Fla. Stat. § 57.105

Section 57.105(7) does not provide reciprocal attorney’s fees for an account stated action that does not rely on the credit contract containing the fee provision.

Foxhall v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC · filed 2018-11-30(7)

Because the action framed by Portfolio in these cases did not rely on the credit contracts containing the unilateral fee provision, we conclude that the debtors are not entitled to reciprocal fees under section 57.105(7) by virtue of those contracts.

Section 57.105(7) makes a contractual prevailing-party attorney’s fee provision reciprocal.

Kellogg & Kimsey, Inc. A Florida Corporation v. Progressive Plumbing, Inc. · filed 2019-09-30(7)

Florida Statute § 57.105(7) further renders a prevailing party contractual attorney’s fee provision bilateral in effect.

Section 57.105(7) gives the other party to a contract the same entitlement to prevailing party fees when the contract’s fee provision benefits only one party.

Neelu Aviation, LLC v. Boca Aircraft Maintenance, LLC · filed 2019-12-26(7)

However, even where a contract is “one-sided,” by operation of law, section 57.105(7) bestows on the other party to the contract the same entitlement to prevailing party fees.

Section 57.105(7) does not give a nonparty to a contract a reciprocal right to recover fees under that contract.

Miami Beverly, LLC · filed 2020-01-02(7)

Similar to the Florida Community Bank case, MDH is not an actual party to the contingency fee retainer agreement under which it seeks fees, accordingly, there is no reciprocity under section 57.105 and MDH and its counsel are not entitled to reimbursement of its fees and costs.

Section 57.105(5) does not authorize fees for an appeal before a district court of appeal because the appeal is not a chapter 120 administrative proceeding before administrative law judges.

Q.H. c/o AMY HILL v. SUNSHINE STATE HEALTH PLAN, INC. · filed 2020-10-07(5)

In this case, section 57.105(5) does not apply because this appeal is not an “administrative proceeding” under chapter 120, nor are the judges of this court “administrative law judges.”

Section 57.105(7) allows reciprocal contractual attorney’s fees when the movant is a party to the contract and has prevailed; fees are premature when prevailing-party status remains unresolved after remand.

Branch Banking & Trust Company v. KRAZ, LLC · filed 2020-10-20(7)

Further, “[i]n order to obtain prevailing party fees pursuant to section 57.105(7), the moving party must prove (1) that the contract provides for prevailing party fees, (2) that both the movant and opponent are parties to that contract, and (3) that the movant prevailed.” ... It is not clear at this stage whether BB&T is the prevailing party of the bankruptcy proceeding and adversary proceeding.

Section 57.105 does not support an attorney’s fee award for invoking circuit court jurisdiction when related claims properly aggregate above its monetary threshold.

JOYCE v. JOSEPH SHINGARY a/k/a JOE SHINGARY · filed 2020-12-16

We reverse the circuit court’s orders granting the corporate defendant’s motion for entitlement to attorney’s fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2019), and then awarding the corporate defendant the amount of those attorney’s fees. ... However, the record indicates the plaintiff’s original complaint and amended complaints all properly pled above the then-circuit court $15,000 jurisdictional amount by alleging unpaid future wages of $12,000 and unpaid past wages of $6,500, both arising from the corporate defendant’s termination of the plaintiff’s employment under a single independent contractor agreement.

Section 57.105(7) entitles a homeowner who successfully defends a foreclosure action for lack of standing to attorney’s fees when the mortgage provides for prevailing party fees.

FRANK WATERS v. U.S. BANK, N.A. · filed 2021-05-26(7)

The issue on appeal concerns Appellant’s entitlement to trial court attorney’s fees under section 57.105(7), Florida Statutes (2019), in a foreclosure action where the homeowner successfully defended against the foreclosure based on a lack of standing defense. ... Accordingly, we remand the matter to the trial court with instructions to vacate the order denying Appellant’s motion and to determine the appropriate amount of attorney’s fees.

Section 57.105(7) makes a contract’s unilateral attorney’s fee provision reciprocal for a borrower who prevails when the foreclosure plaintiff had standing at trial but not when it filed suit.

BEVERLY A ELLIS and FREDERICK J. ELLIS v. US BANK TRUST, N.A. · filed 2021-06-23(7)

In Page, our supreme court abrogated Glass, and held that a contract’s unilateral attorney’s fee provision became reciprocal to a borrower under section 57.105(7), Florida Statutes (2019), when the borrower had prevailed in a foreclosure action in which the plaintiff had established standing at the time of trial but not at the time suit was filed. ... Based on Page’s holding abrogating Glass, we now reverse the trial court’s order denying the borrowers’ motion for attorney’s fees in the instant case.

Section 57.105(7) permits contractual attorney’s fees for a borrower who successfully defends an enforcement action when the contractual relationship and fee provision are established, even if the lender failed to prove standing when it filed suit.

ARLENE GHENT and DAVID M. HENRY v. HSBC MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC. · filed 2021-06-30(7)

As our supreme court stated in Page, the failure to prove standing at the inception of suit does not prevent the borrowers from proving that the first condition of section 57.105(7) was satisfied: ... Therefore, the first condition was met in the instant case. It is also clear in this case that the borrowers satisfied the second condition required by section 57.105(7), as they “successfully defended against an action to enforce the contract.” Id.

Section 57.105(7) permits a prevailing party to recover contractual attorney’s fees when a contract existed between the parties and the party prevailed in an action concerning it.

MICHAEL R. MAISONNEUVE and CYNTHIA A. MAISONNEUVE v. SITUS INVESTMENTS, LLC · filed 2021-08-18(7)

Applying Page to this case, it is undisputed that a contract existed between the parties, which contract was assigned to the foreclosing party. Second, the mortgagors prevailed in an action with respect to the contract. Therefore, the mortgagors were entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105(7).

Section 57.105(7) makes a unilateral contractual attorney’s fee provision reciprocal when the other party prevails in an action to enforce the agreement, even if the loan is nonrecourse.

CASTELLANOS v. REVERSE MORTGAGE FUNDING LLC · filed 2021-05-12(7)

Therefore where, as here, the agreement contains a provision allowing unilateral attorney’s fees when one party is required to take action to enforce the agreement, and the other party to the agreement prevails in such action, section 57.105(7) applies to make the unilateral provision reciprocal and authorizes an award of attorney’s fees to that prevailing party.

Section 57.105(7) permits a borrower who defeats a mortgage claim after rescinding the loan to recover fees under the note and mortgage.

Kristin Lee Davis · filed 2021-09-15(7)

As the prevailing party, the Debtor’s request for attorney’s fees and costs under the note and mortgage will also be granted. Fla. Stat. § 57.105(7) (“If a contract contains a provision allowing attorney’s fees to a party when he or she is required to take any action to enforce the contract, the court may also allow reasonable attorney’s fees to the other party when that party prevails in any action, whether as plaintiff or defendant, with respect to the contract.”)

Section 57.105(7) permits reciprocal attorney’s fees only for contracts entered into on or after October 1, 1988; a transfer without a novation does not bring an earlier contract within the subsection.

CVP COMMUNITY CENTER, INC. v. MCCORMICK 105, LLC · filed 2020-08-05(7)

That section, however, applies to contracts which were entered into on or after October 1, 1988. As the contracts in this case were entered into before that date, section 57.105(7) did not apply.

Section 57.105(7) gives a prevailing party reciprocal attorney’s fees when the contract allows the opposing party to recover fees for enforcing it.

LUBITZ v. SCHENDEN · filed 2020-12-02(7)

The parties’ representation agreement allowed the law firm to recover attorney’s fees incurred in litigating to collect unpaid sums under the agreement. Under the reciprocity provision in section 57.105(7), Florida Statutes (2019), the client had a right to recover her attorney’s fees for prevailing in defending against the charging lien.

Section 57.105(7) makes a unilateral contractual attorney’s fee provision reciprocal when the other party prevails in an account stated action with respect to the contract.

Ham III v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC & SC18-2143 Laura Foxhall v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC · filed 2020-12-31(7)

We conclude that the unilateral fee provisions in the credit card contracts are made reciprocal to the prevailing debtors under section 57.105(7).

Section 57.105(7) makes a unilateral attorney’s fee provision reciprocal for a prevailing borrower even when the underlying loan is nonrecourse.

RUBIELLA v. CASCADE FUNDING RM3 ACQUISITIONS GRANTOR TRUST · filed 2021-05-19(7)

The legal question thus presented is whether the nonrecourse nature of the underlying loan renders inapplicable the reciprocity provision of section 57.105(7). We recently answered that question in the negative in Castellanos v. Reverse Mortgage Funding, LLC, 3D20-472 (Fla. 3d DCA May 12, 2021). ... The instant case is indistinguishable, in all material respects, from Castellanos. Therefore, and as we did in Castellanos, we reverse the trial court’s order denying Rubiella’s motion for attorney’s fees, and remand for the trial court to enter an order granting entitlement to fees under section 57.105(7) and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Section 57.105(7) allows prevailing defendants to recover attorney’s fees based on a mortgage’s fee provision even if the plaintiff was not assigned the note.

BLYTH v. OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC · filed 2021-08-18(7)

Even if appellee had not been assigned the note, appellants would still be entitled to fees under section 57.105(7), because of the fee provision in the mortgage.

Section 57.105(7) allows reciprocal attorney’s fees only when a contract gives one party a right to fees.

Jeffrey Allen Snyder and Noilyn Saray Snyder · filed 2021-11-16(7)

Because the Debtors cannot identify a unilateral contractual provision that would entitle the Creditor to attorney fees, the Debtors are not entitled to seek fees under that statute.

Section 57.105(7) requires a party seeking reciprocal attorney’s fees to establish a contract providing for fees, contractual privity between the parties, and prevailing party status.

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC, ETC. and U.S BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS TRUSTEE, etc. v. FARAMARZ · filed 2021-12-15(7)

Simply stated, for recovery of section 57.105(7) attorney’s fees, it is the moving party’s burden to establish: (1) a contract providing for attorney’s fees; (2) contractual privity between the plaintiff and defendant; and (3) a prevailing party.

Section 57.105(7) permits a prevailing borrower to recover attorney’s fees under a contract’s fee provision even after raising lack of standing as a defense.

ROBERTO VERDE AND SOLANGEL VERDE v. HSBC BANK USA, N.A. · filed 2022-01-05(7)

Consequently, because it is undisputed that the Verdes prevailed below and that they and HSBC Bank were parties to a contract with a fee provision, we conclude the Verdes were entitled to fees pursuant to section 57.105(7).

Section 57.105(7) makes unilateral attorney’s fee agreements reciprocal and does not apply when the agreement’s fee provision is not unilateral.

NATALIA SOLANGE FONT POMALES v. AKLIPSE ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC. · filed 2022-02-23(7)

The Tenants also moved for fees under section 57.105(7), Florida Statutes (2021), which makes unilateral fee agreements reciprocal. But because the provision in the lease agreement is not unilateral, that statute is inapplicable here.

Section 57.105(7) makes a contractual attorney’s fee provision reciprocal, allowing the prevailing party to recover fees when the contract requires them.

Scotlynn USA Division, Inc. v. Titan Trans Corporation · filed 2022-09-26(7)

And as the Magistrate Judge observed, the Broker-Carrier Agreement provides that litigation fees “shall” be shifted, and section 57.105(7) renders that provision reciprocal.

Section 57.105(7) does not make an attorney’s fee provision in one contract reciprocal for an action enforcing a separate agreement.

Rios v. Tower Hill Specialty Group, LLC · filed 2022-03-31(7)

This situation, then, lies outside the scope of § 57.105(7). That statute applies when a contract contains an attorneys’ fee provision and a party takes action to enforce the contract. See Fla. Stat. § 57.105(7). But here, although the Promissory Note contains such a provision, Rios took legal action to enforce the Operating Agreement, not the Promissory Note.

Section 57.105(7) permits a prevailing homeowner to recover reciprocal contract fees after an involuntary dismissal for the bank’s failure to prove standing, when the parties are not strangers to the contract and the contract allows the bank to recover fees.

TORRES v. THE BANK OF NEW YORK AS TRUSTEE · filed 2021-09-08(7)

We now reconsider the case at hand. Applying Page, first, the record establishes that the parties are not strangers to the contract; the homeowner concedes that he executed the subject note, and the bank proved that it had standing at the time of trial by presenting the blank- indorsed note. Second, the contract at hand contains a provision allowing the bank to recover attorneys’ fees: “Lender shall be entitled to collect all expenses incurred in pursuing the remedies provided in this [paragraph], including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys’ fees . . . .” Third, since the homeowner’s motion for involuntary dismissal was granted, the homeowner prevailed. These conditions having been met, we conclude that the trial court erred by denying the motion for attorneys’ fees.

Section 57.105(7) can allow a prevailing debtor to recover reciprocal attorney’s fees in an action seeking only denial of discharge, depending on the contract’s fee provision and the circumstances.

Valley National Bank v. Gleiber · filed 2023-08-28(7)

The Motion presents a question of first impression for this Court—whether Fla. Stat. § 57.105(7) applies in an adversary proceeding brought solely under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) for denial of discharge. The Court rules that, depending on the text of the relevant fee shifting provision in the parties’ contract and the circumstances of the case, a debtor prevailing in such an action may obtain fees and costs under Fla. Stat. § 57.105(7).

Attorney’s fees under § 57.105(7) cannot be awarded when the court cannot yet determine entitlement because the substantive claims remain unresolved.

Johnston-Gebre v. IH4 Property Florida, L.P · filed 2025-04-11(7)

As this Court denied SMS’s motion on both substantive grounds, it cannot, at this juncture, find that it is entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 57.105(7) and accordingly denies SMS’s motion on this issue.

Section 57.105(7) allows a prevailing party to recover reciprocal contractual attorney’s fees for prejudgment garnishment proceedings related to the contract.

Little v. Bath & Kitchen Boutique, LLC, Etc. · filed 2026-05-27(7)

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s determination that the fees provision in the Contract Amendment, made reciprocal by section 57.105(7), entitled BKB to an award of attorney’s fees for the legal work related to the prejudgment writ of garnishment.

Section 57.105(2) requires prevailing party status for an award of reciprocal contractual attorney’s fees.

E-Z Cashing, LLC v. Ferry · filed 2023-02-21(2)

Because the Court has reversed the Bankruptcy Court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of her, Ms. Ferry is no longer a prevailing party. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of HHR, 532 U.S. 598, 601 (2001) (explaining that a “judicial imprimatur,” in the form of a judgment on the merits or a consent decree or similar judicial relief, is necessary to establish prevailing party status). As such, Ms. Ferry is not entitled to attorney’s fees under Section 57.105(2). In re O’Steen, No. 3:14-BK-4766-PMG, 2019 WL 6001891, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2019) (determining that, in the context of Section 57.105(2), “the prevailing party determination is a precondition to the court’s exercise of discretion to award a fee to the other side.”).

Section 57.105(7) requires a binding contract to support an award of reciprocal attorney’s fees.

Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of West Palm Beach v. Vita Lounge, LLC · filed 2025-11-12(7)

Because the parties intended to be bound only when the negotiations were reduced to a formal writing, and a formal writing was never executed, there was no contractual basis to support an award of fees under section 57.105(7).

Section 57.105(7) can entitle a prevailing defendant to fees under a credit card agreement’s fee provision.

Engelin v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC · filed 2025-08-06(7)

As the prevailing party, Mr. Engelin was entitled to an award of his attorney's fees pursuant to section 57.105(7) and the fee provision in the credit card agreement.

Section 57.105(7) can entitle a defendant who prevails on a motion to dismiss to reasonable attorney’s fees for defending the action.

Law Office of Brandon A. Rotbart, P.A. v. Seraphin · filed 2025-10-01(7)

Accordingly, because the Court is granting Ms. Seraphin’s motion to dismiss the second amended complaint, she is the prevailing party under Fla. Stat. § 57.105(7), such that she is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees for defending against this action.

Section 57.105(7) allows a prevailing borrower to recover attorney’s fees when the note and mortgage allow the holder or lender to recover fees for enforcement.

Sequoia Financial Solutions, Inc. v. Warren · filed 2016-08-17(7)

Because both agreements contained a provision allowing for the ... holder/lender to collect attorneys’ fees in enforcing them, the Warrens as the borrowers may receive attorneys’ fees under § 57.105(7) because they prevailed when the district court dismissed the case.

Fees awarded under section 57.105 are charged entirely to the liable party rather than prorated according to the parties’ property interests.

Barden v. Pappas · filed 1990-07-12

This court in the earlier opinion, while not specifying so, awarded attorneys fees pursuant to Section 57.105 Florida Statutes (1987). While we affirm the amount of fees set by the court, we reverse the pro rata award and order that the entire amount be awarded against appellee.

A trial court may award appellate attorney fees under section 57.105 only if the appellate court remands that issue.

LeGrand v. Dean · filed 1992-05-08

On the other hand, the trial judge clearly lacked jurisdiction to grant appellate attorney fees, absent a remand of that issue from this court.

Section 57.105 did not support an attorney-fee award against counsel personally on these facts, despite her misconduct.

Moore v. Moore · filed 1995-05-05

We are sympathetic with the plight of the trial judge, but on the facts of this case, we are nevertheless unable to sustain an award of attorney fees entered against her personally pursuant to Section 57.105.

Section 57.105 does not permit an attorney’s fee award against counsel for fees incurred before counsel appeared in the case.

Maloney v. Avemco Insurance Co. · filed 2001-09-26(1)

We also conclude that it was error to award fees against Maloney for the period of more than two years prior to April, 1992, the date of his appearance as Tobin’s attorney.

Section 57.105(1) generally requires the losing party and the losing party’s attorney to pay an attorney’s fee award in equal amounts.

Neustein v. Miami Shores Village · filed 2002-12-26(1)

We reverse on the amount, and remand with directions to reduce the amount of the judgment to fifty percent of $11,500. In an ordinary award of 57.105(1) fees, “the court shall award a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid to the prevailing party in equal amounts by the losing party and the losing party’s attorney....” § 57.105(1), Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis added).

Section 57.105(1) requires fees awarded to the prevailing party to be paid in equal amounts by the losing party and the losing party’s attorney.

Toemmes v. Sites · filed 2003-06-11(1)

The final judgment should reflect that the fees are “to be paid to the prevailing party in equal amounts by the losing party and the losing party’s attorney.”

Section 57.105(1) requires the sanctioned attorney’s fee to be paid in equal amounts by the party and the party’s attorney.

Wasileski v. Warga · filed 2004-03-11(1)

We do, however, find error in the apportionment of fees. Accordingly, we vacate that portion of the order and remand with directions that the order require the “attorney’s fee to be paid to the [former wife] in equal amounts by the [former husband] and the [former husband’s] attorney.” § 57.105(1), Fla. Stat. (1999).

Section 57.105 places the attorney’s share of a fee award on the losing party when the attorney acted in good faith based on the client’s misrepresentations.

Avemco Insurance Co. v. Tobin · filed 2004-11-10

Where the court finds that the attorney was acting in good faith, then the attorney’s share should be awarded against the losing party.

Section 57.105(1) requires an award of attorney's fees in equal amounts against the losing party and the losing party's attorney when its conditions for fees are met.

Danziger v. Alternative Legal, Inc. · filed 2008-05-21(1)

Based on the foregoing, we hold the trial court erred in not awarding attorney's fees "to be paid to the prevailing party in equal amounts by the losing party and the losing party's attorney" pursuant to section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes.

Section 57.105 does not allow a court imposing attorney’s fees here to sanction the attorney while excluding the party.

Skarka v. Lennar Homes, Inc. · filed 2010-03-03(1)(b)

Because Petitioner’s attorney’s reply to this court’s show cause order was wholly unresponsive, attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2008), are hereby imposed against Petitioner’s attorney and Petitioner. Although we would prefer to exclude Petitioner from this sanction, section 57.105 does not authorize this court to fashion such a remedy.

Section 57.105(1) requires sanctions for unsupported legal positions to be paid in equal amounts by the losing party and the losing party’s attorney.

Stratton v. 6000 Indian Creek, LLC · filed 2012-07-25(1)

In such a case, the sanctions award is “to be paid to the prevailing party in equal amounts by the losing party and the losing party’s attorney” as specified by section 57.105(1).

Section 57.105(1) requires fees to be paid in equal amounts by the losing party and the losing party’s attorney, subject to the attorney’s good-faith exception in subsection (3).

Shelly L. Hall, M.D., P.A. v. White · filed 2012-08-29(1)

As to the fees under section 57.105, we agree that the trial court abused its discretion in taxing those fees solely against the appellant. Section 57.105(1) provides that the fees are “to be paid to the prevailing party in equal amounts by the losing party and the losing party’s attorney.” Here, the appellees’ motion for fees under section 57.105 was clearly addressed toward the conduct of the appellant’s attorney, Roger Hall, and we decline to infer that the trial court intended to find that Hall acted in good faith so as to be exempt from fees under section 57.105(3).

Section 57.105 does not support imposing a fee sanction on an attorney individually when the sanction was not sought against him and the record does not establish that his role warrants it.

Airan2 v. Cadence Bank, N.A. · filed 2012-03-16

From this record, it does not appear that the Bank requested a judgment against Mr. Airan. Moreover, the record does not establish that his limited .role in this lawsuit would warrant this sanction even if the Bank had requested it. Accordingly, the trial court erred in holding Mr. Airan jointly and severally responsible for half of the section 57.105 fee sanction imposed.

Section 57.105 does not permit both a client and an attorney to be liable for the entire fee award.

Austin & Laurato, P.A. v. State Farm Florida Insurance Co. · filed 2017-11-17(1)

While section 57.105 contemplates situations where either the client or the attorney may be liable for one hundred percent of the fee award, it does not permit both to be held liable for the entire award.

Section 57.105(1) requires a fee award to be divided equally between the losing party and its attorney, rather than imposing the full amount on both.

Mc Liberty Express v. All Points Services · filed 2018-08-08(1)

Section 57.105(1) requires apportionment of fee awards “to be paid to the prevailing party in equal amounts by the losing party and the losing party’s attorney . . . .” Here, the trial court’s orders appear to improperly impose “joint and several liability” for the full amount upon the appellants, Garcia-Menocal, and the GMIP law firm. ... Accordingly, reversal is likewise warranted on this issue.

A section 57.105 fee award requires specific factual findings when the court concludes that the issues are too intertwined to allocate fees.

MARIA ISABEL SAAD v. ABUD · filed 2023-04-19

We find that the trial court committed reversable error by failing to include in the final judgment on the motion for sanctions specific factual findings to support its legal conclusion that the issues are so inextricably intertwined that allocation of time spent solely on establish an enforceable contract was not possible.

Section 57.105(1) permits attorney's fees for a complete absence of a justiciable issue, but does not permit a contingency risk multiplier for those fees.

Transflorida Bank v. Miller · filed 1991-04-01(1)

However, the trial court erred by applying a contingency risk multiplier in computing the 57.105(1) attorney's fees.

Section 57.105 fees cannot include a contingency risk multiplier when counsel’s fee depends solely on a section 57.105 recovery in a patently frivolous case.

Swortz v. Southern Rainbow Corp. · filed 1992-08-04

As a result, the trial court may not, on remand, apply a contingency risk multiplier in computing the section 57.105 attorney’s fees.

Section 57.105 fee awards cannot include a contingency risk multiplier.

Richardson v. Merkle · filed 1994-12-02

A contingency risk multiplier should not be applied to an award of fees based on section 57.105.

A fee award under section 57.105 does not warrant a contingency risk multiplier when counsel is paid hourly and faces no risk of nonpayment.

Pompano Ledger, Inc. v. Greater Pompano Beach Chamber of Commerce, Inc. · filed 2001-12-12

Although we approve the authority of the court to award fees under this section in this case, the trial court applied a contingency fee multiplier to enhance the fee award. ... Because there was no risk of nonpayment and the fee arrangement was strictly an agreement to pay fees on an hourly basis, the use of a multiplier was not justified.

Section 57.105 presumes fees will be assessed against both the attorney and client unless the attorney shows good faith.

Horticultural Enterprises v. Plantas Decorativas, LTDA · filed 1993-09-03

The statute clearly makes “good faith” an avoidance of the presumptive assessment of fees against both attorney and client, however. Fees must be assessed against counsel as provided by statute unless the attorney can show good faith.

Section 57.105(1) sanctions do not apply to counsel's ill advised appellate argument when counsel conscientiously determined that the argument was required to represent the client.

Insua v. Chantres · filed 1996-01-17(1)

On the basis of counsel's frank and forthcoming post-opinion motion, we modify the last sentence of the opinion of December 6, 1995, to reflect that Travelers Indemnity Company had no part in the appellee's contention in the answer brief that the order should be affirmed and that the actions of counsel, who was responsible for that argument, while ill advised, were based on a conscientious determination that the position was required properly to represent Ms. Chantres. (The answer brief was required to be filed during the period between counsel's motion to withdraw from that representation and the granting of that motion by this court.) The facts demonstrate, therefore, contrary to our initial conclusion, that neither Travelers nor counsel is properly subject to the sanctions of section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1993).

Section 57.105 permits an attorney’s fee award against an attorney who relitigates claims already determined to be a sham; the attorney cannot claim good faith.

Security Pacific Credit Cor v. Oasis Plaza Corp. · filed 1998-05-20

Appellant, Security Pacific Credit Corporation (“SPCC”) appeals the denial of attorney’s fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1995), against attorney-appellee, Bruce Friedlander (“Friedlander”). We reverse, because Friedlander did not act in good faith where he re-litigated claims that had already been determined to be a sham.

When a complaint raises no justiciable issue, the attorney bears the burden of showing good faith to avoid a personal assessment of fees under section 57.105(1).

Andzulis v. Montgomery Road Acquisitions, Inc. · filed 2002-11-01(1)

The trial judge in this case misapplied the burden of coming forward with evidence concerning whether Adams acted in good faith. Adams or his attorney had that burden at the fee hearing and failed to address or carry it. The burden was not on the moving parties, the Andzulises, to show bad faith or the absence of good faith.

Under the 1996 version of § 57.105, an attorney who acts in good faith is not personally responsible for fees; good faith requires honesty, sincerity, and a lack of recklessness, rather than freedom from simple negligence.

Schwartz v. Millon Air, Inc. · filed 2003-08-12

Again the touchstone is whether the lawyer acted in “good faith.” And a good faith standard is not a simple negligence standard; good faith focuses on honesty, sincerity, and a lack of recklessness.

Section 57.105(1) requires an evidentiary hearing before counsel is excluded from personal liability under its good-faith exception.

O'Grady v. Potash · filed 2003-12-24(1)

We reverse that portion of the order excluding counsel for Potash from liability, and remand for an evidentiary hearing where counsel for Potash may present evidence, if any, that he acted in good faith based on the representations of his client.

Section 57.105(1) protects a losing party’s attorney from personal responsibility for fees if the attorney acted in good faith based on the client’s representations about material facts.

Tobin v. Bursch · filed 2005-03-30(1)

Upon remand, the trial court is directed to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the plaintiffs’ attorney “acted in good faith, based on the representations of his or her client as to the existence of those material facts.” § 57.105(1), Fla. Stat. (2002). If the trial court determines that the plaintiffs’ attorney acted in good faith, fees are to be assessed only against Raymond and Deborah Burseh.

Section 57.105(1) requires the court to assess fees only against the client if the client's attorney acted in good faith based on the client's representations about material facts.

Tobin v. Bursch · filed 2008-03-26(1)

Upon remand, the trial court is directed to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Jonathan E. Bursch's attorney "acted in good faith, based on the representations of his or her client as to the existence of those material facts." § 57.105(1), Fla. Stat. (2002). If the trial court determines that his attorney acted in good faith, fees are to be assessed only against Jonathan E. Bursch.

Under section 57.105(1), counsel must make an objectively reasonable investigation of the facts supporting a claim to avoid liability for attorney's fees; merely vetting a client's account is insufficient.

Yang Enterprises, Inc. v. Georgalis · filed 2008-08-07(1)

Additionally, counsel's assertion that he should not be held liable for one-half of the attorney's fees under section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes, is unavailing. It is not enough for counsel to assert that he "vetted" his clients' representation of the facts. To avoid liability, counsel must make an objectively reasonable investigation of the purported facts supporting a claim.

Section 57.105(1) requires a full evidentiary hearing on counsel’s good faith before imposing attorney’s fees on counsel.

FERDIE v. Isaacson · filed 2009-05-06(1)

A trial court’s decision under section 57.105(1) must be supported by competent substantial evidence; therefore, it follows that a full evidentiary hearing on the good faith issue is necessary.

Section 57.105(3)(b) does not require a finding that an attorney lacked good faith before fees are awarded against the attorney.

Dan Pronman, Gary Pronman and Mark P. Bockstein v. Brian Styles and Movie Star Musclecars, Inc. · filed 2015-03-04(3)(b)

Nothing in the plain language of the statute suggests that the court is required to find that there was not good faith before granting an award.

Section 57.105(3)(a)’s good-faith exception can protect a claim seeking to extend existing law.

William B. Mills v. Vero Beach Country Club, Inc. · filed 2020-10-14(3)(a)

VBCC’s argument in Count II thus fell within section 57.105(3)’s “good faith” exception.

The 1990 amendment to section 57.105(1) concerning prejudgment interest does not apply retroactively to cases commenced before its October 1, 1990 effective date.

Visoly v. Security Pacific Credit Corp. · filed 1993-10-12(1)

We also reject plaintiff's argument that the amendment to section 57.105(1) bars the award of interest in this case. ... Plaintiff correctly asserts that the amendment can be construed as a bar to awarding interest to a defendant; however, the assertion fails because the amendment became effective October 1, 1990, and may not be applied retroactively to this case, which commenced in May 1990.

The 1990 prejudgment-interest amendment to section 57.105(1) applies only to actions instituted on or after its October 1990 effective date.

Miller v. Transflorida Bank · filed 1995-06-28(1)

The sentence in question became effective as of October 1990. See Ch. 90-300, § 1, at 2387, Laws of Fla. That part of section 57.105(1) applies only to “actions instituted on or after that date.” Ch. 90-300, § 2, at 2387, Laws of Fla. Here, the action began on April 1, 1987. Therefore, the amendment to section 57.105(1) does not bar an award of prejudgment interest to appellant. On the other hand, it also does not establish appellant’s entitlement to prejudgment interest.

Section 57.105(1) includes prejudgment interest in an attorney’s fee award, accruing from the date entitlement to fees is determined until the amount is fixed.

Wells v. Halmac Development, Inc. · filed 2016-02-03(1)

Moreover, section 57.105(1) expressly awards prejudgment interest as part of its recovery: “Upon the court’s initiative or motion of any party, the court shall award a reasonable attorney’s fee, including prejudgment interest, to be paid to the prevailing party . . . .” Accordingly, we conclude that prejudgment interest is due to Petitioners on the award of $36,000 from the date this Court determined their entitlement to attorneys’ fees (July 10, 2013) to the date the trial court rendered the Appellate Fee Judgment determining the exact amount due (December 10, 2014).

Section 57.105(1) does not authorize costs or attorney’s fees for litigating the amount of a fee award.

Eisman v. Ross · filed 1995-12-13(1)

Based on the record before us, we affirm the trial court's award of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes (1993). We must, however, reverse that portion of the award which represents both costs and attorney's time spent litigating the amount of fees because there is no statutory basis for the same.

Section 57.105(7) does not authorize fees for time spent litigating the amount of attorney's fees.

Mediplex Const. of Florida, Inc. v. Schaub · filed 2003-09-03(7)

As such provisions do not exist, the Schaubs cannot avoid Palma under the instant facts. In conclusion, to paraphrase the supreme court in Palma, if section 57.105 should be broadened to include fees for time spent litigating the amount of attorney's fees, then the legislature, and not this court, should do so.

Section 57.105(7) does not allow recovery of attorney’s fees for determining the amount of fees due.

HOUSEHOLD FINANCE CORP., III v. WILLIAMS · filed 2020-02-19(7)

Section 57.105(7), Florida Statutes, allows courts to grant reasonable attorney’s fees to a party when that party prevails in any action regarding a contract that allowed for attorney’s fees. However, this statute does not permit an award of “fees for fees.”

Section 57.105 does not authorize imposing costs, including expert witness fees, on the losing party's attorney.

Berman & Feldman v. Winn Dixie, Inc. · filed 1996-12-18

However, in the supplemental final judgment, an eight-hundred-dollar expert witness fee, along with prejudgment interest thereon, was assessed against the appellants. This was error since section 57.105 does not provide for the imposition of costs against the losing party's attorney.

Under the 1995 version of section 57.105, fees cannot be assessed against an attorney who did not file the initial complaint when that complaint was not found frivolous from its inception.

Bisson v. Arellano · filed 2003-02-05

However, we reverse the fee award ordering plaintiffs' attorney to pay fees as this attorney did not file the initial complaint in this action. ... In this case, there has been no determination that the initial complaint was frivolous.

A request for fees against predecessor counsel under section 57.105(1) requires notice to that counsel, whether the request is made in the trial court or on appeal.

Alvarez, Armas & Borron, P.A. v. Heitman · filed 2000-10-18(1)

Due process considerations require that if attorney’s fees are sought against predecessor counsel, predecessor counsel must be given notice of that fact. That is true when a 57.105(1) motion is filed in the trial court, and is also true in the present circumstance where that relief is sought by appeal.

Section 57.105 does not make equitable considerations, including payment of a party’s fees through indemnification, relevant to entitlement to fees.

O'GRADY v. Potash · filed 2002-06-05(1)

Clearly, the legislature has not identified the equities of a situation as a consideration under section 57.105. Thus, the fact that O'Grady was indemnified has no bearing on the determination of her entitlement to fees.

Section 57.105(3) permits an award of discovery expenses when a discovery response was primarily intended to cause unreasonable delay; the award requires findings supporting that basis.

Harley Shipbuilding Corp. v. FAST CATS FERRY SERVICE, LLC. · filed 2002-07-10(3)

Fast Cats sought sanctions under the new version of section 57.105(3), Florida Statutes (2000), which requires the court to award damages to the moving party for expenses in obtaining an order compelling responses to discovery when the response to a demand for discovery "was taken primarily for the purpose of unreasonable delay." The circuit court made no findings suggesting that Fast Cats is entitled to attorneys' fees for obtaining this order. ... We also quash that portion of the order finding that Fast Cats is entitled to sanctions of attorneys' fees and costs.

Section 57.105(5)'s policy of reciprocal attorney's fees is not strong enough to override a contractual choice of another state's law.

Walls v. Quick & Reilly, Inc. · filed 2002-08-30(5)

Surely, if the courts do not attach a strong public policy to Florida's usury laws and statutes of limitations, we should not attach a strong public policy to the provisions of section 57.105(5), which allows reciprocal attorneys fees in contract actions.

Section 57.105’s reciprocal attorney’s fee provision is substantive for choice-of-law purposes and does not apply when another state’s substantive law governs.

Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Tousa, Inc. v. Citicorp North America, Inc. (In Re Tousa, Inc.) · filed 2009-10-30(7)

The Florida Supreme Court’s determination that statutory rights to attorneys’ fees are substantive precludes me from relying on § 57.105 in awarding attorneys’ fees to the Committee here.

Section 57.105 does not express a public policy strong enough to override a contractual choice of another jurisdiction’s substantive law.

Southeast Floating Docks, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co. · filed 2012-02-02

Under a conflict of law analysis, an award of attorney’s fees under section 768.79 is not substantially different than an award of fees under section 57.105. Neither statute advances a sufficient public policy concern to override the strong policy of protecting freedom of contract.

Under the 1997 version of section 57.105(1), a court determines whether a claim was frivolous from the prejudgment record without additional discovery.

Jackson v. York Hannover Nursing Centers, Inc. · filed 2003-09-05(1)

Thus, a trial court need only review the prejudgment record to determine whether there is a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the complaint. In any event, deposing the Personal Representative’s attorneys is unnecessary because a determination should be based on the face of the prejudgment record. A motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes (1997), therefore, does not require additional discovery to determine whether a cause of action at its inception was completely untenable and frivolous.

Section 57.105(4) requires a party seeking attorney’s fees to comply with its 21-day safe harbor before filing or presenting the motion.

City of North Miami Beach v. Berrio · filed 2011-06-01(4)

Because the motion for attorney’s fees should have been denied for noncompliance with the twenty-one day “safe harbor” provision of subsection 57.105(4), Florida Statutes, we reverse.

A trial court’s award of attorney’s fees under section 57.105 is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Mercury Ins. Co. of Florida v. Coatney · filed 2005-09-16

A trial court's determination in regard to an award of section 57.105 attorney's fees is reviewed by the abuse of discretion standard.

An award of attorney's fees under section 57.105 rests in the trial court's discretion and is reviewed for clear abuse of discretion.

Nasser v. Nasser · filed 2008-01-30

The award of attorney's fees under section 57.105 is a matter committed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal, absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion.

An order denying section 57.105 sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Fils-Aime v. Roberson · filed 2019-05-08

An appellate court reviews an order denying a motion for 57.105 sanctions for an abuse of discretion.

A section 57.105 fee award is reviewed for abuse of discretion as to statutory compliance and the amount of fees.

RESTORATION 1 OF THE TREASURE COAST, INC. a/a/o PATRICIA MORELLI v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY and STATE FARM · filed 2023-01-04

We conclude that the appellant did not object to or try to cure any insufficiency in the motion itself, and the court did not abuse its discretion in determining both that the requirements of section 57.105 were met and the amount of attorney’s fees.

Section 57.105(4) bars a party from filing a sanctions motion when the challenged claim is withdrawn within twenty-one days after service.

Vanderpol v. Frengut · filed 2006-07-12(4)

Appellant withdrew his motion well within the twenty-one day period provided for in section 57.105(4). Therefore, we find that appellees were not permitted to file their motion and that the trial court erroneously considered it.

Section 57.105(4) permits reasonable attorney’s fees incurred after service of a sanctions motion when the opposing party continues to pursue a meritless claim.

Delta Fire Sprinklers, Inc. v. SouthTrust Bank, N.A. · filed 2006-09-08(4)

However, Delta continued to pursue its meritless claim by filing a motion for rehearing and propounding a discovery request upon South-Trust. After denying the motion for rehearing, the trial court acted within its discretion in awarding SouthTrust its reasonable attorney’s fees incurred subsequent to the date of service of its motion for attorney’s fees.

Section 57.105(4) requires a party seeking sanctions to serve the motion and allow 21 days for withdrawal or correction before filing it; failure to comply bars an attorney's-fee award.

Burgos v. Burgos · filed 2007-02-14(4)

The appellee failed to comply with the requirements of section 57.105(4). Therefore, the trial court erred in granting attorney's fees under section 57.105.

Section 57.105(4) requires a party seeking attorney's fees under subsection (5) to give twenty-one days' notice; the court cannot bypass that requirement by adopting the party's motion as its own.

Davidson v. Ramirez · filed 2007-11-14(4)

The legislative intent is to require the twenty-one-day notice whenever a subsection 57.105(5) motion is filed by a party. It would frustrate the legislative intent to avoid the twenty-one-day notice by allowing the court to adopt the party-filed motion as the court's own. Since this was a party-filed motion, the subsection 57.105(4) notice period had to be observed.

Section 57.105(4) requires a party to serve a sanctions motion and wait 21 days before filing it; a warning letter does not satisfy the motion requirement.

Nathan v. Bates · filed 2008-12-24(4)

The statute, however, clearly provides for a motion, not a letter. The clear language of the statute refers to the service of a motion, followed by its filing twenty-one days later.

Section 57.105(4) requires service of the sanctions motion itself; a warning letter is insufficient, and filing after the proceedings end denies the opposing party the required twenty-one days to withdraw the challenged claim.

Anchor Towing, Inc. v. Florida Department of Transportation · filed 2009-04-22(4)

The letter that Sunshine’s counsel sent to Anchor’s counsel threatening to seek attorney’s fees does not meet the mandatory notice requirements of section 57.105(4). The letter sent to opposing counsel is not the same as the statutorily required motion, which is required to be served on opposing counsel and later filed with the court. ... Filing the motion with the court after the proceedings concluded also does not comply with the statute, as Anchor did not then have the statutorily required twenty-one days in which to withdraw the objected to claims.

Section 57.105(4) requires a party to wait twenty-one days after serving a sanctions motion before filing or presenting it to the court.

Montgomery v. Larmoyeux · filed 2009-06-03(4)

Section 57.105(4) could not be clearer in its requirement that a motion seeking sanctions may not be filed with or presented to the court within twenty-one days of service of the motion.

Section 57.105(4) requires a party seeking fees to serve the motion 21 days before filing it with the court.

Nedd v. Gary · filed 2010-06-02(4)

Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2007), cannot support an award of fees. Gary did not serve the Nedds with a section 57.105 motion 21 days before filing it with the court.

Section 57.105(4)’s 21-day safe harbor applies to sanctions motions in appellate proceedings: the motion is served before filing, giving the opposing party time to withdraw or correct the challenged matter.

In Re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure · filed 2010-06-24(4)

To harmonize the rules with section 57.105, we adopt the amendments as proposed by the Committee. ... Subdivision (b)(4) incorporates the requirements of the safe-harbor provision of section 57.105. If the nonmoving party does not withdraw or correct the challenged paper or statement within twenty-one days of service of the motion, the movant would be authorized to file the motion with the court no later than the time for serving the reply brief, if applicable, or no later than thirty days after service of the motion.

Section 57.105(4) requires a party seeking sanctions to serve its motion and allow 21 days to withdraw or correct the challenged allegation before filing it.

DeLauro v. Porto · filed 2011-07-08(4)

Porto served DeLauro with his motion for attorney’s fees as sanctions on April 30, 2008, and his motion was filed with the bankruptcy court on the same day. Therefore, Porto did not provide DeLauro an opportunity to amend or withdraw his objections within 21 days before he filed the motion for sanctions, as the statute requires.

Section 57.105(1), as conditioned by subsection (4), does not authorize fees on a post-mistrial motion when the challenged allegation made during jury selection cannot be withdrawn or corrected within the 21-day period.

Ferere v. Shure · filed 2011-07-20(1), (4)

Here, given that the plaintiffs counsel alleged the “doctoring of records” during jury selection, there was no way for the plaintiffs counsel to “withdraw or appropriately correct” that allegation within 21 days after service of the defendants’ post-mistrial motion. Thus, section 57.105(1), as conditioned by section 57.105(4), was not applicable to this situation.

Section 57.105’s twenty-one-day safe harbor makes sanctions unavailable when the challenged party voluntarily dismisses the case within that period.

Pino v. Bank of New York · filed 2013-02-07(4)

Sanctions pursuant to section 57.105 were unavailable because BNY Mellon dismissed the case within twenty-one days of Pino’s request for sanctions.

Section 57.105(4) requires twenty-one days notice before an award of attorney’s fees under section 57.105.

Kunsman v. Wall · filed 2013-04-10(4)

Further, in regard to section 57.105 fees, Wall failed to provide Kunsman with twenty-one days notice as required by section 57.105(4), Florida Statutes. Therefore, we strike the award of attorney’s fees.

A subsequent or amended sanctions motion that raises a new ground must independently satisfy the twenty-one-day safe harbor requirement.

Lago v. Kame By Design, LLC · filed 2013-08-07(4)

We hold that if a party files a subsequent or amended motion for sanctions under section 57.105 and raises an argument that was not raised in the original motion for section 57.105 sanctions, the subsequent motion must independently comply with the twenty-one-day “safe harbor” provision of section 57.105(4).

Section 57.105(4) does not require a separate sanctions motion for fees incurred defending an earlier sanctions motion against exceptions inextricably intertwined with it.

Lopez v. Department of Revenue · filed 2015-09-30(4)

Because DOR’s Exceptions were inextricably intertwined with Lopez’s 57.105 Motion, it was not necessary for Lopez to serve and file a separate 57.105 motion in order to obtain fees in defending the general magistrate’s Report and Recommendations on the exact same 57.105 Motion Lopez had previously served and filed.

A party seeking appellate fees as a sanction under section 57.105 must follow rule 9.410(b)’s safe harbor procedure.

Jarrette Bay Investments Corp. v. BankUnited, N.A. · filed 2016-11-30(4)

According to the plain language of rule 9.410(b), parties seeking appellate fees as a sanction pursuant to section 57.105 are required to proceed pursuant to rule 9.410(b), not rule 9.400(b).

Section 57.105(4) requires a party to wait twenty-one days after serving a sanctions motion before filing it, allowing the challenged document to be corrected or withdrawn.

Estimable v. Prophete · filed 2017-06-07(4)

Here, the father’s motion for sanctions complied with the twenty-one-day “safe harbor” provision as the father’s notice was sent on July 21, 2015, and the sanctions motion was filed thirty-five days later on August 25, 2015.

A party seeking fees under section 57.105 must comply with subsection (4)'s 21-day safe harbor; asking the court to act on its own initiative does not make the request court-initiated.

FLORIDA HOMEOWNER EQUITY AND LOST PROPERTY, LLC v. FAIRCHILD and U. S. BANK, N. A. · filed 2024-12-13(4)

Where it is a party moving for fees, the party's motion "must be served but may not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion, the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected." § 57.105(4). There is no question that Mr. Passer did not comply with section 57.105(4). ... Further, the record does not support that the trial court awarded fees on its own initiative.

Section 57.105 supplements other available sanctions and does not displace a court’s inherent authority to award fees for an attorney’s bad-faith conduct.

Rosenberg v. GABALLA · filed 2009-01-21(4)

Rosenberg argues that when section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1999), was amended, it rendered obsolete the “inequitable conduct doctrine” of Moakley which permits a trial court to use its “inherent authority to impose attorneys’ fees against an attorney for bad faith conduct.” Moakley, 826 So.2d at 226. We disagree. ... Subsection (4) of the statute provides: “The provisions of this section are supplemental to other sanctions or remedies available under law or under court rules.” § 57.105(4), Fla. Stat. (1999).

Section 57.105(1) permits a court to impose a fee sanction on its own initiative without the twenty-one-day notice required for a party’s sanctions motion.

Koch v. Koch · filed 2010-09-22(1)

However, this argument cannot defeat a court-imposed fee sanction under section 57.105(1) because the twenty-one-day notice provision simply does not apply to a court-imposed fee sanction.

A court acting in its appellate capacity must give the notice required by rule 9.410(a) before awarding attorneys’ fees on its own initiative as a sanction under section 57.105.

United Automobile Insurance Co. v. Doctor Rehab Center, Inc. · filed 2013-08-28

The circuit court was acting in its appellate capacity; therefore a sua sponte award of attorneys’ fees as a sanction under section 57.105 must comport with the notice requirement of rule 9.410(a).

Section 57.105(1) permits an appellate court to award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs on its own motion, with the trial court determining the amount after a hearing.

Sherron v. CTX Mortgage Co. · filed 2014-12-12(1)

This court, sua sponte, orders Sherron to pay reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred by Appellees in this appeal, pursuant to section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes. The trial court is to determine the amount of fees after a hearing.

Section 57.105(1) permits a court to award fees on its own initiative despite a party’s defective sanctions motion, if the record shows the court did not simply adopt that motion.

Laura M. Watson, Stephen Rakusin, and the Rakusin Law Firm v. Stewart Tilghman Fox & Bianchi, P.A., William C. Hearon, P · filed 2016-06-29(1)

In examining these cases together, we now expressly hold that a trial court does not abuse its discretion in ordering a party to pay attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105(1) on its own initiative, even if a motion is filed by a party and the moving party fails to comply with the safe harbor requirements of the rule, as long as it can be determined from the record that the trial court is not simply adopting the moving party’s motion.

Section 57.105 permits sanctions on a court’s initiative or a party’s motion and does not contemplate enforcement by the Attorney General.

Gustino v. Stoneybrook West Master Association, Inc. · filed 2021-01-04(1)

Section 57.105 doesn’t “contemplate enforcement by the Attorney General,” which “counts heavily against [Gustino’s] traceability argument.” ... Rather, the law allows for sanctions only “[u]pon the court’s initiative ... or motion of any party,” Fla. Stat. § 57.105(1), and the Attorney General was not a party to Gustino’s breach of contract claim against the association.

A motion for attorney’s fees under section 57.105 is defensive in nature and does not waive an objection to personal jurisdiction.

Two Worlds United v. Zylstra · filed 2010-11-05

A motion for attorney’s fees under section 57.105 does not waive the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction.

Section 57.105 does not permit an award of costs on a sanctions motion.

Santini v. Cleveland Clinic Florida · filed 2011-05-11

The trial court also erred when it awarded costs against McCoy under the section 57.105 motion which is not permitted by the statute.

Section 57.105 does not authorize an award of costs.

Jackmore v. In Re: Estate of William Jackmore, etc. · filed 2014-07-30

An award of costs is not authorized under section 57.105.

Section 57.105(1) does not authorize an award of costs.

Heldt-Pope v. Thibault · filed 2015-11-13(1)

However, section 57.105(1) does not provide for the award of costs.

Section 57.105 does not provide a mechanism for recovering costs.

Grand Reserve at Tampa Condominium Association, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA · filed 2016-01-29

Upon concession of error by Appellee, we reverse the imposition of costs the circuit court awarded under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2014), as this statute "does not provide a mechanism for recovering costs."

Section 57.105(1) authorizes attorney's fees as a sanction but does not authorize costs, including expert witness fees.

Lana v. Assimakopoulous-Panuthos · filed 2017-06-23(1)

Here again, as noted above, section 57.105(1) provides only for an award of attorney's fees—not costs.

Section 57.105(1) permits attorney's fees as sanctions but does not permit costs, including expert witness fees.

Lana v. Assimakopoulos-Panuthos · filed 2017-10-20(1)

Instead, we follow the plain language of section 57.105(1), as well as our own prior binding decisions in Heldt-Pope and Siegel, and hold that the award of expert witness fees as a cost under section 57.105(1) was improper.

Section 57.105(3) permits damages caused by improper litigation delay, with payment into the court registry pending a decision on how the funds should be used.

Korte v. US BANK NAT. ASS'N · filed 2011-06-08(3)

The trial court, however, avoided this potential windfall by requiring that the "delay damage" amount be paid into the court's registry pending further order of the trial court. ... In summary, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting U.S. Bank's motion for attorney's fees and delay damages under section 57.105(1)(a) and (3). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order requiring Korte to pay $18,682.99 into the court registry as damages to U.S. Bank caused by Korte's improper delay of the foreclosure proceedings.

Section 57.105(3) permits damages for losses caused by knowingly unsupported defenses asserted to delay a foreclosure action.

Korte v. U.S. Bank National Ass'n · filed 2011-06-08(3)

Here, we affirm that section 57.105 is applicable in mortgage foreclosure actions to sanction defendants and/or their counsel for asserting defenses which they know or should know are not supported by the material facts of the case, but are nonetheless asserted for the primary purpose of delaying the entry of a final judgment. Furthermore, those who assert such knowingly unsupportable defenses may find themselves liable not just for a portion of the opposing party’s attorney’s fees, but also for other losses that a trial court finds resulted from the improper delay.

Section 57.105(7) makes contractual attorney’s fee provisions reciprocal, but its fee entitlement cannot be enforced against the United States absent a waiver of sovereign immunity.

United States ex rel. Rural Development v. Wonders · filed 2012-04-18(7)

After prevailing in the action, Ms. Wonders filed a motion for attorney’s fees, relying on the attorney’s fee provision in the promissory note and the language in section 57.105(7), Florida Statutes (2008), which makes such clauses reciprocal. ... The law is clear that even when the United States initiates litigation in a state court in a context such as this, state laws providing for attorney’s fees against the losing party cannot be enforced against the United States.

Section 57.105 cannot support a fee award when the opposing party was never served with a motion under the statute.

Anderson v. McDonough · filed 2016-04-08

However, the Estate does not properly invoke section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2011); Anderson was never served with a motion under the statute.

A section 57.105(4) sanctions motion must be served in strict compliance with Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516.

Goersch v. City of Satellite Beach · filed 2018-07-16(4)

We affirm and hold that a section 57.105 motion must be served in strict compliance with rule 2.516.

Section 57.105(4) requires a safe harbor motion to be served before filing, but that service need not be by email under rule 2.516(b)(1).

Isla Blue Development, LLC v. Moore · filed 2017-06-14(4)

And the specific language of section 57.105(4) states that the motion which provides the required twenty-one-day safe harbor notice "must be served but may not be filed with or presented to the court." Accordingly, such a motion is only served on the opposing party but is not filed with the court, unlike the documents addressed in rule 2.516(a). Therefore, we conclude that the email service requirements of rule 2.516(b)(1) do not apply to such a motion.

Section 57.105(4) safe harbor motions are not subject to the email service requirements of rule 2.516(b)(1).

MICHAEL J. DENINO & VINCENZA ABBATE - DENINO v. ABBATE · filed 2018-05-04(4)

Relying in part on this court's decision in Boatright, 218 So. 3d at 967, this court held in Isla Blue Development, 223 So. 3d at 1099, "that the email service requirements of rule 2.516(b)(1) do not apply" to a motion filed as part of the section 57.105(4) safe harbor notice. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order denying sanctions and remand for further proceedings for the trial court to determine whether the Appellants are able to establish a legal entitlement for fees against any party and, if so, to hold an appropriate evidentiary hearing to establish the amount and liability for such an award.

Section 57.105 safe harbor notices need not comply with rule 2.516’s e-mail service requirements.

LAW OFFICES OF FRED C. COHEN, P.A. v. H.E.C. CLEANING, LLC. · filed 2020-02-05(4)

Based on the foregoing, we recede from Matte and Estimable, and instead hold that rule 2.516’s e-mail service requirements do not apply to service of a section 57.105 safe harbor notice.

A section 57.105 safe harbor notice need not comply with rule 2.516’s e-mail service requirements.

SAFEPOINT INSURANCE COMPANY v. ELENA GINSBURG and MICHAEL GINSBURG · filed 2021-01-20

Based on Wheaton’s reasoning, in Law Offices of Fred C. Cohen, P.A. v. H.E.C. Cleaning, LLC, 290 So. 3d 76, 77 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020), we receded from Matte and instead held “that rule 2.516’s e-mail service requirements do not apply to service of a section 57.105 safe harbor notice.” Accordingly, pursuant to Wheaton and Law Offices of Fred C. Cohen, P.A., we reverse the order on review and remand for further proceedings.

Section 57.105(4) requires a party seeking sanctions to serve its motion at least twenty-one days before filing it and give the opposing party an opportunity to withdraw the challenged filing or contention.

STEPHAN JAY LAWRENCE v. MARINA TOWER OF TURNBERRY ISLE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., etc. · filed 2021-06-16(4)

There is no indication from the scant record before us that Gibraltor complied with the “safe harbor” requisites of section 57.105 of the Florida Statutes.

Section 57.105(1) does not authorize fees for bad faith opening statements without a meritless filing, and a fee award under it requires compliance with subsection (4)’s notice procedure.

PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC. v. BARBARA COHEN, as Personal representative of the ESTATE OF RITA SHIFRIN · filed 2022-06-08(1), (4)

The instant case did not involve a meritless filing, but rather bad faith statements by Philip Morris in opening. ... Here, there was no motion for sanctions under section 57.105(4) and no way for Philip Morris to “withdraw[] or appropriately correct[]” statements made in opening.

Section 57.105 permits fees against counsel who joins after a sanctions motion when counsel is on notice of that motion and is named in and served with the fee motion.

LAWRENCE J. SHAPIRO, ESQ. v. WPLG, LLC · filed 2023-05-17(4)

In the present case, Shapiro came into the case afterward. Therefore, Shapiro was on notice of the motions for sanctions and was later named in and served with the motion for attorney’s fees.

A party seeking section 57.105 fees against an attorney must comply with the safe harbor provision before asking the court to award fees against that attorney.

FANTAUZZI v. JAMES C. DAY AND JOHN P. FLECK · filed 2024-04-03(4)

Further, nothing in our record shows that Fleck complied with the safe harbor provision mandated by section 57.105(4) prior to asking the trial court to award fees against Fantauzzi.

Section 57.105(3) bars an attorney's fee award when the losing party makes a good-faith argument to change existing law with a reasonable expectation of success.

B.W.P. v. A.L.H. · filed 2015-01-23(3)

As recognized by the Fourth District, attorney's fees should not be awarded pursuant to section 57.105 when the losing party attempted in good faith to advance a novel question of law.

Section 57.105(3) bars a fee award when a claim was presented in good faith to seek a change in the law with a reasonable expectation of success.

B.W.P. v. A.L.H. · filed 2015-01-23(3)

Section 57.105(3) states that notwithstanding whether an action is not supported by the facts or the application of then-existing law, fees may not be awarded if the claim “was initially presented to the court as a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law, as it applied to the material facts, with a reasonable expectation of success.”

Section 57.105(3)(a) bars monetary sanctions under paragraph (1)(b) when a claim presents a good faith argument to establish new law with a reasonable expectation of success.

Melissa McCullough, individually, and McCullough Law Group, P.A. v. Kelly Kubiak, individually, and Merlin Law Group, P. · filed 2015-02-18(3)(a)

Here, we conclude that the plaintiffs’ claim was presented as a good faith argument for the establishment of new law, with a reasonable expectation of success.

Section 57.105 does not permit sanctions merely because an argument fails when it was made in good faith to extend existing law.

Key Biscayne Gateway Partners, Ltd. v. Village Council for the Village of Key Biscayne · filed 2018-02-21(3)(a)

That Gateway’s argument did not succeed does not of itself demonstrate the level of frivolousness or lack of good faith demanded by section 57.105.

Section 57.105(3)(a)’s good faith argument exception applies only to sanctions sought under subsection (1)(b).

AT&T MOBILITY LLC v. RIGNEY · filed 2023-09-06(3)(a)

Section 57.105(3)(a)’s plain language states that its prohibition applies to a motion seeking monetary sanctions only “[u]nder paragraph(1)(b).” Id.

Section 57.105 permits a reasonable attorney’s fee award without limiting it to the discounted rate the prevailing party agreed to pay its attorney.

Hatcher v. Roberts · filed 1989-02-10

In our judgment, an appellant, who is sanctioned for pursuing a frivolous appeal, should not be allowed to benefit from this contractual arrangement, and in fact, the trial court’s order evidences agreement with that principle.