Fla. Stat. § 57.105

Section 57.105 may support an attorney’s fee award in federal court when plaintiffs continue to pursue state-law claims after removal, even if their amended complaint also cites federal law.

Armstrong v. Colonial Bank, N.A. · filed 2008-10-06

The Armstrongs argue that § 57.105 does not apply in this case because rule of decision the district court applied in deciding the case was a federal law, the National Bank Act. We might be persuaded if the Armstrongs had brought this case under the National Bank Act in the district court, but they did not. They sued the bank under state law, and after the bank removed the case to district court, they continued to rely on state law when they amended their complaint. True, the amended complaint also cited the National Bank Act as a basis for recovery, but stuck with their state law allegations to the bitter end.

Section 57.105 does not warrant fees merely because a parent seeks to set aside a custody agreement before final judgment on the ground that the court must independently determine the children’s best interests.

Puglisi v. Puglisi · filed 2014-04-17(1)

Although section 57.105 fees have been awarded where there has been an unjustified refusal to honor the terms of a marital settlement agreement, see Koch v. Koch, 47 So.3d 320 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), we cannot conclude that former husband’s attempt to set aside the custody agreement prior to issuance of the final judgment, on the basis that the trial court had an independent obligation to determine the children’s “best interests” and repudiate the “preliminary” agreement to the extent it was inconsistent with this standard, warrants such an award.

Section 57.105 does not authorize attorney’s fees in original workers’ compensation proceedings under chapter 440.

PHILLIP S. LANE v. Workforce Business Services, Inc. etc., etal · filed 2014-11-11

Because we find that section 57.105 is not applicable to original proceedings in workers’ compensation claims brought under chapter 440, we affirm the denial of attorney’s fees.

Fee awards under section 57.105(1) and (7) depend on prevailing-party status; reversing the dismissal that supplied that status requires reversal of the awards.

H & R Block Bank v. Perry · filed 2016-09-09(1), (7)

Our reversal of the order of dismissal requires that we also reverse the order granting Ms. Perry’s motion for sanctions under section 57.105(1) and motion for attorney’s fees and costs under section 57.105(7). Each of those statutes provides an entitlement to fees for a party that prevails on some aspect of the litigation. ... Because that order is to be reversed, she cannot yet be a prevailing party for purposes of these statutes.

Section 57.105 does not apply to a federal-law action that does not invoke diversity jurisdiction.

Zinman v. L.A. Fitness International LLC · filed 2021-06-21

However, because this action arises under federal law and does not invoke the Court’s diversity jurisdiction, Section 57.105 does not apply.

Section 57.105(8) permits attorney’s fees in a protective injunction proceeding only upon clear and convincing evidence that a party knowingly made a false statement or allegation about a material matter.

CADAVID v. SAPORTA · filed 2022-08-03(8)

In the instant case, the award of attorney’s fees was not permitted under the plain language of the statute because the record did not contain “clear and convincing evidence” that the former girlfriend knowingly made a false statement or allegation in her petition with regard to a material matter.

Section 57.105’s reciprocal attorney’s fee provision applies to contracts entered into on or after October 1, 1988.

Complete Interiors, Inc. v. Behan · filed 1990-01-04(2)

We note parenthetically that the Legislature has amended section 57.105 to provide that if a party prevails in an action based on a contract which contains a provision entitling the other party to collect attorney's fees, the prevailing party may be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees. [5] This law took effect October 1, 1988, and applies to all contracts entered into on or after that date. Here, the contract containing the one-sided attorney's fees provision was entered into by the parties in 1983 and thus the statute is inapplicable.

Section 57.105 creates a substantive right to attorney’s fees and does not apply retroactively to an action commenced before its effective date.

Love v. Jacobson · filed 1980-11-25

We reverse because Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978) did not become effective until approximately a year and a half after the commencement of the action and is not retroactive.

Section 57.105 does not apply retroactively to a complaint filed before its effective date.

Porteous v. Fowler · filed 1981-02-04

In each instance the award was based upon Section 57.105 Florida Statutes. The amended complaint was filed in January, 1978, five months prior to the effective date of that statute. We determine that the statute has no retroactive effect, for the reasons expressed in Tuggle v. Government Employees Insurance Company, 220 So.2d 355 (Fla.1969) which involved attorneys’ fees for services rendered in appellate proceedings. That rationale is equally applicable here.

Section 57.105 did not apply to an action commenced before the statute’s effective date.

Guthartz v. Lewis · filed 1981-12-08

First, even if, arguendo, we treat the plaintiffs' supplemental complaint as the commencement of the action, that pleading was filed five months prior to the effective date of Section 57.105, rendering the statute inapplicable to this action.

Section 57.105(2) does not make a mortgage’s attorney’s fee provision reciprocal when the note predates the subsection’s effective date.

Clearman v. Dalton · filed 1998-03-27(2)

Because the mortgage note predated the effective date of section 57.105(2), Florida Statutes, the statute did not operate to make the attorney's fee provision in the mortgage reciprocal.

For conduct before the October 1, 1999 revision, section 57.105 required a finding that the lawsuit was frivolous from its inception before sanctions could be imposed.

Rosenberg v. Morales · filed 2002-02-06

The effective date of the revision to section 57.105 is October 1, 1999. Thus, any sanctions would have to be assessed under the old statute, which required a finding that the lawsuit was frivolous "from its inception."

Section 57.105(5) applies to a pre-1988 declaration when a property purchase after its effective date creates a novation between the owner and association.

HOLIDAY SQUARE OWNERS ASS'N INC. v. Tsetsenis · filed 2002-07-12(5)

Thus their purchase in 1994 constituted a novation of the declaration between the Tsetsenises and the Association, and entitled the Association to the reciprocity benefits of section 57.105(5).

Section 57.105(4)'s safe harbor is a substantive change and does not apply retroactively.

Walker v. CASH REGISTER AUTO INS. · filed 2006-12-22(4)

Because we conclude that the safe harbor provision of subsection (4) is a substantive change, we hold that it does not have retroactive application and, therefore, could not be applied to the instant case.

The 2002 amendment to section 57.105(4), which provides a 21-day opportunity to withdraw or correct a challenged filing, affects substantive rights and does not apply retroactively.

Hampton v. Cale of Fort Myers, Inc. · filed 2007-09-19(4)

As in Smith, the amendment in this case has procedural aspects, but affects substantive rights, and cannot be retroactive.

Section 57.105(4)'s safe harbor applies to a fee motion filed after July 1, 2002, even if the lawsuit began earlier.

Kenniasty v. Bionetics Corporation · filed 2009-06-10(4)

Although Deitz and Moore filed suit prior to the effective date of section 57.105(4), this safe harbor provision applied because Bionetics filed its motion for attorney’s fees on March 28, 2003, well after its July 1, 2002, effective date.

Section 57.105(4)’s safe harbor does not apply when the claims found frivolous were originally filed before the provision took effect, even if the fee motion was filed afterward.

Bionetics Corp. v. Kenniasty · filed 2011-02-10(4)

We conclude that the safe harbor provision does not apply to a case where claims found to be frivolous by a trial court were originally filed before the safe harbor provision took effect.

Section 57.105 allows attorney’s fees for a frivolous liability issue but requires fees to be limited to that issue when damages present a justiciable issue.

Hernandez v. Leiva · filed 1980-12-09

Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, supra, only authorizes attorney's fees on the finding of a complete absence of a justiciable issue. Here, there was a justiciable issue with respect to damages. The order awarding the fee made no allocation between the issues of liability and damages. Consequently, we reverse and remand the order awarding attorney's fees with directions that only reasonable fees with respect to the issue of liability be awarded.

A party seeking fees under section 57.105 waives joint assessment against the losing party and counsel by requesting fees against the party alone.

Kerzner v. Lerman · filed 2003-07-23(1)

Although the statute provides that fees and costs awarded thereunder will be awarded against the party and the attorney, such a request was not made in this case. The wording of Lerman’s motion, and her arguments before the trial court, specifically sought fees against the party, only. Nor does Lerman argue before this court that the order is improper. For that reason, we hold that Lerman waived her ability to seek fees jointly assessed against the party and counsel as contemplated by section 57.105, Florida Statutes.

Section 57.105 requires a claim for fees under the statute in a fee application or motion before fees may be awarded.

Guthartz v. Lewis · filed 1981-12-08

Second, none of the several applications and motions for attorneys’ fees filed by the plaintiffs’ attorneys during the course of this protracted litigation contained a claim for attorneys’ fees under Section 57.105, a necessary predicate for any award under the statute.

A Section 57.105 attorney's fee award is set aside when the judgment supporting it is reversed.

Fieldstone v. Chung · filed 1982-06-08

After depositions disclosed that, among other things, the Chungs may have had a greater income than reported on some of their loan applications, the trial court entered a final summary judgment for the Chungs, returning to them the $11,000.00 deposit and awarded them $5,444.00 as attorney's fees pursuant to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1978). ... As to the attorney's fees, the final summary judgment being reversed, this award will likewise be set aside.

Section 57.105 requires a reasonable attorney’s fee when the losing party raised no justiciable issue; the award depends on the value of the services, even if the prevailing party paid nothing for counsel.

Wright v. Acierno · filed 1983-09-15

We agree that the use of the word "shall" in the statute evidences the legislative intention to impose a mandatory penalty in the form of a reasonable attorney's fee once the determination has been made that there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue raised by the losing party. If we are to implement the legislative intent to discourage baseless claims, stonewall defenses and sham appeals in civil litigation by placing a price tag through attorney's fees awards on losing parties who engage in these activities, Whitten, supra, the award must be based only on the reasonable value of the services, not on whether or how much the prevailing party has actually paid, or why, in fact, no fee was paid.

Section 57.105 does not support an attorney fee award when the record does not establish entitlement.

Michigan National Bank of Detroit v. Maierhoffer · filed 1979-11-13

The cross-appellant’s alternate contention that he was entitled to an attorneys fee under Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (Supp.1978) is not tenable on this record.

Section 57.105 does not permit an attorney’s fee award solely because a claim lacks enough evidence to survive a directed verdict, even when counsel was warned of that likelihood.

A.M. Shandloff, Inc. v. Richter · filed 1984-01-24

We are unable to say, however, that the entire claim was frivolous so as to justify the order entered below awarding attorney’s fees under Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1981). Although the plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient to survive a defense motion for directed verdict and the trial court warned counsel of this probability at the outset of the trial, this showing, without more, was insufficient to establish, as urged, a basis for the award of attorney’s fees herein under the above statute.

Section 57.105 permits a trial court to determine from the record alone whether a matter is frivolous, without taking evidence.

O'BRIEN v. Brickell Townhouse, Inc. · filed 1984-10-16

There is no requirement that a trial court must take evidence to determine whether a matter is frivolous, it may do it on the record alone.

Section 57.105 does not entitle a party to recover fees for additional counsel who does nothing of substance.

Salfi v. Ising · filed 1985-03-07

To hire, or have present, another lawyer who does nothing of substance does not entitle one to a fee from the opponent under section 57.105.

An erroneous award of attorney’s fees under section 57.105 is subject to reversal.

Buyers Broker Realty of Marco Island, Inc. v. Marco Beach Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1989-02-24

However, we conclude, as appellee concedes, that the award of attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1987), was erroneous.

A party seeking attorney fees under section 57.105 must properly present the request in the trial court.

James v. Smith · filed 1989-01-19

The only attorney fees request below was predicated upon section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1987), and we decline to reverse the trial court's denial of fees on that basis.

An attorney’s fee award under section 57.105 must be justified.

Infeld v. Mamber, Savage & Singer, P.A. · filed 1992-03-10

The order awarding attorney’s fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1989) was obviously unjustified and is therefore reversed.

Section 57.105 requires an attorney’s fee award to include a finding that there is a complete absence of a justiciable issue.

Taylor v. McGregor · filed 1993-03-30

Even if the award of attorney’s fees and costs was based on section 57.105, the order must be reversed because it does not contain a finding that there is a complete absence of a justiciable issue.

Section 57.105 permits an award of attorney's fees when a party's defenses fail to raise a justiciable issue of law or fact.

Bremshey v. Morrison · filed 1993-05-21

Appellant appeals the trial court's judgment awarding attorney's fees to appellees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1989), and awarding prejudgment interest on such fees. We affirm the award of attorney's fees but reverse the award of prejudgment interest. In its judgment, the trial court determined that appellant's defenses failed to raise a justiciable issue of law or fact and, thus, that appellees were entitled to recover attorney's fees from appellant under section 57.105.

Entitlement to § 57.105 attorney’s fees must be pleaded, unless the opposing party waives an objection to the failure to plead it.

Ganz v. Hzj, Inc. · filed 1992-03-17

We therefore affirm the order on appeal because (a) entitlement to Section 57.105 fees was not pled in the defendant’s answer, and (b) the record fails to establish a waiver by the plaintiff of this pleading requirement — the only apparent exception to the rule established in Stockman.

Section 57.105(1) requires prior notice before fees and costs may be taxed at a summary judgment hearing.

Sclafano v. Sclafano · filed 1993-10-13(1)

We do agree with her, however, that it was improper to tax fees and costs against her under section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes (1991), at the summary judgment hearing without giving her prior notice.

Section 57.105(1) requires appropriate factual findings to support an attorney's fee award.

Adlow, Inc. v. Mauda, Inc. · filed 1994-03-04(1)

The trial court order setting attorney's fees, however, must contain appropriate findings of facts to support an award pursuant to § 57.105(1), Florida Statutes (1991).

Section 57.105 does not support an attorney’s fee award when the facts provide no basis for it.

Dippell v. Dippell · filed 1996-12-11

Under the facts of this case, there is no basis for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1993).

Section 57.105 does not require a party to plead a request for attorney's fees specifically.

Bruce v. Barcomb · filed 1996-06-07(1)

We recognize that under section 57.105 one is not required to plead specifically a request for attorney's fees in order to be entitled to the fees.

A pleading that seeks fees under section 57.105 can provide sufficient notice of a claim under subsection (2) without naming the subsection.

Crane v. Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County · filed 1997-02-26(2)

However, the pleadings in the instant case, although not artfully drafted, provided sufficient notice to Appellant that Appellee could be seeking fees pursuant to either subsection of the statute.

An order awarding attorney fees under section 57.105 must state the facts supporting the award.

Daniels v. Reeves · filed 1998-07-09

Appellant seeks review of an order, entered after an order dismissing his third amended complaint with prejudice, directing him to pay attorney fees to appellee, apparently pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1995). ... However, because the order awarding attorney fees contains no findings of fact, we are constrained to reverse. ... On remand, if the trial court again concludes that an award of attorney fees is appropriate, it shall recite in its order the facts upon which it bases that conclusion.

Section 57.105(1) fee awards require findings, which may appear in written orders and oral findings stated on the record.

Brake v. Swan · filed 2000-07-19(1)

Several of the attorney's fee orders were entered under section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes. Mrs. Brake contends that the orders lack the required findings, but we disagree. We conclude that the necessary findings were made in the written orders and also in oral findings stated on the record, unlike the situation presented in Russo & Baker, P.A., v. Fernandez, 752 So.2d 716 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), and Broad & Cassel v. Newport Motel, Inc., 636 So.2d 590 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).

Section 57.105 cannot support a fee award without allegations or findings that justify it.

Cosio v. Keithley · filed 2000-02-04

Neither have any allegations or findings been made that would support an award pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1995), even if that statute was applicable.

Section 57.105 does not support a fee award when the party did not raise it in the trial court and the court made no findings supporting the award.

NORTH LAKELAND PAIN AND TRAUMA, INC. v. Benson · filed 2002-04-24

In the trial court, Benson never suggested that she was entitled to fees under section 57.105, and the trial court made no findings that would support such an award.

Section 57.105(1) requires findings about an attorney's lack of good faith before fees can be assessed against the attorney.

Valdes v. Lovaas · filed 2001-03-14(1)

The order on appeal assesses one-half of the total fee award against the appellant, Nadia L. Valdez, who was the attorney for the defendant in the proceedings below without any oral or written findings as to this attorney's lack of good faith. We reverse. ... Although the appellee's arguments imply that the trial court made such findings, there is nothing in the record before us to assure that the requisite findings were made.

Section 57.105(1) requires a finding supported by substantial, competent evidence that the losing party or attorney knew or should have known the claim lacked the necessary material facts.

Cooke v. Custom Crete of Southwest Florida, Inc. · filed 2003-01-03(1)

The trial court in the present case did not find that'Cooke or his attorney knew or should have known that Cooke’s claim was not supported by material facts. To the contrary, the court found that Cooke’s counsel acted reasonably in filing suit. ... Thus, not only do the trial court’s own findings reveal the error in the court’s award of fees to Custom Crete, the record reveals a lack of substantial, competent evidence to support that award.

A party seeking attorney's fees under section 57.105(2) must specifically plead entitlement to them.

Precision Tune Auto Care, Inc. v. Radcliffe · filed 2002-04-24(2)

However, a party seeking attorney's fees pursuant to section 57.105(2), the crucial statute in this case, must specifically plead entitlement to such fees.

An order awarding attorney's fees under section 57.105 must include findings supporting the award.

Goldberg v. Watts · filed 2003-12-12

An order awarding attorney's fees under section 57.105 must include findings by the trial court to support the award.

Section 57.105(1) requires an express finding that the claim lacks factual or legal support, and a fee award must be supported by substantial, competent evidence.

Shortes v. Hill · filed 2003-10-03(1)

The order awarding fees made no express finding that Shortes's counterclaim was not supported by material facts, or by the application of then-existing law to the material facts as required by section 57.105(1). Further, the order is not supported by substantial, competent evidence.

Section 57.105(1) requires prevailing-party status for a fee award; reversal of the underlying judgment removes that status.

Prison Health Services, Inc. v. Florida Ass'n of Counties Trust · filed 2003-11-21(1)

Because this court has reversed the summary judgment entered in favor of FACT, see Prison Health Servs., Inc. v. Fla. Ass’n of Counties Trust, 28 Fla. L. Weekly D2510 (Fla. 2d DCA Oct.31, 2003), FACT is no longer the prevailing party; therefore, we reverse the instant award of attorney’s fees and costs. See § 57.105(1), Fla. Stat. (2002).

An attorney's fee award under section 57.105(1) requires appropriate factual findings supported by substantial, competent evidence.

Schultz v. Time Warner Entertainment Co. · filed 2005-03-04(1)

We affirm the order finding it contains sufficient findings of fact. Adlow, Inc., v. Mauda, Inc., 632 So.2d 714 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (holding that an order setting attorney's fees must contain appropriate findings of fact to support an award pursuant to section 57.105(1)). We find that there was substantial, competent evidence presented to support the trial court's order.

Section 57.105(4)’s twenty one day notice requirement applies to a party’s sanctions motion, not an award imposed on the court’s own initiative.

Morton v. Heathcock · filed 2005-09-14(4)

The fee award in this case was imposed on the trial court's own initiative as expressly authorized by section 57.105(1), and not at a party's request. [6] The twenty one day notice requirement imposed by section 57.105(4) on motions filed by "a party," does not, therefore, apply.

A court awarding fees under § 57.105(1) and (2) must state a basis for the award and apply the statutory standards.

Orange County Building Codes v. Strickland Construction Services Corp. · filed 2005-10-28(1), (2)

Notwithstanding, we must vacate the award of attorney’s fees in view of the technical failure of the circuit court to enunciate a basis for the award. ... We deny the petition in part because the circuit court did not depart from the essential requirements of the law when it quashed the order suspending Strickland’s ability to obtain permits, but grant the petition in part by quashing the award of attorney’s fees, and remand this cause to the trial court with directions to determine whether OCB and its attorney should be responsible for Strickland’s attorney fees after applying the statutory standard of section 57.105(1) and (2).

An objection that a fee motion failed to comply with section 57.105(4)'s safe harbor requirement must be raised in the trial court to be considered on appeal.

Ferrara v. Community Developers, Ltd. · filed 2005-11-30(4)

Ferrara's failure to argue to the trial court that Community Developers did not comply with 57.105(4), and his failure to respond to the motion for attorney's fees, precluded the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court, sitting in its appellate capacity, from considering his argument on appeal.

Section 57.105 allows attorney's fees only for a prevailing party; a non-party cannot qualify.

Department of Children and Families v. HG · filed 2006-03-17(1)

As non-parties, the appellees could not be a prevailing party for purposes of section 57.105.

Section 57.105 fees may include a paralegal’s work even if the paralegal does not testify at the fee hearing.

Banks v. Maxwell Bldg. Corp. · filed 2006-04-12

We affirm a judgment awarding section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2003) attorney's fees against attorney Michael Banks. We reject his arguments on the merits as well as his argument that the court erred in awarding fees for a paralegal who did not testify at the evidentiary hearing. In Toledo v. Wisk, 754 So.2d 83 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), we held that it was not necessary for all attorneys who worked on a case to testify at an attorney's fee hearing, where an attorney who was most heavily involved testified as to the efforts expended by the firm. It follows that if it is unnecessary for all attorneys to testify, it is unnecessary for a paralegal to testify.

Section 57.105 requires specific findings that an appeal lacks support in fact or law before appellate attorney's fees may be awarded as a sanction.

United Auto. Ins. Co. v. MIAMI MED. GROUP · filed 2006-07-19

Moreover, the attorney's fees award cannot be sustained pursuant to section 57.105 as a sanction for pursuing a frivolous appeal. The order awarding attorney's fees on this ground also departed from the essential requirements of the law because it did not contain specific findings that this appeal was neither supported by the facts nor the application of the law.

Section 57.105 requires an express finding that counsel did not act in good faith based on the client's representations before imposing fees on counsel.

Perlman v. AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE COMPANY · filed 2008-08-27(3)(a)

In awarding fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes, the trial court must make an express finding that the claim was frivolous and, where the trial court imposes liability for the fee award against counsel, an express finding that the attorney was not acting in good faith based upon the representations of his client.

Section 57.105(1) fees may be sought only after the claimant becomes the prevailing party; a claim made while that party is losing is premature.

Williams v. Cadlerock Joint Venture LP · filed 2009-08-12(1)

At that point in the trial court, he had no basis to claim fees under § 57.105(1), for he was then the losing party. The trial court had ruled in favor of his adversary on the merits, so any claim for fees under § 57.105(1) had not yet accrued and would have then been premature.

Section 57.105(1) allows an attorney’s fee award only to a prevailing party when its other conditions are met.

Ohio National Life Assurance Corp. v. Langkau Ex Rel. Estate of Langkau · filed 2009-11-17(1)

Only a prevailing party is entitled to relief under Fla. Stat. § 57.105(1) (mandating an award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party if certain conditions are met) or Fla. Stat. § 627.428(1) (providing that a prevailing party shall be entitled to attorney’s fees as against the insurer). Because Clay cannot show that he is the prevailing party, we conclude that he is not entitled to attorney’s fees, pursuant to Fla. Stat. §§ 57.105(1) or 627.428(1), at this time.

A fee award under section 57.105(1) cannot stand when it rests on an erroneous determination that the plaintiff filed suit before satisfying required pre-suit procedures.

Gerber v. Vincent's Men's Hairstyling, Inc. · filed 2011-03-30(1)

We next consider whether the trial court erred in granting the defendants’ attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes (2009). Here, it appears that the trial court based its award of section 57.105 attorney’s fees upon its erroneous determination that plaintiff improperly filed her complaint in circuit court before complying with the pre-suit procedures set forth under Title VII and the FCRA. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs under section 57.105.

A section 57.105 attorney’s fee award requires findings of fact supporting the award.

Regions Bank v. Gad · filed 2012-02-17

However, because the portion of the order directing Appellant to pay Appellee’s attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105 contains no findings of fact to support the award, we are constrained to reverse this portion of the order.

The post-1999 version of section 57.105 does not require an order awarding fees to find that the claim lacked a justiciable issue of fact or law.

Robbins v. Rayonier Forest Resources, L.P. · filed 2012-12-13

Although such a finding was required by the 1979 version of the statute, the 1999 amendments to section 57.105 removed the requirement that an order awarding fees pursuant to the statute include a finding that the claim lacks a justiciable issue of fact or law.

Section 57.105(1) requires a finding that a claim is frivolous or devoid of merit before attorney’s fees may be awarded.

Jenkins v. Plaza 3000, Inc. · filed 2014-02-12(1)

As to the attorney’s fees which the trial court assessed pursuant to section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes (2012), for filing the counterclaims, the court entered the order without making a finding that the action was frivolous or so devoid of merit on the facts and law as to be completely untenable. ... We thus reverse the assessment of attorney’s fees.

The Fourth District required an express finding of no justiciable issue in a section 57.105 fee order, despite evidence supporting the award.

Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. · filed 2014-01-08

BUT, the trial court’s order is technically deficient because it fails to include a specific finding regarding the complete absence of a justiciable issue in the insured’s cause of action. ... We therefore reverse on this issue only and remand the case to the trial court for the requisite findings.

Section 57.105(1) applies a “knew or should have known” standard to unsupported claims or defenses.

Moore v. Estate of Flaire Mae Albee · filed 2018-02-19(1)

Here, as Moore correctly observes, the trial court appears to have utilized this pre-1999 standard of a “complete absence of a justiciable issue” instead of applying the “knew or should have known” standard now applicable.

Section 57.105 requires a full opportunity to be heard and detailed findings before a court imposes attorney’s fee sanctions.

Blue Infiniti, LLC and Jorge Diaz-Cueto v. Annette Cassells Wilson and Ricky Wilson · filed 2015-07-08(1)

It was therefore error for the trial court to impose sanctions upon Blue Infiniti and its attorney prior to affording a full opportunity to be heard and without making detailed findings in its order.

Section 57.105 requires findings of fact to support an attorney’s fee sanction.

Serra v. Brown · filed 2016-06-03(1)

The order on appeal contains no findings required under section 57.105 to support the award. Consequently, we must reverse.

Section 57.105(1) requires detailed written findings explaining the basis for an attorney’s-fee sanction.

Clautide Jean-Pierre, James Jean-Pierre, and Reynold Jean-Pierre v. Glaberman · filed 2016-05-25(1)

We agree with the homeowners that the trial court erred when it failed to make detailed findings in its order regarding the basis for the fees sanction.

An award of fees under section 57.105(1) requires evidence detailing the work performed; an affidavit and documents neither introduced into evidence nor stipulated to at the hearing are insufficient.

Chandler v. KCCS, Inc. · filed 2017-08-30(1)

Joel Chandler appeals from a final order awarding KCCS, Inc., fees pursuant to section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes (2016). We affirm the decision to award sanctions but reverse as to the amount awarded. Although there was evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing as to the hourly rate and the reasonableness of the fees, the only evidence detailing the work actually completed consisted of an affidavit and related documents that were neither introduced into evidence nor stipulated to at the hearing. The evidence was thus insufficient to support the award.

The amount of a section 57.105(1) sanctions award must be supported by competent evidence; counsel’s argument and billing records not admitted into evidence are insufficient.

PANSKY v. PANSKY · filed 2018-11-28(1)

Daniel Pansky appeals the circuit court’s final order granting the Law Firm of Barry S. Franklin & Associates, P.A.’s motion for sanctions under section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes (2015). ... Yet we agree that the court erred when it determined the amount of fees to award the Law Firm without receiving any testimony or other evidence.

Section 57.105(1) requires a reasonable attorney’s fee award when its requirements are met and no exception applies.

O'NEAL v. SHAWN DARLING AND MENACHEM MAYBERG · filed 2021-05-12(1)

When the requirements of section 57.105 are met and, as here, no exception applies, the statute directs that “the court shall award a reasonable attorney’s fee.’” § 57.105(1) (emphasis added).

Section 57.105(1) permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees but does not authorize an additional punitive amount based on opposing counsel’s hours.

SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, INC. v. HEIKKA · filed 2020-03-04(1)

While authority exists for a court to consider the non-movant’s attorneys’ hours expended in determining the reasonableness of the movant’s attorney’s fees, no authority exists under section 57.105 for a court to award the movant not only for the movant’s reasonable attorneys’ fees, but an additional punitive amount, such as an amount equivalent to the non-movant’s attorneys’ hours expended, as occurred here.

Section 57.105(1) fees may be awarded without a separate evidentiary hearing when the record clearly establishes that the claims were legally meritless.

LANSON v. REID · filed 2020-11-04(1)

Thus, as the record was unclear whether Blue Infiniti had asserted a frivolous claim, an evidentiary hearing was warranted. In the Appellants’ case, the record is very clear that the claims they asserted over the past decade were legally meritless.

Section 57.105(1) requires findings of frivolity to award fees, but does not require contrary findings to deny them.

SANS SOUCI GATED HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. LUKOV · filed 2021-03-10(1)

Although the law requires a trial court to render findings of frivolity as a prerequisite to awarding fees under the relevant statute, findings to the contrary are not necessary in denying such fees.

A third-party purchaser at a foreclosure sale may recover attorney’s fees under section 57.105 without formally intervening.

LAWRENCE v. MARINA TOWER OF TURNBERRY ISLE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., etc. · filed 2022-07-13

While not a party in the first instance, Gibraltor, as third-party purchaser at a foreclosure sale, is a quasi-party with standing and does not need to formally intervene. ... As such, Gibraltor was entitled to recover attorney’s fees under section 57.105.

Section 57.105(7) applies to unilateral contractual attorney’s fee provisions and does not create a right to fees where the contract gives both parties the same right.

Endurance American Specialty Insurance Company v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2023-09-27(7)

This Court agrees with Judge Tuite’s characterization of Section 7.B as a bilateral fee provision, such that Section 57.105(7) cannot apply.

Section 57.105(1) provides reimbursement for incurred attorney’s fees rather than damages, so a possible fee recovery alone does not create appellate standing.

Rush v. Meininger · filed 2023-07-24(1)

The possibility of attorney’s fees does not make Rush a person aggrieved. The provision she cites directs the court to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party as a sanction if it finds that the losing party knew or should have known that its arguments were unsupported by the facts or law. Fla. Stat. § 57.105(1). Such a finding is not guaranteed even if Rush obtained a favorable judgment. In addition, the court’s order denying her permission to sue means that she will not accrue any attorney’s fees to be reimbursed, so she has not experienced a pecuniary loss from the denial. Nor would she experience a gain if the order were overturned, as attorney’s fees reimburse for incurred expenses; they do not provide a damages award. Plus, Rush is proceeding pro se. The fee-shifting statute does not give her appellate standing.

Section 57.105 requires express findings before a court may award attorney’s fees as sanctions for an unsupported claim or defense.

DARIO AYALA, individually, and INRI INC., d/b/a ARMS INTL v. INTERAVIA SPARES AND SERVICES, INC. · filed 2022-11-09(1)

The notion of implicit sanctions is incompatible with our case law, which requires express findings before sanctions may issue. ... We conclude that Appellee has no entitlement to attorney’s fees and costs under section 57.105.

Section 57.105(1) requires competent, substantial evidence to support an attorney’s fee award.

HOROWITZ vs ROSSDALE CLE, INC. · filed 2023-02-17(1)

An award of attorney’s fees under section 57.105 must be supported by competent, substantial evidence.

An attorney’s fee award under section 57.105(1) must be supported by competent substantial evidence, and its amount must be determined under Rowe.

GIBSON, ESQ., LOFTUS, ESQ. v. U. S. BANK, N. A., FAIRCHILD · filed 2024-10-16(1)

We find merit in Mr. Loftus' argument that the amount of attorney's fees awarded by the trial court is not supported by competent substantial evidence. The order on appeal is therefore reversed to the extent it awarded $29,649 in attorney's fees and remanded for another evidentiary hearing following which the trial court must apply the dictates of Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985), when determining the appropriate amount of the fee award.

Section 57.105 requires an order awarding attorney’s fees to include factual findings supporting the award; a conclusory grant is insufficient.

Izard v. Bois · filed 2024-07-31

Here, the trial court simply awarded fees under 57.105 in a conclusory fashion, but it failed to make the required factual findings in its order. The court’s single conclusory paragraph failed to comply with the requirements for an award of 57.105 attorney’s fees.

Section 57.105 permits an attorney's fee award against a defaulting defendant who forces a plaintiff to litigate despite having no justiciable defense.

Castaway Lounge of Bay County, Inc. v. Reid · filed 1982-03-18

We interpret the statute as requiring that a prevailing party's fees be paid when he is impelled, by the losing party, to waste judicial resources and needlessly expend his own time and money. This can occur when a losing party raises issues that are not justiciable, and it can occur when, as here, the losing party has forced the plaintiff to resort to the courts even though there are no justiciable issues that can be raised in defense.

Section 57.105 does not authorize attorney's fees against a defendant who defaults without raising any issue.

Sachs v. Hoglund · filed 1981-04-28

Contrary to the plaintiff's contention here, the above statute does not require a defendant to enter a civil litigation and contest it upon pain of having an attorney's fee award entered against him.

Section 57.105 does not authorize attorney’s fees solely because a defendant fails to answer.

Fritillary Holdings, Inc. v. PAT AND MAE'S DANCELAND CLUB, INC. · filed 1984-01-18

The only question raised on appeal, which we deem to have merit, is whether attorney's fees can be awarded under Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1981), solely because a defendant fails to answer. We hold the statute inapplicable and reverse.

Section 57.105 does not justify attorney’s fees when a defendant merely defaults without other conduct of the kind the statute targets.

Van Kleeck Co. v. Homes · filed 1984-04-06

However, the court finds that the rule set forth in that case does not justify an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the cited section in a case where the defendant has simply defaulted without any other activity which could be characterizd as the type that this statute was designed to inhibit.

Section 57.105 permits attorney's fees to be assessed against attorneys who brought and maintained a frivolous lawsuit in the name of unauthorized corporations, with the attorneys added as unsuccessful plaintiffs.

Lage v. Blanco · filed 1988-03-08

The question presented is whether the court, for the purpose of assessing fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1985), for bringing a frivolous lawsuit, may substitute as parties the attorneys filing the action where the attorneys brought and bitterly maintained the suit in the name of corporations without the corporations' authorization. ... We agree that the appellants could not be added as third-party defendants after judgment because there was never a third-party claim and because their presence in the litigation was at all times as plaintiffs. Nevertheless, the result would be the same if they are added, as they should have been, as unsuccessful plaintiffs. The order on review is modified accordingly. Affirmed as modified.

Section 57.105(1) allows recovery of attorney’s fees against HRS despite the 1992 amendment to section 61.16.

Fort v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services · filed 1993-11-05(1)

.The July 1, 1992, amendment to section 61.16, Florida Statutes (1991), contained in Chapter 92-138, § 6 at 1174, Laws of Florida, does not bar recovery of attorney's fees against HRS under section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes (1991).

Section 57.105(1) does not permit a fee award against a party merely for defaulting instead of defending an action.

STATE, DEPT. OF HWY. SAFETY v. Salter · filed 1998-05-27(1)

As a matter of law, section 57.105 fees may not be awarded against a defaulting party in civil litigation.

Section 57.105(1) allows appellate attorney's fees against both a party and counsel for a frivolous appeal, unless counsel acted in good faith on the client's factual representations.

Visoly v. Security Pacific Credit Corp. · filed 2000-08-16(1)

Under Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1999), the losing party and the losing party's counsel are equally responsible for the payment of fees unless the losing party's counsel has acted in good faith, based upon the factual representations of his or her client. ... Counsel and the Visolys are jointly liable for Security Pacific's appellate attorney's fees, as both are responsible for the pursuit of this frivolous appeal which lacks substance or reason.

Section 57.105(1) does not authorize a fee award solely against an attorney when the case against the client has been dismissed and the fee claim against the client has been waived.

Sexton v. Ferguson · filed 2011-11-16(1)

A plain reading of the statute does not support an attorney’s fee award solely against a party’s attorney where, as here, the case against the attorney’s client had been dismissed and the claim for attorney’s fees against the attorney’s client has been waived.

Section 57.105(1) authorizes attorney’s fees against the Department of Revenue in a child support proceeding when the facts support an award.

Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement v. Cessford · filed 2012-11-09(1)

We, therefore, conclude that the trial court is authorized to enter an award of attorney’s fees against DOR pursuant to section 57.105(1) if the facts support such an award.

Section 57.105 does not permit an attorney's fee award before the case concludes solely because a party frustrated a settlement agreement.

Steinhardt v. EASTERN SHORES WHITE HOUSE ASSOC., INC. · filed 1982-04-06

Construing the statute narrowly, as we must, an award of attorney's fees before the case is concluded and only because a party has frustrated a settlement agreement cannot be sustained.

A fee award under § 57.105 requires findings explaining entitlement and the hours, hourly rate, and any multiplier used to calculate the amount.

Home Insurance Co. v. Gonzalez · filed 1995-01-04

Now, turning to the award of attorney’s fees in favor of the Gonzalezes, an examination of the record reflects that the trial court’s attorney’s fee order is deficient because it failed to set out the basis and reasons for finding an entitlement to attorney’s fees, and also failed to make findings regarding the number of hours, the hourly rate, and any multiplier, which were employed in calculating the fee amount.

A fee award under section 57.105 must be reversed when the judgment supporting it is reversed.

Jewett v. Leisinger · filed 1995-05-24

Because the trial court's summary judgment order is reversed, the order awarding the Leisingers' attorney's fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1993), must necessarily be reversed as well.

A section 57.105 attorney fee award must state the facts supporting it so the award can be reviewed on appeal.

Glisson v. JACKSONVILLE TRANSP. AUTHORITY · filed 1998-02-06

Appellants seek review of a final order directing them to pay attorney fees to appellee pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1991). Because the trial court's order contains no findings of fact to support the award of attorney fees, we are unable intelligently to review the propriety of that award.

Section 57.105(1) permits the merit of a claim or defense to be assessed when asserted or at any time before trial.

Gahn v. Holiday Property Bond, Ltd. · filed 2002-08-09(1)

Section 57.105 now permits the merit of claims and defenses to be measured when the claim or defense is asserted, or anytime prior to trial.

Section 57.105(1) permits attorney's fees for sanctionable post-judgment motions.

Freedom Commerce Centre Venture v. Ranson · filed 2002-07-19(1)

Accordingly, the trial court's initial ruling that allowed attorney's fees was correct, and the subsequent ruling, finding that fees were not available for motion practice, must be vacated.

A trial court may enter a section 57.105 fee award while the underlying judgment is on appeal if that judgment has not been vacated.

Katz v. NME Hospitals, Inc. · filed 2002-12-26

Here, where the judgment had not been vacated pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540, the trial court could properly enter the award of fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes, during the pendency of appeal of the underlying judgment.

A motion for attorney's fees under section 57.105(1) must be filed within a reasonable time after final judgment; an unexplained 18½-month delay is unreasonable.

Graef v. Dames & Moore Group, Inc. · filed 2003-09-10(1)

Dames & Moore was required to move for section 57.105(1) attorney's fees within a "reasonable time" after entry of final judgment. ... Dames & Moore's 18½ month delay similarly falls outside the boundary of reasonableness.

A section 57.105 fee award requires findings on the reasonable hourly rate and hours charged, with competent, substantial evidence supporting the amount.

DEBRA J. SUTTON, PA v. LeBeau · filed 2005-07-29

Initially, we note that we find no error in the trial court's finding that Mrs. LeBeau is entitled to section 57.105 fees and costs. However, because the trial court's final order granting such fees and costs failed to make the required findings regarding the reasonableness of the hourly rate and number of hours charged, and because the record before us does not contain competent, substantial evidence to support the amount awarded by the trial court, we must reverse.

A court assessing fees under section 57.105 must make findings that clearly explain the basis for the amount awarded.

Sunset Park Church of God, Inc. v. Gay · filed 2005-11-18

We affirm the determination that Sunset is entitled to attorney’s fees and costs; however, we reverse and remand so the trial court can comply with the procedures outlined in Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145 (Fla.1985), to assess section 57.105 fees. The order awarding attorney’s fees contains no findings of fact. Thus we cannot determine how the trial court awarded $10,000. Under Rowe, the trial court must clearly articulate the basis for the fee.

Section 57.105(4) gives the opposing party an opportunity to withdraw or correct a challenged defense before a sanctions motion is filed; a motion served and filed after trial is untimely.

O'Daniel v. Bd. of Comm. of Monroe County · filed 2005-12-07(4)

Subsection four of the statute illustrates the legislature's intent to give a party an opportunity to retract a frivolous "paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial" before the opposing party can file a motion for section 57.105 fees. Here, the motion for fees was served and filed following the conclusion of the trial on the merits. Thus, the appellee was never given an opportunity to retract or amend its defenses. Therefore, the motion for attorney's fees was untimely and properly stricken.

Section 57.105(1) permits a fee award before a case ends for an unsupported claim or defense, even if the sanctioned party may ultimately prevail.

Barthlow v. Jett · filed 2006-05-04(1)

Even if Barthlow ultimately prevails in her action, however, the statute allows an award of fees at this stage for the reasons found by the trial court.

A section 57.105 attorney’s fee award is reversible if the trial court does not make findings supporting it.

Department of Revenue v. Marchines · filed 2007-03-16

The trial court’s order against the Department is deficient in this regard, and without such a finding, the award of fees pursuant to section 57.105 is reversible.

Section 57.105(4) gives a party twenty-one days to withdraw a claim and avoid fees, but if the claim remains, fees may be calculated from when its lack of factual or legal support was or should have been known.

Yakavonis v. Dolphin Petroleum, Inc. · filed 2006-07-26(4)

The statute gives Yakavonis a twenty-one day window within which to withdraw her claim against Hyatt and avoid any attorney's fees. However, once that time expires there is nothing in the statute which requires the time for computation of attorney's fees to begin only then. The trial court is free to measure the attorney's fees from the time it was known or should have been known that the claim had no basis in fact or law.

A section 57.105 fee award must specify the number of hours reasonably expended on the allegation for which fees are awarded.

Brown v. PANHANDLE CITIZENS COALITION · filed 2009-06-03

Diane Brown seeks review of an order of the administrative law judge imposing sanctions pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2006). The administrative law judge entered a comprehensive, well-reasoned order on the requests for sanctions filed by St. Joe Company and Clara Avenue, LLC. As Ms. Brown correctly argues, however, even if there is competent, substantial evidence in the record to support the award of attorney’s fees — which we are unable to ascertain from this record — the judge was required to specify the number of hours reasonably expended on her allegation that Clara Avenue, LLC’s Future Land Use Map amendment failed to protect historic or cultural resources.

Section 57.105 requires statutory findings to support an award of attorney’s fees.

Kurgan v. Morton D. Weiner/AMPAC, Inc. · filed 2010-12-22

Because the order on appeal assesses attorney’s fees without making the statutory findings required under section 57.105 to support the award, we are compelled to reverse.

Section 57.105 permits recovery of fees from the time a claim was known or should have been known to lack a basis in fact or law, once the twenty-one day safe harbor expires.

Wood v. Haack · filed 2011-03-02(1)(a)

The trial court’s limitation of the fee award to those incurred from the date of service of the third amended complaint was in error. ... Rather, once the twenty-one day safe harbor expires, “[t]he trial court is free to measure the attorney’s fees from the time it was known or should have been known that the claim had no basis in fact or law.”

A section 57.105 fee award is inappropriate when the directed verdict supporting it is reversed.

Hagans Co. v. Manla · filed 1988-11-08

Our reversal of the directed verdict renders Manla's attorney's fee award premature under section 448.08 and inappropriate under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1985). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ralph Hagans attorney's fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1985).

Section 57.105 allows a lawyer sued in a frivolous action to recover fees for the lawyer's own time as well as for hired counsel.

Friedman v. Backman · filed 1984-08-15

We have no difficulty in holding that, in a frivolous suit against a lawyer, he is entitled to attorney's fees for his time and effort under Section 57.105, just as he is for services rendered by counsel he employs to represent him.

Section 57.105 authorizes attorney’s fees against the losing party when a civil action presents a complete absence of a justiciable issue.

Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Dubay · filed 1988-03-24

In the present case, the state attorney’s office was acting as the prosecuting attorney; it was not a party to the action. Consequently, the state attorney’s office could not be held liable as the losing party under section 57.105.

Section 57.105(1) permits fees against an attorney who becomes a party by asserting personal interests in litigation, even when the client is not liable for fees.

Avemco Ins. Co. v. Tobin · filed 1998-04-29(1)

Having so made themselves parties, they came under the statutory term "party" in section 57.105(1) by their own conduct and were thus properly liable for fees even though their nominal client in the litigation was not itself liable for such fees.

Section 57.105 does not permit attorney's fees against a party who did nothing wrong and took no part in the litigation after assigning his rights.

Cardona v. Benton Exp., Inc. · filed 2001-12-26

Even after the statute was amended effective October 1, 1999, it was improper to assess attorney's fees against Cardona. The trial court denied fees against Cardona's counsel, arguably the only one that could be accused of presenting a frivolous claim. Evidently the court felt that counsel had acted in good faith. There was no evidence that Cardona did anything wrong and no indication that he had anything to do with the litigation after he was paid and he assigned his rights to Fireman's Fund.

Section 57.105 requires a losing party for an attorney's fee award under both its pre-1999 and current versions.

Zanone v. Clause · filed 2003-07-11(1)

We need not determine under which version of section 57.105 fees were awarded because, under either the pre-1999 amendment or the current version, Zanone was not a "losing party" as is required under section 57.105.

Section 57.105 permits an appellate attorney-fee sanction to be paid in equal amounts by the losing party and its attorney.

Bay Park Towers Condominium Association, Inc. v. Triple M. Roofing, Corp. · filed 2011-03-16

Upon consideration of the responses to this Court’s December 22, 2010, order to show cause, including the response filed by former counsel, Berk, Merchant & Sims, PLC, and finding all of the responses to be insufficient, the Court awards, as a sanction, a reasonable attorney fee to Appellant for the prosecution of the appeal, to be assessed against both Triple M. Roofing Corporation and IRT-Arcon, Inc., to be paid in equal amounts by each party and their counsel, pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2009) (stating an award of reasonable attorney fees is to be paid to the prevailing party “in equal amounts by the losing party and the losing party’s attorney”).

Section 57.105 allows a reasonable attorney fee as a sanction, paid in equal amounts by the losing party and the losing party’s attorney.

Eskanos v. Washington Mutual Bank, FA · filed 2011-06-15(1)

Upon consideration of the response, and finding the response to be insufficient, this court awards, as a sanction, a reasonable attorney fee to Appellee for the defense of the appeal, to be assessed against Appellants and their counsel, to be paid in equal amounts by Appellants and their counsel, pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statute (2011) (stating an award of reasonable attorney fees is to be paid to the prevailing party “in equal amounts by the losing party and the losing party’s attorney”).

Section 57.105 requires the losing party's attorney to disclose the conflict and consequences of continued representation when the attorney may be relieved of personal responsibility for an equal share of the prevailing party's attorney's fee.

Khoury v. Estate of Kashey · filed 1988-11-15

The interests of the losing party and his attorney necessarily diverge in a section 57.105 proceeding. This is so because, having made a proper showing of good faith, the losing party’s attorney is relieved of personal responsibility for an “equal share” of the prevailing party’s attorney’s fee. ... It is therefore incumbent upon the attorney facing a 57.105 proceeding to apprise the client of the conflict and consequences of continued representation once the attorney has formed a reasonable belief that such representation will not be adversely affected. The attorney should document not only the disclosure, but also the client’s endorsement of the disclosure and the continuing representation.

Subsection 57.105(2) makes contractual attorney's fee provisions mutual for contracts entered into on or after October 1, 1988.

Adler v. Key Financial Services, Inc. · filed 1989-11-28(2)

First, subsection 57.105(2), which provides for mutuality of contractual attorney's fees, is effective only for contracts entered into October 1, 1988 and thereafter. Since the contracts at issue here were executed prior to that date, and provide for attorney's fees only for the creditor, subsection 57.105(2) affords no basis for an award of attorney's fees to the Adlers.

Section 57.105 allows attorney's fees when a party's position is so clearly without merit on the facts and law that it is completely untenable.

Horacio O. Ferrea North American Div., Inc. v. MOROSO PERF. PROD., INC. · filed 1989-12-06

Finally, we affirm the trial court's denial of attorney's fees to Ferrea pursuant to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes. Moroso's position in the instant litigation was not "so clearly devoid of merit both on the facts and the law as to be completely untenable." Whitten v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., 410 So.2d 501 (Fla. 1982).

Section 57.105 does not clearly entitle an appellant to attorney's fees in this case.

Lakes of Emerald Hills v. Silverman · filed 1990-02-21

Neither is appellant clearly entitled to attorney's fees as the "prevailing party" nor under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1987).

Section 57.105 requires an award of attorney’s fees when litigation is frivolous and devoid of merit.

Freixas v. Buena Vista Lakes Condominium Ass'n · filed 1990-02-27

We hold that the Association is clearly entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1987) and, accordingly, remand this matter to the trial court with directions that attorney’s fees be awarded, under the above-cited statutory section, to the Association.

Section 57.105 allows attorney's fees as a sanction for unsupported claims or defenses.

Cox v. HAMMOND AND COMPANY, INC. · filed 1990-09-19

We also reject the broker's claim to fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes.

Section 57.105 authorizes attorney's fees for a prevailing party, so a non-prevailing party is not entitled to them.

In Re Estate of Parson · filed 1990-12-10

Because appellant is a non-prevailing party under our disposition, we also affirm the trial court's order denying appellant's claim for attorney's fees, filed pursuant to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1987).

Section 57.105 permits an award of attorney’s fees and costs when its requirements are met.

Farm Labor Organization Committee, Inc. v. Zapata · filed 1991-01-23

We find no error in the trial court’s determination that the appellees in this case were entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1987).

Section 57.105 permits attorney's fees to be awarded and governs the court's handling of that fee issue.

Brookridge Community Property Owners, Inc. v. Brookridge, Inc. · filed 1991-01-24

We agree with the appellant, however, that the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction of the issue of attorney's fees that could be awarded pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1989), and we reverse in regard to that issue.

Section 57.105 does not authorize attorney's fees when a claim is dismissed on the pleadings alone.

Stoddard v. Wohlfahrt · filed 1991-02-07

The court properly dismissed the action, but a dismissal on the pleadings in this case was not sufficient grounds to award attorney's fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1987).

Section 57.105 permits attorney's fees for unsupported claims or defenses but does not allow a prevailing party with no interest in the recovered fee to recover fees incurred solely to obtain attorney's fees.

Pierpont v. Pierpont · filed 1991-04-12

We affirm the awards of attorney's fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1989), except that we reverse to the extent such fees included attorney’s fees for work to recover attorney’s fees when the prevailing party has no interest in the fee recovered.

Section 57.105 authorizes attorney's fees against a party who pursues a frivolous appeal.

Parker v. Parker · filed 1991-07-31

We also grant the ex-wife's motion for attorney's fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1989), as the appeal filed by Mr. Parker was frivolous.

Section 57.105(2) applies to contracts entered into on October 1, 1988, or thereafter.

WRC Properties, Inc. v. Ted's News, Inc. · filed 1991-06-11(2)

The statute clearly provides that it “shall apply to contracts entered into on said date (October 1, 1988) or thereafter.”

Subsection 57.105(2) provides mutuality of attorney's fee remedies in contract cases and does not permit fees when no contract exists.

County Waste, Inc. v. Public Storage Mgt., Inc. · filed 1991-06-25(2)

It is evident that the intent of subsection 57.105(2) is to provide mutuality of attorney's fee remedy in contract cases. ... Under that decision, once the trial court determined, as it did, that no contract existed, there could be no award of attorney's fees under the contract. As County Waste would be unable to obtain attorney's fees under the contract, Public Storage is not entitled to attorney's fees under the statute.