Fla. Stat. § 57.105

Section 57.105 does not support an attorney's fee award without a finding that the claim was frivolous or the challenged filing was intended to cause unreasonable delay.

Glarum v. LASALLE BANK NAT. ASS'N · filed 2011-11-17(1)-(2)

That statute permits a trial court to award a "reasonable attorney's fee" to the "prevailing party" where the plaintiff's claim was frivolous or to a party to compensate for the opposing party's dilatory conduct. § 57.105(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. The trial court did not find that appellants' claims were frivolous, and the trial court did not conclude that Lord's affidavit was filed to cause unreasonable delay. Thus, section 57.105 could not serve as a basis for the award of attorney's fees to LaSalle.

Section 57.105 supported an appellate fee sanction against the debtors and their attorney for a frivolous appeal.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Hernandez · filed 2011-06-22(1)

Accordingly, we grant Washington Mutual’s motion for appellate attorneys’ fees and sanctions against both the Debtors and their attorney, Paul B. Woods, jointly and severally. See id.; § 57.105 Fla. Stat.

Section 57.105 does not support an attorney’s fee award when the claim does not meet the threshold for frivolousness.

Kenniasty v. Bionetics Corp. · filed 2011-12-16

After examining this claim, we are bound to agree that it does not meet the threshold required for a finding of frivolousness under section 57.105. We reverse the award of attorney’s fees in favor of Bionetics.

Section 57.105 does not authorize sanctions for a colorable motion under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b).

Swan Landing Development, LLC v. First Tennessee Bank National Ass'n · filed 2012-09-19(1)

And because Swan Landing and its attorneys presented a colorable claim to support the 1.540(b) motion, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the Bank’s motion for sanctions and fees under section 57.105.

Section 57.105 permits attorney’s fees from the start of a case when the claim was clearly time-barred when filed.

Shuck v. Smalls · filed 2012-12-05(1)

Because the petition was clearly time-barred, we agree with appellees’ argument on cross-appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award section 57.105 attorney’s fees from the inception of the case.

Section 57.105(1) permits appellate attorney fees as sanctions when a party and its counsel persist in a frivolous litigation position.

Albelo v. Southern Oak Insurance Co. · filed 2013-02-06(1)

We summarily reverse the order on appeal and grant Albelo’s motion for an award of appellate attorney fees pursuant to section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes (2011). ... Southern Oak’s and its counsel’s persistence in arguing Albelo was required to seek a guardian for herself as a condition of continuing this action was frivolous.

Section 57.105(1) does not make a claim sanctionable merely because the defendant won summary judgment on qualified immunity.

Phillips v. Garcia · filed 2014-08-13(1)

The fact that the trial court determined, via summary judgment, that Phillips was entitled to qualified immunity, does not necessarily mean that Garcia’s malicious prosecution claim lacked factual support—and was therefore sanctionable—under section 57.105.

Section 57.105 provides a remedy when a complaint is completely untenable, including when it pursues a frivolous, unsupported legal theory.

Gonzalez v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. · filed 2014-12-04

Third, it is true that “Florida favors access to the courts and has interpreted section 57.105 to provide a remedy only where the plaintiff’s complaint is completely untenable.” Vasquez v. Provincial S., Inc., 795 So. 2d 216, 218 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001). Gonzalez’s complaint, however, does not present a “good faith attempt to change an existing rule of law,” as did the complaint at issue in Vasquez. Id. Rather, Gonzalez asserts a legal theory that is frivolous and unsupported, and has been repeatedly rejected.

Section 57.105 does not authorize attorney’s fees for a claim that has a reasonable basis and is not frivolous.

Peter v. Osorio-Khor · filed 2016-08-03(1)

We cannot conclude under the facts of this case that the removal petition was a “frivolous” filing, for which section 57.105 is designed to deter.

Section 57.105(1) permits fees against a party and attorney who knew or should have known a claim lacked factual or legal support.

Badgley v. Suntrust Mortgage, Inc. · filed 2014-03-14(1)

The trial court properly awarded section 57.105(1) fees based on its findings that Badgley and her attorney knew or should have known that Badgley’s claim was “not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the claim or defense” and “[wjould not be supported by the application of then-existing law to those material facts.”

Section 57.105 permits a fee motion solely against counsel for a legally unsupported claim and requires a sanction when one distinct factual basis for liability lacks legal support, even if other bases appear in the same count.

HARVEY LEE DAVIS and ERIC MCCABE v. BAILYNSON · filed 2019-01-30(1)(b), (3)(c)

We hold that under proper circumstances, section 57.105(3)(c) permits the filing of a section 57.105(1)(b) fee motion solely against an attorney, and not the client. We further hold that under the current version of section 57.105(1), if an action asserts separate factual scenarios for liability and one of the scenarios meets the criteria for a 57.105(1) fee sanction because it is not supported by law, the sanction must be ordered.

Section 57.105 authorizes an attorney’s fee award when a party continues to pursue a claim it should know has no legal basis.

Law v. Law · filed 2015-04-01(1)(b)

At this juncture, the Radhert Firm no longer had any claim, contractual or otherwise, to support payment of its fee for representing Benjamin from the escrowed funds. This matter should have been at an end. Yet the Radhert Firm continued to pursue its claim against Ruth prolonging this matter and causing Ruth to incur substantial legal fees. On this record, we cannot agree that Ruth was not entitled to a section 57.105 award.

Section 57.105(1)(b) requires attorney’s fees when counsel knew or should have known that a claim lacked support under then-existing law.

Wells v. Halmac Development, Inc. · filed 2016-04-13(1)(b)

Therefore, Castro’s counsel knew or should have known that any claim that Castro was entitled to be declared the prevailing party, after the arbitrator clearly determined there was no prevailing party, “[w]ould not be supported by the application of then-existing law to those material facts.” § 57.105(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2012).

Section 57.105 requires reasonable attorney’s fees when a party or its attorney knew or should have known that a claim lacked a legal basis.

Rawson v. Gulf Coast Property Management Co., Inc. · filed 2018-12-14(1)

Under these facts, Gulf Coast or its attorney knew or should have known that there was no legal basis for an interpleader action because the final order of dissolution, which had not been stayed pending appeal, awarded the rental property to Ms. Rawson.

Section 57.105(1) does not authorize attorney's fees when a losing claim has support in the material facts and existing law.

MacAlister v. Beavis Construction, Inc. · filed 2015-05-27(1)

In conclusion, the record does not support the trial court's finding that the malicious prosecution claim was not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the claim or by then existing law. The trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion for attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to section 57.105.

Section 57.105(1) does not authorize attorney's fees when the losing party's claim is arguably supportable under the facts and law and is not frivolous.

Blinn v. Florida Power & Light Company · filed 2016-03-16(1)

Keeping in mind the court's duty to apply section 57.105(1) with restraint, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that FP&L was entitled to attorney's fees for defending against Blinn's claims.

Section 57.105(1)(a) does not permit fees for lack of factual support when the claim has evidence that, if accepted, would establish a necessary fact.

Casey v. Jensen · filed 2016-03-23(1)(a)

Section 57.105(1) only requires that a claim be supported by "material facts," which we have described as facts sufficient to establish a fact if accepted.

Section 57.105(1)(a) does not authorize sanctions merely because a party lacks conclusive proof when filing, if the party reasonably believes the facts supporting its claim exist.

Trust Mortgage, LLC v. Dina Ferlanti and Anthony Ferlanti · filed 2016-06-01(1)(a)

A party does not need to have conclusive evidence to prove its case at the time of filing in order to avoid sanctions. Instead, like here, where the party reasonably believes the factual basis for its claim exists, it is entitled to proceed with its claims and seek to prove those facts.

Section 57.105 does not permit attorney’s fee sanctions when a lawsuit has an arguable basis in law and fact.

Kowallek v. Lee Rehm, Port St. Lucie Police Department, City of Port St. Lucie, Florida Power & Light Company · filed 2016-04-06

Daniel E. Kowallek appeals the trial court’s order awarding attorney’s fees to Florida Power & Light Company and Asplundh Tree Expert Company (“the appellees”) as a section 57.105 sanction for filing a frivolous lawsuit. We determine there was an arguable basis in law and fact for the suit, and thus, reverse.

Section 57.105(1) does not permit sanctions when a claim has an arguable basis in law and fact, even if it ultimately fails.

MINTO PBLH, LLC v. 1000 FRIENDS OF FLORIDA, INC. · filed 2017-10-18(1)

Where there is an arguable basis in law and fact for a party’s claim, a trial court may not sanction that party under section 57.105.

Section 57.105(1) requires courts to evaluate each defense separately and award fees incurred litigating it from the point it became unsupported by material facts or existing law.

Infiniti Employment Solutions, Inc. v. MS Liquidators of Arizona, LLC · filed 2016-11-04(1)

We therefore direct the trial court to hold a hearing for the purposes of determining when MS Liquidators’ three affirmative defenses became unsupported by the material facts or the application of then-existing law to those material facts and to award attorney’s fees incurred by Infiniti in litigating these defenses.

Section 57.105(1) requires an attorney’s fee award when a party persists in pursuing a motion that clear law does not support.

Paul v. Avrahami · filed 2017-04-12(1)

Appellee’s motion for attorney’s fees against Appellants (who were originally impleaded defendants) was without merit and clearly contrary to both statutory and case law. We reverse the trial court’s denial of Appellants’ section 57.105 motion for attorney’s fees, and remand for the trial court to grant the motion.

Section 57.105(1) sanctions are supported when competent, substantial evidence shows a defense was unsupported and identifies when the parties and counsel knew it should have been withdrawn.

Roberts v. PNC Bank · filed 2018-10-16(1)

Finally, even if we ignore these waivers, the trial court’s order is supported by competent, substantial evidence and sets forth very specific findings as to the unsupported nature of the defense and a date by which Appellants and their counsel knew the defense should have been withdrawn. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order, grant Appellee’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees, and deny Appellants’ motion.

Section 57.105 requires a fee award when a properly filed sanctions motion establishes an unsupported claim and no statutory exception applies.

MARK W. RICKARD, P.A., d/b/a LAW GUARD v. NATURE'S SLEEP FACTORY DIRECT, LLC. · filed 2018-10-31(1)(b)

Accordingly, as NS timely and properly filed a motion in accordance with section 57.105(4), the trial court lacked discretion to deny this motion beyond the exceptions noted in section 57.105(3) (none of which are applicable here, other than 57.105(3)(c), as discussed above).

Section 57.105(1) does not warrant sanctions when a party’s reliance on evidence is not patently frivolous, even if the claim fails at summary judgment.

Acosta v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2021-11-23(1)

Here, the Court does not find that Plaintiff’s reliance on Dr. Stockham’s opinion is patently frivolous sufficient to warrant sanctions under either Rule 11 or Fla. Stat. § 57.105.

Section 57.105(1)(a) permits sanctions for an unfounded motion for rehearing that lacks support from the material facts.

PAULO CESAR MANTEGAZZA POMELLI v. POMELLI · filed 2021-10-06(1)(a)

As to section 57.105 sanctions, we find that such sanctions were properly imposed on the Husband for filing an unfounded motion for rehearing.

Section 57.105(1) does not warrant attorney’s fees for a viable but weak claim; voluntary dismissal does not establish that the claim lacked merit.

REYES v. COSCULLUELA · filed 2021-10-27(1)

Having carefully surveyed the relevant judicial landscape, we conclude Reyes asserted a viable claim, albeit a weak one, that the incessant noise emanating from a batting cage on the neighboring property sufficiently interfered with the comfort, repose, and enjoyment of his home so as to constitute a nuisance under the common law. Further observing the decision to end litigation has no bearing on the merits, we find the award of fees was unwarranted.

Section 57.105 sanctions are unwarranted when Rule 11 sanctions are inappropriate.

Healthcare Resources Management Group, LLC v. EcoNatura All Healthy World, LLC · filed 2022-03-14

However, sanctions are not warranted under Section 57.105 if sanctions are not appropriate under Rule 11.

Section 57.105 requires fees when a party or counsel knew or should have known that a claim lacked factual or legal support, subject to the good faith exception for arguments to change the law.

THE DENTAL LAW FIRM, P.A. d/b/a SHOCHET LAW GROUP v. PAUL KINCER, SCOTT MOORE, and THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE PUBLIC ADJUSTERS, · filed 2022-08-17(1)(a)-(b), (3)(a)

We conclude the public adjuster’s third-party action, when initially filed, was not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the third-party action’s claims or the application of then-existing law, and did not present a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law. Thus, the circuit court erred in denying the law firm’s section 57.105 motion.

Section 57.105(1)(b) requires an award of reasonable attorney’s fees when counsel knew or should have known that a claim or defense lacked support under existing law as applied to the facts.

South Wild Olive, LLC v. Total Maintenance Services, LLC · filed 2024-05-17(1)(b)

Based on these circumstances, sanctions were required. See § 57.105(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (providing “the court shall award a reasonable attorney’s fee” to the prevailing party if “the losing party’s attorney knew or should have known that a claim or defense . . . [w]ould not be supported by the application of then-existing law to those material facts” (emphasis added)).

Section 57.105(1) requires an attorney’s fee award when an essential element of a claim lacks support, even if the party offers a novel argument on another element.

Estate of Tarina M. White v. Florida Medical Examiners Commission and Dr. J. Radtke · filed 2025-07-16(1)

The trial court’s finding on the novelty of one element of the Estate’s claim is not enough to shield the Estate from paying attorney’s fees to the prevailing party—Dr. Radtke—under section 57.105(1).

Section 57.105(1) does not authorize sanctions for failure to satisfy a condition precedent.

Steinberg v. Fiesta Homeowners Association, Inc. · filed 2025-03-05(1)

To the extent section 57.105 sanctions were also based on the Homeowner’s failure to comply with the pre-suit mediation requirements of section 720.311(2)(a), this was also error, as section 57.105(1) does not encompass a litigant’s failure to satisfy a condition precedent.

Section 57.105 fees are unwarranted when a challenged trust interpretation rests on an ambiguity the trust empowers the trust protector to resolve.

Jeff Lieberman, Etc. v. James Sloto, Etc. · filed 2025-03-05

Because “should” is, at a minimum, ambiguous, the Trust Protector had the sole authority pursuant to the Trust to interpret or clarify the meaning of the word “should.” Resolving the ambiguity as Lieberman did with the amendment defining “should” in section 4.12 to mean non-mandatory comports with the intent of the settlor. Thus, 57.105 fees were not warranted here, and the trial court abused its discretion in awarding them to Sloto.

Section 57.105(1) does not permit sanctions when a claim has an arguable basis in law and fact.

Steinberg v. Fiesta Homeowners Association, Inc. · filed 2025-05-21(1)

But the question of whether the Homeowner’s claim is derivative is arguable. Thus, sanctions were not appropriate.

When a release may bar claims, section 57.105(1)(b) requires the court to assess whether the claims were barred and whether counsel had a good faith basis to bring them.

Mickler v. Victoria M. Iizuka F/K/A Victoria M. Mickler and Chip Parker · filed 2025-06-27(1)(b)

However, the court did not make a determination as to whether the claims against Mickler were indeed subject to the Release and whether Parker had a good faith basis to bring the claims despite the Release and the court’s inability to set aside the Consent Judgment under rule 12.540. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings as to whether the Release precluded Iizuka’s claims against Mickler and as to Parker’s decision to nevertheless bring the claims against Mickler.

Section 57.105 does not make every claim that lacks legal merit sanctionable.

Klayman v. Portfolio Media, Inc. · filed 2026-05-06

A claim, however, may lack legal merit even if not sanctionable under section 57.105.

Section 57.105 authorizes attorney's fees after a voluntary dismissal if the court finds a complete absence of a justiciable issue of law or fact.

MacBain v. Bowling · filed 1979-07-31

However, subsequent to the Randle decision, supra, the Legislature passed (and it became effective) what is now Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1978), and we hold that a trial judge is now authorized to award attorney's fees upon a voluntary dismissal if he finds "... a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised . .".

An involuntary dismissal of a claim does not, by itself, establish entitlement to attorney’s fees under Section 57.105.

Bacon v. August · filed 1982-01-05

Although the plaintiffs’ attempt to pierce a corporate veil was rejected by an unap-pealed order of involuntary dismissal at the conclusion of their case at the trial, we are unable to find an abuse of discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees under Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1979).

Section 57.105 does not permit attorney’s fees based solely on a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal, even one with prejudice.

EXEC. CENTERS OF AMERICA, INC. v. Durability Seating & Interiors, Inc. · filed 1981-07-07

Even a voluntary dismissal with prejudice is alone insufficient to support a finding by the court that there is a complete absence of a justiciable issue. Holding a party liable for attorney's fees solely because they bring a law suit and then take a voluntary dismissal would have the deleterious effect of discouraging parties from seeking voluntary dismissals and is not what is contemplated by Section 57.105.

Section 57.105 permits attorney’s fees after a voluntary dismissal if the court finds, on a supported record, a complete lack of a justiciable issue.

Fierer v. 18th Ave. Development Corp. · filed 1982-06-15

Voluntary dismissal is not a bar to an award of attorney's fees. ... Executive Centers, supra, holds that a dismissal by itself will not support an award under Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1979), absent the required finding of a complete lack of justiciable issue which is supported by the record. ... Here, the trial court made the requisite finding on the basis of a proper record.

Section 57.105 permits an award of attorneys’ fees after a voluntary dismissal.

Merrill Enterprises, Inc. v. Barkett Oil Co. of Florida · filed 1982-11-10

We agree entirely with the MacBain decision and also hold that attorneys’ fees are taxable under the aforecited statute after a voluntary dismissal.

A lawsuit filed before the relevant legal issue was clearly resolved is not frivolous for purposes of section 57.105, even if the issue was resolved by trial.

Molyett v. Society Nat. Life Ins. Co. · filed 1984-07-13

For purposes of attorney's fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1981), we cannot say that this lawsuit was frivolous, even though the legal issue presented had been clearly resolved by Prince and Purdy by the time this case came to trial. Section 627.7372 requires the admission of collateral source evidence at trial. Until Prince, in 1983, it was not clear that this rule also applied in a situation where the parties settled out of court. This lawsuit was filed in 1982, before Prince was decided. Therefore, appellants are not entitled to attorney's fees under section 57.105.

Section 57.105 does not authorize attorney’s fees for an unsuccessful claim that has arguable substance.

Builders Shoring & Scaffolding v. King · filed 1984-08-02

We do not agree, however, that the third party complaint was so frivolous as to warrant the imposition of attorney’s fees against the third party plaintiffs under the provisions of section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1983). Although the position asserted by third party plaintiffs was erroneous on the merits, the claim was not entirely devoid of even arguable substance.

Attorney's fees awarded under section 57.105 are treated as costs.

Grasland v. Taylor Woodrow Homes Ltd. · filed 1984-12-05

We, therefore, adopt the view of our sister court and hold that attorney's fees awarded under section 57.105 should be treated as costs.

Section 57.105 does not necessarily permit attorney's fees when events during litigation reveal that a suit cannot be sustained.

Greater Clearwater v. Modern Graphic · filed 1985-02-15

Events during the course of a lawsuit which reveal that the litigation is not sustainable do not necessarily convert a case into one in which fees under section 57.105 are recoverable.

Section 57.105 can support an attorney’s-fees award in a suit to recover a real estate broker’s commission.

E.A. Law & Co., International v. Provende, Inc. · filed 1985-05-28

Suffice it to say, however, that the points on appeal all involve the application of well-settled principles of law ... and attorney’s fees under Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1983)... to the fact pattern revealed in this record. After a thorough study of the briefs and record herein, we are convinced that the trial court did not misapply any of these well-settled principles of law.

A party that prevails on summary judgment is not necessarily entitled to attorney’s fees under Section 57.105.

National Ben Franklin Insurance v. Naviera Neptuno S.A. · filed 1985-08-08

We do not, however, view this case as one in which attorney’s fees should be awarded pursuant to Section 57.105 Fla. Stat. 1984, so that portion of the judgment is reversed, and the failure to award additional fees is affirmed.

Section 57.105 permits an attorney's fee award based on conduct in a court proceeding, not conduct before the proceeding that led to the suit.

Ferrara v. Caves · filed 1985-09-18

It is conduct in connection with the court proceeding, e.g., stonewalling by a defendant who has no glimmer of a meritorious defense, not conduct long before there is a court proceeding, that can be grounds for an attorney's fee award under this statute.

Section 57.105 permits an award of attorney’s fees for both trial and appellate proceedings.

Miller & Squire, Chartered v. Hall · filed 1985-09-25

We determine that appel-lee is entitled to attorney’s fees, both trial and appellate, under the authority of section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1983), and remand to the trial court for determining the amount of same.

Section 57.105 permits an attorney's fee award against a party for a frivolous appeal.

NATIONAL UNION FIRE INS. COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH v. Gelfand · filed 1985-10-15

The points presented in the appeal taken by National Union alone are so patently frivolous that we have assessed a $2,500 attorney's fee against it under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1983).

Section 57.105 permits an award of attorney’s fees for a frivolous appeal.

Menkes v. Menkes · filed 1985-11-12

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and grant the appellee’s motion for attorney’s fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1983), in the amount of $1,000.

Section 57.105 permits attorney’s fees only when the circumstances satisfy the strict test established by case law.

Hall v. City of Pompano Beach · filed 1986-02-26

We disapprove of the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to appellees under section 57.105 because we do not believe the circumstances here meet the strict test laid down in the case law to justify such awards.

Section 57.105 does not permit an attorney’s fee award in this case.

Alario & Associates, Inc. v. Jorge Resendiz, Inc. · filed 1987-12-16

Plaintiff broker appeals from an order assessing attorney’s fees against the broker pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1985), after the entry of a summary judgment in favor of defendant in the broker’s suit for a commission. We agree with appellant that it was improper to award attorney’s fees in this case.

Section 57.105 permits a prevailing party to seek a reasonable attorney’s fee when the opposing claim or defense lacks a justiciable issue, subject to the statute’s good faith exception.

Capital Factors, Inc. v. Heller Financial, Inc. · filed 1989-04-28

However, even if the aforementioned motion had been timely filed, the Magistrate concluded that Plaintiff is within its right to request attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to Florida Statute Section 57.105. Upon review of this matter, the Court finds in accordance with the Magistrate, and hereby denies the aforesaid motion.

A denial of attorney’s fees under section 57.105 is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Syna v. Lewen · filed 1989-10-03

We find no abuse of discretion in the denial of fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1987).

Section 57.105 does not entitle a seller to attorney’s fees merely because it defeats a buyer’s specific performance claim.

Goldman v. Citicorp Savings of Florida · filed 1989-10-10

Further, Citicorp’s suggestion that it is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1987), is without merit.

Section 57.105 permits attorney's fees when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a claim that lacked any justiciable issue of law or fact.

Kirby v. Adkins · filed 1991-06-20

An award of attorney's fees may be made pursuant to section 57.105 when a plaintiff takes a voluntary dismissal provided there is a proper finding of a complete absence of a justiciable issue of law or fact.

Section 57.105(1) does not authorize attorney’s fees for a defendant voluntarily dismissed without success on a significant issue or relief on the merits.

Wendy's International, Inc. v. Nu-Cape Construction, Inc. · filed 1996-03-14(1)

Florida Statutes, Sections 57.041 and 57.105 limit recovery of costs and attorneys’ fees to the “prevailing party” or the “party recovering judgment.” ... Nu-Cape is not a prevailing party; it has not succeeded “on any significant issue in litigation” and has not received a judgment or any “relief on the merits of its claim.” Nu-Cape was simply voluntarily dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a).

Section 57.105 fees in a suit are foreclosed by a stipulated dismissal when the party did not move for or pursue them.

Doss v. Bank of America, NA · filed 2003-10-31

It is true that an award of section 57.105, Florida Statutes, attorney's fees in the collection suit were foreclosed by the joint stipulation and dismissal of it, since Doss did not move for or pursue them.

Section 57.105(1) does not justify attorney's fees solely because a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a defendant whose inclusion in the claim was arguably supported by fact and law.

Connelly v. Old Bridge Village Co-Op, Inc. · filed 2005-10-12(1)

The plaintiffs' ultimate voluntary dismissal of the Marinellis did not constitute adequate justification for section 57.105 fees.

Section 57.105 permits a party to present evidence supporting a fee motion after the lawsuit has been voluntarily dismissed.

Hustad v. Architectural Studio, Inc. · filed 2007-06-20(1)

Even when the lawsuit is dismissed in its early stages, the movant under section 57.105 is entitled to present evidence and establish a record for the purposes of demonstrating entitlement to attorney's fees. The failure of a trial court to consider a motion for award of section 57.105 attorney's fees merely because the lawsuit has been voluntarily dismissed is an abuse of discretion.

Under section 57.105(7), a defendant is the prevailing party for attorney's fees when the complaint against her is dismissed with prejudice, even if the plaintiff files a new action.

Bank of New York v. Williams · filed 2008-04-10(7)

Here, since the complaint was dismissed with prejudice, it is clear that Williams was the prevailing party.

A request for sanctions under section 57.105 does not give the movant a vested right to have sanctions decided or awarded when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action.

Service Experts, LLC v. Northside Air Conditioning & Electrical Service, Inc. · filed 2010-11-17

Also, the Northside defendants’ request for sanctions under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2009), filed in response to Service Experts’ complaint, did not vest upon them a right to have sanctions determined or awarded against Service Experts.

Section 57.105 requires a sanctions motion to be filed before voluntary dismissal for the trial court to retain jurisdiction to decide it.

Pomeranz & Landsman Corp. v. Miami Marlins Baseball Club, L.P. · filed 2014-08-13(4)

Pursuant to Pino v. Bank of New York, 121 So. 3d 23, 41-43 (Fla. 2013), a trial court has continuing jurisdiction to consider a 57.105 motion for sanctions only where the motion for sanctions was filed with the court before a voluntary dismissal.

A trial court lacks jurisdiction to hear a section 57.105 sanctions motion filed after the case is voluntarily dismissed.

Buckingham Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Metcalf · filed 2016-12-19

A trial court lacks jurisdiction to hear a motion for sanctions under section 57.105 that is filed after the case is voluntarily dismissed.

Section 57.105(7) permits a borrower to recover fees under a reciprocal contractual fee provision after the lender voluntarily dismisses a foreclosure action when the borrower's standing defense was never decided on the merits.

RODRIGUEZ v. WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, FSB, AS TRUSTEE FOR STANWICH MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST A · filed 2018-12-12(7)

WSF’s voluntary dismissal rendered Glass inapplicable because the parties never litigated the merits of Venture’s or WSF’s standing below, and the trial court never made a finding that the Borrower was not a party to the note or mortgage. ... Therefore, Borrower is not precluded from recovering fees based on a provision in the contract and section 57.105(7).

Section 57.105(7) permits reciprocal appellate attorney’s fees when the opposing party voluntarily dismisses its appeal after maintaining a right to enforce the contract’s fee provision.

Glass v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, etc. · filed 2019-01-04(7)

The issue presented in this case is a homeowner’s entitlement to appellate attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105(7), Florida Statutes, after a bank files a notice of voluntary dismissal in the district court of appeal. ... Because our caselaw is clear that a voluntary dismissal of an appeal renders the opposing party the prevailing party for the purpose of appellate attorney fees and because Nationstar maintained its right to enforce the reverse mortgage contract in its appeal until the dismissal, we quash the decision below.

Section 57.105(7) allows a prevailing party to rely on a reciprocal contractual fee provision after a voluntary dismissal when no court has determined that the parties lacked a contractual relationship.

DOMENIC GROSSO a/k/a DOMENIC L. GROSSO v. HSBC BANK USA, N.A. · filed 2019-02-06(7)

A voluntary dismissal, without a judicial determination, should allow reliance on the reciprocal attorney’s fees provision of section 57.105(7).

Section 57.105(7) allows a party to rely on a reciprocal attorney’s fee provision after a voluntary dismissal when no court has determined that the parties lacked a contractual relationship.

DOMENIC GROSSO a/k/a DOMENIC L. GROSSO v. HSBC BANK USA, N.A. · filed 2019-05-08(7)

A voluntary dismissal, without a judicial determination, should allow reliance on the reciprocal attorney’s fees provision of section 57.105(7).

Section 57.105(7) makes unilateral contractual fee provisions reciprocal and permits a prevailing borrower to recover fees after a bank’s voluntary dismissal when no court has found that the parties lacked a contractual relationship.

GEORGE P. VENEZIA and VICKY VENEZIA v. JP MORGAN MORTGAGE ACQUISITION · filed 2019-05-22(7)

The entitlement to fees under section 57.105(7) applies when the party seeking fees prevails and is a party to the contract containing the fee provision. ... Significantly, there was never a judicial determination by the trial court that the bank or appellants were not a party to the contract. Based on the foregoing authority, appellants were entitled to attorney’s fees.

Section 57.105(7) treats a defendant as the prevailing party when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a contract action, even if the plaintiff later refiles and prevails.

Mihalyi v. LaSalle Bank, N.A. · filed 2014-10-29(7)

A plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal makes a defendant the “prevailing party” within the meaning of subsection 57.105(7), even if the plaintiff refiles the case and prevails. ... Since LaSalle Bank voluntarily dismissed the foreclosure action against Mihalyi, she is the prevailing party.

Section 57.105(7) entitles a defendant to contractual attorneys’ fees and costs as the prevailing party when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action on remand.

Brian Kelly a/k/a Brian K. Kelly v. BankUnited · filed 2015-01-07(7)

As Appellee voluntarily dismissed the foreclosure action against Appellant on remand from the reversal of final summary judgment, Appellant is the prevailing party for purposes of section 57.105(7), which entitles him to attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to the provisions in the mortgage document.

Section 57.105(7) does not entitle a defendant to prevailing party fees after a voluntary dismissal when a settlement leaves neither party substantially prevailing.

Brian Kelly a/k/a Brian K. Kelly v. BankUnited, FSB · filed 2015-03-18(7)

Where a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal results in neither party substantially prevailing in the litigation outcome, neither party is the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys’ fees.

Section 57.105(7) treats mortgagors who obtain dismissal of a foreclosure action without prejudice as prevailing parties eligible for attorney’s fees.

Romaguera v. Trust Mortgage LLC · filed 2018-01-17(7)

Here, we conclude as a matter of law that the Romagueras were the prevailing party below within the meaning of section 57.105(7).

A court with jurisdiction over a post-dismissal sanctions motion may also consider a section 57.105 motion directed at that motion.

AGUILERA v. JOAO GABRIEL ALBERTO AGUILERA · filed 2020-12-09(1)

As the court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the renewed motion for sanctions, it also has jurisdiction to decide a motion for sanctions directed to that motion.

A section 57.105 sanction may be awarded against counsel after a voluntary dismissal where the defendants prevailed; the fee amount is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

LOPEZ v. CAVAGNUOLO · filed 2021-11-10

Upon our review of the record, we affirm, and hold that the trial court committed no error in its determination that defendants were the prevailing party following the filing of a notice of voluntary dismissal, nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in its determination of the amount and reasonableness of the attorney’s fees to be awarded.

Section 57.105 permits attorney's fees when an action is frivolous, including fees on appeal.

Kisling v. Wooldridge · filed 1981-04-29

In Allen v. Estate of Dutton, 384 So.2d 171 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), this court outlined the requirements for the award of attorney's fees under section 57.105. This case clearly falls within those requirements. ... The trial court was justified in finding the action frivolous and in awarding the fees. ... For the reasons expressed here, appellee's motion for appellate attorney fees under the same statute is granted, and the cause is remanded to the trial court to fix that fee.

Section 57.105 permits attorney's fees on appeal when the losing party raised no justiciable issue of law or fact, but an unsuccessful appeal is not necessarily frivolous.

Belcher v. First Nat. Bank of Miami · filed 1981-10-27

This section authorizes the award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in any civil action in which the court finds that there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the losing party. Although such fees are authorized on appeal, T.I.E. Communications, Inc. v. Toyota Motors Center, Inc., 391 So.2d 697 (Fla.3d DCA 1980), and would not constitute a retroactive application of Section 57.105 since the statute took effect June, 1978 and this appeal was filed in November, 1978, Love v. Jacobson, 390 So.2d 782 (Fla.3d DCA 1980), we nonetheless find that they are not merited under the facts of this case. In light of the recent Popovich ruling, appellants' position, although unsuccessful on the merits, was clearly not frivolous.

Section 57.105 permits attorney’s fees for an appeal that raises no justiciable issue of law or fact.

Ferguson v. Estate of Ferguson · filed 1982-03-03

This matter has been considered on motion to tax attorneys’ fees by appellee pursuant to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1980). The motion to tax attorneys’ fees is granted and the matter remanded to the trial court for determination as to the amount. After a thorough review of the briefs, the record on appeal, and the motions and arguments regarding attorneys’ fees, we conclude that this appeal presents a situation within the statute in that there is a complete absence of a justiciable issue of law or fact raised by appellant. This has been held to be the equivalent of frivolousness.

Section 57.105 permits a court to award an appellee attorney's fees on its own initiative in an appeal.

Smyth v. Smyth · filed 1982-08-04

This Court sua sponte awards appellee attorneys fees in this appeal pursuant to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1981) in the amount of $500.00.

Section 57.105 permits an attorney fee for defending a cross-appeal.

Hodge v. Department of Professional Regulation · filed 1983-04-27

We further award Dr. Hodge an attorney fee for defending the cross-appeal pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1981), and we direct the Board to set an appropriate fee.

Section 57.105 permits an award of attorney’s fees to appellees when an appeal is entirely frivolous.

Southeast First Leasing, Inc. v. Koontz · filed 1983-05-17

The trial court’s discretion was therefore so obviously properly exercised under Sec. 47.-122, Fla.Stat. (1981), e.g., ... that this appeal is entirely frivolous. We have accordingly granted the appellees’ several motions for attorney’s fees under Sec. 57.105, Fla.Stat. (1981).

Section 57.105 permits an appellate court to award attorney’s fees when there is a complete absence of a justiciable issue of law or fact, even if the opposing party prevailed below.

Department of Revenue v. Gurtler · filed 1979-10-03

Thus, notwithstanding their success in the lower court, we find there to be a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact. .This b.eing so, pursuant to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1978), we hereby assess One thousand ($1,000) dollars in attorneys fees in favor of the appellant.

Section 57.105 entitles the prevailing party to a reasonable attorney's fee for defending a frivolous lawsuit that raises no justiciable issue, including fees for trial and appeal.

Constructors, Inc. v. Carter Elec. · filed 1982-02-03

It is our considered opinion the appellant did not and, under all the facts and law shown to us by appellant, could not ever allege a justiciable issue. For that the appellee is entitled to an award of a reasonable attorney's fee for having to defend the frivolous lawsuit in the trial court and on appeal.

Section 57.105 permits an award of appellate attorney’s fees when an appeal raises no justiciable issue.

Hatcher v. Miller · filed 1983-03-01

Miller has moved for attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1981). We find that Hatcher has failed to raise a single justiciable issue and that his stubbornly litigious actions have resulted in a waste of judicial resources. Clearly, whatever benefits Miller may have hoped to derive from the lower court judgment have been significantly diminished by the cost of this appeal. We therefore grant a fee of $2,000 to Miller to help defray that cost.

Section 57.105 permits an award of attorney's fees on appeal when the appeal is spurious.

Nicholason v. Bryant · filed 1985-04-04

For the foregoing reasons, the modification order entered below on March 5, 1984, is affirmed and the appellee's motion for attorney's fees on appeal, based upon the "spurious" nature of this appeal ( i.e., based upon section 57.105, Florida Statutes), is granted.

An award of attorney fees under section 57.105 may be appealed.

Don Mowery, Inc. v. Hill · filed 1984-08-09

an award of attorney fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1983), on the basis that, as a matter of law, such an award by a trial court cannot be appealed. This erroneous determination constitutes a departure from essential requirements of law, and such is conceded by the respondents.

Subsection (1) authorizes attorney’s fee awards on appeal when a civil action completely lacks a justiciable issue of law or fact.

R.E. Medical Group, Inc. v. Frith · filed 1990-05-22(1)

When § 59.46 is read in conjunction with § 57.105(1), it authorizes an award of attorney’s fees on appeal in appropriate circumstances.

Section 57.105 permits an award of attorney’s fees on appeal when the appellate points are frivolous.

Smith v. Federal National Mortgage Co. · filed 1992-04-01

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment appealed from and award appellee attorney’s fees on appeal pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes.

Section 57.105(1) permits an award of attorney’s fees when an appeal presents a complete absence of any justiciable issue of law or fact.

Newman v. Henry · filed 1993-11-24(1)

We also find that there is a complete absence of any justiciable issue of law or fact presented in this appeal, and therefore we assess attorney’s fees in favor of appellee and against appellant pursuant to section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes (1991).

Section 57.105 permits a court to award attorney’s fees and costs on its own initiative when it finds an appeal frivolous.

Brahmbhatt v. Allstate Indemnity Co. · filed 1995-04-05

Although appellee has not requested this relief, we sua sponte dismiss this appeal because we have determined that the issue raised is so lacking in merit as to be frivolous on its face, and remand to the trial court with directions that costs and attorney’s fees be assessed pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes.

Section 57.105 authorizes an award of attorney’s fees and costs for a frivolous appeal.

Marrone v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance · filed 1995-05-03

We dismiss this appeal because it is frivolous and direct the trial court to award attorney’s fees and costs under section 57.105, Florida Statutes.

Section 57.105 permits appellate attorney's fees and costs for a frivolous appeal even when the appellee has not requested them.

Brahmbhatt v. Allstate Indemnity Co. · filed 1995-05-31

Although appellee has not requested this relief, we have determined that the issue raised is so lacking in merit as to be frivolous on its face, and we therefore remand to the trial court with directions that appellate costs and attorney's fees be assessed pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes.

Section 57.105 permits appellate attorney’s fees for a frivolous appeal whose lack of merit was apparent when filed.

Department of Revenue v. Smatt · filed 1996-07-19

We also hold this to be a frivolous appeal and remand for the imposition of attorney's fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes. ... After reviewing the facts of this case, the case law and the actions of the DOR, we find this appeal has no merit and it was apparent at the time the appeal was filed.

Section 57.105(1) permits an award of appellate attorney’s fees and costs against a party for an appeal that was meritless when filed.

Dicus v. District Board of Trustees for Valencia · filed 1999-06-04(1)

This is an example of an appeal with no merit. That fact was apparent at the time it was filed. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court but remand with instructions that appellate attorney’s fees ... and costs be assessed against appellant in favor of Valencia pursuant to section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes.

A finding that an appeal lacked merit under Rosen does not establish that it is frivolous for purposes of section 57.105.

Rados v. Rados · filed 2001-04-06

A determination by this court that an appeal lacked merit for purposes of Rosen, 696 So.2d 697, should not be equated with a determination that the appeal is "frivolous" for the purposes of section 57.105 or section 61.16(1), Florida Statutes (1999), which has more serious consequences.

Section 57.105 does not permit appellate attorney's fees against counsel for an appeal that presents a justiciable question and is not frivolous.

Lidsky Vaccaro & Montes, PA v. Morejon · filed 2002-03-13

Since Fortune's request that the appellate panel below revisit the prior appellate order rested upon the panel's grace or sound discretion, we do not believe that it could be deemed so frivolous as to warrant the imposition of attorney's fees pursuant to section 57.105. We have defined an appeal as frivolous if it presents no justiciable question and is so devoid of merit on the face of the record that there is little prospect it will ever succeed.

Section 57.105 does not authorize appellate attorney’s fees against a litigant whose unsuccessful action and appeal were not totally without merit.

Goldfisher v. Ivax Corp. · filed 2002-10-16

Those same cases providing that a “common benefit” may justify fees combined with the complaint’s arguable claim for relief, support the conclusion that IVAX is not entitled to section 57.105 fees. Dr. Goldfisher was not victorious, however neither his action nor subsequent appeal, were totally without merit.

Section 57.105 permits an appellate fee award for an unsupported interlocutory appeal to be made and enforced immediately after the appeal, without awaiting the final outcome of the case.

Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Herron · filed 2002-10-04(1)

It follows that when appellate attorney's fees are awarded under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1999), for an interlocutory appeal, the award should be made and enforced immediately after the appeal.

Section 57.105(1) permits an award of appellate attorney's fees when a party pursues an appeal it knew or should have known was factually and legally without merit.

Churchville v. Ocean Grove RV Sales, Inc. · filed 2004-06-18(1)

An award of appellate attorney's fees against the appellants is appropriate in this case to cover the attorney's fees incurred by the appellee, Damon Corporation, subsequent to the appellants filing their Amended Notice of Appeal, on March 24, 2004. See § 57.105(1) Fla. Stat. (2003); ... However, the appellants knew or should have known, when they presented this claim to the Court that it was factually and legally without merit.

Section 57.105(1) permits an appellate court to award attorney’s fees on its own initiative, with the fees paid equally by a party and its attorney.

Crosspointe, Inc. v. Johnson · filed 2005-03-10(1)

Upon this Court’s own initiative, respondent is awarded appellate attorney’s fees to be paid in equal amounts by petitioner and petitioner’s attorney pursuant to section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes.

Section 57.105 allows an appellate court to sanction conduct on appeal, while sanctions for conduct in the trial court must be determined by the trial court.

Boca Burger, Inc. v. Forum · filed 2005-09-29

As explained above, an appellate court only has authority to impose sanctions under section 57.105 for conduct occurring in the appellate court. Conversely, the trial court should determine any sanctions for conduct occurring in that court.

Section 57.105 permits an award of attorneys' fees for an appeal devoid of any arguable merit.

Buckeye Ret. Co. v. Nassau Land & Trading · filed 2006-11-03

Moreover, because this appeal is devoid of any arguable merit, we grant Kavanaugh's motion for attorneys' fees, made pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2005).

Section 57.105 permits an appellate court to impose attorney's fees for claims barred by res judicata or otherwise lacking legal merit after giving the appellant an opportunity to respond.

Giovanini v. Giovanini · filed 2007-07-24

As to each claim, this court ordered Appellant to show cause as to why fees should not be imposed on the claim pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes, on the basis that the claim was either barred by res judicata, or otherwise without legal merit. ... Appellant's reply to this court's show cause order was wholly unresponsive. Accordingly, attorney's fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes are hereby imposed against Appellant.

Section 57.105(1)(a) permits appellate attorney's fees when a party continues to defend a judgment despite knowing or having reason to know that its defense lacks support in the material facts.

Magee v. AMERICAN SOUTHERN HOME INS. CO. · filed 2008-06-02(1)(a)

Clearly, at the time American Southern filed its motion to relinquish jurisdiction, it knew or should have known its defense of the trial court's order was not supported by the necessary material facts. ... Magee's motion for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes is GRANTED.

Section 57.105 authorizes appellate attorney fees when a party and its attorneys knew or should have known their arguments lacked support in the material facts and applicable law, with fees apportioned between them under the statute's procedure.

Uniteamerica, Inc. v. Farmers and Merchants Bank · filed 2008-09-15

Furthermore, we conclude that appellant and its attorneys knew or should have known that the arguments made in the briefs were not supported by the material facts and applicable law. Consequently, we AFFIRM the trial court's challenged rulings and GRANT the appellee's motions for appellate attorney fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2005). On remand, the trial court shall determine the proper amount of the attorney fees for handling this appeal and shall then apportion the fees between appellant and its attorneys according to the procedure set out in section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2005).

Section 57.105 permits sanctions for a frivolous appeal, including an award of the appellee’s attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal.

Jenkins v. Motorola, Inc. · filed 2011-04-20

Appellee’s, Motorola, Inc., and Cingular, Inc., motion for sanctions pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes, (2011), for filing a frivolous appeal is granted. We remand to the trial court for an award to Motorola, Inc. of its attorney fees and costs incurred on this appeal.

Section 57.105 permits appellate attorney’s fees for an appeal unsupported by existing law, but a represented party cannot be sanctioned under subsection (1)(b).

Waddington v. Baptist Medical Center of Beaches, Inc. · filed 2012-01-30(1)(b), (3)(c)

Finding that this appeal satisfies section 57.105(l)(b), we award Appellee its reasonable appellate attorney’s fees to be paid in full amount by Appellant’s counsel. Although section 57.105(1) mandates that attorney’s fees be paid in equal part by both the losing party and counsel, section 57.105(3)(c) prohibits sanctioning a represented party under subsection (l)(b).

Section 57.105(1)(b) authorizes attorney’s fees for a frivolous appeal that counsel knew or should have known lacked legal merit.

Ass'n v. State, Fish & Wildlife Conservation Commission · filed 2012-06-06(1)(b)

We have the authority to award fees under this section when an attorney files a frivolous appeal. ... Based on the facts we have recited above, Appellants’ attorneys knew or should have known that this appeal meets this standard.

Section 57.105(1) permits an appellate court to award attorney’s fees on its own initiative when counsel knew or should have known that an appeal’s claims lacked support in the material facts of record.

Schwades v. America's Wholesale Lender · filed 2014-09-05(1)

The appellants’ attorney, Kelley Bosecker, knew or should have known, since the filing of her initial brief, that the claims asserted therein were not supported by the material facts of record. As such, counsel acted in bad faith in this matter. Therefore, we sua sponte award the appel-lees attorney’s fees for this appeal.

Section 57.105(1) permits an attorney’s fee award when a claim lacks support in material facts or existing law, even after a preliminary finding of probable cause.

Garrido v. Miami-Dade Police Department · filed 2015-02-25(1)

He was nonetheless wrong in rejecting out of hand the claim for fees under section 57.105, where as here, neither the facts nor the law supported in any fashion, the forfeiture sought.

Section 57.105 permits an appellate court to award attorney’s fees for defending a frivolous appeal.

Ruth Cosner and Law Firm of Topkin & Partlow v. Park · filed 2015-11-25

We affirm the final judgment entered by the trial court and grant the defendant/appellee’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees incurred in defending this appeal pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2013). ... Overall, this appeal meets the standard for frivolousness, and therefore an award of fees to the appellee is appropriate.

Section 57.105 permits attorney’s fee sanctions for a frivolous appeal, with fees assessed equally against the appellant and counsel.

Maestrales v. Flaherty · filed 2015-04-10

We find this appeal to be frivolous and completely without merit, as the sole error claimed is that the trial court conducted the rehearing as requested and scheduled by Appellant and Appellant’s counsel. Appellee’s motion for sanctions pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2013), is granted. The case is remanded to the Circuit Court in and for Volusia County, Florida pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.410(b) to determine and assess reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by Appellee for the appeal, which are to be paid in equal amounts by Appellant and Appellant’s counsel.

Section 57.105(1)(b) permits appellate sanctions when an appeal lacks a well-grounded legal argument.

In the Interest of A.T.H. · filed 2015-12-14(1)(b)

This appeal lacked any well-grounded legal argument and is, therefore, devoid of merit. ... Accordingly, we sanction Andrews ■ under section 57.105(l)(b) and rule 9.410(a).

Section 57.105(1) authorizes appellate attorney’s fees and costs as a sanction against a party and counsel for a frivolous appeal.

MANZARO v. D'ALLESSANDRO · filed 2017-11-01(1)

Pursuant to section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes (2016), Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.410(a), and this Court’s inherent authority, the Court awards the appellee its appellate attorney’s fees and costs as a sanction against the Appellant and his counsel, Guillermo J. Farinas, Jr., for the filing of a frivolous appeal.

Section 57.105(1) permits a court to impose sanctions on its own initiative when a litigant knew or should have known that an appeal lacked support in material facts or applicable law.

Galusha v. Lowes Home Centers, LLC, and Ann Shuler Waters · filed 2025-04-04(1)

Furthermore, we sua sponte impose sanctions on Appellant pursuant to section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes (2024), as he knew or should have known that his attempt on appeal to reverse the lower court was not supported by material facts or applicable law.

Section 57.105 does not authorize attorney’s fees against the State for appellate proceedings in a criminal case because it applies to appellate proceedings in civil cases.

State v. LoChiatto · filed 1980-03-19

Section 57.105, which provides: ... does not authorize this court to assess an attorney's fee against the State for appellate proceedings in a criminal case for the reason that the statute pertains to appellate proceedings in civil cases.

Section 57.105 does not authorize attorney’s fees for a defendant who defeats the plaintiff’s claim by raising an affirmative defense.

Southeast Growers, Inc. v. Designed Facilities, Inc. · filed 1979-05-11

It is therefore held that where a claim is asserted by plaintiff and defeated as a result of an affirmative defense raised by defendant, attorney’s fees cannot be awarded to defendant under §57.105.

Section 57.105 does not warrant an attorney's fee award where the court has found material issues of fact or law.

Denes and Denes & Associates, Inc. v. Walter E. Heller & Co. · filed 1981-03-24

The award of attorney's fees pursuant to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1978) is not merited under the facts of this case. Such an award is also inconsistent with a prior ruling by the court on appellees' motion for summary judgment wherein it was expressly held that there were material issues of fact or law.

Section 57.105 attorney’s fees cannot be awarded when no claim for fees under the statute was made.

Hartman Services, Inc. v. Southeast First National Bank of Miami · filed 1981-06-02

Second, it cannot be claimed under Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1979) because no claim for the award was made under the statute.

Section 57.105 does not authorize attorney's fees on the facts of this homeowners association assessment dispute.

Slater v. Breakwater Homes Ass'n · filed 1982-04-28

Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, does not apply to the facts of this case, nor can appellee rely on Section 718.125, Florida Statutes, which governs only the condominium form of ownership.

Section 57.105 permits an attorney fee award for defending a cross-appeal that lacks merit.

Hodge v. DEPT. OF PROF. REG. OF FLA. · filed 1983-04-27

We further award Dr. Hodge an attorney fee for defending the cross-appeal pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1981), and we direct the Board to set an appropriate fee.

Section 57.105 permits an appellate court to award attorney fees and remand for a hearing to determine a reasonable amount.

Hackenberg v. Artesian Pools of East Fla., Inc. · filed 1983-11-03

Further, we grant appellee's motion for attorney fees under Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1981) and remand the matter to the circuit court to hold a hearing to take evidence and assess a reasonable amount for those fees.

Section 57.105 does not apply when a party hires counsel to collect a debt that is admittedly due.

American Druggist Insurance Co. v. First Citizens Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n · filed 1986-02-19

While the courts may be sympathetic to the plight of those having to employ counsel and go to court to collect debts that are admittedly due, we have already determined in Fritillary that Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1983) does not apply to such situations.

Section 57.105 permits attorney’s fees as a remedy in suits brought under Florida’s election laws.

Broida v. Dade County Election & Canvassing Board · filed 1989-05-09

Appellant challenges that award, contending that section 57.105 is inapplicable to a suit brought under Florida’s election laws. We reject that assertion, for the applicable statutes contain no such limitation. Section 57.105 was a remedy available to appellee Newbold, and, on this record, the trial court properly found appellee was entitled to relief.

Section 57.105(1) applies to prohibition proceedings, including those arising from criminal cases, both in the circuit court and on appeal.

State v. Guzman · filed 1997-07-30(1)

Moreover, we note, and we urge both the state and the circuit court to do the same, that, unlike the underlying criminal proceeding, see State v. Brown, 527 So.2d 207 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), prohibition is in the nature of a civil remedy, see 35 Fla.Jur.2d Mandamus & Prohibition § 201 (1996), and is therefore subject to the strictures of section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes (1995), both below and on appeal.

Section 57.105 applies to dependency proceedings.

DEPT. OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERV. v. Carter · filed 2003-06-20

Accordingly, we conclude that section 57.105 applies to dependency proceedings.

Section 57.105 applies only to actions brought in Florida state courts and does not authorize fees in bankruptcy court.

University Centre Hotel, Inc. v. P.C.D. Construction, Inc. (In Re University Centre Hotel, Inc.) · filed 2005-03-22

Statutory attorney’s fees under Fla. Stat. § 57.105 is the second basis for recovery of fees and costs that was raised by P.C.D. for the first time at the hearing. First of all, this section is not an appropriate basis for an award of fees and costs in this Court because Section 57.105 only applies to actions brought in Florida state courts.

Section 57.105 does not authorize sanctions for a meritless claim in a collateral criminal proceeding.

McGee v. State, Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2006-07-31

Because Appellant’s petition is now considered a collateral criminal proceeding under Schmidt, Appellant cannot be sanctioned under section 57.105 for filing a meritless claim.

Section 57.105 does not authorize attorney's fees in collateral criminal proceedings.

Ortiz v. McDonough · filed 2007-05-04

We reverse that portion of the order finding Ortiz's petition to be frivolous pursuant to section 57.085(9), Florida Statutes (2005), and assessing attorney's fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2005), as these sections do not apply to collateral criminal proceedings.