)

The fact that the statute includes the exception at issue here establishes that other counties may be an appropriate venue, depending on the circumstances. Because no other county would compare with the presence of the university in its home county, it would seem that the plain meaning of the statute requires that we look to the significance of the university's presence in the local community in question.

Section 768.28(1) permits a tort action against a state university board of trustees in the county where the cause of action accrued if the university has a substantial presence there conducting its customary business.

University of Florida Board of Trustees v. Andrew · filed 2007-07-31(1)

If a university maintains a substantial presence in a particular county and transacts its customary business in that county, an action against that university’s board of trustees may be brought in that county under the plain language in section 768.28(1), Florida Statutes.

Section 768.28(1) permits a tort action where the cause accrued if the affected agency or subdivision has an office there for its customary business.

LEE MEMORIAL HEALTH SYSTEM, etc. v. IGNACIO MARTINEZ, etc. · filed 2022-03-23(1)

The language does not state that a tort action may unconditionally be brought where the cause of action accrued. Instead, a tort action may be brought where the cause of action accrued “if the affected agency or subdivision has an office in such county for the transaction of its customary business[.]” See § 768.28(1), Fla. Stat. (2021) (emphasis added).

Subsection 768.28(9) protects state and subdivision officers, employees, and agents from personal tort liability for acts within their employment unless they act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and wilful disregard of human rights, safety or property.

Metropolitan Dade Cty. v. Kelly · filed 1977-06-30(9)

Since appellees do not claim that Pena acted in bad faith, Pena's motion to dismiss should have been granted.

Subsection 768.28(9) shields state employees from personal tort liability unless they acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose.

Pennington v. Serig · filed 1977-11-15(9)

In the absence of any allegation or proof of bad faith or malicious purpose on their part, defendants are immune from personal liability under Section 768.28(9), Florida Statutes (1975).

Section 768.28(9) indemnifies a state employee for a monetary judgment arising from negligence within the scope of employment, but does not bar a suit against the employee.

Talmadge v. District School Bd. · filed 1978-03-01(9)

We hold that this statute acts only to indemnify an employee of the state for a monetary judgment entered against him as a result of negligent acts occurring within the scope of his employment, but does not operate as a bar against suing such an employee as a party defendant.

Section 768.28(9) indemnifies a state employee for monetary judgments arising from negligent acts within the scope of employment and does not bar suing the employee as a defendant.

Paul v. Heritage Insurance Co. of America · filed 1978-08-15(9)

Therefore, upon our determination that the holding of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, properly states the law and that the proper rule is that this statute acts only to indemnify an employee of the state having monetary judgment entered against him as a result of negligent acts occurring within the scope of his employment and does not bar a suit against the employee as a party defendant, we reverse the judgment appealed and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with the views herein expressed.

Section 768.28(9) requires allegations necessary to maintain an action against municipal employees.

Reckner v. Foremost Insurance Co. · filed 1979-10-24(9)

However, we find no error in the trial court’s dismissal of the action against the employees of the municipality because of the absence of any allegations necessary under Section 768.-28(9), Florida Statutes (1974).

Subsection (9) does not prevent state officers, employees, or agents from being sued as party defendants under § 768.28.

DISTRICT SCH. BD. OF LAKE CTY. v. Talmadge · filed 1980-02-14(9)

We construe subsection (9) not to prevent a state officer, employee, or agent from being made a party defendant in an action under section 768.28.

Under the version of section 768.28 governing this case, a public employee remained personally liable for damages exceeding the governmental entity’s liability limit.

Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Jacobs · filed 1981-08-11(9)

Under District School Board of Lake County v. Talmadge, supra, Corlazzoli remained liable for amounts which surpassed the limit of the City’s liability.

Section 768.28(9) requires the state to pay judgments against its employees directly but does not require the state to defend them.

Greer v. Mathews · filed 1982-01-28(9)

Neither Sections 111.07 nor 768.28(9) mandate the state to defend its employees. The former only gives the state discretionary authority to defend its employees, while the latter only requires the state to pay directly a judgment against its employees.

Section 768.28 does not make a city liable for a tort judgment in an action against its employees alone that does not invoke the section.

City of Miami v. March · filed 1982-02-02

The employees, instead, chose litigation choice # 3 as stated in District School Board of Lake County v. Talmadge, 381 So.2d 698, 703 (Fla.1980), to wit: a suit against the other “employee alone, without invoking section 768.28, under traditional legal principles regarding tort actions against public employees,” Id. at 703, and rejected litigation choices # 1 and # 2 under Talmadge, supra, which would have made the City a party defendant in the action under Section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1979). As the City of Miami was not and could not be a party to this action, it plainly follows that it cannot be held liable on the judgment entered in the action.

The version of section 768.28 governing personal suits against state employees is the version in effect when the cause of action accrues.

Kirkland Ex Rel. Kirkland v. State, Dept. of Hlt. Etc. · filed 1983-01-04(9)(a)

Prior to this 1980 amendment, section 768.28(9) permitted suits based on negligence. While this suit was filed after the effective date of the 1980 amendment, Kirkland's cause of action accrued on the date of the accident. The date of the accident controls and the prior version of the statute would apply.

Under the 1979 version of § 768.28(9), a government employee could be personally liable for ordinary negligence while performing ministerial duties.

City of North Bay Village v. Braelow · filed 1985-05-14(9)

The question we must decide is whether this governmental employee, Officer Ort, can be held personally liable for his negligent conduct occurring in the course of his duties under the 1979 statute. ... We conclude therefore that the trial court acted properly in conforming the judgment by limiting the city's liability to $50,000 and imposing liability on the officer for the excess.

Under the 1979 version of § 768.28(9), public employees have no personal liability on judgments for causes of action accruing from June 6, 1979, through June 30, 1980, unless they acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with willful and wanton disregard of human rights, safety, and property.

Rice v. Lee · filed 1985-07-02(9)

The elimination of the inconsistent indemnification provision renders the meaning of the statute and the intention of the legislature very clear, i.e., in causes of action accruing from June 6, 1979 to June 30, 1980, public employees have no personal liability on judgments entered against them unless they acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or with a willful and wanton disregard of human rights, safety and property.

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields public employees from personal tort liability for acts within the scope of employment unless the complaint sufficiently alleges bad faith, malicious purpose, or wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety or property.

Comuntzis v. Pinellas County School Bd. · filed 1987-06-05(9)(a)

The allegations in the third amended complaint clearly claim that the acts or omissions complained of occurred within the scope of the defendants' employment and do not sufficiently allege bad faith, malicious purpose or wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety or property. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the complaint as to the individual defendants Demps and Dagostino.

Under the 1979 version of section 768.28(9), public employees generally could not be held personally liable for negligent acts.

City of North Bay Village v. Braelow · filed 1986-11-26(9)

We agree with the court in Rice that public employees could not be held personally liable, except as qualified, for negligent acts under section 768.28(9) as it existed in 1979.

Section 768.28(9)(a) precludes joining deputies as defendants when the complaint does not allege bad faith, malicious purpose, or wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Kaisner v. Kolb · filed 1987-07-01(9)(a)

We note that, because there were no allegations of bad faith, malicious purpose or wanton and willful acts in disregard of human rights, safety or property made against deputies Kolb and Jones, they were improperly joined as defendants in this suit.

Section 768.28(6) requires notice for a tort claim against the state, while subsection (9)(a) permits a claim against individual state employees when the complaint sufficiently alleges wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Aysisayh v. Infante · filed 1988-02-10(6), (9)(a)

We affirm the dismissal order as to the defendant, State of Florida, for failure of the plaintiff to satisfy the notice requirements of Section 768.28(6). Commercial Carrier Corporation v. Indian River County, 371 So.2d 1010 (Fla.1979). However, the complaint was not dismissible as to the individual defendants inasmuch as the complaint was marginally sufficient to allege that such defendants acted “in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.”

Section 768.28(9)(a) protects state employees, including public hospital physicians, from personal liability for simple negligence committed within the scope of their public employment.

Bates v. Sahasranaman · filed 1988-03-30(9)(a)

There is no reason to interpret the provisions, which insure that the protection of the act extends to volunteer firefighters, public defenders and outside prison health care providers, as limiting the all inclusive language of the statute. Nor is there any reason to consider physicians apart from other professional state employees. The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. There are other public policy concerns which the legislature has resolved by the broad, non-exclusive language in the statute, protecting all state employees from personal liability for simple negligence occurring in the scope of their public employment.

Section 768.28(9)(a) generally protects state officers, employees, and agents from personal tort liability for acts within the scope of their employment unless they act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of specified rights or safety.

Hutchinson v. Miller · filed 1989-09-14(9)(a)

However, the individual defendants are protected from suit because of section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), which provides in pertinent part: ... Nothing in the record reveals bad faith, malicious purpose or willful disregard of the deceased's rights, so the individual officers are exempt from suit.

Section 768.28(9)(a) grants immunity from personal liability for acts or omissions within a legislative function unless the officer acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

PCB PARTNERSHIP v. City of Largo · filed 1989-09-27(9)(a)

In addition, they are immune from personal liability for acts or omissions within the scope of their legislative function, unless they acted "in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property." § 768.28(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (1987).

Section 768.28(9)(a) does not automatically immunize a state employee from all tort liability or suit merely because of state employment.

Knauf v. McBride · filed 1990-07-19(9)(a)

Just because appellant is an employee of the State of Florida does not mean he is as a matter of law immune from all liability or suit.

Subsection 9(a) permits municipal employees to sue coemployees for tort injuries when the coemployee acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Tracey v. Ludwig · filed 1992-09-09(9)(a)

Section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1984), controls causes of action by employees of a municipality against coem-ployees. ... We cannot agree with the trial court that the third amended complaint did not allege the “bad faith or ... malicious purpose or ... wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property” requisite for a cause of action under that section.

Section 768.28(9)(a) bars individual tort liability for state employees acting within the scope of their employment unless they act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard.

Spradley v. Martin · filed 1995-08-21(9)(a)

Plaintiff also is precluded from recovery under Section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), against Defendants in their individual capacities because he does not allege that Defendants acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in a wanton or willful manner.

Section 768.28(9) does not eliminate individual tort liability for public employees who act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Resha v. Tucker · filed 1996-01-18(9)

In Talmadge, we did recognize that a government employee who acts in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property is subject to an individual cause of action governed by traditional, preexisting legal principles for tort actions against public employees. Id. at 702-03.[1] ... This statement remains true despite subsequent amendments to section 768.28(9), Florida Statutes (1995).

Section 768.28(9)(a) allows a personal liability claim against a deputy sheriff to proceed when the complaint sufficiently alleges conduct meeting its threshold.

Lemay v. Kondrk · filed 2003-12-05(9)(a)

On review, we conclude that the complaint contains sufficient allegations to state a claim that meets the threshold for personal liability set forth in section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes (1998).

Section 768.28(9)(a) permits personal liability for an employee's acts within the scope of employment when they are committed in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Ondrey v. Patterson · filed 2004-02-27(9)(a)

We cannot agree with the dissent's position because under section 768.28(9)(a), an employee is liable for acts or omissions that are committed within the scope of employment but are committed in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Section 768.28(9)(a) permits correctional officers to be sued in their individual capacities when the complaint states a claim for personal liability.

Hall v. Knight · filed 2008-07-17(9)(a)

We agree with Appellant that the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint for the failure to state a cause of action against Appellees in their individual capacity. See Hall v. Officer Knipp, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 982 So.2d 1196, 1196 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (reversing the dismissal order as to the correctional officer because the appellant's allegation was sufficient to state a cause of action against the officer in his individual capacity); Medberry v. McCallister, 937 So.2d 808, 814 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (reversing the dismissal order because the appellant's pleadings tracked all of the pertinent language in section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes, allowing the appellees, two correctional officers, to be sued and held personally liable).

Section 768.28(9) permits personal liability for government employees who act in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

MS Ex Rel. Soltys v. SEMINOLE COUNTY SCHOOL BD. · filed 2009-07-10(9)

Summary judgment, however, is inappropriate because the allegations against Garrett clearly fall within the exception of § 768.28(9), which provides for personal liability for employees acting in "bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property." § 768.28(9), Fla. Stat.

Section 768.28(9) permits personal liability for a government employee who acts in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

M.S. ex rel. Soltys v. Seminole County School Board · filed 2009-07-10(9)

Summary judgment, however, is inappropriate because the allegations against Garrett clearly fall within the exception of § 768.28(9), which provides for personal liability for employees acting in “bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.”

Section 768.28 bars a mere negligence action against individual county jail employees.

James v. Goryl · filed 2011-06-10

However, this claim had to be dismissed because a mere negligence action may not be maintained against the individual employees of the Lake County jail.

Section 768.28(9)(a) permits a tort claim against state employees individually when the complaint sufficiently alleges conduct outside the scope of employment or conduct that falls within the statute’s exception to immunity.

Allen v. Frazier · filed 2014-02-07(9)(a)

The allegations describing the manner in which appellees conducted the search of appellant’s cell as being “outside the scope of their employment,” the wanton destruction of appellant’s property, and the desecration of his religious items are sufficient at this stage of the proceedings to fall within the exception to immunity provided in section 768.28(9)(a).

Section 768.28(9)(a) shields an officer acting within the scope of employment from personal liability for a state tort claim unless the officer acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.

Thomas v. Beebe · filed 2024-08-08(9)(a)

Defendant acted within the scope of his employment when he entered Plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff alleges no facts to support a finding of bad faith, malicious purpose, or a wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property. For this reason, sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff’s state law trespass claim, and it must be DISMISSED.

Section 768.28(9) permits an action against a public employee for negligence within the scope of employment.

Donner v. Hetherington · filed 1979-05-15(9)

In Paul v. Heritage Ins. Co. of America, *1227 363 So.2d 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), following Talmadge v. District School Board of Lake County, 355 So.2d 502 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), we interpreted Sec. 768.28(9), Florida Statutes (1977) to permit the maintenance of an action against a public employee "as a result of negligent acts occurring within the scope of his employment." 363 So.2d, at 564. It is clear that McCardel did not conclusively demonstrate that she was not guilty of simple negligence and that she was, under this holding, therefore not responsible for the allegedly improper treatment accorded the plaintiff.[2] The summary judgment therefore cannot be permitted to stand.

Section 768.28 waives sovereign immunity in tort actions to the extent of liability coverage, and its applicability to a fraud claim depends on when the fraud was or should have been discovered.

STATE EX REL., DIV. OF ADMIN. v. Oliff · filed 1977-09-13

While sovereign immunity in tort actions has been waived by Section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1975), to the extent of liability coverage, the Department contends such was not the law in April, 1974. ... This cause of action, sounding as it does in fraud,[1] accrues when the fraud or deceit was or should have been discovered. ... The question of discovery is a factual one, not appropriately passed upon at the pleadings stage. The trial judge correctly denied the motion to dismiss as to the first count.

Section 768.28(6)'s notice requirement does not delay accrual of a tort claim against the state; the claim accrues when injury and damage occur.

Department of Transp. v. Soldovere · filed 1988-01-28(6)

Nothing in subsection 768.28(6) suggests that the cause of action accrues only after the notice of claim is filed and is then denied by the appropriate agency. ... This is merely a procedural requirement and does not abrogate the general rule that a cause of action accrues when the injury occurs and the damage is sustained.

Section 768.28(1) governs when a negligence cause of action against a state agency accrues and where the action may be brought.

Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Shatto · filed 1989-02-09(1)

As applied to Shatto’s negligence action against the department, Soldovere II represents a substantial change in the interpretation of section 768.28, which, if there had *939been no prior decision from this court relating to the venue issue, would require, upon the department’s timely motion, that the action be transferred from Duval County to Leon County.

Subsection (5) limits claims arising from one incident to $100,000 when multiple persons are entitled to recover.

DEPT. OF HEALTH & REHAB. SERV. v. McDougall · filed 1978-05-25(5)

Subsection (5) of § 768.28 restricts the state's monetary liability by the following statement: ... Under these circumstances, this is not the claim of or judgment for one person. Therefore, payment of the judgment is limited by only the $100,000 ceiling stated in the above-quoted statute.

Section 768.28 limited the City of Jacksonville’s liability for the injury to $50,000 under the 1979 statute.

City of Jacksonville v. Raulerson · filed 1982-06-08

Sean's mother and next friend also appeals in Sean's behalf from the circuit court's remission of the judgment to $50,000, the statutory limit of Jacksonville's liability. Sec. 768.28, Fla. Stat. (1979). ... The appellee cross appeals challenging the trial court's limitation of damages to $50,000.00. We reject this attack by reference to Cauley v. City of Jacksonville, 403 So.2d 379 (Fla. 1981).

Section 768.28(5)'s monetary limits on a city's liability apply to a common-law negligence claim against the city.

City of Miami v. Harris · filed 1986-06-03(5)

Because, again as we noted in our initial opinion, see p. 71 n. 3, the common-law negligence count will not support an award of attorneys' fees and the monetary limits of the City's liability set forth in the waiver of sovereign immunity statute clearly apply to the common-law negligence count, the elimination of the Section 1983 count, unlike the elimination of the common-law negligence count, will severely and adversely affect the plaintiffs.

Section 768.28(5)'s $100,000 individual liability limit applies when the cause of action accrued after the October 1, 1981 increase.

Department of Transp. v. Soldovere · filed 1986-12-03(5)

As stated earlier in this opinion, the accrual date of Soldovere's cause of action is critical because the legislature modified section 768.28(5), Florida Statutes (1981), on October 1, 1981, increasing DOT's exposure to an individual from $50,000 to $100,000. ... Consequently, we affirm the trial court's final order finding DOT liable for Soldovere's injuries up to the sum of $100,000 since we are bound by the law of the case doctrine to find that Soldovere's cause of action accrued after October 1, 1981.

Section 768.28(8) limits attorney fees recoverable against a governmental hospital to 25 percent of the judgment.

North Broward Hospital District v. Johnson ex rel. Johnson · filed 1988-12-14(8)

That statute is applicable to this award of attorneys’ fees vis-a-vis the hospital, as a governmental agency, and thus the judgment should properly mention the limitation on the fee recovery as against the hospital to twenty-five percent of the judgment.

Section 768.28(5) limits a state agency or subdivision's liability for tort claims to $100,000 per person and $200,000 for claims arising from one incident.

Evanston Ins. Co. v. City of Homestead · filed 1990-06-12(5)

The City, pursuant to Art. X, Section 13 Florida Constitution (1968), Sections 768.28(5) and 286.28(2), Florida Statutes (1985),[5] has not waived sovereign immunity which would otherwise preclude the City from being legally obligated to pay anything. In the instant case, the City's waiver of immunity can be to the extent of, and only to the extent of, any insurance it has purchased.

Section 768.28(8) does not preclude an attorney’s fee for a successful defense of a medical malpractice action.

DeRosa v. Shands Teaching Hospital & Clinics, Inc. · filed 1989-08-10(8)

However, we conclude that section 768.28(8), as an aspect of the state’s sovereign immunity waiver, does not preclude an attorney’s fee for appellee’s successful defense of this medical malpractice action.

Section 768.28(5) limits a county’s total payment in a tort action to $200,000, including attorney’s fees; any excess is recoverable only through legislative action.

PINELLAS BD. OF COM'RS v. Bettis · filed 1995-09-08(5)

Section 768.28(5) limits the County's liability in a tort action to $200,000.00. This is the total amount payable by the County, and any excess amount is recoverable only by action of the legislature.

Section 768.28(5) caps a county’s total payment in a tort action, including attorney’s fees, at $200,000; collecting an award above that amount requires legislative action.

Pinellas County ex rel. Board of County Commissioners · filed 1995-09-08(5)

Section 768.28(5) limits the County’s liability in a tort action to $200,000.00. This is the total amount payable by the County, and any excess amount is recoverable only by action of the legislature. ... To the extent the trial court’s order awarding attorney’s fees requires the County to make payment beyond the limits of its liability, that was error.

Section 768.28(5) waives a sheriff’s sovereign immunity for tort claims up to $100,000.

Hattaway v. McMillian · filed 1994-06-17(5)

By statute, the sovereign immunity of an entity such as the Sheriff is waived for tort claims up to $100,000.

Section 768.28 does not apply to sheriffs or their deputies because it cannot waive sovereign immunity they never had.

Harris v. Stack · filed 1978-12-20

Section 768.28 does not apply to or cover the office of sheriff or his deputies.

Under the original section 768.28, sheriffs are covered as county officials and are subject to its provisions for negligent or wrongful acts of their deputies.

Beard v. Hambrick · filed 1981-03-05(2)

Concerning the applicability of section 768.28 to sheriffs, we find that a sheriff is a "county official," and, as such, is an integral part of the "county" as a "political subdivision" and that section 768.28 is applicable to sheriffs as a separate entity or agency of a political subdivision. In our opinion, a sheriff and his deputies were intended by the legislature to be covered under the provisions of section 768.28.

Section 768.28(6)(a) requires notice to the appropriate entity before bringing a tort claim against a sheriff’s office.

Pirez v. Brescher · filed 1990-09-05(6)(a)

The purpose of the statute is to insure that proper notice is given to the appropriate entity. In Broward County, the sheriff is an elected constitutional officer who retains his own counsel. In our judgment, it is the sheriff’s department that should have been given notice.

Section 768.28(9) treats a state or subdivision employee called as a witness in a tort action arising from the employee’s actions as an adverse witness, without a showing that the employee is unwilling or hostile.

Rotte v. City of Jacksonville · filed 1989-05-16(9)

Section 768.28(9), Florida Statutes (1981), read in pari materia with section 90.608(2) and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.450(a), indicates that the legislature intended that when an employee of the state or its subdivision is called as a witness in a tort action which resulted from his actions, he must be considered an adverse witness, and there is therefore no need to establish that he is “unwilling or hostile” under rule 1.450(a) before he may be interrogated by leading questions under that rule or impeached under section 90.608(2).

Section 768.28(16)(b) exempts governmental risk management claims files from public disclosure while a related legislative claim bill remains pending.

Wagner v. Orange County · filed 2007-06-15(16)(b)

It is evident from this background that a legislative claim bill is truly a claim for relief and as such is included in the phrase "settlement of all claims arising out of the same incident." The absence of the term "bill" after the word "claims" does not remove claim bill proceedings from the ambit of the exemption from disclosure.

Section 768.28(16)(b) makes records in a governmental risk management claims file confidential and exempt from disclosure until the related claims are resolved.

City of Homestead v. McDonough · filed 2017-11-01(16)(b)

This statute clearly indicates that all of the email correspondence documents at issue contained in the City’s risk management claims file, including Records 3 and 4, are confidential and exempt from disclosure until such time as the issues or claims related to McDonough’s Notice of Intent have been resolved.

A denial of summary judgment on an employee’s claim of immunity under section 768.28(9)(a) does not warrant immediate certiorari review when the case involves ordinary negligence and no discretionary public function.

Keck v. Eminisor · filed 2010-10-25(9)(a)

Because this case involves only ordinary negligence and does not implicate other policy concerns or the discretionary functions of public officials as in Tucker, this court will not now undertake immediate interlocutory review by certiorari.

A petition for certiorari challenging a nonfinal order denying immunity under § 768.28 is dismissed.

TBE Group, Inc. v. Banerjee · filed 2011-08-17

We have previously dismissed petitions for writ of certiorari challenging nonfinal orders that denied claims of sovereign immunity, pursuant to section 768.28, Florida Statutes. ... Accordingly, the instant petition likewise is hereby dismissed.

An order denying summary judgment on a claim of individual immunity under section 768.28(9)(a) is subject to interlocutory review when the issue turns on a question of law.

Keck v. Eminisor · filed 2012-11-15(9)(a)

For the above reasons, we answer the rephrased question in the negative and hold that an order denying summary judgment based on a claim of individual immunity under section 768.28(9)(a) is subject to interlocutory review where the issue turns on a question of law.

Section 768.28(14)’s four-year limitation period applies to negligence claims against governmental entities, including claims by prisoners concerning their confinement.

Calhoun v. Nienhuis · filed 2013-02-22(14)

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s summary judgment because Calhoun’s action was timely filed within section 768.28(14)’s four-year limitation period.

Section 768.28 waives sovereign immunity for wrongful death actions against the state and its agencies or subdivisions and provides a four-year limitations period.

Dubose v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co. · filed 1980-08-15(11)

Section 768.28, Fla.Stat., provides the waiver of sovereign immunity which allows appellant to bring suit against the School Board of Alachua County. The unambiguous language of that statute allows wrongful death actions to be brought against the state and its agencies or subdivisions subject to the limitations specified therein. See § 768.28(1). Section 768.28(11) establishes a four-year statute of limitations for *462such actions.

Section 768.28(12) gives four years to sue a governmental agency; for a contractual subrogation claim, the period begins on the date of injury rather than the date of payment.

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County · filed 1983-08-02(12)

Under section 768.28(12), Florida Statutes (1975), an action against a governmental agency must be brought within four years of the date the statute of limitations begins to run. ... For the above stated reasons, we hold that in contractual subrogation, the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the injury occurs and not on the date the subrogee makes its payment to the subrogor.

Section 768.28 provides a four-year limitations period for an action against a public hospital.

Whack v. SEMINOLE MEMORIAL HOSP. · filed 1984-09-27

Appellant raises for the first time on appeal that Seminole Hospital is a public hospital and therefore pursuant to Section 768.28, Florida Statutes, a four year statute of limitations should apply. Since appellee Seminole Hospital twice averred in its pleadings that it was a public entity the four year statute of limitations would apply. The summary judgment in favor of Seminole Hospital is reversed and remanded.

Section 768.28(11)’s four-year limitations period does not apply to claims against individual state officers, employees, or agents.

Cliffin v. State, Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services · filed 1984-10-11(11)

Subsection 11 of Section 768.28, which provides for the four-year statute of limitations, does not by its terms refer to an officer, employee, or agent of the State, and cannot be extended to include those individuals.

Section 768.28(11) provides a four-year limitations period for claims against a hospital that is a state agency.

Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. S.L.R. ex rel. Moore · filed 1984-10-11(11)

The applicable statute of limitations for a hospital which is a state agency is four years.

Section 768.28(11) sets the limitations period for an action against a public hospital; an action may proceed while that period remains open.

PUBLIC H. TRUST OF DADE CTY. v. Knuck · filed 1986-10-07(11)

For these reasons, we grant the writ and prohibit revival of the action against the University of Miami and Dr. Scheinberg; however, because the applicable statute of limitations, § 768.28(11), Fla. Stat. (1985), has not expired, see Whitney v. Marion County Hospital District, 416 So.2d 500 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), we deny the writ as to Jackson Memorial Hospital.

Section 768.28(11) supplies the limitations period for an action against a public hospital; an action may proceed while that period remains open.

Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Knuck · filed 1986-10-07(11)

For these reasons, we grant the writ and prohibit revival of the action against the University of Miami and Dr. Scheinberg; however, because the applicable statute of limitations, § 768.28(11), Fla.Stat. (1985), has not expired, see Whitney v. Marion County Hospital District, 416 So.2d 500 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), we deny the writ as to Jackson Memorial Hospital.

Section 768.28(11) provides a four-year filing period without a period of repose for negligence actions against a state agency.

Lewis v. North Broward Hospital District · filed 1991-02-20(11)

Several cases involving medical malpractice actions against a state agency have held that the appropriate statute of limitations is the four-year statute contained in section 768.28 Florida Statutes, and not the two-year statute found in section 95.11(4)(b) Florida Statutes. ... While those cases did not involve the statute of repose, it would be illogical and inconsistent with the rationale of the holding in those cases to suggest that while the statute of limitations contained in section 95.11(4)(b) Florida Statutes did not apply, the statute of repose contained therein would. ... We conclude that it was error for the trial court to hold appellants’ claim against appellee barred by the four-year statute of repose in section 95.11(4)(b) Florida Statues.

Section 768.28(11) provides a four-year limitations period without a period of repose for negligence actions against state agencies.

Menendez v. PUBLIC HEALTH TRUST OF DADE CTY. · filed 1990-07-24(11)

Section 768.28(11), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980), which provides a four-year limitation without a period of repose for the filing of a negligence action against a state agency, is the appropriate statute of limitations in negligence actions against Jackson, see Jaar; Whitney v. Marion County Hosp. Dist., 416 So.2d 500 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), a state agency.

Section 768.28(11) allows its statute of limitations to be tolled when fraudulent concealment hides facts needed to discover the negligent act or resulting injury.

Vargas v. Glades General Hosp. · filed 1990-07-25(11)

For these reasons, we hold that the statute of limitations contained in section 768.28(11), Florida Statutes, may be tolled by fraudulent concealment of the facts necessary to put the injured party on notice of the negligent act or the resulting injury.

Section 768.28(11) bars tort claims four years after accrual, with accrual generally presenting a factual question about discovery or the duty to discover.

Twigg v. Hospital Dist. of Hardee County, Fla. · filed 1990-02-21(11)

The Court is dealing with a statute of limitations as to § 768.28(11). ... The question of date of discovery, or duty to discover, is a factual one not amenable to resolution on motion to dismiss. ... The court cannot find, at this time, that the claims of Counts I, II, and III are barred by the operation of § 768.28(11).

Section 768.28(11) provides a limitation period for claims against the state but no statute of repose.

Public Health Trust v. Menendez · filed 1991-08-15(11)

The fact that section 768.28(11) provides a statute of limitation but not a statute of repose thus means that no repose period was intended.

Section 768.28(12), now (13), gives maritime tort claims against a Florida state agency a four-year limitations period under the state's waiver of sovereign immunity.

Horn v. State, Department of Transportation · filed 1996-01-04(12)

In the absence of such language, we conclude that the 4-year limitations provision found in section 768.28(12) should control here because Florida intended that it apply generally to tort actions permitted by its limited waiver of sovereign immunity.

Filing an initial complaint tolls the limitations period in section 768.28(12), even when the amended complaint is filed after that period runs.

Platt Ex Rel. Platt v. Dept. of Health & Rehab. · filed 1995-08-28(12)

Moreover, given our conclusion that it was error to dismiss the initial complaints for noncompliance with rule 1.070(i), running of the section 768.28(12) limitation period was tolled upon the filing of those initial complaints, rather than upon the filing of the amended complaints.

Section 768.28(12) gives a claimant four years to sue the state, and allegations supporting tolling can prevent dismissal on limitations grounds.

Sap v. State, Dhrs · filed 1997-09-03(12)

This section provides, with certain exceptions not applicable here, that a claim against the state must be brought within four years after such claim accrues. S.A.P. argues, and we agree, that because her complaint sufficiently alleges factual bases for tolling the statute, it cannot be said that the defense of the statute of limitations affirmatively appears on the face of the complaint.

Section 768.28(12) generally requires claims against the state to be brought within four years after accrual, but sufficiently alleged tolling can prevent dismissal on limitations grounds.

S.A.P. v. State, Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services · filed 1997-09-03(12)

S.A.P. appeals a final order which dismissed with prejudice her second amended complaint against appellee, State of Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), based upon the application of the statute of limitations, section 768.28(12), Florida Statutes (1993). This section provides, with certain exceptions not applicable here, that a claim against the state must be brought within four years after such claim accrues. S.A.P. argues, and we agree, that because her complaint sufficiently alleges factual bases for tolling the statute, it cannot be said that the defense of the statute of limitations affirmatively appears on the face of the complaint.

Section 768.28 applies a four-year filing limit to this tort suit against a public college.

Dicus v. District Board of Trustees for Valencia · filed 1999-06-04

Both dates are past the four-year time limit for filing this lawsuit.

Equitable estoppel can bar a state agency from asserting section 768.28(13)'s four-year limitations period when its misconduct caused the late filing.

Dhrs v. Sap · filed 2002-11-27(13)

If we, as we must, take the factual allegations in S.A.P.'s second amended complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences therefrom in her favor, we conclude that the doctrine of equitable estoppel bars HRS from asserting that the complaint was untimely filed. Section 768.28(13) is a conventional statute of limitations, nothing more; it is not a statute of repose that forecloses all forms of equitable relief.

Section 768.28(13)’s limitations period is subject to equitable estoppel when the state’s misconduct causes a claimant’s late filing.

Florida Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. S.A.P. · filed 2002-11-27(13)

If we, as we must, take the factual allegations in S.A.P.’s second amended complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences therefrom in her favor, we conclude that the doctrine of equitable estop-pel bars HRS from asserting that the complaint was untimely filed. Section 768.28(13) is a conventional statute of limitations, nothing more; it is not a statute of repose that forecloses all forms of equitable relief.

Section 768.28(14) provides a four-year limitations period for tort claims alleging physical injury caused by the negligent or wrongful acts of government employees.

Green v. Cottrell · filed 2016-11-10(14)

Based upon the foregoing, we hold that where, as here, a prisoner files an action alleging that he suffered physical injury due to the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of the employees of a government entity, the one-year statute of limitations period in section 95.11(5)(g)—a provision enacted as part of a chapter law that was intended to curb frivolous filings by prisoners—does not apply. Instead, the four-year statute of limitations in section 768.28(14) governs.

Section 768.28(14) provides a four-year limitations period when a prisoner alleges physical injury caused by a government employee’s negligent or wrongful act or omission.

Jerry Layne Rogers, Sr. v. Julie L. Jones, Secretary, etc. · filed 2017-10-05(14)

However, the Florida Supreme Court quashed our decision in Green, determining that the four-year statute of limitations under section 768.28(14), Florida Statutes (2011), governs actions where a prisoner alleges “physical injury due to the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of the employees of a government entity.” Green v. Cottrell, 204 So. 3d 22, 29 (Fla. 2016). As such, Appellant’s negligence claim should not have been dismissed under section 95.11(5)(g).

Section 768.28(14) supplies the four-year limitations period the court applied to a Florida § 1983 claim.

Joseph v. State Mutual Life Insurance Co. of America · filed 2006-08-04(14)

Joseph filed his complaint in Florida, where the alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment rights occurred and where the statute of limitations in personal injury actions is four years. Fla. Stat. § 768.28(14); see Baker v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 850 F.2d 1480, 1481-83 (11th Cir. 1988).

Subsections (9)(b) and (10)(f), which extend immunity to qualifying universities and their medical providers at teaching hospitals, do not violate the cited provisions of the Florida Constitution.

Bean v. University of Miami · filed 2018-08-01(9)(b), (10)(f)

The legislature’s 2011 amendments to section 768.28, contained in subsections (9)(b) and (10)(f), did not violate the sovereign immunity, equal protection, due process, access to courts, jury trial, and private debt provisions of the Florida Constitution.

Section 768.28(7) requires service of process on the Department of Insurance but sets no deadline for serving it, and service is not a precondition to maintaining the tort action.

Cole v. Department of Corrections · filed 2003-03-19(7)

Lemonik and Rubin clearly state that there is no limitation period in which to serve process upon the Department of Insurance, and that service of process upon the Department of Insurance, a non-party, although statutorily mandated, is not a precondition to the maintenance of a tort action against a governmental body.